CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

The relationship between regionalism and nationalism has been a sensitive issue in
modern Chinese history, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s. It has resulted in
disputes among both Western and Chinese scholars. The disputes are based on the fact that
the many different factions of the GMD which were based on regions adopted or developed
their own ideological frameworks and implemented policies in their regions different to
those of the central government under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. Li Zongren and the
Guangxi Clique are an example of this. This phenomenon was, in fact, a product of time
and context, when the old social system had disintegrated but the new one had not fully
emerged; consequently, the political unity of the nation had not been achieved. For this
reason, Diana Lary has rightly suggested that the Guangxi Clique was both regionalist and
nationalist.1 This thesis, based on the Clique’s theory and practice in the 1930s, indicates
further that regionalism was a superficial phenomenon but nationalism became its
substance in Guangxi. In other words, Li Zongren and his Guangxi group were to lead the
people of Guangxi to nationalism by using regionalism as an indirect path. Through a
discussion of its actions in dealing with national crises and the measures taken in response
to Japanese aggression in the 1930s, I have suggested that the Guangxi Clique did not
create regionalism, but fostered and developed an already existing sentiment. The Clique
aimed to transfer this regionalism to the level of nationalism to serve its own political
needs, those of struggle with Jiang Jieshi for power in both the region and the centre and to

1
Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1931,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 211.

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meet the demands for regional reconstruction and national salvation for the battle with
Japan. Naturally, the Guangxi Clique’s actions in consolidating its base and strengthening
its relations with its neighbouring provinces - the Southwest regional factions - were tinged
with regionalism.
However, the fact that the Guangxi Clique developed policies based on the
conditions of its province is not sufficient to suggest that this group was merely regionalist;
it strove, too, to arouse nationalist consciousness in the region. In other words, the Guangxi
Clique’s theory and practice in the 1930s were based on the region but consciously aimed
to serve the nation. Regionalism was the surface of the Clique’s political behaviour only;
nationalism was actually the substance of its actions. For the same reason, we could not
regard Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist regime in Guangzhou as regionalist during the
period 1924-1926, when the GMD authorities carried out a series of policies and launched
wars against other militarists in Guangdong to unify the province and consolidate the GMD
base. The policies carried out by Jiang Jieshi were to serve the purpose of the achievement
of nationalist ambitions; the Guangxi Clique was pursuing the same goal. In other words,
both Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi Clique were approaching the same goal, although by
different routes. As the Guangxi leaders and the Clique realised, the cultivation of
nationalist consciousness had to start with rural society, the basic level of Chinese social
structure, and it was this conception on which Guangxi's mass mobilization and
reconstruction were based. In this sense, Guangxi-type regionalism was part of the
development of Chinese nationalism.
We return to the major theme of this thesis, the relationship between regionalism
and the internal unity of the GMD, for it is this internal unity which is frequently perceived
as the precondition of national political unity and political integration. Did the Guangxi
Clique undercut or benefit the internal unity of both the GMD and the nation? This study,
through an examination of the Clique's theories and policies under the circumstances of
Japanese aggression in China, suggests that the actions of Li Zongren and the Guangxi
Clique in the 1930s were conducive to internal political unity of both the GMD and the
nation; and such internal political unity was the prerequisite for the political integration
China needed at that time.
According to Tang Tsou, analytically speaking, political integration has three
aspects, although empirically they are linked: integration among the elite, integration

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between the elite and the masses, and integration of a political community. Logically and
historically, one takes precedence over the other in the order given. He suggests further that
Without integration among the elite, integration between the elite and the masses is
difficult to achieve; without integration between the elite and the masses, there
cannot be an integrated political community. In a disintegrated political
community, the process of political integration begins historically with the
integration of the elite or a counter-integration between the elite and the masses. To
the degree that integration is achieved, the reintegrated political community
furnishes a general framework within which the elite and the masses find their
places.2
Through an examination of the Guangxi Clique’s efforts in mass mobilization and
reconstruction, this study suggests that they coincided with the process necessary for
political integration given above, particularly in the aspect that all sub-national political
systems, such as that of the province, served the entire national political system of the
nation. That is to say, this system refers to a political organization uniting all groups and
parties at that time (see Introduction, p. 17). After it was defeated by Jiang Jieshi in 1929 in
central China and returned to Guangxi, the Clique had already realized the importance of
unity of the elite, and it strove to consolidate its leadership. This provided Li Zongren and
the Guangxi group with not only a base from which to oppose Jiang Jieshi but also a force
with which to bargain with the latter for reconciliation and then cooperation, to achieve the
internal unity of the GMD in 1936. This unity indicated that the GMD was approaching
elite integration, and on this, the GMD was able to compromise with the CCP in 1937,
from which sprang the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This was a temporary
compromise between the Nationalists and the Communists as well as other political parties
and groups in pursuit of national salvation, and a step in the direction of political
integration, one which proved, however, to be temporary and unstable.
In terms of the integration of the elite and the masses, the Clique had achieved quite
a lot. Through a series of policies and measures taken in the province, the Clique sent large
number of well-trained officers and cadres to the countryside to mobilize the masses; this
served to arouse their nationalist consciousness and to reinforce the relationship between
the elite and the masses. In this sense, the slogan of “reconstructing Guangxi and restoring
China” was not only propaganda of the Clique but also an ideal for which it desired to

2
Tang Tsou, “Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China”, Ping-ti Ho
and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p.
279.

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struggle. At the same time, by employing the Pearl River Valley Revolutionary theory and
the slogan of national salvation, the Clique successfully united the masses of the province
for the purpose of resisting Japan and reconstructing the province and restoring the nation.
In other words, a sub-national political system was formed, which was a significant step in
the direction of political unity and national integration. This sub-national political system
could be readily integrated into a national political system once the appropriate conditions
emerged. Such conditions occurred with the demand for national unity and the forming of
an anti-Japanese national united front to fight Japan. The Clique’s mass mobilization in its
region was thus appropriate to the prevailing demands for increased unity and integration to
resist Japan.
The foundation of political integration in this context was mass mobilization. The
Clique rebuilt the disintegrating social order in its province to achieve regional political
integration through militia organization, the three-in-one system, and the policies of three-
fold self-reliance and three incorporations. In Guangxi, the new hierarchical structure
incorporated the party, administrative and military authorities of the province, district
militia headquarters, basic militia units and peasants. This provided the Clique with a
strong and integrated organizational structure with which to carry out its policies and to
establish efficient control over the province. The Clique’s success in mass mobilization
relied on the employment of a powerful and effective motive force, i.e. its own ideology
and political framework, which aroused the masses' political consciousness of both the
region and the nation. As Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng suggest, a political organization
which is based on a certain political program is unable to control the army. The western
parliament-type political party or group is in this category, because the army in the modern
western nation-state is subordinated to the authority of the constitution. In contrast to the
western countries, in the ultra-stable structure of modern Chinese society, the army was
only subordinated to the ideology of a certain political party or group, such as the “party
army” (e.g. both the Red Army and the Nationalist Revolutionary Army) in the Republic.
Essentially, the political party established and controlled the army by its ideology rather
than by its organizational structure.3 Accordingly, the Guangxi Clique established its own

3
Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Kaifang zhong de bianqian: zailun Zhongguo de chao
wending jiegou, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993, p. 282. Jin and Liu
suggest that China has been an ultra-stable society for over two thousand years. According
to their view, up to now, Chinese social structure, particularly its social organizational

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secret political organization, and formulated an ideology based on its perceptions of the
need to resist Japan and its perceptions of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution; this
provided the Clique with a force able to control the army and to mobilize the masses (see
Chapter Four). As a result, not only did the Guangxi troops successfully become
subordinated to the Clique’s ideology, but the peasants also were persuaded through the
Clique’s propaganda to accept the ideology of the Clique through the medium of militia
organization and training. The Clique was able to direct this identity and sense of Guangxi
as a region to the national level.
Nationalism might originate with a sense of region. Arousing the masses’ sense of
commitment to their native place can function as the foundation for a consciousness of, and
commitment to, the nation. Serving the nation can thus start with serving the region.
Indeed, based on the local conditions, the Guangxi Clique worked out and practised
policies and programs appropriate to the needs of the region, but its ultimate aim was to
construct the nation. In so doing, the so-called Guangxi regionalism and Chinese
nationalism could coexist, the former contributing to the latter. If we say, as Lloyd
Eastman does, that Jiang Jieshi was a nationalist as he was deeply committed to the welfare
of the Chinese nation,4 we can assert that Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique were also
nationalists of another type. The former insisted on putting the entire nation under his
dictatorship, in which there was no room for a loyal opposition; Jiang believed that anyone
who opposed him was thereby acting against the best interests of the nation. In Jiang's
view, anyone who opposed him was, ipso facto, disloyal to the nation. This presumption
motivated Jiang Jieshi to attempt to wipe out all opposition, including factions and
individuals, in the attempt to achieve political integration. But Li and the Clique strove to

structure, has not been subject to changes, nor characterised with stagnation, even though
Chinese social life has frequently changed in the past two or three thousand years. China
has experienced significant periodic social turbulence, which occurred once every two or
three hundred years and often ended with a devastating temporary collapse of social
structure. But this social structure was always able to rebuild itself. In short, according to
Jin and Liu, this social structure endures social progress and development, as well as
periodic collapse, yet maintained special organizational structure over long periods. This is
the characteristic of the ultra-stable structure of the Chinese society in both ancient and
modern times.
4
Lloyd Eastman gives a thorough description of Jiang Jieshi’s relationship with the
nation. For details see Lloyd Eastman, The Nationalist Era in China, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 18-19.

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mobilize the masses at the basic level of rural society in order to arouse, firstly, a regional
consciousness, and secondly, a nationalist consciousness. In other words, both Jiang and Li
had the same goal but used different means to achieve political integration.
More importantly, the Guangxi Clique made a contribution to the internal unity of
the GMD and to national political unity. The Clique played a role in the formation of the
Anti-Japanese National United Front, a form of national political unity which allowed an
integrated response to Japanese aggression. After the Northern Expedition, national
political unity for resistance against Japan required political integration, in which the
internal political unity of the GMD was the necessary foundation. This required all parties
and factions to compromise. Under these circumstances, Li Zongren and the Guangxi
Clique gradually transformed their policy of “resisting Japan and opposing Jiang” to that of
“forcing Jiang to resist Japan”, and later to "supporting Jiang to resist Japan", and finally
reached reconciliation with Jiang Jieshi in 1936. This created both unity and cooperation
between the two major factions of the Nationalists. It is true that the cooperation and unity
were at times more apparent than real, but this situation provided the GMD with favourable
conditions to achieve conciliation with the Communists so that a form of national political
unity for resistance against Japan could be constructed. Moreover, the Guangxi Clique not
only strove to prepare for a war fighting Japan by mobilizing the masses and advocating the
“scorched earth resistance” idea, it also put them into practice; an example is the “June 1
Movement”. These efforts promoted the formation of the anti-Japanese national united
front and greatly influenced the outcome of the Xi'an Incident. In other words, the June 1
Movement was a prelude to the Xi’an Incident, and a “dress rehearsal” for the anti-
Japanese national united front.
In sum, based on the above discussion, this thesis suggests that the Guangxi Clique
was a faction capable of national ideology and policies within the GMD during the 1930s,
ideology and policies which transcended regionalism. While struggling with Jiang Jieshi
for power in both regional and central structures, the Guangxi Clique could readjust its
domestic and external policies for its survival and pursuit of power in accordance with the
changing domestic and external situation, and meet the needs of the national salvation
movement to promote the eventual nationwide war to fight the Japanese invader. In fact,
this important role played by the Clique in the promotion of the Resistance War had been
already recognised by some Western observers in China at that time. For example, during

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the war of resistance, at least in the early stage, the Guangxi Clique was regarded as one of
three major politico-military groups of the anti-Japanese national united front in China
(others were the Communists and the Jiang group).5 This is actually an affirmation of the
significant roles the Guangxi Clique played at that time. Meanwhile, this indicates that the
Clique’s attitudes towards internal and external affairs at that time were important to
national political unity. It also reflected the fact that the Clique was not a group concerned
with the extension of its own strength in the region alone, but a nationalist body as well
with a genuine concern for national affairs. Through examining the process of the Guangxi
Clique’s growth and its actions during the 1920s and 1930s, this study suggests that the
Clique was at all times a nationalist, not a regionalist group, always aiming to share the
power of the central government with other main factions of the GMD. I also argue that the
view that referred to the so-called “Guangxi Empire” in 1928 and 1929 is misleading.6
This view also was a product of the internal political struggle for power within the GMD.
In fact, the Clique did not abandon its attempt to return to the centre even though it strove
to reconstruct the province and to cooperate with other regional factions.
As mentioned earlier, Diana Lary asserts categorically that the Guangxi Clique’s
“persistence of regionalism undercut nationalism, the nationalism of national unity”.7 This
thesis indicates that Lary’s view of the Clique’s practice of regionalism in Guangxi is not
incorrect, but the suggestion that it undercut nationalism seriously underestimates the
significance of regionalism to nationalism. In that sense, this thesis is a revision of Lary’s
view. Through a careful analysis of the documents and other materials existing at that time,
this thesis suggests that the Clique was arousing and promoting nationalism among the
masses by fostering and strengthening their identity with their own region, even though
such a practice appeared to have a strong regionalist colour. Based on materials unearthed
from various sources, this study points out further that the strategies of the Guangxi Clique
in response to the national crisis and in other policy-making benefited from a broad analysis
of Chinese society and a rational perception of the nature and significance of the Chinese

5
Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency,
New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 22-23.
6
See Diana Lary, Region and Nation, Chapter Six, pp. 115-128.
7
Ibid, p. 212.

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revolution. These flowed from the work of the “Brains Trust” established by the Clique
(see Chapter Three). What I have emphasized in this study is the Clique’s contribution to
the creation of national political unity and political integration in the 1930s. Compromises
among the various parties and factions laid the foundations for national political unity when
confronting the national crisis caused by Japanese aggression. From that point of view, the
Guangxi Clique’s efforts to achieve internal political unity both in the GMD and in the
nation should therefore be recognised.
On the other hand, this thesis, through discussing the Guangxi Clique’s roles in the
promotion to achieve national political unity and the formation of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front during the 1930s, also complements the studies by Chu Hongyuan
and Eugene Levich of Guangxi’s mass mobilization and provincial reconstruction.8 Both
Chu and Levich appraise the Guangxi Clique’s mass mobilization and reconstruction
within the province. They see the Clique’s achievements in the above two aspects as the
foundation of the major contribution of Guangxi province to the national resistance war. I
agree with their views. It is a pity, however, that the following issues are ignored in their
studies: What were the motive forces employed by the Guangxi Clique to achieve
mobilization of the masses and reconstruction? How did the Clique readjust its policies to
meet the needs of the time for national salvation? To what extent did the Clique contribute
to the promotion of the national resistance war against Japan through its policies in both
province and the southwest area? This thesis has attempted to remedy these omissions with
a detailed discussion of the above issues. I also raised some new points in discussing
several important events relating to the Clique’s theory and practice in the 1930s, which
have not been paid sufficient attention by either Chinese or Western historians.
This thesis argues that the reasons for actively practising mass mobilization and
reconstruction were closely interrelated to the readjustment of the Guangxi Clique’s
policies and guidelines in the light of changes to China's situation in the different periods.
The scope of this study has focused on the period after the Northern Expedition in 1928-29
and before the official launching of the Resistance War against Japan in 1937, when the

8
For detailed studies by both Levich and Chu, see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993; Chu Hong
Yuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b
(December, 1988), pp. 307-353; and Chu’s other articles on Guangxi in the Bibliography of
this thesis.

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Japanese imperialist army was step by step expanding its invasion of China in the attempt
to conquer the Chinese nation completely. In response to the national crisis facing the
country, the Guangxi Clique developed positive policies designed to achieve national
salvation. Li Zongren and his group transferred their energies from their power struggle
with the Jiang group to resistance against the Japanese invader. The main mark of this
transformation is the policy of “annei weiyou rangwai, tongyi weiyou kangri” (only
resistance against foreign aggression could achieve domestic pacification, and only
resistance against Japan could lead China to unity). This policy coincided with the needs of
anti-Japanese aggression for national salvation to oppose that of Jiang Jieshi’s “rangwai
bixian annei” (domestic pacification before external war). There is no denying the fact that
the action of the Clique aroused some suspicions that its policy was a strategy in its struggle
for power with Jiang Jieshi. Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique indeed attempted to
replace the Jiang group by exploiting the needs for national unity and resistance against
Japan. But there is no doubt that the Guangxi Clique made a point of resisting Japan and
strove to achieve it. As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, the necessary principle
to appraise correctly the roles of Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique at that time is whether
their response to the national crisis helped the course of the War of Resistance. From the
point of view of the above, the action of the Guangxi Clique to promote a nationwide
resistance against Japan should be considered in a positive light. In other words, in this
regard the practice of the Clique coincided with the national interests. Its practice both in
fostering regionalism and regional identity which had already existed in the province and in
strengthening cooperation and connection with other regional factions in the southwest was
also an attempt to guide and develop them to the level of nationalism.
An important sign that the Guangxi Clique's roles in Chinese politics of the 1930s
were formed to coincide with the needs of national salvation and in the promotion of the
Anti-Japanese National United Front was the deliberate change of its policies. After it was
defeated in the central government and central China by the Jiang group and forced to
return to Guangxi in 1929, the Clique had persisted for years in opposing Jiang Jieshi in
order to obtain revenge and to indicate its different policies from the latter in both external
and domestic affairs. The Clique began to lay equal stress on anti-Jiang and anti-Japan in
its policies after the “September 18 Incident” in 1931. However, based on its analysis of
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution and on its willingness to resist Japanese

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aggression, Li Zongren and his Clique gradually changed the anti-Japan and anti-Jiang
policy into that of “forcing Jiang to resist Japan”, and then to “supporting Jiang to resist
Japan”. This change coincided with the clarion call for resistance throughout the country.
The outbreak and outcome of the “June 1 Movement” in 1936 marked the process of this
policy transformation. This movement laid a foundation not only for unity of the GMD but
also the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Many historians pay great
attention to the changes of the Chinese Communist Party's policy in the same aspect. They
believe that these changes led the CCP to readjust its anti-Jiang and anti-Japan policy to
that of “forcing Jiang to resist Japan”, which was the foundation of the CCP’s
reconciliation with Jiang Jieshi and the GMD at the end of 1936 and in 1937.9 But they
ignore the actions of the Guangxi Clique and its impact on the CCP. This thesis has
indicated that the Guangxi Clique had initiated its policy change ahead of the CCP, creating
favourable conditions for a similar change of policy in that body. Both organizations then
together made step by step changes towards resistance to Japan and acceptance of Jiang's
leadership for that unified purpose. Perhaps, placing emphasis on the united front with the
CCP for the purpose of restoring the nation also planted a seed for Li Zongren’s return to
Communist China in 1965 after his exile in the United States for over fifteen years.
Based on the above view point, this thesis further explains the important roles the
Guangxi Clique played in the promotion of national resistance and the formation of the
Anti-Japanese National United Front in the following three aspects.
First, the Guangxi Clique initiated the idea of the full-scale Resistance War - the
“scorched earth resistance” (jiaotu kangzhan). This idea was officially announced by Li
Zongren on April 7, 1936, and developed further by other leaders of the Guangxi Clique
after that. Although resistance was the common demand of many political parties and
groups in China, the “scorched earth resistance” idea was for the first time comprehensively
and systematically explained as a policy, strategy and tactic of the Resistance War against
Japan. The Guangxi Clique was the first politico-military group in China to put forward
the proposition of full-scale resistance. This idea had a great impact on other parties and

9
K. K. Shum’s work is a best example of the study in this field. For details see Kui-
kwong Shum, Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United
Front, 1935-1937, Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

324
groups and obtained positive response from many sides at that time. It also became a very
important part of the GMD’s policies during the War of Resistance.
Secondly, the “June 1 Movement” in 1936 was a test of the willingness of the
Guangxi Clique to practice its "scorched earth resistance" idea. The outbreak of the
Movement was frustrated by many internal and external elements, but the final outcome of
the Movement was significant. In contrast to Diana Lary’s view that the “June 1
Movement” failed, this study indicates that both the Guangxi Clique and Jiang Jieshi were
winners. The result of the Movement caused the GMD’s two major factions, in conflict
with each other for years, to become reconciled for the purpose of resistance against
Japanese aggression. This facilitated the internal unity of the GMD and national unity for
the struggle against Japan.
Thirdly, the Guangxi Clique’s actions in the “June 1 Movement” not only provided
the CCP with a theoretical foundation to change its policy to one of cooperation with the
GMD to form a united front for the purpose of fighting Japan, but also influenced both the
Northeast troops under Zhang Xueliang and the Northwest troops under Yang Hucheng in
launching the “Xi’an Incident” at the end of 1936 to force Jiang Jieshi to cease all civil war
and resist Japan. In this sense, the “Xi’an Incident” was the continuation of the “June 1
Movement”. In other words, the latter served the former as a link between past and future.
Furthermore, the Guangxi Clique strengthened its contacts and cooperation with both the
CCP and leaders of regional factions such as Liu Xiang in Sichuan province after the
“Xi’an Incident”. As a result, their actions contributed to the final formation of the anti-
Japanese National United Front throughout the country.
The theory and practice of the Guangxi Clique indicated that it was a politico-
military group. However, its own ideals and theoretical framework were mostly short-term;
the Clique’s measures and tactics were based on the need to achieve national political unity,
whether under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi or itself, for the launching of the resistance war
against Japan. Its plans for the future after the war of resistance were uncertain. This
explains why the Clique put all its strength into the resistance war once it broke out. Of
course, this did not mean that the Clique had abandoned its demands for a share of power in
the central government for which they had struggled with Jiang Jieshi for so many years.
However, because of the short term character of its policies, it found itself unable to keep
pace with the struggles for its own ideology and influence in post war China. Nevertheless,

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the Guangxi Clique played a major role in making possible the Anti-Japanese National
United Front, and it did this, at least partly, through its successful attempt to channel
regional sentiment into identification with and defence of China as a national entity. We
can consequently see the important link between regionalism and nationalism, and the role
played by the Guangxi Clique in forging this link.

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