1. ABBAS vs. ABBAS G.R. No.

183896 January 30, 2013 Void ab initio Marriage, Marriage License as a Formal
Requisite of a Valid Marriage
FACTS:
Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, met Gloria, a Filipino, in Taiwan in 1991 and they got married there in 1992.
Later, Gloria filed bigamy cases against him. As advised bt his counsel, he went to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, where their Marriage License was issued, to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license. There, he
was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. It appeared that the
marriage license number appearing in their marriage contract was the number of another marriage license issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
The RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued in favor of Gloria and Syed. Hence, their marriage was declared void ab
initio.
On appeal, the CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal.
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties
had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him
for bigamy.
Syed’s MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for Syed and Gloria.
RULING:The petition is meritorious.
The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3) of the Family Code, which read as
follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony
xxxx
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as
the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. While Syed was able to secure a certification that there
was no marriage license.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied
by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.

3. NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner, vs. MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

FACTS: Maria and Jose are married. The man contended that the wife refused to consummate their marriage by refusing to have
sexual intercourse with him during the marriage. He alleged that their last intercourse was prior to their marriage. He contended
that the wife was suffering from psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Is the argument meritorious?

xxx
HELD: No, the argument is unmeritorious. Refusal of the a wife to have sex with her husband is not a sign of
psychological incapacity.

The husband’s evidence merely established that the wife refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that
she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. There must be
proof that the psychological disorder renders her “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. In Marcos v. Marcos, it was ruled that Article 36 of the
Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. (G.R. No. 173138; December 1, 2010)

7. CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but
subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he
discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for
divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the
divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went
to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists
under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court
in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was
provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family
Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition
for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

15. PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Psychological Incapacity, Article 36 of the Civil
FACTS: The RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient
to prove infidelity. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied where the trial court reiterated
that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initioon the ground of
respondent’s psychological incapacity.

RULING: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are
unavailing in the instant case.

The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends
than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance,
and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects
spoken of were more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable” and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be “protected” by the state.
18. KALAW V. FERNANDEZ
Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973,
maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four
children. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn
Quejano who gave birth to a son.
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children
from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.

The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also,
in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.

Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the
Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.

Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the
two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go
to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.

Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by
her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr.
Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual
infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD).

The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code.
The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological
incapacity.

RULING: The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial
courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a
serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging
the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on
the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts
heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that
respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of
time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment
of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and and parental duties.
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.

25. Mercado vs. Tan

PERSONS Article 40 - Family Code

FACTS: Dr. Vincent G. Mercado and Maria Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 in Bacolod City. A
Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by them. Mercado entered in that document his
status as “single”. Unknown to Tan, Mercado was already married to Thelma Oliva. The first marriage
was solemnized in Cebu City on October 10, 1976. Oliva bore Mercado two children. Tan therefore filed
a complaint for bigamy (Art. 349, RPC) against Mercado in Bacolod City. Mercado, in his defense, said
that his first marriage was already declared null and void and that Tan had knowledge of his first
marriage. The trial court ruled that Mercado’s first marriage was still subsisting and was liable. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE/S: W/N the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner Mercado
of bigamy.

HELD: Yes. The element of previous legal marriage is present in this case. Under Article 40 of the
Family Code “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgement declaring such previous marriage void”. In this case, petitioner
Mercado contracted a second marriage even though there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity in
his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
Tan had filed a complaint charging him of bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was
still subsisting, Mercado is liable for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

27. ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs . NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage l icense . The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights . The defendant contends that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" .

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio; (2) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so
when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead; (3)
Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father’s death.

HELD: As to the first issue, YES. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. However, a marriage license is dispensed with, as
provided in Article 76 of the Civil Code, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage..

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by
the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father’s marriage void after his death?: A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared
by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it
never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void. "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband
and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio . But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based
only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
The court granted the petition, reversed the decision made by the lower court, and ordered the
reinstatement of the case.

35. QUIAO V. QUIAO G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]FACTS:Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for
legal separation against petitioner

FACTS: Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby
awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be
divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the
payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending
spouse.Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or
after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC
a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”RTC held that the
phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting
the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining
the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles
63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when
it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102
applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned
subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.2. Whether the offending spouse
acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.3. Is the computation of
“net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net profits”
earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO:1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code,
the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the
spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case
and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.2. The
petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife.”While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.In the present case, the petitioner
was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner
prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the
petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net
profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the
husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property
each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the
couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or
their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned.In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable,
since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation½share decision of
Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with
nothing.On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of
the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between
the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.In the instant case, since it was
already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty
party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

40. GLICERIA ROSETE v. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ZAMBALES, GR No. L-6335, 1954-07-31

Facts: In criminal case No. 2897 for murder of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Epifanio Fularon was convicted and
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P2,000.
On February 10, 1949, to satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon four parcels of land
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio Fularon and Gliceria Rosete. These parcels of land were sold at public auction
as required by the... rules for the sum of P1,385.00, leaving an unsatisfied balance of P739.34.
On March 8, 1950, Gliceria Rosete redeemed two of the four parcels of land which were sold at public auction for the sum of
P879.20, the sheriff having executed in her favor the corresponding deed of repurchase.
On April 10, 1950, an alias execution was issued to satisfy the balance of the indemnity and the sheriff levied upon the two
parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete and set a date for their sale. Prior to the arrival of this date, however,
Gliceria Rosete filed... a case for injunction to restrain the sheriff from carrying out the sale praying at the same time for a writ of
preliminary injunction. This writ was issued upon the filing of the requisite bond but was later dissolved upon a motion filed by
defendants who put up... counter-bond.
The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out the sale as originally scheduled and the property was sold to one
Raymundo de Jesus for the sum of P970. This development prompted the plaintiff to amend her complaint by praying therein,
among other things,... that the sale carried out by the sheriff be declared null and void.

Issues: Since it appears that plaintiff redeemed the two parcels of land in question with money obtained by her from her father,
has the property become paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further execution?

Ruling: We are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons: (a) Gliceria
Rosete, the wife, redeemed the property, not in behalf of her husband, but as successor in interest in the whole or part of the
property, it being then... conjugal. The term "successor in interest" appearing in subdivision (a), Section 25, Rule 39, includes,
according to Chief Justice Moran, "one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law" or "the wife as regards her
husband's homestead by reason of the fact... that some portion of her husband's title passes to her (Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1) when acquired by her
by-right of redemption, and (2) with money belonging exclusively to her
(Article 1396, old Civil Code).
The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of the plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption
as successor in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment debtor. It can no longer therefore be the
subject of... execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability of the latter. The conclusion reached by the
lower court on this matter is therefore not warranted by law.

41. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtained a divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American citizen while residing
in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred from
remarrying.

50. WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DY

FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo
Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter’s former marriage. Having been
allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia
likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

HELD: It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it
will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has
yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband.
Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the
prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he
can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.