MATERIAL CAUSALITY, NON—BEING, AND PLATO's HYPODOCHE:

A RE-VIEW OF THE TIMAEUS IN TERMS OF THE DIVIDED LINE 1

Why are there things which exist rather than nothing? This question is perhaps
the primary one for Metaphysics; perhaps also, it is primary for Ontology since the
question asks for an account of beings, an account for the multiplicity of things we
perceive in the contents of sensation. One way of viewing the business of Plato's
Timaeus is to see this enterprise as an essential objective. The Timaeus opens recall-
ing the discussion of the day before; that discussion is unquestionably indicated to
be the contents of the Republic. One way of reading this connection is to see con-
structive efforts in the Republic as methodologically instructive in interpreting the
Timaeus. I shall argue that one reading of the Divided Line in the Republic which
presents us with a theory of cognition gives us a previously unexplored avenue for
understanding the Timaeus.1 Most especially I have in mind the two accounts of the
principles of creation — the first at 28Aff., the second at 47Aff.
Central to this concern is an understanding of the hypodoche or Receptacle,
discussed in that dialogue. In this paper, I am concerned to discuss the way in which
two issues in the so-called "later" dialogues are brought together in the hypodoche:
a certain interpretation of Non-Being, and a view of the material cause.
According to the Sophist, Being is the dunamis, the power, to affect and be ef-
fected (247E). Non-Being, however, is resolved for us as Other or Difference. In the
important article by Ed Lee,3 Non-Being is definitively shown to be constitutive
Otherness. I argue here that the hypodoche is the transcendental condition for the
possibility of difference; in part, it fulfills the role of to heteron in the Sophist. The
hypodoche also points the way to an understanding of material cause, broadly con-
ceived as the condition which makes finite appearance possible. The function of the
material cause is to explain how it is that appearances are unlike the Form, the entity
that appears; it explains, so far as possible, the recalcitrance of spatio-temporal ex-
istence to the atemporal-a-spatial existence of the Forms. But the hypodoche gives
us reason to re-think the notion of materiality as such since it is described to us both
as the condition which makes appearance possible, and at the same time, absolutely
Empty and devoid of all determination whatsoever. The hypodoche brings together
for us both the constitutive Otherness of the Sophist and the absolutely Empty and
Indeterminate material cause, called to apeiron, the Unlimited, in the four-fold
classification of Being in the Philebus. The hypodoche brings together for us these
two, and gives a new turn to them, in the implicit context of re-viewing the problem
of Non-Being in the broadest ontological and metaphysical context; that context is
framed by the question: Why are there things which exist rather than nothing?

I
Arthur Lovejoy, in his well-known work The Great Chain of Being,* does not
consider the role of the hypodoche when he sets out his analysis of the relation of
Form to phenomena in Plato's ontology. Concisely stated, the answer to "Why are
there things which exist?" for Plato is expressed by what he has called a "principle
of plenitude." The principle of plenitude makes two claims, one general, the other
specific. The general claim is that the things which exist, here identified with the
phenomenal world of imperfect and mutable entities, are a necessary consequence of
the nature of the Absolute; the specific claim, concerning everything which can be,
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that "every conceptual possibility is realized in actuality". Only the general claim
will be considered here.'
"Why are there things which exist rather than Nothing?" is, in effect, taken to
mean this. How are we to account for a field of inherently imperfect, ever-changing
phenomenal entities? How is it that there can be the appearance of things at all,
given the perfect, mutable, and self-sufficient Absolute which Plato called the field
of Form or Idea? The problem is this: if the Forms constitute a self-sufficient field,
then how can the existence of these imperfect and dependent phenomena be explain-
ed? There must be a relation between these two fields — Plato insists on this — and
yet any relation seems to undermine the claim that the intelligible realm of Forms is
self-sufficient. Lovejoy's assesment of the general claim turned out to be this:
And thus Plato, tactitly making the crucial assumption that
the existence of many entities not eternal, not supersensible,
and far from perfect, was inherently desirable, finds in his
otherwordly Absolute, in the Idea of the Good itself, the
reason why the Absolute cannot exist alone. The concept of
Self-Sufficing Perfection, by a bold logical inversion, was —
without losing any of its logical implications — coverted into
the concept of a Self-Transcending Fecundity.6
Plato's answer to the question, "Why are there things which exist rather than
Nothing?", according to Lovejoy, is that there are things which exist because it is
the nature of the Absolute to manifest itself in a field of things; the perfection of the
Absolute consists in its self-pluralizing activity.
It shall be argued that Lovejoy's formulation is not incorrect but does not go
far enough, that what he expressed was merely a dianoetic account of the relation
between Form and phenomena, that his account tells us only what is the case but not
why. I will set out the overall perspective of a dianoetic and noetic account (i.e. the
two highest levels of the Divided Line — Republic 509A—51 IE), and then consider
the version of the dianoetic account which Plato gives us at Timaeus 28A and subse-
quently at 51 A, and next the noetic account which we get at 47E—50E in that same
dialogue. The answer to the question, "Why are there things which exist rather than
Nothing" is different on the two distinct levels, dianoetic and noetic. The principle
of plenitude properly expresses the relation of Form to phenomena on the dianoetic
level of explanation; it insists that a principle of plenitude is the proper answer to the
proper question, "Why are there things which exist rather than Nothing?". The
noetic account provides a different explanation of this relation; it shows us that our
question is wrong-headed and should have been asked, "Why is there Nothing
rather than things which exist?". The answer to the question, grasped noetically, is
satisfied by what I shall call the principle of the Fullness of Emptiness, a principle
which locates Non-Being at the heart of Being, a view which finds intelligibility
grounded in the reality of Non-Being.
What is at stake in this account is the essential role played by Nothingness.
Already in the Sophist, Non-Being is revealed as to heteron "Other" or "Dif-
ference"; in the Timaeus, Non-Being or Nothingness is exposed as the hypodoche,
Absolute Emptiness which is the conditio sine qua non of all difference and
multiplicity. In the Philebus (along with the Sophist and Statesman), Plato has
demonstrated the Being of Becoming; in the Timaeus he goes on to show — as
remarkable as it may seem — the Being of Non-Being, that Non-Being plays a
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fundamental role in explaining why there are things which exist, NOT rather than
Nothing, but because of Nothingness.

II
In the Republic, we learn of the structure of the Divided Line (509Cff).7 There
we are told of a four-fold division; in each case we distinguish a particular faculty
and the corresponding object apprehended through the employment of that faculty.
So from the lowest to highest levels: (1) eikasia (Imagination) apprehends eikones
(images); (2)pistis (Belief) apprehends zoa (living things, i.e. finite intelligences); (3)
dianoia (Thought) apprehends mathemata (mathematical objects); and (4) noesis
(Intellection) apprehends eide or ideal (Forms or Ideas). These levels will be referred
to as: (1) mythic, (2) technic, (3) dianoetic, and (4) noetic, respectively. We can ask
for — and Plato in fact furnishes us with — an account of the relation between
Form and phenomena as seen from every level. For example, we can inquire how the
mythic level comprehends the dianoetic and noetic, and so on. We can ask, from
each mode of apprehending objects, not only the relation between faculty and ob-
ject, on that level, but also how that level views the epistemological enterprise on
each of the other levels.
The mythic level provides an account which guesses or conjectures about the
nature of reality, its presentation is often in the form of a myth or story which,
however, points far beyond its conjecture to a determinate and certain reality. The
technic level is the field of "know-how"; it is the field in which any man with a skill
— the technician — operates. The technic level is characterized by "belief" claims;
it concerns the knowledge a man must have if he is to find his way home. The
dianoetic level provides a hypothetical account of reality, it is the field of "knowing-
what" principles are involved in any branch of knowledge. All mathematical and
kindred sciences characterize the knowledge apprehended dianoetically. The
dianoetic level is always a hypothetical level, a level un-grounded by the non-
hypothetical principles revealed by the noetic account. The dianoetic account reveals
hypothetically "what" principles are entailed in some relation; the noetic account
tells us "why" they are so related. The noetic level, therefore, is characterized by a
"knowing-why" certain principles exposed hypothetically by the dianoetic account
are related in some precise way. Noetically, we establish a priori principles, prin-
ciples apodeictically certain which no experience whatsoever can contradict. It is im-
portant to note that the realization of first principles follows from the upward move-
ment from hypothesis to those principles, from dianoetic to noetic levels the move-
ment downward from noetic to dianoetic levels is the move toward justifying the
hypothetical method and the sciences whose foundation rests in that method.

Ill
On each level of the Divided Line, every complete ontological account provides
us with four aspects of the Being of an entity. Interpreted differently within the con-
text of the character of each different level, the four aspects of the being of an entity
yet remain the same. First, we are told of the structural or formal character; second,
the material nature or condition for material presentation; third, the cause of agency
which unites the formal and material character of an entity; and fourth, the nature
of the product which results from the union of formal and material through an effi-
cient cause of the union — this fourth aspect, properly understood, reveals the
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purpose or end of this production. These four aspects of an entity, these four on-
tological determinations of an entity, should sound remarkably similar to Aristotle's
doctrine of four causes discussed in the Metaphysics and elsewhere. It has been, of
course, a well-established fact since Cherniss' important work that there is much
which Aristotle misunderstands or purposefully misrepresents to show, by contrast,
that all pre-Aristotleian philosophy has been a stumbling toward the realization of
the four causes which he set forth.1 What is here implied is that the doctrine of the
four causes, in at least a general fashion, is already set forth in the dialogues.
Now let us bring this four-fold to bear on the dianoetic and noetic accounts.
There are two fundamental respects in which these two account differ; (1) the
dianoetic account introduces principles hypothetically — because these so-called
principles are yet unjustified — but does not establish the rules according to which
they fit together; the noetic account tell us "why" they are so related, and (2) the
dianoetic account underscores the ontological tension between Forms and
phenomena; the noetic resolves the tension, not by claiming that Forms and
phenomena are identical, but by revealing that they are two aspects of one and the
same Being. This integral connection is made clear by an examination of the special
character of nous.

IV
The principle of plenitude is a characteristic dianoetic assesment of the relation
between Forms and phenomena; it is a statement of the fact that Plato's ontology
presupposes that it is the nature of Being, conceived in its purely formal respect, to
express itself, manifest itself, pluralize itself (or whatever phrase be thought more
felicitous). The formal aspect of Being constitutively understood as perfect, im-
mutable, and eternal eidetic structure, is thought to necessarily manifest itself. So,
the principole of plentitude tells us something about the nature of Being, in answer-
ing the question, "Why are there things which exist?" As Lovejoy put it, the Ab-
solute was not really Absolute since it was related to entities whose nature was not its
own, that it was a requirement of the Absolute to manifest itself. But Lovejoy does
not tell us why. It can already be seen, however, in a late dialogue like the
Parmenides — though doubtlessly earlier than the Timaeus — that the consequence
of the second part of the dialogue is to affirm that if the Absolute, considered in its
purely formal aspect, is conceived so absolutely as to be unrelated to anything else,
then nothing follows from the hypothesis that it does or does not exist.9 The negative
doctrine of that dialogue insists that Absolute Unity must be related to the field of
multiplicity. Only a noetic account — never a dianoetic one — informs us of the
causal character of that relation.
In this formulation, Lovejoy focuses on the earlier part of the Timaeus. He is
attentive to the two distinct kinds of Being distinguished there, that which always is
and never comes-to-be and that which always comes-to-be and never is (27E—28A);
in this enterprise he is sedulous to Plato's discussion of three distinct entities: that
which is, that which comes-to-be, and the cause of that which comes-to-be since
everything which comes-to-be necessarily comes-to-be by a cause. The first
characterizes the "model"; the second, the "image" or "copy" of the model; the
third, the "Demiurge" or fashioner of all things, who instantiates the model on in-
determinate material of the copy. What is noticeably neglected is the treatment of
the material aspect of Being, the very issue pressed in the section beginning at 47E
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when the ontology is considered, not according to nous, but to ananke. And as it so
happens, the material consideration reveals two things: (1) the noetic account of on-
tology when the material cause, the hypodoche, is claimed to be the eternal, im-
mutable, and intelligible "this" (touto) as opposed to the phenomenal appearance
which is always "suchlike" (toiouto), and (2) the material aspect of the dianoetic ac-
count — thus far missing — when the hypoche is subsequently described as chora
("space").10
The issue that underlies the development in the Timaeus from 28E to 53C is that
the dianoetic level cannot even give a complete account of itself; here, the material
aspect of Being is overlooked. The next step is to go higher up on the Divided Line to
the noetic account. The noetic account will reveal the shortcoming of the dianoetic.
Having revealed the essential character of the material cause of Being we can go
back down to the dianoetic level to complete the account. At 52A, with the efficient
cause in the background, that which is, that which comes-to-be, and the Receptacle
are re-introduced. I take it that this indicates the account is being reiterated on
another level (i.e. the dianoetic level).
Now, since I have claimed that both dianoetic and noetic accounts must provide
all four ontological determinations, and since Lovejoy has neglected the material
aspect, it follows that his assessment is not even a complete or strong form of the
dianoetic account. By considering the hypodooche the Receptacle or material cause,
as chora, we can now consider the complete dianoetic structure of ontology. The
emphasis must be on the Receptacle as "space". All instantiations of Form — the
model — must be somewhere. The chora, the "somewhere" called "space"
separates Form from phenomena, structure from the shining forth ofthat structure.
Thereby, the dianoetic account insists on the maintenance of the ontological tension
between Form and phenomena which can rightly be called on this level — Being and
Becoming.

V
The noetic account of Platonic ontology characteristically and systematically
refuses to accept an ontological disparity among any of the four aspects of Being.
The relation between one aspect and another is considered in terms of what we might
call logical moments or relations, aspects of Being which are logically but not prac-
tically distinct. The key to the noetic account comes in the presentation of a par-
ticular explanation of the material cause, the hypodoche. The noetic account is
made possible by the awareness of the noetic character of Nothingness, and how —
only on this basis — can we comprehend what is comprehensible.
The material cause as hypodoche, as Cornford observed," is never ex hou, it is
always en ho; it is never that "out of which" phenomena are constituted or con-
structed, but always that "in which" images (qua phenomena) appear.12 It is entirely
void of all determinations whatsoever (51A6—7), it is absolutely nothing in itself,
and yet it shares with the Forms a designation of noetic status. When the hypodoche
is revealed as the nurse (tithene, 49A6) of all Becoming which is utterly Empty
(51A6—7), we have the noetic account. When the hypodoche is revealed as chora or
"space" in the restatement of the ontological structure (52D2 et seq.) the account is
dianoetic.
The Forms, on the one hand, constitute an aspect of Being as Fullness, a
Fullness neither spatial nor temporal, an eternal field of perfect completeness. The
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hypodoche, on the other, represents another aspect of Being, the eternal, immutable
Nothing. The significance of such a distinction is this. Being is characteriscally ex-
pressed in a moment of Emptiness as well as Fullness. The project of Being —
noetically speaking — is the project of making full what can never be Full as such.
Being in its moment of Fullness is never Empty; in its moment of Emptiness it is
never Full. Both moments exist in an essential relation to each other, a relation
characterized by confrontation, of a dialectical sort.
How it it that Being contains both an eternal undifferentiated Emptiness and a
differentiated Fullness, we are told at 51A6—7 is "difficult and obscure." And yet,
on this account, the hypodoche is not the dianoetic hypothesis which serves as the
explanans for the irrational and transient nature of phenomena — although it does
serve this function dianoetically. But noetically, the hypodoche is a non-
hypothetical principle which serves as the explanans for the nature of Being as Form
or Fullness to manifest or pluralize itself.
The manifestation of Form — this field of Fullness — requires that Form
"manifests" or "appears." And if this Form or Fullness appears it must shine forth
from where it is to where it is not. But since this field of Fullness is Full, that is, all-
encompassing, since there is not "where" where it is not, then there is no-where for
it to appear. On this noetic level of the Divided Line, there is no "space" — the pro-
blem posed by a "spatial-where" arises for the first time of the dianoetic level with
the introduction of mathematical objects, and thereby two-dimensional representa-
tion of structure. The hypodoche turns out to be the transcendental condition for
the possibility of all manifestation, the conditio sine qua non of all appearance
whatsoever; the hypodoche is the "where-ness" which serves as the explanans for
the manner in which Form appears in the mode of phenomena. Now if this Form or
Fullness appears, it can only entail some manner of movement within itself; it can
only, as it were, flow into itself, because there can be nothing outside itself. In this
so-called "movement" — a dialectical movement, to be sure — Fullness moves into
its own Emptiness, its own Nothingness; it "moves" from where it is to where it is
not. This manner of speaking is intended to describe a dialectic between two aspects
of Being, its own Fullness and Emptiness, a dialectic which gives rise to the ap-
pearance called "Becoming." This internal movement within itself describes the
manner in which the structure of Being — Form — shows itself, or, as if, stands out-
side of itself, externalizes or manifests itself. Being expresses itself in a dialectical
process — looked at from a poetic point of view — of trying to fill-up its ever pre-
sent Emptiness. This Emptiness or Nothingness is an inherent feature of Being itself;
this is what makes it so "difficult and obscure." The hypodoche is absolutely
Empty, and yet eternal and eternally constitutive of Being. With every advance of
Fullness into its own Emptiness, the Emptiness remains forever Empty and
unreachable. The Emptiness always remains as a constitutive challenge to that
Fullness. And this Emptiness is both absolutely indeterminate and thereby Nothing,
and yet only this Nothing could be the condition of all appearance. Stated different-
ly, given the self-instatiating nature of Forms, there must be an internal, constitutive
condition which explains this self-instantiating nature; that condition is the ab-
solutely indeterminate hypodoche.
In the view presented here, the hypodoche is the "constitutive Otherness" of
the Sophist; as such, it is the condition which makes differentiation and thereby
determination possible. Furthermore, this hypodoche as "constitutive Otherness"
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serves as the material cause of beings as such. The condition for differentiation,
then, following the instruction in the Sophist that Non-Being is Other, the role
fulfilled here by the hypodoche, is Non-Being alone in its noetic application. This
Non-Being qua hypodoche assures the possibility of the self-externalization —
manifestation — of Being through its own self-differentiation. It seems that only by
virtue of the fact that Non-Being plays a constitutive role in the structure of Being,
as the hypodoche, that Being undergoes this "project" of granting Being to what is-
not, and in this process, dialectical in nature, there arises that lot of Nothing, called
beings.
Let us summarise this dialectic which expresses the ontology of the Timaeus. In
the first account at 28Aff, the Model is used in order to fashion the Copy. The Copy
is the indeterminate matter structured by the Model. The fashioning or structuring
of the material is brought about through the agency of the Demiurge. Lovejoy's
principle of plenitude assesses this three-fold as having the necessary feature of
manifestation. In short, the Absolute must appear. Lovejoy assesses in the nature of
this Platonic Absolute, a self-instatiating character of eidetic structure. In the se-
cond account at 47Aff, a new condition for the appearance of Being is described.
There, we get a different level of consideration for our overall enterprise of answer-
ing the persistent question, "Why are there things which exist rather than nothing?"
We get the introduction of the hypodoche, the condition which explains how dif-
ference, and thereby plurality as such, is possible. The hypodoche explains, not how
phenomena are like the Forms which they instantiate but rather, how the
phenomena are u/jlike the Form — we get an account of the condition which makes
difference possible, and that is Otherness as a constitutive feature of that Absolute.
If we wish to put it poetically, in response to the mythos which is the dramatic
mode of the Timaeus, we might say that there is a description of a flow of the
Fullness of Being into its own Emptiness. In the noetic description, we speak of a
dialectic between Model and the hypodoche, or the internal indeterminate as a con-
dition for the self-instantiation of Form. This hypodoche is understood functional-
ly; its Emptiness is the refelective medium which underlies, as condition, the re-
iterative character of the self-instatiating nature of Forms.11 The Fullness of Emp-
tiness, the reflection of Fullness in its own Emptiness (which is the movement of Be-
ing within itself), is what we call the field of Becoming (the out-flow of Fullness).
The noetic account of the explanation of Becoming, then, is described by the Princi-
ple of the Fullness of Emptiness. As Lovejoy's principle of plenitude provided a
dianoetic account of the field of Becoming by claiming that Plato tacitly assumes it
is the nature of the Absolute to manifest itself in a field of imperfect multiplicity, so
I propose that the principle of the Fullness of Emptiness presents a noetic account of
the same relation. This principle tells us more than what Plato assumes; it tells us —
according to Plato — why.
Now to complete the account, to show how it is that the account is noetic, I
must consider the role of the nous-demiurge. I will begin by explaining the move
which Plato makes from the account according to nous to a restatement according
to anangke. First, as Archer-Hind made clear long ago, ananke has no status in-
dependent of nous; it "signifies the forces originated by nous, the sum total of the
physical laws which govern the material universe: that is to say, the laws which
govern the existence of nous in the form of plurality." M And secondly, he
planomene aitia, or the Errant cause, which characterizes the account according to
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ananke, expresses both the dianoetic and noetic aspect of the material cause: in the
former it suggests "space" or "place" as the material determination of all ap-
pearance; in the latter it suggests the intelligible "this" yet utterly Empty, eternal
Nothingness, which serves as the condition for the structuring and movement of this
eidetic Fullness. So the account beginning at 47E in terms of ananke is no less an ac-
count according to nous; rather, the ananke aspect of the noetic account completes
the account by insisting on the importance of the material cause which turns out —
as that en ho — to point the way to the characteristic noetic determination, namely,
that Being contains within itself Absolute Emptiness as well as Absolute Fullness,
and that this Nothing is the condition for the possibility of all manifestation or
pluralization.
To complete this noetic account, the perspective in which the account is set
must be made clear: the nature of Being to manifest or instantiate itself is in fact the
manifestation or pluralization of nous ("Pure Intelligence"), that in the Timaeus we
are told that the genera of all the Forms or Ideas is the auto ho esti zoon and that the
pluralization of nous or the evolution of Pure Intelligence comes in the form of
finite zoa ("finite intelligences") which comprise the entire realm of the Forms."
At Timaeus 39E, Plato tells us "So many Forms [ideas] as Pure Intelligence
(nous) perceived to exist in the Absolute Living Intelligence, according to their varie-
ty and multitude, such kinds and such number did he [Demiurge] think it necessary
that this universe should possess." The totality of these Forms are four — four dif-
ferent levels of intelligences (zoa): the firey gods, winged air creatures, water
dwellers, and earthly beings. The demiurge is hypothetically (and anthropomor-
phically) suggested as the active causal agency represented non-hypothetically in the
principle of nous. What we get is the pluralization of the noeton zoon as noeta zoa;
we get the pluralization of Pure Intelligence (nous), thought as auto ho esti zoon or
Absolute Living Intelligence, in finite intelligences (zoa). The manifestation or
pluralization of absolute nous — what Heidegger might call the presencing-of-what-
is-present — comes in the definite form of finite presentations. The determinations
of these definite manifestations is made according to definite and determinate
material presentation. Everything generated is a finite thing; every finite thing is a
bounded thing and therefore a spatio-temporal entity; and every spatio-temporal en-
tity, therefore, has a material presentation or "body". A "body" is the manner in
which everything finite is presented as a determinate thing. The four elements — in
the discussion which follows in the Timaeus — are the basic and determinate struc-
tures according to which all material presentation, and therefore all manifestation
takes place. The process of pluralization or manifestation involves the move from
Fullness to Emptiness, from Pure Intelligence to finite intelligences whose deter-
minate mode of presentation is materially determined by the application of the four
elements — fire, air, water, and earth — to the varying levels of finite intelligences.
On this account, higher levels of intelligences are presented in fire dominated bodies
(such as the gods), then air, water, and earth. The manner of applying these various
modes of material presentation to the varying levels of intelligence characterizes the
concern of the dianoetic account.

Robert Hahn,
Department of Philosophy,
Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. U.S.A.
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 Notes

1. This essay is an off-shoot of several other longer and more detailed studies. Special acknowledge-
ment is due to The University of Texas at Arlington for an Organized Research Grant which made
it possible to prepare this paper during the summer of 1978. Earlier versions of this paper were
constructively criticized by Karsten Harries, Robert Brumbaugh, and Heinrich von Staden. Of
course, I assume full responsibility for the contents presented here.

2. It could be argued that the epistemological structure set forth by the Divided Line, whatever its im-
port, is not necessarily presupposed by the discussion in the Timaeus. I cannot stop here and argue
at length for this. I take it that since the Timaeus begins by recalling the discussion which took
place "yesterday," the outline of which makes it clear that it is the Republic, this supposition is
not prima facie unreasonable. It seems to me that this epistemic structure underlies the discussion
in the Timaeus, and I attempt to show in the course of this paper that it is by virtue of a considera-
tion of this structure in the Republic that a more coherent view of the two creation accounts — at
28Aff. and at 47Aff. — is available. In addition, cf. T. Negro, La concezione platonica delta
scienza, Milano 1940, who argues for the view that the Timaeus presupposes Republic VII in ad-
vancing its own account. But note, the fact that, internally-speaking, the Timaeus succeeds the
Republic immediately is not equivalent to the claim that, externally-speaking, its time of composi-
tion is contemporaneous with the Republic. In my estimation, the Timaeus properly belongs to the
latest group of Plato's writings. Curiously enough, I believe that Cherniss' assessment of the date
of the Timaeus is more or less correct, but not for the reasons he gives. Rather I should support
Owen's evaluation of the philosophical nature of that work — though not his dating which places
the writing of the Timaeus much earlier. Cf. also J.M. Rist, "The Order of the Later Dialogues of
Plato," Phoenix XIVA. 1960, pp. 207—222.

3. Edward N. Lee, "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist," in Philosophical Review LX-
XXI,3. 1972 pp. 267—303. This is an important study, but I must take exception to some of the
consequences of this theory. I think that certain consequences and connections that I draw are pro-
blematic in the specific context of Lee's study; in the course of some correspondences on this
topic, I have found Lee's comments instructive.

4. Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. Harvard 1936. p. 49.

5. On this topic of the "principle of plenitude" cf. two important critiques of Lovejoy which affirm
diverging views concerning the "specific" claim: J. Hintikka, Time and Necessity. Oxford 1973,
pp. 72—3; and E. Maula, "Plato on Plenlitude," Ajatus. 29, 1967, pp. 12—50.

6. Lovejoy, op. at. pp. 49—52.

7. For a view sympathetic to the one given here see Robert Brumbaugh's "Plato's View of the Arts,"
in Facets of Plato's Philosophy, ed. W. Werkmeister (Supplementary volume of Phronesis) Van
Gorcum, 1977; see also my review of Facets, forthcoming from the Journal of the History of
Philosophy.

8. Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy. Vol.. 1, N.Y. 1972 (originally
published in 1944).

9. This view was defended by C. Ritter in his Kerngedanken der Platonischen Philosophie, 1931,
available in English as The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, trans. A. Alles, N.Y. 1933, p. 164. cf.
also my article "On Plato's Philebus 15B1—8" in Phronesis XXIII.2. 1978, pp. 158—172. esp.
notes 31, 41, 43.

10. There is, of course, the problem of determining why Plato does not introduce the hypodoche
earlier and thereby avoid the partial repetition of the accounts. The reason why we have two
separate accounts, in this manner, is that at 28Aff. the treatment is on one level, at 47Aff.
another. Further corroboration for this comes in the form of a literary device, overlooked entirely

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 by most scholars on these passages. The literary device consists in the difference between the in-
vocatory prayers. In the first prayer at 27D, guidance is requested from the "gods and goddesses";
at 48D, the second prayer calls on the help of "God the savior" [sotena]. I am suggesting, of
course, that this distinction is not merely incidental, but rather on the dramatic level, reflects the
change in philosophical perspective. In the first case, the reference to gods and goddesses is a
reference to "plurality". The recalcitrance exhibited by Becoming is explained in terms of the
disorderly motion attributed to the activities of the secondary divinities. The second account,
however, examines Being in the context of "unity"; here, the philosophical change of perspective
is mirrored in the dramatic turn to "one" God — the "savior" of the argument lies in overcoming
the shortcoming which arise when one restricts an account to plurality alone.

11. F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology. London 1952. p. 181.

12. For this reason, R. Muth's claim can be accepted if emended to qualify the hypodoche as having a
re-productive power, and not a "productive" power per se, in Zum Physis-Begriff bei Platon.
Wiener Studien 64, 1950. pp. 53-70.

13. Concerning the re-iterative character of the self-instantiating nature of Forms, cf. the recent and
interesting work by J. Findlay, Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines, N.Y. 1973. pp.
302—321, est. 305 and 319—321.

14. R.D. Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato, trans, and imrod. with notes. London 1888. cf.
48D-note. The reader may also wish to consult the relatively sympathetic treatment by G.R. Mor-
tow, "Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's Timaeus" in Philosophical Review 59 1950. pp.
147—163; and H. Cherniss, comments in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,
98, 1954. p. 26n.40. Cf. also L.J. Eslick, "The Material Substrate in Plato," in The Concept of
Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy, ed. E. McMullin, 1965; especially the discussion by
McKeon, Sellers, and Hanson, which follows and is corollory with the article, pp. 55—58; see also
A.E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford 1928, pp. 299—305; also A. Rivaud,
Espace et changement dans le Timee de Platan. Paris 1956. pp. 209—214; and J.H.M.M. Loenen,
De Nous in het Systeem van Plato's Philosophie. Amsterdam 1951. pp. 223—225.

15. Here I am following Archer-Hind, "Plato's Timaeus 51B" in the Journal of Philology, 35, 1896.
pp. 49—53. This is certainly the most important article — although, indeed, controversially so —
on this passage, and on the turn of later Platonism, offered to us by nineteenth century scholar-
ship.

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