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I.
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS AND BASIC CONCEPTS
1. Define and explain the Archipelagic Doctrine.
An archipelago, which consists of a number of islands separated by bodies of water, should be treated as
one integral unit, and the waters inside the baselines are considered internal waters. It has two
components: (a) straight baseline method; and (b) internal water principle.
It is embodied in the second paragraph of Art. I of the 1987 Constitution which states that: The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines (Art. I, 1987 Constitution).
2. What is an Archipelago?
An archipelago is a group of islands including parts of islands, interconnecting waters, and other natural
features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features, form an
intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such (Art.
46, UNCLOS).
3. What are the Maritime Zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS?
a. Internal Waters – consist of waters around, between and connecting the islands of the Philippine
Archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, including the waters in bays, rivers and lakes.
No right of innocent passage for foreign vessels exists in the case of internal waters (Harris, Cases and Ma-
terials on International Law, 1998).
b. Contiguous Zone – the zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to 12 nautical miles
from the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary to prevent the
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within the territory or
territorial sea (Art. 33, UNCLOS).
c. Territorial Sea – extends up to 12 nautical miles outward from the baselines.
d. Exclusive Economic Zone – the zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a
State over which the Costal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving,
and managing its natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters super adjacent to the sea-
bed and the of the seabed and subsoil and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation
and exploration of the zone (Arts. 56-57, UNCLOS).
4. In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. In 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by
enacting RA 9522. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with
the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Among
others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and
the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands. Several concerned citizens questioned the
constitutionality of RA 9522. They raised the following arguments:
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a. RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory;
b. RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines weaken
our claim over the Kalayaan Island Group and Scarborough Shoal;
c. RA 9522 failed to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo;
d. RA 9522 converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters
to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III.
Rule on each of the argument raised.
a. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters, contiguous zone,
exclusive economic zone), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. Baselines laws are nothing
but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights.
b. Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of
two provisions of UNCLOS III. Moreover, Sec. 2 of RA 9522 states that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction over these Regime of Islands. Far from surrendering the Philippines claim
over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine state‘s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
c. RA 9522 did not repeal Section 2 of RA 5446 (Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the
territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation
of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which
the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
d. Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The
fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest
of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law
principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government,
in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. (Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167,
July 16, 2011)
5. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD). In this MOA-AD, the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) would be established. The
BJE is granted the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands
of the Bangsamoro. The BJE shall also have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its
"internal waters”; the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the
BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and
south west of mainland Mindanao; and within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
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"Central Government" shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all
natural resources. The MOA-AD also states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish
trade missions in those countries. Finally, the relationship between the Central Government
and the BJE shall be associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a
structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact.
Several petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus were filed assailing the
constitutionality of the MOA-AD. The Solicitor General opposed these petitions arguing that
there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review as the MOA-AD is yet to be
signed by the parties.
a. Is the contention of the Solicitor General correct?
No. That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. The petitions alleged
that the MOA-AD violates the Constitution, thus, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act
of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute .
b. What is the associative concept in International Law?
An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while
maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between
integration and independence.
c. Did the MOA-AD vest in the BJE the status of an associated state?
Yes. The provisions in the MOA-AD are consistent with the international legal concept of association: the
BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the
Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external
defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands (which are associated states) to be consulted by the U.S.
government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. (Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel,
G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008)
d. Does the present constitution recognize the concept of association?
No. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
"associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

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e. Does the MOA-AD violate Sec. 22 of Art. II of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development?
Yes. An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion
of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity. (Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel,
G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008)
6. Explain the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution,
that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997)
7. What are the tests of a valid delegation of power?
a. Completeness Test – the law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
legislature that nothing is left to the judgment of the delegate; when it reaches the delegate, the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
b. Sufficient Standard Test - the law must offer a sufficient standard to specify the limits of the
delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and specify conditions under which it is to be
implemented. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. (Abakada Guro Partylist vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008)
8. How did the Disbursement Acceleration Program violate the doctrine of separation of
powers?
The Disbursement Acceleration Program violated the doctrine of separation of powers through the
following acts and practices:
a. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropria-
tions Acts;
b. The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other of-
fices outside the Executive; and
c. The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act. (Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
9. How does the Pork Barrel System violate the (a) principle of separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) principle of checks and balances; (d) principle of
accountability and (e) principle of local autonomy?
a. Principle of separation of powers: The defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
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would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation. At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program
menus – have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to
be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Aside from the area of project
identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release
and realignment. Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the
separation of powers principle.
b. Non-delegability of legislative power: The Pork Barrel System, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged
in Congress. It must be emphasized that individual legislators have no law-making authority except only
when acting as a body.
c. Principle of checks and balances: A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be
the President‘s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him
by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." For the President to exercise his
item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. Under the Pork Barrel System, the amount specified in the GAA is only a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive per-
sonal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based
on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA
is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto con-
sideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a ―budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and con-
sequently impairs the President‗s power of item veto.
d. Principle of accountability: An accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of

public funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appro-
priation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post- enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they them-
selves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authoriza-
tion runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution (prohibition to intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for pecuniary benefit or where they may be called upon to act on
account of their office).
e. Principle of local autonomy: The concept of legislator control underlying the Countrywide Devel-
opment Fund (CDF) and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direc-
tion of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial juris-
diction." Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated

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by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
10. The House of Representatives has a long standing tradition that the candidate for House
Speakership who garnered the second highest of votes automatically becomes Minority
Leader. The elections for Speakership were held and it resulted in the following: 252
Members voted for Alvarez, 8 voted for Baguilat, 7 voted for Suarez, 21 abstained, and 1 no
vote.” Despite this, Baguilat was never recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Consequently, those who did not vote for Alvarez convened and elected Suarez as the House
Minority Leader. Thereafter, Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Gomez, a representative of the 4 th District of Bulacan, filed a Petition for Mandamus before
the Supreme Court to compel the House of Representatives to respect the long standing
tradition and recognize Baguilat as the House Minority Leader. Will the petition prosper?
No. Section 16, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each house shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. This provision states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as
to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. While the Constitution is explicit on
the manner of electing a Speaker of the House of Representative, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers. All that the Charter says is that 'each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.' As such, the method of choosing who will be such other officers
is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the House itself, not by the Court. (Baguilat vs.
Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe).
11. Rules on State Immunity.
Subject/Entity Immunity
Head of State The head of state, who is deemed the personification of the sate, is inviolable, and
thus enjoys immunity from suit. (JUSMAG Philippines vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 108813, December
15, 1994)
Diplomatic agents Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunity
(including consuls to
certain extent) A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, ex-
cept in the case of:
(a) A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of
the mission;
(b) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as ex-
ecutor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the
sending State;
(c) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the dip-
lomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. (Art. 31, Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations)
Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of
the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts per-
formed in the exercise of consular functions.
Exceptions:
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(a) Arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or a consular employee in
which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an agent of the sending State; or
(b) By a third party for damage arising from an accident in the receiving State caused
by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft. (Rep. of Indonesia vs. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, June
26, 2003)
Foreign agent Can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that
he is acting within the directives of the sending state. (Minucher vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003)
United Nations, as well as Immune from suit (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized
its organs and specialized Agencies of the United Nations)
agencies; other
international organizations
or agencies (World Heath
Organization, World Bank,
ADB, etc)
Incorporated government An incorporated government agency possesses a juridical personality independent of

agency the State. If its charter provides that the agency can sue and be sued, the suit will lie,
including one for tort. The provision in the charter constitutes express consent on the
part of the State to be sued.
Unincorporated An unincorporated agency has no juridical personality independent of the
government agency Government. To determine its suability, one has to inquire into principal functions of
the agency.
If governmental: No suit without consent. Note: Even in the exercise of proprietary

functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, an unincorporated agency
still cannot be sued without its consent.
If proprietary: Suit will lie. When the State engages in principally proprietary
functions, then it descends to the level of a private individual, and may therefore, be
vulnerable to suit.
Local government units Not immune from suit. They can sue and be sued. [Section 22(a)(2) and 24 of RA 7160]
Public officers May not be sued for acts done in the performance of their official functions or within
the scope of authority. (DOH vs. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc., G.R. No. 182358, February 20,
2013)
12. What is the Restrictive Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit?
Under the Restrictive Doctrine of State immunity, state immunity extends only to acts jure imperii
(sovereign and governmental acts) and not to acts jure gestionis (private, commercial and proprietary
acts). The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contracts relate to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (US vs. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, May 22,
1985; Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)
13. When is a suit against a public official deemed to be a suit against the State?

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The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done
in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the State
where the satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the State itself to
perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to
the plaintiff. (Lansang vs. CA, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000)
14. Spouses Garcia are the owners of five hectares of land situated in the Municipality of
San Jose. Consequently, the Municipality of San Jose donated a 1,200 sqm of land to the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). However, the municipality
erroneously included portions of Spouses Garcia’s property in the donation. The DOTC then
constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the properties of
Spouses Garcia. When Spouses Garcia discovered this encroachment, they demanded the
DOTC to vacate. The demand went unheeded prompting the spouses to file a complaint for
an accion publiciana against the DOTC. The DOTC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming
immunity from suit. Will you grant DOTC’s Motion to Dismiss?
No. The doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
The Constitution identifies the limitations to the awesome and near-limitless powers of the State. Chief
among these limitations are the principles that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law and that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Consequently, our laws require that the State's power of eminent domain shall be
exercised through expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private property is taken for public use,
it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By
necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity. When the
government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
(DOTC vs. Spouses Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, January 29, 2016)
15. The University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement
with Umasa Builders for the construction of the College of Arts Building in its UPLB campus.
UP failed to pay the cost of the construction. Umasa Builders then filed a collection suit
against UP. The trial court ruled in favor of Umasa Builders. Umasa Builders filed a Motion
for Writ of Execution. If you were the judge, will you grant the Motion?
No. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. The adverse judgment
rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by
execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. Suability
depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts.
The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it
can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact
that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
It is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution, enforcement or
satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in P.D.
No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. All money claims against
the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty days.
Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari
and in effect, sue the State thereby. (UP vs. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012)
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16. Jona was hired by Koko Overseas Corporation (KOC) in behalf of its principal, the
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year
contract covered by a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Under the MOA, all newly-hired
employees undergo a probationary period of one year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil
Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. Jona was then deployed but was terminated for
allegedly failing to pass the probationary period. When she returned to the Philippines, she
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against KOC as the local recruitment agency, and the
Ministry, as the foreign principal. KOC filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that since the
Ministry is immune from suit, being a foreign government agency, such immunity extended
to KOC. Is KOC’s contention correct?
No. KOC, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of overseas
Filipino workers which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a
government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal‘s liability must first be
established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable. In providing for the joint and
solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042
precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of
what is due them. (ATCI vs. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010)
II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
17. Discuss the Principle of Non-Delegability of Powers.
Potestas delegate non potest delegare (what has been delegated cannot be further delegated). It is
based on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right, but a duty to be
performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014)
18. What are the permissible delegations of power under the 1987 Constitution?
a. Tariff Powers to the President (Sec. 28[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
b. Emergency Powers to the President (Sec. 23[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
c. Delegation to the people (Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art. X; Sec. 2, Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution; Republic Act No.
6735);
d. Delegation to local government units (Sec. 9, Art. IX, 1987 Constitution; Republic Act No. 7160);
e. Delegation to administrative bodies; and
f. Delegation of rule-making powers to the Supreme Court (Sec. 5[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution) and
Constitutional Commissions (Sec. 6, Art. IX-A; Sec. 3, Art. IX-C; Sec. 2[2], Art. IX-D, 1987 Constitution).
19. A law, which delegated some appropriation powers to the President, was passed. The
law contains provisions such as “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President” and “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.” Are these
provisions valid?
No. These provisions constitute an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the law may be used (sufficient standard test). It gives the President wide latitude to
use the funds for any other purpose he may direct and, thus, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public

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funds beyond the purview of the law. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
20. Discuss the three post-enactment measures exercised by Congress.
a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to

administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of
government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report
from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved. This is exercised when Congress asks the heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments
for budget purposes. Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of confirmation.
b. Congressional investigation - While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of

looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging
of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under
Sec. 21, Article VI - the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
c. Legislative supervision - The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. Supervision connotes a continuing and informed
awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given
administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past
executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional
supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority. (Abakada Guro Partylist vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715,
August 18, 2008)
21. What is a legislative veto? Is it unconstitutional?
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a commit-
tee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take
effect.
Yes. It is unconstitutional in three respects:
a. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove IRRs based on a determination of whether or not

they conformed with the provisions of the law, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power ex-
clusively vested in the Courts by the Constitution;
b. It violates the principle of bicameralism because legislative power is vested in Congress which consists
of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power re-
quires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two cham-
bers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto,
both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid;
c. It violates the rule on presentment. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President
for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can be-
come a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the
Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take ef-
fect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress. (Abakada Guro Partylist vs.
Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 18, 2008)
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22. What are the non-legislative powers of congress?
a. National Board of Canvassers (Art. VII, Sec. 4(4));

b. Calling for special election for President and Vice President (Art. VII, Sec. 10);
c. Decide temporary disability of the President (Art. VII, Sec. 11);
d. Veto or extension of habeas corpus and martial law (Art. VII, Sec. 18);
e. Approval of amnesty (Art. VII, Sec. 19);
f. Senate concurrence in treaties (Art. VII, Sec. 21);
g. Declaring a state of war or national emergency (Art. VI, Sec. 23);
h. Utilization of natural resources (Art. XII, Sec. 2);
i. Constituent assembly to amend or revise the Constitution (Art. XVII, Secs. 2-4);
j. Initiate impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2);
k. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Senate Electoral Tribunal (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
l. Commission on Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
m. Ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council (one seat) (Art. VIII, Sec. 8).
23. What are the qualifications and term of office of members of the Congress?
SENATORS DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES PARTY-LIST NOMINEES

QUALIFICATIONS
a. Natural-born citizen of the a. Natural-born citizen of the a. Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines; Philippines; Philippines;
b. On the day of the election, is at b. On the day of the election, at b. Registered voter;
least thirty-five (35) years of age; least twenty five (25) years of c. Resident of the Philippines for
c. Able to read and write; age; at least one (1) year
d. Registered voter; c. Able to read and write; immediately preceding the day
e. Resident of the Philippines for not d. Except for Party-List of the elections;
less than two (2) years Representatives, a registered d. Able to read and write;
immediately preceding the day of voter in the district in which he e. The nominees of sectoral
the election. (Sec. 3, Article VI, 1987 shall be elected; and parties or organizations that
Constitution) e. Resident thereof for not less represent the "marginalized
than one (1) year immediately and underrepresented," or
preceding the day of the that represent those who lack
election. (Sec. 6, Art. VI, 1987 "well-defined political
Constitution) constituencies," either must
belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy
for their respective
sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties
or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations
(Paglaum vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
203766, April 2, 2013); and
f. At least twenty five (25) years
of age on the day of the
election. (Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
TERM
6 years 3 years
Limit: No Senator shall serve for more Limit: No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more

Pre-week Notes
than two consecutive terms. than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
Voluntary renunciation of the office length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
for any length of time shall not be his service for the full term for which he was elected.(Sec. 7, Art. VI, 1987
considered as an interruption in the Constitution)
continuity of his service for the full
term of which he was elected.(Sec. 4,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
24. Does a city need to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to another
district?
No. While Sec. 5(3) of Art. VI requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to
one representative; it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district. (Mariano vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995)
25. Is the 250,000 minimum population an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province?
No. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. Plainly read, Section 5(3)
of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province. (Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010)
26. Can Congress validly delegate the power to create provinces and cities to the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Assembly?
No. The power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the
power to create a legislative district because Sect. 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides that each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives. However, Sec. 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Sec. 5(4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law
that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives
can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law
passed by Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts
is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its
incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law.
Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative
body. Moreover, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its
occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a
regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
powers extend only to its regional territory. (Sema vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008)
12 | CLEAR
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27. Local Government Code (LGC) provides for the requirements for the conversion of a mu-
nicipality into a component city. One of the requirements was a generated annual income of
at least 20 million pesos. Congress amended the LGC and increased the income requirement
to 100 million pesos. A few years later, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws for the conver-
sion of the Municipality of Tutubi and Tipaklong into component cities. Because these two
municipalities do not meet the income requirement, the Congress provided for exemption
clauses which exempted the two municipalities from the income requirement. Can the Con-
gress validly provide for such exemption? Explain.
Yes. The exemption clauses found in the Cityhood Laws are considered as amendments to the LGC itself.
The law-making powers of Congress necessarily includes the power of amendment. Congress has the
power to alter or modify laws. Moreover, Congress can exempt municipalities from the income require-
ment in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the
LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as
engines for economic growth in their respective provinces. (League of Cities vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176961,
February 15, 2011)
28. The Municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
Subsequently, RA No. 7675 was passed converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City. A section of the said law provides the following:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district
with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of
this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall
become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at
the same election.
a. Joshua assails the constitutionality of RA No. 7675 on the ground it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule. Joshua argues that the inclusion of the above-mentioned section in RA
7675 resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Is Joshua correct?
No. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. (Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, December 8,
1994).
b. Joshua also argues that the people of San Juan should participate in the plebiscite on RA
No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Is he correct?
No. The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the
inhabitants of San Juan are properly excluded from the plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. (Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994).
29. During his incumbency as member of the Senate, Senator Rocky Del Sur was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). Does the election of Senator Rocky as
the Chairman of the PNRC resulted to the forfeiture of his senate seat in view of Sec. 13, Art.
VI of the 1987 Constitution?

Pre-week Notes
Sec. 13, Art. VI. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during
his term without forfeiting his seat.
No. The PNRC is an autonomous, neutral and independent organization. To ensure and maintain its
autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government.
The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress. Also, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his
appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman
is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads to the conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or
employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. The office of
the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. (Liban vs.
Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009)
30. The Senate Committee on Public Order invited several persons, including Arbin, to
discuss and deliberate pending Senate bills which aim to further improve the current Anti-
Hazing Law. Arbin attended the senate hearing. However, because of his refusal to answer
several questions posed at him during the hearing, the Senate Committee cited him in
contempt and he was placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms. May Arbin
be placed under the Senate’s custody indefinitely until such time he answers the questions
asked of him?
No. The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in
aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said
power is invoked. The legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances: (a) upon the
approval or disapproval of the Committee Report; and (b) upon the expiration of one (1) Congress. (Balag
vs. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)
31. What are the parameters to guide the Commission on Elections in determining who may
participate in the Party-List elections?
a. Three (3) different groups may participate in the Party-List system, namely: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations;
b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any ―marginalized or under-represented‖ sector;
c. Political Parties can participate in Party-List elections provided they register under the Party-List
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections;
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be ―marginalized and under-represented‖ or ―lacking well-
defined political constituencies‖;
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ―marginalized and
under-represented‖ must belong to the ―marginalized and under-represented‖ sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack ―well-defined
constituencies‖, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy of their respective sectors;
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided they have at least one (1) nominee who remains qualified. (Atong-
Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)
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32. What are the inviolable parameters to determine the winners in Party-list Elections?
1. The twenty percent allocation: the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;
2. The two percent threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
3. The three-seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
4. Proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
a. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
c. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
d. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of
votes garnered by each party by the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.
There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation:

a. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats which is the difference
between the maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of
the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party‘s share in the remaining available seats.
b. Second, assignment of one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available
seats are completely distributed. Distribute all of the remaining seats in the second round of seat
allocation.
c. Finally, apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled.
33. Is a party-list required to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented?
No. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
It is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of
the sector/s, which they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the
sector represented by their party or organization. (Abang-Lingkod vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 206952, October 22,
2013)

Pre-week Notes
34. What are the immunities and privileges granted to the legislative members?
a. Immunity from arrest - grants the legislators the privilege from arrest while Congress is ―in
session‖ with respect to offenses punishable by NOT more than 6 years of imprisonment, (Sec. 11, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution) whether or not he is attending the session. (People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76,
February 3, 2000)
b. Legislative privilege - No member shall be questioned or held liable in any forum other than his
respective Congressional body for any debate or speech in Congress or in any committee thereof. (Sec.
11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
35. A complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) was filed
against Marie, the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) Commissioner. During
the pendency of the investigation, Marie resigned as the CID Commissioner and ran for
Senator. She won and started to serve her term as a member of the Senate. During her
incumbency as senator, the investigation on her alleged violation of RA 3019 was finally
completed and an Information was filed formally charging her before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days. Marie
questioned the said order contending that since she is a senator, only the Senate has the
power to suspend her. Is she correct?
No. The order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the Constitution is a punitive measure
that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. While the preventive suspension under RA 3019 is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on the
person for misbehavior as a Member of the Congress. (Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18,
2001)
36. What are the particular inhibitions attached to the respective offices of senators and
representatives?
a. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat
(Incompatible Office) (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
b. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected (Forbidden Office) (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution);
c. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies (Sec.
14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
d. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise
or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office
(Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
e. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
37. What is an Enrolled Bill? State the Enrolled Bill Theory.
An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the proper
16 | CLEAR
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officers of each House, and approved by the President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. The court is bound
under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers by the contents of a duly authenticated measure of
legislature. (United States vs. Pons, G.R. No. L-11530, August 12, 1916; Mabanag vs. Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5,
1947; Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997)
38. Enumerate the quorum and voting requirements in Congress.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING REQUIRED VOTE

Concurrence in a treaty or international 2/3 of ALL the Members of the Senate
agreements (Sec. 21, Art. VII)
Senate
2/3 of ALL the Members of the Senate
Conviction in impeachment cases
(Sec. 3[6], Art. XI)
House of 1/3 of ALL the Members of the House
Affirm/Override a Resolution to impeach
Representatives of Representatives (Sec. 3[3], Art. XI)
Election of President or Speaker of the MAJORITY of ALL of its respective
House, as the case may be Members (Sec. 16[1], Art. VI)
MAJORITY of each House (Sec. 16[2],
Quorum to do business
Art. VI)
Discipline Members for disorderly behavior 2/3 of ALL of its Members (Sec. 16[3],
[suspend or expel] Art. VI)
Request of matters to be entered in the 1/5 of the Members present (Sec. 16[4],
Journal Art. VI)
2/3 of both Houses in joint session
Declaration of the existence of a State of
assembled, voting separately (Sec.
War
23[1], Art. VI)
2/3 of ALL the Members of such House
Overriding the President‘s Veto
(Sec. 27[1], Art. VI)
MAJORITY of ALL the Members of the
Grant of tax exemption
Congress (Sec. 28[4], Art. VI)
MAJORITY of ALL the Members of both
Breaking a tie in cases of President and Vice
Houses, voting separately (Sec. 4, Art
President elections
VII)
Common to both MAJORITY vote of ALL the Members of
Houses Confirmation of a new Vice President
both Houses of Congress, voting
nominated by the President
separately (Sec. 9, Art. VII)
Determination whether or not the President
2/3 of both Houses, voting separately
is unable to discharge the powers and duties
(Sec. 11, Art. VII)
of his office
Revocation of the proclamation of Martial
MAJORITY of ALL its Members, voting
Law or suspension of the privilege of the
jointly (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
Writ of Habeas Corpus
Extension of the proclamation of Martial Law
MAJORITY of ALL its members, voting
or suspension of the privilege of the Writ of
jointly (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
Habeas Corpus
Concurrence with President‘s grant of MAJORITY of ALL the Members of the
amnesty Congress (Sec. 19, Art. VII)
Amendment/Revision of the 1987 3⁄4 of ALL the Members of the
Constitution (as a Constituent Assembly) Congress (Sec. 1[1], Art. XVII)
2/3 of ALL of the Members of the Con-
Calling of Constitutional Convention
gress (Sec. 3, Art. XVII)
Submitting to the electorate the question of MAJORITY vote of ALL its Members (Sec. 3,
calling a Constitutional Convention Art. XVII)
Commission on MAJORITY vote of ALL the Members
Approval/Rejection of Appointment
Appointments (Sec. 18, Art. VI)

Pre-week Notes
39. What are the requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Sec. 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, must
be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
a. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
b. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations of their respective offices;
and
c. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. (Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No.,209287, July 1, 2014)
40. Discuss the power of augmentation.
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items in their respective
appropriations. (Sec. 25 [5], Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
41. Distinguish Legislative Inquiry from Oversight Function.
IN AID OF LEGISLATION OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS

Who may appear? Any person Department Heads
Who may be Anyone, except the President and the No one. Each House may only request
summoned? members of the Supreme Court the appearance of the Department Heads
Subject matter Any matters for purposes of pending Matters related to the Department only
legislation
Obligatory force of Mandatory Discretionary
appearance
42. What are the three limitations to the power of each House of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation?
a. The inquiry must be in aid of legislation;

b. It must be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure of a House of Congress
conducting such inquiry; and
c. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry shall be respected. (Sec. 21, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution; Bengzon vs. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991)
43. Distinguish Inquiry in Aid of Legislation from Question Hour.
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION QUESTION HOUR

(Sec. 21) (Sec. 22)
Relates to? Relates to the power to conduct inquiries in Pertains to the power to conduct a
aid of legislation. question hour.
Purpose To elicit information that may be used for To obtain information in pursuit of
legislation. Congress‘ oversight function.
Nature of attendance Attendance is compulsory. Attendance is discretionary.
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Persons required to Any person. Only Department Heads.
attend
Who conducts? Committees. Entire body.
Subject matter Any matter for the purpose of legislation. Only matters related to the
Departments.
Basis Grounded on the necessity of information in Congress merely seeks to be informed
the legislative process (the power of inquiry) on how Department Heads are
being co-extensive with the power to implementing the statutes which it
legislate. has issued.
44. Is an Executive Order requiring all Executive Department heads to secure the consent of
the President before appearing in Question Hour valid?
Yes. The requirement to secure presidential consent, limited as it is only to appearances in the question
hour, is valid on its face. For unlike inquiries in aid of legislation under Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution
where such appearance is mandatory, under Sec. 22, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
45. Will you answer be the same for appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation?
No. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
46. Provide the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
a. Three (3) Supreme Court Justices designated by the Chief Justice;

b. Six (6) members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and from those registered under the party-
list system represented therein. (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
47. What is the quorum required for the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal?
The presence of at least:

a. One (1) Justice; and
b. Four (4) Members of the Tribunal. (Rule 6, 2015 Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal)
48. In computing for the quorum in the House or Senate, should the members who are
outside the country be included?
No. In computing quorum, members who are outside the country and, thus, outside of each House‘s
jurisdiction are not included. The basis for determining the existence of a quorum shall be the total
number of members who are within the coercive jurisdiction of the such House. (Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No.
L-2821, March 4, 1949)
49. When does the HRET’s jurisdiction over election contests begin? When is a candidate
considered a Member of the House of Representatives?
HRET‘s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of

Pre-week Notes
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has been proclaimed and thus became a member of
the House of Representatives.
To be considered a member of Congress, there must be concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a
valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption to duty. The following requisites would bring
the election contest under the jurisdiction of the HRET. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction over said contest. (Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)
50. What is the composition of the Commission on Appointments?
a. Senate President as ex-officio chairman (shall not vote, except in case of a tie);
b. 12 Senators;
c. 12 members of the House of Representatives; elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. (Sec. 18, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
51. Enumerate the Presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments.
a. Heads of the Executive departments (Except the Vice-President who is appointed to a cabinet post);
b. Ambassadors, other public ministers, or consuls;
c. Officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain;
d. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution, such as:
i. Chair and members of the COMELEC, COA, and CSC;
ii. Regular members of the JBC. (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
52. Distinguish Initiative from Referendum.
Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: (a)
Initiative on the Constitution, (b) Initiative on statutes, and (c) Initiative on local legislation.
Meanwhile, referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two (2) classes, namely: (a) Referendum on statutes and (b)
Referendum on local laws. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
III. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
53. Enumerate the prohibitions attached to the President, Vice- President, Cabinet Members,
and their deputies or assistants, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution.
a. For President and Vice President, they shall not receive any other emolument from the government or
any other source (Sec. 6, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution).
b. Shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure unless:
 Otherwise provided in the Constitution (e.g. VP can be appointed as a Cabinet Member without the
need of confirmation by Commission on Appointments; Secretary of Justice sits as ex officio
member in the Judicial and Bar Council)
 The positions are ex-officio and they do not receive any salary or other emoluments therefore (e.g.
Secretary of Finance as head of the Monetary Board)
c. Shall not practice, directly or indirectly, any other profession during their tenure;
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d. Shall not participate in any business;
e. Shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government, including GOCCs;
f. Shall avoid conflict of interest in conduct of office; and
g. Shall avoid nepotism (Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution).
54. Enumerate the powers of the President under the Constitution.
a. Appointing power (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);

b. Power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices (Sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
c. Commander-in-Chief powers (calling-out power, power to place the Philippines under martial law, and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) (Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
d. Pardoning power (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
e. Borrowing power (Sec. 20, Art. VII , 1987 Constitution);
f. Diplomatic/Treaty-making power (Sec. 21, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
g. Budgetary power (Sec. 22, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
h. Informing power (Sec. 23, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
i. Veto power (Sec. 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
j. Power of general supervision over local governments (Sec. 4, Art. X, 1987 Constitution);
k. Power to call special session (Sec. 15, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
55. Can a governor declare a state of national emergency and exercise emergency powers?
No. A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. He will exceed his authority when he declares a state of emergency and calls upon the Armed
Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of
One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be
performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief powers to which the ―calling-out‖ powers constitutes a portion. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. (Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)
56. Can the President re-organize the national government?
Yes. The President has the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes
the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create
and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials; it is effected in
good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. (MEWAP vs. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007)
57. Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others,
against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the
President. President Benigno Aquino III, however, issued Executive Order No. 13, abolishing
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Senator Francis assailed the constitutionality of E.O. No. 13 on
the ground that the President is not authorized under any existing law to create the IAD-

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ODESLA and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial
functions, the President usurped the powers of congress to create a public office,
appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies.
a. Can the President validly issue E.O. 13?
Yes. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Under Section 31(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize
the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring
functions from one unit to another. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
b. Did the President, in issuing E.O. 13 usurp the power of Congress to create a public office?
No. The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA,
which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more
than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third
division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA could take on the
additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. (Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-IAD, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012)
58. What are the parameters for review to determine whether there exists factual basis for
the proclamation of Martial Law? What is the standard of proof required in determining
such?
The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: (a) actual rebellion or
invasion; (2) public safety requires it; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that
there is actual rebellion or invasion. The first two requirements must concur. The President needs only to
satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or
rebellion for purposes of declaring Martial Law. (Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
59. After being confirmed that the town of Masinloc was attacked and seized by a group
inspired by ISIS, a well-known international terrorist group, President Dilis declared Martial
Law on the entire region of Mindawi where the town of Masinloc is situated. Congress fails
to convene and vote on either extending or revoking the proclamation of Martial Law.
Senator Mapilit filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel Congress to convene and decide on
the extension or revocation of the Martial Law pursuant to Sec. 18, Article VII, of the 1987
Constitution. Would the action prosper?
No. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to
revoke the President's declaration or suspension. The use of the word "may" in the Constitution is to be
construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke,
but in order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members
of the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation. (Padilla vs. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July
25, 2017)
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60. What are the classification of Appointments?
a. Permanent Appointments are those extended to persons possessing the requisite eligibility and are
thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure;
b. Temporary Appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and
without necessity of just cause or valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing
power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be
replaced at any time a permanent choice is made;
c. Regular Appointment is one made by the President while the Congress is in session, takes effect
only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the
end of the term of the appointee.
d. Ad interim Appointment is one made by the President while the Congress is not in session, takes
effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon
the next adjournment of Congress. Midnight Appointment is one made two (2) months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the incumbent President. (Nachura,Outline
61. Distinguish disapproved ad interim appointment from by-passed appointment.
Ad interim appointments are appointments made by the President while Congress is not in session or
doing recess. An ad interim appointment is permanent in nature and takes effect immediately. Thus, one
who was issued an ad interim appointment may immediately enter upon the discharge of his functions.
An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid upon disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or, if
not confirmed, until the next adjournment of Congress. On the other hand, a by-passed appointment is
one, which receives neither approval nor rejection from the Commission. (Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002)
62. What are the elements of a valid appointment made by the President?
a. Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

b. Transmittal of the appointment paper signed by the President and evidence of the transmittal;
c. A vacant position at the time of appointment;
d. Receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made,
whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process
should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks
even one step. (Velicaria-Garafil vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015).
63. What are midnight appointments?
Appointments made by the President or Acting President two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term. (Sec. 15, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
64. Does the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to the Judiciary?
No. First, had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable

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to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4(1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court. Second, Sections 4(1), Article VIII imposes on the President the
imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution. Finally, the framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates
for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
65. Elena Bautista was appointed as Undersecretary of DOTC. She was designated as
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department. Following the resignation of then
MARINA Administrator Vicente Suazo, Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. Does
the designation of Bautista as OIC of the Office of the Administrator of MARINA violate of
Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure?
Yes. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment
in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution must be
given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to
wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Sec. 3, par. (2), Article VII; or
acting as President in those instances provided under Sec. 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 (1), Article
VIII.
Bautista, being the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, was covered by the stricter prohibition under Sec.
13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. (Funa
vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010)
66. Provide the distinctions between the prohibitions in Sec. 13, Article VII and Sec. 7 (2),
Article IX-B.
Sec. 13, Article VII Sec. 7 (2), Article IX-B

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any any other office or employment in the government or
other office or employment during their tenure. any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.
Applicable only to President, the Vice- President, Meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. elective and appointive public officials and employees.
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" refers Holding of dual or multiple offices is allowed if:
to Constitution itself, to wit: a) Allowed by law; or
a) the Vice-President being appointed as a member of b) The primary functions of the position.
the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or
acting as President in those instances provided under
Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII;
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b) and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue
of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
67. Does the Office of the President have jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over a Deputy Ombudsman?
No. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos
and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot
but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The law directly
collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman,
but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks
to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who
act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. (Gonzales III vs. Office of the President,
G. R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014; Barreras- Sulit vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196232; February 26, 2014)
68. Will you answer be the same if it is the Special Prosecutor who is subjected to the
disciplinary authority of the President?
No. The Office of the President has administrative disciplinary power over a Special Prosecutor. By virtue
of Sec. 21 of the Ombudsman Act grants the President the power to remove a Special Prosecutor for any
of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process. (Gonzales III vs. Office
of the President, G. R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)
69. State the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or the Alter Ego Principle.
The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the
circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are
exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively
the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter. (Hontiveros-Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R.
No. 181293, February 23, 2015)
70. Distinguish the President’s power of control and supervision.
CONTROL SUPERVISION
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that
an act. the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules.
If the rules are not followed, the officer in control may, The supervisor does not have the discretion to modify
in his discretion, order the act undone or redone by his or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. order the work done or redone but only to conform to
the prescribed rules. (Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, Au-
gust 4, 1994)
71. What are the three elements of presidential communications privilege?
a. Quintessential and non-delegable presidential power: Power subject of the legislative inquiry must be
expressly granted by the Constitution to the President, e.g commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning,
and diplomatic powers;
b. Operational Proximity Test: It must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in ―operational
proximity‖ with the President (i.e. officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of

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their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive‘s organizational structure);
c. The privilege may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought
―likely contains important evidence,‖ and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008)
72. What are the forms of executive clemency? Explain briefly.
a. Pardon – an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment
that the law inflicts for the crime he has committed;
b. Commutation – the reduction or mitigation of the penalty;
c. Reprieve – the postponement of a sentence or stay of execution;
d. Parole – the release from imprisonment but without full restoration of liberty as parolee is still in the
custody of the law although not in confinement;
e. Remission of fines and forfeitures – prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation of
forfeited property and it cannot have the effect of returning properly which has been vested in third
parties or money ion the public treasury; and Amnesty – an act of grace concurred in by the
legislature and usually extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, and which
puts into oblivion the offense itself;
f. Amnesty - The grant of general pardon to a class of political offenders either after conviction or even
before the charges is filed. It is the form of executive clemency which under the Constitution may be
granted by the President only with the concurrence of the legislature. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political Law, 2016)
73. What are the limitations on the exercise of the pardoning power of the President?
a. It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
b. It cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable recommendation of
the Commission on Elections (Sec. 5, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution);
c. It can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (People of the Philippines vs. Salle, Jr., G.R. No.
103567, December 4, 1995, reiterated in People of the Philippines vs. Bacang, G.R. No. 116512, July 30, 1996) ;
d. It cannot be granted in cases of legislative or civil contempt;
e. It cannot absolve the convict of civil liability (People of the Philippines vs. Nacional, G.R. Nos. 111294-95,
September 7, 1995); and
f. It cannot restore public offices forfeited (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989).
74. Distinguish Pardon from Amnesty.
PARDON AMNESTY
Judicial notice Private act of the President upon which Public act of the President that courts may
there can be no judicial scrutiny; it must be take judicial notice of.
pleaded and proved.
To whom granted; Granted to an individual after conviction. Granted to classes of persons or communities
when before the institution of criminal prosecution
or sometimes after conviction.
Concurrence by No need for the concurrence of the Need the concurrence of the Congress.
the Congress Congress.
Acceptance Acceptance is necessary. No need for distinct act of acceptance.
Offense Generally granted for infractions of peace Addressed to political offenses.
of the state.
Effect Looks forward and relieves the offender Looks backward and abolishes and puts into
from the consequences of an offense of oblivion the offense itself, as if no offense
which he has been convicted. was committed. (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez,
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G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949)
75. Does pardon ipso facto restore former office, as well as the corresponding rights and
privileges?
No. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon neither to his former public office nor to his
rights and privileges, which were necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction
although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility to that office. To regain former public officer,
one must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. (Monsanto vs.
Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)
76. Rules in the vacancy in the Office of the President.
Circumstance Who will succeed?

Vacancy at the Death or permanent disability. Vice President-elect.
beginning of the Fails to qualify. Vice President-elect shall act as President
term of the until the President-elect shall have qualified.
President-elect President shall not have been chosen. Vice President-elect shall act as President
until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified provided congress did not get 2/3
votes to declare the president as temporarily
incapacitated.
No President and Vice President chosen The President of the Senate or, in case of his
nor shall have been qualified, or both inability, the Speaker of the House of
shall have died or become permanently Representatives shall act as President until a
disabled. President or Vice President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
N.B.: In the event of inability of the officials

mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide
for the manner in which one who is to act as
President shall be selected until a President
or a Vice President shall have qualified.
Vacancy during the Death, permanent disability, removal Vice President
term from office, or resignation.
Death, permanent disability, removal The President of the Senate or, in case of his
from office, or resignation of the inability, the Speaker of the House of
President and Vice President. Representatives shall act as President until a
President or Vice President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
N.B.: In the event of inability of the officials

mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide
for the manner in which one who is to act as
President shall be selected until a President
or a Vice President shall have qualified.
Temporary When President transmits to the Senate Vice President as Acting President.
disability President and the Speaker of the House
his written declaration that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a
writing declaration to the contrary.
When a majority of all of the members of Vice President as Acting President.

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the Cabinet transmits to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House Thereafter, when the President transmits to
their written declaration that the the Senate President and Speaker of the
President is unable to discharge the House his written declaration that no inability
powers and duties of his office. exists, he shall re-assume the powers and
duties of his office.
Serious illness Does not result to vacancy because the
Cabinet members in charge of national
security and foreign relations can still access
the President. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
77. What is the expanded power of judicial review?
It is the power of the court to inquire into the exercise of discretionary powers to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989)
78. Enumerate and discuss the requisites of Judicial Review.
a. Actual case or Controversy– It involves a conflict of legal rights, assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of legal resolution. It must be both ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial
determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, or that which seeks to resolve
hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems.
b. Proper party(locus standi)– One who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of;
c. Earliest opportunity– Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
d. Necessity of deciding constitutional questions – As long as there are other bases which courts
can use for decision, constitutionality of the law will not be touched, thus, courts should refrain from
resolving any constitutional issue "unless the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case."
(Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
79. What is the Operative Fact Doctrine?
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot
always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains
its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no
effect. (Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
80. What is the Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality?
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as
applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may
become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. (Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004)
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81. What is the test to determine whether a question is political or justiciable?
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer
to the question ―whether there are constitutionality imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.‖ If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. (Francisco Jr. vs. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
82. Explain the Political Question Doctrine.
Political questions refer ―to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.‖ (Vinuya vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)
83. Explain the concept of Moot and Academic Question in Judicial Review. Enumerate the
exceptions to this rule.
As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to
decide moot questions. An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely
to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination
thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Nevertheless, the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved;
c. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, Inc. vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia, G.R. No. 209271, July 26, 2016)
84. What are the safeguards of Judicial Independence?
a. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It may not be abolished by legislature.

b. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.
c. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of minimum original and appellate jurisdiction. Appellate
jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and concurrence.
d. Appointees to the Judiciary are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
e. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel.
f. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts.
g. Members of the Judiciary have security of tenure, which cannot be undermined by a law reorganizing
the Judiciary.
h. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
i. The Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy. Salaries of judges may not be reduced. (In Re: Clarifying and
Strengthening the Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy, A.M. No.
01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, September 25, 2009)

Pre-week Notes
j. The Supreme Court alone may promulgate Rules of Court. Congress can no longer enact any law
governing rules of procedure for the courts. (Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January
19, 1999)
k. The Supreme Court alone may order temporary detail of judges. The Supreme Court can appoint all
officials and employees of the Judiciary. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
85. Discuss Judicial Privilege.
The privilege against disclosure of information or communications that formed the process of judicial
decisions. This applies to confidential matters, which refer to information not yet publicized by the Court
like (1) raffle of cases, (2) actions taken in each case in the Court‘s agenda, and (3) deliberations of the
Members in court sessions on case matters pending before it. This privilege, however, is not exclusive to
the Judiciary and it extends to the other branches of government due to our adherence to the principle of
separation of powers. (In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials
and Employees as Witnesses under the Subpoenas of Feb. 10, 2012 and the Various Letters of Impeachment
Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012, February 14, 2012)
86. What is the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council?
a. Ex-Officio members:
i. Chief Justice, as Chairman;
ii. Secretary of Justice; and
iii. a Representative of Congress.
b. Regular members:
i. Representative from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
ii. Professor of Law;
iii. Retired Justice of the Supreme Court; and
iv. Representative of the private sector. (Sec. 8, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
87. According to Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution, the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. What does the term fiscal autonomy mean?
Fiscal autonomy contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that the needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to deny, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
by law or prescribed by it in the course of the discharge of its functions. (Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No.
103524, April 15, 1992)
88. May Congress exempt a government-owned and controlled corporation from the
payment of legal or docket fees?
No. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Sec. 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. Moreover, legal fees under
Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly
declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as
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mandated by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital
source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court's fiscal
independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned
or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy
and erodes its independence. (Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010)
89. Can the court issue an injunction against the construction of the Torre de Manila
Condominium, on the ground that such is a sore to the view of the Rizal Monument and an
endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage?
No. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the condominium project due to its effect on the
background of the Rizal Monument. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the
area where Torre de Manila Condominium is being built is a privately-owned property that is not part of
the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site, and the Torre de Manila Condominium
area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park. (Knight of Rizal vs. DMCI, G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017)
90. Can the Court allow the release of copies of SALN and other personal documents of the
incumbent Justices?
Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure
and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. Section 17, Article XI, has
classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. There is no
cogent reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other
magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No.
6713, and its implementing rules and regulations. (RE: Request for Copies of the SALN and Personal Data Sheet
or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary, A.M. No. 09-8-
6-SC, June 13, 2012)
91. What are the qualifications to the appointment to the Judiciary?
Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal
Regional Trial
Supreme Court Court of Appeals Trial Court, Sandiganbayan
Court
Municipal Circuit
Trial Court
Natural born citizen of the Philippines Filipino Citizen Filipino Citizen Natural born citizen of
the Philippines
A judge of a lower A judge of a lower Has been engaged Has been engaged Has been a judge of
court engaged in the court engaged in in the practice of in the practice of a court of record or
practice of law in the the practice of law law in the law in the been engaged in
Philippines for fifteen in the Philippines for Philippines or has Philippines or has the practice of law
(15) years or more. fifteen (15) years or held a public office held a public office in the Philippines or
more.* in the Philippines in the Philippines has held office
requiring admission requiring admission requiring admission
*Same to the practice of to the practice of to the bar as a pre-
qualifications as law as an law as an requisite for at least
provided in the indispensable indispensable ten (10) years.
1987 Constitution requisite for at least requisite for at least
for Justices of the ten (10) years. five (5) years.

Pre-week Notes
Supreme Court.
(Sec. 7, Chap. 1, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129)
At least 35 years of At least 30 years of At least 40 years of
At least 40 years of age.
age. age. age.
92. Distinguish judicial legislation from the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
Judicial legislation is the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which
someone believes ought to have been embraced. This exercise of judicial power is forbidden by the
tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative,
and the judicial. (Tañada vs. Yulo, G.R. No. L-43575, May 31, 1935)
On the other hand, rule-making power is an auxiliary administrative power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning the following:
a. protection and enforcement of Constitutional rights;
b. pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
c. admission to the practice of law;
d. Integrated Bar, discipline and practice of law;
e. legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. (Sec. 6[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
V. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
93. What are the guarantees of independence provided for by the Constitution to the three
Constitutional Commissions (COMELEC, COA and CSC)?
a. They are constitutionally-created; may not be abolished by statute of its judicial functions (Sec. 1, Art.
IX-A, 1987 Constitution);
b. Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute (Art. IX-B, C and D,
1987 Constitution);
c. Each is expressly described as independent (Sec. 1, Art. IX-A , 1987 Constitution);
d. Chairmen and members are given fairly long terms of office for seven (7) years (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B, C
and D, 1987 Constitution);
e. Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment (Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution);
f. Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B,
C and D, 1987 Constitution);
g. Salaries of chairmen and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during continuance in
office (Sec. 3, Art. IX-A; Sec. 17, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution);
h. Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy (Sec. 5, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution);
i. Each commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided they do not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights [though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court] (Sec. 7, Art. IX-A, 1987
Constitution);
j. Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications and inhibitions calculated to strengthen
their integrity (Sec. 2, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution); and
k. Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service Law
(Sec.4, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution).
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94. Overview of the Powers and Functions of Constitutional Commissions.
CSC COMELEC COA

The central personnel agency of a. Enforce and administer all laws The 1987 Constitution has made
the Government: and regulations relative to the con- the COA the guardian of public
a. Establish a career service and adopt duct of an election, plebiscite, initia- funds, vesting it with broad powers
measures to promote morale, efficien- tive, referendum, and recall. over all accounts pertaining to gov-
cy, integrity, responsiveness and cour- ernment revenues and expendi-
tesy in the civil service. b. Decide, save those involving the tures and the use of public funds
right to vote, all questions affecting and property, including the exclu-
b. Strengthen the merit and rewards elections, including determination of sive authority to define the scope of
system. the number and location of polling its audit and examination; to estab-
places, appointment of election offi- lish the techniques and methods for
c. Integrate all human resources de- cials and inspectors, and registration the review; and to promulgate ac-
velopment programs for all levels and of voters. counting and auditing rules and
ranks. regulations. Its exercise of its gen-
c. Deputize, with the concurrence of eral audit power is among the con-
d. Institutionalize a management cli- the President, law enforcement stitutional mechanisms that give life
mate conducive to public accountability agencies and instrumentalities for the to the check and balance system
(Sec. 3, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution). exclusive purpose of ensuring free, inherent in our form of govern-
orderly, honest, peaceful and credi- ment. (DelaLlana vs. COA, G.R. No.
▪ The Civil Service Commission has ble elections. 180989, February 7, 2012)
the power to hear and decide adminis-
trative cases instituted before it directly d. Register, after sufficient publica- a. Examine, audit and settle all
or on appeal, including contested ap- tion, political parties, organizations or accounts pertaining to the revenue
pointments (Administrative Code of coalitions which must present their and receipts of, and expenditures
1987). platform or program of government or uses of funds and property
and accredit citizens‘ arms. owned or held in trust or pertaining
The power of the Civil Service Commis- to, the Government.
sion includes the authority to recall an e. File, upon a verified complaint, or
appointment initially approved in disre- on its own initiative, petitions in court The COA conducts examination or
gard of applicable provisions of the for the inclusion or exclusion of vot- post-audit basis with regard to
Civil Service rules and regulations. (Ma- ers, investigate and, where appropri- Constitutional Commissions and
thay vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. ate, prosecute cases of violations of bodies or offices granted fiscal au-
No. 130214, August 9, 1999) election laws. tonomy under the Constitution;
autonomous state colleges and
f. Recommend to Congress effec- universities; other government-
tive measures to minimize election owned and controlled corporations
spending, including limitation of and their subsidiaries; and not go-
places where propaganda materials vernmental entities receiving subsi-
shall be posted, and to prevent and dy or equity, directly or indirectly,
penalize all forms of election frauds, from or through the Government.
offenses, malpractice, and nuisance
candidates. b. Keep the general accounts of
Government, and preserve vouch-
g. Recommend to the President the ers and supporting papers for such
removal of any officer or employee it period as provided by law.
has deputized, or the imposition of
any other disciplinary action, for vi- c. Authority to define the scope of
olation or disregard of, or disobe- its audit and examination, establish
dience to, its directive, order, or de- techniques and methods required
cision. therefore.
The power of the Commission

Pre-week Notes
h. Submit to the President and Con- to define the scope of its audit and
gress a comprehensive report on the to promulgate auditing rules and
conduct of each election, plebiscite, regulations and the power to disal-
initiative, referendum or recall. (Sec. low unnecessary expenditures, is
2, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution) exclusive, but its power to examine
and audit is not exclusive. (Devel-
opment Bank of the Philippine vs.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 88435,
January 15, 2002)
d. Promulgate account and audit-

ing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disal-
lowance of irregular, unnecessary,
expensive, extravagant or uncons-
cionable expenditures or uses of
government funds or property.
95. State the composition, qualifications, requirement of confirmation of appointment

and prohibitions on members of the Constitutional Commissions.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON COMMISSION ON

COMMISSION ELECTIONS AUIDIT
Composition 1 Chairman 1 Chairman 1 Chairman
2 Commissioners 6 Commissioners 2 Commissioners
Qualifications a. Natural born citizens; a. Natural born citizens; a. Natural born citizens;
b. At least 35 years at the b. At least 35 years at the b. At least 35 years at the
time of the time of the appointment; time of the appointment;
appointment; c. Holders of College c. Certified Public
c. With proven capacity Degrees; and Accountant with at least
for public d. Not candidates for any 10 years of auditing
administration; and elective position in the experience or a lawyer
d. Not candidates for any election immediately who practiced law for at
elective position in the preceding appointment least 10 years;
election immediately
preceding appointment N.B.: Majority, including the N.B.: At no time shall all
Chairman, must be members Members of the
of the Philippine Bar and Commission belong to the
practiced law for at least 10 same profession
years.
d. Not candidates for any
elective position in the
election immediately
preceding appointment
Appointments Needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Disqualifications Same as President and Vice President (under Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution) and members of
the Congress (under Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution).
96. What are the prohibited offices and interests imposed upon members of
Constitutional Commissions?
No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure:

a. Hold any other office or employment;
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b. Engage in the practice of any profession;
c. Engage in the active management and control of any business which in any way may be affected by
the function of his office; and
d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or
their subsidiaries. (Sec. 2, Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
97. Jurisdiction of Constitutional Commissions.
CSC COMELEC COA

The civil service embraces all a. Original jurisdiction over all con- The Commission shall have exclu-
branches, subdivisions, instrumentali- tests relating to the elections, re- sive authority, subject to the limi-
ties, and agencies of the Government, turns, and qualifications of all elec- tations, to define the scope of its
including government-owned or con- tive regional, provincial, and city audit and examination, establish
trolled corporations with original char- officials, and appellate jurisdiction the techniques and methods re-
ters. (Sec. 2[1], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitu- over all contests involving elective quired therefor, and promulgate
tion) municipal officials decided by trial accounting and auditing rules and
courts of general jurisdiction, or regulations, including those for the
The Commission has original jurisdic- involving elective barangay officials prevention and disallowance of
tion to hear and decide a complaint decided by trial courts of limited irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
for cheating in the Civil Service Ex- jurisdiction. extravagant, or unconscionable
aminations committed by government expenditures or uses of govern-
employees. The fact that the com- b. Exclusive original jurisdiction over ment funds and properties. (Sec.
plaint was filed by the Civil Service all contests relating to the election 2[2], Art. IX-D, The 1987 Philippine
Commission itself does not mean that returns and qualifications of all elec- Constitution)
it cannot be an impartial judge. (Cruz tive regional, provincial and city
vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. officials. The COA's audit jurisdic-
144464, November 22, 2001) tion extends to the government,
c. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction or any of its subdivisions, agen-
over all contests involving elective cies, or instrumentalities, including
municipal officials decided by the government-owned or controlled
RTC, or involving elective barangay corporations with original char-
officials decided by the MTC. ters. Its jurisdiction likewise cov-
d. Decisions, final orders, or rulings ers, albeit on a post-audit basis,
of the COMELEC on election con- the constitutional bodies, commis-
tests involving elective municipal sions and offices that have been
and barangay offices shall be final, granted fiscal autonomy, auto-
executory, and not appealable. (Sec. nomous state colleges and univer-
2[2], Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution) sities, other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their
En Banc: subsidiaries, and such non-
1. Exercise of administrative powers: governmental entities receiving
a. Violation of election laws; and subsidy or equity from or through
b. Correction of errors from election the government. The power of the
returns to statement of votes; COA to examine and audit gov-
2. Quasi-judicial/adjudicatory ernment agencies cannot be taken
power: Review of decisions of away from it as Section 3, Article
COMELEC division IX-D of the Constitution mandates
that ―no law shall be passed ex-
Division: empting any entity of the Gov-
1. All election cases including post ernment or its subsidiary in any
proclamation controversies (Sec. guise whatever, or any investment
2(2), Art. IX(6), 1987 Constitution) of public funds, from the jurisdic-
2. Petition to Cancel Certificate of tion of the [COA].(Veloso vs. Com-

Pre-week Notes
Candidacy (COC); mission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677,
3. Cases appealed from the September 6, 2011)
decisions of RTC/MTC.
98. President Arroyo appointed Guillermo Carague as Chairman of the Commission on

Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years. Carague’s term of office started on February 2,
2001 to end on February 2, 2008. She also appointed Reynaldo Villar as the third member of
the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar
as COA Commissioner, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. The
Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. Was the appointment valid?
No. Although promotional appointment (Commissioner to Chairman) is not prohibited, Villar‘s

appointment is still not valid. Sec 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years
without reappointment. x x x Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. x x x
Accordingly, the promotional appointment as COA Chairman of Villar for a stated fixed term of less than
seven (7) years is void for violating a clear, but mandatory constitutional prescription. The vacancy in the
position of COA chairman when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration
of his 7-year term. Hence, the appointment to the vacancy thus created ought to have been one for
seven (7) years. However, Villar cannot be appointment to a full 7-year term because of the rule against
one serving the commission for an aggregate term of more than seven (7) years because when he was
appointed as Chairman, he already served 4 years as Commissioner. (Funa vs. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April
24, 2012)
99. In what instances may promotional appointment (Commissioner to Chairman) be valid?
A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not
exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
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VI. BILL OF RIGHTS
100. Requisites for the exercise of the fundamental powers of the state.
POLICE POWER POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER OF TAXATION

a. Lawful subject a. Private property; a. Public purpose;
b. Lawful means b. Taking in the constitutional sense; b. Uniform, equitable, and progres-
c. Public use; sive;
When exercised by a delegate: d. Just compensation; c. Within the jurisdiction of the tax-
e. Due process of law. ing authority;
a. Expressly granted by law d. Certain guarantee against injuries
b. Within the territorial limits When exercised by a delegate to individuals shall be provided. (Na-
c. Must not be contrary to law (additional): There must be genuine chura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law,
necessity. 2016)
101. Distinctions between and among the fundamental powers of the state.
POLICE POWER POWER OF EMINENT POWER OF TAXATION

DOMAIN
Basis Public necessity and right of Necessity of the property for Power emanating from
State and of public to self- public use. necessity. (Lifeblood
protection and self- Doctrine Theory)
preservation.
Scope Liberty and property. Property rights only. Property rights only.
Who may exercise? Only by the government. May be exercised by private Only by the government.
entities.
Purpose For property or purpose that Property taken intended for Property taken intended
are noxious, thus may be public use, thus for for public use, thus for
destroyed. wholesome purposes. wholesome purposes.
Compensation Intangible, altruistic feeling Full and fair equivalent value Protection and public
that the individual has of the property expropriated. improvements for the
contributed to the public taxes paid.
good.
102. What are the aspects of due process and its requisites?
a. Substantive – serves as a restriction on government‘s lawmaking and rule-making power. Its

requisites are: (a) the interests of the public, in general, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the intervention of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals;
b. Procedural – serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of government.
See table below for its requisites. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
103. Requisites of Procedural Due Process in different proceedings.
TYPE REQUISITES
Judicial Proceedings a. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it;
b. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the Defendant and
over the property which is the subject matter of the proceedings;
c. The Defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
d. The judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer
in Political Law, 2016)

Pre-week Notes
Administrative and Quasi- a. There must be a right to a hearing;
Judicial Proceedings b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
c. The decision must have something to support itself;
d. The evidence must be substantial;
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or,
at least, contained in the record and disclosed to parties;
f. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
g. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision. (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940)
Disciplinary sanctions in a. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
schools accusation against them;
b. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
(Guzman vs. National University, G.R. No. L-6828, July 11, 1986)
104. What is the concept of Procedural Due Process in the administrative proceedings?
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. 'To be heard' does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard thru
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process. (Disciplinary Board, LTO vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 224395, July 3, 2017, J.
Perlas-Bernabe)
105. What is the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine?
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
(SPARK vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
106. What is the Doctrine of Preferred Freedoms?
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Property and property rights can be lost through prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity."(Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973)
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107. What are the requisites of a valid classification?
a. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
b. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
c. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
d. It applies equally to all members of the same class. (Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No.
192935, December 7, 2010)
108. What are the levels of scrutiny used by the courts in reviewing the constitutionality of
a classification embodied in a law?
a. Deferential or Rational Basis Scrutiny – the challenged classification needs only be shown to be
rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;
b. Middle-Tier or Intermediate Scrutiny – the government must show that the challenged
classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is, at least, substantially
related to serving that interest; and
c. Strict Judicial Scrutiny – a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
(Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009)
109. Are aliens entitled to the protection of equal protection clause?
Yes. As a general rule, it applies to all persons, both citizens and aliens. The Constitution places the civil
rights of aliens on equal footing with those of the citizens. Except when, Statutes may validly limit
exclusively to citizens the enjoyment of rights or privileges connected with public domain, the public
works, or the natural resources of the State. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957).
110. A law was passed which provides that: (a) any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy;
and (b) an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. Is there a
substantial distinction between appointive and elective officials to justify the different
treatment?
Yes. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. (Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698,
February 22, 2010)
111. Does RA 9262 (Anti Violence Against Women and their Children Act) violate the equal
protection clause?
No. First, R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinction. The unequal power relationship between women and
men and the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classif ication under

Pre-week Notes
the law. Second, the classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction between men
and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against
women and children. As spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, the State recognizes the need to protect
the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security. Third, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
their children are threatened by violence and abuse. Lastly, R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and
children who suffer violence and abuse. (Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
112. What are the requisites of a valid taking?
a. The expropriator must enter a private property;

b. Entry must be for more than a momentary period;
c. Entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
d. Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and
e. Utilization of property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property (Republic vs. De Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974).
113. Explain the expansive concept of public use.
Public use does not necessarily mean ―use by the public at large.‖ Whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement. Moreover, that only few people benefit from
the expropriation does not diminish its public use character because the notion of public use now includes
the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. (Manosca vs. CA, G.R. 166440, January 29, 1996)
114. Distinguish possessory taking from regulatory taking.
A "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A
"regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of the property. No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and
when regulation becomes a taking. What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that
government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A regulation that permanently denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a
"taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land
make the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking. (City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005)
115. State the role of the judiciary in determining just compensation.
The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination,
but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that
its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the 'justness' of the decreed compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Dalauta, G.R. No.
190004, August 8, 2017)
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116. What are the requisites before an LGU can exercise its power of Eminent Domain?
a. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property;
b. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless;
c. There is payment of just compensation; and
d. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. (Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp., G.R. No.
127820, July 20, 1998)
117. What are the effects of delay in payment of just compensation?
a. For nonpayment, the remedy is the demand of payment of the fair market value of the property and
not the recovery of possession of the expropriated lots. (Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
147511, January 29, 2003)
Exception: When the government fails to pay just compensation within five years from the f inality of
the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. (Republic of the Philippines v. Vicente Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005)
b. The imposition of 12% interest rate from the time of taking when the property owner was deprived of
the property until July 1, 2013 - when the legal interest on loans and forbearance of money was re-
duced from 12% to 6% per annum by BSP Circular No. 799. Accordingly, from 1 July 2013 onwards,
the legal interest on the difference between the final amount and initial payment is 6% per annum.
(Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation v. Republic, GR No. 218628, September 6, 2017)
118. What is Inverse Condemnation? How is it different from payment of damages?
It is an action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency. It has the
objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. As regard damages,
inverse condemnation, on one hand, is an action to recover, while on the other hand, payment for
damages is predicated on statutory enactments and emanates from a transgression of a right. (National
Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011)
119. What is the effect of abandonment of intended use behind the forced property taking?
The expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to
reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack
one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular
public purpose for which the property will be devoted. (MCIAA vs. Lozada, G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010)
If the particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned,
then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of
the amount of just compensation received. (De Ouano vs. Republic, G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011)
120. What are the instances of valid warrantless arrest?

Pre-week Notes
a. In flagrante delicto: When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (Sec. 5[a], Rule 113, Rules of Court);
b. Hot Pursuit Doctrine: When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has committed it. (Sec. 5[b], Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court);
c. Escape Rule: When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Sec. 5c, Rule 113,
Rules of Court);
d. Abscond Rule: An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if
he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending.
(Sec. 23[2], Rule 114, Rules of Court); and
e. When the right is voluntarily waived (People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 130644, March 13,
1998)
121. Search Warrant vs. Warrant of Arrest.
BASIS SEARCH WARRANT WARRANT OF ARREST

As to authority The judge must personally examine in the It is not necessary that the judge should
which examines form of personally examine the complainant and his
searching questions and answers, in writing witnesses; the judge would simply personally
and under oath, the complainant and the review the initial determination of the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally prosecutor to see if it is supported by
known to them. substantial evidence.
Basis of The determination of probable cause depends He merely determines the probability, not the
determination to a large extent upon the finding or opinion certainty of guilt of the accused and, in so
of the judge who conducted the required doing, he need not conduct a new hearings.
examination of the applicant and the
witnesses.
122. The Bantay Bayan operatives of Brgy. West, Makati City, while patrolling the
neighborhood, saw Jeff who was intoxicated while standing in front of a gate enclosing an
empty lot. Later, they searched him and found two sachets of white substance which later
yielded positive for the presence of methamphetamine, a dangerous drug. Jeff was then
charged of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Jeff moved to exclude the two sachets of
shabu as evidence arguing that the search made against him was illegal rendering the
evidence inadmissible. The prosecution countered that since the search was made by mere
Bantay Bayan operatives who are not state agents, then the constitutional proscription
against unreasonable search and seizure would not apply. Is the prosecution correct?
No. While the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution generally cannot be invoked against
the acts of private individuals, the same may nevertheless be applicable if such individuals act under the
color of a state-related function. The acts of the Bantay Bayan or any barangay-based or other volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and order in their
respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be deemed as law
enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987
Constitution to them. (Miguel vs. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
123. Ivan Li was flagged down by PO1 Jad Ong for violating a municipal ordinance for not
wearing a helmet while driving. While he was issuing a citation ticket to Li, he noticed that
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the latter was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. He told Li to take out
the contents of the pocket of his jacket and Li obliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which included a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to
three (3) inches in size. Upon seeing the said container, PO1 Ong asked Li to open it; and in
the process of opening, Li spilled out the contents of the container which turned out to be
four (4) plastic sachets of shabu. Li was then charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Li objected to the admissibility of the evidence. Despite the objection, the RTC con-
victed Li ruling that the search and seizure was lawful as it was incidental to a lawful arrest.
Was the conviction proper?
No. There was no valid arrest. When Li was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traf-
fic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the drivers‘ license of the latter. At the time Li was waiting for PO1 Ong to issue the
ticket, he could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO1 Ong to
arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the pe-
riod during which Li was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
When a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation, this procedure
does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. There was no justification for a full-
blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct mi-
nimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown. (Luz vs. People,
G. R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
124. What are the guidelines in the conduct of public bus searches?
a. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin
to airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines
can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners,
passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection
must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be
refused entry into the terminal.
b. While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus
owner in the following three instances:
i. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus
where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person
and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of
information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger onboard;
ii. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and
his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or
private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because
unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for
these passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal.
iii. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents
can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.

Pre-week Notes
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and
the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid rea-
sonable search.
a. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the
person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule.
b. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities,
persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected.
c. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety.
d. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.
Note: Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the
terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with
these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a
reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional
guarantee under Sec. 2, Article III of the Constitution.
Not applicable: The guidelines do not apply to privately owned cars. Neither are they applicable to
moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one
or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person until
the passengers on board alight from the vehicle . (Saluday v. People, GR No. 215305, April 3, 2018)
125. What are the instances of valid warrantless search?
a. When the right is voluntarily waived;

b. Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a lawful arrest (sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court);
c. Search of vessels and aircraft (People of the Philippines vs. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000);
d. Search of moving vehicles (Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002); and
e. Search and seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances (Spouses Veroy vs. Layague, G.R. No. L-
95630, June 18, 1992).
126. What is “Stop and Frisk”?
In the landmark U.S. case, Terry vs. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 [1968]), it was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal activity may
be afoot. In People of the Philippines vs. Sy Chua (G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003), the Supreme
Court said that for a ―stop and frisk‖ situation, the police officer should properly introduced himself an
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in
order to check the latter‘s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer
must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer‘s experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband and concealed
about him. It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for
the principle to apply.
127. What is the Plain View Doctrine?
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Objects in the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It is usually applied where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an incriminating
object. It has the following requisites:
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who has the right to be where they are; (c)
the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
c. ―plain view‖ justified the seizure of the evidence without any further search. (People of the Philippines vs.
Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993)
128. When is there Administrative Arrest?
There is an administrative arrest when there is an arrest as an incident to a deportation proceeding.

(Morano vs. Vivo, G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967)
129. Does the DOJ have the power to issue Hold Departure Orders (HDO)?
No. The power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The courts may issue a HDO against an accused in
a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The DOJ may not justify its
imposition of restriction on the right to travel of the subjects of DOJ Circular No. 41 by resorting to an
analogy. Contrary to its claim, it does not have inherent power to issue HDO, watchlist orders, or allow
departure orders, unlike the courts, or to restrict the right to travel in anyway. It is limited to the powers
expressly granted to it by law and may not extend the same on its own accord or by any skewed
interpretation of its authority. (Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018)
130. When is intrusion on privacy of communication allowed?
a. By lawful order of the court; and

b. When public safety or order so requires otherwise, as may be provided by law. (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987
Constitution)
131. Is a regulation mandating the opening of mail or correspondence of detainees violative

of the constitutional right to privacy? Explain.
No. There is no longer a distinction between an inmate and a detainee with regard to the reasonable
expectation of privacy inside his cell. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary to accommodate
institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, primarily internal security. As long as the letters are
not confidential communication between the detainee and his lawyer the detention officials may read
them. But if the letters are marked confidential communication between detainee and the lawyer, the
officer must not read them but only inspect them in the presence of detainees. A law is not needed
before an executive officer may intrude into the rights of privacy of a detainee or a prisoner. By the very
fact of their detention, they have diminished expectations of privacy rights. (Alejano vs. Cabuay, G.R. No.
160792, August 25, 2005)
132. Explain the doctrine of reasonable expectation to privacy.
This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
expectation has been violated.

Pre-week Notes
The reasonableness of a person‘s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
a. Whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
b. This expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
c. Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual‘s ―reasonable
expectation of privacy.‖ Hence, the reasonableness of a person‘s expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the
case. (Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998)
133. Explain the Exclusionary Rule.
Any evidence obtained and confiscated in violation of the Constitution (i.e. unreasonable searches and
seizures) are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. (Comerciante vs. People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015, J. Perlas-
Bernabe)
134. Enumerate the scope of protected freedom of expression under the Constitution.
a. Freedom of speech;
b. Freedom of the press;
c. Right of assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances;
d. Right to form associations or societies not contrary to law;
e. Freedom of religion; and
f. Right to access to information on matters of public concern (Art. III, 1987 Constitution);.
135. Enumerate forms of speeches not protected by the Constitution.
a. Laws against obscenity, libel and slander (contrary to public policy);

b. Right to privacy of an individual;
c. Right of state/government to be protected from seditious attacks;
d. Legislative immunities;
e. Fraudulent matters;
f. Advocacy of imminent lawless conducts;
g. Fighting words; and
h. Guarantee implies only the right to reach a willing audience but not the right to compel others to
listen, see or read.
136. Distinguish Content-Based Regulations from Content-Neutral Regulations.
Content-Based Regulations Content-Neutral Regulations

Content-based regulations can either be based on the Concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expres- merely controls the time, place, and manner.
sion.
Clear and present danger and strict scrutiny test Intermediate Scrutiny Test or Substantial interest test.
(Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January
21, 2015)
137. Is a facial challenge to a penal statute allowed?
No. Facial challenges are not allowed in penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
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well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. (KMU vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 17855, October 5, 2010)
However, when a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The rationale for this exception is to
counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person
who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply
restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence. (Disini vs. SOJ, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
138. State the Overbreadth Doctrine.
The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.
vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
139. Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Duterte to implement a nationwide

curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as
part of "Oplan Rody. Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances
was the City of Manila. The City of Manila enacted an Ordinance entitled " An Ordinance
Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew
Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties
Therefor; and for Other Purposes.” The Ordinance provided exemptions from the coverage of
the curfew, to wit: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or
guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students
and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their
residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.
Is the subject ordinance constitutional?
No. The ordinance violates minors‘ right to travel.
The State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they
are singled out on reasonable grounds. To determine if the restriction is reasonable, the strict scrutiny
test shall be applied considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right. Under the strict scrutiny
test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of
proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
interest.
Here, the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinance is to keep unsupervised minors during the late
hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to
potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. As such, a compelling State interest exists.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens

Pre-week Notes
should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights.
While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to
achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so
narrowly drawn. Here, the Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the
curfew. This Ordinance is not narrowly drawn in that the exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run
the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. The Manila Ordinance do not account for
the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression, among others. The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too
limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. (SPARK vs. Quezon City G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017)
140. What are the tests for valid governmental interference to freedom of expression?
a. Clear and Present Danger Rule – words are used in such circumstance and of such nature as to
create a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evil that the State has a right
to prevent. (Schenck vs. U.S., G.R. No. 437, 438, March 3, 1919)
 Clear: The degree of the danger. Causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising
from the utterance questioned.
 Present: The proximity of the danger. Time element, identified with imminent and immediate
danger; the danger must not only be probable, but very likely inevitable. (Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969)
b. Dangerous Tendency Rule – words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the State
has a right to prevent. (Cabansag vs. Fernandez, No. L-8974, October 18, 1957)
c. Balancing of Interest Rule – when a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order;
and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional and partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the
court is to determine which of the two conflicting interest demands the greater protection under the
particular circumstances presented. (American Communications Association vs. Douds, 339 US 382 [1950])
d. Grave-But-Improbable Danger Test – whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid danger. (Dennis vs. US,
341 US 494 [1951])
e. O’Brien Test – in situations when ―speech‖ and ―non-speech‖ elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, whether there is a sufficiently important governmental interest that warrants
regulating the non-speech element, incidentally limiting the ―speech‖ element. (Social Weather Station vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2002)
f. Direct Incitement Test – the words that a person uttered and the likely result of such utterance. It
emphasizes on the very words uttered and their ability to directly incite or produce imminent lawless
action. It criticizes the clear and present danger test for being too dependent on the specific
circumstances of each case.
141. Brother Raffy, the host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putangbabae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa saputangbabaeyan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
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Because of these remarks, the MTRCB preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating
Daan program. Brother Raffy contends that the suspension violated his freedom of speech
and expression. Is he correct?
No. Some forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that restrictions on
unprotected speech may be decreed without running afoul of the freedom of speech clause. Unprotected
speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security. Here,
Brother Raffy‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it
is, in that context, unprotected speech. Applying the balancing-of-interest test, the government‘s interest
to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable
curtailment and valid restraint on Brother Raffy‘s prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan
during the suspension period. (Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009)
142. What are the requisites for protection of Commercial Speech?
a. The speech must not be false or misleading or proposing an illegal activity.

b. The governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation must be substantial.
c. The regulation must directly advance the governmental interest.
d. The regulation must not be overboard. (Central Hudson Gas vs. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557
[1980])
143. Under the Constitution, what are the State regulations of mass media?
a. The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens.
b. The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the public interest
so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed.
c. The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for the
protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare.
d. Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
e. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be limited
to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such
entities must be citizens of the Philippines. (Sec. 11(1), Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution)
Movie Censorship Television Censorship Radio Censorship

Censorship is allowable only under the On the program of Dating Daan, The SC held that it is the duty
clearest proof of a clear and present Soriano made crude remarks like of Far Eastern to require the
danger of a substantive evil to public ―lihitimong anak ng demonyo, si- submission of a manuscript as a
safety, morals, health or any other legi- nungaling, etc.‖ MTRCB preventive- requirement in broadcasting
timate public interest: ly suspended him and his show. SC speeches. For speeches, a ma-
held that the State has a compelling nuscript or short gist must be
1. There should be no doubt what is interest to protect the minds of the submitted. (Santiago vs. Far East-
feared may be traced to the expres- children who are exposed to such ern Broadcasting, G.R. No. L-48683,
sion complained of. materials. (Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. November 8, 1941)
2. Also, there must be reasonable ap- No. 164785, April 29, 2009)
prehension about its imminence. It
does not suffice that the danger is The television camera is a powerful
only probable. (Gonzales vs. Kalaw- weapon which intentionally or inad-
Katigbak, G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985) vertently can destroy an accused

Pre-week Notes
and his case in the eyes of the pub-
Limited intrusion into a person‘s privacy lic. Considering the prejudice it pos-
is permissible when that person is a pub- es to the defendant‘s right to due
lic figure and the information sought to process as well as to the fair and
be published is of a public character. orderly administration of justice,
What is protected is the right to be free and considering further that the
from unwarranted publicity, from the freedom of the press and the right
wrongful publicizing of the private affairs of the people to information may be
of an individual which are outside the served and satisfied by less distract-
realm of public concern. (Ayer Productions ing, degrading and prejudicial
vs. Capulong, G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988) means, live radio and television
coverage of the court proceedings
shall not be allowed. No video shots
or photographs shall be permitted
during the trial proper. Video foo-
tages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be limited and re-
stricted. (Secretary of Justice sv. San-
diganbayan, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, Sep-
tember 13, 2001)
144. What are the exceptions to the Non-Establishment Clause.
a. Exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious purposes
(Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
b. Citizenship requirement of ownership of educational institutions, except those established by religious
groups and mission boards (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution);
c. Optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools (Sec. 3[3], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution);
and
d. Appropriation allowed where minister or ecclesiastic is employed in the armed forces, in a penal
institution, or in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium. (Sec. 29[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
145. Justice Dahon initiated the holding of Catholic masses in the Hall of Justice of Kyusi.
Justice Ugat filed a Complaint against the holding of masses contending that such act is
unconstitutional as it violates the non-establishment clause. Is Justice Ugat correct?
No. The holding of Catholic masses at the Kyusi Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely
accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities
expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when
judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there
on their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative
officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning continue
to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been
converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of
its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions. (In Re: Letter of Tony Q.
Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19 SC, March 7,
2017)
146. What is Benevolent Neutrality?
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
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accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
(Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003)
147. What is the Lemon Test?
It is a test to determine whether an act of the government violates the non-establishment clause. To pass
the Lemon Test, a government act or policy must:
a. Have a legislative secular purpose;

b. Does not primarily inhibit or advance a religion; and
c. There is no excessive entanglement between state ng religion.(Lemon vs. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 [1971])
148. What are the matters not covered by the right to access to information?
a. Information affecting national security, military and diplomatic secrets. It also includes inter-
government exchanges prior to consultation of treaties and executive;
b. Agreement as may reasonably protect the national interest;
c. Matters relating to investigation, apprehension, and detention of criminals which the court may not
inquire into prior to arrest, prosecution and detention;
d. Trade and industrial secrets and other banking transactions as protected by the Intellectual Property
Code and the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act; and
e. Other confidential information falling under the scope of the Ethical Safety Act concerning classified
information. (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998)
149. Is the right to strike included in the right to form unions or freedom of assembly by
government employees?
No. The right to strike is NOT included in the right to form unions or freedom of assembly by government
employees. Their employment is governed by law. It is the Congress and administrative agencies which
dictate the terms and conditions of their employment. The same is fixed by law and circulars and thus
not subject to any collective bargaining agreement. (GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawasa GSIS, G.R. No.
170132, December 6, 2006).
150. When does a law impair the obligation of contracts?
a. It changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as to the time or mode of performance;
or
b. It imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed if it authorizes for its satisfaction
something different from that provided in its terms. (Clemens vs. Nolting, G.R. No. L-17959, January 24,
1922)
151. What is Custodial Investigation?
Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. When the investigation is no longer
general inquiry unto an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, as when the
suspect has been taken into police custody and the police carries out a process of interrogation that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements. Investigation focuses on the guilt of a person such that he is
no longer allowed to leave the premises. Miranda ruling is applicable. (People of the Philippines vs. Judge
Ayson, G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989)

Pre-week Notes
Custodial investigation includes the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of law. (Sec. 2, Republic Act No. 7438, April 27, 1992)
152. What are the rights of the accused during custodian investigation?
a. Any person under investigation for the commission of the offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of a counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel;
b. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him, Secret detention places, solitary in communicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him; and
c. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation
to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. (Sec. 12, Art. III, 1987
Philippine Constitution)
153. Distinguish bail as a matter of right from bail as a matter of discretion.
BAIL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT BAIL AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION

Before conviction a. Cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial a. Cases filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Court of an offense punishable by death,
Circuit Trial Court; and reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
b. Cases filed before Regional Trial Court depending if the evidence of guilt is strong;
of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
After conviction a. Cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial a. Cases filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Court for offenses punishable by death,
Circuit Trial Court; reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment;
b. Accused convicted by Regional Trial b. Cases filed before the Regional Trial
Court, but the penalty imposed does not Court if the penalty imposed is imprisonment
exceed six (6) years and the judgment is exceeding six (6) years, provided none of the
not yet final. circumstances enumerated in Sec. 5(3), Rule
114 are present. (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 121917, July 31, 1996)
c. When the accused is charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
evidence of guilt is not strong. (Sec. 7, Rule
114, Revised Rules of Court)
d. For humanitarian considerations. (Enrile
vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 213847)
154. Is the right to bail available in extradition proceedings?
Yes. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly,
the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
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should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. (Government of Hong Kong
Special vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007)
155. Explain the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
A trial from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. But justice and fairness, not the speed, are the
objectives.
 If trial is unreasonably delayed, accused is entitled to dismissal, equivalent to acquittal.
 A separate trial is consonant with the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
 The remedy of the accused in an unreasonable delay – habeas corpus (if he has been restrained of his
liberty) or certiorari, prohibition or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. (Saldariega vs.
Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)
156. Explain the scope of the right against self-incrimination.
a. Applies only to compulsory testimonial self-incrimination – refers to the use of mental processes and
the communicative faculties, and not to a merely physical activity. (Villaflor vs. Summers, GR No. 16444,
September 8, 1920) The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, September 30, 1987)
b. If the act is physical/mechanical, the accused can be compelled to allow or perform the act, and the
result can be used in evidence against him.
c. However, privilege protects the accused against any attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of
his handwriting in connection with a prosecution for falsification.
d. Handwriting in connection with a prosecution for falsification is not allowed. (Beltran vs. Samson, G.R. No.
32025 September 23, 1929)
e. The prohibition also extends to the compulsion for the production of documents, papers and chattels
that may be used as evidence against the witness, except where the State has a right to inspect the
same, under the police or taxing power.
f. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a television interview are
admissible in evidence if voluntarily made. (People of the Philippines vs. Rondero, GR No. 125687, December
9, 1999)
Examples:
a. Witness may not be compelled to produce documents, papers, and chattels that may be used as evi-
dence against him, except where the State has a right to inspect the same, such as books of accounts
of corporations, under the police power (Cruz, I., Constitutional Law, 2015 Edition, p. 666);
b. Witness may not be compelled to furnish specimen of his handwriting in connection with his prosecu-
tion for falsification. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence, and attention.
(Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929);
c. Accused may be made to take off her garments and shoes and be photographed (People vs. Otadora,
G.R. No. L-2154, April 26, 1950);
d. Accused may be compelled to show her body for physical investigation to see if she is pregnant (Vil-
laflor vs. Summers, GR No. 16444, September 8, 1920)

Pre-week Notes
157. What are the immunities that may be granted to a witness?
a. Transactional Immunity – that which may be granted by the Commission on Human Rights to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, which
makes the witness immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony
relates (Sec. 18[8], Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution);
b. Use and Fruit Immunity – prohibits the use of witness‘ compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. (Galman vs. Pamaran, G.R. No. 71208-
09, August 30, 1985)
158. What are the requisites for double jeopardy to attach?
There must be:

1. a valid complaint or information;
2. filed before a competent court;
3. to which the defendant had pleaded; and
4. of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. (People vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 197546, March 23, 2015)
159. What are the protections that the right against double-jeopardy provide?
Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal; (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3)
against multiple punishments for the same offense. (People of the Philippines vs. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 137953-
58, March 11, 2002)
160. What are the exceptions to the right against involuntary servitude?
a. Punishment for a crime for which the party has been duly convicted. (Sec. 18[2], Art. III, 1987
Constitution)
b. Personal military or civil service in the interest of national defense. (Sec. 4, Art. II, 1987 Constitution)
c. Naval (mercantile marine) enlistment. (165 U.S. 275 [1987])
d. Posse comitatus (Power or Force of the Country) for the apprehension of criminals (U.S. vs. Pompeya,
G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915): In the pursuit of persons who violated the law, such as brigands, the
authorities may command all the male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them in the arrest.
e. Striking workers – return to work order issued by the DOLE Secretary or the President in industries
affected with public interest. (45 O.G. Supp. No. 9, p. 47)
f. Minors under patria potestas are obliged to obey their parents. (Art. 211, Family Code)
161. What are the prohibited punishments?
a. Involuntary servitude (Sec. 18, Art. III, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

b. Excessive Fines (Sec. 19, Art. III, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
c. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments. (Sec. 19, Art. III, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
d. Ex post facto law and Bill Attainder. (Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
e. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado and other forms of detention and the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities. (Sec. 12, Article III, ; Sec. 19, Art. III, Sec. 19, Art. III, 1987
Philippine Constitution)
f. Indefinite Imprisonment.
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162. What is a Bill of Attainder?
It is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative
for a judicial determination of guilt. (People of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27,
1972)
163. What are the writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, and when
are they available as a remedy?
Definition When available

A writ issued by a court directed to a a. Liberty is subject to physical restraint.
person detaining another, commanding b. In case of moral restraint.
him to produce the body of the prisoner c. Conviction in a court without jurisdiction
at a designated time and place, with the or where his sentence has become invalid.
Writ of Habeas day and cause of his capture and d. Unlawful denial of bail.
Corpus detention, to do, to submit to, and to e. Denial of right to speedy trial. (Cruz,
submit whatever the court or judge Constitutional Law, pp. 285-286)
awarding the writ shall order on his
behalf. (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 499)
A remedy available to any person whose Available to any person whose right to life,
right to life, liberty and security is liberty, and security is violated or threatened
violated or threatened with violation by by an unlawful act or omission of a public
Writ of Amparo an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
official or employee, or of a private or entity.
individual or entity. (Sec. 1, A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC)
A remedy available to any person whose There must be a nexus between right to
right to privacy in life, liberty or security privacy and right to life, liberty and property.
is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or
Writ of Habeas
entity engaged in the gathering,
Data
collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (Sec 1, A.M. No. 08-1-16-
SC 22).
A legal remedy designed for the The writ of kalikasan may be sought by
protection of one‘s constitutional right to anyone whose constitutional right to a
a healthy environment. (Sec. 16, Art. II, balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
1987 Constitution; Sec. 1, Rule 7, Rules of whose constitutional right to a balanced and
Procedure for Environmental Cases) healthful ecology is threatened with violation,
by an unlawful act of omission of a public
Writ of Kalikasan official or employee, or private individual or
entity and such violation or threat involves
―environmental damage of such magnitude as
to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants of two or more cities, or
provinces.‖ (Sec. 1, Rule 7, Section 1, Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases)

Pre-week Notes
164. Can the validity of an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) be challenged in a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan?
Yes. In general, the proper procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to follow the appeal process
provided in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with the proper administrative appeal
process, recourse may be made to the courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. However, in exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to challenge
defects in the ECC provided that (1) the defects are causally linked or reasonably connected to an
environmental damage of the nature and magnitude contemplated under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan,
and (2) the case does not violate, or falls under an exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and/or primary jurisdiction. (Paje vs. Casiño, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015)
165. Is the doctrine of command responsibility applicable to amparo proceedings?
Yes. Command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars
or domestic conflict." The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to
enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue.
In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the
superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such
identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government
agency. (Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)
VII. CITIZENSHIP
166. Comparison of 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution vis-à-vis Citizenship.
1935 CONSTITUTION 1973 CONSTITUTION 1987 CONSTITUTION

a. Those who are citizens of the a. Those who are citizens of the a. Those who are citizens of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the Philippines at the time of the adoption Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution. of this Constitution. adoption of this Constitution;
b. Those born in the Philippine b. Those whose fathers and mothers b. Those whose fathers or
Islands of foreign parents who, before are citizens of the Philippines. mothers are citizens of the
the adoption of this Constitution, had c. Those who elect Philippine Philippines;
been elected to public office in the citizenship pursuant to the provisions c. Those born before January 17,
Philippine Islands. of the Constitution of nineteen 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
c. Those whose fathers are citizens hundred and thirty-five. elect Philippine citizenship upon
of the Philippines. d. Those who are naturalized in reaching the age of majority; and
d. Those whose mothers are citizens accordance with law. (Sec. 1, Art. III) d. Those who are naturalized in
of the Philippines and, upon reaching accordance with law. (Sec. 1, Art.
the age of majority, elect Philippine IV)
citizenship.
e. Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. (Sec. 1, Art. IV)
N.B.: The following persons were

citizens of the Philippines on
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November 15, 1935, the date of the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution:
a. Persons born in the Philippine

Islands who resided therein on April
11, 1899 and were Spanish subjects
on that date, unless they had lost
their Philippine citizenship on or
before May 14, 1935.
b. Natives of the Spanish Peninsula
who resided in the Philippines on April
11, 1899, and who did not declare
their intention of preserving their
Spanish nationality between that date
and October 11, 1900, unless they
had lost their Philippine citizenship on
or before May 14, 1935.
c. Naturalized citizens of Spain who
resided in the Philippines on April 11,
1899, and did not declare their
intention to preserve their Spanish
nationality within the prescribed
period (up to October 11, 1900).
d. Children born of (a), (b) and (c)
subsequent to April 11, 1899, unless
they lost their Philippine citizenship
on or before May 14, 1935.
e. Persons who became naturalized
citizens of the Philippines in
accordance of naturalization law since
its enactment on March 26, 1920.
167. Who are natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution?
Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with Paragraph (3)
of Sec. 1, Art. IV shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Sec. 2, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution)
168. What are the two categories of natural born Filipino citizens under RA 9225?
a. Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225 who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines (prospective effect); and
b. Natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath (retroactive effect). (David vs. Agbay, G.R No. 199113,
March 18, 2015)
169. Lulu was found abandoned as a newborn infant in a Parish Church in San Miguel, Bula-
can. Her biological parents are unknown but she has typical Filipino features: height, flat
nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face. She was registered
as a foundling at the Office of the Civil Registrar. Subsequently, she was adopted by the

Pre-week Notes
spouses Rody and Leni, both Filipino citizens, and was given the name Lulu. If Lulu decides
to run for Senator, would she be qualified to run as one? Why or why not?
Lulu would be qualified to run. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. Foun-
dlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are be-
ing found, as covered and supported by the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Art. 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because
there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child
of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. That a person with
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child
born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical cer-
tainty, that Lulu‘s parents are Filipinos. (Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the
contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution and not
just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being of children, gua-
ranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting
human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. (David vs.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
Since Lulu is considered natural-born, she is qualified to run for a Senate position, a position which re-
quires natural-born citizenship as a qualification.
170. Modes of acquiring, losing, and re-acquiring citizenship.
ACQUIRE LOSE RE-ACQUIRE

Involuntary Voluntary a. Under Republic Act No. 9225, by
a. By birth; a. By naturalization in a foreign country; taking the oath of allegiance;
Voluntary b. By express renunciation of citizenship; b. By judicial or legislative
b. By naturalization; and c. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance naturalization; and
c. By marriage. to support the Constitution or laws of a c. By repatriation of deserters of the
foreign country upon attaining 21 years of Army, Navy, or Air Corps. (Nachura,
age; Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
d. By rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country;
Involuntary
e. By cancellation of the Certificate of
Naturalization (for naturalized citizens);
and
f. By having been declared by
competent authority a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war.
171. Modes of acquiring citizenship by direct naturalization.
a. Administrative Naturalization (pursuant to Republic Act No. 9139);

b. Judicial Naturalization (pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473);
c. Legislative Naturalizations in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to
an alien;
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d. Collective change of nationality as a result of cession or subjugation;
e. In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the state where they are born. (Nachura,
Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
172. Qualifications, Disqualifications, and Ground for Denaturalization under

Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Judicial Naturalization).
GROUNDS FOR
QUALIFICATIONS DISQUALIFICATIONS
DENATURALIZATION
a. Not less than 21 years of age on a. Opposed to organized a. Naturalization certificate is
the date of the hearing of the government or affiliated with obtained fraudulently or
Petition; any association or group of illegally;
b. Resided in the Philippines for a persons who uphold and teach b. If, within two (2) years, he
continuous period of not less doctrines opposing all organized returns to his native country or
than ten (10) years. The period governments; to some foreign country and
may be reduced to five (5) b. Defending or teaching the establishes residence there,
years if he (a) honorably held necessity or propriety of provided that one-year stay in
office in Government; (b) violence, personal assault, or native country, or two-year stay
established a new industry or assassination for the success or in a foreign country, shall be
introduced a useful invention in predominance of their ideas; prima facie evidence of intent to
the Philippines; (c) married to a c. Polygamists or believes in take up residence in the same;
Filipino woman; (d) been polygamy; c. Petition was made on an invalid
engaged as a teacher in the d. Convicted of a crime involving declaration of intention;
Philippines (in a public or moral turpitude; d. Minor children failed to graduate
private school not established e. Suffering from mental alienation through the fault of the parents
for the exclusive instruction of or incurable contagious disease; either by neglecting to support
persons of a particular who, during the period of their them or by transferring them to
nationality or race) or in any of residence in the Philippines, another school; and
the branches of education or have not mingled socially with e. Allowed himself to be used as
industry for a period of not less the Filipinos, or who have not dummy.
than two (2) years; (e) was evinced a sincere desire to learn
born in the Philippines; and embrace the customs, If the ground for denaturalization
c. Good moral character; believes traditions, and ideals of the affects the intrinsic validity of the
in the principles underlying the Filipinos; proceedings, the denaturalization
Philippine Constitution; must f. Citizens or subjects of nations shall divest the wife and children of
have conducted himself in a with whom the Philippines is at their derivative naturalization. But if
proper and irreproachable war during the period of such the ground was personal to the
manner during the entire period war; and denaturalized Filipino, his wife and
of his residence in the g. Citizens or subjects of a foreign children shall retain their Philippine
Philippines in his relations with country whose laws do not citizenship. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer
the constituted government as grant Filipinos the right to in Political Law, 2016)
the community in which he is become naturalized citizens or
living; subjects thereof.
d. Own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less than
Php 5,000.00, or must have
some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
e. Speak and write English or
Spanish and any of the principal
Philippine languages; and
e. Enrolled his minor children of
school age in any of the public
or private schools recognized by
the government where

Pre-week Notes
Philippine history, government,
and civics are taught as part of
the school curriculum, during
the entire period of residence in
the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his
Petition for Naturalization.
173. What are the effects of naturalization?
a. Vests citizenship on wife if she herself may be lawfully naturalized (Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971);
b. Minor children born in the Philippines before the naturalization shall be considered citizens of the
Philippines;
c. Minor child born outside the Philippines who was residing in the Philippines at the time of
naturalization shall be considered a Filipino citizen;
d. Minor child born outside the Philippines before parent‘s naturalization shall be considered Filipino
citizen inly during minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines;
e. Child born outside the Philippines after parent‘s naturalization shall be considered a Filipino, provided
that he registers as such before any Philippine consulate within one year after attaining majority age,
and tales his oath of allegiance. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
174. Qualifications, Disqualifications, and Grounds for Cancellation of Certificate of

Naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (Administrative Naturalization)
GROUNDS FOR
CANCELLATION
a. Born in the Philippines and a. Opposed to organized government a. If the naturalized person or his
residing therein since birth; or affiliated with any association duly authorized representative
b. Not be less than 18 years of age or group of persons who uphold made any false statement or
at the time of filing his/her and teach doctrines opposing all misrepresentation, or
Petition; organized governments; committed any violation of
c. Of good moral character and b. Defending or teaching the law, rules, and regulations in
believes in the underlying necessity or propriety of violence, connection with the Petition,
principles of the Constitution personal assault, or assassination or if he obtains Philippine
and must have conducted for the success or predominance citizenship fraudulently or
himself/herself in a proper and of their ideas; illegally;
reproachable manner during c. Polygamists or believes in b. If, within five (5) years, he
his/her entire period of polygamy; shall establish permanent
residence in the Philippines in d. Convicted of a crime involving residence in a foreign country,
his relations with the duly moral turpitude; provided that remaining for
constituted government as well e. Suffering from mental alienation more than one (1) year in his
as the community in which or incurable contagious disease; country of origin or two years
he/she is living; who, during the period of their in any foreign country shall be
d. Have received his/her primary residence in the Philippines, have prima facie evidence of intent
and secondary education in any not mingled socially with the to permanently reside therein;
public or private educational Filipinos, or who have not evinced c. If he allowed himself or his
institution duly recognized by a sincere desire to learn and wife or child with acquired
the Department of Education, embrace the customs, traditions, citizenship to be used as
where Philippine history, and ideals of the Filipinos; dummy; and
government, and civic are f. Citizens or subjects of nations d. If he, his wife, or his child with
taught and prescribed as part of with whom the Philippines is at acquired citizenship commits
the school curriculum and war during the period of such any act inimical to national
where enrolment is not limited war; and security. (Nachura, Outline
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to any race or nationality, g. Citizens or subjects of a foreign Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
provided that should he/she country whose laws do not grant
have minor children of school Filipinos the right to become
age, he/she must have enrolled naturalized citizens or subjects
them in similar schools; thereof.
e. Have a known trade, business,
profession, or lawful occupation,
from which he/she derives
income sufficient for his/her
support and that of his/her
family;
f. Be able to read, write, and
speak Filipino or any of the
dialects in the Philippines; and
g. Have mingled with the Filipinos
and evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs
and traditions and ideals of the
Filipino people.
175. Distinguish Dual Citizenship from Dual Allegiance.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP DUAL ALLEGIANCE

Definition Arises when, as a result of concurrent A situation in which a person
application of the different laws of two or simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
more states, a person is simultaneously loyalty to two or more states. It is a result
considered a national by the said states. of an individual‘s violation.
Application of law May arise from as a consequence of Inimical to the national interest and shall
different laws or mode of acquiring be dealt by law. (Sec. 5, Art. IV, 1987
citizenship. Constitution)
VIII. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
176. What are the elements of Public Office?
a. Created by law or by authority of law;

b. Possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of government, to be exercised for the
benefit of the public;
c. Powers conferred and duties imposed must be defined, directly or impliedly, by eh legislature or the
legislative authority;
d. Duties must be performed independently and without the control of a superior power other than the
law, unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the legislature,
and by it placed under the general control of a superior office or body; and
e. Must have permanence or continuity. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
177. What are the elements of De Facto office?
a. A validly existing public office;

b. Actual physical possession of said office;
c. Color of title to the public office. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
178. Distinguish De Facto Officer from De Jure Officer.

Pre-week Notes
DE JURE OFFICER DE FACTO OFFICER
Basis Takes possession of an office based on Has possession of a public office based on
right. reputation.
Authority An officer who in all respects is legally Has possession and performs the duties
appointed or elected and qualified to under color of right without being technically
exercise the office. qualified in all points of law to act.
Removal Cannot be removed in a direct proceeding May be ousted in a direct proceeding against
him by quo warranto.
Security of tenure Enjoys security of tenure. May be removed Does not enjoy security of tenure. May be
from office only with just cause. removed from office even without just cause.
179. Distinguish De Facto Officer from a usurper.
DE FACTO OFFICER USURPER

Color Of right or Has color of right or title to the office. Has neither lawful title or color of right or title.
title
Public knowledge Assumes to exercise functions where public Simply assumes to act as officer where the
of lack of does not know his lack of title or authority. public knows he is such a usurper.
authority
Removal May be removed only in a direct Can be ousted at any time in any proceeding.
proceeding against him.
Validity of acts De facto officer‘s acts done in the exercise Usurper‘s acts are absolutely null and void.
of authority are valid in so far as the public
is concerned.
180. Disqualifications to hold public office under the Constitution.
a. No candidate who lost in an election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any
office in the Government. (Sec. 6, Art. IX-B)
b. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure. (Sec. 7[1], Art. IX-B)
c. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary function of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other position in Government. (Sec 7[2], Art. IX-B)
d. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
(Sec. 13, Art VII)
e. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations of their subsidiaries, during his term for which he was elected. (Sec. 13, Art.
VI; Adaza vs. Pacana, G.R. No. L-68159, March 18, 1985)
f. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII; In Re: Designation of
Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano as Member of Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC,
October 5, 1988)
g. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment (Sec. 2, Art IX-A). The same disqualification applies to the Ombudsman and his Deputies.
(Sec. 8, Art. XI)
h. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation from office. (Sec. 11, Art. XI)
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i. Members of constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding their appointment. (Sec. 1,
Art. IX-B; Sec. 1, Art IX-C; Sec. 1, Art IX-D; Sec. 8, Art. IX)
j. Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies are appointed to a term of
seven (7) years, without reappointment. (Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-B; Sec. 1[2], Art IX-C; Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-D; Sec.
11, Art XI)
k. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office
of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 13, Art. VII)
181. Alberto Agra was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation
of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera. Subsequently, he was designated as Acting Solicitor
General in a concurrent capacity. Mr. Paki Lamero questioned the appointment of Agra citing
the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet
and their deputies and assistants. In his defense, Agra said that his designation as Solicitor
General was only temporary and thefore, not covered by the constitutional prohibition. Is he
correct?
No. The Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary. (Funa vs. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February
19, 2013)
182. Prohibitions for public officers or employees.
a. No officer or employee of the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
political campaign. (Sec. 2[4], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
b. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress,
any present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, 1987
Constitution)
c. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted,
directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or –controlled bank or financial institution to the
President, the Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have
controlling interest. (Sec. 16, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
d. No public officer or employee shall be assigned to perform clerical duties.
e. No detail or re-assignment shall be made within three (3) months before any election without the
approval of the Commission on Elections.
f. All appointments made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the
chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are
prohibited. (Laurel vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 71562, October 28, 1991)
183. Who should file his/her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth?
a. Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;
b. Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court
Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President;
c. Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;

Pre-week Notes
d. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President,
and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
e. All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil
Service Commission. (Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6713)
184. State the Next-in-Rank Rule.
When a vacancy occurs, employees next-in-rank should be considered for promotion (Sec. 21, Civil Service
Law). The person next-in-rank shall be given preference in promotion when the position immediately
above his is vacated. But the appointing authority still exercises discretion and is not bound by this rule,
although he is required the special reasons for not appointing the officer next-in-rank. This means that
the one who is next-in-rank is given only preferential consideration for promotion; but it does not
necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. (Panis vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 102948, February 2, 1994)
185. State the Automatic Reversion Rule.
All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by the
Civil Service Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position
invalidates the promotion of those in the lower positions and automatically restores them to their former
positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to payment of salaries for services actually rendered
at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments. (Sec. 13, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292)
For this rule to apply, the following must concur:
a. there must be a series of promotions;

b. all promotional appointments are simultaneously submitted to the Civil Service Commission; and
c. the Civil Service Commission disapproves the appointment of a person to a higher position.
(Divinagracia vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 110954, May 31, 1995)
186. Governor Ulah entered into a contract of consultancy with Feru, wherein the latter was
employed as Consultant-Technical Assistant in the Office of the Governor. Jeki complained
that Feru should not have been appointed as consultant because of his disqualification for
appointment or employment in any government position. Governor Ulah countered that the
consultancy services rendered by Feru could not be considered as government service and
therefore, he is not disqualified to be a consultant. Is Governor Ulah correct in assuming that
Feru is not a government employee?
Yes. Feru rendered consultancy services for the provincial government not by virtue of an appointment or
election to a specific public office or position but by a contractual engagement. Those who render ser-
vices with the government, without occupying a public office or without having been elected or appointed
as a public officer evidenced by a written appointment and recorded with the Civil Service Commission, is
outside the concept of government service. (Joson vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 210220-21, April 6, 2016)
187. Can public officials be still held administratively liable for a misconduct committed dur-
ing a prior term?
Yes. Public office is a public trust and as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, it is plainly inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another
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elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no con-
stitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
(Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, Jr., G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
188. Modes of terminating official relationship.
Expiration of the term or tenure of office;

Natural causes Reaching the age of retirement; and
Death or permanent disability.
a. Resignation;
b. Acceptance of an incompatible office;
c. Abandonment of office;
Acts or neglect of officers
d. Prescription of the right to office;
e. Failure to assume elective office within six (6) months from proclamation;
f. Filing of a certificate of candidacy.
a. Removal;
b. Impeachment;
Acts of the government c. Abolition of office;
d. Conviction of a crime; and
e. Recall (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
189. What are the kinds of Preventive Suspension?
a. Preventive suspension pending investigation (Sec. 51, Administrative Code); and

b. Preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is
suspension or dismissal and, after review, the public officer is exonerated. (Sec. 47, Administrative Code)
190. Is preventive suspension pending investigation a penalty?
No. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against
respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If
the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be
lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found
innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. (Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801,
April 6, 1995)
The period of preventive suspension cannot be deducted from whatever penalty may be imposed upon
the erring officer. (CSC Resolution No. 90-1066)
191. Gloria was charged administratively. She was subsequently placed under preventive
suspension pending investigation by the Secretary of Education. Later on, she was
exonerated from the charge against her. Is she entitled to backwages?
No. An employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to
compensation because such suspension "is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining
authority to conduct an unhampered investigation." Upon the other hand, there is right to compensation
for preventive suspension pending appeal if the employee is eventually exonerated. This is because
"preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered
illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence,
she should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension." (Baculi vs. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)

Pre-week Notes
192. What are the periods for preventive suspension?
a. For local elective officials – 60 days (maximum) for single offense within a single year for several
offenses but not exceeding term of office and 90 days (maximum) for multiple offenses. (Sec. 23,
Local Government Code or RA 7160)
b. For civil service officers and employees – 90 days (maximum)
c. Ombudsman may be suspended for 6 months. (Administrative Order No. 07, Rules of Procedure of the Office
of Ombudsman)
193. Distinguish preventive suspension pending investigation from preventive suspension

pending appeal.
Pending Investigation Pending Appeal

Not a penalty but only a means of enabling the Punitive in character.
disciplinary authority an unhampered investigation.
After the lapse of 90 days, the law provides that he If exonerated, he should be reinstated with full pay for
be automatically reinstated. the period of suspension.
During such preventive suspension, the employee is If during the appeal he remains suspended and the
not entitled to payment of salaries. penalty imposed is only reprimand, the suspension
pending appeal becomes illegal and he is entitled to back
salary corresponding to the period of suspension.
(Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995)
194. What are the classifications of service in the Civil Service?
a. Career Service – characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications, opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions, and security of tenure.
i. Open career positions – prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

ii. Closed career positions – scientific or highly technical in nature;
iii. Career Executive Service – undersecretaries, bureau directors, etc., where the appointee is
required to possess the appropriate Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) eligibility;
iv. Career Officers (other than those belong to the Career Executive Service) who are appointed by
the President;
v. Positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, although governed by a separate merit system;
vi. Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter;
vii. Permanent laborers.
b. Non-career Service - characterized by entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests utilized
for the career service, tenure limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-terminous with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose the employment was made.
i. Elective officials and their personal and confidential staff;
ii. Department Heads and officials of Cabinet rank who hold office at the pleasure of the President,
and their personal and confidential staff;
iii. Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office, and their personal
and confidential staff;
iv. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in government is on accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the
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employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period not exceeding one year, under their
own responsibility, with the minimum direction and supervision; and
v. Emergency and seasonal personnel.
195. What are the kinds of appointments to the Civil Service?
Extended to a person possessing the requisite qualifications, including the eligibility

Permanent
required for the position, and thus protected by the constitutional guaranty of security
Appointment
of tenure. (Achaoso vs Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991)
Extended to one who may not possess the requisite qualifications or eligibility
required by law for the position, and is revocable at will, without the necessity of just
cause or a valid investigation.
Purpose: No person may be appointed to a public office, unless he or she possesses

the requisite qualifications. The exception to the rule is where, in the absence of
Temporary (Acting
appropriate eligibles, he or she may be appointed to merely in a temporary capacity.
Appointment)
Such a temporary appointment is not made for the benefit of the appointee. Rather,
an acting or temporary appointment seeks to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of
official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection
of a permanent appointee. (Civil Service Commission vs. Darangina, G.R. No. 167472,
January 31, 20017)
The appointment may be revoked only at the expiration of the period or, if revocation
is made before expiration, the same has to be for a valid and just cause.
Temporary
Appointment for fixed
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a
period
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of
a permanent occupant to the office. (Pimentel vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, Oct. 13, 2005)
196. What is the Condonation Doctrine?
The re-election of a local government official bars the continuation of the administrative case against him;
inasmuch as the re-election of the official is tantamount to condonation by the people of whatever
misdeed he may have committed. (Malinao vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 117618, March 29, 1996)
197. Is the Condonation Doctrine still applicable?
No. It was abandoned in Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015.
The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people
at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local official‘s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped
off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved
of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term .
198. What are the steps of initiating impeachment?
a. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof.
b. It shall be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter.

Pre-week Notes
c. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
d. Majority vote of at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to affirm or override
the said resolution. The vote of each member shall be recorded.
e. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed. (Sec 3[1], Art XI, 1987 Constitution)
199. Enumerate and discuss the grounds for impeachment.
a. Culpable violation of the Constitution – the deliberate and wrongful breach of the Constitution.
Violation of the Constitution made unintentionally, in good faith, and mere mistakes in the proper
construction of the Constitution do not constitute and impeachable offense.
b. Treason – committed by any person who, owing allegiance to the Government of the Philippines, not
being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort
within the Philippines or elsewhere. (Art. 114, Revised Penal Code)
c. Direct Bribery – committed by any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a
crime, in connection with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another. If the
object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing
something which it was his official duty to do. (Art. 210, Revised Penal Code)
d. Indirect Bribery – committed by a public officer when he accepts gifts offered to him by reason of
his office. (Art. 211, Revised Penal Code)
e. Graft and Corruption: This must be understood in the light of the provisions of the Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Any violation of the prohibited acts provided there in
constitutes a ground for impeachment.
f. Other high crimes: The exact meaning of "other high crimes or betrayal of public trust" as an
impeachable offense is still undefined. The framers of the Constitution put impeachment into the
hands of the legislative branch and transformed it from a matter of legal definition to a matter of
political judgment. Hence, the definition of an impeachable offense depends on the majority of the
House of Representatives considers it to be a given moment in history. (De Leon, Philippine Constitutional
Law, 1999)
g. Betrayal of Public Trust – a new ground for impeachment, which covers "any violation of the oath
of office involving loss of popular support even if the violation may not amount to a punishable
offense." (De Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1999)
200. Determine the applicability of impeachment and quo warranto as remedies to remove
an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected official.
An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official‘s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a
quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. On the
contrary, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly
elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may
either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes
an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise . (Republic vs. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 19, 2018)
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201. What are the functions of the Ombudsman?
a. Investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (Sec. 15(1), RA No. 6770;
b. Direct any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, as well as any GOCC with original charter, to perform or expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties (Sec. 15(2)
R.A. No. 6770; Sec 13(2) Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
c. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith (Sec. 15(3) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(3), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
d. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered
into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the COA for appropriate action (Sec. 15(4) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec. 13(4), Article XI, 1987
Constitution);
e. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities and examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents (Sec. 15(5), R.A. No.6770;
see also Sec. 13(5), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
f. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due process
(Sec 15(6) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(6), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
g. Determine the causes if inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption and to make
recommendations for their elimination and observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency (Sec
15(7) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(7), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
h. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such function or duties
as may be provided by law (Sec 15(8), R.A. No. 6770);
i. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released (Sec 15(10), R.A. No. 6770).
202. A complaint for disbarment was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Manny, an Assistant Prosecutor, for issuing a resolution recommending the
dismissal of a criminal complaint filed by a certain Joey. A similar disbarment complaint was
filed against Atty. Sam, the Secretary of Justice for allegedly incurring inordinate delay in
resolving a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. Will the complaints prosper?
No. The IBP has no jurisdiction over the complaints. The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the
performance or discharge of official duties as a prosecutor of the Department of Justice. Hence, the
authority to discipline Atty. Manny exclusively pertained to his superior, the Secretary of Justice.
In the case of Atty. Sam, as Secretary of Justice, the authority to discipline pertained to the President.
In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises
disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of Atty. Manny and Sam as officials
performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated
from their accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. (Trovela vs. Robles, A.C. No. 11550, June 4, 2018)
203. What are the powers of the Office of the Special Prosecutor?

Pre-week Notes
a. To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandi-
ganbayan;
b. To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
c. To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman. (Sec.11, Par. 4, RA 6770)
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
204. What are the powers of administrative bodies?
a. Quasi-Legislative or Rule-Making Power – the exercise of delegated legislative power, involving

no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out on the law itself (Republic of the Philippines vs. Drugmakers Lab. Inc., G.R.
No. 190837, March 5, 2014);
b. Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power – the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law (Smart Telecommunications, Inc. vs. National
Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003); and
c. Determinative Power (Cruz, Administrative Law, 2007).
205. Differentiate Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial powers.
Quasi-Legislative Quasi-Judicial
Operates on the future. Operates based onpast facts.
General application. Particular application (applies only to the parties involved).
May be assailed in court without subscribing to the Only be challenged in court with prior exhaustion of
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. administrative remedies.
Does not require prior notice and hearing (except Requires prior notice and hearing (except when the law
when the law requires it). does not require it).
May be assailed in court through an ordinary action. Appealed to the Court of Appeals via petition for review
(Rule 43).
206. What are the doctrines relative to Administrative Law?
a. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction - The Courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling
is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. (Lihaylihay vs. Tan, G.R.
No. 192223, July 23, 2018)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction simply calls for the determination of administrative questions,
which ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather courts of justice. (Cruz, Philippine
Administrative Law, 2016)
b. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies – Where a remedy before an administrative
agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a
matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought to the courts. (Catipon, Jr. vs. Japson, G.R. No.
191787, June 22, 2015);
c. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action - No resort to courts will be allowed unless
administrative action has been completed and there is nothing left to be done in administrative
structure. (Magalang vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013)
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d. Doctrine of Res Judicata – A final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and constitutes an absolute
bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action . (Brillantes vs. Castro,
G.R. No. L-9223, June 30, 1956)
207. What are the kinds of administrative rules and regulations?
a. Supplementary or Detailed Legislation – rules and regulations ―to fix the details‖ in the execution
and enforcement of a policy set out in the law.
b. Interpretative Legislation – rules and regulations construing or interpreting the provisions of a
statute to be enforced and they are binding on all concerned until they are change.
c. Contingent legislation – rules and regulations made by an administrative authority on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends. (Nachura, Political
Law Reviewer, 2016)
208. What are the requisites for valid administrative issuances?
a. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

b. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
c. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
d. It must be reasonable.
e. It must be published with a copy of which submitted to the Office of National Administrative Regula-
tions (ONAR). (Dagan vs. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009)
209. What are the requisites of a valid administrative regulations with a penal sanction?
a. The law itself must make violation of the administrative regulation punishable;
b. The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the violation of the regulation; and
c. The regulation must be published. (Hon. Secretary Perez vs. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, GR
No. 159149, June 26, 2006)
210. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
a. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
b. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
c. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
d. Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
e. Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice;
f. Where judicial intervention is urgent;
g. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
h. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
i. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
j. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
k. When strong public interest is involved; and
l. In quo warranto proceedings. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007).
211. Is the power to issue subpoena inherent to administrative bodies?
No. It is settled that these bodies may summon witnesses and require the production of evidence only
when duly allowed by law, and always only in connection with the matter they are authorized to
investigate. (Evangelista v. Jarencio, GR No. L-29274, November 27, 1975)

Pre-week Notes
X. ELECTION LAW
212. Qualifications and Disqualifications of voters.
a. Citizen of the Philippines; a. Any person sentenced by final judgment to suffer
b. Not disqualified by law; imprisonment of not less than one year;
c. At least 18 years of age; and b. Any person adjudged by final judgment of having
d. Resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) committed any crime involving disloyalty to the govern-
year, and at least six (6) months immediately ment or any crime against national security; and
preceding the election in the place where they intend c. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by com-
to vote. (Sec. 1, Art. V, 1987 Constitution) petent authority. (Sec. 118, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement

shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage
213. A law was passed mandating the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics reg-
istration system for new voters. A petition was filed before the Supreme Court alleging that
the mandatory biometrics registration contravenes the second sentence of Sec. 1, Art. IV of
the 1987 Constitution which states that “No literacy, property, or other substantive require-
ment shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.” Decide on the constitutionality of the
subject law.
The law is constitutional. Biometrics validation is not a ―qualification‖ to the exercise of the right of suf-
frage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
regulate. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other
substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which propa-
gates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good - the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in
this case. (Kabataan Party-List vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, J. Perlas-
Bernabe)
214. What is the concept of continuing registration?
The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a
special election. (Sec. 8, RA No. 8189)
215. What are the causes of deactivation of registration records?
a. Sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than 1 year (unless granted plenary
pardon or amnesty);
b. Adjudged by final judgment for having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly consti-
tuted government (e.g. rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms law) or any crime against national
security (unless restored to full civil and political rights in accordance with law) shall automatically re-
acquire the right to vote upon the expiration of five (5) years after the service of sentence;
c. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority;
d. Did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections (excluding Sangguniang Kabataan
elections);
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e. Registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
f. Loss of Filipino citizenship. (Sec. 27, Republic Act No. 8189)
g. Failure to comply with biometrics validation (Republic Act No. 10637)
216. What are the Qualifications and Disqualifications for Overseas Absentee Voting?
a. Citizen of the Philippines abroad; Those who:
b. Not disqualified by law; and a. have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with
c. At least 18 years of age on the day of the Philippine laws;
elections may vote for president, vice-president, b. have committed and are convicted in a final judg-
senators and party list representatives. (Sec. 4, ment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by
Republic Act No. 9189) imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including
those who have committed and been found guilty of
disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised
Penal Code;
c. are immigrant or a permanent resident who is rec-
ognized as such in the host country, unless he/she exe-
cutes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that: (a) he/she
shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval
of his/her registration, and (b) he/she has not applied
for citizenship in another country; and
d. have been previously declared insane or incompe-
tent by competent authority in the Philippines or
abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consu-
lates, or foreign service establishments concerned. (Sec.
5, Republic Act No. 9189)
217. Pursuant to the mandate in Sec. 2, Art. V of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress
passed a law providing for the system of registration and election for qualified overseas
Filipinos. The law allows the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines. Does the law violate the residency requirement in Sec.
1 of Art. V of the Constitution?
No. Article V of the 1987 Constitution mandating Congress to devise a system for overseas absentee
voting operates as an exception to the residence requirements as the members of the Constitutional
Commission manifested a clear intent to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The strategic location of Sec. 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Sec. 1 with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. (Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150713, July 10,
2003)
218. What are the rules on inclusion and exclusion proceedings?
PETITION FOR INCLUSION PETITION FOR EXCLUSION

(Sec. 34, Republic Act No. 8189) (Sec. 35, Republic Act No. 8189)
When to file Any time, except 105 days before a regular Any time, except 100 days before a regular
election or 75 days before a special election or 65 days before a special election.

Pre-week Notes
election.
Who may file a. One whose application for registration a. One whose application for registration has
has been disapproved by the Board of Elec- been disapproved by the Board of Election
tion Inspectors; or Inspectors, or
b. One whose name has been stricken out b. One whose name has been stricken out
from the list. from the list.
Period to decide Within 15 days after its filing. Within 10 days from its filing.
219. Summary of qualification of candidates.
Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor,
President and District
REQUIREMENTS Senators Vice Mayor, Punong
Vice President Representatives
Barangay, Members
of the Sanggunian
Citizenship Citizen of the
Natural-Born
Philippines
Registered voter    
Read and Write    
Age At least 40 years old At least 35 years old At least 25 years On election day:
on election day. on election day. old on election
day. 23 years old: for
Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor, Vice
Mayor, and members of
the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the
highly-urbanized cities.
21 years old: for Mayor

or Vice Mayor of
independent
component cities,
component cities, or
municipalities.
18 years old: for

members of the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod,
Sangguniang
Pambayan, Punong
Barangay, or members
of the Sangguniang
Pambarangay.
Residence Ten (10) years Two (2) years Resident of the One (1) year
immediately preceding the same district for a immediately preceding
preceding the election day. period of not least the election day.
election day. than one (1) year
immediately
preceding the
election day.
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Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration of
the officer‘s active tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be
seasonably challenged. (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996; Labo vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989)
220. Discuss the rule on domicile/residence.
a. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. The intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a
stranger or new comer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
b. Three rules are well established:

(1) A man must have residence or domicile somewhere;
(2) that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) a man can have but one domicile at a time.
c. Three requisites in order to acquire a domicile by choice:

(1) Residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) An intention to remain there, and
(3) An intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be an actual change of domicile or actual
removal – animus manendi coupled with anumus non revertendi. (Limbona vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186006,
October 16, 2009)
221. Roma is a natural-born Filipino citizen. He was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) and lost his Filipino citizenship. In 2009, he applied for repatriation
under Republic Act No. 9225, before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Fran-
cisco, USA, took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In the same year, he filed a Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in Bustos, Bulacan, Romeo, another candidate for the same posi-
tion, filed a Petition to disqualify or to cancel Roma’s COC on the ground that the latter is a
foreigner. To support his claim, Romeo presented Roma’s travel record indicating that he has
been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines even after renouncing
his American citizenship. Will you grant the petition for cancellation of Roma’s COC?
Yes. Roma‘s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA, through using his US passport after
the renunciation of his USA citizenship, reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion
disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Sec. 40(d) of the Local
Government Code. A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disquali-
fied if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. Even if it made no finding that Roma had de-
liberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the Commission
on Elections could still declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the Local
Government Code. (Agustin vs. Commission on Election, G.R No. 207105, November 10, 2015)
222. What are the grounds for the disqualifications of candidates?
Under the
1987 Three-term limit for local elective officials. (Sec. 8, Art. X)
Constitution
Under the a. Declared incompetent or insane by competent authority (Sec. 12);

Pre-week Notes
Omnibus b. Sentenced by final judgment for: (a) subversion, insurrection, rebellion; (b) any offense for
Election which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months imprisonment; or (c) a
Code crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 12);
c. Given money or other material consideration to influence, induce, or corrupt voters of public
officials performing electoral functions (Sec. 68);
d. Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy (Sec. 68);
e. Spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed (Sec. 68);
f. Solicited, received or made prohibited contributions (Sec. 68);
g. Permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country unless he has waived such statues
(Sec. 68);
h. Violated election rules and regulation of election propaganda through mass media (Sec. 86);
i. Coerced, intimidated, or influenced any of his subordinates, members, or employees to aid,
campaign or vote for or against any candidate or aspirant for the nomination or selection of
candidates (Sec. 261[d]);
j. Threatened, intimidated, caused, inflicted or produced any violence, injury, punishment, dam-
Under the
age, loss or disadvantage upon any person or of the immediate members of his family, his
Omnibus
honor or property, or used fraud to compel, induce or prevent the registration of any voter, or
Election
the participation in any campaign, or the casting of any vote, or any promise of such registra-
Code
tion, campaign, vote, or omission therefrom (Sec. 261[e]);
k. Unlawful electioneering (Sec. 261[k]);
l. Violated the prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds 45 days
before a regular election or 30 days before a special election (Sec. 261[v]); and
m. Violated Sec. 261(cc).
a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sen-
tence;
Under the b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
Local c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
Government d. Those with dual citizenship;
Code e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded. (Sec. 40)
223. Rules on substitution of candidates.
After the last day of the filing of a. Only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party
Certificate of Candidacy, an may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, with-
official candidate dies, drew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the politi-
withdraws, or is disqualified for cal party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office af-
any cause fected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of
the day of the election. (Sec. 77, Omnibus Election Code)
b. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent candidate. ( Recabo
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999)
c. A candidate whose Certificate of Candidacy has been cancelled or not
given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same
political party. (Recabo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134293, June 21,
1999)
If death, withdrawal or The Certificate of Candidacy may be filed (a) with any Board of Election
disqualification should happen Inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate; or (b) with
between the day before the the Commission on Elections, if it is a national position. (Sec. 77, Omnibus
election and mid-day of the Election Code)
election day
Substitution on the day of the Only on death and disqualification shall substitution may take place upon
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election itself the start of the campaign period until mid-day of the elections. (Sec. 77,
Omnibus Election Code)
224. What is a Nuisance Candidate?
One who has no bona fide intention to run for the office and would thus prevent a faithful determination
of the true will of the people. Nuisance candidates are those whose certificates of candidacy are
presented and filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates. (Sec. 69, Omnibus Election Code; Bautista
vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998)
225. What are the determinants of a nuisance candidate?
a. Certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute;
b. To cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates; or
c. By other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide inten-
tion to run for the officer for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and this prevented a faith-
ful determination of the true will of the electorate. (Section 69, Omnibus Election Code, RA 6646)
226. Distinguish Petition for Disqualification under Sec. 68 from Petition to Deny Due
Course to a Certificate of Candidacy under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Sec. 78
Sec. 68
(Petition to deny due course to or cancel
(Petition for Disqualification)
a certificate of candidacy)
a) Election offenses; False material representation in the Certificate
Grounds b) permanent residence in a foreign country. of Candidacy. (See Sec. 74 for the contents of the
CoC)
Anytime between filing of the CoC and Not later than twenty-five (25) days from the
Period proclamation. time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy
Effect on Valid substitution There can be no valid substitution.
substitution
Bona fide candidate The CoC is void ab initio; therefore, the
Effect
person was never a candidate at all.
Rules on succession provided by law. The candidate who got the second highest
Succession/
number of votes in the contested position in
Replacement
the election.
(Aratea vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012)
227. Domeng filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for City Mayor. However, his CoC was
subsequently cancelled for his material misrepresentation in his CoC. Thereafter, he was
substituted by his wife, Maria. Dos, another candidate for the City Mayor, opposed Maria’s
substitution alleging her substitution was void because there was no candidate to substitute
for as Domeng’s CoC was cancelled. Is Dos correct?
Yes. The existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly
substituted. Therefore, a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Sec-
tion 78 [of the Omnibus Election Code] cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.
Here, since Domeng‘s CoC was cancelled, there was no candidate that Maria can validly substitute for.
Hence, Maria‘s substitution, as correctly argued by Dos, was void. (Tagolino vs. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, March
19, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe)

Pre-week Notes
228. What is the supervisory or regulatory power of the Commission on Election during the
Election period?
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time,
and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007)
229. What are the qualifications of a watcher?
a. A qualified voter of the city or municipality;

b. Of good reputation;
c. Not convicted by final judgment of any election offense or of any other crime;
d. Must know how to read and write in Filipino, English, Spanish, or any of the prevailing local dialects;
and
e. Not related within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any chairman or any member of
the board of election inspectors in the polling place where he will be appointed as watcher. (Sec. 178,
Omnibus Election Code)
230. What are the instances where failure of election may be declared?
a. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
b. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
c. After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, ter-
rorism , fraud, or other analogous causes . (Sison vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134096, March 3,
1999)
231. What are the requisites of Failure of Elections?
a. The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast on the specific
precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or in case of the entire municipality, more than fifty percent
(50%) of its total precincts and the votes cast therein; and
b. It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty between the lawful and unlawful ballots.
(Abayon vs. HRET, G.R. Nos. 222236 and 223032, May 3, 2016)
232. Jovito Palparan is the first nominee of the Bantay Partylist group that won a seat in the
2007 elections. A petition for quo warranto was filed before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Bantay and its nominee, Palparan, alleging that Palparan is
ineligible to sit as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized sectors
that Bantay represented. Palparan countered that the HRET has no jurisdiction over his per-
son since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed the
membership in the HoR. Consequently, it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
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case since it is the latter which has the authority to determine which parties or organizations
have the qualifications to seek party-list seats. Is he correct?
No. Although it is the partylist organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that
sits as and becomes a member of the HoR. Sec. 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Repre-
sentatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of
the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC‘s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET‘s own jurisdiction begins. (Abayon vs. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11,
2010)
233. What are the grounds for pre-proclamation controversy?
a. Any questions pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers;

b. Any matter raised under Sections 233 (election returns are delayed, lost, or destroyed, Section 234
(material defects in the election returns), Section 235 (election returns appeared to be tampered or
falsified), and Section 236 (discrepancies in election returns) in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. (Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code)
234. What is the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy?
A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character. Indeed, it is the policy of the law that pre-
proclamation controversies be promptly decided so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board
of Canvassers will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of the election
returns (ERs) that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. The allegations that the election
returns were obviously manufactures must be evident from the face of the said documents to justify the
exclusion of the said election returns and to fall within the ambit of the issues that can be raised in pre-
proclamation controversy. (Saño vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010)
235. Jurisdiction over election contests.
Tribunal
Official Appellate Court
(Original and Exclusive)
President and Vice President Supreme Court, as Presidential Not Appealable
Electoral Tribunal
Senator Senate Electoral Tribunal Supreme Court, via Petition for
Representative House of Representative Electoral Review on Certiorari (under Rule 65):
Tribunal Within thirty (30) days from receipt of
a copy of the decision.
Regional, Provincial, or City Commission on Elections Supreme Court, via Petition for
officials Review on Certiorari (under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court): Within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy of the decision.
Municipal officials Regional Trial Court Commission on Elections, whose
Barangay Municipal (or Metropolitan) Trial decision shall be final, executory, and
Court not appealable: Within five (5) days
from promulgation or receipt of a
copy of the decision.

Pre-week Notes
236. What are the rules in deciding cases in the COMELEC?
a) All election contests within the original/appellate jurisdiction of COMELEC must be heard by
COMELEC Division;
b) All motions for reconsiderations from decisions of COMELEC Division must be heard by COMELEC
en banc;
c) If the COMELEC en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had,
the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding
shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion
shall be denied;
d) A protesting candidate cannot file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court if the COMELEC
en banc votes are tied and there was no re-hearing conducted. The petition for certiorari is pre-
mature and the case must be dismissed. (Sevilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203833, March 10, 2013)
237. When is the Doctrine of Statistical Improbability applicable?
The doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all the votes
cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the
candidates of all the opposing parties appear in the election return. The bare fact that a candidate for
public office received no votes in one or two precincts, standing alone and without more, cannot
adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically improbable. Verily, a zero
vote for a particular candidate in the election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial
evidence that the electoral returns were prepared under duress, force and intimidation. The Doctrine of
Statistical Improbability must be restrictively viewed, with the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing
fraudulent and corrupt practices which is truly called for innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result
that hardly commends itself. (Suhuri vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009)
238. What are the requisites of Election Protest?
a. Must be filed by a candidate who has filed a Certificate of Candidacy and has been voted upon for the
same office;
b. Hinged on the grounds of fraud, terrorism, irregularities, or illegal acts committed before, during, and
after the casting and counting of votes; and
c. Filed within ten (10) days from proclamation of the results of the election. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
239. What are the requisites of a petition for Quo Warranto under Sec. 235 of the Omnibus
Election Code?
a. Filed by any registered voter in the constituency;

b. Hinged on the grounds of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
c. Filed within ten (10) days form proclamation of the results of the election.
240. Distinguish Election Protest from Quo Warranto.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to
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hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the
winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not
to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a
contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated. (Lokin vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010)
241. What is an Automated Election System?
It is the use of an appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in voting, counting, and the
consolidation, canvass, and transmission of election results, and other electoral processes. (Sec. 2[1],
Republic Act No. 9369)
XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
242. What does local autonomy mean?
The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means ―decentralization‖ of
administration, not of power; it does not make the local governments sovereign within the state or an
―imperium in imperio‖. (Basco vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991)
243. To reduce the poverty in the country, the Department of Social Welfare and Develop-
ment launched the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) wherein the government
provides cash grant to extreme poor households. The DSWD takes on the role of lead imple-
menting agency that oversees and coordinates the implementation, monitoring and evalua-
tion of the program. The program was allotted 21 million pesos in the General Appropria-
tions Act. Senator Isko opposed the said program alleging that giving full control to the
DSWD in the implementation of the 4Ps violates the principle of local autonomy as it en-
croached on the power of the LGUs to deliver basic services to their constituents. Is Senator
Isko correct?
No. Although LGUs were vested the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and
facilities, there was express reservation of power by the national government, that is, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. Here, the funding for
the 4Ps came from Congress, therefore, the national government is not precluded from taking a direct
hand in the formulation and implementation of the said program. (Pimentel vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 195770, July
17, 2012, J. Perlas-Bernabe)

Pre-week Notes
244. Fundamental powers of the State as exercised by the local government units.
POLICE POWER
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER OF TAXATION
(GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE)
Every local government unit shall A local government unit may, Each local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly through its chief executive and have the power to create new
granted, those necessarily implied acting pursuant to an ordinance, sources of funds and to levy taxes,
therefrom, as well as powers exercise the power of eminent fees, and charges subject to
necessary, appropriate, or incidental domain for public use, or purpose limitations as Congress may provide,
for its efficient and effective or welfare for the benefit of the consistent with the basic policy of
governance, and those which are poor and the landless, upon local autonomy. Such taxes, fees,
essential to the promotion of the payment of just compensation, and charges accrue exclusively to the
general welfare. Within their pursuant to the provisions of the local governments. (Sec. 5, Art. X,
respective territorial jurisdictions, Constitution and pertinent laws: 1987 Constitution)
local government units shall ensure Provided, however, That the
and support, among other things, the power of eminent domain may not
preservation and enrichment of be exercised unless a valid and
culture, promote health and safety, definite offer has been previously
enhance the right of the people to a made to the owner, and such offer
balanced ecology, encourage and was not accepted: Provided,
support the development of further, That the local government
appropriate and self-reliant scientific unit may immediately take
and technological capabilities, possession of the property upon
improve public morals, enhance the filing of the expropriation
economic prosperity and social proceedings and upon making a
justice, promote full employment deposit with the proper court of at
among their residents, maintain least fifteen percent (15%) of the
peace and order, and preserve the fair market value of the property
comfort and convenience of their based on the current tax
inhabitants. (Sec. 16, Local declaration of the property to be
Government Code) expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the
property. (Sec. 19, Local Government
Code)
245. What are the two branches of the general welfare clause?
a. General legislative power – Authorizes municipal councils to enact ordinances and make regula-
tions not repugnant to law and may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and du-
ties conferred upon it by law; and
b. Police power proper – Authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be proper and neces-
sary for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the mu-
nicipality and its inhabitant, and for the protection of their property ( Fernando vs. St. Scholastica‘s Col-
lege, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
246. What is Devolution?
It is the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities (Sec. 17, Local Government Code)
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It is the transfer of powers and authority from the national government to LGU s as the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State. The nature of power transfer is political and the approach is territorial
or areal (Brillantes, The Philippines: Sustaining the Gains of Decentralization of Local Government 2002)
Devolution shall also include the transfer of LGUs of the records, equipment, and other assets and
personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, function and
responsibilities. (Sec. 15, Local Government Code)
247. What are the requisites of a valid ordinance?
a. Must not contravene the Constitution and any statute;

b. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
c. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. Must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
e. Must be general in application and consistent with public policy; and
f. Must not be unreasonable. (Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, March 11, 1992; Magtajas
vs. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994)
248. What is the rule in Closure of Roads?
A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any
local road, alley, park or square falling within its jurisdiction. ( Sec. 21, R.A. No 7160)
Permanent Closure of Local Roads
a. The ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3 of all the members of the sanggunian;
b. Adequate provision for public safety must be made;
c. The property may be properly used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property may be
lawfully used or conveyed; provided, no freedom park be permanently closed without provisions or trans-
fer to a new site.
Temporary Closure
a. Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual emer-
gency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public
works and highways, telecommunications and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be speci-
fied by the local chief executive concerned in a written order; Provided, however, That no national or lo-
cal road, alley, park, or square shall set temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not off i-
cially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned.
b. Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted local ordinance temporarily close and regu-
late the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sun-
day, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, food-
stuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.
Ordinance Required: The power to permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park
or square falling within the jurisdiction of an LGU can be exercised only through an ordinance passed by
the sanggunian concerned.
Additional limitations in case of permanent closure of local roads:

Pre-week Notes
a. Adequate provision for the maintenance of public safety must be made;
b. The property may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property may be lawfully
used or conveyed, but no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or
relocation to a new site
249. Liability of local government units.
Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or
damage to their property. (Sec. 24, Local Government Code)
Liability for torts a. If the local government unit is engaged in governmental functions, it is not
liable. (Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Firme, G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991)
b. If engaged in proprietary functions, local government unit is liable. (Laganapan
vs. Asedillo, G.R. No. L-28353, September 30, 1987)
Except Article 32 and 2180 of the New Civil Code

Liability for violation of law Moday vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916, February 20, 1997; De Racho v.
Municipality of Ilagan, Isabela, GR No. L-23542, January 2, 1968; Abella vs.
Municipality of Naga, G.R. No. L-3738, November 20, 1951
Liability for contracts A municipal corporation is liable on contracts it enters into provided the contract is
intra vires (City of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71159, November 15,
1989)
250. State the Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability.
A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefit
accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract (Province of Cebu vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72841, January 29, 1987). It applies to all cases where money or
other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the general law, independent of an
express contract, implies an obligation to do justice with respect to the same.
251. Rules on settlement of boundary disputes.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably. To this end:
a. Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall
be referred for settlement to the sangguniangpanlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
b. Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniangpanlalawigan concerned.
c. Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the province concerned.
d. Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly re-
ferred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
e. In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date
the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute
shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days
from the date of the certification referred to above. (Sec. 118, Local Government Code)
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Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the
sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The
Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final
resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal
purposes. If the boundary disputes are between two LGUs not included in the enumeration above, it shall
be resolved by the RTC. (Sec. 119, Local Government Code)
252. What are the instances where there is permanent vacancy in local government set-up?
a. Fills a higher vacant office;

b. Refuses to assume office;
c. Fails to qualify;
d. Dies;
e. Removed from office;
f. Voluntarily resign; and
g. Permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political
Law, 2016)
253. Succession in case of permanent or temporary vacancy in the office.
VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF: SUCCESSOR

Governor or Mayor Vice Governor or Vice Mayor
Vice Governor or Vice Mayor Highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking Sanggunian member, and subsequent
vacancies shall be filled automatically by the other Sanggunian members
according to their ranking.
N.B.: Ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the

proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding
election.
Barangay and Sangguniang Official next-in-rank of the organization concerned. (Nachura, Outline
Kabataan Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
254. Distinguish Local Initiative from Local Referendum.
Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It may be exercised by all registered voters of the province,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. On the other hand, local referendum is the process whereby the
registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend, or reject any ordinance enacted by
the Sanggunian. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
255. What is Recall?
The termination of official relationship of an elective official for loss of confidence prior to
Definition the expiration of his term through the will of the electorate. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Loss of confidence – the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person‘s
Ground ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. (Evardone
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 94010, December 2, 1991)
By the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official
By whom exercised
subject to such recall belongs. (Sec. 69, Local Government Code)

Pre-week Notes
It shall be validly initiated through a Resolution adopted by a majority of all the members
of the Preparatory Recall Assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose. It
Initiation of the
may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered
recall process
voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected. (Sec. 70, Local Government Code)
The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of
Effectivity votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive
the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue
in office. (Sec. 72, Local Government Code)
Prohibition from The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the
resignation recall process is in progress. (Sec. 73, Local Government Code)
a. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his
term of office for loss of confidence;
Limitations b. No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official‘s assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. (Nachura, Outline
Note: The term of office of the winner shall continue the unfinished portion of the term of the losing
candidate.
256. What are the Term Limits of Local Elective Officials?
Term of Office of Local Elective Officials (except Barangay Officials): 3 years, but not more than 3
consecutive terms.
Three-Term Limit Rule: No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. (Sec. 43[b], Local Government Code)
257. Will the conversion of a municipality into a city result in an interruption of the three-
term limit rule that will allow the incumbent municipal mayor to run as a city mayor in the
next succeeding election?
No. Although the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post
as that of the office of the city mayor. The territorial jurisdiction of the new city is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for
nine years. (Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003)
258. Isko Morena ran for the mayoralty post in Manila and won in three consecutive
elections. While serving his third term, his opponent filed an election protest. Months before
the expiration of Mayor Isko’s third term, he was ousted from office. He ran again for the
same post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition was then filed assailing his
eligibility to run as mayor on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule. Decide.
Mayor Isko is not barred by the three-term limit rule, and is allowed to run as mayor in the immediately
succeeding election. He could not be considered as having served a full third term. An interruption for
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any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to break the elected official‘s continuity of
service. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999)
259. Mayor Gretchen died and was succeeded in office by Vice Mayor Claudine. In the two
immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. When she
ran for the same position for the third time, her disqualification was sought for on the
ground of the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule. Decide.
Claudine should be allowed to run for the third time as mayor. When she assumed the position of mayor
by virtue of succession, her service should not be treated as one full term. For the disqualification to
apply, the candidate should have been thrice elected for and had served the same post consecutively.
(Borja vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)
260. Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of
office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
and Section 43 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
No. Preventive suspension does not interrupt the elective official‘s term. Although he/she will be barred
from exercising the functions of the position during the period of suspension, his/her continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected. (Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184836, De-
cember 23, 2009)
261. Hiyas and Puerto were added to the five of the ten towns, which used to comprise
Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form the new Second District. The elected provincial
board member in the First District filed his candidacy for the same position in the Second
District. Thereafter, his disqualification was sought for on the ground of the alleged violation
of the three-term limit rule. Decide.
The elected provincial board member is not disqualified to run for the same position in the Second
District on the ground that the addition of Hiyas and Puerto distinctively created a new district, with an
altered territory and constituency. (Naval vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014)
XII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
262. State the Regalian Doctrine.
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. (Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
263. Classifications of Lands of Public Domain
a. Agricultural
b. Forest of Timber
c. Mineral Lands
d. National parks (Sec. 6, Act No. 2874)
264. Rules on the operation of public utilities.
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws

Pre-week Notes
of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Nei-
ther shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign inves-
tors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in
its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens
of the Philippines. (Sec. 11, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
265. Are service contracts allowing foreign corporations to explore, develop, and exploit pe-
troleum resources in the Philippines to the detriment of the ecosystem constitutional? If so,
what are the rules on allowing service contracts of such nature?
Yes. In La Bugal-B‘laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos (G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004), the Su-
preme Court held that the deletion of the words ―service contracts‖ in the 1987 Constitution did not
amount to a ban on service contracts per se. The following are the safeguards enumerated in the afore-
said case with respect to service contracts allowing foreign corporations to explore, develop, and exploit
Philippine resources:
a) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform
terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid
the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
b) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
c) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascapes of Tañon Strait vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21,
2015)
266. Rules on private lands.
As a rule, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associ-
ations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain (Sec. 7, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution). The follow-
ing are the recognized exceptions:
a) Hereditary succession (Testate Estate of Jose Ramirez vs. Vda. de Ramirez, G.R. No. L-27952, February 15,
1982);
b) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee
of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law (Sec. 8, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution);
c) Americans and American-owned and –controlled corporations hold valid title to private lands
against private persons under the Parity Agreement (Republic of the Philippines vs. Quasha, G.R. No. L-
30299, August 17, 1972). However, this ruling was effectively modified by Sec. 11, Art. XVII of the
1973 Constitutions, which reads: ―Titles to private lands acquired by such persons before such date
(July 3, 1974) shall be valid as against private persons only.‖ Thus, a previous owner may no long-
er recover the land from an American buyer who succeeded in obtaining title over the land. Only
the State has the superior right to the land, through the institution of escheat proceedings, or
through an action for reversion.
267. Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refer to
outstanding capital stock?
No. The term "capital" appearing in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to common
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shares or shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of the members of the board of directors of a
public utility, and not to the total outstanding capital stock. (Gamboa vs. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9,
2012)
268. Control Test and Grandfather Test.
Control Test Grandfather Rule

Also known as the ―liberal test‖; This provides that The method by which the percentage of Filipino equity in a
shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at corporation is computed, in cases where corporate
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by shareholders are present, by attributing the nationality of
Filipino citizens shall be considered of Philippine the second or even subsequent tier of ownership to
nationality. This does not scrutinize further the determine the nationality of the corporate shareholder. Thus,
ownership of the Filipino shareholdings. to arrive at the actual Filipino ownership and control in a
corporation, both the direct and indirect shareholdings in the
corporation are determined.
Primary test (but it may be combined with the Applies only when the 60-40 Filipino foreign ownership is in
Grandfather Rule). doubt or where there is reason to believe that there is
noncompliance with the provisions of the Constitution on the
nationality restriction.
XIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
269. What is Social Justice?
Social Justice is neither communism nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but rather the
humanization of laws and the equalization of the social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of the people and adoption by the government of measures calculated to ensure
economic stability of all the component elements of the society through the maintenance of the proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. (Calalang vs.
Williams, G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940)
270. Is the Commission on Human Rights entitled to fiscal autonomy?
No. The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy under the constitution. (CHR Employees‘ Association vs. CHR, G.R. No.
155336, November 25, 2004)
271. Does the Commission on Human Rights have jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over,
or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights?
No. The Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; it was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the func-
tions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of re-

Pre-week Notes
ceiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. (Cariño vs. CHR, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991)
XIV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
272. Is Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution (i.e., highest budgetary priority to educa-
tion) mandatory or directory?
No. While it is true that under Sec. 5(5) of Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution Congress is mandated to "as-
sign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain
its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job sat-
isfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judg-
ment, to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of
which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. (Guingona vs.
Carague, G.R. No. G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991).
273. Does the Philippine Military Academy enjoy the academic freedom which authorizes it
to impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the
peculiar needs of the academy?
Yes. Philippine Military Academy is the premier educational institution of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in accordance with Section 30, Article III of Commonwealth Act No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,
Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO No. 292, it is an institution that enjoys academic
freedom guaranteed by Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court
held that academic freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its student.
The PMA has the freedom on who to admit, to expel, given the high degree of discipline and honor
expected from its students who are to for part of AFP. The school‘s power to instill discipline in their
students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely
to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. The power to impose
disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. (Cudia
vs. The Superindentent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)
274. What are the essential freedoms of a university?
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, ex-
periment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a uni-
versity — to determine for itself on academic grounds (a) who may teach, (b) what may be taught, (c)
how it shall be taught, and (d) who may be admitted to study. (Sweezy vs. New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 236
[1957] cited in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Technology, G.R. No. L-40779, November 28,
1975)
275. Overview of educational institutions.
Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission
boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at
Ownership
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may,
however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions. (Sec.
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4[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
Control and The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the
administration Philippines. (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens
shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this
Alien schools sub section shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their
dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.
(Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets
shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Tax exemptions
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be
entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions
on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. (Sec. 4[3], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
XV. THE FAMILY
276. Does the RH Law violate the right to life of the unborn?
No. The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. A
reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While
the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH
Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. The RH Law is
replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it
should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.
Note: A provision in the RH-IRR which defines abortifacient as any drug or device that ―primarily‖ induces
abortion was declared unconstitutional. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in
the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its
sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized
ovum. (Imbong v. Ochoa, GR No. 240819, April 8, 2014)
277. In the Reproductive Health Law, it was provided that in case of disagreement of the
spouses, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures (e.g. tubal ligation and
vasectomy) shall prevail. It was contended that this provision intrudes into the zone of
privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is claimed that, by giving absolute
authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to
mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. Is the
contention tenable?
Yes. Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature,
should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the
State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The
right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

Pre-week Notes
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority
to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the
decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a
marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. The
right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. (Imbong v.
Ochoa, GR No. 240819, April 8, 2014)
278. The RH Law provides:
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of
family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Rule on the constitutionality of the above provision.
It is unconstitutional. There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of
the minor with regard to family planning. This disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that
"the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." (Imbong v. Ochoa, GR No.
240819, April 8, 2014)
XVI. AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
279. What are the tests to determine whether a proposed change is an amendment or a
revision of the Constitution?
a) Quantitative Test – The Court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not con-
sider the degree of the change. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive
in its provisions as to change directly the ‗substantial entirety‘ of the constitution by the deletion or alte-
ration of numerous existing provision.
b) Qualitative Test – The Court inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the Con-
stitution. The main inquiry is whether or not the change will ―accomplish such far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.‖ The changes include those to the
―fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its branches,‖ and those that ―jeopardize the tra-
ditional form of government and the system of checks and balances.‖ Whether there is an alteration in
the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. (Lambino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
174153, October 25, 2006)
280. Distinguish Amendment from Revision.
AMENDMENT REVISION
Definition An addition or change within the lines of the A change that alters a basic principle in the
original constitution as will effect an Constitution.
improvement, or better carry out the (Lambino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153,
purpose for which it was framed. October 25, 2006)
Scope Envisages a change of only a few specific Involves alterations of different portions of the
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provisions. entire document. (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 1935)
Intention To improve specific parts or to add new To determine how and to what extent a document
provisions deemed necessary to meet new should be altered.
conditions or to suppress specific portions (Sounding Board, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006)
that may have become obsolete or that are
judged to be dangerous.
Who may A People‘s Initiative may propose only Only the Congress or a Constitutional Convention
propose? amendments to the Constitution. may propose revisions to the Constitution. (Lambino
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153, October
25, 2006)
281. Procedure and voting requirements for Amendment and Revision.
BY PROPOSAL RATIFICATION
AMENDMENTS Congress By a vote of ¾ of ALL its members Via a plebiscite, 60-
(as Constituent Assembly) 90 days after
Constitutional Convention Either by a 2/3 vote of all the members submission of the
of the Congress, or (if such vote is not amendments.
obtained) by a majority vote of all the
members of Congress
Peoples‘ Initiative A Petition of at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein.
REVISIONS Congress (as Constituent By a vote of ¾ of ALL its members Via a plebiscite, 60-
Assembly) 90 days after
Constitutional Convention Either by a 2/3 vote of all the members submission of the
of the Congress, or (if such vote is not revisions.
obtained) by a majority vote of all the
members of Congress
282. Explain the importance of distinguishing between and amendment and revision.
It is important to distinguish the two in order to determine the proper procedure to undertake to make
the amendment or revision valid. Section 2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution allows the people,
through the process known as initiative, to propose only amendments to the Constitution. The framers of
the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between ―amendment‖ and ―revision‖ of the
Constitution by setting, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. On the other hand, a people‘s initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose
revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to pro-
pose amendments. (Lambino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)
283. What is the doctrine of proper submission?
The plebiscite must be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of the
proposal by Congress or the Constitutional Convention, or after the certification by the COMELEC of the
sufficiency of the petition. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)

Pre-week Notes
XVII. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
302. Concepts relevant to Public International Law.
a. Obligations erga omnes – those obligations which, by virtue of their nature and importance,
are the concern of all States and for whose protection all States have a legal interest (Belgium vs.
Spain, 1970 I.C.J. 3, February 5, 1970). It is a Latin phrase literally means ―towards everyone‖. In
International Law, the concept refers to specifically determined obligations that states have to-
wards the international community as a whole.
b. Jus cogens – norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character (Ocampo vs. Abando, GR.
No. 176830, February 11, 2014). It means ―compelling law‖ and is also called peremptory norm.
c. Ex aequo et bono – basis for decision by an international tribunal on the grounds of justice
and fairness. It is an alternate means of decision-making in place of the normally employed le-
gal rules of treaties and custom (Art. 38, Statute of International Court of Justice). It is a Latin term
which means ―what is just and fair or according to equity and good conscience‖ (Bernas, Interna-
tional Law, 2009).
d. Opinio juris – the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory.(Bernas, International Law,
2009)
e. Pacta sunt servanda – every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per-
formed by them in good faith. (Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
f. Rebus sic stantibus–a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard
to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the
parties. (Art. 62, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
g. Par in parem non habet imperium – even the strongest State cannot assume jurisdiction
over another State, no matter how weak, or question the validity of its acts in so far as they are
made to take effect within its own territory. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
h. Restitutio in integrum – a Latin phrase meaning "returning everything to the state as it was
before". This principle is commonly followed by courts while awarding damages in common law
negligence cases. The amount of damages awarded should be sufficient bring the plaintiff back
to the position as if no tort has been committed.(Germany vs. Poland, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 9 [1927])
303. Distinguish International Law from National Law.

As to: INTERNATIONAL LAW NATIONAL LAW
Nature Law of Coordination: Result of Law of Subordination: Command issued by a
agreement among the equal states political superior to those subject to its
forming the family of nations. authority.
Enacting Authority Not imposed but adopted by states Issued by a political superior for observance
as a common rule of action by those under its authority
What does it regulate? Regulates relations of States and Regulates relations of individual among
other international persons. themselves or with their State.
Basis and contents Derived principally from treaties, Consists mainly of statutory enactments,
international customs and general and to lesser extent, executive orders and
principles of law. judicial pronouncements.
Enforcement Enforced by subject themselves Enforced by regular and pre-existing
through methods of self-help. machinery for administration of justice.
Remedy in case of Resolved through state-to-state Redressed through local administrative and
violation transactions judicial processes.
Responsibility Entails collective responsibility Entails individual responsibility
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304. What are the rules in resolving conflicts between international law and national law?
From the point of view International Law vs. Constitution: Uphold the Constitution
municipal tribunal Constitution vs. Treaty: Uphold the constitution
International vs. Statute: What comes last in time will usually be upheld by
the municipal tribunal.
From the point of view of Since the rights and obligations of a State in its international relations are
international tribunal determined by international law, it is this law, and not the municipal law of the
State, which provides the standards by which to determine the legality of its
conduct. (Briggs, The Law of Nations, 1982)
305. Who are the subjects in public international law?
a. State – a group of people living together in a definite territory under an independent government
organized for political ends and capable of entering into international relations. (Cruz, International Law,
2003);
b. International organizations – institutions established by a treaty composed of members that are
states or international organizations regulated by international law and endowed with a legal personal-
ity and thus generally can engage in contracts and can sue and be sued in national courts, subject to
certain immunities. (Roque, Primer on Public International Law, 2014)
c. Individuals – basic unit of the society, national or international. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
306. Distinguish Doctrine of Incorporation from Doctrine of Transformation.
DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION DOCTRINE OF TRANSFORMATION

International law is part of the municipal law This is based on a strict dualist approach. Since the two
automatically without the necessity for the interposition systems are distinct and operate separately, for
of a constitutional ratification procedure. international law to become part of domestic law it must
be expressly and specifically transformed into domestic
law through the appropriate constitutional machinery
such as an act of Congress or Parliament. This doctrine
flows by analogy from what is applicable to treaties.
Treaties do not become part of the law of a State, unless
it is consented to by the state. (Bernas, International Law,
2009)
307. How does the Doctrine of Incorporation operate in the Philippines in relation to
treaties?
In the case of treaties as international law, they become part of the law of the land when concurred in by
the Senate in accordance with Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which sets down the mechanism
for transforming a treaty into binding municipal law. With regard to customary law and treaties which
have become customary law, by saying that the Philippines ―adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land,‖ the Constitution manifests its adherence to the ―dualist‖
theory and at the same time adopts the incorporation theory and thereby makes international law part of
domestic law. This provision makes the Philippines one of the states which make a specific declaration
that international law has the force also of domestic law. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
308. What are the sources of international law?
Primary Sources

Pre-week Notes
Treaties or conventions – must be concluded by a sizable number of states and thus reflect the will or
at least the consensus of the family of nations. (Cruz, International Law, 2003);
a. Customs – practice which has grown up between states and has come to be accepted as binding by
the mere fact of persistent usage over a long period of time. (Fenwick, International Law, 1948); and
b. General principles of law – derived from the law of nature and are observed by the majority of
States because they are believed to be good and just. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
Secondary Sources
a. Decisions of courts (Art. 38, Statute of International Court of Justice);

b. Writings of publicists (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
309. Distinguish soft law from hard law.
Soft Law Hard Law

Refers to norms that are non-binding in Refers to binding international legal norms or
character but still have legal relevance. Usually those which have coercive character. (Bernas,
serves a precursor to hard law. Public International Law, 2009)
The term soft law is used to denote agreements, principles and declarations that are not legally binding.
Soft law instruments are predominantly found in the international sphere. On the other hand, hard law
refers generally to legal obligations that are binding on the parties involved and which can be legally
enforced before a court. (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights)
310. What is the postliminy theory or jus postliminium?
When a foreign power occupies a state and exercises the powers of government, the political laws of the
said state are deemed automatically suspended but the former government automatically comes to life
and will be in force and in effect again upon the re-establishment of the former government. (Taylor,
International Law, p. 615.)
311. What is Statelessness?
The status of having no nationality, as a consequence of being born without any nationality, or as a result
of deprivation or loss of nationality. (Labo vs Comelec, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989)
312. What are the rights of a Stateless person?
Under the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1960), a stateless person is entitled to,
among others, the right to religion and religious instruction, access to courts, elementary education, pub-
lic relief and assistance and rationing of products in short supply, as well as treatment of no less favora-
ble than that accorded to aliens.
Also, under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

1. Everyone has a right to the nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
313. What is the rule on non-refoulement?
Also known as the Prohibition of Expulsion or Return:
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1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the fron-
tiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, natio-
nality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are rea-
sonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having
been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the communi-
ty of that country. (Art. 33, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees)
314. What are the principles of State Jurisdiction?
a. Territoriality Principle- A state has absolute, but not necessarily exclusive, power to prescribe, ad-
judicate and enforce rules of conduct that occurs within its territory.
b. Nationality Doctrine- A State may exercise jurisdiction over its nationals, with respect to their con-
duct, whether within or outside its territory.
c. Protective Principle- Any State has the right to punish acts even if committed outside its territory,
when such acts constitute attacks against its security, as long as that conduct is generally recognized
as criminal by states in the international community.
d. Universality Principle- Certain offenses are so heinous and so widely condemned that any state
that captures an offender may prosecute and punish that person on behalf of the international com-
munity regardless of the nationality of the offender or victim or where the crime was committed.
e. Passive Personality Principle- It authorizes states to assert jurisdiction over offenses committed
against their citizens abroad. It recognizes that each state has a legitimate interest in protecting the
safety of its citizens when they journey outside national boundaries.
315. What are the requisites of a valid treaty?
To be valid, a treaty must:

a. be entered into by parties with treaty-making capacities;
b. through their authorized representatives;
c. without the attendance of duress, fraud, mistake, or other vices of consent;
d. on any lawful subject matter; and
e. in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
316. Discuss the treaty-making process.
The steps in the treaty-making process are:
a. Negotiation – Conducted by the parties to reach an agreement on its terms;

b. Signature – The signing of the text of the instrument agreed upon by the parties;
c. Ratification – The act by which the provisions of a treaty are form;
d. Accession – A State can accede to a treaty only if invited or permitted to do so by the contracting
parties. Such invitation or permission is usually given in the accession clause of the treaty itself;
e. Exchange of instruments of ratification; and
f. Registration with the United Nations.
317. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President. The role of the
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
What are the two constitutional provisions that require the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements?

Pre-week Notes
a. Sec. 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the
concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject
treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This means it forms
part of Philippine law by virtue of transformation.
b. Sec. 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the
Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to
consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. (BAYAN vs.
Zamaora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000)
318. Distinguish a treaty from an executive agreement.
From the viewpoint of International Law:

The distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an executive agreement is
irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
From the domestic setting:

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of
executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the
Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not
expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are
products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely
executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being
on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence
over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international agreement
are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 212426 and
212444, January 12, 2016)
319. Do warships enjoy absolute sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag
state?
No. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art.
31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter‘s internal waters and the territorial
sea.
Warships continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Art. 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State. If any warship
does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the terri-
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torial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may
require it to leave the territorial sea immediately;
Art. 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship oper-
ated for non-commercial purposes.
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with
the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law;
Art. 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.
With such exceptions, nothing in the Convention affects the immunities of warships and other govern-
ment ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship‘s unauthorized entry into our inter-
nal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions
may apply. (Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)
320. What if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, such as the United States,
can it be held liable under the UNCLOS?
Yes. Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on the ―traditional uses of the oceans‖ as codified
in UNCLOS. The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty
(mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the
world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. Non-membership in
the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over
its internal waters and territorial sea. Is is thus expected for the US to bear ―international responsibility‖
under Art. 31. (Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)
321. What are the guidelines enunciated in Saguisag vs. Ochoa in entering into international
agreements?
1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent requirements that must be fulfilled by
the international agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must be duly concurred in by
the Senate.
2. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President may choose the form of the
agreement (i.e., either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided that the agreement dealing with
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal agreement that first allows their entry or
presence in the Philippines.
3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and standards set by the
law and/or treaty that the former purports to implement; and must not unduly expand the interna-
tional obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in the law or treaty.
4. The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws and
treaties. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January 12, 2016)
322. What is an Internationally Wrongful Act or International Delinquency?

An IWA exists when there is an act or omission that is attributable to the State under international law
and such conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. (Art. 2, Articles on State
Responsibility)

Pre-week Notes
323. When a State commits an IWA, may it use as a defense the legality of their conduct
under domestic laws?
No. Under Article 3 of the ASR, when a State commits an IWA, it may not escape liability by claiming the
legality of their conduct under domestic laws. A State can be held responsible for acts such as failing to
honor a treaty, violating the sovereignty of another State, damaging the territory of other States, and
failing to protect foreign nationals found in their territory to the extent provided by international law. (Art.
3, Articles on State Responsibility)
324. What is the Doctrine of State Responsibility?
Under this Doctrine, a state may be held responsible for an international delinquency, directly or indirectly
imputable to it, which causes injury to the national of another state. Liability will attach to the State
where its treatment of the alien falls below the international standard of justice or where it is remiss in
according him the protection or redress that is warranted by the circumstances. Its function is to assure
the traveler that when his rights are violated in a foreign State, he will not be denied any remedy simply
because he is not one of its nationals. The idea, in other words, is to encourage more intercourse among
the peoples of the world through inter-visitation of their respective countries. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
325. What are the consequences of State Responsibility?
1. Duty to cease the act;

2. The State responsible for the wrongful act is under the obligation to:
a. Cease the act if it is still continuing; and
b. Offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. (Article 30, Articles on State
Responsibility)
3. Duty to make reparations:
a. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by
the internationally wrongful act of a State. (Article 31, Articles on State Responsibility)
b. The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to
comply with its obligations to make reparations. There are three forms of reparation:
i. Restitution;
ii. Compensation; and
iii. Satisfaction. (Art. 30, Articles on State Responsibility)
326. What is the Calvo Clause?
This is a stipulation by which the alien waives or restricts his right to appeal to his own State in
connection with any claim arising from the contract and agrees to limit himself to the remedies available
under the laws of the local State. The Calvo Clause may be enforced as a lawful condition of the contract.
However, it may not be interpreted to deprive the alien‘s State of the right to protect or vindicate his
interest in case they are injured in another State as such waiver can legally be made not by him but by
his own State. (North American Dredging Co. [United States of America] vs. United States of Mexico, General
Claims Commission, 1926)
327. Who are considered as refugees?
Any person who is outside the country of his nationality or the country of his former habitual residence
because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a political group or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to
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avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or, if he has no
nationality, to return to the country of his former habitual residence. (United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, 1951 Sec. A par. 2).
328. Distinguish Extradition from Deportation
EXTRADITION DEPORTATION
As to authority Effected at the request of the State of Unilateral act of the local State
origin
As to cause Based on offenses committed in the State Based on causes arising in the local State.
of origin.
As to effect Calls of the return of the fugitive to the Undesirable alien may be deported to a State
State of origin. other than his own or the State of origin.
329. What is the doctrine or rule of specialty?
Under the rule of specialty in international law, a Requested State shall surrender to a Requesting State a
person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of extradition. (Government of
HongKong Administrative Region vs. Munoz, G.R. No. 207342, November 7, 2017)
The doctrine of specialty, a fundamental feature of extradition law, provides that a state may only
prosecute an extradited individual for the offenses agreed to by the sending state. (Forstein, Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law)
330. Principles of International Humanitarian Law.
a. Principle of Distinction – persons fighting in armed conflict must, at all times, distinguish between
civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives;
b. Principle of Military Necessity – the belligerents may employ any amount and kind of force to
compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible loss of lives, time, and money;
c. Principle of Humanity – prohibits the use of any measure that is not absolutely necessary for the
purposes of the war;
d. Principle of Chivalry – requires the belligerents to give proper warning before launching a bom-
bardment or prohibits the use of perfidy in the conduct of hostilities; and
e. Principle of Proportionality – attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss to civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, are prohibited. (Cruz, International Law,
2003)
331. Distinguish International Humanitarian Law from Human Rights Law.
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Applicability Applies in situations of an armed conflict Protects the individual at all times, in war and
peace alike.
Derogations No derogations are permitted under IHL Some human rights treaties permit governments
because it was conceived for emergency to derogate from certain rights in situations of
situations, namely armed conflict. public emergency
Purpose Aims to protect people who do not or are no Tailored primarily for peacetime, apply to
longer taking part in hostilities. The rules everyone. Their principal goal is to protect
embodied in IHL impose duties on all parties individuals from arbitrary behavior by their own
to a conflict. governments. Human rights law does not deal
with the conduct of hostilities.

Pre-week Notes
Obligations of the Obliges States to take practical and legal States are bound by human rights law to accord
State measures. national law with international obligations.
Implementation Provides for several specific mechanisms that Human rights implementing mechanisms are
help its implementation. Notably, States are complex and contrary to IHL, include regional
required to ensure respect also by other systems. Supervisory bodies, such as the UN
States. Provisions are also made for enquiry Commission on Human Rights, are either based
procedure, a Protecting Power mechanism, on the UN charter or provided for in specific
and the International Fact-Finding treaties (for example the Human Rights
Commission. In addition, the ICRC is given a Committee, which is rooted in the International
key role in ensuring respect for the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966).
humanitarian rules. The Human Rights Commission and its Sub-
commissions have developed a mechanism of
special rapporteurs and working groups, whose
task is to monitor and report on human rights
situations either country or by topic. Six of the
main human rights treaties also provide for the
establishment of committees (e.g. the Human
Rights Committee) of independent experts
charged with monitoring their implementation.
Certain regional treaties (European and
American) also establish human rights courts.
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCHR) plays a key part in the
overall protection and promotion of human
rights. Its role is to enhance the effectiveness of
the UN human rights machinery and to build up
national, regional and international capacity to
promote and protect human rights and to
disseminate human rights texts and information.
(Extract from ICRC publication ―international
humanitarian law; answers to your questions .
332. What are the ways of drawing baselines under the UNCLOS?
a. Normal baseline method – one drawn following ―the low-water line along the coast as marked on
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.‖ (Art. 5, UNCLOS) This line follows the cur-
vatures of the coast and therefore would normally not consist of straight lines. This criterion is the
most favorable to the coastal State and clearly shows the character of territorial waters as appurte-
nant to the land territory.
b. Straight baseline method – where the coastline is deeply indented or cut into, or if there is a fringe
of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight lines joining the appropriate
points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is meas-
ured. (Art. 7, UNCLOS)
333. State the Right of Innocent Passage.
Vessels may be allowed innocent passage within the archipelagic waters, but this right may be suspended,
after publication, in the interest of international security.
334. State the Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage.
An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes there above, suitable for the continuous and
expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent
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territorial sea. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and
air routes. Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with UNCLOS.
The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend
temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such
suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having
been duly published. (Art. 53[3], UNCLOS III)
An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes suitable for the continuous and expeditious
passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial
sea. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes.
(Article 53[1][2], UNCLOS III)
335. Basic Principles in International Environmental Law.
a. Precautionary Principle – a moral and political principle which states that if an action might cause
severe or irreversible harm to the public and to the environment, and in the absence of certainty of
scientific proof that such harm shall not follow, the one advocating the action shall have the burden of
proof. Where there is good reason to believe that there is a threat of serious or irreversible damage to
the environment, a lack of full scientific certainty shall not be a valid excuse to postpone employing
cost-effective measures to prevent the damage.
Elements:
(1) Uncertainty;
(2) Serious environmental or health damage; and
(3) The damage is irreversible.
b. Polluter-Pay Principle – the polluting party pays for the damage done to the natural environment.
c. Principle of Sustainable Development – a pattern of resources that aims to meet human needs
while preserving the environment so that these needs are met not only in the present, but in the in-
definite future.
d. Principle of Subsidiarity – things that an individual can do himself, should not be transferred to
society. If the individual is not capable of solving certain problems, the society is obliged to give aid.
e. Principle of Common-but-Differentiated Responsibilities – recognizes historical differences in
the contributions of developed and developing States to global environmental problems, and differ-
ences in their respective economic and technical capacity to tackle these problems.
f. Principle of Good Neighborliness – prohibits States from using or permitting the use of its territory
in a manner that is injurious to another State, or that other State‘s persons or property.
HAIL TO THE CHIEFS!

Pre-week Notes

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I.

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS AND BASIC CONCEPTS

1. Define and explain the Archipelagic Doctrine.

c. Territorial Sea – extends up to 12 nautical miles outward from the baselines.

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Rule on each of the argument raised.

a. Is the contention of the Solicitor General correct?

b. What is the associative concept in International Law?

d. Does the present constitution recognize the concept of association?

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6. Explain the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy.

7. What are the tests of a valid delegation of power?

d. Principle of accountability: An accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of

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11. Rules on State Immunity.

Incorporated government An incorporated government agency possesses a juridical personality independent of

If governmental: No suit without consent. Note: Even in the exercise of proprietary

12. What is the Restrictive Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit?

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II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

17. Discuss the Principle of Non-Delegability of Powers.

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20. Discuss the three post-enactment measures exercised by Congress.

a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to

b. Congressional investigation - While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of

21. What is a legislative veto? Is it unconstitutional?

Yes. It is unconstitutional in three respects:

a. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove IRRs based on a determination of whether or not

a. National Board of Canvassers (Art. VII, Sec. 4(4));

SENATORS DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES PARTY-LIST NOMINEES

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There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation:

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37. What is an Enrolled Bill? State the Enrolled Bill Theory.

38. Enumerate the quorum and voting requirements in Congress.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING REQUIRED VOTE

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40. Discuss the power of augmentation.

41. Distinguish Legislative Inquiry from Oversight Function.

IN AID OF LEGISLATION OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS

a. The inquiry must be in aid of legislation;

43. Distinguish Inquiry in Aid of Legislation from Question Hour.

INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION QUESTION HOUR

46. Provide the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

a. Three (3) Supreme Court Justices designated by the Chief Justice;

The presence of at least:

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50. What is the composition of the Commission on Appointments?

51. Enumerate the Presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on

52. Distinguish Initiative from Referendum.

III. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

54. Enumerate the powers of the President under the Constitution.

a. Appointing power (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);

56. Can the President re-organize the national government?

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a. Can the President validly issue E.O. 13?

61. Distinguish disapproved ad interim appointment from by-passed appointment.

a. Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

63. What are midnight appointments?

64. Does the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to the Judiciary?

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Sec. 13, Article VII Sec. 7 (2), Article IX-B

70. Distinguish the President’s power of control and supervision.