CHAPTER - III

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES

 CHAPTER - m

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES

Since the studies on strikes and lock-outs from sociological point of

view are very limited, the efforts are made to collect the information from
booKs, journals, Ph.D. and Post Graduate research thesis, conference
papers, journals, periodicals and news papers. Most of the studies are
done 'in the form of Industrial Disputes', or 'Industrial Unrest' or
'Industrial Relations'. These studies are presented below in a
chronological sequence. •

3.1 "STRIKE AS A LABOUR WEAPON" - A STUDY BY M. VASUDEVA

MOORTHY (1946) 1 :

In the pre-independence period M. Vasudva Moorthy (1946) in his

two articles wrote about the strike. In first part he dealt with "strike as
a labour weapon" and in second part with "causes and cure". The first part
is considered here.

He noted : "The object of a strike Is generally to obtain an industrial

concession from the employers and of a lock-out is to retaliate upon the
workers for any of their combined actions or to force a decision on them.
The aim of each is to inflict economic injury on the other and as such the
declaration of a strike or a lock-out proclaims a socio-economic conflict.
Though industrial strike is a comparatively modem feature, the conflict
between labour and capital is very old. The difficult living and working
conditions grindled the lives of workers and they had neither happiness
 (52)

at home nor joy at work. Their life was a perpetual transition from the
roaring factories to the dark slums and vice versa”.

Moorthy further gives an account of methods practiced by the labour

to get their demands sanctioned. He observed, 'violence' was practiced by
the workers as it was the easiest method to pull down the head of the
industry. The chief forms of violence were kidnapping, assassination or
beating of the employer or some other responsible person concerned. One
of these methods was usually employed in the most riotous days of chartism
in England and Syndicalism in France. In India the assassination of
employers or jobbers was practiced by the workers. The cases of sabotage
such as wilful destruction of, or damage to the plant or power or material
by the workers with a view to dislocate work were common practices. A
well-known instance of widespread sabotage in labour history was the
'Dynamite Campaign' embarked upon by the Structural Iron Workers' Union
in the United States during the early decades of this century. In India,
following 1942 arrests of national leaders such type of sabotages were
undertaken by the workers.

He observed that the principal reasons for increase in number of

disputes were found in the rapid industrialization of the country, growing
consciousness amongst workers of their rights and development of trade
union organization.

According to him the losses on the part of workers were : (1) losing
the job or at least temporary loss of employment with the inevitable con­
sequence of lowering of income; (2) impairment of the efficiency of the
worker and blunting his interest due to frequent and prolonged strikes;
 (53)

(3) falling victim of the money-lenders; (4) weakening the unions thus
breaking the strength of labour movement; and (5) clashes between the
groups of workers.

Finally, Mr. Moorthy pointed out that the presence of the police,
though perhaps necessary, made the situation psychologically more
inflammable. He further observed that, the police, by their poor education,
low salaries and bad examples were least fitted to preserve peace, con­
sequently resulting into clashes between the police and workers.

3.2 "STRIKES - THEIR CAUSES AND CURE" -

A STUDY BY M. VASUDEVA MOORTHY 2 (1946) :

In the second part of the article Moorthy proceeded to analyse the

causes that led to strike and ways of preventing strikes. According to him
the strikes were resorted to for reasons falling under five heads : political,
economic, personnel relations, working conditions and miscellaneous. The
political strikes were undertaken either to protest any repugnant legisla­
ture or sympathy to political leader for his arrest and it was treated as a
healthy sign by Moorthy since, politics was an important part of social life.
In case of economic reasons the relation between wages and strikes was
very intimate, as was evident from the fact that during the quarter ended
30th June 1944, out of 197 stoppages in British India, 111 accounted for
disputes relating to wages and 15 to demand for bonus. Moorthy argued
that the industry was a Joint adventure and labour had not only mixed but
invested its labour in it and hence they had a right to claim at least a part
of the profits when huge returns were realized and dividends disbursed to
distant shareholders. In case of personnel relations, Moorthy pointed out
 (54]

that many times the jobber or mukaddam was most trusted by the
management and his mistake while behaving with workers was enough to
plunge a group of workers or a department or even entire factory into a
strike. The delegation of some of the functions of manager to subordinates
interposed unreliable links between employer and employees. The remarks
of the Royal Commission. "We believe that an important factor at work in
creating industrial unrest in India is the lack of contact which too often
exists between employers and employed" were still holding good according
to Moorthy. He assigned the reasons of strikes to working conditions such
as shift-working, hours of work, holidays, state and nature of machinery
etc. In miscellaneous reasons he cited example of refusal of request of
workers to use a particular premises in possession of the manager for the
purpose of recreation or worship, grain shops etc.

Moorthy had given examples o: 49 stoppages in India during one

month i.e. October 1945 which showed that 31 were due to economic
reasons (wages + bonus). 10 were due to personnel-ill-treatment/
suspension/dismissal, 4 ' were due to working conditions and 4 were
miscellaneous.

In prevention of strikes Moorthy had suggested 3 ways (1) through

mutual settlement, (2) through legislative machineiy and (3) by changing
the industrial machineiy. For first, he had suggested works committees.
In legislature machinery functioning ne commented that the then Trade
Disputes Act of 1929 (amended in 1938) and Bombay Industrial Disputes
Act, 1938 (amended upto 1941) could secure merely adoption of
reasonable methods of settlement and postponement of the immediate
strike since the findings of Board of Conciliation and Industrial Courts,
 (55)

arbitration and award were not binding on any parly. These Acts were not
successful measures. Moorthy concluded. In alternative he suggested
de-industrialization and taking to handicrafts where individuals or units
of families or groups of individuals would be masters of their own tools
and would manage their own production and distribution. Another
alternative suggested by him was to decentralize industries and organize
them into smaller units, owned and run by workers themselves which
would secure wider employment and eliminate urban congestion and slums.

3.3 BOMBAY COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY STRIKES : 1922 - 19643:

V.P. Josh! studied the strikes in Bombay Cotton Textile Industry

from 1922 to 1964. He says that the underlying causes, such as bad
social conditions and the inferior position of workers, are general in their
influence and are common to most strikes. The proximate causes, however
show some changes in their relative importance over the years. During the
years 1951 - 1964 personnel disputes had been the most important cause
of strikes. Because of the proper linking of dearness allowance to the cost
of living index these years had seen a reduction in the importance of
-wages disputes. The bonus, work-load and retrenchment were other
significant causes of strikes in these years. It is generally believed that
strike activity is responsive to many socio-economic influences. But the
examination of the strikes with reference to four such influences
: (i) employment and union membership, (ii) strikes in other industries in
Bombay, (iii) cost of living, and (iv) the state of trade in Cotton Textile
Industry, showed no significant relationship of the strike activity to any of
them. However, the depressed state of trade in some years appeared to
have had some effect in prolonging the duration of strikes.
 (56)

3.4 TWO STRIKES IN TATA IRON AND STEEL WORKS

JAMSHEDPUR 4 :

Kamik reviews two major strikes in Tata Iron and Steel Works
(Jamshedpur) that took place during 1914 - 22. He analyses the major
causes and settlement. Of these two strikes, the first took place on 24th
February 1920 in which the demand was for a 50 percent rise in wages,
coupled with 19 other demands such as sick leave, holidays, codification
of service rules, strike wages, etc.. All Indian workers numbering 32,000
joined the strike. There were, at that time, a number of European workers
in supervisory position who continued to work inspite of strike. The
relations between supervisory officers and workers were not cordial. The
strike was a spontaneous out-burst of the long pent-up feeling to
discontent and anger. When it broke out workers had no organizations but
it was formed later on as "Jamshedpur Labour Federation" which pursued
the strike. After formation of committee under chairmanship of Sir Dorabji
Tata, the strike came to an end on 20th March, 1920. The demands
sanctioned were : All men drawing Rs. 50 and less would receive a
permanent increase of 25% in lieu of 10% bonus, while men drawing over
Rs. 50 would receive a permanent increase of 20% in lieu of the bonus.
The strike ended but a large number of issues were left undecided which
led to fresh trouble in the works in the next few years.

On 19th September 1922 another strike took place. The main

demand was wage rise to compensate for an increase in prices. Inspite of
the profits that had been made, the company refused to consider the
demands immediately. With the intervention of the leaders of the AITIJC
to which Jamshedpur Labour Federation was affiliated, the negotiations

u
 (57)

were opened. On 22nd October 1922 a settlement took place. There was
no 10% reduction in wages as announced earlier by the company. A
conciliation board comprising of 10 members each from management and
labour was to be set up for settlement of all other items. But this board
was never set up. The settlement took place with workers' representatives,
but soon thereafter the secretary of the union was dismissed from service.
That paved the way for a number of disputes which 6 year later erupted
into a bitter strike.

3.5 ROYAL COMMISSION ON LABOUR 5 :

Royal Commission on labour reviewed another big and protracted

strike that took place in the Tata Iron and Steel Works at Jamshedpur in
1928. It gives an account of attitude of workers' representatives and
management. It began on 18th April 1928 and ended on 13th September
1928 because of intervention by Subhash Chandra Bose. While dealing
with the reasons for this strike, Mr, J.R. Dain, Deputy Commissioner of
Area, Government of Bihar, comments The labour association had lost
its representative character over a year before the outbreak of the strike.
Many of the leaders of the association have risen to responsible and
well-paid posts in the company. It was artificial and unrepresentative.
The men regarded it more as an agency of the company for dealing with
labour than as men's representative The association had thus lost the
confidence of the workers, but on the ground that it was the only
recognized organization, the company refused to talk with others and this
attitude was responsible to some extent for the prolongation of the strike".

3.6 POLITICAL STRIKES AND VIOLENCE IN LABOUR DISPUTES 6:

S. Kannappan and D. Saran have discussed the problem of violence

 (58)

in industrial conflicts in India in their study. They have illustrated four

cases namely Kanpur strike of 1955, Bombay automobile strike of 1958,
the Central Government employees strike of 1960, and the Tata Steel
strike of 1958. According to them the political strikes and violence
dominated the industrial relations scene in India. The political strike are
disapproved because the purposes of strike bear a little relevance to labour
management relations. Mere political orientation of labour leaders does
not indicate political strike. The Central government employees strike of
1960, Tata Steel strike of 1958 and Kanpur textile strike of 1955 clearly,
demonstrated that, although the labour leaders were active in political
opposition to the government, the substantial industrial relations issues'
were also involved in these conflicts. The data regarding violence in
disputes are not available, but such development is frequently reported in
the newspapers. A classification of industrial disputes by causes for the
period 1947 to 1963 shows that wages are responsible for 27 to 30 percent
of the total disputes during any given year, bonus for 7 to 13 percent,
personnel matter 32 to 42 percent and 1-9 percent not known. Finally,
it is very difficult to know in which cases violence broke out. The role of
the police in outburst of violence appears to be greatly aggravated by their
presence in the factories. It also appears that when strikes drag on for
more than three to five days, violence is more likely to occur than in
shorter work-stoppages, particularly as prospects of a favourable
settlement recede with the passage of time. Sometimes newspaper account
tend to link violence with communist led strikes or demonstrations. But
it is also clear that several communist led unions have a successful record
of bargaining with their employers. When there is actual violence, there
is of course no choice but to employ superior violence to stop it. But this
 (59)

is only an immediate stop-gap measure and must be followed by more

forward-looking steps.

6.7 INTUC'S POLICY AND PRACTICE ON STRIKE 7 :

Wolkinson and Dayal have done critical analysis on INTUC's policy

and practice on strikes in India's industrial relation system. They
observed : (i) The INTUC's labour philosophy dictates that a union strike
only in extreme cases. This INTUC's approach both shared and reinforced
by government's industrial relations policy which similarly seeks to limit
union strike activity. According to INTUC an effort to conciliate, arbitrate
or adjudicate a dispute must first be made before a strike can even be
considered, (ii) As long as other federations continued to view the strike
as a legitimate weapon, it is unrealistic to expect the INTUC unions to
accept only passive methods of dispute settlement, (iii) There are serious
doubts whether the Gandhian trade union approach is relevant to the
Indian industrial relations scene, (iv) Whether the ITUC's strike policy will
remain viable will depend also on the successful or failure of the government's
dispute settlement machinery, because between 1957 and 1970, only 597
labour disputes were resolved through government adjudication or
voluntary arbitration, (vi) The INTUC has called for widespread reforms
in the government machinery and recommended Industrial Relations
Commissions at Central and State levels which should be Compelled to
intervene if adjudication was desired by either labour or management.
This commission should be a permanent body acting independently of the
courts and consequently should resolve the cases expeditiously". The
paper concluded that inspite of INTUC's philosophy, there exists rival
unionism, local union consciousness based on caste or community and
extreme worker dissatisfaction and hence militancy.
 (60)

3.8 CLOSURES, LOCK-OUTS AND STRIKES : WORKERS'

REACTIONS 8 :

P. Chakraborty in her study of workers' reactions on closures, lock­

outs and strikes in West Bengal in engineering, pottery, ceramic. Jute and
cotton industries during 1969 to 1971 found : (i) 24 percent of the
respondents expressed complete ignorance of the reasons of closures. 54
percent felt that the manifest causes of closures were either unreasonable
demands of the union, union stubbornness, labour indiscipline, or union
rivalry. Only 24 percent respondents said that management's inefficiency
or management's self-interest was the predominant factor for closures.
The workers also expressed the view that closures had most probably been
declared in collusion with the union leaders with a view to getting rid of
the rival union or gratifying some ulterior motives of both the management
and the union leader concerned, (ii) Several workers reported that they
looked upon their union leaders as economic father and protector, but to
their utter dismay they found that at a later stage, these leaders entered
into a secret deal with the management in closing the factories, (iii) When
the strike/lock-out/closure continued beyond one month, the workers,
particularly those who were placed at the lower income group and who
had large family, had adverse attitudes towards union leaders in the sense
that they felt insecure and worried as to how long it would continue.
Further continuance of closure and lack of financial assistance from trade
unions resulted in alienating workers from their unions, (iv) All- the
respondents expressed their strong aversion to strikes / lock-outs /
closures. It was their primary desire that the wheels of the industry
should remain moving without strife or strike. About 90 percent of the
respondents opined that such disputes could have been averted if
 (61)

management and union had seen reasons i.e. the management should
have adopted a more sympathetic attitude and the union leader should
have realized the difficulties of the management and made reasonable
demands, (v) As regards the impact of the disputes on labour-
management relationship, H percent felt there was a significant
)

improvement, 33 percent felt, no improvement, and 56 percent did not

perceive any change, (vi) Almost all the respondents felt that strike /
closure had adversely affected their economic position. All of them had
to incur debts for their maintenance. Also, during strikes / closures, the
workers had to maintain themselves by drastic cuts in their budgets. 60
percent respondents took loan from money lenders and 40 percent from
friends and neighbours. Barring a few workers, who lived in Joint families,
almost all workers in the sample had to go half-fed and undergo total
starvation for several days. In some cases owing to lack of money, edu­
cation of children was to be stopped, (vii) In temporary closures workers
were unprepared for the contingency, the impact of closure on worker’s
budget was the hardest. (vUi) 76.5 percent of the respondents did not find
any alternative work while 28.5 percent were fortunate to secure casual
work, (ix) 90 percent of the workers favoured one union in one industrial
unit. The interest of the political based union is primarily poHtieal and
j

welfare of the workers is secondary, (x) Long-drawn strikes / lock-outs

/ closures had wide spread effects and repercussions not only on the
morale but also on the attitudes of workers towards trade union leaders.

3.9 STRIKES ON 1969 IN HIPPO COMPANY :

Alphons Indana reviewed the 33 days (from 28-4-1969 to

30-5-1969) strike in Hippo Company. According to him the main cause
 (62)

of this strike was the reported postponement of fixation of scales and

grades. According to the assurance given during the previous strike,
negotiations started on 7th February 1969. The proposal of the
management heightened the hopes of the union. Inspite of this prospect
of a long-term settlement, the two parties moved towards a strike, due to
one basic difference i.e. the management wanted to go slow in finalizing
the pay scales whereas the union demanded immediate action. On
30th May 1969 the strike ended. The Executive Director agreed to
maintain the status quo by withdrawing the termination orders.

3.10 STRIKE OF 1971 IN HIPPO COMPANY 10 :

Alphons Indana studied another strike (from 15.8.1971 to 5.9.1971)

in Hippo Company. The factory utilized molasses as raw material for
manufacturing alcohol. Due to bad crop in 1970 out of 44,000 tonnes of
molasses required, only 50 percent of it could be procured. Again styrene
monomar, another intermediary raw material for polystyrene, was not
available in India that year. For these reasons the company laid off 194
workmen. This gave rise to a conflict. The lay-off was illegal as it oc­
curred while a dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal and all
the workers were involved in that dispute. There were also some incidents
of gherao and stopping of officers cars and beating of some workers for not
participating in the strike. Twenty-one strikers were suspended for this
misconduct. The strike was called off on 5th September 1971 when the
management agreed to withdraw the suspension orders.

3.11 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN KARNATAKA :

The findings of Nagarju in the study of Industrial Disputes in

 (63)

Karnataka Indicate that wages, allowances and bonus as earning of

workers have contributed for nearly 38% of disputes per year on an
average for the period from 1965 to 1974. If we add to this figure the
annual average percentage of disputes caused by personnel and
retrenchment factors which are also as much economic as wages,
allowances and bonus since they lead to problem of unemployment, the
annual average of percentage of disputes caused by these economic
factors amounted to over 66% per year for the same period and the
balance of 34% of disputes were caused by non-economic factors. Thus
it is clear that the hypothesis that in a developing economy like ours,
economic factors tend to dominate over non-economic factors In causing
industrial disputes, has been tested and established.

3.12 UNIONISM IN THE TATA IRON AND STEEL COMPANY 12 :

Mamkootam has interviewed 263 ordinary members and 116

committee members from the trade union of Tata Iron and Steel company,
Jamshedpur. He noted that the workers were extremely dissatisfied and
disillusioned with the Tata Workers’ Union (TWU) and did not take an
active interest in its affaire. The TWU was of marginal importance to'the
workers. The workers had apathy and alienation to the TWU.
Nevertheless, the fact remained that the TWU enjoyed the status of the
sole bargaining agent representing the entire work force in the company
and the workers were bound by its decisions and policies.

The TISCO workers realized that their union was of little

importance to them. They also expressed this awareness through the
repeated comment, "the leadership of the TWU is sold out to the
 (64)

management; the TWU is of benefit only to its leaders and a few of their
supporters and not to the workers in general". Many workers expressed
the view that the TWU was supported by the management, and was a
mere 'rubber stamp' which had no independent strength of its own. The
overwhelming majority of the workers were of the opinion that 'the TWU
had become just another department of the company'.

The management was actively encouraging factionalism within the

union. In fact, encouraging the existing factional divisions was an effec­
tive means of suppressing possible wcrker militancy at the shopfloor level.

Mamkootam observes that a more important and direct constraint

on Indian trade unionism growing inio a strong worker movement is the
way the Indian worker identifies his primary group. "First and foremost,
he is a member of his caste, community and region, his role as a worker
is only secondary. In a society which is still very traditional, where
membership in caste and community is more important than that in the
work group, trade unionism remains mere a myth than a reality. In fact,
the Jamshedpur case proves that the Indian Labour Force is extremely
diverse in its aspiration and ideology. It lacks homogeneity of structure
and interest. The easy availability of labour coupled with a high level of
unemployment makes the Indian work force unstable and incoherent
in itself*.

3.13 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN TEXTILE INDUSTRIES OF INDORE -

FROM 1971 TO 1973 13 :

D. K. Laldas studied the industrial disputes during 1971-77 in Unit

of textile industries of Indore (M.P.). According to him from the year 1971
 (659 4

to 1977 the number of work stoppages ranged from 1 to 4 except 1976

when there was no stoppage. The number of workers involved ranged
from 1755 to 5544 and mandays lost ranged from 2075 to 19800. The
causes of disputes revealed that out of total 15 disputes, 7 were for wages,
dearness allowance, bonus, incentive, overtime and remaining 8 were for
personnel, service conditions etc. In the year 1970, the major issue under
dispute was revision of wage scale. The management of this unit was
trying to implement a job evaluation scheme which was unacceptable to
the employees. The Indore Mill Mazdoor Sangh gave a notice of agitation
on December 10, 1970. After go slow, work to rule workers resorted to
strike for 14 days. It became serious so the management declared lock­
out. Because of efforts of Labour Minister and Labour Commissioner and
discussion between union and management, settlement took place on 1st
February 1971. But again on Issue of disciplinary cases and wages for the
strike period, union called strike which continued for four days. Again on
issue of incentive, work load and dearness allowance, the workers struck
work on 27th June 1974. The management declared a lock-out on the
following day due to mal-treatment of the Officers and their being forced
by the workers to withdraw charge sheets. Mill Mazdoor Sangh tried to
bring normalcy but the management did not reciprocate it.

3.14 INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN INDIA AND MAHARASHTRA : FROM

1974 TO 1980 :

M. K. Singh in her paper on 'Industrial Workers and Social Change’

has given an account of the industrial unrest in India and Maharashtra
during* 1974 to 1980. She observed that in Maharashtra 1974 was the
most disturbed year with the maximum number of strikes/lock-outs (674)
 (66)

and maximum number of mandays lost (7.60 million) and 3,68,633

workers involved while 1976 seemed to be quieter, with only 313 strikes/
lock-outs and 0.49 million mandays lost. However, in 1977, after the
emergency was relaxed, the upward spurt of strikes and lock-outs was
noticed, the number of strikes were 446 with 1.94 million mandays lost
only for initial 9 months of 1977, the figures for remaining 3 months were
not available. She quotes the explanation for the upward trend during
1977 given by then Janata Government, "the lifting of emergency and the
restoration of normal rights of the working class witnessed the expression
of the pent up feelings of the workers in the form of demonstrations and
collective action to draw attention to the grave injustice that the workers
had suffered during emergency". In 1979 more number of workers were
involved with less number of mandays lost and more number of strikes/
lock-outs as compared to 1978 and 1980.

While summing up for Maharashtra as well as for India as a whole,

she further observed that: (a) the year 1974 was the most disturbed year,
registering maximum number of strikes/lock-outs (with marginal variation
for All India figures), workers in and mandays lost: and (b) the year 1976
faced the minimum number of strikes/lock-outs with the least number of
mandays lost.

While comparing Maharashtra with other states with respect to

unrest during 1974 to 1978 Singh found that Maharashtra ranked first in
terms of number of disputes and mandays lost, except 1978 in which
Tamil Nadu registered only higher number of strikes/lock-outs but in
mandays lost, Maharashtra maintained its first position.
 (67)

In Maharashtra, she pointed out that, engineering industry had the

highest percentage of disputes (39.48 to 46.38%) throughout the period,
except in 1974 and 1980 when miscellaneous industries had more
percentage of disputes (i.e. 40.06% and 35.58%, respectively).

- So far as causes of disputes were concerned, she observed that in

Maharashtra 36.83% industrial disputes during 1974-80 were due to pay,
allowances and bonus issue, while 34.47% disputes were due to
retrenchment and grievances about personnel.

In her further study of cause effect relationship with the socio­

economic implications with special reference to Maharashtra Singh puts
the feet that since the relationship between the employer and employees
is that of power group relationship, the employees have to use tactics like
strikes and go-slow movements in order to succeed in their fight with the
power group, otherwise probably they would not even get the desired rise
in wages. She concludes that every three or four years, there is a need
to fight for an increase in wages. The workers expect the unions to
conduct a struggle with management and obtain for them rise in wages or
some extra facilities. Thus, whenever the resistance to increase the wages
and other benefits by the management goes beyond a limit, industrial
unrest starts. In Maharashtra during 1974-80 on the whole, the cause of
higher wages was most dominant for industrial unrest. Talking about
grievances of personnel, she points out that the employees always have to
obey the orders of the employers, employees being in a weaker position in
power relationship. Thus, whenever the trouble breaks out in the
industry, suspension of the activities due to one reason or another starts
with the objective of crushing the union. Harassment to the leaders of
 (68)

union or workers on one score or other is another tactics that is normally

adopted by the employers. In Maharashtra the disputes due to
retrenchment and grievances had been the second dominant cause for
unrest, average of 7 years was 34.47% i.e. almost one third of the total
number of strikes were due to personnel reasons.

While commenting on government machinery and union leadership

she concludes : (i) Failure of the government machinery to play her role
effectively and prominently is responsible to a larger extent for industrial
unrest in the country; (ii) It is very unfortunate that the leadership of
unions by and large is in the hands of Incapable persons who cannot be
genuine leaders of the working class and It is mostly governed by political
interest than by anything else; sometimes it is governed by personal
interest alone.

3.15 BOMBAY TEXTILE STRIKE OF 1982 : THE WORKERS VIEWS

AND STRATEGIES 1989 15 ;

H.W. Maria Van Wersch of Amsterdam University has studied the

Bombay textile strike of 1982 from the point of view of workers views and
strategies. Her study period was Jan. 1986 to June 1987. Her sample
of study was 150 workers from Finlay and Spring Mills with 113
permanent and 37 badli workers. The findings of her study are presented
in detail below :

It is interesting to learn about Dr. Samant's entry in this strike.

When textile workers struck work for a day in September 1981 there was
nothing to indicate this event, bearing the characteristics of a ritual, would
in due time turn, into the biggest strike the Indian subcontinent ever
 (69)

witnessed. It involved roughly 2.5 lakh textile workers and though official
period given is 18.5 months, it is very difficult to say whether it is ended
or it still continues. There may not be another example even in
the world history.

Just like in any other year, the agitation was for a proper bonus
settlement. Although the Trade Union Joint Action Committee (TUJACO),
a platform for unions belonging to the opposition, threatened with a
indefinite strike in case the demands were not met, no one took this very
seriously. On 22nd Oct. 1981 the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS)
and Mill Owners Associations (MOA) prepared an agreement of bonus
ranging from 8.33 to 17.33% depending on capacities of mills. Next day
workers from 15 mills staged a sit-down strike to protest the outcome of
the negotiations. However, workers from 7 mills joined duties while others
remained on strike. The workers on strike were 34,000 i.e. 14% of the
work force. The workers of Standard Mills on 23rd Oct. 1981 marched to
Dr. Samant’s residence at Ghatkopar, requesting him to lead the strike,
since they wanted somebody new and dashing. Initially Dr. Samant
refused to lead but ultimately accepted the invitation.

On Oct. 30, 1981 he announced foundation of new union,

'Maharashtra Girani Kamgar Union' (MGKU) in a large gathering and also
declared indefinite strike if demands including wage hike of Rs. 200 to 400
p.m. alongwith permanency to badli workerswere not met. Prior to that
Dr. Samant represented Empire Dyeing workers where his union was not
representative union but forced the management to give a wage increase
of Rs. 150 to 200 p.m. just a few months before. This was the factor the
workers believed in him though he was outsider for their respective mills.
 (70)

On Nov. 10, 1981 then Chief Minister appealed to Dr. Samant to

postpone indefinite strike, but workers were not in mood to listen even Dr.
Samant who was helpless. The High Power Committee (HPC) was estab­
lished by State Government which included Chief Minister, Dr. Shrikant
Jichkar and Bhaurao Patil. However, the RMMS, did not like its own
government's decision of HPC. It became a prestige issue, went upto late
Indira Gandhi and though the settlement was in sight it could not take
place and Dr. Samant was forced to declare indefinite strike from 18th
t

January, 1982.

The worker's committees were formed which played major role. They
collected and distributed food and money to striking workers, prepared for
rallies, morchas, gheraos. Many participated in 'Jail bharo campaign'.
Meanwhile by the end of 1982, more than 60% workers went back to their
native villages since the money and food distribution by unions were
inadequate. During 18-2-1982 to 1-8-1983 total 248 cases of violence
were registered out of which 178 were of common assaults, 59 criminal
threat, 3 rash acts, 4 rioting and 4 murder.

In case of membership, according to verification done by the Reg­

istrar, RMMS was having 46,488 membership in December 1981, 30,154
in January 1982 and only 1,135 in February. It was deserted by the
workers in the textile industry who were 2.5 lakhs. In the initial stage,
the Registrar appeared to be in favour of Samant's union recognition on
the basis of membership verification but at end it turned down the
demand of MGKU and declared that RMMS was functioning according to
BIR Act and it was not acting on behalf of the employers against the
interest of the employees. The appeal in Industrial Court by Dr. Samant
 (71)

was turned down. The Issue of union recognition was discussed in

parliament and one union in one establishment was favoured but issue of
which union is to be recognized was not solved. The decision on secret
ballot system was not taken by the government.

So far as effects of the strike were concerned, according to Kotwal

Committee report (1987) the following picture was emerged :

Kotwal committee found that in all 1,06,356 workers were affected by

strike and 46,575 workers had not been paid their dues. Here the
meaning of affected was those who lost jobs (49%), resigned (40%), retired
(8%) or expired (2.5%).

For survival 150 workers in the sample resorted to fanning - 35

workers, agri-labourer - 15. farming + agri-labourer - 11, powerloom
weaver - 20, textile work - 6, handloom weaver - 2, bigari - 20, mazdoor
- 9, factory work - 7, helper - 14, selling on road - 2, vendor fruit/
vegetables - 14, other - 17 and unemployed - 16. Major problems
experienced during strike were finances - 87.3%, boredom - 54%, tensions
at home - 40%, unaccustomed / hardwork - 18.7%, no problems - 6.7.%
and other 7.3%. The workers suffered financially by way of property sale
- 4.7%, loans- 46.0%, properly sale + loans - 32.7%. The suppliers of
loans to workers included : friends - 43.6%, relatives - 23.6%, money
lender - 12.7%, bank 11.8% and credit society - 8.2%. The 14 workers
had to pay interest @ 2% p.m. while one @ 7.5% and as a extreme case
another one borrowed @10% p.m. Surprisingly 25.3% workers were with­
out any debts at the end of strike, whereas another quarter of the workers
in the sample were having debts on their head above Rs. 7,000 at the end
 (72)

of strike. These debts were used for marriage, illness, house

purchases etc..

Out of 150 workers only 59 workers stated that they had received
help from unions and in that badlis were 19%. Some workers were in
need of help but the stock of grains was over. The help in the form of grain
was less than 15 kg., and in form of money less than Rs. 100 during
entire period.

Most of the workers (137) supported the strike for poor financial
condition of workers/wage hike, 38 workers supported because of
disappointing performance of RMMS. Only 3 respondents supported for
permanancy benefit to badlis and which suggested that there was not a
divergence of Interest between badlis and permanent workers as expected
by the researcher in the beginning owing to 80,000 badlis in the total
workers. Most of the workers (60%) regarded Dr. Samant as a successful/
powerful man followed by workers saying that he was non-corrupt and
honest. Two thirds of the workers were convinced that no other union was
4

in position to help them because of lack of power and many other believed
that other unions were cheating workers.

The majority of workers (73) expressed illegal strikes were useless,

38% opined that if strikes should take place at all, those should not be
indefinite. The legal and limited duration strike was favoured by the
workers. Out of 150, 49 workers did not want to go on strike again. It
was interesting to note that overwhelming majority of the workers (79%)
held the government responsible for the outcome (failure) of the strike,
secondly, RMMS was blamed and only 8 workers blamed Dr. Samant.
 (73)

Only 28% workers opined that courts were useful, while 37.6%
stressed usefulness on certain conditions and 34.4% stated the courts
were not useful. This anger appeared due to pendency before the courts
and delays in justice by the time significance gets lost.

The researcher concluded :

"Lastly, it may be observed that the consequences of the strike were

disastrous. Not only did strike result in colossal losses in terms of
employment and wages but the fighting spirit of the workers has been
largely extinguished. A substantial majority of the workers sank back in
apathy and acquiescence. If a strike in Lenin's terms, is a "school of war",
then this one seems to have been particularly successful in producing
dropouts, and if its performance is to improve, a rewriting of the
curriculum seems to be called for".

3.16 STRIKE OF 1989 , IN TELCO, PUNE 16 :

The main issue of dispute was a recognition of leadership of

terminated worker Shri. Rajan Nair. After his termination in the capacity
of President of Telco Kamgar Sanghtana (TLS), the union sent a letter
to management asking it to enter into fresh agreement about workers
demands on 31st August, 1988. This was turned down by management
on the ground of unrecognized leadership of Nair. The workers started
violent activities. There was emergence of a new union on 9th February
1989 called as Telco Employees Union (TEU) which is believed to have
come in existence at the instance of management. The management
entered into an agreement with TEU on 19th September 1989 and average
 (74)

wage hike of Rs. 585 per month was assured. Because of this attitude
of the management, the workers became uneasy and they adopted means
like work to rule, go slow and tool down. Meantime Shri. Rajan Nair
alongwith 6000 workers out of 9000 went in mass hunger strike from 21st
September 1989. This followed mass arrests of these workers on 29th
Setp. 1989. As soon as these workers were released. Nair gave a notice
of strike on 24th October 1989. Meanwhile elections to Loksabha were
declared. The Chief Minister of Maharashtra took leading part in bringing
together Nair and Ratan Tata of Telco. Unconditionally and unilaterally
the strike was called off on 22nd November 1989. There was no settle­
ment of any sort. Because of this unrest, the daily production of 30
vehicles in Telco came down to three to four. This also hit indigenous
ancillary units in and around Pune, Ichalkamanji an Kolhapur from which
Telco made purchasing amounting to Rs. 230 crores. These ancillary
units also generated employment of over 50,000 workers.

3.17 IYENGAR, VUAYSHREE, (1990) STUDIED : THE IMPACT OF

INDUSTRIAL STRIKE ON THE FAMILIES 17 :

This is an exploratory descriptive study. It tries to explore the

reasons for strike and the effect of the strike on worker and his family.
75 workers were interviewed from Paper Mill, Woolen Mill and Chemical
Factory in Kalyan area affected by strike during 1986-89. The major
findings were - (i) Reasons for strike - a) 46.7% due to improper
wages b) 30.7% due to dismissal of a worker c) 8% due to improper
working conditions, and d) 14% did not know, just to support others
 (75)

(ii) Effect of strike - a) 38.7% were without income during strike b)

53.3% received income between Rs. 100 and Rs. 1500 c) 20% had to
change housing, and d) 2.7% experienced effect on child education.

Considering the adverse effect of the strike on the worker and his
family, the respondents have realized that they should not go on strike in
the future. Hie strike adds to the mental tension and creates lots of
economic problems which the whole family had to bear. The respondents
felt that negotiation is the best way to express the demands and they had
also stressed the role of trade unions in promoting welfare of the workers.

3.18 NEW GENERATION OF ORGANIZED WORKFORCE 18 :

Anil Sengupta while participating in National Seminar on

"Industrial Relations - Coming Decade" at New Delhi, pointed out that the
labour relations scene In India had witnessed two important
developments: (i) erosion of managerial authority, and (ii) increasing shift
of power in trade union from the hands of leaders to those of rank and
file workers during the last two decades. According to him, the present
workforce is young, literate, more skilled, belongs to upper castes and is
urban in origin. Workers of today also attach high importance to intrinsic
factors, such as lack of recognition for achievement, absence of adequate
promotional facilities and opportunities for training and development.
Therefore, Sengupta advises the managers to be responsive not only to the
lower level needs of workers, such as money and security, but also to their
higher order social-psychological needs. He gives hints to trade union
leaders also to draw their strength from the support of the rank and file.
 (76)

The employers in different parts of the country have become

increasingly vociferous in their complaint. In one report the employers
claimed : "Far more damaging to production are the rampant indiscipline
and erosion of work-ethic even when there is no strike or lock-out." Sengputa
further talking on outside leadership puts in words of Ramswamy (1988)
that, "ironically, while the complaint in the fifties and sixties, when trade
unionism was in its infancy, was that professional agitators were Inciting
gullible workers, the employers now want nothing more than that the
present pattern of leadership (composed of outsiders) should grow strong
and continue".

Sengupta, further quotes findings of study in mid-60's in and around

Calcutta by Charkraborty : "Business executives and union officials have
inadequate knowledge about the factors contributing to worker's job
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Both management and union people fail to
appreciate the impact of monotonous work on workers. Secondly, wage
has been ranked as the most important factor by both business executives
and labour leaders, while the industrial workers attach first importance to
steady and permanent work. Thirdly, the co-workers play a much more
significant role towards workers' job satisfaction than management and
union think."

Sengupta further pointed out that even though they were satisfied
with the security of their jobs and several other extrinsic factors, yet there
was overall dissatisfaction, including such intrinsic factors as lack of
recognition for achievement, absence of adequate promotional facilities
and opportunities for training and development.
 (77)

While speaking on participation of workers Sengupta adds that,

since the effectiveness of participation at any level in an organization is
also very much dependent on decisions at other levels, it is necessary to
spread participation throughout the length and breadth of an
organization. Not only that, it is also necessary to allow workers
progressively to exert greater influence in the organizational decision-making
process, because, as one expert in this field has pointed out, the workers'
appetite for power increases once they taste it.

According to Sengupta the All India Organization of Employers has

stated recently that there is a shared feeling among the employers that the
existing labour laws have proved to be counter productive, leading to a
widespread indiscipline, violence and proliferation of trade unions. Sengupta,
therefore, attached this reason why the employers wanted the labour laws
to be restructured which would curb trade union power. Thus employers
and managers were also unhappy over the delay in passing the latest
Industrial Relations Bill by the Parliament which aimed at curtailing trade
union power.

Ramswamy's findings indicate : " as the vast majority of the leaders

think of their members as being Ill-Informed and incapable of deciding
what is in their own best interest, ope might say that even the leaders are
not free from the historical stereotyped belief that industrial workers
cannot take responsibility for themselves. As a result, even humane
leaders with a deep compassion for labour abrogate to themselves the
power to decide on behalf of labour".
 (78)

Sengputa, has attached much importance to the union activities.

He points out dismal scene of trade union movement : "Despite the
presence of competent worker activists, the new union has not been able
to dispense with the services of the outside middle class leadership. They
still need them for political leverage. Because of linkage with political
parties, the trade unions have often failed to intervene in factory politics
effectively. The politically committed leaders and cadres have often
subordinated workers' shopfloor interest to the immediate interests of the
parties to which they are linked. As a result, unions do not often enjoy
support at the shopfloor. Their position, therefore, depends critically on
political maneuvers and fortunes of their respective political parties.
Moreover, linkage with parties has fragmented the trade union movement
on ideological line, which has further weakened the already weak trade
union movement. It is against this background that we have to
understand the decline of politically-oriented unions and emergence of
independent unions in recent years in certain regions of the country having
modem industries and which are also growing".

Lastly, Sengupta has doubted the continuance of the shopfloor

independent unions on long run basis and stressed need to reorient the
style of functioning by the trade union leadership.

3.19 SHORTER AND TILLY'S STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL VIOLENCE IN

FRANCE FROM 1890 TO 1935 19 :

The trade unions were not recognized during this period. The strike
violence was very low i.e. only 2% i.e. 88 out of over 4,000 strikers were
violent. They found that violent strikes were larger and longer lasting
 (79)

than the peaceful strikes. They expected but did not find, that strikes
over union organization issues were more violent. They also found that
industries with tightly knit work organizations and modem conflict
strategies were more prone to strike but less prone to violence.

3.20 SNYDER AND KELLY'S STUDY OF VIOLENCE OVER 6,000

ITALIAN STRIKES BETWEEN 1878 AND 1903 20 :

It involves, a period before and shortly after the official recognition

of trade unions in Italy. When compared to France, Italy was
characterized by markedly more labour conflict. The number of strikes in
Italy rose steadily despite government prohibitions throughout most of the
period. This period was particularly violent, as indicated by the fact that
11 percent of strikes were violent. They also found violence was more
likely in large and lengthy strikes. They investigated several aspects of
strike issues. They found that only multiple issue strikes significantly
increased strike violence. The effects of such contextual variables as wage
changes and industrial growth were found to be trivial. Like Shorter and
Tilly (1971), they found inter-industry difference suggesting that
industries in which workers lacked a tightly knit organizational structure
were more likely settings for violent strikes. They also found that violent
strikes were less likely to yield a favourable outcome, a result that directly
challenges Gamson's findings for protest movement as a whole.

3.21 TAFT AND ROSS'S (1969) STUDY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN

STRIKES 21 :

They studied in depth a few highly publicized violent strikes, which

precludes any systematic comparison of violent and non-violent strikes.
 (80)

They found that strikes over union organization issues were more likely to
be violent than strikes over other issues.

3.22 STRIKES IN ONTARIO AND VIOLENCE FROM 1958 TO

1967 22 :

Don Sherman Grant II. and Michael Wallace, have conducted a

research study on cause of strike violence using strike-level data from
Ontario from 1958 to 1967. They have given detail review about resource
mobilization theory on the determinants and consequences of violence as
well as about three studies on this issues in France, Italy and America by
different scholars. Grant and Wallace observe that, "there is no rigorous,
quantitative study of strike violence in advanced industrial countries in
the post world war II eta. However, research by Jamieson Taft and Ross
and other suggests that violence has been an important feature of strikes
in this era particularly in the United States and Canada. Hence, the
opportunity to investigate industrial violence during the late 1950's and
early 1960 will Illuminate the process of violence".

In this study the measures of violence was an ordinal measures of

picketer's conduct as reported by company officials. Employers
evaluations of picketers' behavior were used to represent escalating stages
of violence and were coded as follows : peaceful conduct 1(46.5%), blocked
plant entrance 2 (23.3%), threatened to damage property or injure persons
3(11.80%) did actual damage to property 4 (13.6%) and did actual injury
to persons 5 (4.8%). Only a small percentage of strike showed the most
extreme form of violence confirmed their expectations that most strikes
 (81)

during this era were relatively peaceful. It recognizes that violence is a

continuous concept and that actions such as blocking a plant entrance,
however symbolic, may pose real threat to persons trying to gain entry or
may serve as a pretext for authorities to initiate violence.

3.23 WORKERS BREAK OPEN MILL LOCKS 23 :

The workers cannot wait longer In case of closures. According to

the report in the Times of India dt. 22-2-92 the enthusiastic workers of
New Great Eastern Mills at Byculla and activists of the 'Bandh Girani
Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti' broke open the locks in the weaving sections
of the unit and marched inside in a bid to clean up the machines. Over
250 people started cleaning 600 plain and 200 automatic cimmco looms
in a crusty state lying unused for nearly five years. It would take over six
months to restore the looms to working conditions. Mr. Prakash Reddy
of A1TUC expressed that the workers would sell the scrap and other items
to raise money to start the mill and hoped that they would force the
government to take some action. He recalled the similar 1972 incident in
case of Sakseria Mills, now Bombay Textiles, under the leadership
of Mr. S. A. Dange, a veteran militant leader, after which mill was taken
over by the government.

In the context of this mill, the reactions of workers were collected

and presented in the same issue of TOI under heading "workers bent on
starting mill". This mill was over 100 years old and employed over 3000
workers. It was closed in 1987. In fact the management had not declared
lock-out or closure. The owner K. K. Kanoria, who was least interested
in solving the problem, faced financial difficulties and he closed the mill.
 (82)

After closure there were several agitations and demonstrations without

any gain. The Chief Minister intervened and matter was represented
before Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) but there
was no outcome. According to the Industrial Development Bank of India
(IDBI) Rs. 55 crores were required to start the mill out of which the owner
expressed to contribute only 1.5 crores. The main creditor of the mill -
the Dena Bank was also not in position to solve the problem. This mill
has Rs.40 crore liability. This resulted in workers taking over the mills
to restart with hope that the government would wave the interest and
other charges on the liabilities. But in five years, it has taken all the
happiness of its workers. Vasant Ganpat Mahadik worked for 27 years in
the mill was stranded without a job who comes daily to sign his muster
card like other employees. Mahadik has bitter reactions. He said "It Is
all a game by the management. Neither the government, the union, nor
the owner can run this mill, so why don't they let us run it? We are now
determined to start the mill. The government is not interested. Who
elects this government? Is it the rich people? It is we workers. But we
are forgotten after the vote is cast". Like him, there is Vasant Sutar who
joined the mill in 1939. After 42 year service record, he was not paid his
retirement dues. He said. "I was given Rs.7,000 and that was used up in
my son's marriage. I have two daughters to get married. Where will I get
the money " 'Swaraj' has no meaning for us". Another worker Sohan
Simru used to work as a sweeper in the mill and after the mill was closed,
he too was unable to find any permanent job. He said, "I sell ’bhel*
sometimes. I have no place to stay and have to keep moving". Another
worker, Nivruti Panhale, who was with the mill for 20 years, said, "Now,
that we have dared to take over the mill, there is some hope. Anyway, try
 (83)

at getting the mill started won't harm us.” Another worker said, "There
was a stage when we lost faith in everything. Now we have some courage,
and we feel something will happen". Someone else said that the
recognized union, the 'Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh' had let them down.

3.24 DETERMINANTS OF STRIKES IN INDIA 24 :

R. Beans and K. Holden have done study on "Determinants of Strikes"

in post independence period i.e. from 1952 to 1990 in three parts i.e. first
from 1952 to 1977, second from 1952 to 1985 and third 1952 to 1990.

In first part they found that union density (membership) was

positively associated with strike frequency and was statistically
significant. The effect of election years was to increase the number of
strikes, whereas the emergency period had the consequence of reducing
strikes. The effect of real wage change was insignificant.

When the period was extended upto 1985 the emergency effect was
found to be statistically significant, trade union density almost significant,
elections not quite significant and real wages totally insignificant.

When the sample period was extended to 1990, election effect lost
its significance. Thus, when sample period was extended from mid-1970'
upto more recent years, it would appear that the explanatory power of
elections in strike determination becomes less marked.

3.25 MAKING THE UNION A PARTNER 25 : .

According to Dr. Jamshed Irani, Managing Director of Tata Steel,

many companies in India have taken the initiative to build mutual trust
 (84)

between management and trade unions and between management and

workmen. Such companies have had years of industrial peace and steady
improvement in productivity. On the other hand, the lack of attention by
many companies has brought about industrial unrest, an absence of trust
in the relationship and low productivity. He 1ms suggested that, (i) first
the government must take initiatives both at the Central/State levels to
depolitieise trade unions and labour movements and pass on authority to
the employees themselves; (ii) review and amendment of labour laws are
required in order to create a free and fair environment for policy-making
and decision making, avoiding misuse and abuse on any side; and
(iii) managements must give the highest priority in terms of time and effort
to the whole process of industrial development.

3.26 A CHASTENED TRADE UNIONISM 26 :

E. A. Ramswamy, one of the top experts on industrial relations in

India, in his article on "a chastened trade unionism", observes that, trade
unions have held organized industry in their grip for well over quarter
century. Human resource managers in the vast majority of the firms have
spent time and energies trying to contain union power. It is most impor­
tant to know that most unions lack the inherent strength to merit the
power they have enjoyed. The fact is that our unions are in the midst of
an unprecedented crisis. Their membership is shrinking. In Ramswamy’s
opinion four major circumstances have worked in unions favour namely
: (i) The law has enabled them to make demands without proof of mem­
bership. There is a need for membership verification (ii) The command
economy fostered since independence has suited them ideally. The employers
have to pay, in any case, more only to permanent workers, whose num-
 (85)

bers could be decreased by shifting work to casual and contract labour,

often in connivance with the unions, (iii) The public sector has been
willing to purchase peace without even the profits. To deal with a diverse
group of employees, without union, becomes a difficult task to manage­
ment and therefore management bargains with union and here the pur­
pose of collective bargaining gets lost. Further Ramswamy opines that if
the liberalization of the economy does proceed, trade union power would
come under severe threat. Enforcing the exit of unwanted individuals and
unprofitable activities is not sufficient to improve productivity. As the rest
of the world has found out, workers cannot give their best without some
commitment to the goals of the enterprises and some power to influence
its decisions. Participatory management is one way of achieving this
objective. Human resource management (HRM) is the other. In Germany
and Sweden the participation management has statutory support. HRM,
in contrast, has resulted from management initiative without political or
statutory backing. HRM is a system of participation in its own right,
although the decisions are usually confined to the shopfloor, whereas
statutory methods provide labour, a say in range of decisions from shopfloors
to the board of directors. Industrialist would prefer HRM and it has posed
a challenge to trade unionism everywhere. Unlike collective bargaining,
HRM aims at building bridges between the management system and the
individual employee. Participatory management ought to have pride of
place in labour's agenda, whereas our unions have opposed it tooth and
nail. The liberalization of the economy would, if anything, add to exploi­
tation and conflict of interest. There is no question at all that we need
a labour movement to work for a more egalitarian social order. But that
has to be chastener and reborn movement which has learnt its lessons.
 (86)

3.27 INDUSTRIAL UNREST WORST IN MAHARASHTRA 27 :

According to Mr. A. M. Joshi, Maharashtra has earned the dubious

distinction of witnessing the most industrial unrest in the country.
Ironically, India, with almost half a dozen strikes every day, leads in
labour problems in the developed and developing countries of the world,
according to an official survey. Maharashtra witnessed 140 industrial
strikes in 1991, involving 42,200 workers and resulting into a loss of 13.5
lakh mandays. The figures were, however, lower in 1992 when 132 strikes
were witnessed involving 26,100 workers and resulting into a loss of 9.19
lakh mandays. In 1992, the monetary loss incurred by the workers was
to the extent of Rs.l 1.30 crores and the net loss in production was to the
tune of Rs. 210 crores. This is in contrast to the figures of Rs. 11.40
crores and Rs. 212 crores respectively, in 1991.

The two major issues resulting in the industrial unrest have been
wage rise and bonus. Over 50 percent of the strikes are said to be due
to intra-union and inter-union rivalries, which the state government has
failed to check inspite of the promulgation of the 'Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,
1971'. There are many instances where the workmen have changed loy­
alties overnight. The union which have got recognition under the 'Act'
have in many cases lost their majority support and the other unions of
splinter groups of the same unions have come perforced tp deal with such
situations and ignore the recognized unions as the management is inter­
ested in seeing that there is no production loss and prolonged industrial
unrest.
 (87)

As a result, majority of recognized unions under the 'Act' have lost

their majority over a period in many industries and new unions have come
into being claiming majority support. They refuse to seek statutory
recognition but instead exert pressure on the management to deal with
them directly or face confrontation. So the management has to totally
ignore the recognized unions, it is said.

To overcome these problems, the Sanat Mehta Committee

recommended a check-off system, each employee is free to indicate to the
management the union to which he belongs so that eligibility can be
decided on the basis of check-off system. This system is not only
practicable but it also eliminates the flaws of the existing union
membership verification system it is felt.

3.28 THE SENA TARGETS TELCO 28 :

Roop Karnani in the article 'the Sena targets Telco' writes that, after
a successful wage agreement (a minimum rise of Rs.750) at Bajaj Auto's
Aurangabad plant, the Bharatiya Kamgar Sena (BKS), a wing of Shiv Sena,
is trying to woo workers at Bajaj Auto and Telco, two of the largest
industrial units in Pimpri-Chinchwad belt. On 14th January 1993, BKS
alongwith Telco Kamgar Sanghtana (formerly led by Rajan Nair) called
a meeting of workers to announce the merger of BKS with TKS. Y.B.
Bhosale, an eminent labour consultant and adviser to Telco management
for several decades says. "Unless Telco management neglects its
employees, which is certainly not likely, BKS's attempt to enter Telco will
fail because workers have suffered badly during the last strike. On the
other side. Ramesh More of BKS alleges that, the Telco management uses
pressure tactics to prevent the workers from joining BKS. He further
 (88)

alleges that in 1989 there was a genuine movement under the leadership
of Rajan Nair, whom the Shiv Sena had supported, but it was crushed by
the arrest of 5000 fasting workers because of government intervention at
the behest of Telco management.

3.29 WORKERS PAY WITH THEIR LIVES 29 :

Vidyadhar Date narrates the agony of the workers after closure of

their work place. According to him nearly 500 workers of Srinivas Textile
Mill in Bombay have died since the profit making mill closed down in 1984
without getting their gratuity which the management was legally bound to
pay them. Srinivas was considered a top mill, next only to Century and
Bombay Dyeing, when it closed down following a dispute between two
groups in the management. He fears that the number of textile workers
dying in poverty and destitution in Bombay would be much higher since
several mills like Modem, New Great, Kamala, and Phoenix have closed
down in the last few years.

3.30 BAJAJ WORKERS FINED Rs. 1 LAKH EACH 30 :

On 6th September 1993, the Bombay High Court for the first time
has imposed a staggeringly heavy fine of Rs.31 lakhs on 31 workers of
Bajaj Auto, Pune who indulged in acts of violence by causing loss to the
company by setting fire to vehicles, damaging company property and
attacking security personnel along with loss to government property by
burning a police wireless van, damaging police vehicle and equipment
while on law and order duty on June 16 and 19, 1979. The workers
belonged to Bajaj Auto Kamgar Sanghatana. at Pune. The union was
insisting on several terms and conditions for their new agreement which
 (89)

the management was not willing to concede. The employees, therefore,

not only stopped work but resorted to acts of violence. The offence was
registered by police and the trial was conducted in Session Judge's Court,
Pune, who punished these 31 accused with three year’s rigorous impris­
onment in 1985 on which appeal was filed in high court which imposed
only fine of Rs. 1 lakh on each accused after passing remark that Indus­
trial Dispute Act did not sanction such methods.

3.31 OPINION POLL ABOUT STRIKES 31 :

The 'Metropolis' weekly, Bombay, records on its machine on every

Saturday the opinions expressed by citizens on phone on a given issue
under heading 'Opinionline'. On 11.9.93 it published 'Opinionline' on five
questions on strike. It was found that close to 60 percent of those who
called up were convinced beyond doubt that, all strikes were politically
engineered. About 66 percent felt that labour organizations in the country
were pampered by politicians and others. One of the respondents
expressed that our government and judiciary were directly responsible for
supporting and retaining labour laws that had virtually sanctioned
unethical work practices. Not as many thought that the strikes were the
off-shoot of a degenerating democratic process. It was expressed that the
system could not be held responsible for our ills if people start
subverting the democratic process. An overwhelming four fifths were
certain that frequent strikes would affect foreign investment in the
country. Surprisingly, two-thirds of the respondents felt a ban on strikes
was not the way out.
 (90)

3.32 'HAS THE LABOUR LEADERSHIP FORGOTTEN THE TRUTH? 32:

TODAY'S LABOUR LEADERSHIP :

Arun Tikekar of Marathi Daily Loksatta has made an excellent exercise

in reviewing the present and past leadership in Bombay. He has quoted
Henry Edward Manning, Archbishop of West Minister 1889, after the first
London Dock strike - "To put labour and wages first and human or
domestic life second is to invert the order of God and nature". Tikekar
questions, "whether the labour leadership forgot this truth ?" Mr. Tikekar
has narrated the roles of historical stalwarts of labour movement in
Bombay namely Comrade S.A. Dange, N. A. Lokhande G.D. Ambekar,
N.M. Joshi etc.. He says that these leaderships were based on sound
foundation of thinking and morality due to which they were respected by
employees as well employers equally. When they foresaw that due to
protracted strike workers were going to get irrepairable losses and suffer­
ing they immediately suspended their activities and compromised with the
employers and again used to move to fresh move on non-violent basis.
Whatever might be the bitterness caused due to exchanges during nego­
tiations, the employers were very much confident of non-violent activities
of leaders like Comrade Dange, the workers were also happy. When
Mr. Tikekar slides down to present leadership, he has lot to say. He says
that, leaders like George Fernandes used to make Bombay stand still in
ten minutes, such was their powerful hold. Dr. Datta Samant in 1982
could attract the workers in lakhs without much efforts. Mr. Tikekar
observes that both the leaders have no hold now. He adds, it is pertinent
to note that the labour movement in Bombay is .alarmingly slowed down.
He suggests introspection by everybody. Unworthy demands by leaders
and prolonging the struggle till workers get fatigued have caused damage
to employer and employees, both. He points out that due to liberal
 (91)

economic policy and trade union troubles in Bombay, the industries are
going out of Bombay and also out of state which is not good sign for
labour. He gives serious thought to increasing number of vested interests
of leadership with eye on personal prosperity using violent activities. He
asks the labour leaders whether these vagabonds are purchased by the
employers in the name of compromise at the cost of workers benefit? He
advised the other leaders from Pune and other areas to take lesson from
Bombay. Mr. Tlkekar's views are also supported by several readers in
'Lokmanas' column of Loksatta.

3.33 LOCK-OUT PERIOD PAYMENT : A SUPREME COURT

DECISION 33 :

According to the report in Loksatta, a Marathi daily, the payment

of Rs. 16,73,802 has been deposited in the name of workers of Walchandnagar
Industries, Maharashtra, on account of 21 days illegal lock-out as per the
order of the supreme court dt. 28th August 1992. There was a 3 month
strike from July to September, 1985 in machine division of Walchand
Industries. The company declared lock-out from July 7, 1985 to July 28,
1985. The lock-out was challenged by the union in the industrial court
and the decision was in favour of workers. The company filed appeal in
high court which went against it and hence it approached the apex court
where the decision was again against the company. The workers union
hoped that they would get payment of two months strike period also, fight
for which was going on.
 (92)

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 (93)

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 (94)

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 (95)

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33. Loksatta, News Item, dt. 13-10-1993.