Political Law Reviewer Bar 2019 Par 2 V 21 by Atty. Alexis Medina ACADEMICUS REVIEW

2019 BAR REVIEW NOTES
POLITICAL LAW
PART II.
Selected Recent Jurisprudence (2010-June 2018)1

By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2
STATE POWERS AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
STATE POWERS
POLICE POWER
The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts is a valid exercise of police power
affecting the ability of private establishments to price their products and services:
Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. The laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made
by senior citizens and PWDs are a valid exercise of police power and do not require the payment
of just compensation. The 20% discount is a police power regulation affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and services relative senior citizens. It is not an exercise of
the power of eminent domain that requires just compensation. This is because there is no taking
of property involved, but only an imposition of burden. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of
Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
The laws on discounts for senior citizens and PWDs meet the requirements of
a valid exercise of police power - lawful subject and lawful means: The laws mandating
a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs meet the two
requirements for a valid exercise of police power: (a) the interests of the public generally require
the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper
exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In
this case, the well-being of senior citizens and PWDs is a lawful subject of legislation. The means
employed to achieve the purpose of legislation – which is to impose discounts on the medical
services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax
deduction rather than tax credit – is also lawful. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social
Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts does not amount to a

compensable taking of private property because there is no private property invaded
or appropriated, as what is supposedly taken is not earned profits but merely an
expectation of profits: The laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made
by senior citizens and PWDs do not amount to a taking of private party that requires just
compensation. The requirements that expropriator must enter a private property and the entrance
is for more than a momentary period are absent. There is no private property that is invaded or
appropriated by the State. What was supposedly taken is not even earned profits but merely an
1 This collection of summaries or capsules of recent jurisprudence is a work in progress (v 21), subject to continuing
revision and updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.
2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of Law; Valedictorian,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade
Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland, 2014); Philippine Representative, Senior Officials’
Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 2015; Transaction Adviser on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs); Litigation lawyer;
formerly with the Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manlastas Law Offices (Pecabar); Teaches Constitutional Law at San Sebastian College-
Recoletos, Manila, College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; Taught Constitutional
Law at New Ear University, College of Law; Partner, Libra Law
ACADEMICUS REVIEW CENTER 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 1
expectation of profits, which may not even occur. There can be no taking of a contingency or of
a mere possibility. Also, the supposed taking is not permanent because establishments are not
prevented from adjusting their prices to accommodate the effects of the granting of the discount,
and thus, losses are not inevitable. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
The law mandating senior citizens’ discount is not a taking of private property
without just compensation, as the regulation affects only the seller's right to profit,
not earned profits: The laws mandating a 20% discount for senior citizens’ and PWDs are not
confiscatory as no private property is taken without just compensation. The subject provisions
only affect the petitioner's right to profit, and not earned profits. The right to profit is not a vested
right but an inchoate right, a mere expectation, which may or may not come into existence.
(Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669,
April 25, 2017)
The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts is a valid police power regulation,
as the state may impose burdens on private entities, even if it may affect their profits:
The laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and
PWDs are police power regulations similar to the minimum wage law, zoning ordinances, price
control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours
to eight, and the like. It is within the bounds of the police power of the state to impose burden
on private entities, even if it may affect their profits. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of
Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
Property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. The regulation of a profession,
calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate exercise of police power. Thus,
the law requiring real estate developers to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and
dispose of their properties is a valid exercise of police power. (Remman Enterprises v.
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014)
The rational relationship test for a valid exercise of police power: (1) the interests of
the public generally require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Lacking these two requisites, the
police power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a
violation of the due process clause. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March
12, 2013)
Example of means employed not reasonably related to the purpose of the law:
The ordinance -- which requires property owners to (1) demolish their existing concrete wall, (2)
build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence
six meters back in order to provide a parking area – is invalid. Providing for a parking area has
no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of prevention
of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness.” (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Limiting the height of fences of private properties to one meter and requiring fences in
excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru has no reasonable relation to its purpose of
ensuring public safety and security. Such exposed premises could even entice and tempt would-
be criminals to the property. The ordinance is thus an invalid exercise of police power. (Fernando
v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Police power prevails over the non-impairment clause: The constitutional guaranty
of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power. The law is deemed
written into the contract between the parties. Thus, survey firms may be compelled by the
Comelec, through regulation, to reveal the identities of subscribers to election surveys, despite
the confidentiality clause in their contracts. (Social Weather Station v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 208062, April 27, 2015)
EMINENT DOMAIN
Meaning of “taking”: "Taking" of property takes place when: (1) the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property;(2) there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property; (3) the owner is deprived of the ordinary use of the
property, or (4) when he is deprived of the jurisdiction, supervision and control of his property.
(Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)
Mandatory five-meter setback of fences amounts to a deprivation of the

beneficial use of private property and thus, is a compensable taking: A city ordinance
requiring land owners to setback their fences by five meters to provide for parking space for the
general public is tantamount to a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. The total destruction of value of the property is not required for a taking to be
compensable. Thus, the implementation of the ordinance requiring a five-meter setback of the
fence to provide for a parking area for the public would be tantamount to a taking of private
property for public use without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution.
(Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Moreover, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners
of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of
the community. The ordinance will substantially divest property owners of the beneficial use of
their property solely for aesthetic purposes. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No.
161107, March 12, 2013)
Easement of right-of-way on the land is equivalent to the taking of property. (Republic of

the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)
Constitutional limitations on the power of eminent domain: first, private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation; and second, no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (Republic v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892,
209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)
Just compensation: Full and fair equivalent of the property taken: Fair market
value as standard: Just compensation means the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The standard value is the "fair market value" of the property
at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property,
whichever is earlier. (Republic v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September
2015)
No requirement of full payment of just compensation prior to government

takeover of property: The full payment of just compensation is not a prerequisite for the
Government's effective taking of the property, nor is the transfer of property title from the
property owner to the Government a condition precedent to the taking of property. (Republic of
the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)
Reckoning point for determination of just compensation: The reckoning period of

the valuation of just compensation is the date of taking or the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, whichever is earlier. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana,
G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)
The reckoning point for determination of just compensation is the value of the
property at the time of taking, even if the valuation is outdated: Even if the government
taking was in 1940, and the action for payment of just compensation was only filed in 1995, the
reckoning point for determining just compensation is still the value of the property at the time of
taking. Thus, just compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of
taking, that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appears outdated. (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
Interest as part of just compensation: When the taking of the property precedes the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, the Court orders the condemnor to pay the full amount
of just compensation from the date of taking whose interest shall likewise commence on the same
date. (Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015)
Just compensation: Interest must be paid in case of delay, to be computed from the time
the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012)
Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the time
of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in
line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799,58 series of 2013.59.
(Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)
Actions for just compensation are not barred by laches: An action for payment of
just compensation is not barred by laches. Laches as a doctrine of equity does not apply because
law and equity dictate payment of just compensation. Thus, even after the lapse of more than
50 years, a property owner may still file a claim to demand just compensation for the taking of
his property without the benefit of expropriations proceedings. (Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
Actions for just compensation are not barred by prescription: An action for
payment of just compensation does not prescribe. If private property is taken by the Government
for public use without expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover
the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function: Statutes and

executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not
binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines or standards in ascertaining the
amount thereof. (National Power Corporation v. Spouses Zabala, G.R. No. 173520, January 30,
2013)
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against the actions of private individuals:
The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against
the acts of private individuals. Thus, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked, for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. The protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen are considered law enforcers for
purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights: Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen
can be deemed law enforcement officers for purposes of the application of the Bill of Rights.
Similarly, port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions are
deemed agents of government for purposes of the application of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Bantay Bayan civilian volunteers are deemed law enforcers for purposes of the
prohibitions in the Bill of Rights: The acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-based or
other civilian volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation
of peace and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such,
they should be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of
Rights. Consequently, evidence obtained by them during an illegal search is inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under the Constitution. (Miguel v. People, July 31,
2017, G.R. No. 227038)
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against the action of a political party,
which is a private organization: The right to due process guards against unwarranted
encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens. It cannot be invoked in
private controversies involving private parties. A political party is still a private organization, not
a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to
life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. (Atienza v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010)
RIGHT TO LIFE
An ordinance that promotes economic benefits over the very basic rights to life,
security and safety -- is invalid: An ordinance to promote the constituents’ general welfare in
terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety of the
people. In the absence of any convincing reason that the life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan,
Ordinance No. 8187 in favor of the retention of the oil depots is invalid and unconstitutional.
(Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014)
Requirements for a writ of kalikasan: 1) actual or threatened violation of the

constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; 2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and 3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces: In gist, petitioners contend
that respondents' failure to implement environmental laws and executive issuances resulted in
the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners'
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and may even be tantamount to
deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due
process of law. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: 1. there is
an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and 3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The petitioners failed to show that public
respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the
petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, apart from adducing expert
testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go
beyond mere allegation in establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public
respondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission,
G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017)
DUE PROCESS
Substantive and procedural due process: Due process of law has two aspects:
substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of
the due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural
requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that
interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand,
means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in
conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are
called upon to administer it. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
Substantive due process: To stop the construction by of a building in a private

property even though there is no law, ordinance, or rule that prohibits such
construction would violate substantive due process: The Constitution states that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. It is a fundamental
principle that no property shall be taken away from an individual without due process, whether
substantive or procedural. The dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of the
construction of a building in one's own property would violate substantive due process. In the
present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that
matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is
within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on
the part of the City of Manila "to consider," the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119". While
the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is
being built is a privately-owned property that is "not part of the Rizal Park that has been declared
as a National Heritage Site in 1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the
Rizal Park. Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a
cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure." There is no standard in
Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining the background sightline that is supposed to be
protected or that is part of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal Monument. The ordinance does
not prescribe how sightline is determined, neither is there any way to measure by metes and
bounds whether al construction that is not part of the historic monument itself or is outside the
protected area can be said to violate the Rizal Monument's physical integrity, except only to say
"when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is marred
and impaired." This kind of a standard has no parameters. Obviously, the Court cannot apply
such a subjective and non-uniform standard that adversely affects property rights several
kilometers away from a historical site or facility. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, G.R. No.
213948, April 18, 2017)
Procedural due process: When the lack of prior notice and hearing is not
necessarily a violation of due process -- clamping of illegally parked vehicles: Notice
and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many
instances under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not
necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process. Immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by
clamping the tires is not a violation of due process, despite the lack of a trial-type hearing prior
to the clamping. The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires is necessary
because the transgressors are not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance,
notice and hearing would be superfluous. Moreover, the transgressors have the chance to reverse
the apprehensions through a timely protest which procedure equally satisfies the need for a
hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law is not indispensable to ensure a
compliance with the guaranty of due process. (Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December
10, 2013)
Ex-parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order in VAWC cases does not

violate due process: The ex-parte issuance of temporary protection order (TPO) - before notice
and hearing - is valid because time is of the essence to prevent further acts of violence against
women and children. Moreover, after a TPO is issued, the respondent is afforded an opportunity
to present his side. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)
Basic principles of administrative due process: Administrative proceedings are not

exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process. In
Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Court laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings,
as follows: 1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit
evidence in support thereof; 2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 3) The
decision must have something to support itself; 4) The evidence must be substantial; 5) The
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected; 6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and 7) The board or body
should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
(Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
Although the FDA is the primary agency that determines whether a contraceptive drug or
certain device has no abortifacient effects, the FDA should allow its findings and conclusion to be
questioned and those who oppose the same must be given a genuine opportunity to be heard.
(Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
The FDA certified, procured and administered such contraceptive drugs and devices,
without the observance of the basic tenets of due process, without notice and without public
hearing, despite the constant opposition from the petitioners. Thus, the certifications/re-
certifications and the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the FDA should be
struck down as violative of the constitutional right to due process. A decision rendered in
disregard of the right to due process is void for lack of jurisdiction. (Alliance for the Family v.
Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio: A decision rendered

without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void
for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. The
cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
of their jurisdiction. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)
Due process requires opportunity to be heard: What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. The
opportunity to be heard through motion for reconsideration is sufficient compliance with due
process. Any initial defect in due process, if any, is cured by availing of this remedy. (Shu v. Dee,
G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014)
Due process in administrative proceedings means opportunity to explain one's

side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of: In administrative
proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend oneself. The essence of due process, therefore, as
applied to administrative proceedings, is an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)
Meaning of “to be heard”: “To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25,
2013)
Administrative due process: A formal or trial-type hearing is not always

necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied: The essence of due
process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. The petitioner actively
participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR. He was
also given the opportunity to appear before the Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory
questions. Lastly, he was informed through a memorandum of the decision of the Board of
Directors dismissing him from the service. No denial of procedural due process where the
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded. (Vivo v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)
Right to counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings: In an

administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel. As
such, the right to counsel is not imperative. Thus, there is nothing objectionable in the denial by
an adjudicating body of a request to reschedule an administrative conference because the counsel
for the respondent would not be available. (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)
Any procedural defect in an administrative proceeding is cured by the filing of
a motion for reconsideration: In any event, any procedural defect in the proceedings taken
against the petitioner was cured by his filing of the motion for reconsideration and by his
appealing the adverse result to the CSC. Any defect in the observance of due process is cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and that denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who was afforded the opportunity to be heard. Defects in procedural due
process may be cured when the party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)
There is still a denial of due process if the respondent was able to file a motion
for reconsideration but he had no fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer
the accusations against him as he was not furnished with the affidavits against him:
Even in his motion for reconsideration, he never had the fair opportunity to squarely and
intelligently answer nor refute the accusations against him as he was not furnished with the
affidavits against him. Thus, he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process. (Office
of the Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)
A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel: A

party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such
body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. As such, the admissions made by
petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. (Carbonel v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010)
Due process and NBI investigations: There is no violation of due process in an NBI
investigation if the respondents are not given an opportunity to file an answer or submit counter-
evidence. The NBI does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers and its findings are merely
recommendatory. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014)
Void-for-vagueness doctrine and due process: Vague laws are void because first,
these violate due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid; second,
these leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." Petitioners must properly identify
a) any provision in the law, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning
and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly; or b)
an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
For counsel’s mistake to amount to a denial of due process, the negligence of

counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court: The general
rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural
technique, unless the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
of law. The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court.
To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the
counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client’s cause. (Uyboco v.
People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014)
Due process required in military academy disciplinary proceedings: A cadet

facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private
interests (life, liberty, or property). Hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds
of procedural due process is a must. The PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process.
(Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February
24, 2015)
Due process in student disciplinary cases: Formal trial-type hearing is not

required at all times: Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those in courts of justice. A formal trial-type hearing is not,
at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is enough that the parties are given
a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. (Cudia v. The Superintendent
of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)
Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in

administrative investigations: Recourse to discovery procedures is not mandatory:
The Court has consistently held that technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings are not
exact replicas of those in administrative investigations. Recourse to discovery procedures as
sanctioned by the Rules of Court is then not mandatory for an administrative body. In proceedings
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, decisions may be reached on the basis of position
papers or other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure
and evidence. (Sibayan v. Alda, G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018)
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. In administrative proceedings, due process entails "a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Thus, a denial of a respondent’s motion to avail of discovery procedures to obtain evidence in
her defense is not a violation of due process if she was afforded the opportunity to be heard and
to explain her side before the administrative body and was allowed to submit her answer and all
documents in support of her defense. (Sibayan v. Alda, G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018)
EQUAL PROTECTION
Similar treatment for persons or things similarly situated: The constitutional right
to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers
& Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
The equal protection clause requires a valid classification: The guaranty of equal
protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may
be treated and regulated differently from another. In other words, a valid classification must be:
(1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class. (Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
A valid classification rest on substantial distinction and the classification must

be germane to the purpose of the law: If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185,
August 16, 2016)
The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there
are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. (Ferrer v. Bautista,
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
Three tests in Equal Protection: Rational scrutiny, intermediate

scrutiny and strict scrutiny: The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the
justification given by the Government for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. This
test requires analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally require its exercise, as
distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means employed that are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels of
scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. (Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
When to apply the tests: Rational basis scrutiny for economic and social
welfare laws, intermediate scrutiny for classifications based on gender or illegitimacy
and strict scrutiny for laws that affect fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
class disadvantage of a suspect class: The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational
relation test or rational basis test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to the
legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics or social
welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class. When the classification puts a quasi-
suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review.
Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be
substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine
and must not depend on broad generalizations. The strict scrutiny review applies when a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the burden
to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Rational basis test: Reviewing the reasonable relationship between the means
and the purpose of the ordinance: Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the
reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine
whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or
reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law. Applying the test, the established classification under
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be viewed in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated
with respect to the avowed purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification
under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative classification); and (2) the classification based on
purpose (elimination of the mischief). (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Examples of valid classifications
Valid classification: Real property owner and informal settler for purposes of
the socialized housing program: For the purpose of urban development and housing
program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct
classes are too obvious. The differentiation is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution. Thus, a socialized housing tax on real property owners to provide funds for the
housing of informal settler is a not class legislation that violates the equal protection clause.
(Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
Valid classification: Judges with over 5 years of experience and judges with
less for purposes of nomination by the JBC: The policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service
as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts does not
violate the equal protection clause. There is a substantial distinction between judges with 5 years
of experience and those with less than 5 five years. The classification is reasonable and relevant
to its legitimate purpose of selecting those with proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Examples of invalid classification
Invalid classification - Aerial spraying of pesticide versus other methods of

spraying pesticide: The mischief that the prohibition sought to address was the fungicide drift
resulting from the aerial application. The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted
in Davao City are aerial, truck-mounted boom, truck-mounted mechanical, and manual spraying.
However, Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes the prohibition only against aerial spraying. However,
the occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of
any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying
produces drift that may bring about alleged health risks to the community. A ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve. In the process, the
ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is
drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to
the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law. As such, the decision
of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted with arbitrariness. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Invalid classification – Aerial spraying without any distinction between

spraying of pesticides and spraying of other substances such as vitamins: The assailed
ordinance (which bans aerial spraying on agricultural land) also tends to be "overinclusive"
because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose. The imposition of the ban is too broad because the
ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the
agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents admit that they aerially treat their
plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances. The imposition of the
ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of the agricultural
activity being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the
purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance,
seeks to address. The total ban on aerial spraying runs afoul with the equal protection clause
because it does not classify which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as
reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of
liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino
Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Invalid classification: Garbage fees based on whether the payee occupies a lot,
condominium or socialized housing unit: Imposing an annual garbage fee on all domestic
households based on rates that depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an
occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment – violates the equal
protection clause. For the purpose of garbage collection, there is no substantial distinction
between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium,
socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced
by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar
schedule of fee is both just and equitable. (Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
Invalid classification: PUV owners and private vehicle owners for purposes of
posting election campaign materials on vehicles. Prohibiting owners of Public Utility
Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates the
equal protection clause. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express
their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there
is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
(1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14,
2015)
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Reasonable and Unreasonable Searches
The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures. It is
only directed against those that are unreasonable. Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures
fall outside the scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden. As a general rule, searches
conducted with a valid are reasonable. (Veridiano v. People, June 7, 2017, G.R. No. 200370)
Valid Warrantless Search: Search with a Valid Warrant

Requirements for validity of search warrants: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)
Meaning of probable cause for search warrants: There must be probable cause –
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense is in the place to be searched. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No.
176066, August 11, 2010)
Duty of a judge in issuing search warrants: The judge must personally and
thoroughly examine the applicant and his witnesses. (Ogayon v. People, September 2, 2015)
There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered by
the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to
justify the issuance of the search warrant. In the absence of records indicating that the issuing
judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses – such as depositions
and transcripts of the examination and the application for the search warrant and supporting
affidavits – the Search warrant is a nullity. (Ogayon v. People, September 2, 2015)
In an application for search warrant, the mandate of the judge is for him to conduct a full
and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The searching
questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses must depend on a large extent upon
the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may conduct
his examination, it is axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and
not merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on the
intent and factual and legal justifications for a search warrant. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No.
216922, April 18, 2018)
Description of the place in search warrants: A description of the place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. The specific room in
the house to be searched need not be identified. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11,
2010)
Requirement of one specific offense in search warrants: The Rules of Court
requires that a search warrant must be issued in relation to one specific offense. A search warrant
applied for and issued in connection with the crime of kidnapping with murder does not violate
this rule because the kidnapping with murder or homicide is one special complex crime. (Castillo
v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Reason for the one specific offense requirement in search warrants: One of the
constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on
probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent
the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant. In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined
as such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. For a judge to find probable cause to issue a warrant,
there must be competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. The one-
specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search warrant
should issue only on the basis of probable cause. (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February
21, 2018)
Search warrant for violation of Securities Regulation Code and Estafa – invalid:
A search warrant for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa
(Art. 315, RPC)” violates the requirement that the warrant must be in connection with one specific
offense. Violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under
the said law such as manipulation of security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker
without being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of unregistered clearing
agency, and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers among
others. Moreover, the violation of the SRC and estafa are offenses entirely different from each
other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. (People v.
Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
To be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to
be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. If the search warrant does
not state the specific offense committed, it is not possible for the issuing judge as well as the
applicant to determine that the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime. Thus, a
search warrant for violation R.A. 8799 and (The Securities Regulation Code) and Estafa and
ordering the seizure of telephone bills showing the companies’ calls to clients abroad; list of
brokers and their personal files; incorporation papers of all these companies, sales agreements
with clients; copies of official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages from the clients;
company brochures; letterheads -- is null and void for having been issued for more than one
offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure. The terms
used in this warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the
transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. (People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
Description of the area to be searched: The specific area to be search inside a
large compound need not be identified in the warrant: A description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable
effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. The search
warrant identifying the place to be searched, as (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2)
the palay warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague,
Isabela – without identifying the two houses, one nipa hut, two external bathrooms, one garage,
one warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one warehouse for a palay drying machinery inside
the compound -- sufficiently describes the place to be searched. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No.
216922, April 18, 2018)
Description of items to be searched: Items must bear direct relation to the
offenses for which the warrant is being issued: A search warrant may be said to particularly
describe the things to be seized (1) when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact -
not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; (3) and
when the things to be described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offenses for
which the warrant is being issued. The purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be
seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant in order to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable
searches and seizures will be committed. Only objects that are (a) subject of the offense; (b)
stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended to
be used as the means of committing an offense, can be the proper subject of a search warrant.
Having no direct relation to the crime of kidnapping with homicide, the 1,600 sacks of palay that
were supposedly sold by the victims to the accused and found in his warehouse, cannot be a
proper subject of a search warrant. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
The seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure
illegal, and the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and (2) the
fact that the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made a
search and seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidate the first search
and seizure. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Valid Warrantless Search:

Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
A lawful arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed: A
search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search
is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be
reversed." (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Grounds for a valid warrantless arrest: A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07
June 2017)
In flagrante delicto arrest requirements: Requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto

arrest to justify a subsequent warrantless search: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Overt act requirement in flagrante delicto arrest: For a warrantless arrest of an

accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer." Trying to run away when approached by a police officer, even when
no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. Flight per
se is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014)
Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. Reliable

information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. The accused must perform some
overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)
Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt
act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed. The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified as a
hot pursuit arrest if the law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a
warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. (Veridiano v.
People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Over act requirement: The mere act of leaving a residence of a known drug
peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest: The mere act of leaving a residence of a known
drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest, unless there is an overt manifestation that the
person had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal
activity of illegal possession of shabu. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Overt act requirement: The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot
be considered a criminal act that justifies an in flagrante delicto arrest. The mere act
of a person who smells of liquor in passing by police officers without acting suspiciously or doing
anything wrong is not an overt act that shows that she has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a crime to justify a warrantless in flagrante delicto arrest. The act of walking
while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act. (Reyes v. People, G.R. No.
229380, June 06, 2018)
Requirements for a valid hot pursuit arrest: Law enforcers need not personally
witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it. (Veridiano v.
People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
An informant’s tip that a pot session is going on inside a house is not sufficient justification
for police officers to enter such house to effect an arrest and seizure without a warrant. Personal
knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366,
December 13, 2010)
Hot pursuit arrest and the requirement of personal knowledge by police

officers of facts that the person to be arrested has committed the crime: That the police
obtained prior information from two persons that the woman had just bought illegal drugs – does
not justify a “hot pursuit” arrest because the arresting officers had personal knowledge of any
fact or circumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. A hearsay tip by
itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts,
based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime
(Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018)
Police presence during the commission of the offense is not required for a hot
pursuit arrest: In a hot pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was being
committed is not required. It is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. Thus, if the
police officers respond to the scene of the crime in less than one hour and talked to the bloodied
mauling victim who identified his attackers in the same neighborhood, and these alleged attackers
did not deny the incident but had a different version – the police officers had personal knowledge
to justify the warrantless arrest of the alleged attackers. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601,
November 10, 2014)
The arrest of a person who had presented himself before the police station to clear his
name and prove that he was not the accused -- was not valid, as he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of any
offense that he might have committed. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan
Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
Valid Warrantless Search: Search of a Moving Vehicle or

Search at Checkpoints
Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. A

checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, 07 June 2017)
Routine checkpoint searches: Valid even without probable cause: Routine

checkpoint searches are valid for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Extensive checkpoint searches: Valid when probable cause is present: Extensive

checkpoint searches are valid when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that the
vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an
offense. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped
information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. Although the
Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information,
there were other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

Stop and Frisk Search
Requirement in stop-and-frisk search: Not probable cause, but genuine reason

that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person may be armed and dangerous:
Probable cause is not required but a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous. (People
v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with his
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Stop-and-frisk procedure for the police: Stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapons or contraband: A stop-and-frisk is the act of a police officer
to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain
a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine
reason, in accordance with his experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person to be held has weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No.
204589, November 19, 2014)

Plain View Doctrine
Plain view doctrine requirements: 1) prior justification for an intrusion; 2) discovery

is inadvertent; and 3) object is immediately apparent. Contraband inside a match box being held
by the person unlawfully arrested, and which was not readily apparent to the police officers
cannot be validly seized under the plain view doctrine. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589,
November 19, 2014)
Contraband lying outside of a suspect’s house and exposed to the sight of police officers
serving a search warrant can be seized under the plain view doctrine. (Crescencio v People, G.R.
No. 205015, November 19, 2014)
Evidence cannot be considered “inadvertently discovered” for purposes of seizure of

evidence in plain view if the police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior
surveillance or investigation. The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance
if the identity and address of one of the suspects were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have
been secured prior to effecting an arrest and seizure. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366,
December 13, 2010)
When items not described in the search warrant may be seized under the plain
view doctrine: Under the plain view doctrine, during the conduct of the search, objects falling
in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. For the "plain view
doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are present: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18,
2018)
The items supposedly seized in plain view must be confiscated in relation to
the seizure of the items identified in the search warrant: Other items subsequently
found cannot be admitted: The plain view doctrine cannot apply if it is not clear whether the
items supposedly seized in plain view were confiscated in relation to the seizure of the items
identified in the search warrant -- whether prior to, contemporaneous with or subsequent to such
seizure. The "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Immediately apparent test: Items not inherently unlawful cannot be seized
under the plain view doctrine: The "immediately apparent" test only require there is a
probable cause to associate the property with a criminal activity. The plain view doctrine cannot
justify seizure of items the possession thereof is not inherently unlawful. Thus the following items
not described in the warrant but also seized are inadmissible: (a) 3 torn cloths; (b) black bag
pack; (c) a piece of gold-plated earing; (d) a suspected human hair; (e) a piece of embroidered
cloth; (f) 3 burned tire wires; (g) empty plastic of muriatic acid; and (h) white t-shirt. (Castillo v.
People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)

Consented Search
Consent must be given voluntarily, intelligently and without duress: The

constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which
may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. If a police officer,
without coercion or intimidation, asks for permission to open a bag and the bag owner says, “yes,
just open it,” there is consent to the search of the contents of the bag. (People v. Cogaed, G.R.
No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
Silence is not necessarily consent to a search but mere passive conformity

given under intimidating or coercive circumstances. The police carry the burden of
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free
from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. (Veridiano v. People, June
7, 2017, G.R. No. 200370)
Reasonable Search:
Airport Security Search
Routine airport security searches: Valid because of their minimal intrusiveness,

the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel: Airport security searches are valid even without a warrant,
because of their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. (Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023,
February 06, 2013)
Reasonable Search:
Seaport Security Search
Routine x-ray scanning of baggage at seaports by port authorities: Valid just like
routine airport security searches: The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in
domestic seaports -- akin to routine security procedures in airports – are reasonable. The reason
is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports of
travel. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Routine baggage inspections at seaports by port authorities: Opening of baggage by port

inspector is reasonable. The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to
ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. It is a permissible intrusion to privacy
when measured against the possible harm to society caused by lawless persons. (Dela Cruz v.
People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Reasonable Search:
Search by a government employer of an employees’

office in connection with investigation of work-
related misconduct
A government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated office

environment is reduced: A government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated office
environment is reduced. The employee’s privacy interest in an office is to a large extent limited
by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. (Pollo v. Constantino-
David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)
A government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy in his

government-issued computer containing his personal files, if the government office implemented
a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything
they create, store, send or receive on the office computers. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No.
181881, October 18, 2011)
A warrantless search by a government employer of an employees’ office in

connection with investigation of work-related misconduct is justified at inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct: A warrantless search by a government
employer of an employees’ office in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct is
justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, a search of a government
employee’s files in the government-issued computer, conducted in connection with investigation
of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint -- is a reasonable
exercise of the managerial prerogative of an employer to ensure operational effectiveness and
efficiency. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)
Reasonable Search:
Public Bus Search: Guidelines, Limitations, Application
The State can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in
a public bus. A bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property
accessible to the public. The State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security
measures and filter those going in. A person's expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he
or she enters private premises that arc accessible to the public. Thus, a bus inspection at a military
checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. (Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
Guidelines for reasonable public bus searches:
Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine
inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. Metal detectors and x-ray scanning
machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic
scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, in
the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry
into the terminal. (Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel
of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a
passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be
stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different
from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal
articles carried by a passenger onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passenger en route, the
prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same
routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the person
boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick
passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine search
at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints
where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their
bags or luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus
terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to
qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the
least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing,
if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second,
neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable
identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third,
as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the
evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put
at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses
and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers
at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever
compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while
in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable,
thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they
applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which
are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged
down by any other person unti1 the passengers on board alight from the vehicle. (Saluday v.
People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
FREE SPEECH
Facial Challenges on the Ground of
Void-for-Vagueness
The void-for-vagueness challenge aims to counter a statute’s chilling effect on

free speech: When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. This is to counter the "chilling effect"
on protected speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under
an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking to avoid being charged of
a crime. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 2010)
Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, as facial challenges, apply only to free speech
cases, not for testing the validity of penal statutes. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014)
Spam is protected speech, prohibition on spam is invalid: The prohibition on the

sending of internet “spam” under Republic Act (R.A.) 10175 (the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012) is a violation of freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads
would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him; commercial speech is also entitled to protection. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014)
Libel is unprotected speech and may be penalized. The government has an obligation
to protect private individuals from defamation. The cybercrime law penalizing the author of a
libelous online statement or article is valid. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 18, 2014)
The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the commission of internet libel is
void for being vague and overbroad: The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the commission
of internet libel is void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding or abetting"
unnecessarily sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms, generating a
chilling effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace. Also, netizens are not given "fair
notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its vagueness also
causes a chilling effect on the freedom of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014)
Actual malice in libel cases: To be convicted of libel for criticisms of public

officials on matters of public interest, the prosecution must be prove that the offender
had actual malice, meaning he made the defamatory statement with the knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not: The conduct,
moral fitness, and ability of a public official to discharge his duties are undoubtedly matters of
public interest. The statements on the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of Domingo
are matters of public interest as these relate to his moral conduct, his capacity to lead the DTI
Region VIII employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs of the office. These statements
undoubtedly make it to the grade of qualifiedly privileged communication and thus, would require
actual malice to be actionable. It must be stressed, however, that once it is established that the
article is of a privileged character, the onus of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff who
must then convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. There is "actual
malice" or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. It was evident that the
statements as to the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of Domingo cannot be regarded
to have been written with the knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of whether
these were false, bearing in mind that Batuigas had documentary evidence to support his
statements. (Manila Bulletin v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017)
Why Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized tarpaulins posted on

private property by non-candidates during elections is void
The tarpaulins are political advocacy of private individuals and not election
propaganda subject to Comelec regulation: Speech with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection. Tarpaulins put up by private individuals that contain statements of
their approval or criticisms of public officials’ vote on the RH Law, as part of these private
individuals’ advocacy campaign against the RH Law, and not paid for by any candidate or political
party – are not election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by non-candidates or
who do not speak as members of a political party which are principally advocacies of a social
issue during elections -- is unconstitutional. Regulation of election paraphernalia involving speech
of persons who are not candidates is valid, if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken
as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a)
should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition
of the message.
The Comelec’s general role includes ensuring equal opportunities and reduce spending
among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of
the electorate in the electoral exercise. Expression by the electorate on contemporary issues is a
form of speech protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution.
The prohibition is a content-based prior restraint that is presumed invalid:

Prohibiting non-candidates from posting on their private property tarpaulins containing their
opinions that may affect elections is a content-based regulation that is presumed invalid. A
content-based prior restraint will only be valid it if passes the clear and present danger test.
The prohibition is an impermissible encroachment on the right to property: The

act of the Comelec in restraining private individuals from posting tarpaulins expressing political
views in their own private property is an impermissible encroachment on the right to property.
The Comelec prohibition is a deprivation of property without due process. (The Diocese of Bacolod
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
Why the aggregate-based time air-time limits on campaign advertising is

invalid
Restriction on freedom of speech and of the press: The Comelec’s rule -- limiting
the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty
(180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements -- is unreasonable and arbitrary, as it
unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of the press. It unduly restricts and constrains
the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Violation of the right to suffrage: The COMELEC’s aggregate time-limit rule [rule
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements] violate the people’s right to
suffrage by restricting the right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise
of their right to determine their own destiny. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
Why the Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material

during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals is
void
The prohibition constitutes a content-based prior restraint on the right to free

expression which is presumed invalid: The Comelec prohibition on posting of an election
campaign material during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport
terminals --constitutes a prior restraint on the right to free expression. Prior restraints are
presumed invalid.
Assuming it is a content-neutral regulation, it is still not valid because first, it

is not within the constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second, there
is no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals: A content-neutral regulation, which merely controls the time, place or manner of
speech, is valid if the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals
from posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation because, first,
it is not within the constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second, there is no
necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
No captive audience: Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting
election campaign materials cannot be justified under the captive-audience doctrine. The
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs
and transport terminals, nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained
therein. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14,
2015)
Why the Comelec’s regulation requiring disclosure of names of those who

commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms -- is
valid
When published, election surveys partake of the nature of election propaganda

subject to Comelec regulation: Election surveys may influence voter preferences. When left
unregulated, election surveys can undermine the holding of "fair" elections, which is the purpose
of the Fair Election act. The Fair Election Act aims to realize the policy under the 1987 Constitution
to guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and reduce political inequalities.
Election surveys may tend to shape voter preferences. When published, election surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. The requirement of
disclosing the names of subscribers to election surveys is valid regulation of declarative speech
by private entities in the context of an election campaign because 1) it has basis in a statute, 2)
it furthers not just an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one, which is
to guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and 3) narrowly tailored to meet
the objective and is least restrictive means to achieve that objective.
Mandatory after-election disclosure of names of those who commission

election surveys is not a prior restraint: The Comelec’s regulation requiring disclosure of
names of those who commission or pay for election surveys is not a prior restraint as the
disclosure requirement kicks in only upon, not prior to, publication. (Social Weather Station v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)
The Comelec rule on mandatory right to reply is valid: The Constitution itself
mandates the right to reply. Moreover, radio and TV broadcasting companies do not own the
airwaves but are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. The exercise of the privilege
may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
(GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Non-Establishment Clause: Government neutrality in religious matters: The

constitutional mandate that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion," is
known as the non-establishment clause. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church;
nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force
nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion. What non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
Under the Establishment Clause, the State is prohibited from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April
2014)
It is a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of a party from registration. The government must act for
secular purposes. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April
8, 2010)
Free exercise clause: Freedom to act on one’s belief is subject to government

regulation: The guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe
and the freedom to act on one's belief; the first part is absolute; the second part is limited and
subject to regulation where the external acts affect the public welfare. In case of conflict, the
court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8
April 2014)
When freedom of religion and government regulation conflict
Benevolent Neutrality allows accommodation: Government accommodation of

religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)
Benevolent Neutrality allows for exemption from government regulation:

Pursuant to the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. To compel a conscientious objector to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction would be violate "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the right to
free exercise of religion. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses
to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a
patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of religious freedom. (Imbong
v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)
A 2010 CHED Memorandum has imposed a positive duty on all Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in
case such activities interfere with their religious obligations. Thus, HEI officials are duty bound to
enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it requires the exemption of students who are
Seventh-Day Adventists from academic responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of their
Saturday worship. (Almores v. Achacoso, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 217453)
That a student is being made by a state university to choose between honoring his
religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious freedoms.
(Almores v. Achacoso, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 217453)
When the government can compel a conscientious objector to act contrary to

his religious belief and conviction: Compelling state interest, such as to save the life
of the mother or a child: In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the
compelling state interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion
that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny. Thus, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating
a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. If it is
necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. Whatever burden
imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering
the life he would be able to save. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)
Why the holding of religious rituals such as Catholic masses at the basement
of any hall of justice may be allowed
The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their
religion: Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of
Church and State: Allowing the practice does not violate the principle of separation of Church
and State. The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their religion.
Our very own Constitution recognizes the religiosity of our people. Allowing religion to flourish is
not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State.
There is no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of

religious freedom in the halls of justice: Although religious freedom is not absolute, a
compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. To
successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC
Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees
in the performance of their official functions. In this case, there is no state interest compelling
enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.
Allowing the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation: Allowing the holding
of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but
merely accommodation. To give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State
adopts a policy of accommodation. Benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under
certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically
into account, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. (In re: Holding of
Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7,
2017)
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Meaning of the right to privacy: The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. Right
to privacy may extend to places where one has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access, such as a business office. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test: The reasonableness of a person’s

expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual
has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show

intention to keep posts private through the use of privacy tools: To have an expectation
of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to keep certain posts private through
the use of privacy tools. A Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right
which necessarily accompanies said choice. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666,
September 29, 2014)
Surveillance cameras should cover places where there is reasonable

expectation of privacy: In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should
these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would
be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
There are the three strands of the right to privacy: (1) locational or situational
privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. The right to informational privacy
is usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. (Vivares v.
St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
An ordinance requiring property owners to expose their property by limiting the height of
fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru is
a violation of the right to privacy of the property owners. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
LIBERTY:
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Waiver under Art. 125 of RPC: Not a license to detain a person indefinitely: The
waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the unbridled
right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and caprices of
the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not
a license to detain a person ad infinitum. Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be
construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. A detainee
must be promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver
of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No.
91659) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases
where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was
appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or
automatic review. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413,
July 25, 2017)
A person is illegally arrested and detained because of a mistaken identity can avail himself
of a petition for habeas corpus. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang
Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
LIFE, LIBERTY & SECURITY:
THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Nature of the Writ of Amparo: Protection of the right to life, liberty, and
security: The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to
violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to
address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Callo
v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)
Meaning of enforced disappearance: The arrest, detention, or abduction of persons

by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political organization
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. (Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September
19, 2017)
Meaning of extralegal killings: Killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. (Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No.
230324, September 19, 2017)
Elements of enforced disappearance: (a) that there be an arrest, detention,

abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be
followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for
such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. There is no enforced disappearance if the detention is carried out by the State through the
Bureau of Immigration, which admits that the petitioner is detained in the Immigration Detention
Facility and there is no intention to remove him from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time because his detention is in connection with a pending criminal case against her.
(Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)
Judgment in writ of amparo proceedings: Writ of amparo proceedings do not

determine criminal, civil or administrative liability. The principal objective of its proceedings is the
initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof
had transpired. (Roxas v. Macapagl Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)
In the proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the guilt or innocence of the
respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor
to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty
or security. (Republic v. Cayanan, November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability

in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility
or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011)
Responsibility and/or accountability: The legal basis or bases for impleading military
commanders in amparo cases. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have participated in
an enforced disappearance. Accountability refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility, or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure, or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. (Balao v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011)
Duty of respondents in amparo proceedings: Show extraordinary diligence in
the conduct of investigation: The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove
that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed
in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability.
(Republic v. Cayanan, November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
Extraordinary diligence in investigation: Passive certificates to the effect that

the missing person was not being detained by any of them are severely inadequate:
A public official or employee impleaded as a respondent in the petition for the writ
of amparo should submit with the verified written return supporting affidavits, which detail among
other things, the steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission.
Passive certificates to the effect that the missing person was not being detained by any of them
are severely inadequate, and amount to a general denial, which is not allowed. (Republic v.
Cayanan, November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
Extraordinary diligence: Details of the investigation conducted must be given:

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the investigations
conducted by the authorities in a manner that would enable the court to judiciously determine
whether or not the efforts to ascertain a missing person’s whereabouts had been sincere and
adequate. (Republic v. Cayanan, November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
The failure of the police to conduct a fair and effect investigation may amount
to a violation of or threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of a person: The
failure of the police and military authorities to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted
to a violation of or threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of a person who claims to have
been abducted and tortured by the military. The right to security of a person includes the positive
obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate. The
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective
if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations. The duty to investigate must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty.
(Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)
THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
The writ of habeas data is a remedy in case a person’s right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual or a person’s right to control information regarding oneself. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No.
193636, July 24, 2012)
Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be
granted: Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be granted. Thus, the
existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. (Vivares v. St.
Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
The petitioner must show that the supposed dissemination of a sex video will
violate his right to privacy in life, liberty or security: The petition must adequately show
that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence. Thus, it must be shown that the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination
of the subject sex video will violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the petitioner.
(Lee v. Ilagan, October 8, 2014, G.R. No. 203254)
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against
the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. (Vivares v. St.
Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
Right to privacy may yield to a compelling state interest, such as the

dismantling of private armed groups: The right to privacy is not absolute. It may succumb
to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. (Gamboa v. Chan,
G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
An application for a writ of habeas data may be denied if the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest, such as dismantling of private
armed groups (PAGs). The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion
on the private life of Gamboa. Thus, the act of the police in collecting information on individuals
suspected of maintaining PAGs, such as Gamboa, and in sharing and forwarding such information
to a government body tasked to investigate PAGs was not an unlawful act that violated or
threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The fact that the PNP released
information to the government investigating commission without prior communication to Gamboa
and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation
or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-
gathering and investigation. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
LIBERTY OF ABODE
The law allows evictions and demolition without any court order in cases where
persons occupy danger areas or areas where government infrastructure projects are
about to be implemented but the prescribed procedure must be followed: The
Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling
demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. RA 7279 allows
summary evictions and demolition in cases where persons or entities occupy danger areas (such
as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways) and when persons
occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane
manner, RA 7279 requires compliance with a prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or
demolition orders, including prior 30-day notice and adequate consultation. Evictions and
demolitions without any court order under RA 7279 are valid. (Kalipunan Ang Damay Ang
Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)
TRAVEL
Power of the Supreme Court to curtail the right to travel of members of the
judiciary and court personnel: The Supreme Court, under its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof, has the power to oversee all matters relating
to the effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it, including the
rules and regulations on their foreign travels. (Leave Division v. Heusdens, Dec 13, 2011, AM No.
P-11-2927)
The Supreme Court regulations on foreign travels of members of the judiciary and court
personnel is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel
can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be
a disruption in the administration of justice. (Leave Division v. Heusdens, Dec 13, 2011, AM No.
P-11-2927)
Constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel:

The right to travel is part of the guarantee of freedom of movement that the Constitution affords
its citizen. However, the right to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and
inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. The liberty of travel may be impaired even
without Court Order, but the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of
"national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law." (Genuino v.
De Lima, April 17, 2018, G.R. No. 197930)
The right to travel is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may
impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law. (Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special
protection to children. Article 139 of PD 603 explicitly authorizes local government units, through
their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. PD 603 provides sufficient
statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to
travel. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017)
There is no law authorizing the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise of

the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health:
The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 -- which authorizes the DOJ to restrain the right to travel --
has no legal basis. There is no law authorizing the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise of
the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. (Genuino v.
De Lima, April 17, 2018, G.R. No. 197930)
In the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the accused is

not necessary: n the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the accused is not
necessary for the prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties. If the accused chooses to waive
his presence or fails to submit countervailing evidence, that is his own lookout. The DOJ therefore
cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the
ground that it is necessary to ensure attendance in the preliminary investigation of the complaints.
There is also no authority of law granting it the power to compel the attendance of the subjects
of a preliminary investigation. (Genuino v. De Lima, April 17, 2018, G.R. No. 197930)
The DOJ cannot keep an individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he
may not be able to evade criminal prosecution: That there is a risk of flight does not
authorize the DOJ to take the situation upon itself and draft an administrative issuance to keep
the individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he may not be able to evade criminal
prosecution and consequent liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not have; it is a
usurpation of function that properly belongs to the legislature. (Genuino v. De Lima, April 17,
2018, G.R. No. 197930)
How restricting travel may constitute a violation of freedom of religion, speech,

assembly, and association: Whenever the freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and
association require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected. Restricting
movement in those circumstances to the extent that these rights cannot be exercised without
violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Why the State may restrict the right to travel of minors: The restrictions on the
right to travel that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. Minors do
possess and enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as
those of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their
parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and restricts
the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in voting, executing contracts, employment, and
travelling. The differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights is justified by: first, the
peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed
and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing. (Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
What the government must show to validly restrict a fundamental right, such
as the right to travel: The strict scrutiny test - Compelling state interest and least
restrictive means: Limitations on the fundamental right to travel of minors are constitutionally
permissible if these pass the strict scrutiny test. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the
burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest,
and (2) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly
tailored to accomplish the interest. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Restricting the right to travel: The compelling state interest requirement of the
strict scrutiny test: Compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies. That
children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae
constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. In this case, respondents have
sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if
not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal
pressure and influences. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No.
225442, August 8, 2017)
Restricting the right to travel: The least restrictive means requirement: While
fundamental rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the
extent necessary to achieve the State's compelling interest: While fundamental rights
may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the
purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must
be so narrowly drawn. The curfew ordinances, in restricting the right to travel, must also
sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Curfew ordinances must provide for exemptions that allow the exercise of the
rights to association, free exercise of religion, travel, peaceably assemble, and free
expression: The curfew ordinances, in restricting the right to travel, must also sufficiently
protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble,
and of free expression. The Navotas and Manila curfew ordinances protect the rights to education,
to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not
account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others. (Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has
the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law;
(c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present
when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires. (People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014)
Miranda rights apply only during a custodial investigation: Miranda rights apply
only during a custodial investigation, when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the
police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements." Custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed. (People v.
Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 221424)
What custodial investigation means: Person is a suspect, under custody and

being questioned by the police: Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken
into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to
elicit an admission. If a person, before he is arrested and placed under custodial investigation,
voluntarily confesses to the police his commission of a crime, such confession, even if done
without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right, and is admissible
as evidence. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015)
Confession to the police when the person was not yet a suspect – admissible
as evidence because he was not yet under custodial investigation: An uncounseled
confession elicited during the initial police interview at the residence of an alleged theft victim at
the time when the person confessing was not yet identified by the police as a suspect -- is
admissible as evidence against that person, because the person was not yet under custodial
investigation. However, a subsequent confession to the police after being brought to the police
station is inadmissible because her appearance before the police station already falls within the
definition of custodial investigation. (People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 221424)
Miranda rights are not available in administrative investigations: Rights in

custodial interrogation, such as the right to counsel, apply only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Thus, an employee’s
written statement given during an administrative inquiry conducted by an employer in connection
with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment -- is
admissible as evidence against the employee, even if he was not assisted by a lawyer when he
signed the written statement. (Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29,
2014)
A person under custodial investigation must be assisted by counsel at all times:

The law requires that "any person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel. The extrajudicial confession of the accused is inadmissible as
evidence. No lawyer assisted the accused at the time he was arrested and brought to the police
station to answer questions about the crime and he was assisted by his lawyer only during the
time he executed his extrajudicial confession. (People v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14,
2018)
The counsel must be independent: a legal consultant in the Office of the

Municipal Mayor is not: A legal consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor -- whose duty
is to provide legal advice to the Mayor whose duty, in turn, is to execute the laws and ordinances
and maintain peace and order in the municipality -- cannot be considered as an independent
counsel since protecting the rights of the accused as a suspect is in direct conflict with his duty
to the Municipal Mayor and the local government of the Municipality. (People v. Paris, G.R. No.
218130, February 14, 2018)
The lawyer must be competent: The lawyer who will assist the accused should be
competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused,
as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
recital of the individual's constitutional rights. A lawyer is not vigilant in protecting the rights of
the accused, if during the course of the custodial investigation, he allows the accused to answer
each question without reminding him that he can refuse to answer and/or remain silent. (People
v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Paraffin test without a lawyer is valid: The right against self-incrimination extends
only to testimonial compulsion, and not when the body of the accused is examined. (People v.
Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014)
BAIL
Purpose: Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
Who are entitled to bail: The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
his guilt is strong. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
When bail may be allowed regardless of the crime charged and independently
of the merits of the charge: When the incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious
to his health or to endanger his life: Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless
of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. The
objective of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial. (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
SPEEDY TRIAL &
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Protection against vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays in cases: The

Constitution declares that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The right to speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98,
April 16, 2018)
Balancing Test: Four factors to consider to determine a violation of the right to

a speedy trial: To determine whether accused-appellant's right to speedy trial was violated,
"four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant." (People v. Domingo, G.R.
No. 204895, March 21, 2018)
Under the “balancing test,” in the determination of whether that right has been violated,
the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reason/s for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)
the prejudice caused by the delay. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16,
2018)
Example of violation of the right: Pre-trial was not held for more than 1 year-
after the arrest; the prosecution failed to present any evidence during the 4 settings
with any justifiable reason; the accused was in detention during the trial; and the
accused moved for the dismissal of the case for violation of his right to a speedy trial:
In this case, all the factors showing a violation of his right are present: (a) length of delay; (b)
the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant. (People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)
The court must consider the length of delay and the reason for the delay: The
more than eight years it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather
routine issue (like venue in libel cases) is inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified:
The length of delay must be commensurate with the reason thereof. The more than eight years
it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather routine issue (like venue in libel cases)
is clearly inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. Furthermore, the silence of the accused during
such period could not be viewed as an unequivocal act of waiver of their right to speedy
determination of their cases. That the accused could have filed a motion for early resolution of
their cases is immaterial. The more than eight years delay the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor incurred
before issuing his resolution of the complaints is an affront to a reasonable dispensation of justice
and such delay could only be perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive manner.
(People v. Macasaet, G.R. No. 196094, March 05, 2018)
Dismissal on the ground of violation of speedy trial amounts to an acquittal:

The dismissal of a case on the ground of violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial
amounts to an acquittal and will bar another prosecution for the same offense or even the filing
of a motion for reconsideration by the prosecution as it will violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy, even if it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the case. (People v.
Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)
When an OMB investigation lasting 7 years is not necessarily a violation of the

right to speedy disposition of cases: An Ombudsman investigation lasting seven years does
not necessarily amount to a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases, considering the
following circumstances. In spite of the prescribed periods to act upon complaints and motions
are set by the rules, the concept of speedy trial, or speedy disposition of cases for that matter, is
a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Moreover, the following circumstances
do not show a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases: a) the investigating officer had
to embark into the detailed investigation of 63 cash advance transactions in the two complaints
to investigated upon, covering the period of four years; b) the motions for reconsiderations filed
by the respondents; c) the other cases pending before the OMB; d) there is nothing on record
that would show that respondents asserted this right to speedy disposition during the OMB
proceedings when they alleged that the delay occurred; e) neither was there a considerable
prejudice caused by a delay upon the respondents, as there is no showing of any persecution of
the respondents, political or otherwise, or that he they were made to endure any vexatious
process during the two-year period before the filing of the proper Informations. (People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Requirements for jeopardy to attach: The first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July
27, 2015)
Jeopardy will not attach in case of dismissal of a complaint during preliminary

investigation: Since the preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial, the dismissal of
a case during preliminary investigation would not put the accused in danger of double jeopardy
in the event of a re-investigation or the filing of a similar case. (Jamaca v. People, G.R. No.
183681, July 27, 2015)
If the accused were never arraigned in lower court, and the criminal case was dismissed
upon the order of the Supreme Court, a first jeopardy never attached. (Ocampo v. Abando, G.R.
No. 176830, February 11, 2014)
Double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical
offenses: Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other: The protection against double jeopardy may
be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. Where two different laws (or articles
of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other. There is nothing common or
similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification of private document under
Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the
Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily
include or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to attach—
a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first—is, therefore, absent. (Assistio v. People,
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015)
Provisional dismissal is not an acquittal; hence, jeopardy will not attach: The
provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal is made with
the express consent of the accused; thus, double jeopardy does not attach. (Saldariega v.
Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)
Jeopardy does not attach in case of a void dismissal, because it is as if there

was no acquittal or dismissal: If the court’s dismissal of the cases was void for having been
done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction, it is as if there
was no acquittal or dismissal of the cases at all. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to annul
the resolutions of Sandiganbayan for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion which
granted respondents' motion to dismiss premised on the ground of inordinate delay in the
preliminary investigation violating their right to speedy disposition of their cases – does not put
the accused twice in jeopardy. In this case, the order of dismissal was rendered by a court who
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and thus if is as
if there was no acquittal or dismissal; respondents have not yet been arraigned for their refusal
to appear therein, instead they filed a motion to dismiss; and the cases were dismissed at
respondents' instance and thus, with their express consent. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
232197-98, April 16, 2018)
CONFRONTATION
The right to confront and cross-examine a witness is not available during

preliminary investigation, which is not part of trial: Preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such
as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. (Estrada v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)
INFORMATION
Right to information and the State’s duty of full public disclosure: The people’s
constitutional right to information is intertwined with the government’s constitutional duty of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. The people have the right to access
the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning
bidder for a government project. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)
FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ALL TRANSACTIONS

INVOLVING PUBLIC INTERESTS
The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern

enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of
full public disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article
II of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in the
Government. (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No.
175210
Requisites for invoking the right to information: The people’s right to information
is not absolute. Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by
writ of mandamus: 1) the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or
public interest; and 2) it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No.
175210)
Matters not covered by the right to information: The constitutional guarantee of

the people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and intelligence
information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters, diplomatic
correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting, executive sessions of either house of Congress,
and internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. Close-door Cabinet meetings are not covered in
order to allow the free exchange of ideas among Government officials. (Sereno v. Committee on
Trade and Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No. 175210)
Not covered by the right to information - information on on-going evaluation

or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee:
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the
bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While
the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on
the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there
arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right
to information attaches. The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International,
June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)
Not covered by the right to information – privileged information such as the

deliberative process privilege: Privileged information is outside the scope of the constitutional
right to information, just like military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order. The deliberative process privilege -- involving as it does the deliberative
process of reaching a decision -- is one kind of privileged information. Deliberative process
privilege protects from disclosure advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
(Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)
Fundamental requirements for the communication to be covered by the

deliberative process privilege: 1) pre-decisional; and 2) deliberative: First, the
communication must be pre-decisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy."
Second, the communication must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process
in that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters." Records
which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature - part of or related to the deliberative
process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of
internal deliberations, and similar papers - are protected and cannot be the subject of a subpoena.
(Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)
The reasons for the deliberative process privilege: first, the privilege protects
candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public confusion from premature
disclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy; and third, it protects the
integrity of an agency's decision; the public should not judge officials based on information they
considered prior to issuing their final decisions. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA
International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)
CRUEL AND DEGRADING PUNISHMENT
Perpetual disqualification from public office is not cruel, degrading and

inhuman punishment: The prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the
individual of his humanity. It applies only to a punishment that is flagrantly and plainly oppressive
and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. Perpetual disqualification from public office for the repeated failure to file the SOCE
does not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. (Maturan v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017)

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2019 BAR REVIEW NOTES

Selected Recent Jurisprudence (2010-June 2018)1

STATE POWERS AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES

The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts does not amount to a

Mandatory five-meter setback of fences amounts to a deprivation of the

Easement of right-of-way on the land is equivalent to the taking of property. (Republic of

No requirement of full payment of just compensation prior to government

Reckoning point for determination of just compensation: The reckoning period of

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function: Statutes and

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

Requirements for a writ of kalikasan: 1) actual or threatened violation of the

Substantive due process: To stop the construction by of a building in a private

Ex-parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order in VAWC cases does not

Basic principles of administrative due process: Administrative proceedings are not

A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio: A decision rendered

Due process in administrative proceedings means opportunity to explain one's

Administrative due process: A formal or trial-type hearing is not always

Right to counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings: In an

A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel: A

For counsel’s mistake to amount to a denial of due process, the negligence of

Due process required in military academy disciplinary proceedings: A cadet

Due process in student disciplinary cases: Formal trial-type hearing is not

Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in

A valid classification rest on substantial distinction and the classification must

Three tests in Equal Protection: Rational scrutiny, intermediate

Examples of valid classifications

Examples of invalid classification

Invalid classification - Aerial spraying of pesticide versus other methods of

Invalid classification – Aerial spraying without any distinction between

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Reasonable and Unreasonable Searches

Valid Warrantless Search: Search with a Valid Warrant

Valid Warrantless Search:

In flagrante delicto arrest requirements: Requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto

Overt act requirement in flagrante delicto arrest: For a warrantless arrest of an

Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. Reliable

Hot pursuit arrest and the requirement of personal knowledge by police

Valid Warrantless Search: Search of a Moving Vehicle or

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. A

Routine checkpoint searches: Valid even without probable cause: Routine

Extensive checkpoint searches: Valid when probable cause is present: Extensive

Valid Warrantless Search:

Requirement in stop-and-frisk search: Not probable cause, but genuine reason

Valid Warrantless Search:

Plain view doctrine requirements: 1) prior justification for an intrusion; 2) discovery

Evidence cannot be considered “inadvertently discovered” for purposes of seizure of

Valid Warrantless Search:

Consent must be given voluntarily, intelligently and without duress: The

Silence is not necessarily consent to a search but mere passive conformity

Routine airport security searches: Valid because of their minimal intrusiveness,

Routine baggage inspections at seaports by port authorities: Opening of baggage by port

Search by a government employer of an employees’

A government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated office

A government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy in his

A warrantless search by a government employer of an employees’ office in

Guidelines for reasonable public bus searches:

Facial Challenges on the Ground of

The void-for-vagueness challenge aims to counter a statute’s chilling effect on

Spam is protected speech, prohibition on spam is invalid: The prohibition on the

Actual malice in libel cases: To be convicted of libel for criticisms of public

Why Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized tarpaulins posted on

The prohibition is a content-based prior restraint that is presumed invalid:

The prohibition is an impermissible encroachment on the right to property: The