Chennai - 020
General Considerations
Whereas law as a means of governance of human communities
dates back to at least 3000 BCE in ancient Egypt, sustained and
systematic philosophical reflection on its nature for which there is
surviving evidence began only in the late 5th century BCE in ancient
Greeceand nearby areas of the Mediterranean, not long after the birth
of Western philosophy itself. From that point onward, a more or less
continuous history of such reflection can be traced up to the present
day. As is true with the history of philosophy more generally, one
can observe over the centuries changes not only in the theories set
forth but also in the central questions about law that such theories
were meant to answer.
Although every philosophical theory is in part a product of the
time, place, and culture in which it is developed, the philosophy of
law is parochial in an additional sense. Philosophical speculation
about the nature of law not only is very often shaped by the politics
of the time and place of a given theorist but is also carried on with a
specific sort of legal system and legal culture in view. The latter fact
is important, as the kinds of legal systems in Europe and the
Anglophone world have varied widely through the last several
millennia. Although the shape and structure of those systems cannot
be discussed in any detail here, it should nonetheless be noted that
a robust understanding of each of the major theories and texts in the
history of philosophy of law requires some acquaintance with the
legal systems of the cities and states in which a given theory was
developed. For example, the centrepiece of the legal system of
Aristotle’s Athens was a representative legislative body,
the Ecclesia, in which a wide variety of political disputes were
debated and addressed by statute, while its court system was, though
important, very rudimentary by modern standards (it was governed
by largely customary procedural rules and administered by ordinary
citizens, as there were no judges, lawyers, or other legal
professionals during that period). As a result, Aristotle theorized
about law primarily on the model of general rules of action enacted
by legislation and revisable by direct vote or other plebiscitary
means. To take a different example, starting in the 17th century
many British (and later other Anglophone) philosophers of law
argued for the central importance of judicial institutions for the very
existence of a legal system and debated the idea of legal reasoning as
a distinct sort of deliberative activity. More recently, increasing
attention has been paid to the related question of how the language
of the law is to be correctly interpreted. Some theorists, beginning in
the early 20th century, even found it fruitful to think about the nature
of law primarily from the point of view of legal professionals such
as judges or lawyers. That development is surely to be at least partly
explained by the fact that those theorists reflected on law almost
exclusively within advanced common law systems—i.e., those legal
systems found throughout the Anglophone world (and now beyond)
in which specially trained lawyers argue on behalf of the interests of
clients in court and elsewhere and in which judges often play a
quasi-legislative role in fashioning legal rules in the form of
precedents, which are binding on later courts for the purposes of
deciding future cases.
Ancient Greece
The abstract concept of law is acknowledged, though not
discussed, in the poems of Homer and Hesiod in the 8th–7th
century BCE. In the Greek histories and literature of the 6th and 5th
centuries BCE, however, one finds the first articulation of ideas
about law that have had enduring influence in the West: that law is a
kind of command or prohibition with regard to what its subjects
ought to do and that law is often accompanied by at least the threat
of punishment or coercion by the state. Herodotus (born about
484 BCE), in his History of the Greco-Persian Wars, records
a Spartan king remarking to the king of Persiathat the Greeks “are
free, yet not wholly free; law is their master, whom they fear much
more than your men fear you. They do whatever it bids.” The
historian Xenophon (c. 430–c.350 BCE) relates in his Memorabilia a
likely apocryphal conversation between a young Alcibiades and his
guardian, the great Athenian statesman Pericles, in which the latter
declares that “whatever the sovereign power of the state, having
deliberated, enacts and directs to be done is known as law” and
denies that mere compulsion exerted by a tyrant is sufficient to
qualify as law. The great dramatist Sophocles, in his
tragedy Antigone, first made salient the important idea that the
requirements of law and morality may conflict. In the play, King
Creon orders the body of Antigone’s brother to remain unburied as a
posthumous punishment for treason. Out of familial duty, Antigone
flouts the order and buries the body, thereby herself risking
punishment by death. She rejects the king’s legal authority, saying
that even he “could not override the unwritten and unfailing laws
given us by the gods.”
But it is Plato (428/427–348/347 BCE), writing during the
decline of the Athenian empire, who was the first to advance
philosophical claims about the nature of law. The relevant Greek
term, nomos, varied widely in meaning across contexts, often
referring simply to convention or practice. But by Plato’s time it had
acquired the more-specific sense of a statute or a proclaimed or
written directive that established a standard for human action. In
his dialogue Crito, Plato fictionally cast his teacher, Socrates,
imprisoned and sentenced to death (for impiety and corrupting the
young), as faced with a choice between accepting the death
penalty and escaping, thereby disobeying the law. In the dialogue
Socrates makes the provocative argument, on behalf of the laws of
Athens, that since he has received the benefits and protections of
living under law for his entire life and has never left the city out of
protest, he is obligated either to obey its laws or to persuade the state
that they should not be enforced against him. Since he has failed (at
his trial) in the latter task, he must respect the laws by obeying their
commands, regardless of their content.
Aristotle was also the first to articulate what has come to be
known as the ideal of the rule of law. He shared the common Greek
view that, as a general principle, law had a share in eternal divine
wisdom. As such, it was an instrument by which to constrain the
exercise of political power, particularly that of tyrants, whose
policies represented only their own interests and not the good of the
community. On the (even by then) age-old debate as to whether the
best law or the best person should rule a city, Aristotle’s position
was clear: “He who asks law to rule is asking God and intelligence
and no others to rule, while he who asks for the rule of a human
being is importing a wild beast too.…Law is intelligence without
appetite.”
Rome And The Middle Ages
Although many aspects of ancient Greek culture had
continuing influence throughout the Roman Empire from the 1st
century BCE onward, law was not one of them. The Romans
established new legal forms and institutions as well as the first legal
professionals and administrators. Roman jurists developed the
first form of what would later be called “legal science,” and a
new genre of legal writing was invented in service of this discipline,
in which jurists would collect and organize Roman law according to
complex taxonomies. This practice culminated in the Digest
(Digesta), assembled by the Byzantine emperor Justinian I (reigned
527–565 CE), a work that eventually served as the basis of many
modern legal systems of western Europe. But whereas Greek
law faded in influence, the Greek legacy in the philosophy of law
was to endure for several centuries, extending through the Middle
Ages, during which there were many refinements and extensions of
Greek themes and ideas, particularly within the Christian tradition.
The Roman jurist and philosopher Cicero (106–
43 BCE) articulated the first, and some would say
definitive, conception of what is called “natural law.” Although
Cicero was a legal practitioner and was versed in the positive
(human-enacted) law of the Roman state, he sought to situate it in
relation to what he considered objective moral truths, which he also
called “laws” (thus the tendency of many writers up to the present
day to refer to timeless moral truths as “natural law”).
The Early Modern Period (1600–1800) Command and common-
law theories of law
From the late European Renaissance to the end of the 18th
century, philosophical debates about the nature of law grew and
diversified considerably, involving theorists from England and
across continental Europe. There were two major thematic
developments during that period. First was the development of the
view, first articulated in ancient Greece and developed to some
extent by Aquinas, that law should be understood on the model of a
command, given by a superior to an inferior, the issuance of which
made certain actions obligatory for the rational addressee
(and putative subject). Second, starting in the 1620s, there emerged
in England an increasingly sophisticated defense of the idea that at
the foundation of law was custom, exemplified by the common
law of England. These “common law theorists” have had an
enduring impact on Western philosophy of law up to the present day.
The 19th Century
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is one of the great philosophers
of law in the Western tradition, but his legacy is unusual and is in
fact still developing. He remains one of the most analytically
rigorous and insightful philosophers ever to write about the nature of
law, but much of his writing was, upon his death, unpublished—and
indeed unread until the mid-20th century. A much-simplified version
of his philosophy of law was presented by the English jurist John
Austin (1790–1859), which in turn helped set the agenda for
important work in the 20th century.
Philosophy Of Law From The Early 20th Century
The 20th century was very much the century of legal
positivism: the two preeminent figures in the philosophy of law, the
Austrian-born jurist Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) and the English legal
theorist H.L.A. Hart (1907–92), both developed influential versions
of a positivist theory of the nature of law. Defenders of antipositivist
views, such as the American constitutional lawyer Ronald
Dworkin (1931–2013) and the Australian Thomist John Finnis,
developed their views by way of response, in particular to Hart. At
the same time, Hart’s most-prominent student and the most-
influential figure in late 20th-century philosophy of law, Joseph Raz,
worked within the positivist framework, developing distinctive
positions growing out of both Kelsen and Hart. During the same
period, there also emerged “realist” schools of legal philosophy—
one in Scandinavia and one in the United States—that were basically
positivist in orientation but were concerned with very different
philosophical (in the case of the Scandinavians) and practical (in the
case of the Americans) questions from those considered by Kelsen
and Hart.
Conclusion
Law, as a central feature of most developed human societies,
has been an object of philosophical reflection since the beginning
of Western philosophy in ancient Greece. In the 21st century, its
concerns continued to be shaped by the major figures of the modern
era—especially Hobbes, Bentham, Hart, and Kelsen—and the
schools of realist jurisprudence. Whether new paradigms in
legal philosophy will emerge, marking a break from the themes of
the modern era, will ultimately depend on how law and legal
institutions evolve in the future.
State Obligations
States have an obligation to protect environmental rights. This
involves ensuring the provision of the above rights as well as
the obligations:
• To require the prior assessment of the possible environmental
and human rights impacts of policies and projects.
• To ensure that they comply with their obligations to
indigenous peoples and members of traditional communities.
• To ensure the effective enforcement of their environmental
standards against public and private actors.
Private Sector Obligations
Business have a responsibility to respect environmental
rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the human
rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts
with which they are involved. This includes the obligations:
• To develop policies that respect environmental rights
• To undertake due dilligence processes to identify, prevent,
mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on
human rights
• To create processes to enable the remediation of any adverse
human rights impacts that they cause or to which they
contribute
Children's Rights and the Environment
No group is more vulnerable to environmental harm than
children. Air pollution, water pollution and exposure to toxic
substances, together with other types of environmental harm, cause
1.5 million deaths of children under the age of 5 every year, and
contribute to disease, disability and early mortality throughout their
life. In addition, climate change and the loss of biodiversity threaten
to cause long-term effects that will blight children’s lives for years to
come. Making matters worse, children are often not able to exercise
their rights, including their rights to information, participation and
access to effective remedies. States must do more to respect, protect
and fulfil the rights of children in relation to environmental harm.
To that end, the Special Rapporteur with the assistance of UN
Environment, Queen’s University Belfast, and Terre des Hommes,
have produced this child-friendly resource in all UN languages
which describes the effects of environmental harm on the rights of
children as well as human rights obligations relating to the
protection of children and future generations from environmental
harm.