CO V NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
June 30, 2014 | Peralta J NCC 13, Rules of Court Rule 22 & RAC 31 ● Furthermore, the second paragraph of Rule 117, Sec 8 should be construed to mean
Doctrine: Oder of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order
of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the
criminal case having been revived.
Case Summary: No notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing
which was served on the private complainant. Petition was dismissed and motion for
reconsideration was denied. Resolutions of Court of Appeals were affirmed
consequently dismissing relevant criminal cases permanently
Facts:
● Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a
complaint for violation of B. P. 22 against petitioner William Co.
● In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed
on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
criminal Procedure. Uy received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003,
while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after. On July 2, 2004, Uy, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases which was granted.
● Co filed a petition challenging the revival of the criminal cases. He argues that the
June 9, 2003 order provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should be considered
as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. Assuming
that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 order,
not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to
revive and the trial court's issuance of the order granting the revival must bewithin the
one-year period. Even assuming that the one-year period torevive the criminal cases
started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 order, Co asserts that the
motion was f f iled one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
Issue: WON the provisional dismissal of the criminal case has become permanent.
(No)
Ruling:
● Essential requisites of the first paragraph of Sec 18, Rule 117 of the ROC, which are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph
thereof are :
1) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves
for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case
2) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3) The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally
;
4) The public prosecutor is served with a copy ofthe order of provisional dismissal of
the case.
● In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the
hearing which was served on the private complainant at least 3 days before said
hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules.
that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order
of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the
criminal case having been revived.
● When a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the
court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address pursuant to Sec 2, Rule 13 of
ROC. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he
is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
● Also, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court
order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is not found
in the Rules.
● Further, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the
timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive the criminal cases. Even if the Court will consider
that 2004 is a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be
reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy.
Disposition: Petition is denied and resolutions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
RULE 22 of ROC - Computation of Time
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day
of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court
sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. (a)
Section 2. Ef ect of interruption. — Should an act be done which effectively interrupts
the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run
on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. The day of the act that
caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period. (n)
RAC Sec. 31. Legal Periods. – “Year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; “month” of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which
case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains;
“day,” to a day of twenty-four hours; and “night,” from sunset to sunrise.
1
 JASON IVLER vs. SAN PEDRO 1.
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
2.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the
second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in
criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari
when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent; and
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.
HELD:
(1) Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and
(2) The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
RATIO:
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes
evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders
his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his
standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted.
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that
petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." - that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property ".
The Court found: Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences
on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on
complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will
only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a
felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight x x x," a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one
or more consequences.
2
How should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework
apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively
alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately
following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which
involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one
quasi-crime with its multiple consequences unless one consequence amounts to
a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand,
resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with
the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light
felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the
approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even
though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing"
of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave
or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting
acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized
as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses,
in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light
offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution
of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless
of their number or severity, penalizing each consequence separately. By
prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number
and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, it is held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.

3
 LOS BAÑOS V. PEDRO
G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009 Brion, J.
petitioners Ariel M. Los Baños on behalf of Victor Arevalo, Marcial Olympia,
Rocky Mercene and Raul Adlawan
respondents Joel R. Pedro
FACTS OF THE CASE
May 13, 2001: Philippine National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his
firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team was
composed of Police Senior Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal Olympia, SPO1
Rocky Mercene, and PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-
Ace with plate number WHT-371 on the national highway, coming from the Boac town
proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion) opened the window, Arevalo
saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not show any COMELEC authority to
carry a firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one, but he opened the case when
asked to do so. The checkpoint team saw the following when the case was opened: 1)
one Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial number 173-56836, loaded with six
ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing 100 bullets; 3) two pieces speed loader
with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear protector. Pedro was with three other
men. The checkpoint team brought all of them to the Boac police station for
investigation.
- The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the
election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business
without any authority from the Comelec. After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial
prosecutor filed the above Information against Pedro with the Marinduque Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for violation of the Code’s Article XXII, Section 261 (q), in relation to
Section 264.
- Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. The
preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the
RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information "contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense." Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification dated
September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted" from the gun ban. The provincial
prosecutor opposed the motion.
- The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to
return the seized articles to Pedro.
- Los Baños moved to reopen the case, as Pedro’s Comelec Certification was a
"falsification," and the prosecution was "deprived of due process" when the judge
quashed the information without a hearing.
- The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los
Baños’ motion. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTC’s order primarily based
on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. He
likewise cited the public prosecutor’s lack of express approval of the motion to reopen
the case.
summary Joel Pedro was caught illegally carrying a firearm without a
written permit from COMELEC at a checkpoint at Boac,
Marinduque a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections (there was a gun ban). Pedro says that he has a “permit”
from COMELEC. RTC quashed the Info and asked the petitioners
to return the items seized from Pedro. Los Baños asked RTC to
reopen the case. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the
RTC’s order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing
that the dismissal had become permanent. SC finds the petition
meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial
court for arraignment and trial.
- The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the motion to
reopen the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule
117 applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations where both the
prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where
the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and
not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and
over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s arraignment date.
- Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s
mandated reopening He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal contemplated
under Section 8, Rule 117.
CA: DENIED the petition for lack of merit based on:
Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must establish the
following:
1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
- On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to reopen the case
was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the time the public prosecutor was
served the notice of dismissal. Therefore, the state is barred from reopening the case.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedro’s motion for partial reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED, and respondent Ariel Los Banos’ motion for modification
of judgment is, accordingly, DENIED.
issue
- WON Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then
the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC
decision reopening the case should prevail. NO, Sec 8 Rule 177 is not applicable.
ratio
4
- We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the
trial court for arraignment and trial.
- An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash
and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their
features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found
within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash
results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
- To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose
respective rules refer to different situations that should not be confused with one
another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or
information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of
Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall
under provisional dismissal.
- Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of
the case that the RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the
CA’s order is legally proper.
Pedro’s MTQ:
- The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains
averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h),
Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule
117]. We find from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged a
specific offense and provides the details on how the offense was committed. Thus, the
cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other hand, we do not see on the face
or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. The cited
basis, in fact, for Pedro’s motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (dated
September 24, 2001, issued by Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department,
Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel of the Comelec, granting him an
exemption from the ban and a permit to carry firearms during the election period) that
Pedro attached to his motion to quash. This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde
that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash
grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information.
Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the
genuineness of the COMELEC certification.
- Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was
in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function, and
utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the
basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
- One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the fact that
Pedro was charged of violating Section 261(q) of the Code, instead of Section 32 of
R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261(q); these two sections aim to penalize
among others, the carrying of firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places
during the election period without the authority of the Comelec. The established rule is
that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information Further, in Abenes v. Court of
Appeals, we specifically recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A. No.
7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under Section
261(q) of the Code.
- WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the assailed
September 19, 2005 decision and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223 respectively MODIFIED and REVERSED. The case is
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque for the arraignment and trial
of respondent Joel R. Pedro, after reflecting in the Information the amendment
introduced on Section 261(q) of the Code by Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166.
Additional notes: (Just in case Sir asks about this)
- The case differentiated Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
a. Motion to Quash
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea,
the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the
Information. The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled
out in the complaint or information. The rules governing a motion to quash are found
under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the
grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment
for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse
or justification; and
5
 (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

b. Provisional Dismissal
On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states that:
SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except
with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the
accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both
the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.

6
 RULE 118 – PRE-TRIAL
BAYAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN (2002)
Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial
FACTS:
1. Three informations were filed against Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and
Sixto M. Bayas charging them with malversation through falsification
penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal
Code in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer
2. They pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
3. Pretrial
a. October 15, 1999 - cancelled because the counsel for the accused,
Atty. Molintas was not prepared
b. November 5, 1999 - cancelled because of the absence of the counsel
due to flu. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to
discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by
Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero.
c. December 10, 1999 - parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Documents, which had been duly signed by the two accused
(herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero (this was
supposedly the day the pre-trial should resume so they could pass
upon all other matters)
d. January 14, 2000 - Atty. Molintas was again absent; rescheduled to
Feb 14.
e. Feb 7, 2000 - Att. Molintas moved to withdraw as counsel for the
accused. Granted on Feb 14, 2000, pretrial rescheduled to March 31.
f. March 31 - new counsel (Atty. Cinco) moved to withdraw joint
stipulation of facts specifically when they admitted disbursement of
funds. Invoked consti right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty.
4. SB: denied motion to withdraw stipulation of facts
a. no vitiation of consent through fraud or mistake of a serious character
b. The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the
accused to defend himself is not a ground for setting aside a pre-trial
order
ISSUE/HOLDING:
1. W/N pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused because
allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court has issued a pretrial order
approving them.
a. NO. Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of
facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they
simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner.
They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time, help
unclog court dockets.
b. Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good
cause. They should be enforced especially when they are not false,
unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy. When made
before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made them
can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud,
misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of
sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case.
Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in
the courts sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not
be disturbed on appeal.
c. Validity of joint stipulation: They wanted to be relieved of it without alleging
falsity, fraud, mistake. They did not even dispute the finding of the SB of no
vitiation of consent. In fact, they admitted that they freely gave their consent
in signing the joint stipulation of facts.
a. They blame incompetence of previous counsel; he failed to consider
their legal interests. To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a
mistake must be one of fact not, as in this case, a mere lack of full
knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining it
b. Hornbook doctrine applies: parties are bound by the action or the
inaction of their counsel. To all intents and purposes, the acts of a
lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts of the
client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple
negligence committed by the counsel.
d. Presumption of innocence: However, the Rules were amended in 1985,
precisely to enable parties to stipulate facts. The amendment was carried over
to the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The acceptability of
stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. There is
nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy
encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that
x x x everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law
or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right and without detriment to the community at large. In this case, there
could have been no impairment of petitioners right to be presumed innocent,
right to due process or right against self-incrimination because the waiver was
voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and is sanctioned by the Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
e. Necessity of a pretrial order: Not necessary. Section 2 of Rule 118
a. for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy
the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in
writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their
counsel. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the
supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the
flow of the proceedings.
b. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the
parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who
made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may
not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the
consequences of the disadvantage. If the accused are allowed to
plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning,
they should likewise be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial
agreement under appropriate circumstances.
7
 c. Moreover, SB could not be faulted for not approving the stipulations
as the pretrial was rescheduled 6 times
f. Role of Lawyers in pretrial: The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that if
the counsel for the accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial
and do not offer an acceptable excuse for their lack of cooperation, the court
may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
a. attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the
real issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to
embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant
by their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise
relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by their
unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that they signed and that
their clients fully assented to.
b. They were the ones who validly and voluntarily entered into the joint
stipulation. If the Court allows it to be withdrawn, there would be no
end to litigations. Lawyers can wiggle in and out of agreements the
moment they are disadvantaged. Lawyers should remember,
however, that they are not merely representatives of the parties but,
first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties
assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice is more
significant than that of acquitting their client, rightly or wrongly.
g. GAD: the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies at the
sound discretion of the court. Unless exercised with grave abuse, this
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.
a. Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw
the stipulations that they had freely and voluntarily entered into. Also,
no bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the antigraft court for
failing to immediately act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was
due, not to its deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the continued
absence of petitioners counsel.

8
 ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGO AND PEOPLE
TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection
clause
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the
same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and
the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all
violations of said law violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this
Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated
by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of
the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court
(Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. –
The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons
under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v.
Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et
al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph
of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from
issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule
58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted
its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the
exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the
Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive
and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.
SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED
The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to
preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations
behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a
qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition
against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
9
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING: prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure on hand can sustain.

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive
or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may
be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on
plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement
of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly
desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.
Plea bargaining, when allowed
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing
or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in
allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less
than the evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or
weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the
evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is
improper and irregular.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense
make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is
to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and
finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining

neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means
to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense
that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the

10