EDISON SO v. REPUBLIC, GR NO.
170603, 2007-01-29 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION
Facts:
Petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization[3] under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law,... He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has
lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth;... tition were the Joint
Affidavit[4] of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioner’s Certificate
of Live Birth,[5] Alien Certificate of Registration,[6] and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[8] setting the petition for hearing
at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were
enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire
petition and... its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and
notice be posted in public and... conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty.
Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant
and adviser of the So family’s business. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner
was gainfully employed and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Ma
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known
petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner
were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy.
Petitioner was a member of... some school organizations and mingled well with
friends... petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003. The trial court ruled that the
witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period required by law, and they had
affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had... satisfactorily
supported his petition with evidence. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA
Issues:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO
ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO
ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO
ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.
Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed
to prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 47
Ruling:
The CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for
naturalization without prejudice.[34] According to the CA, petitioner’s two (2) witnesses
were not credible because they... failed to mention specific details of petitioner’s life or
character to show how well they knew him; they merely ‘parroted’ the provisions of the
Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their applicability to petitioner’s case.[35]
The... appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the
requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the
day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002,
petitioner was only twenty (20)... years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old,
falling short of the requirement.[36] The CA stated, however, that it was not its
intention to forever close the door to any future application for naturalization which
petitioner would file, and that... it believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in
due time, a decided asset to this country.[37]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[38] was denied in a Resolution...
petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of
naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the petition
for naturalization without prejudice.
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges
that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should
not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance
with the... law.
MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 (1999) G.R. No. 135083
Quick Guide: Edu Manzano ran for the position of vice mayor in 1998 and got the most
number of votes. His co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify Manzano on the ground
that he is a dual citizen (US and PH). Petition was dismissed. There is no doubt that
Manzano is a dual citizen upon birth being born to both Filipino parents in California.
Court held that the disqualification of dual citizens contemplates dual allegiance and by
merely registering as a voter, filing CoC and electing in the said certificate Philippine
citizenship, Manzano has effectively renounced his US citizenship.
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were
candidates for vice-mayor in Makati City in the May 11, 1998. Manzano got the most
number of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of the pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent
was not a citizen of the PH but of the US
On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC
of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective position. Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San Francisco
California on September 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws
COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second Division and declared
Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a Filipino citizen by
operation of the 1935 constitution and he has effectively renounced his US citizenship
when he registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998. In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati. Ernesto
Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the elections filed this petition
Issues:
WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification? WON there was a valid
election of citizenship?
Held:
NO. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that through Sec.
40(d) of the Local Government Code (which declares as “disqualified from running for
elective local position… Those with dual-citizenship”), Congress has “command[ed] in
explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold elective
office.” Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary;
it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a
national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of a person’s volition; it is a
situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a question
of which state’s law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a country’s
sovereignty. Hence, “dual citizenship” in the aforementioned disqualification clause
must mean “dual allegiance”. Therefore, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.
Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice that upon filing of
certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual citizenship have elected their
Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondent’s
certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I
am a Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to,
a foreign country.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto…”The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen.
David v. Agbay [G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015]
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they
purchased a lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindor. However, in the
year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public
land and part of the salvage zone. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous
Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground
that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against the petitioner. Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA
was pending, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A.
9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07issued by the Consulate
General of the Philippines (Toronto). In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time
he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he
had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He
further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to
him that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to
convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits
between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution
finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and
recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It
ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure
the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been
naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino
citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition
of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225
HELD:NO
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29,
2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of
Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the aforesaid oath.
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become
citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3
lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the
first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but
the terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the
second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before (first group) and after (second group) the effectivity of
R.A. 9225.Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to
describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and
retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA
63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
wherein the following was explained:
“The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 63…The second aspect is the retention of Philippine
citizenship applying to future instances… eacquired for those who previously lost
[Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the
future.”
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under
the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that
he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was
then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those
ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.While he re-
acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause
for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
Maquiling v. COMELEC ( Sereno, April 16, 2013)
Facts:
• Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of
his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
• On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
• On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of andidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
• Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines.
• On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him
in default and to present evidence exparte.
• Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was only after his
proclamation that Arnado filed his
verified answer.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
• Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as
one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a
Filipino citizen. The Court ruled that Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
• Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of
Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC: Ruled in favor of arnado
• Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, There are
three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim
as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
Issue:
Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
Held:
Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it
does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position which makes him
dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that
comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It
likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage,
those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full
and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. It is a continuing requirement
that must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Therefore, the Court held Arnando
disqualified for any local elective position as provided by express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Popular vote does not cure this ineligibility
of the candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements set by the Constitution are
nugatory.
Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as reiterated in the
case of Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal
effect is produced. Hence among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who
garnered the highest votes should be declared as winner.
REPUBLIC V. SAGUN (G.R. NO. 187567; FEBRUARY 15, 2012)
FACTS:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and
Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and
did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age
of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but
was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport.
Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter of Precinct No.
0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national
elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive
acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated
on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport. After
conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009
granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen. Upon payment of the
required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate [on]
her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for
review on certiorari before us. Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an
oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of
Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with
the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12
years after she reached the age of majority.
ISSUES:
Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible?
Is an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching
the age of majority, considered to have been made within a reasonable time as
interpreted by jurisprudence?
HELD:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of
justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law,
for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative
to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of
respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court's
competence.
As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a judicial declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent
is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with
the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship. When respondent
was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which
declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art.
IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of
the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the
Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the
1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are
Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional
provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by
the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the
old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply
with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine
citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation
in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since
the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election.
The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and
other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of
election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the
intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having
failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial
court must be denied. (Re: Application For Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D.
Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 1, 7-8.)
RIZALITO Y. DAVID v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL & MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES,
GR No. 221538, 2016-09-20
Facts:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Rizalito Y.
David (David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision
and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET
Case No. 001-15. Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling
whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo.[6] Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on September 3,
1968 at about 9:30 a.m.[7] He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.[8]
Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was
found on September 6, 1968.[9] She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the
Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe
(more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly
known as Susan Roces) Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States. To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport
from the moment she renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She
remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until
today.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is
DISMISSED.
David moved for reconsideration
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds.
First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown, private respondent fails
to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to establish her Filipino
"blood line," which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's determination of
who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion,
petitioner insists that as private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could
never leave reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that
ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Issues:
Judicial review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private respondent's
citizenship. the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal... the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for certiorari—
through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may
seek relief from this Court.
Ruling:
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which
provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral
Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal shall be
the "sole" judge.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. The
Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In
Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained that
while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do
so, however, but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction,
. . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing.
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of whether
there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors
in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been
nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of
stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for. A glaring misinterpretation of the
constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of
the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion.[126] The
arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law. We find no basis
for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established
personal circumstances of private respondent.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be
Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not
know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where parentage
may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown. Though her
parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an
express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical
consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The
Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the
deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal instruments. The
assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of
the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement
from birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this
status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she
reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No.
9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic. As against
Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count
themselves as natural-born. Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and
the need to establish bloodline is misplaced.
 To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must
look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. She did not. At no
point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual
naturalization process. Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of
natural-born status. It privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely
different premise from the restrictive process of naturalization. It should be with the
actual process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against
other procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for
the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does
not even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or
ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign. The
citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as
petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline. The Constitution sustains a presumption
that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or
a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount
to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of
service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to
excluding them from certain means such as professions and state scholarships, which
will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be
tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged
proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from
office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class
of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the
object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted
nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and
render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine
their development. Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the
constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from
discrimination. As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to
natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from
Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, re-
acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen
of the United States, she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was
naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a]
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country." Thus,
private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American
citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006,
she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition
of her Philippine citizenship.
Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship,
although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and
capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of
allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in
Section 5). Those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may exercise
attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. This
reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at all.
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to
run for elective public office must comply with all of the following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,[251]
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is,
to allow for voting in elections
Third, "making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July
7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.[256] Second,
on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San
Juan.[257] This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed with the need to
comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship. Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully
reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other
requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No.
9225.
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with
Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born,
Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225
signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship. Thus, he or she does not become
a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is
recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may
have consequences de facto.
Principles:
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a
diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference
that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of his
or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a
natural-born citizen. This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of
every single foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and
substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born.
The Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies
(particularly, courts and the Commission on Elections[113]) the power to rule on
contests[114] relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
Senate (as well as of the House of Representatives). There are two (2) aspects to the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests
is exclusive to any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it
performs no other function.
The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, independent
from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests relating to members of
the National Assembly the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which
vested the power to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that
"[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."
The language of the provision being interpreted is the principal source from which this
Court determines constitutional intent. To the extent possible, words must be given
their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of
the Philippines: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:(1) Those who are
citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;(2) Those
whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;(3) Those born before January
17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens: Sec. 2. Natural-
born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to have rights." It
is one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a political community. . . The core
of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and
the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. Citizenship, therefore, is
intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits
and protection provided by it. Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory,
not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification, however, did not
extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago
was to be governed by special laws.
December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain,
that there existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens,[159] thus:(a)
Persons born in Spanish territory,(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
were born outside of Spain,(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,(d)
Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town
of the Monarchy.
Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the
Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899.
However, it did not account for the status of children born in the Islands to parents who
were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the common law concept of jus
soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the United States, applied
to the Philippine Islands.
Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902.
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands,... The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born
inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of
April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in
the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country."... the requirement of being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard
against foreign infiltration in the administration of national government
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and
naturalized.
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63[242] and Republic Act No.
8171[243] specifically "to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries."
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own
words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."... hat Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country."
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and
immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. Retention of Philippine
Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the aforesaid oath.
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship.
Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and
employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 212785, April 04, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. GO PEI HUNG, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A Petition for Naturalization must be denied when full and complete compliance with
the requirements of Commonwealth Act. No. 473 (CA 473), or the Revised
Naturalization Law, is not shown.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside (1) the February 28, 2014
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97542 affirming the July 21,
2010 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila City, Branch 16 in
Naturalization Case No. 07-118391, as well as (2) the CA's June 5, 2014
Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On December 3, 2007, respondent Go Pei Hung - a British subject and Hong Kong
resident - filed a Petition for Naturalization5 seeking Philippine citizenship. The case was
lodged before the RTC of Manila, Branch 16 and docketed as Naturalization Case No. 07-
118391.
After trial, the RTC issued its July 21, 2010 Decision granting the respondent's petition
for naturalization. The RTC declared, thus:
The issue to be resolve [sic] here is whether or not the petitioner deserves to become a
Filipino citizen.
In Commonwealth Act No. 473, approved June 17, 1939, provided [sic] that persons
having certain specified qualifications may become a citizen [sic] of the Philippines by
naturalization.
Section 2. Qualifications. - Subject to Section 4 of this Act, any person having the
following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than
ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation wife the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation:
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal
Philippine languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the
Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed
as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.
The Court, upon reviewing the records of this case, the pieces of documentary evidence
and the testimonies of the petitioner and his two (2) character witnesses, x x x finds that
petitioner Go Pei Hung, has complied with all the qualifications stated in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473.
It appeared that there is no impediment to the Court's nod of approval to petitioner's
supplication[, H]e had presented at least two (2) credible persons, stating that they are
citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required (Section 7 of CA 473).
As held in Lim versus Republic 17 SCRA 424, 427, (1996[)] citing Vy Tain vs. Republic, L-
19918, July 30, 1965.
'As construed by case law, they must have personal knowledge of the petitioner's
conduct during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines.'
Also in [the] case of Edison So vs. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007
and Republic vs. Hong, G.R. No. 168877, March 24, 2006[:]
"In naturalization proceedings, the applicant has the onus to prove not only his own
good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must,
be credible persons."
Both witnesses presented by petitioner made common declarations that they came to
know him [in] 1995 and became good friends with petitioner. Verily, given the birth of
petitioner in 1961, the testimony of his two (2) witnesses, Mr. La To Sy Lai and So An Ui
Henry Co Sy, that they came to know the petitioner sometime in 1995, [revealed] x x x
that they had personal cognition of petitioner's demeanor during the petitioner's
residence in the Philippines. Certainly, they see and observe the applicant continuously,
every day and every week in order to be competent to testify on his reputation and
conduct.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition, for Naturalization filed by petitioner Go
Pei Hung is hereby GRANTED.
Under Republic Act 530, this decision granting the application for naturalization shall not
become final and executory until after two (2) years from the promulgation of the
decision and after another hearing is conducted to determine whether or not the
applicant has complied with the requirements of Section 1 of said law with the
attendance of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative x x x, and so finds
[that] during the intervening time the applicant:
(1) [has] not left the Philippines;
(2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated
rate; and
(4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.
Set hearing on August 30, 2012 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
97542. On February 28, 2014, the CA issued the assailed Decision, pronouncing thus:
x x x [T]he Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed the present appeal,
alleging that:
'I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE'S
FAILURE TO FILE A DECLARATION OF INTENTION, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 5 OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT (C.A.) NO. 473;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE'S
FAILURE TO ATTACH A CERTIFICATE OF HIS ARRIVAL IN THE PHILIPPINES, AS MANDATED
BY SECTION 7 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT X X X NO. 473:
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE'S
FAILURE TO SHOW BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS A LUCRATIVE
TRADE, PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION, AS REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2 OF
CA. NO. 473; and
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE'S
FAILURE TO PRESENT DURING THE HEARING OF THE PRESENT CASE AT LEAST TWO
CREDIBLE PERSONS AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 7 OF CA. NO. 473.'
Petitioner-appellee opposes the appeal and claims that he has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to be a naturalized Philippine citizen.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether x x x the court a quo committed a reversible
error in granting the petition for naturalization.
After [a] careful consideration of the arguments and the evidence on record, this Court
rules to dismiss the appeal.
Anent the first assigned error, the Republic claims that the petitioner failed to file with
the OSG a Declaration of Intention as required under Section 5 of Commonwealth Act
(CA) No. 473, as amended, which provides that:
'Sec. 5. Declaration of Mention. - One year prior to the filing of his petition for
admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file
with the Bureau of Justice, a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines. x x x'
As the foregoing Section 5 of CA No. 473, as amended, provides, the declaration shall be
filed with the Bureau of Justice, now the OSG, at least one year before the filing of the
petition, and shall set forth the following:
(a) name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence
and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft in which he came to
the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the
declaration;
(b) a certificate showing the date, place and manner of his arrival;
(c) a statement that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the
Philippines, now the Department of Education, where Philippine history, government,
and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire
period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen; and
(d) two photographs of himself.
Petitioner-appellee does not deny that he failed to file with the OSG the required
declaration of intention, but he claims that he is exempted from filing the same
pursuant to Section 6 of CA 473, as amended, which provides that:
'Sec. 6. Persons exempt from requirement to wake a declaration of intention. - Persons
born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in
public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of
thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having
to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this
Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has
given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in
private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality. The same shall be understood to be applicable with respect to the widow
and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.'
According to petitioner-appellee, he has been continuously residing in the Philippines
since 1973, during which he resided at 2277-B Luna Street, Pasay City. Also, he studied
[at the] Philippine Pasay Chinese School in 1974 and later graduated [from] Grade VI in
1976. Thus, petitioner-appellee claims that, counted from 1973 to 2007 when he filed
the petition for naturalization, he [had] been continuously residing in the Philippines for
a period of thirty-four (34) years.
As to why petitioner-appellee stated in his petition that he continuously resided in the
Philippines starting in 1989 only, he explained that it was [in] that year that he was
officially issued a Certificate of Permanent Residence by the Bureau of Immigration. But,
to be entitled to that status, he had to [have] resided in the Philippines for a longer
period of time.
This Court is convinced that petitioner-appellee has been residing in the Philippines
earlier than 1989. As narrated in the petition, he commenced his residence in the
Philippines in 1973 at 2277-B Luna Street Pasay City. A year later, he enrolled at the
Philippine Pasay Chinese School, where he later graduated [from] Grade VI in 1976. That
he had been living in the Philippines in 1973 was also established by petioner-appellee
during his direct examination, thus:
xxxx
It bears stressing that this testimony was not contradicted or refuted by the Republic
which was represented by the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Thus, counted from 1973 to 2007 when he filed the petition for naturalization,
petitioner-appellee had been continuously residing in the Philippines for more than
thirty (30) years, or a period of thirty-four (34) years to be exact. Pursuant to Section 6
of CA 473, as amended, petitioner-appellee is exempted from filing the aforesaid
declaration of intention.
Relatedly, considering that petitioner-appellee is exempted from filing the declaration of
intention, petitioner-appellee is also exempted from filing the certificate of arrival which
is, after all, just a component of the declaration of intention as provided under Section 5
of CA No. 473, as amended.
It is also not amiss to mention that all the information needed to be stated in the
declaration of intention were stated also in the petition for naturalization and were
proven during the presentation of evidence. So, while petitioner-appellee is exempted
from filing the said declaration, he, nevertheless, provided and proved the facts needed
to support his petition for naturalization.
As for the third, assigned error, the Republic claims that the petitioner-appellee does
not have a lucrative trade, profession or occupation within the meaning of the
Naturalization Law, and that while petitioner-appellee alleged in his petition that he
derived an annual income of $165,000.00 as a businessman, he failed to present any
evidence to support his supposed business.
The Court is not persuaded.
According to Section 1 of CA No. 473, as amended, one of the qualifications of a person
applying to be a naturalized Philippine citizen is that he must either own real estate in
the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have
some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Petitioner-appellee
sought to establish that he is a businessman, [from] which he derives an average annual
income of P165,000.00 During the trial, he marked and offered in evidence his Annual
Income Tax Returns for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. He also testified that he was
helping in the business, which was put up by his wife, called the Excel Parts Sales Center,
located at 1161 R. Hidalgo Street, Quiapo, Manila. This was affirmed by petitioner-
appellee's witness, Lato Sy Lai, who told the court that petitioner-appellee's business is
the sale of automobile parts.
Thus, contrary to the claim of the Republic, petitioner-appellee was able to prove that
he has a lucrative trade, profession or occupation, which is the sale of automobile parts,
one which has not been rebutted by the Republic nor has been shown to be illegal,
immoral or against public policy.
As for the fourth and last assigned error, the Republic claims that the petitioner-
appellee failed to present credible persons as character witnesses, and that the two
persons who testified for the petitioner-appellee resorted to mere generalizations.
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner-appellee, presented two character witnesses: Lato Sy Lai and So An Ui Henry
Sy. Both witnesses testified in court and were cross-examined by the City Prosecutor of
Manila on such matters as how they met petitioner-appellee, how the petitioner-
appellee related to Filipinos and how petitioner-appellee has adapted to Filipino culture,
customs and traditions. We have reviewed the testimonies of these, witnesses and we
find no error on the part of the trial court when it found these witnesses credible. As
held in People vs. dela Cruz, the matter of evaluating the credibility of witnesses
depends largely on the assessment of the trial court, and appellate courts rely heavily on
the weight given by the trial court on the credibility of a witness as it had a first-hand
opportunity to hear and see the witness testify.
It must be stressed again, that despite its opportunity to do so, the Republic failed to
present any evidence or witness, to oppose the testimonial evidence presented by the
petitioner-appellee.
In fine, the Republic has failed to show that the court a quo committed reversible error
in granting petitioner-appellee's petition for naturalization.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated July 21, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, in Naturalization Case No. 07-118391
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis in the original: citations omitted)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its June 5, 2014 Resolution, the appellate
court held its ground.
Issues
In the present Petition, it is argued that —
The petition for naturalization should not [have been] granted because: i) respondent
did not file his declaration of intention with the OSG; ii) respondent did not state the
details of his arrival in the Philippines in his petition and the certificate of arrival was
not attached to the petition.; iii) respondent is not engaged in a lucrative profession,
trade or occupation; and iv) respondent failed to present during hearing qualified
character witnesses as required under CA No. 473.8 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner's Arguments
In its Petition and Reply9 seeking reversal of the CA dispositions and denial of
respondent's Petition for Naturalization in Naturalization Case No. 07-118391, petitioner
contends that naturalization should be denied due to the failure of respondent to attach
a Declaration of Intention and Certificate of Arrival to his Petition for Naturalization, as
required under CA No. 473; that contrary to the CA's pronouncement, respondent is not
exempt from filing the required Declaration of Intention as he was neither born in the
Philippines, nor had he resided therein for a period of 30 years or more, as the record
showed that he was born in Hong Kong and became a permanent Philippine resident
only in 1989 - or for a period less than the required 30-year residency counted from the
filing of his Petition for Naturalization in 2007; that the Certificate of Arrival - which is
lacking - is equally important as it prevents aliens who have surreptitiously entered the
country without the proper document or certificate of entry from acquiring citizenship
by naturalization, and the absence of such document renders the Petition for
Naturalization null and void; that the Petition for Naturalization was not validly
published in its entirety; that respondent was not. engaged in a lucrative trade,
profession or occupation as he only had an average annual, income of P165,000.00 in
2007 - when he filed the Petition for Naturalization - or a monthly income of only
P13,750.00, which was insufficient for the support of his wife and three minor children,
much less for his sole sustenance: that the two witnesses presented in respondent's
favor were not credible character witnesses as they resorted to mere generalizations in
their testimonies and did not delve into specific details - and they did not actually know
respondent well since they both came to know him only in 1995.
Regarding procedural matters, petitioner argues that, while it did not attach the
annexes to the instant Petition to the copy sent to respondent, these documents were
nonetheless known to the latter and he had them in his possession all throughout these
proceedings.

Respondent's Arguments
In his Comment,10 respondent argues that the instant Petition should be denied as it
violated Section 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court11 as petitioner did not attach the
annexes to the copy of its Petition sent to respondent; besides the Petition is without
merit. In particular, respondent argues that he is exempt from filing a Declaration of
Intention and submitting a Certificate of Arrival, as he has been a resident of the
Philippines for more than 30 years, having arrived in the country in 1973 and residing
therein since; that the petitioner's computation of respondent's residency from 1989
reckoned from the issuance of his certificate of permanent residence, was incorrect;
that the Certificate of Arrival is a mere "component part, in the filing of the Declaration
of Intention"12 - which is thus no longer required since respondent is exempt from filing
the said Declaration of Intention; that the Petition for Naturalization was validly
published in accordance with the requirements of law; that respondent was engaged in
a lucrative trade, as in fact since January 2010, he was already earning a monthly income
of P50,000.00 as a commission sales executive; and that the witnesses for respondent
gave credible testimonies on the latter's character and behavior.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
In Republic v. Huang Te Fu,13 a case decided by this ponente, the following
pronouncement was made:
In Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must
show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law;
otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held
that "[t]he courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued
with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should he rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of
proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law."14 (Citations omitted)
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an
applicant for naturalization must attach a Certificate of Arrival to the Petition for
Naturalization:
Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship
shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two
photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and
former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether
single or married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of
the wife and of the children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in the
Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of
the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this
Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the
provisions of this Act; that he has compiled with the requirements of section five of this
Act; and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of
the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must
be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at
least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that
said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of
the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The
petition shall also set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the
petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival,
and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition. (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent came to the country sometime in 1973; thus, he should have attached a
Certificate of Arrival to his Petition for Naturalization. This is mandatory as respondent
must prove that he entered the country legally and not by unlawful means or any other
manner that is not sanctioned by law. Because if he entered the country illegally, this
would render his stay in the country unwarranted from the start, and no number of
years' stay here will validate his unlawful entry. The spring cannot rise higher than its
source, so to speak.
In Republic v. Judge De la Rosa,15 this Court held that the failure to attach a copy of the
applicant's certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of CA 473 is fatal
to an applicant's petition for naturalization. the ruling in said case proceeds from
pronouncements in the past, to wit:
Finally, petitioner-appellant failed to attach in his petition a certificate of arrival as
required by Sec. 7 of Com. Act No. 473, as amended, which omission likewise nullifies
his petition. The reason for the requirement that the certificate of arrival should form
part of the petition is to prevent aliens, who illegally entered the Philippines, from
acquiring citizenship by naturalization. If, as he pretends, his certificate was taken back
by the Bureau of Immigration and in lieu thereof he was issued an immigrant's
certificate of residence, he could have submitted the same or a certified true copy
thereof.16
Naturalization granted without the filing of a certificate of arrival as required by the
statute, the same being a matter of substance, is illegally procured. (U.S, vs. Ness, 62 L.
Ed. 321).17 (Citations omitted)
x x x Again in the above quoted Section 7 of the law, the certificate of arrival must be
made a part of the petition. This provision is mandatory and it has been enacted for the
purpose of preventing aliens, who have surreptitiously come into the islands without
the proper document or certificate of entry, from acquiring citizenship by naturalization,
unless the said provision is complied with. This Court cannot grant the petition as the
said grant would be a clear violation of the express mandate of the law.18

The Certificate of Arrival should prove that respondent's entry to the country is lawful.
Without it, his Petition for Naturalization is incomplete and must be denied outright.
Even if respondent acquired permanent resident status, this does not do away with the
requirement of said certificate of arrival. An application to become a naturalized
Philippine citizen involves requirements different and separate from that for permanent
residency here.
Respondent likewise argues that the required certificate of arrival is a "mere component
part in the filing of the Declaration of Intention"19 and thus unnecessary since he is
exempt from submitting the latter document. This is not correct. The Declaration of
Intention is entirely different from the Certificate of Arrival; the latter is just as
important because it proves that the applicant's entry to the country was not illegal -
that he was a documented alien whose arrival and presence in the country is in good
faith and with evident intention to submit to and abide by the laws of the Republic.
Certainly, an illegal and surreptitious entry into the country by aliens whose
undocumented arrival constitutes a threat to national security and the safety of its
citizens may not be rewarded later on with citizenship by naturalization or otherwise; to
repeat, a spring will not rise higher than its source.
On the issue of petitioner's alleged failure to attach the required annexes to the copy of
the instant Petition that was sent to respondent, this is rendered insignificant and moot
by the fact that respondent's application for naturalization - which is patently defective
for failure to attach the required certificate of arrival - involves the national interest, as
well as the security and safety of the country and its citizens. Any procedural infirmities
in this case are superseded by the national interest. "[T]echnicalities take a backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other way around."20
To repeat, strict compliance with all statutory requirements is necessary before an
applicant may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization. The absence of even a
single requirement is fatal to an application for naturalization.
In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner
to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege
extended to him by the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent,
existing or vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a
foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the
statute confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply with ail the
statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is
fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the
naturalization process.
Hence, all other issues need not be discussed further as respondent failed to strictly
follow the requirement mandated by the statute.
It should be emphasized that 'a naturalization proceeding is so infused with public
interest that it has been differently categorized and given special treatment, x x x Unlike
in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not
preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to
present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute
res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the
certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or
fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court
may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x
x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the
parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the
purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of
the law and extant jurisprudence.'
Ultimately, respondent failed to prove full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the Naturalization Law. As such, his petition for naturalization must be
denied without prejudice to his right to re-file his application.21
Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, this Court finds no need to resolve
the other issues raised by the parties. With the finding that respondent's Petition for
Naturalization did not include the Certificate of Arrival as required by CA 473, as
amended, the said Petition should have been dismissed outright on that, sole ground.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 28, 2014 Decision and June 5, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97542 are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The respondent's Petition for Naturalization in Naturalization Case No. 07-
118391 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila City, Branch 16 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro,** Bersamin,*** and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.