The Police Order (PO) of 2002 was based on three fundamental ideas:

depoliticisation of police, operational and administrative autonomy, and

credible accountability. However, as the proposed structures for achieving
these objectives were never made functional, the benefits of a reformed
police could not *percolate* down to the people. Not only did complaints
against police persist, but the notorious thana culture remained entrenched.
Sadly, due to a lack of political will to reform the police, a well-intentioned
initiative floundered.

Ironically, it was Mr Hussain’s *incendiary* words, for long his most potent
weapon, that landed him in trouble — and, if convicted, he could face up to
15 years in jail. Specifically, the charge of terrorism is based on an address
he delivered via telephone to his supporters in August 2016, provoking them
to go on the rampage in Karachi.
“ENEMIES of the people,” shrieked the Daily Mail earlier this year when
judges ruled that the British government cannot invoke Article 50 of the
European Union Treaty without parliament’s sanction. The more recent
unanimous ruling of its supreme court — that Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s
advice to the queen to *prorogue* parliament was bad in law and void — has
incurred criticism in some quarters of the UK. It merits close study in South
Asia given its relevance to any parliamentary democracy.

Constitutionalism and rule of law are akin to a faith. To uphold them, you
must believe that unadulterated process is *sacrosanct* and it is sinful to
fidget with it or short circuit it to manufacture desirable results. You must
believe that every suspect has a right to be defended. That everyone is to be
deemed innocent until proven guilty. That justice must be delivered in
accordance with written law and not vague conceptions of morality or
popular rhetoric. Our justice system’s key problem is that it exists as
facilitator of the state as opposed to protector of citizens.
This past month there was much *hoopla* about suspects dying in police
custody and torture as the go-to investigation method in Pakistan. A report
by the Justice Project, in collaboration with Yale Law School, discovered
“conclusive signs of abuse in 1,424 cases out of a sample of 1,867 medico-
legal certificates compiled by a state-appointed medical board in the district
of Faisalabad from 2006 to 2012.”

Diplomatic *dexterity* is in high demand to meet the challenge and optimise

the opportunities. In the final analysis, MoFA should try to make it a “whole
of the government” exercise including Zalmay Khalilzad, Departments of
State and Defence and the CIA, remaining mindful of the pulls and pushes
within the US and Afghan administrations.
We have expanded in detail upon the sticking points of the peace *parleys*
previously in this space. To recount, these are ceasefire; withdrawal of
foreign forces; intra-Afghan dialogue; and power-sharing arrangements
among the stakeholders. Here we would discuss fine-tuning the peace
process and overcoming probable hiccups — if and when the accord is
signed — such as the implementation mechanism, guarantees, inter-Taliban
chasm, dealing with ISIS and proffer relevant policy pointers for Pakistan.