THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
foreign countries and shall have the option to
• DEFINITION AND ELEMENT
Article 1, Montevideo Convention
The State as a person of international law should
possess the following qualifications:
(a) A permanent population;
(b) A defined territory;
(c) A government; and,
(d) Capacity to enter into relation with other
states. 

Province of North Cotabato v Republic
of the Philippines
The elements under the Montevideo Convention,
along with other factors that the Supreme Court
considered in declaring the MOA-AD
unconstitutional.
Under the MOA-AD:
People: …acknowledge the “birthright of all
Moros and all Indigenous people of Mindanao to
identify themselves and be accepted as
Bangsamoros.
Territory: …”the territory of the Bangsamoro
homeland… further describing “as the land mass
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial, and
alluvial domains”…. Significantly it indicated that
the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its internal water…
Government: …”Bangsamoro people are
acknowledged as having the right to self
governance, which right is said to be rooted on
ancestral territoriality/suzerain authority…
Capacity to enter into relation with other
states: …”the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with
establish trade missions in those countries.’’
• These considerations led the Supreme Court to
characterise the relationship between the RP
and BJE as “associative characterised with
shared authority and responsibility”:

—- stressing that in international practice, the
‘associated state’ arrangement has usually been
used as a transitional device of former colonies
on their way to full independence. 

International legal concepts consistent with
association under MOA-AD:

(1) BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and
trade relations with foreign countries;
(2) Commitment of the RP to ensure BJE’s
participation in meetings and events of
ASEAN and specialised UN agencies;
(3) Continuing responsibility of RP over external
defense; and
(4) BJE’s right to participate in Philippine official
missions.
• MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies
that the same is on its way to independence.
• TERRITORY
Components of territory:
(1) landmass otherwise known as terrestrial
domain;
(2) Inland and external waters, which makes up
the maritime and fluvial domain; and,
(3) Air space above the land and waters which is
called aerial domain.
 Article 1, 1987 Philippine Constitution
(1) The national territory comprises the
Philippine archipelago with all the islands and
waters embraced therein and (2) all other
territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, (3) consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including
its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas. (4)
The waters around, between and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimension, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.
• This is a substantial reproduction of Article 1 of
the 1973 Constitution with only minor changes.
• Departing from the method employed in the
1935 Constitution, which described the
national territory by reference to the pertinent
treaties concluded by the United States during
its regime in this country.
• The present rule now physically lists the
component of our territory and so de-
emphasizes recollections of our colonial past.
• The 1987 Constitution, has deleted reference
to the territories we claim “by historic right or
legal title” as provided under the 1973
Constitution. 
 1st Baseline law that was passed was R.A. No.
— this does not mean an outright or formal
abandonment of such claim, which was best left
to a judicial body capable of passing judgment
over the same.
(1) Tracing what comprises the Philippine
archipelago:
According to Committee Chairman Quintero of
the 1986 Constitutional Convention, “reference
must be made to the 1935 Constitution”.
— this refers to the pertinent treaties concluded
by the US during its regime in this country, to wit:

(1) Treaty of Paris;

(2) Treaty of Washington;

(3) 1930 Treaty between Great Britain and the US;

(4) Because Batanes was not included, a catch all
phrase to remedy that…”all other territories over
which the present Government of the Philippine
Islands exercises jurisdiction.”
• The second sentence in Article 1, 1987
C o n s t i t u t i o n i s a n a ff i r m a t i o n o f t h e
archipelagic doctrine — under which we
connect the outermost points of our
archipelago with straight baselines and
consider all the waters enclosed thereby as
internal waters
• Archipelagic Doctrine 

— the entire archipelago is regarded as one
integrated unit instead of being fragmented
into so many islands.

—- an archipelagic State is considered as a
single and indivisible territory because
baselines are drawn in the outermost points.
History of our Baseline Laws:
3046 pursuant to the Philippines being signatory
of UNCLOS I—which codified among others the
sovereign right of States over their territorial seas,
the breadth of which, however, was left
undetermined. 



2nd Baseline law was R.A No. 5446 to correct
the typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North
Borneo.

3rd Baseline Law, R.A. No. 9522 was passed,
consistent with the Philippines’ obligation after
the Philippines ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
—which among others “prescribes the water-land
ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines”, which
was believed to make our baseline law more
“compliant” with the provisions of UNCLOS III
insofar as the determination of the “water-land
ratio, length, and contour of baselines” of our
archipelago is concerned.
— accordingly, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimised the location of other base points
around the Philippine archipelago and classified
other territories namely the Kalayaan Islands
Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as
“regimes of islands” whose islands generate their
own applicable Maritime zones.
Magallona vs Ermita
— The constitutionality of RA 9522 was
challenged on the grounds of, to wit:
(1) RA 9522 reduced the Philippine maritime
territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power in violation
of Article 1 of the !987 Constitution, which
embodies the treaties under 1935
Constitution; and
(2) It opens the country’s waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, among others, undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security.
(3) Furthermore, it failed to reference either the
Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of
UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands
to determine the maritime zones of KIG and
Scarborough.
Supreme Court rejected these claims:
(1) UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws
play no role n the acquisition, enlargement, or
as what petitioners claim, diminution of
territory. Under international law typology,
States acquire, or conversely lose territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription, not by executing multi-lateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statues to comply with treaty’s term
to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial land features are outside
UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.
(2) Whether referred to as Philippine ‘internal
waters’ under Article 1 of the Constitution, or
as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III
(Article 49[1]), the Philippines exercises
sovereign powers over the body of water
lying landward of the baselines, including the
space over it and the submarine areas
underneath.
(3) Had Congress enclosed the KIG as part of the
Philippine Archipelago, adverse legal effects
would have been ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III where it required that such
drawing of baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago. KIG are
located at an appreciable distance from the
nearest shoreline , such that any straight
baseline loped around them from the nearest
basepoint will inevitably depart to an
 appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.
The definition in Article 1 now covers the
following territories:
1. Those ceded to the United States by virtue of
the Treaty of Paris of 1898.
2. Those defined in the treaty concluded
between the United States and Spain, which
were not defined in the Treaty of Paris,
specifically the islands of Cagayan, Sulu, and
Sibutu.
3. Those defined in the treaty between the
United States and Great Britain, specifically
the Turtle and Mangsee islands.
4. The island of Batanes, which was covered
under the general statement in the 1935
Constitution.
5. T h o s e c o n t e m p l a t e d i n t h e p h r a s e
“belonging to the Philippines by historic right
or legal title” in the 1973 Constitution.
• PEOPLE/CITIZENSHIP
People refer simply to the inhabitants of the
state.
—while there is no legal requirement as to their
number, it is generally agreed that they must be
numerous enough to be self-sufficing.
Article 4, 1987 Constitution
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect their citizenship
at the age of majority; and,
(4) Those who are naturalised in accordance with
law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3, Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizenship of the Philippines who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless
by their act or omission, they are deemed, under
the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance if citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.
C.A. No. 473 - steps for Judicial Naturalization
1. Before 1 year — file a manifestation of his
intention to be naturalised in the Office of
Solicitor General.
2. After the lapse of 1 year, after he filed his
intention, file a petition for naturalisation in
the RTC of where he resided for at least a
year.
3. Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk court
shall have the duty to publish the same in the
 Official Gazette and in one newspaper of
general circulation once every week for three
consecutive weeks. This requirement is
jurisdictional, non-observance thereof shall
render all the proceedings void.
4. At least 6 months after the last publication,
but not within 30 days before any election,
the hearing shall begin which the petitioner
shall establish in his petition that he posses
all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification.
5. If the petitioner is able to prove that he has
all the qualification and non of the
disqualification, his petition will be granted
and the decision shall be final after 30 days
from notice. However, it will only become
executory after 2 years during which the
petitioner will be under probation.
6. The last step is the administration of oath of
citizenship,, and renounce allegiance to any
foreign State.
R.A. No. 9139 — Administrative Naturalization
Law
Effects of Naturalization
M o y Ya L i m Ya o v s C o m m i s s i o n e r o f
Immigration
— Under Section 15, of CA 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, natural-born or naturalized,
become ipso facto a Filipino provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Sec 4 of the same law. Likewise and alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalised here follows the Philippine citizenship
of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.
Loss and Reacquisition of citizenship: CA No.
63
(1) By naturalisation in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution of laws of a foreign
country; or
(4) By rendering services to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country, unless that commission is with the
consent of the Philippine government
provided that either of the following
circumstance. Is present:

(a) the RP has a defensive/ofensive pact
between the said party.

(b) the said foreign country maintains armed
forces in the RP.
(5) By cancellation of the certification of
naturalisation; or
(6) Declared as a deserter of AFP in times of war;
and
(7) In case a woman marries a foreigner, and by
virtue of the laws of the alien spouse, she
acquires his nationality
Bengzon III vs HRET
— Repatriation allows a person to recover or
return to his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Mercado vs Manzano
— Supreme court clarified that the
disqualification of dual allegiance under Section
5, Article IV, refers to dual loyalty, not to dual
citizenship. Thus, Manzano, a dual citizen, can run
as a Mayor.
Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC
o 1968 – Grace Poe was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish of Jaro, Iloilo
o 1974 – Grace Poe was legally adopted by
FPJ and Susan Roces
o 2016 – Grace Poe ran for President
o Petitions for Disqualification were filed
against Poe on the ground of material
misrepresentation because she is not a
Natural-born Filipino Citizen
Petitioner’s Arguments:
o Under the principle of jus sanguinis, persons
of unknown parentage, particularly
foundlings, cannot be considered natural-
born Filipino citizens since blood relationship
is determinative of natural-born status
o International conventions and treaties are not
self-executory and that local legislations are
necessary in order to give effect to treaty
obligations assumed by the Philippines
SC CLARIFYING THE ISSUE
1. The factual issue is not who the parents
of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are
Filipinos
2. GRACE POE IS A NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN
a. Statistics
b. Legal presumptions arising form
established facts
c. Deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention
➢ The exchange between Commissioners
Ragols, Roxas and Montinola reveals that
as a matter of law, foundlings are as a
class, natural born Filipino citizens
d. International Law
i. GAPIL + PIL = Incorporation
ii. The common thread of the
UDHR, UNCRC & ICCPR is to
obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality form birth and ensure
that no child is stateless. This
grant of nationality must be at
the time of birth.
iii. 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws +
1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelesnesss =
GAPIL = a foundling is presumed
to have the “nationality of the
country of birth”
iv. When do you apply
transformation as opposed to
incorporation?
o If the source of international law is a
treaty = transformation unless supported
by local legislation
o GAPIL & CIL = incorporation, not
written, not agreed upon but became a
law by virtue of a traditional long
standing belief,
Natural born
➢ One that does not have to do anything to
acquire or perfect citizenship
➢ It was not by choice of the foundling to
be left there
HELD:
GRACE POE IS NATURAL-BORN
➢ Adopting these legal principles from the
1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational
and reasonable and consistent with the
jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
➢ The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stem from the
presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines.
➢ As empirical data provided by the PSA
show, that presumption is at more than
99% is a virtual certainty.
• SOVEREIGNTY
JUSTIFICATIONS OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Wendell Holmes Jr. — there can be no legal
right against the authority which makes the law
on which the right depends;
Par in parem non habet imperium — equals
cannot assert sovereignty over each other ;
sovereign equality of the state; otherwise it would
unduly vex the peace of nations; and
Public policy — the performance of
governmental function cannot be hindered or
delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the
use and disposition of the means for the
performance of government functions. The loss
of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to
the performance of its multifarious function are
far greater if such a fundamental principle are to
be abandoned and the availability of judicial
remedy were not thus restricted (cited in the case
of Washington Insurance Co. vs Republic of the
Philippines)
Immunity of States and International
Organs
Minucher vs CA
— Main yardstick in ascertaining whether a
person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is
the determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature.
— Although the government was not
impleaded in this case on the allegation that
Scalzo is sued in his personal capacity and
required to indemnify the petitioner in his
personal tort, where in this case, Scalzo was
sufficiently proved and established that he
worked for the US and his imputed acts are
done in the performance of his function.
However, the ultimate liability falls upon the
government of USA that they have to do a
positive act to pay for the damages as
requested by Minucher, thus it is a suit
against the State, which the USA did not give
its consent.
— The power to vest a person with
diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the
executive branch, and in the case of WHO vs
Aquino, the court recognises that in those
cases and matters, the hands of the court are
virtually tied.
— It is not to say that it is an immunity from
the observance of the law of territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability,
rather it is an immunity from the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction. (reiterated in the case
of Arigo vs Swift (par in parem non habet
imperium)
Q: What constitute a suit against a state?
Sanders vs Veridiano
— Mere allegation that government functionary is
being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of
law against public officers, and if applicable, the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token,
mere invocation of an official or public nature of
an act will not insulate him from suability and
liability from an act imputed to him as a personal
tort committed without or in excess of authority.
— Where the character of the act complained of
can be deter mined from the pleadings
exchanged between the parties in the trial, there
is no need to further belabour the case as held in
many cases, i.e. Baer vs Tizon, Syquia vs Almeda
Lopez, that it should be dismissed as it will not
progress because it’s cover by the doctrine of
state immunity.
Exceptions:
 strictissimi juris.
(1) public officer may be sued as such to compel
him to an act required by law—to secure a
judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy
by himself without the government itself having
to do a positive act to assist him.

(2) Where the government violated its own laws
—the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used
as an instrument to perpetuate injustice. (Director
of Bureau of Telecommunication vs Aligaen)
Shauf vs CA

— A public official may sometimes be held liable
in his personal or private capacity if he acts in
bad faith, with malice, grave abuse of discretion,
or in excess of his authority or jurisdiction.
Republic vs Feliciano
— Waiver of State immunity from suit is
equivalent to derogation of sovereignty, thus it
will not be lightly inferred but construed


— Non-establishment of the State’s consent to be
sued is itself a fatal ommission and should be
Moto propio dismissed by courts.
Tan vs Director of Forestry 

— As required by law, waiver of State immunity
from suit must emanate from statutory authority,
hence from a legislative act, not from mere
memorandum/proclamation.

Professional Video Inc vs TESDA

Festejo vs Fernando
— Cited Mobil Philippines vs Customs Arastre
— When a public officer acted without or in
Services : even if an unincorporated government
excess of authority, by taking a private property
agency performs an act proprietary in nature it
without just compensation even if such property
does not necessarily mean that it waived its right
is indeed for public use—he can be sued in his
against State immunity from suit nor it descended
personal capacity for the State is not responsible
in the level of private persons, if such act is
for that officer’s unauthorised act.
incidental in the performance of its primary
function.
Republic vs Villasor
- a suit against the Republic by name;
— dealing with public funds; public funds cannot
- Suit against unincorporated government
be the object of garnishment proceedings even if
agency;
the consent to be sued had been previously
- Government agency covered by a charter with
granted and the state liability adjudged.
respect to its performance;
- In its face a case against a public officer; and
Commission of Public Highways vs San Diego
- Ultimate liability will fall upon the government.
— Appropriation of public funds are covered by
an appropriation act; public services cannot be
paralysed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from its legitimate or specific use.
Q: What constitute a suit against government
agencies?
Section 22 of the LGC — provides for the power
to sue and to be sued of LGUs
Act 3083 — basis for suability of the State in
cases of money claims
Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge Firm
— Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sed, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstances that a state
is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand,, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to sued. Liability
is not conceded by the mere fact that the state
has allowed itself to be sued.
Torio vs Fontanilla
— emphasised the distinction of powers
(whether proprietary or governmental functions)
becomes important for purposes of determining
the liability of the municipality for the acts of its
agents which result in an injury to third person.
— the test of liability of the municipality depends
on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of
the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary function.
• It is already settled that municipal corporations
are suable because their charters grant them
the competence to sue and be sued, pursuant
to Section 22 of LGC.
• Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown they they
were acting in a proprietary capacity. In this
way, the State affords the claimants the right/
chance to prove that that government
functionary acted in a proprietary function and
the failure to establish this, the third party
cannot recover. (cited in the case of US vs
Guinto)
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency vs
University of the Philippines
— In this case, UP is a government
instrumentality but impliedly waived its immunity
from suit by participating in the proceedings.
However, in this case, UP did not invoke state
immunity nor it object being sued, respondent
only emphasized that suability does not
necessarily mean liability.
— It did not go through the procedure
prescribed by Act 3083 wherein all money claims
must be filed with the Commission on Audit
(cited in the case of National Electrification
Administration vs Morales)
National Electrification Administration vs
Morales
— Citing the case of Commissioner of Public
Highways vs San Diego, the court explicitly stated the
the universal rule that where the State gives its consent
to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit the claimant’s action only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution and the power of the courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funs and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment proceeding to satisfy such judgement,
is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
(Public policy function of non-suability of states).
— Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon
determination of State liability, the prosecution,
enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be
pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures
laid down in P.D. No 1445 (Department of Agriculture
vs NLRC, citing the case of Republic vs Villasor) . All
money claims against the government must be filed
with the Commission on Audit, pursuant to Republic
Act 3083, and the rejection of the claim will authorise
claimant to elevate the case to the Supreme Court on
certiorari in effect sue the State thereby (PD 1445, Sec
49-50)