MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR. v.
PEOPLE OF ISSUE:
THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 209195 and
209215, 17 September 2014, SECOND
DIVISION, (Brion, J.)
In a motion to discharge an accused to become a
state witness, it is still the trial court that
determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary
assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications
satisfies the procedural norms. This is a symbiotic
relationship as the trial court largely exercises its
prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and
evaluation.
Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in
the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda naming
Manuel J. Jimenez and several others as co-
conspirators. His statements detailed where the
alleged steel casing containing the body of Ruby
Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver
near the place which he pointed. Montero filed a
motion for discharge as a state witness for the
prosecution, to which Jimenez opposed. The
motion to discharge was granted by Judge Zaldy B.
Docena stating that the prosecution had presented
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
showing compliance with the requisites of granting
the said motion.
Jimenez opposed Judge Docena’s ruling averring
that the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
in granting the motion to discharge because: (1)the
requirements for granting a motion were not
properly complied; (2)there is no absolute
necessity of the testimony of Montero;
(3)Montero’s testimony do not corroborate with
the prosecution’s evidence; (4) and Montero is
favored as a state witness though he appears to be
the most guilty.
Did Judge Docena gravely abuse his discretion
when he granted the motion to discharge Montero
as a state witness?
RULING:
No. Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of
discretion” as the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner.To
resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, itonly require that that the testimony of
the accused sought to be discharged be
substantially corroborated in its material points,
not on all points.A trial judge cannot be expected
or required, at the start of the trial, to inform
himself with absolute certainty of everything that
may develop in the course of the trial with respect
to the guilty participation of the accused. It is still
the trial court that determines whether the
prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the
accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state
witness satisfies the procedural norms. This
relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial
court, by the very nature of its role in the
administration of justice, largely exercises its
prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and
evaluation.
“Most guilty” refers to the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and does not necessarily
mean the severity of the penalty imposed. What the
rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty
would be set free while his co-accused who are less
guilty in terms of participation would be penalized.
Thus, as a rule, what are controlling are the specific
acts of the accused in relation to the crime
committed. The Court draws attention to the
requirement that a state witness does not need to be
found to be the least guilty; he or she should not
only “appear to be the most guilty.”
People v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 185729-32, June 26, 2013
Trial
See: Rule 119 Section 17 (Discharge of Accused to
be State Witness)
FACTS: Respondent Mercado was the President
of JAM Liner, Inc. Other respondents, Belicena,
Andutan Jr., De Vera, and Diala, were Department
of Finance officials formerly assigned at its One-
Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback
Center (DOF One-Stop Shop).
Sometime in 2000, showing willingness to testify
against the criminal syndicate that allegedly ran the
tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop,
Mercado applied with the DOJ for immunity as
state witness under its witness protection program.
The DOJ favorably acted on the application and
granted immunity to Mercado. Still, since the
investigation of the case fell within the authority of
the Ombudsman, the latter charged him and the
other respondents before the Sandiganbayan with
violations of Section 3 of R.A. 3019 and two
counts of falsification under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The first information alleged that respondent DOF
officials approved and issued in 1996 Tax Credit
Certificate 7711 for P7,350,444.00 in favor of
JAM Liner, Inc. for domestic capital equipment
although it did not qualify for such tax credit. The
second Information alleged that they further
illegally issued in 1996 Tax Credit Certificate 7708
for P4,410,265.50 in favor of the same company
covering its purchase of six Mitsubishi buses.
Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation before the Ombudsman, citing the
DOJ’s grant of immunity to him. Acting favorably
on the motion, the Ombudsman executed an
Immunity Agreement with Mercado. The
agreement provided that, in consideration for
granting him immunity from suit, Mercado would
produce all relevant documents in his possession
and testify against the accused in all the cases,
criminal or otherwise, that may be filed against
them. Accordingly, on the same date, the
Ombudsman filed a motion to discharge Mercado
from the information involving him.
But subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution, denying the Ombudsman’s motion.
That court held that the pieces of evidence adduced
during the hearing of the Ombudsman’s motion
failed to establish the conditions required under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court for the
discharge of an accused as a state witness. The
Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration but
the court denied it, hence, this petition of the
People of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution complied
with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the discharge
of accused Mercado as a state witness
HELD: Yes.
Respondents De Vera and Diala, Mercado’s co-
accused who opposed the grant of immunity to
him, contend that the immunity that the
Ombudsman gave Mercado does not bind the
court, which in the meantime already acquired
jurisdiction over the case against him. That
immunity merely relieves Mercado from any
further proceedings, including preliminary
investigation, which the state might still attempt to
initiate against him.
This in a way is true. But the filing of the criminal
action against an accused in court does not prevent
the Ombudsman from exercising the power that the
Congress has granted him. Section 17 of R.A. 6770
provides:
Section 17. Immunities. Under such terms and
conditions as it may determine, taking into account
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the
Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession and production of documents or
other evidence may be necessary to determine the
truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being
conducted by the Ombudsman or under its
authority, in the performance or in the furtherance
of its constitutional functions and statutory
objectives. The immunity granted under this and
the immediately preceding paragraph shall not
exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for
perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt
from demotion or removal from office.
His above authority enables the Ombudsman to
carry out his constitutional mandate to ensure
accountability in the public service. It gives the
Ombudsman wide latitude in using an accused
discharged from the information to increase the
chances of conviction of the other accused and
attain a higher prosecutorial goal. Immunity
statutes seek to provide a balance between the
state’s interests and the individual’s right against
self- incrimination. To secure his testimony
without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the
law recognizes that the witness can be given
immunity from prosecution. In such a case, both
interests and rights are satisfied.
As it happened in this case, the Ombudsman had
already filed with the Sandiganbayan the criminal
action against Mercado and the other respondents
prior to the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity to
Mercado. Having already acquired jurisdiction
over Mercado’s case, it remained within the
Sandiganbayan’s power to determine whether or
not he may be discharged as a state witness in
accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
The Ombudsman premised its grant of immunity to
Mercado on his undertaking to produce all the
documents in his possession relative to the DOF
tax credit scam and to testify in all pending
criminal, civil, and administrative cases against
those involved. Indeed, he had consistently
cooperated even prior to immunity agreement in
the investigation and prosecution of the case. His
testimony gave the prosecution a clearer picture of
the transactions that led to the issuance of the
subject certificates.
In any event, the question before the
Sandiganbayan was whether or not Mercado met,
from its point of view, the following requirements
of Section 17, Rule 119 for the discharge of an
accused to be a state witness:
(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) there is no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
(c) the testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty;
(e) said accused has not at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude
The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent
judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such
power in the Ombudsman as well as in the
Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to
employ an accused as a state witness must
necessarily originate from the public prosecutors
whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution
of the several accused before the courts. The latter
do not as a rule have a vision of the true strength of
the prosecution’s evidence until after the trial is
over. Consequently, courts should generally defer
to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a
motion to discharge an accused so he can be used
as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet
the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119.
Here, the Sandiganbayan held that Mercado’s
testimony is not absolutely necessary because the
state has other direct evidence that may prove the
offenses charged. It held that Mercardo’s
testimony, in large part, would only help identify
numerous documents and disclose matters that are
essentially already contained in such documents.
But the records, particularly Mercado’s
consolidated affidavit, show that his testimony if
true could be indispensable in establishing the
circumstances that led to the preparation and
issuance of fraudulent tax credit certificates.
Indeed, nobody appears to be in a better position to
testify on this than he, as president of JAM Liner,
Inc., the company to which those certificates were
issued.
The decision to move for the discharge of Mercado
was part of prosecutorial discretion in the
determination of who should be used as a state
witness to bolster the successful prosecution of
criminal offenses. Unless made in clear violation
of the Rules, this determination should be given
great weight by our courts.
The Rules do not require absolute certainty in
determining those conditions. Perforce, the Judge
has to rely in a large part upon the suggestions and
the considerations presented by the prosecuting
officer. A trial judge cannot be expected or
required to inform himself with absolute certainty
at the very outset of the trial as to everything which
may be developed in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in
the commission
of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were
practicable or possible, there would be little need
for the formality of a trial. In coming to his
conclusions as to the necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested, as to the
availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused
is the most guilty one; and the like, the judge must
rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the
information furnished by the prosecuting officer.
What is more, the criminal informations in these
cases charge respondents with having conspired in
approving and issuing the fraudulent tax credit
certificates. One rule of wisdom is that where a
crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of
the conspirators is essential so he can testify
against the others. Who else outside the conspiracy
can testify about the goings-on that took place
among the accused involved in the conspiracy to
defraud the government in this case? No one can
underestimate Mercado’s testimony since he alone
can provide a detailed picture of the fraudulent
scheme that went into the approval and issuance of
the tax credit certificates. The documents can show
the irregularities but not the detailed events that led
to their issuance. As correctly pointed out by the
prosecution, Mercado’s testimony can fill in the
gaps in the evidence.
Respondents further contend that Mercado should
not be granted immunity because he also benefited
from the unlawful transactions. But the immunity
granted to Mercado does not blot out the fact that
he committed the offense. While he is liable, the
State saw a higher social value in eliciting
information from him rather than in engaging in his
prosecution.
The Court GRANTED the petition, SET ASIDE
the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions and ORDERED
the discharge of accused Mercado from the
criminal information to be used as state witness.
RATIO: Rule 119 Section 17. Discharge of
Accused to be State Witness. When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of
any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before
resting its case, the court may direct one or more
of the accused to be discharged with their consent
so that they may be witnesses for the state when,
after requiring the prosecution to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge,
the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall
automatically form part of the trial. If the court
denies the motion for discharge of the accused as
state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
EUGENE C. YU vs. THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF TAGAYTAY
CITY, BRANCH 18, REYNALDO DE LOS
SANTOS et al.
An information was filed before the RTC of
Tagaytay City against Messrs. Pedro Lim,
Bonifacio Rojas, Capt. Alfredo Abad, Toto
Mirasol, Venerando Ozores, Mariano Hizon,
Eugenio Hizon and private respondents de los
Santos and Ochoa for the kidnapping and murder
of the late Atty. Eugene Tan (former President of
IBP) and his driver, Eduardo Constantino that
happened on 14 November 1994. While under
custody of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), private respondents Ochoa
and de los Santos executed separate sworn
statements implicating petitioner in the crime. The
PACC re- filed the complaint against petitioner.
Thereafter, three (3) separate informations were
filed against him. The RTC found probable cause
and directed the prosecution to amend the
information to include him as an accomplice.
However, the prosecution maintains that the
petitioner should be charged as a principal and
impugns the resolution of the judge. The
prosecution then filed a “Petition to Discharge as
State Witnesses and Exclude from the Information
accused Ochoa and de los Santos” and the judge
granted the said motion. The CA affirmed the said
order and concluded that there was no necessity for
a hearing to determine a person’s qualification as a
state witness after the DOJ had attested to his
qualification. Republic Act No. 6981, Witness
Protection and Security Benefit Program
(WPSBP), conferred upon the DOJ the sole
authority to determine whether or not an accused is
qualified for admission into the program. It held
that under Section 12 of the said act, upon the filing
by the prosecution of a petition to discharge an
accused from the information, it is mandatory for
the court to order the discharge and exclusion of
the accused.
Facts:
Issue: Whether the discharge of the accused as
state witnesses needs prior determination of the
trial court for their qualification.
Ruling: No, Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure is only one of the
modes of the discharge of the accused as a state
witness.
The prosecution availed of RA 6981 in the
discharge of the accused as state witnesses. It is
distinct and separate from Section 17, Rule 119.
The immunity provided under the former is granted
by the DOJ while the latter is granted by the court.
The former only requires compliance with Section
14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On the other hand, Section 17, Rule
119, contemplates a situation where the
information has been filed and the accused had
been arraigned
and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of
an accused under this rule may be ordered upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case,
that is, at any stage of the proceedings, from the
filing of the information to the time the defense
starts to offer any evidence.
As pointed out by the Court in the case of Soberano
v. People, Section 14, Rule 110 allows the
amendment of the information made before plea
excluding some or one of the accused to be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court in
compliance. It does not qualify the grounds for the
exclusion of the accused and therefore, applies
when it is for utilization of the accused as state
witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of
Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge do not yet come into play.
This is because the determination of who should be
criminally charged in court is essentially an
executive function, not a judicial one.
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides that
the issuance of a certification of admission into the
program shall be given full faith by the provincial
or city prosecutor who is required not to include
the witness in the criminal complaint or
information, and if included, to petition for his
discharge in order that he can be utilized as a state
witness. This provision justifies the regularity of
the procedure adopted by the prosecution for the
discharge of the private respondents. Section 9 of
Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the
power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision,
the court is given the power to discharge a state
witness only because it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
The petitioner argues that the petition to discharge
is not supported by any proof or evidence. There is
no requirement under Republic Act No. 6891 that
the sworn statement and memorandum of
agreement between the private respondents and the
DOJ be first presented in court before an accused
may be admitted to the WPSBP. Moreover, the
DOJ which is tasked to implement the provisions
of RA 6981, has determined that the private
respondents have satisfied the requirements for
admission under the WPSBP.
PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON.
NAZAR U. CHAVES, Judge RTC-Cagayan de
Oro City
FACTS:
Criminal information for Multiple Murder for the
killing of members of the Bucag family were filed
against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit,
Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe
and Richard Doe. It was originally filed before the
RTC of Gingoog City, however by virtue of
Administrative Order, the case was transferred to
RTC of Cagayan de Oro which was presided by
Judge Nazar Chaves. Only Felipe Galarion was
tried and convicted. All the other accused were at
large.Two years later, Felizardo Roxas was
identified as another member of the group who was
responsible for the murder. With that, an amended
information was filed before the same court.
During the preliminary investigation, Roxas
implicated Atty. Miguel Paderanga, his counsel, as
the mastermind of the killings. Consequently, the
amended information was again amended to
include Atty. Paderanga as one of the accused.
During the trial, the court ruled that before Roxas
be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he
must first be discharged as a state witness,
otherwise the prosecution can not present him as a
hostile witness. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, in the alternative, to discharge
Roxas as a state witness. The trial court issued an
Order allowing the presentation of the testimony of
Felizardo Roxas for purposes of proving the
conditions of Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of
Court on the discharge of a state witness. However,
the trial court ruled against Roxas on the ground
that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony will be
tantamount to allowing him to testify as a state
witness even before his discharge as such; that the
qualification of a proposed state witness must be
proved by evidence other than his own testimony;
and that at the hearing for the discharge of a
proposed state witness, only his sworn statement
can be presented and not his oral testimony,
thought the prosecution may still present any other
evidence in support of the discharge. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but
it was denied. Thereupon, the prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
with the CA assailing the order of the trial court,
but it was denied. Hence, the present petition in
SC.
ISSUE: Is the evidence that needs to be presented
by the prosecution in its motion to discharge
limited to the sworn statement executed by its
proposed witness?
HELD.
NO. Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court
may direct one
or more of the accused to be discharged with their
consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
“after requiring the prosecution to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge”.
The provision does not make any distinction as to
the kind of evidence the prosecution may present.
What it simply requires, in addition to the
presentation of the sworn statement of the accused
concerned, is the presentation of such evidence as
are necessary to determine if the conditions exist
for the discharge, so as to meet the object of the
law, which is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary
exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of
the crime charged. No exemption from the term
evidence is provided by the law as to exclude the
testimony of the accused. When the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.
In the case at bar, there is no other evidence more
competent than the testimony of the proposed
witness himself to prove the conditions that his
testimony is absolutely necessary; that there is no
other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense; that his testimony can
be corroborated in its material points; that he does
not appear to be the most guilty; and that he has not
been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude. Further, the trial judge will not be able to
clarify matters found in the sworn statements of the
proposed witnesses if they are not allowed to
testify.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
FELICIANO ANABE y CAPILLAN
FACTS:
Feliciano Anabe and Felicita Generalao in
conspiracy with “another person,” were charged
with robbery with homicide and destructive arson
in the Quezon City RTC. When arraigned,
appellants pleaded not guilty. FELICITA, who
turned state witness gave her version of the crime.
She imputed guilt to Feliciano for the death of Lam
Tiong Uy (Uy), the brother-in-law of Jose Chan
whom the latter requested to stay in his house while
he and his family were vacationing abroad. The
appellants and one Conrada were Chan’s
household helpers who were with Uy during the
commission of the crime. She alleged that she saw
appellant (Feliciano) holding a knife which was
purportedly used in killing Uy then lying lifeless in
the living room. She maintained that Feliciano
admitted to her the authorship of the crime.
Thereafter, he instructed them to immediately
leave the house so that they would not be suspected
of killing Uy. Before leaving, Feliciano set the
house on fire. They headed for the pier and boarded
a boat that brought them to Masbate. On Felicita’s
request, appellant brought her to her province,
Butuan. She was soon brought to Bombo Radio
where she surrendered.
The Quezon City RTC convicted appellant as
charged – robbery with homicide and destructive
arson based on the testimony of Felicita in which
such decision was affirmed by the appellate court.
Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE: WON Felicita’s uncorroborated testimony
on appellant’s confession can stand alone and be
given full credence.
RULING:
The claim of Felicita that appellant confessed to
the killing of Uy must be corroborated to be given
credence. Like any other testimony, Felicita's
statements cannot be readily accepted hook, line
and sinker. More important, the testimony of a
state witness must be received with great caution
and carefully scrutinized. The rule is that the
testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-
conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating
his co-accused cannot, by itself and without
corroboration, be regarded as proof of a moral
certainty that the latter committed the crime. It
must be substantially corroborated in its material
points by unimpeachable testimony and strong
circumstances, and must be to such an extent that
its trustworthiness becomes manifest
Turning an accused into a state witness is not a
magic formula that cures all the deficiencies in the
prosecution’s evidence. The state witness cannot
simply allege everything left unproved and
automatically produce a conviction of the crime
charged against the remaining accused.
Corroboration of the account of the state witness is
key. It is in fact a requirement for the discharge of
an accused to be a state witness under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the testimony
to be given can be substantially corroborated in its
material points. Felicitas’ testimony was found to
be uncorroborated. Hence, it couldn’t be given full
credit by the court.
Rosales vs. CA 215 SCRA 102
An Information was filed before RTC of Lucena
City charging Eduardo Rosales, together with
Crisanto Bautista and private respondents Nelson
Exconde and Ronilo Añonuevo for the murder of
Marcial Punzalan, an ex-Mayor of San Antonio
and Tiaong towns in Quezon Province, and his
leader, Demetrio Ramos. In the trial of the case, the
prosecution presented Eduardo Rosales and then
Crisanto Bautista as witnesses before moving for
their discharge. Admittedly, their testimonies led
to the identification of the alleged masterminds of
the slayings, which included prominent local
political leaders like ex-Mayor Ananiano Wagan
of San Antonio and ex-Mayor Francisco Escueta of
Tiaong as well as two (2) barangay captains, and to
the filing of an information against the four. The
trial court granted the discharge of Rosales but
deferred action on the motion to discharged
Bautista pending resolution of this case. Private
respondents pleaded for the reconsideration of
Rosales' discharge by the same was denied. Upon
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
however, the order of discharge was recalled as the
appellate court found no plausible reason for the
discharge of Rosales after he admitted his guilt in
the course of his testimony. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution denying
reconsideration.
Issue:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in annulling the
discharge of the accused?
Held:
NO. At the time of Rosales' discharge, the
corresponding Information against the alleged
masterminds had not yet been filed. His testimony,
if ever, was then to be a future undertaking on his
part, and the successful prosecution of those
responsible for the dastardly acts would hinge
solely on his testimony as a state witness. As such,
his discharge satisfied the intent of Sec. 9 of Rule
119 that one or more discharged accused "may be
witnesses for the State" and was therefore in accord
with law. The rule is that the discharge of an
accused is left to the sound discretion of the lower
court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see
to it that the conditions prescribed by the Rules are
met. While it is the usual practice of the
prosecution to present the accused who turns state
witness only after his discharge, the trial court may
nevertheless sanction his discharge after his
testimony if circumstances so warrant. In this case,
the imminent risk to his life justified the deviation
from the normal course of procedure as a measure
to protect him while at the same time ensuring his
undaunted cooperation with the prosecution.
Indeed, as is explicit from the Rule, as long as the
motion for discharge of an accused to be utilized as
a state witness is filed before the prosecution rests,
the trial court should, if warranted, grant it. Once a
discharge is effected, any subsequent showing that
not all the five (5) requirements outlined in Sec. 9
of Rule 119 were actually fulfilled cannot
adversely affect the legal consequences of such
discharge which, under Sec. 10 of the Same Rule,
operates as an acquittal of the accused thus
discharged and shall forever be a bar to his
prosecution for the same offense. The Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error when it
annulled and set aside the order for the discharge
of the accused Eduardo Rosales there being no
showing that he actually failed or refused to testify
against his co-conspirators.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ESTACIO, JR.
FACTS:
At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10,
1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and Sumipo,
arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at
Examiner Street, Quezon City where the three of
them would meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the
victim). On Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove
towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on
reaching a secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo
to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then
brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with
bloodied hands later resurfaced. The three then
headed towards Malinta, Valenzuela, Bulacan. On
the way, Estacio and Maritess talked about how
they killed the victim The three later abandoned the
car in Malinta. The following morning, Estacio
went to the residence of Sumipo where he called
up by telephone the victim’s mother and demanded
a P15,000,000 ransom. The mother replied,
however, that she could not afford that amount. In
the afternoon of the same day, Maritess and Estacio
went to Sumipo’s residence again where Estacio
again called up the victim’s mother, this time
lowering the ransom demand to P10,000,000
which she still found to be too steep. The group
then went to Greenhills where Estacio still again
called up the victim’s mother, still lowering the
ransom demand to P5,000,000, P1,000,000 of
which should be advanced. The victim’s mother
having agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio
directed her to place the money in a garbage can
near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in the
evening.
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the
National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23,
1996, Estacio surrendered to the police. The police
then informed the victim’s mother that Estacio had
admitted having killed her son, and that he offered
to accompany them to the crime scene.
Branch 219 of the Quezon City RTC found both
Estacio and Maritess guilty of “kidnapping on the
occasion of which the victim was killed,”
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification,
the trial court’s decision, and finding accused-
appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping with murder and sentencing them to
each suffer the penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON the offense of which appellants were
convicted was erroneously designated. HELD:
YES.
The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The
killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was
gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an
isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent
him from defending himself and to facilitate the
killing.
Respecting the assigned error in discharging
Sumipo as a state witness, the same does not lie.
The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a
state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense committed
except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude.
These conditions were established by the
prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other
than appellants who had personal knowledge of the
acts for which they were being prosecuted. Only he
could positively identify appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime. He does not appear to be
the most guilty. He did not participate in planning
the commission of the crime. He in fact at first
thought that Maritess was joking when she said,
“Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie.” He tried to
dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He
did not participate in the actual stabbing. And he
tried to extricate himself from the attempts to
extract ransom from the victim’s family.
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time,
been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Even assuming arguendo that the
discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was
erroneous, such error would not affect the
competency and quality of his testimony.
Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess’
disclaimer of participation in killing the victim. It
was she who bound the hands and gagged the
victim. When Estacio, in Maritess’ company,
brought the victim to the scene of the crime and
thereafter returned to the car, her and Estacio’s
hands were bloodied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals of May 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants
Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, with the generic
aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle.
PONTEJOS v. DESIERTO
CRIME: Grave misconduct TOPIC: Effect of
discharge
FACTS:
In a case decided by petitioner arbiter Pontejos,
Rasemco, through Aquino, asked for the
nullification of all the proceedings conducted
before said petitioner for alleged extortion, bribery
and graft and corruption committed by him in
conspiracy with Director Wilfredo Imperial and
Ms. Carmen Atos, both of HLURB and one
Roderick Ngo, officer of Hammercon, Inc.
Respondent Ombudsman Desierto issued an order
placing petitioner Pontejos under preventive
suspension for 6 months without pay and further
directing him and Dir. Imperial to file their
counter-affidavits and other controverting
evidence to the complaint. Thereafter, the
Evaluation and preliminary investigation bureau
(EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
joint resolution recommending that: an
Information for Estafa (one count), direct bribery
and unauthorized practice of profession in
violation of RA 6713 be filed against respondent
Pontejos; complaint against Director Imperial and
Ngo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence;
and respondent Atos be extended immunity from
criminal prosecution in accordance with Section 17
of R.A 6770 and be utilized as a state witness. So
the Office of the Ombudsman filed criminal
informations for bribery and estafa against
respondent Pontejos. Then in a Resolution dated
June 21, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman
granted Atos immunity from criminal prosecution
for bribery and estafa filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the above decision
but was denied by the Ombudsman. Filed Petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in
the CA, denied also and upheld the Ombudsman's
decision finding petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the CA denied his motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Did CA err in not declaring that the grant
of immunity to Ms. Atos was improper.
HELD:
NO, the power to choose who to discharge as state
witness is an executive function. Essentially, it is
not a judicial prerogative. It is constitutionally
permissible for Congress to vest the prosecutor
with the power to determine who can qualify as a
witness and be granted immunity from
prosecution. The Court has previously upheld the
discretion of the DOJ, Comelec, and the PCGG to
grant immunity from prosecution on the basis of
the respective laws that vested them with such
power. The OMB was also vested with the power
to grant immunity from prosecution.
According to Pontejos, the OMB's authority to
grant immunity is subject to the "pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court (Sec.17)." He
claims that the procedural rules allow the discharge
of an accused as state witness only upon
conformity of the trial court. An information
against the accused must first be filed in court prior
to the discharge. Moreover, the prosecution could
only recommend and propose, but not grant
immunity. The Court has already held that this
provision is applicable only to cases already filed
in court. The trial court is given the power to
discharge an accused as a state witness only
because it has already acquired jurisdiction over
the crime and the accused. The fact that an
individual had not been previously charged or
included in an information does not prevent the
prosecution from utilizing said person as a witness.
Section 17 of the Ombudsman Act requires
conformity with the Rules of Court, thus requiring
the following circumstances prior to the discharge:
(1) absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused sought to be discharged; (2) no direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed except the testimony of the said
accused; (3) the testimony of the said accused can
be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(4) said accused does not appear to be most guilty;
and (5) said accused has not any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
There must be a standard to follow in the exercise
of the prosecutor's discretion. The decision to grant
immunity cannot be made capriciously. Should
there be unjust favoritism, the Court may exercise
its certiorari power.
In the present case, certiorari is not proper.
Pontejos' allegations do not show, much less
allege, grave abuse of discretion in the granting of
immunity to Atos. The OMB considered Atos'
position, record and involvement in the case prior
to the discharge. DENIED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELMER
DE LA CRUZ and TRANGUILINO
MARTINEZ
FACTS.
Charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom
were accused-appellants De la Cruz and Martinez,
along with three others, namely, Aldrin Tano
(Tano), Romeo Dano (Dano) and Rex Tarnate
(Tarnate). Thereafter, while in the process of
presenting its witnesses, the prosecution filed a
motion to discharge accused Tano as a state
witness. The RTC granted the motion.
De la Cruz was employed by Erwin as a family
driver. He brought Aaron, then an eight-year-old
third-grade student, to and from Claret School.
On November 9, 1998, De la Cruz fetched Aaron
from school. Martinez got inside the car and
handcuffed Aaron's left wrist. Martinez then drove
the car all the way to Batasan Hills where Dano
resided. They fetched Dano who took over control
of the car from Martinez. They proceeded to
Minuyan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Upon arrival, they removed Aaron's handcuff and
entered a vacant house. Martinez and Tano left
Aaron with De la Cruz and proceeded to Tarnate's
house. The following morning, Martinez ordered
Tano to call Erwin to prepare P3 million for your
son’s safety.
At the vacant house where Aaron and De la Cruz
were being kept, Quinano saw the two and asked
them why they were there. Quinano then brought
the two to the barangay hall. Erwin was then
informed by phone that his son was already in the
custody of the barangay officials. The Police
thereafter conducted an investigation.
Tarnate immediately admitted his participation and
revealed information on the identities and
whereabouts of the other accused. The police
proceeded to Batasan Hills to arrest the three other
accused but Dano and Martinez were able to
escape in the confusion and only Tano was
arrested.
ISSUE. Whether Tano appear to be the least guilty
among the accused and that his testimony was
necessary
HELD. For an accused to be discharged as a state
witness, the following conditions must be present:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with
the commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged
with their consent so that they may be witnesses for
the state when, after requiring the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of
the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
• (a) There is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
• (b) There is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;
• (c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material
points;
• (d) Said accused does not appear to be the
most guilty; and,
• (e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
The provision does not require that a state witness
should appear to be the "least guilty" among the
accused. Rather, it
provides that he "does not appear to be the most
guilty" the finding of the lower court revealed that
Tano merely facilitated the commission of the
crime. He merely boarded the car and sat beside
accused-appellant De la Cruz throughout the whole
ride and accompanied accused-appellant Martinez
in going back to Batasan Hills after leaving Aaron
and accused-appellant De la Cruz in Bulacan. True,
he was the one who placed the call to Erwin to
demand ransom. However, he was neither the
mastermind nor the one who hatched the plan to
kidnap Aaron in exchange of money. Clearly, he
did not appear to be the most guilty among the
accused.
Moreover, his testimony was absolutely necessary
as it was the only direct evidence establishing the
presence of conspiracy, from the planning stage up
to the commission of the crime.
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. De la
Cruz and Martinez - guilty, kidnapping for ransom.
GALO MONGE v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Monge’s challenge against Potencio’s discharge as
a state witness must also fail. Not a few cases
established the doctrine that the discharge of an
accused so he may turn state witness is left to the
exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion limited
only by the requirements set forth in Sec. 17 and
25 of Rule 119. Thus, whether the accused offered
to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and
whether there is objectively an absolute necessity
for his testimony are questions that lie within the
domain of the trial court, it being the competent to
resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment
of the trial court with respect to highly factual issue
is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts
except in case of grave abuse of discretion. Hence,
no such grave abuse of discretion is present in this
case. Suffice it to say that issues relative to the
discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial
court as they cannot be addressed for the first time
on appeal.
An order discharging an accused from the
information in order that he may testify for the
prosecution has the effect of an acquittal. Once the
discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future
development showing that any or all of the
conditions provided in Sec.17 have not actually
been fulfilled will not affect the legal consequence
of an acquittal.
Any witting or unwitting error of the Prosecution,
therefore, in moving for the discharge and of the
court in granting the motion (no question of
jurisdiction being involved) will not deprive the
discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and
of his right against double jeopardy. A contrary
rule would certainly be unfair to the discharged
accused because he would then be faulted for a
failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is
inconceivable that the rule has adopted the
abhorrent legal policy of placing the fate of the
discharged accused at the mercy of anyone who
may handle the prosecution.
Indeed, then only instance where the testimony of
a discharged accused may be disregarded is when
he deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in
accordance with his commitment (Sec 18).
Potencio lived up to his commitment, with such,
petition is denied.
PETITION DENIED
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs.People of the
Philippines and the Sandiganbayan, G. R. No.
220598, 19 July 2016
FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for
certiorari separately filed by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts
Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the
Sandiganbayan former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and
Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other
officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit
whose charges were later dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to
evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and
Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to
commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized
under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The information reads: That during the period from
January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the
Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget
and Accounts Manager, all public officers
committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices and taking undue advantage of
their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire,
directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of
PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the
public treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately
filed their respective petitions for bail which were
denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that
the evidence of guilt against them was strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA
and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not
establish a case for plunder against them. The same
were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that
there was sufficient evidence to show that they had
conspired to commit plunder. After the respective
motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and
Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan,
they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Procedural:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for
certiorari is proper to assail the denial of
the demurrers to evidence.
Substantive:
1. Whether or not the State
sufficiently established the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and
Uriarte ;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently
established all the elements of the crime of
plunder: (a) Was there evidence of
amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-
gotten wealth in the total amount of not
less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury
alleged in the information proved by the
Prosecution?
RULING:
Re procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally
not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability
of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that “the order denying
the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to
evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory
order that did not terminate the proceedings, and
the proper recourse of the demurring accused was
to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction
they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the
denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed,
it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ
of certiorari may issue should not be limited,
because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the court that authority is not wanting
to show that certiorari is more discretionary than
either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of
our superintending control over other courts, we
are to be guided by all the circumstances of each
particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’
So it is that the writ will be granted where
necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government cannot be
thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary
or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This
is because the Court has the bounden constitutional
duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion
whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character
and effect of the denial of the demurrers to
evidence, the petitioners as the accused could
avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari
when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did
not properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what
the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the
accused on the basis of their collective actions
prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It
is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that
the conspiracy among all of the accused was by
express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a
chain conspiracy.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v.
Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26,
2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an
information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the
information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the
use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude,
etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know
what is being conveyed, and with such precision as
would enable the accused to competently enter a
plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of
the information as to the allegation of
conspiracy, however, but rather the
identification of the main plunderer sought to be
prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of
the crime of plunder. Such identification of the
main plunderer was not only necessary because
the law required such identification, but also
because it was essential in safeguarding the
rights of all of the accused to be properly
informed of the charges they were being made
answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the
various elements of the crime charged to be set out
in the information is to enable all the accused to
suitably prepare their defense because they are
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constituted the offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the
main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its
resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the
mastermind despite the absence of the specific
allegation in the information to that effect. Even
worse, there was no evidence that substantiated
such sweeping generalization.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly
allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the
cause of the State against the petitioners for
violating the rights of each accused to be
informed of the charges against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:
(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50
Million was adduced against GMA and
Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment,
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The
failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to
the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer
must have amassed, accumulated or acquired
ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00,
the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing
that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for
that matter, had amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There
was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise,
presented by the Prosecution showing even the
remotest possibility that the CIFs
[Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO
had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or
Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act of raiding the public
treasury (under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on
the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation,
conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds
[See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory
construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct
construction of a particular word or phrase that is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings may be made by considering the
company of the words in which the word or phrase
is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases, and its
meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted
by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using
or disposing of another’s property as if it were
one’s own; to misappropriate means to own, to
take something for one’s own benefit; misuse
means “a good, substance, privilege, or right used
improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;”
and malversation occurs when “any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, or property,
wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds
all the four terms together is that the public officer
used the property taken. Considering that raids on
the public treasury is in the company of the four
other terms that require the use of the property
taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury
similarly requires such use of the property taken.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and
gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on
the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of
noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury
requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to
show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had
personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids
on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions
for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the
resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015
and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’
respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the
petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of
evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from
detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no
pronouncements on costs of suit.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and
FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014
Facts:
In October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued a
Resolution ordering the closure of the Orient
Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and
placing such bank under the receivership of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC). PDIC took all the assets and liabilities of
OCBC. PDIC began collecting OCBC’s due loans
by sending demand letters from the
borrowers. Among these borrowers are Timmy’s,
Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to
have loan in the amount of 10 million each. Both
Corporation denied the allegation. Because of this,
the PDIC conducted an investigation and found out
that the loans purportedly for Timmy’s, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form
of manager’s check deposited in the account of the
private respondents.
PDIC filed two counts of Estafa thru falsification
of Commercial Documents against the private
respondents. After finding probable cause, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila
filed Information against the private respondents.
Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC
in Manila, the private respondents pleaded not
guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A
pre-trial was conducted. Thereafter, trial of the
cases ensued and the prosecution presented its
evidence. After the presentation of all of the
prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents
filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition.
The presiding judge granted the private
respondents’ Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and
ordered the case to be re-raffled to another branch.
The case was subsequently re-raffled to the branch
of the respondent RTC judge. Respondent Judge
granted the Motion for Leave to File Demurrer of
Evidence praying for the dismissal of the criminal
cases instituted against them due to the failure of
the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. An order was promulgated by
the respondent judge finding the private
respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be
meritorious, dismissing the Criminal Case. Private
prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied by the RTC Judge. The prosecution
through the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was also
denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
decision of RTC Judge erred in granting the
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer of Evidence.
Held:
No. CA grossly erred in affirming the trial court’s
Order granting the respondent’s demurrer, which
Order was patently null and void for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest
irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the
banking industry and public interest.
The Court found that the prosecution has presented
competent evidence to sustain the indictment for
the crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, and that respondents
appear to be the perpetrators thereof. What the trial
and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that
the OCBC funds ended up in the personal bank
accounts of respondent Go, and were used to fund
his personal checks, even as he was not entitled
thereto. These, if not rebutted, are indicative of
estafa.
Hence, the Petition is GRANTED. Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The July 2, 2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are
declared null and void, and the said cases are
ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of
proceedings.
DE JESUS, SR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR. NOS. 182539-40; FEBRUARY 21, 2011
The Facts and the Case
The Office of the Ombudsman charged the accused
public officers Antonio Y. de Jesus, Sr. (De Jesus,
Sr.), Mayor of Anahawan, Southern Leyte,
Anatolio A. Ang (Ang), his Vice-Mayor, and
Martina S. Apigo (Apigo), the Treasurer, of
falsification of public document before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 26764 and all
three, along with Antonio de Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus,
Jr.), the mayor’s son, of violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) 3019 before the same court in Criminal
Case 26766.1
The first information alleged that De Jesus, Sr.,
Ang, and Apigo (accused local officials) falsified
the Requests for Quotation and Abstract of
Proposal of Canvass on January 18, 1994 by
making it appear that Cuad Lumber and
Hinundayan Lumber submitted quotations for the
supply of coco lumber, when they did not in fact
do so, in violation of Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.2 The second information alleges that,
taking advantage of their positions, the three
municipal officers gave unwarranted advantage to
De Jesus, Jr., who operated under the name
Anahawan Coco Lumber Supply, by awarding to
him the supply of coco lumber worth ₱16,767.00.3
On April 12, 2005, after the prosecution rested its
case, all three accused filed a motion for leave to
file demurrer to evidence, which motion the
Sandiganbayan denied. Rather than present
evidence, however, they proceeded to file their
demurrer, in effect waiving their right to present
evidence.4 The prosecution opposed the demurrer.
On March 7, 2007 the Sandiganbayan rendered
judgment, convicting the accused local officials of
the crimes charged. It, however, acquitted accused
De Jesus, Jr.5 Upon denial of their motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution dated April 16,
2008, the accused public officers came to this
Court on petition for review.6
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in
denying the accused local officials the opportunity
to present their defense after it denied their
demurrer to evidence;
HELD:
The accused local officials assail the
Sandiganbayan’s refusal to allow them to present
evidence of their defense after it denied their
demurrer to evidence. But, contrary to their claim,
the Sandiganbayan did not grant these officials
leave to file their demurrer. It in fact denied them
that leave without prejudice, however, to their
nonetheless filing one subject to the usual risk of
denial. Based on the Minutes of the Hearing on
May 4, 2005,7 the Sandiganbayan resolved as
follows:
The defense’s Motion for Leave of Court to File
Demurrer to Evidence dated April 12, 2005 is
DENIED, without prejudice, however, to its right
to file such demurrer to evidence, without prior
leave of court, but subject to the legal
consequences stated in Section 23, Rule 119 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the defense is hereby given a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice
within which to file, if it so desires, a demurrer to
evidence without prior leave of court. Should this
Court fail to hear from the defense within the said
period, it shall be understood to mean that the
defense will forego the filing of the demurrer to
evidence and will forthwith proceed with the
presentation of its evidence on May 23, 2005 at
8:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. at the Palace of Justice,
Cebu City, as previously scheduled.
On receipt of the above, the accused local officials
informed the court that they would file a demurrer
to evidence even without leave of court.8 The
Sandiganbayan acknowledged the defense’s
manifestation and ordered the prosecution to
comment on or oppose it.9
Having denied the accused local officials’
demurrer to evidence, the Sandiganbayan was
justified in likewise denying their motion to be
allowed to present evidence in their defense. The
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly
Section 23, Rule 119, provide:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. — x x x
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence
filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the
demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of
court, the accused waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. UY
CRIME: Murder TOPIC: Demurrer to evidence
FACTS:
The Decision dated April 7, 2003 of the RTC
Misamis Oriental, granting the separate demurrer
to evidence of accused Louel Uy and Teofilo
Panangin resulting in their “acquittal” for murder
due to insufficiency of evidence, but nevertheless
holding them jointly and severally liable to pay
P35,000 to the heirs of the victim Rabel Campos
representing “vigil and burial expenses” is being
assailed in the present petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court by the
People and the mother of the victim.
The victim, Rabel Campos, was found dead with
several stab wounds in the morning of March 23,
2001 along the National Highway of Maputi,
Naawan, Misamis Oriental. Panangin was arrested
and during the investigation he executed a Sworn
Statement with the assistance of Atty. Celso
Sarsaba of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO),
stating that, he thus stabbed Rabel once at the
stomach as instructed by Uy, he was hesistant but
Uy threatened to shoot him. After he stabbed
Rabel, she was able to run away. Uy, however,
took the knife from him and chased Rabel. On
catching up with her, Uy dragged her to the ground
and stabbed her several times until she expired.
Thus, Atty. Patricio S. Bernales, Jr., District
Agent-in-Charge of the NBI-ILDO, filed a case for
th
murder against Panangin and Uy before the10
MCTC of Lugait-Manticao Naawan. The MCTC
found both Uy and Panangin as the accused and
thereby issued a warrant of arrest against them.
When arraigned, both entered plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, Panangin, with leave of court, filed on
March 3, 2003 a demurrer to evidence on the
ground that when he executed his extra-judicial
confession, his rights under Sec. 12, Bill of Rights
of the Constitution were violated. More than a
month from the filing, the trial court granted the
same.
ISSUE: Was the demurrer to evidence valid
HELD:
NO, the general rule in this jurisdiction is that a
judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a
demurer to evidence is granted. However, just like
any other rule, such is not absolute. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear
showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.
This Court finds that the trial court committed not
only gross reversible error of judgment but also
was actuated with grave abuse of discretion,
exceeding the parameters of its jurisdiction, in
holding that Panangin’s retracting of his
confession shows that the execution thereof was
involuntary and that in any event it was
inadmissible as it was “a fruit of [a] poisonous
tree.” The trial court blindly accepted the claim of
the defense that the confession was not made
voluntarily on the basis of an affidavit executed by
Panangin on July 1, 2002 or more than 5 months
after his sworn statement-confession was given
and after the prosecution rested its case, which
affidavit Panangin was not even called to identify
and affirm at the witness stand, hence, hearsay.
The decision of the trial court undoubtedly
deprived the prosecution of due process as it was
not given the opportunity to check the veracity of
Panangin’s alleged retraction. GRANTED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
BENJAMIN SAYABOC, PATRICIO
ESCORPISO, MARLON BUENVIAJE and
MIGUEL BUENVIAJE G.R.No. 147201
January 15, 2004
On December 2, 1994, Galam was shot to death at
the Rooftop Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop)
owned by him, which was located at Barangay
Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
Earlier that day, Benjamin Sayaboc went to the
Rooftop looking for Galam. Sayaboc waited for
about 3 hours when the vehicle of Joseph Galam
arrived.
Shortly thereafter, employees heard four gunbursts
emanating from the ground floor of the building.
One of them saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing
the latter to fall to the ground face up. Sayaboc
forthwith ran out and toward the tricycle boarded
by Marlon Buenviaje, his father Miguel Buenviaje
and Patricio Escorpiso and sped off towards the
center of the town.
At the hearing, after the prosecution rested its case,
counsel for accused Buenviajes and Patricio
Escorpiso manifested that he be given 15 days to
file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the
evidence. The trial court acceded. But instead of
filing such motion first, he filed a Demurrer to
Evidence on 12 July 1999. The motion for leave to
file the pleading was filed the next day only.
The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence and
the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were deemed to have
submitted their case for judgment. Thus, only
Sayaboc was allowed to proceed with the
presentation of his defense.
Trial Court: Benjamin Sayaboc - guilty of the
crime of murder; Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel
Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso - guilty of the
crime of homicide only.
ISSUE:
Whether the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were
denied constitutional right to due process when
they were not able to present evidence in their
defense.
HELD:
The case CANNOT be remanded to the trial court.
The filing of the demurrer was clearly without
leave of court. The trial court, therefore, correctly
applied the rule on demurrer to evidence found in
Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure when it disallowed the abovementioned
appellants to present evidence on their behalf.
They cannot now claim that they were denied their
right to be heard by themselves and counsel.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave
of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to
present evidence for the accused. The rationale for
this rule is that when the accused moves for
dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in
the belief that said evidence is insufficient to
convict and, therefore, any need for him to present
any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be
allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial
proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints
whenever dictated by convenience. The purpose
behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice
of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the
evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense
would then claim the right to present its evidence.
Decision of RTC, MODIFIED:
Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje – guilty,
homicide.
Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso -
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANILO
GOLE CRUZ
Where and When: Cayombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
1977
Antonio San Victores testified that around 4:30pm,
while on his way to the uninhabited resthouse of
Antonio antaleon to get water, he saw Cruz who
suddenly ran away from the washing area beside
the resthouse and jump over the fence. As he was
about to leave the Kitchen, he heard someone
moaning and found his cousin Teresita Gumapay
lying on her back, wounded in the neck and naked.
Teresita said that she had been raped and stabbed
by Cruz. Antonio brought her to her father, who
then got a jeep which brought Teresita to the
hospital, where 15mins later she was declared
dead. Pat. De Jesus, as told by San Victores that
Cruz raped and stabbed Teresita, went to the house
Pio Cruz (father) who said that Danilo was not at
home but promised to surrender him. On the same
night, Danilo with his father surrendered.
The next day, Danilo was interrogated by
Beunviaje, in the presence of De Jesus, which was
reduced into a written statement in Filiino
(Sinumpaang Salaysay), signed by the accused and
witnessed by Benilda (sister) and Pat. Delos
Santos. However, since the judge was not in his
office when Danilo was brought in before noon and
in the afternoon, and when Danilo was presented to
the judge wherein the Judge refused to administer
the oath, the statement was not placed under oath.
The statement presents that the inquiry started with
questions showing compliance with Sec.20, Art
IV, 1973 Const. and that Danilo admitted killing
Teresita, who then resorted to the discreditable non
mi ricordo answers to the following questions by
the investigator.
The information for Rape with Homicide was filed
with the CFI Sta.Maria, Bulacan presided by Judge
Elbinias. Bail was recommended, but for failure to
post, accused was not released and pleaded not
guilty. In 1980, defense counsel filed by mail a
Motion to submit the accused to Psychiatric
Examination, by which the court ordered NMI
Director to cause such and submit corresponding
report., and in accordance with such signed by Drm
Masikip, the accused “was found suffering from a
mental disorder called Schizohrenia...he needs
further hospitalization and treatment” Danilo
escaped from the hospital but was apprehended the
next day by the security force and police agencies.
In 1982, Dr.Maaba reorted that Danilo is now free
from sign and symptoms of Psychosis and can now
stand trial. He is recommended for discharge and
to be returned to jail.
Defense counsel said that Danilo refused to testify
but instead will present a new witness. The
prosecution moved that the testimony of the
accused be stricken for lack of cross-examination.
The trial court declared the case submitted for
decision. The prosecution waived their right to
present rebuttal evidence. In 1983, court issued an
order motu propio to reopen the case to “enable it
to receive farther exert testimony from
psychiatrists on the mental condition of the
accused at about the time he committed the instant
offense as well as at the time he was placed on the
witness stand during trial, but refused to continue
testifying xxx”
ISSUE: WON the reopening of the case was valid.
HELD: DENIED. The failure of the accused to
complete his testimony was of his own making, on
the initiation, confirmation and reiteration of his
own counsel. The mere filing of a motion to reopen
a case must not in any way automatically vacate an
agreement and order submitting the case for
decision. While the court may reopen a case for
reception of further evidence after the parties have
closed their evidence, such action is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised
only on valid and justifiable reasons which
undoubtedly are inexistent in this case.