G.R. No.

198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from
the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of

Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment
of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended
to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention
to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents
of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares,
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute
fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured
party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits,
after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad
in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was
filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange
their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6She heard the petitioner instructing
the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had
lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation
given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to
the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s
act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition
of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a
marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of
the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC
applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its
provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act
of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that
the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities
such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere
in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven
by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence,
the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to
the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony"
and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn,
was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 625 of
the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear
that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However,
as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails
to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony
of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and
convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses,
Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may
view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of
the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by
the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof
require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As
correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage
Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation
of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely
under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of
the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin
alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together
as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed
a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period
of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names
of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice
and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition
of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of
Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008,
and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to
present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued
for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued
to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial
court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage
but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support
for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she
named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that
Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were
owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as
advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase
"married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the
two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by
Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money,
property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner
of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium
units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No.
61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The
trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice
to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share
in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley
while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7,

1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further
declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT
Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos.
188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626,
194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637,
194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan,
Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go"
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words
"married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are
properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her
collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-
ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the
petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition
and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’ children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor
General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its
Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s
decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of
Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the
initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next
hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally
still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and
was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based
on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared
equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear
and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from
the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with
modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-
appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-
appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and
non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived
her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that
she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an
inviolable institution.

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right
but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence
was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July
2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all
made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court
warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses,
Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel
insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented,
disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could
not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the
postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit
the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was
deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s
continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed
her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case
because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the
trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of
failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to
ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the
parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to
Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab
initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have
proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to
consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was
"married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he
stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his
wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin
and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of
his children with Azucena.

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the
trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and
Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license
issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of
Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification
from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and
absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage
was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and
Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
"was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover
her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially
from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not
a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly
married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
"shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them
and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by
the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent
and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court
of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of
the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the
trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage
shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one
that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity
on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of
the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed
was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of
the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous
because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is
legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it
would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences
of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired
by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given
by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before
the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties
to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally."
The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married
to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either
or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal
to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., Petitioners, v. NORMA
BAYADOG, Respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void
for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.chanrobles.com : law library

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed
the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration
of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at
the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null and
void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after
it was dissolved due to their father’s death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
their father’s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family
Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner’s
averment that the allegations in the petition are ‘true and correct’." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the
petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution" 10 Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13

However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending
the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.chanrobles.com.ph:red

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized
by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity
— that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should
be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
17 The Civil Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 63: ". . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 17 provides in part: ". . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 18 reads in part: ". . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought
to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. . . ." chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence
of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with Respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife" .

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their father’s marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
"at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by
the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by
free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages
is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and Respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance
be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared
by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect
of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though
no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity
can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct
or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death
of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there
must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
said case is ordered REINSTATED.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC V DAYOT
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both
of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According
to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder
in Felisa's house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However,
Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who
had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them
to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table
at the sala of Felisa's house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his
marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.[7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose's version of the story
as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign
the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract.
[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by
[Felisa.]

[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged
Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa's] name in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he
is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa]
as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only
reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then.
This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he
would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable
Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through
fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's action had prescribed. It cited Article
87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance.
x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of
the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action
for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose's appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that
the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said
party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.[15]

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect
the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance
of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on
the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose's
argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that
either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer's
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code
which does not govern the parties' marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly,
it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity - meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity - that is unbroken. Otherwise,
if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based
on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception.
It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa's motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals'
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that
the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court's
Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the
interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS

MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR

LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.[25] She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case
for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa
surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court's ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic's position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties' marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose's notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa's name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District
24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said
barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa's name as his
wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.[30]
This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license
did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after
the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.[32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33]
(3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan
or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment
to the marriage.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending
a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.[36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."[37] One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where
the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39]
They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where a general rule is established
by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.[41]
For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced
to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Court's review.[47] It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties'
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation
of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent
and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must
be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which
is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose's subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisa's
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized
by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, isAFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD
A. TAMANO,Respondents.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage
laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13,
2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano
(Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife,
and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s
legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration
of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil
rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The
complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated
under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the
Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant
Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to
Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has
no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in
his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under
the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda
by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda
was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law
 as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant
Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law; 7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court
for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, 8 and again,
another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on February 20,
1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married
under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.

The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration
of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning
the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the
CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there
can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file
an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented
their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such
purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996,
suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on February
29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.18Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to
July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the
case for decision,23reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed,
on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No.
126603.24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the
reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration27 with finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned
judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared
Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under
Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.29 The court said:

A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of
the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the
late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of
the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not
an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the
subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer
after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry
her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly,
she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the
deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can
no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply
ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse
of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that
Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an
independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano
is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is
Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage
with Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional
errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the
existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 34 and Article
48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s judgment as the proceedings between
the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues
have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an
answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered
its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R.
No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of
the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.

The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity
to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her
marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36laid down the rule that the filing of a motion
to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial
court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in
the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the proceedings will be without
prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s
jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on
August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on
November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a
finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could
be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter
was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such
law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering
their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized
under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as
attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the
husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme
Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and stresses
that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for
certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen
says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that
obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal
standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning
that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda
and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

Issues

The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the latter was
rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the
Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has
not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor
did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and

3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage
declared void ab initio.

Our Ruling

Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her
pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss
before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before
the RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was
never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer
and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of
the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to
the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the
complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on
April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section
6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of
the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed
from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer
to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the
issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts.
In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case
because after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the
husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under
the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had
no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period
earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first
for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court.
However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari
does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of
the judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding
in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining order and only after
the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests
for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her
evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision
in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were
attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics
to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the
trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her
side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to
become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because
G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity
of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine
whether there is collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt of the
court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a
report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the
parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his
report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within
ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and
if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required
report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor
Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there
could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not
the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack
of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason
v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in
the trial court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."
But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively,
unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.
Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions
applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law,
specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s
enactment.54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with
non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses
register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as
one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and
Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of
Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of
nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing
of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from
filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the
husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages
and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have
a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly
precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one
in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file
an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under
the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003.58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in November
1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply,
Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of
them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a
way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages.
We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September
13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015

LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY

MACARAIG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA,
SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.

DECISION
 CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision dated 14 September 20112 and
Resolution dated 1 March 20133 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the Cadastral Survey
of Batangas plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445, L.R.C. Record No. N-22499. The
land, situated in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, contains an area of 484 square meters under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24660.4 The land was previously owned by spouses
Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa (Spouses Manuel) under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-2840.

On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pallocan
West, Batangas City, Branch 4, a Complaint5 for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with
Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and
Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana).

In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived
together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they
separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca had eight children.

Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,6 he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter residential
land for a consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale7 from the Spouses Manuel. The
sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra
Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy."

On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute

Sale,8 another residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land from the spouses Felix
Contreras and Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras). The second purchase consisted of
215 square meters, as declared under Tax Declaration No. 61724, for a consideration of P700.
Thereafter, a split level house with a floor area of 208.50 square meters was constructed on the
484 square meter land.

Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false and
simulated Deed of Sale9 dated 18 April 1979 on the 484 square meter land, together with the
house erected thereon, for a consideration of P80,000 in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.

Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest, and ownership; (2) that
defendants be directed to pay, jointly and severally, to Uy the amounts of P100,000 as moral
damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees, P2,000 as expenses incident to litigation, plus costs of
suit; (3) upon declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, the Register of Deeds of Batangas
City and the City Assessor be directed to register Uy as the sole owner of the real properties; (4)
if defendant Spouses Lacsamana are found by the court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be
ordered to turn over to Uy the entire proceeds of sale of the properties and be adjudged to pay
the damages; and (5) that the sum of P600,000 taken by Rosca from Uy be collated into the
mass of the conjugal partnership properties.

In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and
claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her paraphernal funds.
Rosca added that she was never married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit. In her Counterclaim, Rosca prayed that the court award her (1) P200,000 as moral
damages; (2) P100,000 as exemplary damages; (3) P12,000 as attorney's fees; (4) P3,000 as
incidental litigation expenses; and (5) costs of suit. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer
with Counterclaim dated 21 May 1979 claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value
and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject
property.

In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter,
on consulta,10 with the Land Registration Commission (LRC) because of an affidavit
subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others, that the property was
conjugal in nature and sold without his marital consent.

In a Resolution11 dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of registration stating that
since the property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such circumstance indicated
that the property belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal property. The LRC added that litigious
matters, such as a protest from the other party based on justifiable and legal grounds, were to
be decided not by the Register of Deeds but by a court of competent jurisdiction. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, this Commission is of the opinion that the subject document should be admitted
for registration.

SO ORDERED.12

On 18 February 1981, Uy died.13 His two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy
Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Fifteen years later or on 10 May 1996, Rosca
also died.14 Earlier, respondent Jose Lacsamana died on 20 March 1991.15redarclaw

Meanwhile, on 24 December 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena
(Buena) through a Deed of Absolute Sale.16 Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana
were substituted by Buena as respondent in this case.

During the trial, Uy presented the testimonies of his two daughters, Lydia and Shirley, as his
own witnesses, as well as Rosca, as an adverse witness.

Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by Uy and Rosca.
She alleged that the house existed until it was demolished by Buena's agent sometime in 2006.
Lydia also stated that the funds used to construct the family dwelling came from Uy's business.
Shirley corroborated the testimony of Lydia on all material points.

Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy
cohabited and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their marital union with a
marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings
which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage
contract.

Rosca stated that on 29 January 1964, she alone purchased, as sole vendee, with money
coming from her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land covered by OCT No. 0-2840
and owned by Spouses Manuel. Thereafter, on 15 June 1964, she again purchased, using her
own personal and paraphernal funds, the land adjacent to the first purchased property owned by
Spouses Contreras and covered by Tax Declaration No. 61724. Immediately after, she caused
the construction of a split level house on the land using her own paraphernal funds which
became their family dwelling.

Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her which led to
their physical separation before the year 1973. On 17 September 1976, Rosca obtained a real
estate loan in the amount of P50,000 from Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) using the
house and lot as collateral. In support of this loan, Rosca executed an Affidavit of
Ownership17 dated 27 September 1976, stating that (1) she was the lawful and sole owner of
the 484 square meter land, together with the building erected thereon, and (2) the land was
registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No.
T-24660 was merely a description of her status.

Defendants offered the testimony of Rosca, Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr., Rosaura Mendoza, and
Buena.

Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr. testified that Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale
before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the
matter on consulta with the LRC, which issued a Resolution dated 7 November 1979
recognizing Rosca as the sole registered owner of the property.

Rosaura Mendoza testified that she and her husband purchased, in the amount of P80,000, the
484 square meter property of Rosca on 18 April 1979 through a Deed of Absolute Sale of
House and Lot.18 The Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-24660 and
issued TCT No. T-3519 in favor of the spouses. Then, Spouses Lacsamana mortgaged the
property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment of the mortgage debt on 15 April 1982, PBC
issued a Release of Real Estate Mortgage.

Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-35 from Spouses
Lacsamana on 24 December 1982 for a consideration of P80,000. Consequently, the Registry
of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-35 and issued TCT No. T-324420 in her name.
Likewise, the Assessor's Office of Batangas City issued Tax Declaration No. 90210.21redarclaw

Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that Buena entered the property
and caused the construction of structures without any court order. Consequently, the RTC
issued an Order dated 21 September 2007 granting the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the
case was submitted for resolution.

In a Decision22 dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents. The
lower court found that (1) there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca; (2) the Deed of
Sale executed by Rosca over the house and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana was valid; and
(3) both parties were not entitled to their respective claims for damages. The dispositive portion
of the Decision states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint filed by plaintiff Uy is hereby
DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction and bond are cancelled and are rendered of no force
and effect. The claims for damages of both parties are hereby DENIED. Cost against both
parties.
SO ORDERED.23

Uy filed an appeal24 with the CA. In a Decision25 dated 14 September 2011, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. The appellate court found that respondents were able to overthrow the
presumption of marriage and that the subject property was Rosca's paraphernal property. The
appellate court also upheld the validity of the sale. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 21, 2009 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.26

Uy then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution27 dated 1 March 2013.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The main issue for our resolution is whether the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979, executed by
Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or
fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Uy states that no proof was presented by
Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the
property. Uy also insists that he did not give his consent to the sale which prejudiced his rights
and interest. Uy argues that Rosca did not give physical possession of the house and lot to the
alleged buyers. Further, Uy adds, without admitting that the sale is valid, that the consideration
paid was unreasonably low and unconscionable such that it constitutes an equitable mortgage.
Uy insists that Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered buyers in good faith.

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely on the re-examination
and re-evaluation of the evidence of the parties which had previously been passed upon
exhaustively by both the trial and appellate courts. Respondents added that only questions of
law may be raised under Rule 45. Since the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts were
supported by substantial evidence and none of the recognized exceptions allowing this Court to
exercise its power to review is present, then the petition should be dismissed.

We agree with respondents.

The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial and appellate courts. We
find no reason to disturb their factual findings. In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of
appeal under Rule 45, like in the present case, a petitioner can raise only questions of law.
Here, Uy would like us to review again the factual circumstances surrounding the Deed of Sale
executed by Rosca with the Spouses Lacsamana and to declare the Deed of Sale invalid for
being simulated due to lack of consideration and consent. Clearly, these are questions of fact
which are within the purview of the trial and appellate courts to determine. Also, the issues
raised do not come within the purview of the recognized exceptions28 for this Court to take
cognizance of the case. We have reiterated time and again that this Court is not the proper
venue to consider factual issues as it is not a trier of facts.

Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in
our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage."29Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage.30 However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other
evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias,31 we held
that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage,
as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,32 we held that the
best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or
the Marriage Law of 1929,33 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114,34 which is applicable
to the present case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the
marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband
and wife, must be furnished by the person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the
contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary
of the municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the marriage contract,
the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the solemnization of the
marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official,
priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage.

Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have
sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where
the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a
single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents
Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other. The pertinent
portions of the RTC Decision state:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which plaintiff Uy

anchored his allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of
evidence showing that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca were never actually married to each
other, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the fifth paragraph of
his Petition, to quote: "I am married (not legally)."

Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of Batangas
executed in support of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization categorically states, in Nos. 2
and 4 thereof, that plaintiff Uy was married (not legally).
Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October 1951, plaintiff Uy
also known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as "single" when filling up
his civil status therein.

Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff Uy was an alien
duly registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and that his civil status was
single.

Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas, establishes in Nos. 2
and 4 thereof that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to defendant Rosca.

Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that plaintiff Uy was not
legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.

For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage certificate by
presenting public documents, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee alias Luis G.
Uy, to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines";

Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca and
the descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was legitimate;

Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by defendant
Rosca, stating that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their children;

Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July 1985 wherein she
admitted being the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca admitting she
is the widow of plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified by Rosca;

Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant Rosca

admitting her status as married;

to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy presented
defendant Rosca as an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her the fact of his marriage
with the latter. However, this presumption had been debunked by plaintiff Uy's own evidence
and most importantly, by the more superior evidence presented by the defendants.

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant
Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their
marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage
sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then
became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It
became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were
legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.35
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property
relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple
living together were not incapacitated from getting married. Article 147
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.

The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned
unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that
Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.

First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No. 1194, Rosca
was recognized as the sole registered owner of the property.36redarclaw

Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel and Rosca
covering the 484 square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca's purchase of the
land as evidenced by his signature under "signed in the presence of."37 This could only mean
that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of Rosca's ownership over the property.

Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca in support of
her real estate loan application with PBC in the amount of P5 0,000, Rosca stated that she was
the sole and lawful owner of the subject property and that the land was registered under her
name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely
a description of her status.38redarclaw

Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" was notice to
the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such belonged to Rosca as her
paraphernal property.39 The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the
time the property was registered in her name.40 Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title
to the property should have been in the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca.41redarclaw

In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,42 the property subject of the mortgage was registered in the name
of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." This Court ruled that the
title is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her
husband is also a registered owner.

Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the
presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in
equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had
every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent.

Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or
fictitious for lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was presented by Spouses
Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property or
even if there was consideration, such was unreasonably low and unconscionable. Thus,
Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered as buyers in good faith.

We disagree.

Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any consideration for the sale.
Neither did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, showing the fair
market value of the property at the time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was
unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even mentioned by the appellate court that
"appellants failed to prove that on April 18, 1979, the property might have been worth millions of
pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient substantiation.

Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are binding on this
Court when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the
evidence all over again since payment of the purchase price and the consideration for the sale
are factual issues which cannot be raised in this petition.

In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal property in favor
of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011 and
Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
 DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial
court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-
1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While
in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990
at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at

the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
 On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage
to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled
that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which
held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or
both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed
to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the
law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not
acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised
Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not
a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio,
then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he
cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE

RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE

RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF
THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if
so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage
openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant
case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code,
is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a
second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all
the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration
of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the

annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again
six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared
to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot
be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the
appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with
moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second
marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San
Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live
apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA
from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance
of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same
date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until
1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to
be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in
the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was
issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated
that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a
portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against
the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their
joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties
upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in
the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to
her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z.
Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that
SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be
partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of
SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject
properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the
suit to SOLEDAD.3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,4 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR
of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100)
SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his
sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium
 unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate
arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA.6

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE

TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND
LACHES; and
 IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF
PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF
PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is
not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:

(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE
METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and
sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should
be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
 Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.13

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable;
hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic
court’s approval of the Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit;
and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books.14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to
the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia)
had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into
by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the
Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by
virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such,
the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe
marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity
of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement)
that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then
in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the
event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage.
Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order. (1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

xxxx

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply.
The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as
an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action
for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being
contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also
legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of
gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before

the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of
its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the
Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation
that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the
parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not
evidence.26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase
of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of
₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof
of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to
make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his
own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under
Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not
readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if
the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other
(for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership
or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption
of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares
were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while
conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA
355, thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to

prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish
that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court,
viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued
on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement,
Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89,
Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the
loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated
May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for
₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered
by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection
was simply not established. x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole
industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as
vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty.
Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were
loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid
for them fully or partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN
LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
"married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather
than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and
undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her
burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not serve
the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds
and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained
to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership
of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks
pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having
an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition
for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by
a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she
be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of
the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her
to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée
in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family
laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to
its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a
foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse]
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the pcorolicy against absolute divorces cannot
be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves
as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or
her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
 (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe
a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in
an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency
of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome
a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must
be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;
 (h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The
law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as
yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted
totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented
by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition,
as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series
of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others,
that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be
made parties to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met
in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election
of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would
be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is
not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared
a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act
No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty
on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final
decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry
relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate
Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to
object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he
"is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a
ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the
Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case
be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki,
as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of
bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one
in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil
status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared
that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

 (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan,
the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that
"[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced
back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against
a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the
judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited
review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on
grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency
and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or
a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest
in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to
the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to
sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in
the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the
purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which
is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his
or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying
a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen,
whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino
spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent
that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him
or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to
the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right
between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive
and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry.
The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise,
there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment
and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice
to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO.
2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce
Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the
notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of
general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary
evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and
issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x
x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately
from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall
not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related
to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita,
et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo
as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate
court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to
this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino
was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26. 18 This
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations
of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment
is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem
of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized
American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by
the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining
a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically,
Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the
Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order
that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her
maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation,respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their
minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the
Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial
court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce
decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved
to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was
denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by
the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce
on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue
of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime
of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce,
which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court
agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing
the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject
to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan,
bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the
framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent
in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We
put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there
should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow
the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render
it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration,
and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort
should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected
by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only
if they are constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental
right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these
violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since
it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right
to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to
vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale
rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public
right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to
take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married
to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they
should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt,
there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems
and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has
to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or
her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them
are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based
merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his
or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36,
37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should
be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should
be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case
as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All
to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos
to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying
foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction.
Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and
overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced
in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of
a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively
more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end
of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision
to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support
a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to
be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce.
But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of
the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an
extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to
have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino
citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society
to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.)
Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of
these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage
in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee
on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading
- with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree
of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended,
as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or

political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of

a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

 g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's
spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a
child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after
being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of
a petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1)
year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree
of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18)
years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without
the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over
the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband
and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and
such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition
for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex
to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of
the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and
traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely
believes that they are good for country.77While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil
and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of
any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To
Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss
to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize,
if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person
Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every
human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered
as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has
to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage
under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement
of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and
self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that
some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from
the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San
Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What
we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts
are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient
of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute
may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to
cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal
of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of
Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's
judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise
d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese
laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018

STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former Decision dated November 25, 2015,
which in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet,
Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan
pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a
divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner
filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the
petition and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine
Laws.3 On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled
and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following
requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein was
consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since
petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized
in the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies
of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause.6

On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE
SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE
THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE
HUSBAND.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE
OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.7
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as Divorce by
Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of
divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized
and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for her to avail of the benefit under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted
abroad.8 Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does
not prevent the application of Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent
of the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no longer finds application. In support
of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein
the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the event that he or she is divorced
by a Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship.9 As to the issue of evidence presented,
petitioner explains that the reason why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the
provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable to go to Japan
due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a copy of the same
for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code.
There, she was issued a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do
not issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese
Law due to the potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that
this constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence.10

We grant the petition.

The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v. Manalo,11 the
facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo,
a Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case
for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce
decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the
Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro
Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to
remarry. The trial court, however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country.

On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the
ruling of the CA. There, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the application nor
remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that
"where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that
to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by
the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is,
specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore, should not make a
distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. 12

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite
the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed
that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been
dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu
to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our
courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and again, the
Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. 13 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself.14 Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 2415 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office.17

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce
decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent
Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.