EN BANC and accordingly, the Court hereby orders
[G.R. No. 206666. January 21, 2015.] their ACQUITTAL.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, petitioner, ALFREDO
S. LIM, petitioner-intervenor, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by
Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April
1, 2013 1 and April 23, 2013 2 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively, in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a
Petition-in-Intervention 3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he
prays to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the
City of Manila in view of private respondent former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada's (former President Estrada) disqualification
to run for and hold public office.
The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted
former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et
al." The dispositive part of the graft court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused,
Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by
Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the
other hand, for failure of the prosecution to
prove and establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S.
Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder,
"Boracay Mansion" located at #100
The penalty imposable for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser
penalty shall be applied in accordance with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the accused Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
been under detention shall be credited to him in
full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners. cTADCH
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2
of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby
declares the forfeiture in favor of the
government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five
Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven
Hundred Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos
(P545,291,000.00), n with interest and
income earned, inclusive of the amount
of Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00), deposited in the
name and account of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One
Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos
(P189,000,000.00), inclusive of
interests and income earned, deposited
in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property
consisting of a house and lot dubbed as
11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio
are hereby ordered cancelled and released to
the said accused or their duly authorized
representatives upon presentation of the
original receipt evidencing payment thereof and
subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders
issued against the said accused are hereby
recalled and declared functus oficio. 4
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full
text of said pardon states:
MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of
releasing inmates who have reached the age
of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been
under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the
authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution, I hereby grant executive
clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder
and imposed a penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan
remain in force and in full, including all writs
and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in
pursuance hereof, except for the bank
account(s) he owned before his tenure as
President.
 Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take
effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day
of October, in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and
seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary 5
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President
Estrada "received and accepted" 6 the pardon by affixing his
signature beside his handwritten notation thereon. ATaDHC
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a
Certificate of Candidacy 7 for the position of President. During that
time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC:
(1) SPA No. 09-024 (DC), a "Petition to Deny Due Course and Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy" filed by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong,
ESQ; (2) SPA No. 09-028 (DC), a petition for "Disqualification as
Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento); and
(3) SPA No. 09-104 (DC), a "Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito,
Joseph M. from Running as President due to Constitutional
Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada,
Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou Estrada. In separate
Resolutions 8 dated January 20, 2010 by the COMELEC, Second
Division, however, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on
the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on
reelection applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted
to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored
the former's right to vote and be voted for a public office. The
subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the
COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized
elections, however, former President Estrada only managed to
garner the second highest number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento
sought recourse to this Court and filed a petition for certiorari,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled"Atty. Evilio C.
Pormento v. Joseph 'ERAP' Ejercito Estrada and Commission on
Elections." But in a Resolution 9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court
dismissed the aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness
considering that former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more
ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, 10 this time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case,
filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211
(DC). Risos-Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former
President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of
his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 26558 entitled 'People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada' Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty ofReclusion
Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification." 11 She relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state
respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. — The
following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment
for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a
result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment
for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or
nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign
country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. — Any
person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any public
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty. (Emphases
supplied.) TAIESD
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second
Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter
lack of merit. 12
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken
judicial cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-
028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En
Banc resolution affirming it, this Commission will not belabor the
controversy further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent
proof sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this
Commission declaring categorically that [former President Estrada's]
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the
pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage
in disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage of
government resources." 13
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-
Vidal was denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court's
jurisdiction by filing the present petition. She presented five issues
for the Court's resolution, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA'S PARDON WAS
NOT CONDITIONAL;
II. RESPONDENT COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
 AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO
RUN AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 FOR
HAVING BEEN CONVICTED OF PLUNDER, AN
OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE
CASE INVOLVES THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT
ALREADY RESOLVED IN THE CASES
OF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-028
(DC) AND IN "RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY
ESTRADA EJERCITO, JOSEPH M. FROM RUNNING
AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104 (DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT
RESPONDENT ESTRADA'S PARDON NEITHER
RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR
REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC
OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS
POWER TOMOTU PROPRIO DISQUALIFY
RESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS
PATENT DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS PERPETUAL AND
ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC
OFFICE AND TO VOTE RESULTING FROM HIS
CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR
PLUNDER. 14 TaCSAD
While this case was pending before the Court, or on May
13, 2013, the elections were conducted as scheduled and former
President Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in
his favor. The next day, the local board of canvassers proclaimed
him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estrada's
opponents for the position of Mayor, moved for leave to intervene
in this case. His motion was granted by the Court in a
Resolution 15 dated June 25, 2013. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidal's
theory that former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and
hold public office as the pardon granted to the latter failed to
expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, given that
former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public
office, all the votes obtained by the latter should be declared stray,
and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his name, he
(Lim) should be declared the rightful winning candidate for the
position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for
resolution, the petition filed by Risos-Vidal actually presents only
one essential question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether
or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President
Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a
result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing
out that the pardon granted to former President Estrada was
conditional as evidenced by the latter's express acceptance thereof.
The "acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional
nature of the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the
third Whereas Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office." She explains that the aforementioned
commitment was what impelled former President Arroyo to pardon
former President Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have
been extended. And any breach thereof, that is, when former
President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President and
Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the condition of the
pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence . . . and disqualifies him as a
candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila." 16
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental
basis upon which former President Estrada must be disqualified
from running for and holding public elective office is actually the
proscription found in Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12
of the OEC. She argues that the crime of plunder is both an offense
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more and involving
moral turpitude; such that former President Estrada must be
disqualified to run for and hold public elective office.
Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada,
however, Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not operate to make
available to former President Estrada the exception provided under
Section 12 of the OEC, the pardon being merely conditional and not
absolute or plenary.
Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible
requirements provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. — A
pardon shall not work the restoration of the
right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal — Their accessory
penalties. — The penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with
them that of civil interdiction for life or during
the period of the sentence as the case may be,
and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it
is not enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such
pardon carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By
virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political
rights without categorically making mention what specific civil and
political rights are restored "shall not work to restore the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal." 17 In other words, she considers
the above constraints as mandatory requirements that shun a
general or implied restoration of civil and political rights in pardons.
Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate
Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano in Monsanto
v. Factoran, Jr. 18 to endorse her position that "[t]he restoration of
the right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by
reason of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned,
cannot be left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but
must be stated in express, explicit, positive and specific language."
Applying Monsanto to former President Estrada's case,
Risos-Vidal reckons that "such express restoration is further
demanded by the existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas
[C]lause of the pardon . . . indubitably indicating that the privilege to
hold public office was not restored to him." 19
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
for public respondent COMELEC, maintains that "the issue of
whether or not the pardon extended to [former President Estrada]
restored his right to run for public office had already been passed
upon by public respondent COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings
in SPA Nos. 09-024, 09-028 and 09-104, there is no cogent reason
for it to reverse its standing pronouncement and declare [former
President Estrada] disqualified to run and be voted as mayor of the
City of Manila in the absence of any new argument that would
warrant its reversal. To be sure, public respondent COMELEC
correctly exercised its discretion in taking judicial cognizance of the
aforesaid rulings which are known to it and which can be verified
from its own records, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court on the courts' discretionary power to take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to them
because of their judicial functions." 20
Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is
apparent that [former President Estrada's] conviction for plunder
disqualifies him from running as mayor of Manila under Section 40
of the [LGC], the subsequent grant of pardon to him, however,
effectively restored his right to run for any public office." 21 The
restoration of his right to run for any public office is the exception to
the prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as provided under
Section 12 of the OEC. As to the seeming requirement of Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express
restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated in the
pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid interpretation of
Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] . . . would be stretching too
much the clear and plain meaning of the aforesaid
provisions." 22 Lastly, taking into consideration the thirdWhereas
Clause of the pardon granted to former President Estrada, the OSG
supports the position that it "is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon and cannot therefore serve to restrict its
effectivity." 23 SETaHC
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions." 24
For his part, former President Estrada presents the
following significant arguments to defend his stay in office: that "the
factual findings of public respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional
body mandated to administer and enforce all laws relative to the
conduct of the elections, [relative to the absoluteness of the
pardon, the effects thereof, and the eligibility of former President
Estrada to seek public elective office] are binding [and conclusive]
on this Honorable Supreme Court;" that he "was granted an
absolute pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and political
rights, including the right to seek public elective office such as the
mayoral (sic) position in the City of Manila;" that "the majority
decision in the case of Salvacion A. Monsanto v. Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., which was erroneously cited by both Vidal and Lim as
authority for their respective claims, . . . reveal that there was no
discussion whatsoever in the ratio decidendi of the Monsanto case
as to the alleged necessity for an expressed restoration of the 'right
to hold public office in the pardon' as a legal pre-requisite to remove
the subject perpetual special disqualification;" that moreover, the
"principal question raised in this Monsanto case is whether or not a
public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment;" that his "expressed
acceptance [of the pardon] is not proof that the pardon extended to
[him] is conditional and not absolute;" that this case is a mere
rehash of the cases filed against him during his candidacy for
President back in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code "cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the
President expressly granted by the Constitution;" that the text of
the pardon granted to him substantially, if not fully, complied with
the requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code as it
was categorically stated in the said document that he was "restored
to his civil and political rights;" that since pardon is an act of grace, it
must be construed favorably in favor of the grantee; 25 and that his
disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the
hundreds of thousands of Manileños who voted for him. 26
The Court's Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon
that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-
Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211
(DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section
12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime punishable
by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral
turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for
and hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a
grantee of a pardon that includes a statement expressing "[h]e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights."
Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is
disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila in the May 13, 2013
Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post
despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former
President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly
provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former President
Estrada) right to vote and be voted upon for public office. She
invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the
foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually
specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that
former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada's rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, or to otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same
cannot be upheld based on the pardon's text. ECDaAc
 The pardoning power of the
President cannot be limited by
legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other
acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole,
or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions
that the only instances in which the President may not extend
pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have
not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was
no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador 27 and Pelobello v.
Palatino, 28 which were decided under the 1935 Constitution,
wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the President
shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present 1987
Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to
the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court
reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran,
Jr. 29 thereby establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the
long-standing position of this Court that the exercise of the
pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be
interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it
exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the
President's power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically
through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming
majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly
rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning
power of the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and
corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress
through the enactment of a law. The following is the pertinent
portion lifted from the Record of the Commission (Vol. II): cSaATC
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner
Tan be recognized to introduce an amendment
on the same section.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is
recognized.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9
state:
However, the power to grant
executive clemency for violations of corrupt
practices laws may be limited by legislation.
I suggest that this be deleted on the
grounds that, first, violations of corrupt
practices may include a very little offense like
stealing P10; second, which I think is more
important, I get the impression, rightly or
wrongly, that subconsciously we are drafting a
constitution on the premise that all our future
Presidents will be bad and dishonest and,
consequently, their acts will be lacking in
wisdom. Therefore, this Article seems to
contribute towards the creation of an anti-
President Constitution or a President with vast
responsibilities but no corresponding power
except to declare martial law. Therefore, I
request that these lines be deleted.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,
may the Committee react to that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here
on the resolution of Commissioner Davide
because of the fact that similar to the provisions
on the Commission on Elections, the
recommendation of that Commission is required
before executive clemency is granted because
violations of the election laws go into the very
political life of the country.
With respect to violations of our
Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it is also
necessary to have that subjected to the same
condition because violation of our Corrupt
Practices Law may be of such magnitude as to
affect the very economic system of the country.
Nevertheless, as a compromise, we provided
here that it will be the Congress that will provide
for the classification as to which convictions will
still require prior recommendation; after all, the
Congress could take into account whether or
not the violation of the Corrupt Practices Law is
of such magnitude as to affect the economic life
of the country, if it is in the millions or billions of
dollars. But I assume the Congress in its
collective wisdom will exclude those petty
crimes of corruption as not to require any
further stricture on the exercise of executive
clemency because, of course, there is a whale of
a difference if we consider a lowly clerk
committing malversation of government
property or funds involving one hundred pesos.
But then, we also anticipate the possibility that
the corrupt practice of a public officer is of such
magnitude as to have virtually drained a
substantial portion of the treasury, and then he
goes through all the judicial processes and later
on, a President who may have close connections
with him or out of improvident compassion may
grant clemency under such conditions. That is
why we left it to Congress to provide and make
a classification based on substantial distinctions
between a minor act of corruption or an act of
substantial proportions.
 SR. TAN. So, why do we not just insert
the word GROSS or GRAVE before the word
"violations"?
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress
can make a better distinction because "GRAVE"
or "GROSS" can be misconstrued by putting it
purely as a policy.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo
is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of
the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant
executive clemency is essentially an executive
power, and that is precisely why it is called
executive clemency. In this sentence, which the
amendment seeks to delete, an exception is
being made. Congress, which is the legislative
arm, is allowed to intrude into this prerogative
of the executive. Then it limits the power of
Congress to subtract from this prerogative of
the President to grant executive clemency by
limiting the power of Congress to only corrupt
practices laws. There are many other crimes
more serious than these. Under this
amendment, Congress cannot limit the power of
executive clemency in cases of drug addiction
and drug pushing which are very, very serious
crimes that can endanger the State; also, rape
with murder, kidnapping and treason. Aside
from the fact that it is a derogation of the
power of the President to grant executive
clemency, it is also defective in that it singles
out just one kind of crime. There are far more
serious crimes which are not included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one
observation on that. We admit that the
pardoning power is an executive power. But
even in the provisions on the COMELEC, one will
notice that constitutionally, it is required that
there be a favorable recommendation by the
Commission on Elections for any violation of
election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as
the principal proponent of that and as a
member of the Committee, has explained in the
committee meetings we had why he sought the
inclusion of this particular provision. May we call
on Commissioner Davide to state his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President. cSDIHT
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide
is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to
object to the proposal. We have just approved
the Article on Accountability of Public Officers.
Under it, it is mandated that a public office is a
public trust, and all government officers are
under obligation to observe the utmost of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to
lead modest lives and to act with patriotism and
justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go
into the very core of the concept that a public
office is a public trust, the violation is itself a
violation not only of the economy but the moral
fabric of public officials. And that is the reason
we now want that if there is any conviction for
the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which, in effect, is a violation of
the public trust character of the public office, no
pardon shall be extended to the offender, unless
some limitations are imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should
be with the concurrence of the convicting court,
but the Committee left it entirely to the
legislature to formulate the mechanics at trying,
probably, to distinguish between grave and less
grave or serious cases of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is
now the best time, since we have strengthened
the Article on Accountability of Public Officers,
to accompany it with a mandate that the
President's right to grant executive clemency for
offenders or violators of laws relating to the
concept of a public office may be limited by
Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
Sarmiento is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in
favor of the amendment by deletion.
Madam President, over and over again,
we have been saying and arguing before this
Constitutional Commission that we are
emasculating the powers of the presidency,
and this provision to me is another clear
example of that. So, I speak against this
provision. Even the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions do not provide for this kind of
provision.
I am supporting the amendment by
deletion of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson
would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson
is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am
also in favor of the amendment by deletion
because I am in sympathy with the stand of
Commissioner Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do
believe and we should remember that above all
the elected or appointed officers of our
Republic, the leader is the President. I believe
that the country will be as the President is,and if
we systematically emasculate the power of this
presidency, the time may come when he will
be also handcuffed that he will no longer be
able to act like he should be acting.
So, Madam President, I am in favor of
the deletion of this particular line.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco
would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco
is recognized.
 MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much,
Madam President.
I seldom rise here to object to or to
commend or to recommend the approval of
proposals, but now I find that the proposal of
Commissioner Tan is worthy of approval of this
body.
Why are we singling out this particular
offense? There are other crimes which cast a
bigger blot on the moral character of the public
officials.
Finally, this body should not be the
first one to limit the almost absolute power of
our Chief Executive in deciding whether to
pardon, to reprieve or to commute the sentence
rendered by the court.
I thank you. EHaDIC
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote
now?
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla
would like to be recognized, and after him will
be Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla
is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence,
Madam President. The Sandiganbayan has been
called the Anti-Graft Court, so if this is allowed
to stay, it would mean that the President's
power to grant pardon or reprieve will be
limited to the cases decided by the Anti-Graft
Court, when as already stated, there are many
provisions in the Revised Penal Code that
penalize more serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of
conviction and the case merits the consideration
of the exercise of executive clemency, usually
under Article V of the Revised Penal Code the
judge will recommend such exercise of
clemency. And so, I am in favor of the
amendment proposed by Commissioner Tan for
the deletion of this last sentence in Section 17.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote
now, Mr. Floor Leader?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
Natividad is recognized.
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this
provision which will again chip more powers
from the President. In case of other criminals
convicted in our society, we extend probation to
them while in this case, they have already been
convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we
can offer mercy to them is through this
executive clemency extended to them by the
President. If we still close this avenue to them,
they would be prejudiced even worse than the
murderers and the more vicious killers in our
society. I do not think they deserve this
opprobrium and punishment under the new
Constitution.
I am in favor of the proposed
amendment of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. We are ready to vote,
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the
Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee,
Madam President, prefers to submit this to the
floor and also because of the objection of the
main proponent, Commissioner Davide. So we
feel that the Commissioners should vote on this
question.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in
favor of the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Tan to delete the last sentence of
Section 17 appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please
raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hand.)
As many as are against, please raise
their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)
The results show 34 votes in favor and
4 votes against; the amendment is
approved. 30 (Emphases supplied.)
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way,
serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of
the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal
statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal's interpretation
that the said Articles contain specific textual commands which must
be strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential
grace from the disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
provides: SEIacA
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. — A
pardon shall not work the restoration of the
right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal — Their accessory
penalties. — The penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with
them that of civil interdiction for life or during
the period of the sentence as the case may be,
and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law,
as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will
defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant
executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a
statute there should be no departure. 31 It is this Court's firm view
that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares
that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of
express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with
Risos-Vidal that there was no express remission and/or restoration
of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon
granted to former President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the
aforementioned codal provisions must be followed by the President,
as they do not abridge or diminish the President's power to extend
clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the coverage of the
President's pardoning power. Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to
requirements of convention or form. They only
provide a procedural prescription. They are not
concerned with areas where or the instances
when the President may grant pardon; they are
only concerned with how he or she is to exercise
such power so that no other governmental
instrumentality needs to intervene to give it full
effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is
prescribe that, if the President wishes to include
in the pardon the restoration of the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, or the
remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification, he or she should do so
expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the
President state his or her intentions clearly,
directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To
belabor the point, the President retains the
power to make such restoration or remission,
subject to a prescription on the manner by
which he or she is to state it. 32
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement
that Congress may dictate as to how the President may exercise
his/her power of executive clemency. The form or manner by which
the President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their
respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be
interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is
the essence of the principle of separation of powers deeply
ingrained in our system of government which "ordains that each of
the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere." 33 Moreso, this fundamental principle must be
observed if non-compliance with the form imposed by one branch
on a co-equal and coordinate branch will result into the diminution
of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code should be construed in a way that will give full effect to the
executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in
an overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish
the import of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the
President and duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself.
The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the
power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for
such crimes and the power of the President to grant executive
clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of
the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of the
accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said
accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential
prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide
to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory
penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the
effect of the pardon so decided upon by the President on the
penalties imposed in accordance with law. AHCcET
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the
pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency
extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved
him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that
"(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of
the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right to seek public elective office is
recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and
political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225, 34 otherwise known as
the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as
follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities. — Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their
right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section l, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office
shall subscribe and swear an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption
of office: Provided, That they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where they
took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their
profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or
appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those
who:
 (a) are candidates for or are
occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as
commissioned or noncommissioned
officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized
citizens. (Emphases supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, to which the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges
the existence of said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in Article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression
of the will of the electors[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on
Elections, 35 the Court unequivocally referred to the right to seek
public elective office as a political right, to wit:
Stated differently, it is an additional
qualification for elective office specific only to
Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the
operative act that restores their right to run for
public office. The petitioner's failure to comply
therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of
the law, rendered ineffectual theDeclaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is
yet to regain her political right to seek elective
office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation
of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to
run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek (a) Those sentenced by final judgment
public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right. for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted to serving sentence[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights — including the Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar
right to seek elective office. prohibitions, but it provides for an exception, to wit: TcaAID
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond Section 12. Disqualifications. — . .
the plain meaning of said penal provisions; and prescribes a formal . unless he has been given plenary pardon or
requirement that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could granted amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
be in derogation of the constitutional prohibition relative to the As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former
principle that the exercise of presidential pardon cannot be affected President Estrada's conviction for plunder disqualifies him from
by legislative action. running for the elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring under Section 40 (a) of the LGC. However, the subsequent absolute
opinions in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. 36 to justify her argument that pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively restored his
an absolute pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public right to seek public elective office. This is made possible by reading
office has been restored, and that the penalty of perpetual absolute Section 40 (a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.
disqualification has been remitted. While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section
This is incorrect. 40 (a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although provides a legal escape from the prohibition — a plenary pardon or
the learned views of Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who
Feliciano are to be respected, they do not form part of the has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by
controlling doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land. final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to
On the contrary, a careful reading of the majority opinion run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
in Monsanto, penned by no less than Chief Justice Marcelo B. position.
Fernan, reveals no statement that denotes adherence to a stringent Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC
and overly nuanced application of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised to candidates running for local elective positions is not
Penal Code that will in effect require the President to use a unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,37 the
statutorily prescribed language in extending executive clemency, Court acknowledged the aforementioned provision as one of the
even if the intent of the President can otherwise be deduced from legal remedies that may be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a
the text or words used in the pardon. Furthermore, as explained local election filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates
above, the pardon here is consistent with, and not contrary to, the of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation. 38 The
provisions of Articles 36 and 41. pertinent ruling in the Jalosjos case is quoted as follows:
The disqualification of former What is indisputably clear is that false
President Estrada under Section 40 material representation of Jalosjos is a ground
of the LGC in relation to Section 12
for a petition under Section 78. However, since
of the OEC was removed by his the false material representation arises from a
acceptance of the absolute pardon crime penalized by prision mayor, a petition
granted to him. under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can
running for any elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that also be properly filed.The petitioner has a
former President Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit: choice whether to anchor his petition on
Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
 Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. The law expressly provides
multiple remedies and the choice of which
remedy to adopt belongs to
petitioner. 39 (Emphasis supplied.)
The third preambular clause of the
pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal's declaration, the third preambular
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estrada's rights to suffrage and
to seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially
true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and
political rights" as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential
part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the
word "whereas." 40 Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute
because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. 41 In this case, the whereas clause at issue
is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore,
does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or
to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant
excerpt of COMELEC Commissioner Maria Gracia Padaca's separate
concurring opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the essence of the
legal effect of preambular paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz.:
The present dispute does not raise
anything which the 20 January 2010 Resolution
did not conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-
Vidal raised the same argument with respect to
the 3rd "whereas clause" or preambular
paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states that
"Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed
to no longer seek any elective position or
office." On this contention, the undersigned
reiterates the ruling of the Commission that the
3rd preambular paragraph does not have any
legal or binding effect on the absolute nature of
the pardon extended by former President
Arroyo to herein Respondent.
This ruling is consistent with the
traditional and customary usage of preambular
paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled on
the legal effect of preambular paragraphs or
whereas clauses on statutes. The Court
stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really
not an integral part of a law.
It is merely an introduction
to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the
origin of rights and
obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear
and unambiguous,
the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its
operation much less prevail
over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for
the pardon to be conditional on Respondent's
promise never to seek a public office again, the
former ought to have explicitly stated the same
in the text of the pardon itself. Since former
President Arroyo did not make this an integral
part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to
the pardon extended to former President
Estrada. 42 (Emphasis supplied.)
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo's
silence on former President Estrada's decision to run for President in
the May 2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of the
political party of former President Arroyo, after the latter's receipt
and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to
restore him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public
office. EHSCcT
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency
extended by the President is in issue, the Court must turn to the
only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a
detailed review of the four corners of said document, nothing
therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is
actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of
the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned commitment not
to seek public office will result in a revocation or cancellation of said
pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact or the
prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was granted.
It was not used as a condition to the efficacy or to delimit the scope
of the pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the
third Whereas Clause was one of the reasons to grant the pardon,
the pardon itself does not provide for the attendant consequence of
the breach thereof. This Court will be hard put to discern the
resultant effect of an eventual infringement. Just like it will be hard
put to determine which civil or political rights were restored if the
Court were to take the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the
statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights"excludes the restoration of former President Estrada's rights
to suffrage and to hold public office. The aforequoted text of the
executive clemency granted does not provide the Court with any
guide as to how and where to draw the line between the included
and excluded political rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue
for resolution is not whether the pardon is contingent on the
condition that former President Estrada will not seek another
elective public office, but it actually concerns the coverage of the
pardon — whether the pardon granted to former President Estrada
was so expansive as to have restored all his political rights, inclusive
of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is
of the view that the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary
in scope despite the statement that former President Estrada
is "hereby restored to his civil and political rights," that is, the
foregoing statement restored to former President Estrada all his civil
and political rights except the rights denied to him by the
unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification made up
of, among others, the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. He
adds that had the President chosen to be so expansive as to include
the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, she should have been
more clear on her intentions.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights," to the mind of the Court, is crystal clear — the
pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning,
it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete
and plenary in character, as the term "political rights" adverted to
has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that
the omission of the qualifying word "full" can be construed as
excluding the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public
office. There appears to be no distinction as to the coverage of the
term "full political rights" and the term "political rights" used alone
without any qualification. How to ascribe to the latter term the
meaning that it is "partial" and not "full" defies one's understanding.
More so, it will be extremely difficult to identify which of the
political rights are restored by the pardon, when the text of the
latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of pardon
cannot be presumed from the absence of the qualifying word "full"
when the pardon restored the "political rights" of former President
Estrada without any exclusion or reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the
absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon
which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited
pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverage is concerned, the text
of the pardon can withstand close scrutiny even under the
provisions of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. cSIHCA
The COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-
Vidal, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition
for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined only to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is
presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its
domain. 43
As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the
arbitrary exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to
be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
such an abuse must be patent and gross. 44
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately
demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent and
gross" as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds
it unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention,
which substantially presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-in-
intervention are DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of
the Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution
dated April 23, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, En banc, both
in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., and Carpio, J., join the dissent of J. Leonen.
Brion, * J., J. Brion left his vote to dismiss the Risos-Vidal
petition; see his separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Jardeleza, ** J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BRION, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia's conclusion that the pardon
granted to respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada (or Erap for
brevity) by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (or PGMAfor
brevity) restored his rights to run for and hold public office and to
vote.
I likewise agree with the ponencia that Erap's pardon
complied with the requirements under Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Specifically, Erap's pardon contained an
express restoration of his rights to vote and to hold public office and
an express remission of Erap's perpetual absolute disqualification
brought about by his conviction for plunder. As I will discuss below,
these rights are subsumed under the phrase "civil and political
rights" that PGMA expressly restored in Erap's pardon.
I add that aside from the points discussed by the ponencia,
other material legal justifications exist that would support the same
conclusion and address the vagueness that Risos-Vidal attributes to
the textual language of Erap's pardon. These legal justifications
include an unbiased examination of the third preambular clause of
Erap's pardon, the official definition of "absolute pardon," and the
pertinent rules on statutory construction that, in instances of doubt,
give primacy to the interests of the voters in election cases such as
the present case. I shall discuss all these below.
I maintain, too, that despite the ponencia's resolution of
the issue of Erap's pardon and its effects on his perpetual absolute
disqualification, an equally important issue lingers and remains
unresolved — whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) gravely abused its discretion in relying on its 2010
rulings that Erap's pardon restored his rights to vote and to be
voted for a public office.
This issue is particularly important since the
Court's certiorari jurisdiction is being invoked and the assailed
COMELEC rulings are not being questioned specifically on its ruling
on the issue of Erap's pardon but on the COMELEC's reliance on its
2010 ruling on this particular issue.
This 2010 disqualification ruling pertained to the
consolidated COMELEC Resolution in SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA
No. 09-104 (DC), entitled Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada and In Re: Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.
From Running As President Due to Constitutional Disqualification
and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B.
These cases were filed against Erap when he ran as President of the
Philippines in the 2010 elections. THIcCA
For clarity, the COMELEC Second Division's resolution dated
April 1, 2013 that is being questioned in the present case
states: "Today, this Commission is confronted with a controversy
that is far from novelty. Albeit raised by another petitioner, the issue
raised in the present case is glaringly similar to or intertwined with
the issues involved in the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028
(DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC). Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that
the question of whether or not the pardon granted to respondent
has restored his right to run for public office, which was curtailed
by virtue of his conviction for plunder that carries with it the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, has been passed
upon and ruled out by this Commission way back in 2010. . . Having
taken judicial cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No.
09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc
resolution affirming it, this Commission will not belabor the
controversy further. More so, petitioner failed to present cogent
proof sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this
Commission declaring categorically that respondent's right to seek
public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon
him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission
has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a
settled matter lest indulged in wastage of government resources."
This COMELEC Second Division ruling was upheld by the
COMELEC en banc in its Resolution dated April 23, 2013, which is
also being assailed in the present case.
I stress that the above 2013 COMELEC rulings that are
sought to be nullified in the present case did not explicitly rule on
the issue of Erap's pardon but merely relied on the 2010 COMELEC
rulings on this particular issue. According to Risos-Vidal, this
"reliance" constituted grave abuse of discretion.
To my mind, in the exercise of the
Court's certiorari jurisdiction, the issue of whether or not the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in relying on its 2010 rulings
on Erap's pardon should be squarely ruled upon on the merits,
especially because Risos-Vidal and the parties raised this particular
issue in the present case.
Another crucial issue that must be resolved, in view of its
jurisprudential repercussions, is the legal propriety of Alfredo S.
Lim's (Lim) intervention in the present case.
I discuss all these issues below.
I.
Prefatory Statement
Before this Court is an election disqualification case
involving a candidate (and subsequent winner) in the 2013
elections. By their nature, disqualification cases are not unusual; in
our political system they are given free rein because they affect
voters' choice and governance.
What distinguishes this case is the basis for the objection —
the executive clemency (or as interchangeably used in this
Opinion, the pardon) previously granted by the former President of
the Republic Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to her immediate
predecessor, respondent President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, whom
the former replaced under extraordinary circumstances.
At issue is not the validity of the pardon as this issue has
not been raised; at issue (to be decided in the context of the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC)
are the interpretation of the terms of the pardon and the grantor's
intent, a matter that — in the absence of direct evidence from
grantor PGMA — the Court has to discern from the pardon's written
terms. Intertwined with this issue is the question of whether or not
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the Risos-
Vidal petition based on its 2010 ruling that Erap's pardon restored
his rights to vote and to be voted for a public office.
Thus, we are largely left with the task of interpreting the
terms of the pardon that a politician granted to another politician,
for the application of its terms to a dispute in a political setting —
the elections of 2013. This characterization of the present case,
however, should not change nor affect the Court's mode of
resolution: the Constitution only allows us to adjudicate on the basis
of the law, jurisprudence and established legal principles.
Under this approach, the Court should also be aware that
beyond the direct parties, another party — the formally unnamed
and unimpleaded electorate — has interests that the Court should
take into account. The electorate has a continuing stake in this case
because they participated and expressed their choice in the 2013
elections; in fact, not one of the entities that could have prevented
them from voting — the COMELEC and this Court — acted to prevent
Erap from being voted upon. AEHTIC
Their participation, to my mind, brings into the picture the
need to consider and apply deeper democratic principles: while the
voters are generally the governed, they are at the same time the
sovereign who decides how and by whom they are to be
governed. This step is particularly relevant in the present case
since the electorate's unquestioned preference was Erap, the
recipient of the disputed pardon.
I recite all these as they are the underlying considerations I
shall take into account in this Separate Opinion.
Aside from points of law, I also take into account the
interests of the voters. These interests, in my view, should not only
be considered but given weight and even primacy, particularly in a
situation of doubt.
II.
The Roots of the Present Case
A. The Early Roots: The Plunder and the Pardon.
The present case traces its roots to respondent Erap's term
as President of the Philippines which started at noon of June 30,
1998. He relinquished his post in the middle of his term and was
thereafter charged with the crime of Plunder. 1 The Sandiganbayan
convicted him on September 12, 2007 and imposed on him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties.
On October 25, 2007, former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (PGMA) granted Erap executive clemency under terms that
in part provides:
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the
authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution, I hereby grant executive
clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder
and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
He is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights. [Emphasis supplied]
Erap accepted the pardon without qualifications on
October 26, 2007.
B. Erap's 2010 Presidential Candidacy & Disqualification Cases.
On November 30, 2009, Erap filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for the position of President of the Philippines.
His candidacy immediately drew a trilogy of cases that
were filed on or about the same time, with the intent of
disqualifying him from running as President and from holding office
if he would win.
The first was a petition to cancel and deny due course to
Estrada's CoC [SPA 09-024 (DC)] 2 filed by Elly Velez B. Lao
Pamatong (Pamatong). PGMA was also impleaded as a respondent.
Pamatong alleged that Erap could not validly run for the presidency
because of the constitutional ban against re-election; he also
claimed that PGMA was also prohibited from running for any
elective public office, even as a representative of the 2nd district of
Pampanga. Pamatong also argued in his position paper that Erap's
pardon was not absolute as it was conditioned on his promise not
to run for any public office. 3
The second formal objection to Erap's presidential
candidacy came from Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento) who filed
his "Urgent Petition for Disqualification as Presidential
Candidate" on December 5, 2009 (docketed as SPA 09-028).
Pormento alleged that Erap was not eligible for re-election for the
position of President pursuant to Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution. In his answer to Pormento, Erap re-pleaded his
defenses in the Pamatong case and added that the grant of
executive clemency in his favor removed all legal impediments that
might bar his candidacy for the presidency. 4
The third objection was filed by Mary Lou Estrada, a
presidential candidate, who filed a petition for disqualification and
cancellation of Erap's CoC based on the grounds that he was not
eligible for re-election and that Erap's candidacy would confuse the
electorate, to her prejudice. This case was docketed as SPA 09-104.
The COMELEC, Second Division, called the trilogy to a joint
hearing but opted to issue separate but simultaneous decisions
because the Pamatong case, SPA 09-024, involved PGMA as a
second respondent, while the two other cases [docketed as SPA
Nos. 09-028 (DC) and 09-104 (DC)] only involved Erap as the
respondent. Significantly, while three separate decisions were
issued, they all commonly discussed, practically using the same
wording, the pardon extended to Erap and concluded that the
pardon restored Erap's "right to vote and to be voted for a public
office." 5
B.1. The Disqualification Rulings in the 2010 Election
Cases.
Thus, in clear and explicit terms, the Resolutions in all
three cases uniformly ruled that Erap was not disqualified from
running and from holding office, not only because he was not
running for re-election, but likewise because of the pardon that had
been extended to him. HSIDTE
The COMELEC specifically ruled that the statement in the
pardon stating that — "Whereas, Joseph Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office" — was
not really a condition but was merely a part of the pardon's
preliminary statement. The dispositive portion of the pardon did not
state that it was conditioned on this purported public commitment.
Additionally, his public statement cannot serve to restrict the
operation of, or prevail over, the explicit statement in the pardon
that restored all his civil and political rights, including the right to
vote and to be voted for a public office. 6
Petitioner Mary Lou Estrada pointedly questioned the
COMELEC rulings in her motion for reconsideration, including the
terms of the pardon extended to Erap. 7 Before the 2010 elections
took place, the COMELEC en banc adopted the Second Division
ruling and denied all the motions. 8 Only Pormento responded to
the denial by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 191988.
In resolving Pormento's petition, the Court solely touched
on the issue of "re-election" and held that there was no longer any
justiciable issue to be resolved because Erap had already lost the
2010 elections. Thus, the Court dismissed the whole petition,
observing that Erap fully participated in the elections since
Pormento did not pray for the issuance of a TRO.
Pamatong and Mary Lou Estrada did not pursue further
remedies after the COMELEC en banc denied their respective
motions for reconsideration. This Court, on the other hand,
dismissed Pormento's Rules 64/65 petition assailing the COMELEC
ruling. Thus, the COMELEC ruling in the three cases
became final, executory, non-appealable andnon-assailable. 9
As I will discuss below, these final COMELEC decisions on
Erap's pardon and his resulting qualification to run for elective
public office preclude this same issue of pardon from again being
questioned because res judicata has already set in.
Significantly, when voting took place on May 10, 2010, no
prohibition was in place to prevent the voters from voting for Erap
as a candidate. Neither the COMELEC(because it had dismissed the
petitions against Erap's candidacy) nor this Court (because it did not
issue any temporary restraining order or injunction) prevented Erap
from being voted upon. In a field of ten (10) candidates, Erap
garnered 9,487,837 votes and landed in second place, as against the
winner's 15,208,678 votes. 10
III.
The Risos-Vidal Petition
On October 2, 2012, Erap filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for the position of City Mayor of Manila. As had
happened in the past, this Erap move did not go unchallenged.
A. The COMELEC Petition.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed on January 24, 2013 — or before
the 2013 elections — a petition for disqualification against private
respondent Erap based on Section 40 11 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160, the LGC) in relation with Section 12 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. No. 881, the OEC). Both the LGC and
the OEC commonly disqualify any person convicted of an offense
involving moral turpitude from running for office.
She sought to disqualify Erap from running for mayor for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
(plunder), an offense that carries the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua and the accessory penalties of interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification. She alleged that Erap's subsequent pardon
was conditional and did not cover the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. THSaEC
Risos-Vidal and Erap fully argued the pardon aspect of the
case before the COMELEC and before the Court. In Risos-Vidal's
Memorandum that she submitted to the Court, she attached as
Annex "E" the COMELEC Memorandum of Erap with the attached
Pamatong, 13 Pormento 14 and Mary Lou Estrada 15 COMELEC
resolutions.
B. The COMELEC Ruling.
On April 1, 2013 or 42 days before the 2013 elections, the
COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification,
citing its 2010 rulings in the cases filed against Erap after he filed his
CoC for the position of President of the Philippines in 2010.
According to the COMELEC, it had already ruled in these
disqualification cases and had then held that the pardon granted to
Erap was absolute and unconditional; hence, his previous conviction
no longer barred him from running for an elective public office.
The COMELEC en banc denied Risos-Vidal's motion for
reconsideration, 16 prompting her to file the present petition
for certiorari, where she alleged that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the assailed COMELEC resolutions. 17
While the petition was pending before the Court, the 2013
elections took place. Neither the COMELEC nor this Court barred
Erap from running and being voted upon. He obtained 349,770
votes and was proclaimed as the "duly elected" Mayor on May 14,
2013. His opponent, Lim, obtained 313,764 votes and conceded that
Erap had won. 18
C. The Lim Intervention.
On June 7, 2013 — i.e., after the 2013 elections; Erap's
proclamation as elected Mayor; his concession of the elections to
Erap; and while the present petition was pending before the Court —
Lim (Erap's opponent in the mayoralty race) filed a motion for leave
to intervene, which motion the Court granted in a Resolution dated
June 25, 2013.
IV.
The Issues for Resolution
The main issue in this case is whether the COMELEC
committed GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in ruling that Erap had
been extended a PARDON that qualified him to run for City Mayor
of Manila in the 2013 elections.
Interrelated with this issue is the question of whether or
not the COMELEC committed GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in
dismissing the Risos-Vidal petition based on the 2010 COMELEC
rulings that Erap's pardon restored his rights to vote and to be
voted for a public office.
Closely related to these main issues is the question of
whether — based on the voting circumstances that surrounded the
2010 and 2013 elections — equitable reasons exist that should now
prevent the Court from declaring Erap ineligible for the position to
which he had been elected by the majority of Manila voters.
Central to these issues is the determination of the nature
and effects of the pardon granted to Erap, as well as the effects of
all the developments in the case on the electorate — the innocent
third party whose exercise of the democratic right to vote underlies
the present dispute.
A tangential side issue that should be settled for its
jurisprudential value is the legal propriety of the intervention of
Alfredo S. Lim only at the Supreme Court level.
Other subsidiary issues must necessarily be resolved to get
at the main and side issues. They shall all be topically identified in
the course of resolving the leading issues. IaDcTC
V.
My Separate Opinion
A. Preliminary Considerations.
A.1. The Standard of Review in Considering the present
petition.
In the review of the COMELEC's ruling on the Risos-Vidal
petition, an issue that we must settle at the outset is the nature and
extent of the review we shall undertake. This determination is
important so that everyone — both the direct parties as well as the
voting public — will know and understand how this case was
decided and that the Court had not engaged in any kind of
"overreach."
Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution provides that unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party." A similar provision was
found in the 1973 Constitution.
In Aratuc v. COMELEC (a 1979 case) 19 the Court clarified
that unlike in the 1935 Constitution where the Court had the power
of review over the decisions, orders and rulings of the
COMELEC, 20 the 1973 Constitution changed the nature of this
remedy from appellate review to certiorari.
Aratuc explained that under the then existing Constitution
and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over
orders, and decisions of the COMELEC was not as broad as it used to
be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. 21
The Court further observed that these constitutional,
statutory and jurisprudential changes show the definite intent to
enhance and invigorate the role of the COMELEC as the
independent constitutional body tasked to safeguard free, peaceful
and honest elections. In other words, the limited reach and scope
of certiorari, compared with appellate review, direct that utmost
respect be given the COMELEC as the constitutional body given the
charge of elections. 22
A.1(a) Certiorari v. Appeal.
An appellate review includes the full consideration of the
merits, demerits and errors of judgment in the decision under
review, while certiorari deals exclusively with the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction that rendered the assailed decision or ruling a nullity;
such kind of abuse is way beyond mere error in the assailed
judgment or ruling, and is not necessarily present in a valid but
erroneous decision.
A.1(b) Grave Abuse of Discretion.
The grave abuse of discretion that justifies the grant
of certiorari involves a defect of jurisdiction brought about, among
others, by an indifferent disregard for the law, arbitrariness and
caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, or a decision
arrived at without rational deliberation 23 — due process
issues that rendered the decision or ruling void.
Our 1987 Constitution maintained the same remedy
of certiorari in the review of COMELEC decisions elevated to the
Supreme Court as the Constitutional Convention deliberations
show. 24 This constitutional provision has since then been reflected
under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
Aside from the jurisdictional element involved, another
basic and important element to fully understand the remedy
of certiorari, is that it applies to rulings that are not, or are no
longer, appealable. Thus, certiorari is not an appeal that opens up
the whole case for review; it is limited to a consideration of a
specific aspect of the case, to determine if grave abuse of discretion
had intervened.
For example, it is a remedy that may be taken against an
interlocutory order (or one that does not resolve the main disputed
issue in the case and is thus not a final order on the merits of the
case) that was issued with grave abuse of discretion. This is the
remedy to address a denial of a bill of particulars 25 or of the right
to bail 26 by the trial court in a criminal case. It is also the sole
remedy available against a COMELEC ruling on the merits of a case
as this ruling on the main disputed issue is considered by the
Constitution and by the law to be final and non-appealable. 27
A.1(c) Application of the Standards of Review to the
COMELEC Ruling.
To assail a COMELEC ruling, the assailing party must show
that the final and inappealable ruling is void, not merely
erroneous, because the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in considering the case or in issuing its ruling. EHSADa
Under our established jurisprudence, this grave abuse of
discretion has been almost uniformly defined as a "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion, to be grave, must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."
The present Erap case is an election case brought from a
ruling of the COMELEC en banc to this Court as an independent
action for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation with Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and must perforce be judged under the above-
discussed standards.
The question before us is not simply whether the COMELEC
erred in appreciating the nature of the pardon granted to Erap and
in relying on its 2010 rulings on this matter; the question to ask
is, even if the COMELEC did err, whether its error is to the point of
grave abuse of discretion.
1. The Interests of the Electorate.
As I narrated above, the Erap story did not end with his
crime and conviction. While he had undeniably committed a crime
involving betrayal of the public trust, he was subsequently and
lawfully pardoned for his misdeed. While jurisprudence may be
divided on the effects of pardon (i.e., whether it erases both the
guilt and the penalty), the various cases giving rise to this
jurisprudence do not appear to have considered at all the election
setting that presently confronts us.
 Where the crime from which the guilt resulted is not
unknown and was in fact a very widely publicized event in the
country when it happened, the subsequent electoral judgment of
the people on the recipient of the executive clemency cannot and
should not be lightly disregarded. People participation is the
essence of democracy and we should be keenly aware of the
people's voice and heed it to the extent that the law does not bar
this course of action. In case of doubt, the sentiment that the
people expressed should assume primacy.
When the recipient of pardon is likewise the people's
choice in an election held after the pardon, it is well to remember
that pardon is an act of clemency and grace exercised to mitigate
the harshness of the application of the law and should be
understood in this spirit, i.e., in favor of the grantee whom the
people themselves have adjudged and found acceptable.
It ought not be forgotten that in two high profile elections,
the State had allowed Erap to offer himself as a candidate without
any legal bar and without notice to the voting public that a vote for
him could be rendered useless and stray.
In the 2010 presidential elections, he had offered himself
as a presidential candidate and his candidacy was objected to,
among others, because of the nature of the pardon extended to
him. The COMELEC resolved the objection and he was voted upon
without any formal notice of any legal bar to his candidacy. It is now
a matter of record and history that he landed 2nd in these elections,
in a field of ten (10) candidates, with 9,487,837 voting for him as
against the winner who garnered 15,208,678 votes. To Erap's credit,
he gracefully accepted his electoral defeat. 28
In 2013, he again ran for office. He won this time but a case
was again filed against him with the COMELEC and the case
eventually reached this Court. This is the present case.
The COMELEC cleared Erap by election day of 2013,
dismissing the disqualification case against him and ruling that the
pardon granted to him restored his right to vote and to be voted
upon. Notably, even this Court did not prevent Erap's candidacy and
did not prevent him from being voted upon after his disqualification
case was brought to this Court. Thus, the people went to the polls
and voted Erap into office with no expectation that their votes
could be rendered stray.
Under these circumstances, we cannot and should not
rashly rule on the basis of black letter law and jurisprudence that
address only the fact of pardon; we cannot forget the election
setting and simply disregard the interests of the voters in our ruling.
While the people were not impleaded as direct parties to the case,
we cannot gloss over their interests as they are the sovereign who
cannot be disregarded in a democratic state like ours. ETCcSa
2. The Intervention of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim.
I have included the intervention of former Mayor Alfredo S.
Lim as a matter for Preliminary Consideration as it is an immaterial
consideration under my position that the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in its assailed ruling. Despite its immateriality, I
nevertheless discuss it in light of the Court's prior action approving
his intervention, which court approval was an interlocutory order
that is subject to the Court's final ruling on the merits of the case.
I have to discuss the intervention, too, for jurisprudential
reasons: this intervention, apparently granted without indepth
consideration, may sow confusion into the jurisprudence that those
who came before us in this Court took pains to put in order.
2.a. Intervention in General.
Intervention is a remedy whereby a third party, not
originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant in the
case so that the intervenor could protect or preserve a right or
interest that may be affected by the proceedings.
The intervenor's interest must be actual, substantial,
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.
As discussed below, there are also other equally important
limitations and restrictions to consider before an intervention can
be allowed, among them, the need for the intervention to be timely
filed.
2.b. The context of Lim's intervention.
The timing and incidents of Lim's intervention are
jurisprudentially interesting and, by themselves, speak loudly
against his cause.
The records of this case show that Lim never filed any
petition to cancel Erap's CoC nor to disqualify him. Neither did he
intervene in the COMELEC proceedings in the Risos-Vidal petition.
Instead, Lim allowed Erap to continue as his rival candidate in the
2013 elections for Mayor of the City of Manila.
It will be recalled that Risos-Vidal filed her petition
for certiorari before this Court on April 30, 2013 (or before the May
13, 2013 elections). Lim likewise did not intervene at that point.
Erap won in the elections and in fact, on May 14, 2013, Lim publicly
announced that he respected and acknowledged the COMELEC's
proclamation of Erap and wished him all the best. 29
On June 7, 2013 (25 days after the May 13, 2013 elections,
or 24 days after Erap's proclamation, and 24 days likewise after Lim
conceded victory to Erap), Lim then filed with this Court his motion
for leave to intervene with the attached petition-in-intervention. His
arguments were: 1) Erap was disqualified to run for public office as
his pardon did not restore his rights to vote and to hold public
office; 30 and 2) his intervention was still timely.
Lim also argued that it would have been premature to
intervene in the Risos-Vidal petition before the proclamation
because had Erap's votes not then been counted, they would have
been considered stray and intervention would have been
unnecessary. Lim further argued that, in view of Erap's
disqualification, he should be declared as the winner, having
obtained the second highest number of votes. Lim also additionally
alleged that he never conceded defeat, and the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Risos-Vidal's
petition for disqualification based on its 2010 rulings. 31
2.c. Lim's petition-in-intervention should be dismissed.
Since Lim intervened only in the present petition
for certiorari before this Court, the Rules of Court on intervention
directly applies. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides
that the time to intervene is at any time before the rendition of
judgment by the trial court. AaCcST
The Court explained in Ongco v. Dalisay 32 that "the period
within which a person may intervene is restricted and after the lapse
of the period set in Section 2, Rule 19, intervention will no longer be
warranted. This is because, basically, intervention is not an
independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation."
In Ongco, 33 the Court further traced the developments of
the present rule on the period to file a motion for intervention. The
former rule was that intervention may be allowed "before or during
a trial." Thus, there were Court rulings that a motion for leave to
intervene may be filed "before or during a trial," even on the day
when the case is submitted for decision as long as it will not unduly
delay the disposition of the case. 34 There were also rulings where
the Court interpreted "trial" in the restricted sense such that the
Court upheld the denial of the motion for intervention when it was
filed after the case had been submitted for decision. 35 In Lichauco
v. CA, 36 intervention was allowed at any time after the rendition of
the final judgment. 37 In one exceptional case, 38 the Court allowed
the intervention in a case pending before it on appeal in order to
avoid injustice.
To cure these inconsistent rulings, the Court clarified
in Ongco that "[t]he uncertainty in these rulings has been eliminated
by the present Section 2, Rule 19, which permits the filing of the
motion to intervene at any time before the rendition of the
judgment, in line with the ruling in Lichauco. 39
The justification for this amendment is that before
judgment is rendered, the court, for good cause shown, may still
allow the introduction of additional evidence as this is still within a
liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no
judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the
intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in the
judgment disposing of all claims in the case, without requiring an
overall reassessment of these claims as would be the case if the
judgment had already been rendered. 40
The Court held in Ongco that under the present rules, [t]he
period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. . .
after the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This
is because, basically, intervention is not an independent action but is
ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. 41
The Court further held in Ongco that "there is wisdom in
strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court for
the filing of a motion for intervention. Otherwise, undue delay
would result from many belated filings of motions for intervention
after judgment has already been rendered, because a reassessment
of claims would have to be done. Thus, those who slept on their
lawfully granted privilege to intervene will be rewarded, while the
original parties will be unduly prejudiced." 42
While the Court may have liberally relaxed the rule on
intervention in some cases, a liberal approach cannot be made in
the present case because of jurisdictional restrictions, further
explained below.
Other than these reasons, I add that under COMELEC rules,
only "a person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding
may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be
permitted by the Commission, in its discretion, to intervene in such
action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
such action or proceeding." Thus, Lim could have intervened at the
COMELEC level before or during the hearing of the petition for
disqualification that Risos-Vidal filed.
The records show that Lim intervened only after Risos-Vidal
filed the present petition for certiorari with the Court and not during
the disqualification proceedings before the COMELEC. He was
therefore never a party in the disqualification proceeding before the
COMELEC and, consequently, has not presented any evidence to
support his claims; nor was Erap ever given the chance to controvert
Lim's claims before the COMELEC, the tribunal vested with the
jurisdiction to settle the issues that he raised in his petition-in-
intervention before the Court.
From the perspective of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, I add
that because Lim was not a party before the COMELEC, he never
had the chance to file a motion for reconsideration before that body
— a constitutional and procedural requirement before a petition
for certiorari may be filed before the Court. 43 As a non-party to
the disqualification case before the COMELEC, he cannot be deemed
an "aggrieved party" who has earned the rights under Rule 65 to file
a certiorari petition or to intervene to assail the COMELEC's
decision. The Court, in particular, has no jurisdiction to grant the
prayer of Lim to be declared as the winner, especially since the
COMELEC never had the chance to rule on this in its assailed
decision.
The original jurisdiction to decide election disputes lies with
the COMELEC, not with this Court. 44 Thus, any ruling from us in the
first instance on who should sit as mayor (in the event we grant the
Risos-Vidal petition) will constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Unfortunately, no recourse is available from our ruling.
This character of finality renders it very important for us to settle
the Lim intervention correctly. AEIHCS
At this juncture, I refer back to Ongco, where the Court
held that the filing of a motion for intervention with the CA after the
MTC had rendered judgment is an inexcusable delay and is a
sufficient ground for denying a motion for intervention. 45
Note that in Ongco, the Court still upheld the CA's denial of
the motion for intervention and strictly applied the period to
intervene even if what was involved was an appeal or a continuation
of the proceedings of the trial court.
In contrast, the present case is not a continuation of the
COMELEC proceedings and decision, but an original special civil
action of certiorari. Thus, with more reason should the rules on
intervention be more stringently applied, given too that the Court
has no original jurisdiction over the issues involved in the requested
intervention, in particular, over the issue of who should sit as Mayor
of the City of Manila if Risos-Vidal petition would be granted.
As my last two points on the requested intervention, I
would deny the intervention even if it technically satisfies the rules
by reason of the estoppel that set in when Lim publicly announced
that he was acknowledging and respecting Erap's proclamation. This
public announcement is an admission against his interest that, in a
proper case, would be admissible against Lim.
I also disregard outright, for lack of relevance, the cases
that Lim cited regarding intervention. In his cited Maquiling v.
COMELEC 46 and Aratea v. COMELEC 47 cases, the intervenors filed
their intervention before the COMELEC and not before the Court.
Thus, any reliance on these cases would be misplaced.
In sum, I maintain that Lim should be barred from
participating in the present case as intervenor. Otherwise, the Court
will effectively throw out of the window the jurisprudence that has
developed on intervention, while disregarding as well the sound and
applicable COMELEC rules on the same topic.
VI.
The Merits of the Petition
A.
On the Issue of Pardon and
the COMELEC's Grave Abuse of Discretion.
The COMELEC did not err at all and thus could not have
committed grave abuse of discretion in its ruling that the terms of
Erap's pardon restored to him the right to vote and to be voted
upon. Too, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing the petition of Risos-Vidal and in citing its 2010 final and
executory rulings that Erap's pardon restored his right to vote and
be voted upon.
A.1. Pardoning Power and the Pardon Extended.
Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides for the
pardoning power of the President. It states that except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
Pardon is defined as an act of grace, proceeding from the
power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment that the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. 48
The power to pardon, when exercised by the Chief
Executive in favor of persons convicted of public crimes, is plenary,
limited only by the terms of the Constitution; its exercise within
these limits is otherwise absolute and fully discretionary. The
reasons for its exercise are not open to judicial inquiry or review, The proposal was primarily intended to IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the
and indeed it would appear that he may act without any reason, or prevent the President from protecting his authority conferred upon me by the
at least without any expressed reason, in support of his action. 49 cronies. Manifestly, however, the Constitution, I hereby grant executive
Where appropriate, however, his acts may be subject to Commission preferred to trust in the clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
the expanded jurisdiction of the Court under Article VIII, Section 1, discretion of Presidents and refrained from convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder
paragraph 2 of the Constitution. This jurisdiction may be triggered, putting additional limitations on his and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
for example, if the President acts outside, or in excess, of the limits clemency powers. (II RECORD of the He is hereby restored to his civil and political
of the pardoning power granted him, as when he extends a pardon Constitutional Commission, 392, 418-419, rights.
for a crime as yet not committed or when he extends a pardon 524-525) The forfeitures imposed by the
before conviction. 50 It is evident from the intent of the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full,
Llamas v. Orbos, 51 a 1991 case, discussed the extent and Constitutional Commission, therefore, that including all writs and processes issued by the
scope of the President's pardoning power: DaESIC the President's executive clemency powers Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except
During the deliberations of the Constitutional may not be limited in terms of coverage, for the bank account(s) he owned before his
Commission, a subject of deliberations was except as already provided in the tenure as President.
the proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 Constitution, that is, "no pardon, amnesty, Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH
which reads as follows: "However, the power parole, or suspension of sentence for violation EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take
to grant executive clemency for violation of of election laws, rules and regulations shall be effect.
corrupt practices laws may be limited by granted by the President without the Structurally, this grant is composed of two parts, namely,
legislation." The Constitutional Commission, favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" the introductory Whereas Clauses consisting of three (3)
however, voted to remove the amendment, (Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those paragraphs, and the Dispositive or Command portion which defines
since it was in derogation of the powers of the already adjudged guilty criminally in court the clemency extended and commands its implementation.
President. As Mr. Natividad stated: may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty
In issuing a pardon, the President not only exercises his full
administratively should likewise be extended
I am also against this discretion but likewise directs and gives notice to all — the
the same benefit. [Emphasis supplied]
provision which will again recipient, the officials and entities concerned — that the recipient
chip more powers from the In considering and interpreting the terms of the should now be released and his disqualification lifted, pursuant to
President. In case of other pardon therefore, the starting point for analysis is the position that the terms of the pardon. In this sense, the structure of the written
criminals convicted in our the President's power is full and plenary, save only for the textual pardon assumes importance as pardon has to be implemented in
society we extend probation limits under the Constitution. In the exercise of this power, too, it is accordance with its express terms and is no different in this sense
to them while in this case, not unreasonable to conclude, in the absence of any plain and from a judicial decision that likewise must be implemented.
they have already been expressed contrary intention, that the President exercised the full
In judicial decisions, the Court's resolution on a given issue
convicted and we offer scope of his power.
before it is always embodied in the decision or order's fallo or
mercy. The only way we can A.2. Structural Examination of the Erap Pardon. dispositive portion. 52 It is the directive part of the decision or order
offer mercy to them is The whole text of the pardon that PGMA granted states: which must be enforced or, in legal parlance, subjected to
through this executive WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of execution. A court that issues an order of execution contrary to the
clemency extended to them releasing inmates who have reached the age terms of its final judgment exceeds its jurisdiction, thus rendering its
by the President. If we still of seventy (70), order invalid. 53 Hence, the order of execution should always follow
close this avenue to them, WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been the terms of the fallo or dispositive portion. AaHDSI
they would be prejudiced under detention for six and half years, Other than the fallo, a decision or executory order contains
even worse than the a body — the court's opinion — explaining and discussing the
murderers and the more WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any decision. This opinion serves as the reason for the decision or order
vicious killers in our society . embodied in the fallo. In legalese, this opinion embodies the
elective position or office,
... decision's ratio decidendi 54 or the matter or issue directly ruled
upon and the terms and reasons for the ruling.
 The decision's structure has given rise in certain instances
to conflicts, or at the very least, to ambiguities that clouded the
implementation of the decision. In Gonzales v. Solid Cement
Corporation, 55 this Court laid down the rule when these instances
occur: in a conflict between the body of the decision and its fallo or
dispositive portion, the rule is:
The resolution of the court in a given issue —
embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a
decision or order — is the controlling factor
in resolving the issues in a should be dismissed, the Court then held that the body should
case. Thefallo embodies the court's decisive
action on the issue/s posed, and is thus the
part of the decision that must be enforced
during execution. The other parts of the
decision only contain, and are aptly called,
the ratio decidendi (or reason for the
decision) and, in this sense, assume a lesser
role in carrying into effect the tribunal's
disposition of the case.
When a conflict exists between the
dispositive portion and the opinion of the
court in the text or body of the decision, the
former must prevail over the latter under the
rule that the dispositive portion is the
definitive order, while the opinion is merely
an explanatory statement without the effect
of a directive. Hence, the execution must
conform with what the fallo or dispositive
portion of the decision ordains or
decrees. 56 [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, the body of the decision (or opinion portion) carries
no commanding effect; the fallo or dispositive portion carries the
definite directive that prevails over whatever is written in the
opinion of the court. The body contains the reasons or conclusions
of the court, but orders nothing; execution springs from the fallo or
dispositive portion, not from the decision's body or opinion
portion. In short, the fallo or dispositive portion prevails in case of
conflict.
I say all these, aware that in Cobarrubias v. People, 57 the
Court made an exception to the general rule that the fallo or
dispositive portion always prevails over the decision or order's body.
The exception is when one can clearly and unquestionably conclude,
based on the body of the decision and its discussions, that a mistake
had been committed in formulating the dispositive portion. In such
cases, reason dictates that the body of the decision should
prevail. 58
This contrary Cobarrubias result, to be properly
understood, must be read and considered in its factual context. In
this case, the court itself made a blatant mistake in the dispositive
portion as it mixed up the criminal docket case numbers, thus
resulting in the erroneous dismissal of the wrong criminal case.
Since the decision's body very clearly discussed which criminal case
prevail over the dispositive portion. In other words, when the
decision's intent is beyond doubt and is very clear but was simply
beclouded by an intervening mistake, then the body of the decision
must prevail.
A pardon, as an expression of an executive policy decision
that must be enforced, hews closely to the structure of a court
decision. Their structures run parallel with each other, with the
Whereas Clauses briefly stating the considerations recognized and,
possibly, the intents and purposes considered, in arriving at the
directive to pardon and release a convicted prisoner.
Thus, while a pardon's introductory or Whereas Clauses
may be considered in reading the pardon (in the manner that the
opinion portion of a court decision is read), these whereas clauses
— as a rule — cannot also significantly affect the pardon's
dispositive portion. They can only do so and in fact may even
prevail, but a clear and patent reason indicating a mistake in the
grantor's intent must be shown, as had happened
in Cobarrubias where a mistake intervened in the fallo.
A.3. The Pardon Extended to Erap Examined.
A.3(a) The Decision Convicting Erap.
To fully understand the terms of the granted executive
clemency, reference should be made to the September 12, 2007
decision of the Sandiganbayan which states: cTCaEA
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case
No. 26558 finding the accused, Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by
Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the
other hand, for failure of the prosecution to
prove and establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S.
Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder
and, accordingly, the Court hereby orders
their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been
under detention shall be credited to him in
full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing
to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby
declares the forfeiture in favor of the
government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty
Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety One
Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), n with
interest and income earned, inclusive of the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and
account of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine
Million Pesos (P189,000,000.00), inclusive of
interests and income earned, deposited in the
Jose Velarde account.
 (3) The real property consisting of a house
and lot dubbed as Boracay Mansion located at
#100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose
Jinggoy Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio
are hereby ordered cancelled and released to
the said accused or their duly authorized
representatives upon presentation of the
original receipt evidencing payment thereof
and subject to the usual accounting and
auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-
departure orders issued against the said
accused are hereby recalled and
declared functus officio.
SO ORDERED. HCSDca
A.3(b) The Pardon in light of the Judgment of
Conviction.
This judgment has several components, namely: the finding
of guilt; the principal penalty of imprisonment imposed; the
inherent accessory penalties; the confiscation and forfeitures; and
the disposition of the cash bonds that the acquitted accused filed.
Of these, actions on the forfeitures and the cash bonds
have apparently been recognized as completed pursuant to Article
45 of the RPC, and have been expressly excluded from the executive
clemency. 59 Thus, what remained for the executive clemency to
touch upon were the principal and the accessory penalties that were
outstanding,i.e., the remaining terms of the imprisonment; and the
accessory penalties decreeing that Erap is "restored to his civil and
political rights."
B.
The Risos-Vidal's
Objections Relating to Pardon.
The Risos-Vidal petition sows confusion into the plain terms
of the executive clemency by arguing that: first, the Third Whereas
Clause (referring to Erap's public commitment that he would no
longer seek public office) in fact embodies a condition for the grant
of the executive clemency; and second, no express restoration of
the right to hold public office and to suffrage was made as the
"restoration" was under general terms that did not cover these
specific rights.
B.1. Refutation of the Risos-Vidal Objections.
B.1(a) "Absolute Pardon" as Officially Defined.
A ready reference to understand a pardon is its official
definition under the applicable law and applicable rules and
regulations. The definition of absolute pardonappears in the rules
and regulations of the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP). 60 The
BPP is the constituent office in the Executive
Department 61 responsible for the handling of cases of pardon upon
petition, or any referral by the Office of the President on pardons
and parole, or motu propio. 62 In other words, the BPP is the
foremost authority on what its title plainly states — pardons and
paroles.
Under the BPP's Revised Rules and Regulations, "absolute
pardon" refers "to the total extinction of the criminal liability of
the individual to whom it is granted without any condition. It
restores to the individual his civil and political rights and remits the
penalty imposed for the particular offense of which he was
convicted."63
Aside from absolute pardon, there is the conditional
pardon 64 which is defined as "the exemption of an individual,
within certain limits or conditions, from the punishment which the
law inflicts for the offense he had committed resulting in the partial
extinction of his criminal liability."
These are the authoritative guidelines in determining the
nature and extent of the pardon the President grants, i.e., whether
it is absolute or conditional. To stress, the BPP is the body that
investigates and recommends to the President whether or not a
pardon should be granted to a convict, and that closely coordinates
with the Office of the President on matters of pardons and parole.
Even a cursory examination of the Erap pardon and the BPP
Rules would show that the wordings of the pardon, particularly on
civil and political rights, carried the wordings of the BPP Rules. Thus,
Erap's pardon states:
IN VIEW HEREOF, and pursuant to the
authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency
to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.
In these lights, when PGMA (as President and Head of the
Executive Department to which the BPP belongs) granted Erap
executive clemency and used the words of the BPP rules and
regulations, she raised the inference that her grant was in the
spirit in which the terms of the pardon are understood in the BPP
rules.
In other words, she clearly intended the granted pardon to
be absolute. Thus, the pardon granted totally extinguished the
criminal liability of Erap, including the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification. It cannot be otherwise under the plain and
unequivocal wording of the definition of absolute pardon, and the
statement in the pardon that Erap is restored to his civil and
political rights. DTSIEc
B.2. The Third Whereas Clause as a Condition.
The pardon extended to Erap was very briefly worded.
After three short Whereas Clauses referring to: the Administration
policy on the release of inmates; 65 the period Erap had been under
detention; 66 and Erap's attributed past statement publicly
committing that he would "no longer seek any elective
position, 67 the pardon proceeds to its main directives touching on
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory
penalties by expressly restoring Erap's civil and political rights.
Unlike in a court decision where the ratio decidendi fully
expounds on the presented issues and leads up to the dispositive
portion, the Whereas Clauses all related to Erap but did not, singly
or collectively, necessarily indicate that they are conditions that
Erap must comply with for the continued validity of his pardon.
Notably, the first two Whereas Clauses are pure statements
of fact that the grantor recognized, referring as they do to an
administration policy and to the age of Erap.
The statement on the administration policy of releasing
convicts who are 70 years old, to be sure, could not have been
intended to be conditional so that a future change of policy or a
mistake in Erap's age would have led to the invalidity of the pardon.
Purely and simply, these two Whereas clauses were nothing more
than statements of fact that the grantor recognized in the course of
considering the pardon and they were never intended to operate as
conditions.
The third Whereas Clause, one of the three clauses that the
pardon contains, is similarly a statement of fact — what Erap had
publicly committed in the past, i.e., that he would no longer seek
public office. Such a statement would not be strange coming from a
70-year-old man convicted of plunder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua (literally, life imprisonment) and who, in the ordinary
course, looks forward to an extended prison term. Under these
conditions, he could easily say he would not seek political office
again.
Of course, because the statement, standing by itself, can be
equivocal, it can also be read with a bias against Erap and be
understood to be a promise or a "commitment." The plain reality,
however, is that this clause does not bear the required context that
would lead to this conclusion, and is totality lacking in any indicator
that would make it a condition for the pardon. In short, a clear link
to this kind of conclusion is plainly missing.
This link, for example, would have been there and would
have radically changed the meaning of this Whereas clause had it
stated that Erap publicly committed that, if pardoned, he would not
seek public office. No such link, however, appears in the body of the
pardon, nor is any evidence available from the records of the case,
to show that a promissory commitment had been made and
adopted by PGMA, as grantor.
Thus, as matters stand, the third Whereas clause stands in
the same footing and should be characterized in the same manner
that the two other clauses are characterized: singly or collectively,
they are simply declarations of what the grantor recognized as facts
at the time the pardon was granted. In the manner the Court spoke
of preambles in the case of Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., 68 the Whereas clauses merely manifest
considerations that cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations 69 and cannot make the Erap pardon conditional.
Simply as an aside (as I feel the topic does not deserve any
extended consideration), I do not believe that the "acceptance" of
the pardon is important in the determination of whether the
pardon extended is absolute or conditional.
Irrespective of the nature of the pardon, the moment the
convict avails of the clemency granted, with or without written
acceptance, then the pardon is already accepted. If this is to be the
standard to determine the classification of the pardon, then there
would hardly be any absolute pardon; upon his release, the pardon
is deemed accepted and therefore conditional.
If an express acceptance would serve a useful purpose at
all, it is in the binding effect that this acceptance would put in place.
As in the case of an appointment, a pardon can be withdrawn at any
time before it is accepted by the grantor. Acceptance would thus be
the means to tie the grantor to the grant.
What is important, to my mind, is proof of the
communication of the pardon to the convict, in the cases when
terms and conditions are attached to the pardon. Communications
of these terms, and proof that the convict availed himself of the
granted clemency, would suffice to conclude that the terms and
conditions had been accepted and should be observed.
B.3. Any Doubt Should Take Popular Vote into Account.
At most, I can grant in a very objective reading of the bare
terms of the third Whereas clause that it can admit of various
interpretations. Any interpretative exercise, however, in order to be
meaningful and conclusive must bring into play relevant
interpretative aids, even those extraneous to the pardon, such as
the events that transpired since the grant of the pardon. This case,
in particular, the most relevant interpretative aids would be the two
elections where Erap had been a candidate, the electorate's choices,
and the significant number who voted in good faith to elect Erap.
In 2010, this number was sizeable but Erap only landed in
second place with a vote of 9,487,837 in a field of ten (10)
candidates. This result though cannot but be given appropriate
recognition since the elections were nationwide and Erap's
conviction and pardon were issues used against him.
In the 2013 elections (where Erap's qualification is
presently being contested), the results were different; he garnered
sufficient votes to win, beating the incumbent in this electoral fight
for the premiere post in the City of Manila. TcIaHC
Under these circumstances, no reason exists to disregard
the popular vote, given that it is the only certain determinant under
the uncertainty that petitioner Risos-Vidal NOW TRIES to introduce
in the present case. If this is done and the popular vote is
considered together with the official definition of pardon under the
BPP regulations, the conclusion cannot but be the recognition by
this Court that Erap had been given back his right to vote and be
voted upon.
B.3(a) The Express Restoration of the Right to Hold
Office.
The petitioner Risos-Vidal in her second substantive
objection posits that the pardon did not expressly include the right
to hold office, relying on Article 36 of the RPC that provides:
Pardon; its effects. — A pardon shall not work
on the restoration of the right to hold public
office or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon.
To the petitioner, it was not sufficient that under
the express terms of the pardon, Erap had been "restored to his civil
and political rights." Apparently, she wanted to find the exact
wording of the above-quoted Article 36 or, as stated in her various
submissions, that Erap should be restored to his "full" civil and
political rights.
To set the records straight, what is before us is not a
situation where a pardon was granted without including in the terms
of the pardon the restoration of civil and political rights. What is
before us is a pardon that expressly and pointedly restored these
rights; only, the petitioner wants the restoration in her own terms.
In raising this objection, the petitioner apparently refuses
to accept the official definition of "absolute pardon" pointed out
above; she also fails or refuses to grasp the full import of what the
term "civil and political rights" connotes. The term traces its roots to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 70 which in
turn traces its genesis to the same process that led to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a
signatory. 71
Closer to home, Republic Act No. 9225 (The Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003) also speaks of "Civil and
Political Rights and Liabilities" in its Section 5 by providing
that "Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all the
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines. . ." and in Section 5 (5) mentions the "right to vote and
be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines . . . ."
In Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, 72 the Court
categorically explained the rights included under the term "civil and
political rights," in the context of Section 18, Article XIII of the
Constitution which provides for the Commission on Human Rights'
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights."
According to Simon, the term "civil rights," 31* has been
defined as referring (t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of
the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are
not connected with the organization or administration of the
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. or, as otherwise
defined, civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of
his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in
its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in
a civil action. Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against
involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches
and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 73
Political rights, on the other hand, refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to
hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government. 74
In my view, these distinctions and enumerations of the
rights included in the term "civil and political rights," 75 as accepted
internationally and domestically, are sufficiently clear and cannot be
made the serious basis of the present objection, i.e., that further
specification should be made in light of Article 36 of the RPC that
requires the restoration of the rights of the right to suffrage and to
hold office to be express. To insist on this argument is to require to
be written into the pardon what is already there, in the futile
attempt to defeat the clear intent of the pardon by mere play of
words.
B.3(a)(i) The RPC Perspectives.
From the perspective of the RPC, it should be appreciated,
as discussed above, that a conviction carries penalties with varying
components. These are mainly the principal penalties and the
accessory penalties. 76
Reclusion perpetua, the penalty imposed on Erap, carries
with it the accessory penalty of civil interdiction for life or during the
period of the sentence and that ofperpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been remitted in the pardon.77
The full understanding of the full practical effects of
pardon on the principal and the accessories penalties as embodied
in the RPC, requires the combined reading of Articles 36 and 41 of
the RPC, with Article 41 giving full meaning to the requirement of
Article 36 that the restoration of the right to hold office be expressly
made in a pardon if indeed this is the grantor's intent. An express
mention has to be made of the restoration of the rights to vote and
be voted for since a pardon with respect to the principal penalty
would not have the effect of restoring these specific rights unless
their specific restoration is expressly mentioned in the pardon.
The Erap's pardon sought to comply with this RPC
requirement by specifically stating that he was "restored to his civil
and political rights." I take the view that this restoration already
includes the restoration of the right to vote and be voted for as
these are rights subsumed within the "political rights" that the
pardon mentions; in the absence of any express accompanying
reservation or contrary intent, this formulation grants a full
restoration that is coterminous with the remitted principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Risos-Vidal objects to this reading of Article 36 on the
ground that Section 36 78 and 41 79 expressly require that the
restoration be made specifically of the right to vote and to be voted
upon. J. Leonen supports Risos-Vidal's arguments and opines that
civil and political rights collectively constitute a bundle of rights and
the rights to vote and to be voted upon are specific rights expressly
singled out and required by these RPC articles and thus must be
expressly restored. It posits too that these are requirements of form
that do not diminish the pardoning power of the President. CcaASE
I note in this juncture that J. Leonen's position on the
requirements of Articles 36 and 41, is a very literal reading of 80-
year old provisions 80 whose interpretations have been overtaken
by events and should now be updated. As I discussed above,
technical meanings have since then attached to the term "civil and
political rights," which meanings cannot be disregarded without
doing violence to the safeguards that these rights have acquired
over the years.
In this age and time, "political rights" cannot be understood
meaningfully as rights with core values that our democratic system
protects, if these rights will not include the right to vote and be
voted for. To exclude the rights of suffrage and candidacy from the
restoration of civil and political rights shall likewise signify a
diminution, other than what the Constitution allows, of the scope of
pardon that the President can extend under the 1987 Constitution.
Significantly, this Constitution itself did not yet exist when the
Revised Penal Code was passed so that this Code could not have
taken into account the intent of the framers of this Constitution to
maintain the plenary nature of the pardoning power.81
B.3(a)(ii) Harmonization of Conflicting
Provisions.
Where seeming conflicts appear between or among
provisions of law, particularly between a constitutional provision
and a statute, the primary rule in understanding these seeming
conflicts is to harmonize them, giving effect to both provisions
within the limits of the constitutional provision. 82
As posed in this case, this seeming conflict occurs between
the terms and intent of the current Constitution to give the
President the full power to grant executive clemency, limited only
by the terms of the Constitution itself, on the one hand, and the
collective application of the Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC, on the
other.
In my view, harmonization occurs under the Erap pardon
by giving due recognition to the essentially plenary nature of the
President's pardoning power under Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution, while giving effect to the RPC intent to make clear in
the terms of the pardon the intent to restore the convict's rights to
vote and to be voted upon, as a matter of form that is satisfied by
reference to the restoration of political rights that, as now
understood internationally and domestically, include the restoration
of the right to vote and to be voted upon. Understood in this
manner, the RPC provisions would not be constitutionally infirm as
they would not diminish the pardoning power of the President.
To address another concern that J. Leonen expressed, no
need exists to require the President to grant the "full" restoration of
Erap's civil and political rights as this kind of interpretation renders
illusory the extent of the President's pardoning power by mere play
of words. In the absence of any contrary intent, the use of the
modifier "full" is an unnecessary surplusage.
B.3(a)(iii) The Monsanto v. Factoran Case.
I also address J. Leonen's discussion of the Monsanto v.
Factoran case.
Part and parcel of the topic "RPC Perspectives" is the
position that J. Leonen took in Monsanto — in the course of
repudiating Cristobal v. Labrador, 83 Pelobello v. Palatino84 and Ex
Parte Garland. 85 J. Leonen took notice of the statement
in Monsanto that "[t]he better considered cases regard full pardon .
. . as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualification or disabilities based on
finding of guilt." J. Leonen went on to state that this "including
phrase or inclusion" is not an authority in concluding that the grant
of pardon ipso facto remits the accessory disqualifications or
disabilities imposed on a convict regardless of whether the
remission was explicitly stated, 86 citing the following reasons:
First, J. Leonen maintains that the inclusion was not a
pronouncement of a prevailing rule but was merely a statement
made in the course of a comparative survey of cases during which
the Court manifested a preference for "authorities [that reject] the
unduly broad language of the Garland case." 87
 Second, the footnote to the inclusion indicates
that Monsanto relied on a case decided by a United States court.
Thus, Monsanto was never meant as a summation of the controlling
principles in this jurisdiction and did not consider Articles 36 and 41
of the RPC.
Lastly, J. Leonen argues that even granting that the
inclusion articulated a rule, this inclusion, made in 1989, must be
deemed to have been abandoned, in light of the Court's more
recent pronouncements — in 1997, in People v. Casido, 88 and in
2000, in People v. Patriarca 89 — which cited with approval this
Court's statement in Barrioquinto v. Fernandez. 90
J. Leonen added that the Monsanto inclusion must also be
deemed superseded by the Court's ruling in Romeo Jalosjos v.
COMELEC 91 which recognized that "one who is previously
convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion
temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the accessory penalty shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon."
I disagree with these positions, particularly with the
statement that the Monsanto inclusion was overturned by Casido,
Patriarca (citing Barrioquinto) and Romeo Jalosjos.
I maintain that the inclusion was the ratio decidendi of the
case and was not just a passing statement of the Court.
In Monsanto, the Court emphasized that a pardon may remit all the
penal consequences of a criminal indictment. 92 The Court even
applied this statement by categorically ruling that the full pardon
granted to Monsanto "has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment." 93 In fact, J.
Leonen's interpretation of Monsanto is misleading; his conclusion
on the superiority of Casido, Patriarca and Jalosjos over Monsanto is
likewise misplaced and without basis.
For clarity, the inclusion phrase is part of the Court's
discussion in Monsanto and was made in the context that although
the Court repudiated the Garland ruling (as cited
in Pellobello and Cristobal) that pardon erases the guilt of the
convict, the Court still acknowledged that pardon may remove all
the punitive consequences of a convict's criminal act, including the
disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. 94
The complete discussion of the Court in Monsanto where J.
Leonen selectively lifted the inclusion for his own purposes is as
follows: 95
Having disposed of that preliminary point, we
proceed to discuss the effects of a full and
absolute pardon in relation to the decisive
question of whether or not the plenary
pardon had the effect of removing the
disqualifications prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
xxx xxx xxx
The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v.
Labrador cases, and several others show the
unmistakable application of the doctrinal case
of Ex Parte Garland, whose sweeping
generalizations to this day continue to hold
sway in our jurisprudence despite the fact
that much of its relevance has been
downplayed by later American decisions.
Consider the following broad statements:
A pardon reaches both the
punishment prescribed for
the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that
in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as if
he had never committed the
offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any
of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent
upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities
and restores him to all his
civil rights; it makes him, as
it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and
capacity.
Such generalities have not been universally
accepted, recognized or approved. The
modern trend of authorities now rejects the
unduly broad language of the Garland case
(reputed to be perhaps the most extreme
statement which has been made on the
effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the
more realistic approach. While a pardon has
generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as though he
never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of
a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact
of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the
moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not
forgetfulness.
The better considered cases regard full
pardon (at least one not based on the
offender's innocence) as relieving the party
from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act,including the disqualifications or
disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But
it relieves him from nothing more. "To say,
however, that the offender is a "new man",
and "as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense;" is to ignore the
difference between the crime and the
criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an
offense is a convicted criminal, though
pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the
law may regard him as more dangerous to
society than one never found guilty of crime,
though it places no restraints upon him
following his conviction."
xxx xxx xxx
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress
one vital point: While we are prepared to
concede that pardon may remit all the penal
consequences of a criminal indictment if only
to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon,
being a presidential prerogative, should not
be circumscribed by legislative action, we do
not subscribe to the fictitious belief that
pardon blots out the guilt of an individual
and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent. For whatever
may have been the judicial dicta in the past,
we cannot perceive how pardon can produce
such "moral changes" as to equate a
pardoned convict in character and conduct
with one who has constantly maintained the
mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
xxx xxx xxx
Pardon granted after conviction frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot
bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. This must be
constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of
the true character and purpose of the
privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and
effusive language of the Garland case, we are
in full agreement with the commonly-held
opinion that pardon does notipso
facto restore a convicted felon to public
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by
reason of the conviction although such
pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility
for appointment to that office.
xxx xxx xxx
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom
line: the absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of
the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt
and punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was likewise
removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the office which was
forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in
considering her qualifications and suitability
for the public post, the facts constituting her
offense must be and should be evaluated and
taken into account to determine ultimately
whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant
city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new
appointment. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted]
As against J. Leonen's interpretation of the Monsanto ruling
above, I deduce the following contrary points:
First, contrary to J. Leonen's statement, the Court took into
consideration the provisions of the RPC in arriving at its ruling
in Monsanto.
To reiterate, Monsanto exhaustively discussed the effects
of a full and absolute pardon on the accessory penalty of
disqualification. Hence, the Court ruled that the full pardon granted
to Monsanto resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment under the RPC but did not result in her
automatic reinstatement as Assistant City Treasurer due to the
repudiation of the Garland ruling cited in Pelobello and Labrador.
In contrast, the ruling of the Court
in Casido 96 and Patriarca, 97 which both cited Barrioquinto, 98 all
related to amnesty and not to pardon. The paragraph
in Casido andPatriarca that J. Leonen quoted to contradict
the Monsanto inclusion is part of the Court's attempt
in Casido and Patriarca to distinguish amnesty from pardon.
For clarity, below is the complete paragraph
in Casido 99 and Patriarca 100 where J. Leonen lifted the portion
(highlighted in bold) that he used to contradict the Monsanto
inclusion:
The theory of the respondents,
supported by the dissenting opinion, is
predicated on a wrong contention of the nature
or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be
distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief
Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of
Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is
granted to one after conviction; while amnesty
is to classes of persons or communities who may
be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution
and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives
the punishment, and for that reason it does
"nor work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence" (article 36,
Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense. 101 [Emphasis
supplied]
As between Monsanto, involving a full pardon, and the
three amnesty cases (Casido, Patriarca and
Barrioquinto), Monsanto clearly applies to the pardon that is
involved in the present case where the dispositive portion made a
restoration of Erap's civil and political rights. Note that the pardon
described in the amnesty cases does not even identify whether the
pardon being described was absolute or conditional. In fact, the
portion cited by the majority in the amnesty cases merely repeated
what Article 36 of the RPC provides. Monsanto, on the other hand
and to the contrary, took into consideration these RPC provisions on
disqualifications in relation with the effects of a full pardon.
 From this perspective, J. Leonen is thus careless and
misleading in immediately concluding that the Monsanto ruling on
"inclusion" was overturned by the amnesty cases.
Similarly, contrary to J. Leonen's argument, the ruling
in Romeo Jalosjos v. COMELEC (Jalosjos) did not supersede
the Monsanto ruling cited above.
In Jalosjos, 102 the Court merely reconciled the apparent
conflict between Section 40 (a) 103 of the Local Government Code
and Article 30 104 of the RPC, which provides for the effects of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. EcHAaS
The Court held in Jalosjos that Article 41 of the RPC
expressly states that one who was previously convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to
suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless this
accessory penalty had been expressly remitted in the pardon.
In Jalosjos, the accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in
the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon; hence,
Jalosjos' disqualification to run for elective office was deemed to
subsist. 105
Jalosjos could be harmonized with Monsanto in that the
latter also recognized the provisions of the RPC on the accessory
penalty of disqualification but holds that the full pardon remits this
disqualification.
In the present case, Erap's pardon fully complied with the
RPC requirements for the express remission of the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification as the pardon in fact restored
him to his civil and political rights. In this light, the Monsanto ruling
still applies: while the PGMA pardon does not erase Erap's guilt, it
nonetheless remitted his disqualification to run for public office
and to vote as it expressly restored him to his civil and political
rights.
The Office of the Solicitor General succinctly expressed
the Monsanto ratio decidendi when it said that the Court, despite
ruling against Monsanto, "nevertheless reaffirmed the well-settled
doctrine that the grant of pardon also removes one's absolute
disqualification or ineligibility to hold public office."
B.3(b) Arguments via the Interpretative Route.
Alternatively, if indeed the third Whereas clause had
injected doubt in the express and unequivocal restoration made,
then two interpretative recourses can be made to determine how
this doubt can be resolved.
B.3(b)(i) The Liberal Mode of Interpretation.
The first approach is to use by analogy the ruling and
reasoning in the case of Frank v. Wolfe 106 which involved
commutation of sentence, a lesser grant but which is an act of grace
nevertheless.
The Court held in this case that "it is a principle universally
recognized that all such grants are to the construed favorably to
the grantee, and strictly as to the grantor, not only because they
partake of the nature of a deed, and the general rule of
interpretation that the terms of a written instrument evidencing
with especial force to grants or pardon and
commutations, wherein the grantor executes the instrument with
little or no right on the part of the grantee to intervene in its
execution or dictate its terms, but because of the very nature of the
grant itself as an act of grace and clemency. (Bishop Crim. Law, sec.
757, and cases cited: Osborn v. U.S., 91 U.S. 474; Lee v. Murphy, 22
Grat. Va., 789.) Applying the rule we think that, if it had been the
intention of the commuting authority to deprive the prisoner of the
beneficent provisions of Act No. 1533, 107 language should have
been used and would have been used which would leave no room
for doubt as to its meaning, and would make clearly manifest the
object intended."
This approach, read with the plain meaning rule of
statutory interpretation (i.e., that an instrument should, as a first
rule, be read in accordance with the plain meaning that its words
import) 108 cannot but lead us to the conclusion that the Risos-
Vidal's "third Whereas Clause" objection should be thrown out for
lack of merit.
B.3(b)(ii) The Vox Populi Line of Cases.
The second approach is to accept that such doubt cannot
be resolved within the four corners of the written pardon and resort
should be taken to the external surrounding circumstances that
followed the grant and the interests involved (i.e., protection of the
interests of the electorate and the recognition of vox populi), as
already discussed above and supplemented by the rulings below.
In the Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal 109 line of cases involving the issue of ineligibility based on
the residency requirements, that Court declared that it must
exercise utmost caution before disqualifying a winning candidate,
shown to be the clear choice of the constituents to represent them
in Congress.
Citing Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 110 the Court held that time
and again it has liberally and equitably construed the electoral
laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our
people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to
give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Furthermore, to successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby
giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote.
Another significant ruling to consider is Malabaguio v.
COMELEC, et al. 111 involving the appreciation of ballots, the Court,
citing its ruling in Alberto v. COMELEC, 112 declared that election
cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
The Court further reiterated in Maruhom v. COMELEC, et
al. 113 its ruling that the question really boils down to a choice of
philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply the laws
relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the
naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or
substantial justice; in isolation or in context of social conditions;
harshly against or gently in favor of the voter's obvious choice. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms.
In Rulloda v. COMELEC, et al. 114 involving substitution of
candidates, the Court ruled that the purpose of election laws is to
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a
solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the
people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be
so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases
should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. 115
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities
and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to
the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of
the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results. 116
These rulings, applicable in a situation of doubt yields the
conclusion that the doubt, if any, in the present case should be
resolved in Erap's favor.
B.4. Conclusions on Pardon and Grave Abuse of
Discretion.
In the light of all the above arguments on pardon and the
refutation of the positions of the petitioner Risos-Vidal, I submit to
the Court that under the Rule 65 standard of review discussed
above, no compelling reason exists to conclude that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the pardon aspect
of the case.
No grave abuse of discretion could have been committed
as the COMELEC was correct in its substantive considerations and
conclusions. As outlined above, Erap indeed earned the right to vote
and to be voted for from the pardon that PGMA granted him. It is
the only reasonable and logical conclusion that can be reached
under the circumstances of the case.
C.
The Objections Relating to the 2010 COMELEC
Rulings in the Disqualification Trilogy.
As I previously discussed, despite the ponencia's resolution
that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling on
the issue of Erap's pardon, another crucial issue to be resolved is
whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in relying
on its 2010 rulings in dismissing the Risos-Vidal petition. DEScaT
This issue must be resolved in the present case as the
assailed COMELEC rulings did not rule specifically on the issue of
Erap's pardon but resolved instead that the issue of Erap's pardon is
already a previously "settled matter," referring to the consolidated
COMELEC Rulings in SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC),
entitled Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada and In Re:
Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M. From Running As
President Due to Constitutional Disqualification and Creating
Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B.
As I will discuss below, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in relying on its 2010 disqualification rulings in
dismissing Risos-Vidal's petition.
C.1. The Trilogy of Disqualification Cases in 2010.
As narrated above, 117 Erap's 2010 presidential candidacy
gave rise to three cases — the Pamatong, Pormento and Mary Lou
Estrada cases — all aimed at disqualifying him. The COMELEC duly
ruled in all these cases. If the effects of these rulings have been
muddled at all in the understanding of some, the confusion might
have been due to the failure to look at the whole 2010
disqualification scene and to see how these trilogy of
disqualification cases interacted with one another.
The three cases, appropriately given their respective
docket numbers, were heard at the same time. While they were
essentially based on the same grounds (hence, the
description trilogy or a series of three cases that are closely related
under a single theme — the disqualification of Erap), only
the Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada cases were formally
consolidated; the Pamatong case, the first of the cases, was not
included because Pamatong also sought the disqualification from
public office of PGMA on the ground that she is also constitutionally
barred from being re-elected.
Petitioner Pamatong expressly put in issue Erap's fitness to
be a candidate based on his previous conviction for plunder and the
terms of the pardon extended him by PGMA; the COMELEC, for its
part, directly ruled on the matter. To quote the relevant portions of
the COMELEC Resolution in Pamatong: 118
On December 28, 2009, Petitioner
Pamatong submitted his Position Paper on
Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria M. Arroyo, asking
the questions: Are they above the law? The
Petitioner Pamatong took the absolutist point of
view that former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada is banned forever from seeking the
same position of President of the Republic
having been previously elected as such
President. He also espoused the idea that
Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the
sitting President is forever banned from seeking
any other elective office, including a post such
as member of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, Petitioner maintains that
the pardon granted Estrada was conditioned
on his promise not to run for any public office
again. It was not a full pardon but was a
conditional one. The exercise of executive
clemency was premised on the condition that
former President Estrada should not run again
for Office of the President of the Philippines or
for any other public office. 119
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, there is absolutely no
indication that the executive clemency
exercised by President Gloria Arroyo to pardon
Former President Estrada was a mere
conditional pardon. It clearly stated that the
Former President is "restored to his civil and
political rights" and there is nothing in the
same which limits the restoration. The only
thing stated therein that may have some
bearing on the supposed condition is that
statement in the whereas clause that contained
the following: Whereas, Joseph Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office, but that is not a
condition but is merely part of the preliminary
statement. It cannot therefore serve to restrict
the operation of or prevail over the explicit
statement in the executive clemency which
restored all of Estrada's civil and political
rights, including the "right to vote and to be
voted for public office" for the position of the
Presidency.
This executive clemency granted to the
former President being absolute and
unconditional and having been accepted by
him, the same can no longer be
revoked. 120 [Emphasis supplied]
How the three cases exactly related to one another in
terms of the issues posed is described by the COMELEC in its
consolidated Resolution in the cases of Pormento andMary Lou
Estrada, as follows: 121
 However, as to the substantive aspect
of the case, the Respondent's Answer basically
raises and repleads the same defenses which
were relied upon in SPA 09-024, except for the
additional ground that "the grant of executive
clemency removed all legal impediments that
may bar his candidacy for the
Presidency." 122 These grounds consisted of:
(a) The "President" being alluded to
under section 4 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution refers to
the incumbent President;
(b) The Prohibition does not apply to
the person who merely serves
a tenure and not a complete
term;
(c) Joseph Estrada is not running for
reelection but is "running
again" for the same position of
President of the Philippines;
(d) The Provisions of section 4 (1st par),
Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is clear,
unequivocal and
unambiguous; hence not
subject to any interpretation;
(e) The evil sought to be prevented is
directed against the
incumbent President;
(f) The sovereignty of the people
should be paramount; and
(g) The grant of executive clemency
removed all legal
impediments that may bar his
candidacy for the
presidency. [Emphasis
supplied]
As arranged during the COMELEC's common hearing on the
trilogy, separate decisions were rendered simultaneously. 123 They
all touched on the issue of pardon. HCacDE
As likewise already explained above, all three cases became
final, executory and unappealable five (5) days after its
promulgation, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. 124 Since all the petitioners filed their respective
motions for reconsideration, finality was reckoned from the denial
of these motions.
Of the three, petitioner Pormento went one step further to
assail the final COMELEC ruling before this Court. His effort did not
bear fruitful result as the Court dismissed his petition for mootness
— when the Court issued its ruling, Erap had lost the 2013
presidential elections.
In the dismissal of the Pormento petition before this Court
[G.R. No. 191188], a nagging issue that has left some uncertainty is
the effect of the dismissal on the COMELEC'sPormento ruling. This
assailed COMELEC resolution tackled two issues: 1) the
constitutional prohibition on re-election; and 2) the nature of Erap's
pardon and its effect on his qualification to run for an elective public
office or as President.
The Court, however, in dismissing the case, focused its
discussions solely on the issue of the constitutional ban on re-
election and ruled that this issue had been rendered moot by the
supervening event of Erap's loss in the 2010 elections; the Court did
not discuss or even mention the issue of whether the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that Erap's pardon was
absolute and had restored his right to run for the Presidency.
In this situation, the assailed COMELEC ruling simply
becomes, not only final and executory, but unassailable. No appeal
is available as an appeal is barred by the Constitution. 125 No
petition for certiorari is likewise available unless another petition
had been filed within the period for filing allowed by the Rules of
Court. 126 Thus, the COMELEC rulings on the trilogy of
disqualification cases fully stand, enforceable according to their
terms. From the perspective of the Court, no enforceable ruling was
made nor any principle of law established. In other words, the final
ruling to be reckoned with in any future dispute is effectively the
COMELEC ruling.
C.2. The Risos-Vidal Petition and its Objections
against Erap's Status.
C.2(a) The Objections and its Fallacies.
The Risos-Vidal petition, fully supported by J. Leonen,
objects to the binding effect of the 2010 disqualification trilogy
decisions, on the claim that res judicata did not apply because
pardon was not an issue ruled upon in 2010.
This may have partly stemmed from the statement of
issues in the 2010 COMELEC Resolution in Pormento defining
the issues common to Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada,
disregarding the incidents that transpired in the trilogy and the
issues that Erap raised in his Answer. 127 Another source of
confusion perhaps was the fact that the COMELEC, in ruling on the
2013 Risos-Vidal petition, only cited the Pormento and Mary Lou
Estrada cases.
The objections, in my view, do not take into account
the sequence of events in 2010 on the filing of the disqualification
cases, the relationship of the disqualification cases with one
another, the law on the finality and binding effect of rulings, and
the reason for the COMELEC's citation of the Pormento and Mary
Lou Estrada rulings in the subsequent 2013 Risos-Vidal petition.
In Pamatong, Pamatong raised this issue in his Position
Paper. Thus, pardon was an issue raised and ruled upon. The same
process took place in the subsequent consolidated cases
of Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada, so that the COMELEC itself, in
its resolution of these cases, recognized that pardon was one of the
issues that Erap raised and accordingly ruled on the matter.
Significantly, the COMELEC rulings on the matter of pardon in all
three cases practically carried the same wording, revealing the
COMELEC's view that the cases constituted a trilogy that posed
practically the same issues, one of which is the pardon of Erap.
C.2(b) Res Judicata and its Application to the Case.
The COMELEC Second Division, in dismissing the Risos-Vidal
disqualification petition against Erap, emphasized that the issue of
whether Erap's pardon allowed him to run for office had already
been fully discussed in previous cases, and no longer needed re-
examination. The COMELEC additionally pointed out that petitioner
Risos-Vidal failed to provide sufficient reason to reverse its prior
decision.
J. Leonen noted that this Court is not barred by res
judicata from revisiting the issue of Erap's pardon; we can review
the COMELEC's decision because there is neither identity of the
parties, of subject matters, and of causes of action in the previous
disqualification cases. J. Leonen also pointed out that the Court had
not ruled with finality on the issue of Erap's pardon in Pormento,
because supervening events had rendered the case moot.
I disagree with J. Leonen. As I earlier pointed out, we must
review the COMELEC's decision using the standard of grave abuse
of discretion: we nullify the COMELEC ruling if it gravely abused its
discretion in ruling on the present case; if no grave abuse of
discretion existed, the Risos-Vidal petition should be dismissed
instead of being granted.
As I will proceed to discuss below, the COMELEC did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled in the present case that
Erap's pardon qualified him to run for an elective public office and
that this issue is a previously "settled matter." 128 I say this
because the principle of res judicata, under either of its two modes
— conclusiveness of judgment or bar by prior judgment — applies
in the present case.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: first, the bar by prior
judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Court;
and second, the preclusion of a settled issue or conclusiveness of
judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c) of the Rules of Court. The
COMELEC's 2010 decision resolving whether Erap's pardon allowed
him to run for elections precludes further discussion of the very
same issue in the 2013 petition filed against his candidacy.
Under our review in the present case that is limited to the
determination of grave abuse of discretion and not legal error, I
cannot agree with J. Leonen's strict application of the requisites of
bar by prior judgment. Jurisprudence has clarified that res
judicata does not require absolute identity, but merely substantial
identity. This consideration, under a grave abuse standard of review,
leads me to the conclusion that we cannot reverse the COMELEC's
decision to apply res judicata, even if it meant the application of the
concept of bar by prior judgment. DCTHaS
C.2(b)(i) Issue preclusion or res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment.
Issue preclusion (or conclusiveness of judgment) prevents
the same parties and their privies from re-opening an issue that has
already been decided in a prior case. In other words, once a right,
fact, or matter in issue has been directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action, it is conclusively settled
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies,
regardless of whether or not the claim, demand, or subject matter
of the two actions are the same.
For conclusiveness of judgment to apply, the second case
should have identical parties as the first case, which must have
been settled by final judgment. It does not,unlike the bar by
previous judgment, need identity of subject matter and causes of
action.
Note at this point, that Rule 37, Section 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure renders the COMELEC's decision final and
executory within five days after its promulgation, unless otherwise
restrained by the Court. Neither of the two COMELEC decisions
involving Erap's disqualification in 2010 had been restrained by the
Court; suffice it to say that the five-day period after promulgation of
the decisions in these cases had long passed.
Thus, the COMELEC did not err in considering its decisions
in these cases — all of which resolved the character of Erap's pardon
on the merits — to be final and executory. That the Court refused
to give due course to Pormento's petition assailing the COMELEC
decision on the ground that its issues had been rendered moot by
the 2010 elections, did not make the COMELEC's decision any less
final. In fact, Pormento was already final when it reached the Court,
subject to the Court's authority to order its nullification if grave
abuse of discretion had intervened.
On the requirement of identity of parties, Erap was the
defendant in all four cases. While the petitioners in these cases
were not the same persons, all of them represented the same
interest as citizens of voting age filing their petitions to ensure that
Erap, an election candidate, is declared not qualified to run and hold
office. Notably, Rule 25, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure 129 requires a prospective petitioner to be a citizen of
voting age, or a duly registered political party, to file a petition for
disqualification, regardless of the position the candidate sought to
be disqualified aspires for.
We have had, in several instances, applied res judicata to
subsequent cases whose parties were not absolutely identical,
but substantially identical in terms of the interests they
represent. 130 The cases filed against Erap's candidacy in the 2010
elections and in the 2013 elections share substantially the common
interest of disqualifying Erap as a candidate; these petitioners also
all contended that Erap was not qualified to be a candidate because
of his previous conviction of plunder.
That the 2010 cases involved Erap's bid for re-election for
presidency and the 2013 cases revolved around his mayoralty bid is
not, in my view, relevant for purposes of applying collateral
estoppel because the identity of the causes of action or the subject
matters are not necessary to preclude an issue already litigated and
decided on the merits in a prior case. What is crucial for collateral
estoppel to apply to the second case is the identity of the issues
between the two cases, which had already been decided on the
merits in the first case. All the cases seeking to disqualify Erap from
running hinged on his previous conviction and on arguments
characterizing his subsequent pardon to be merely conditional.
The COMELEC had already decided this issue, not once, but
twice when it separately but simultaneously decided Pamatong's
petition and the consolidated petitions of Pormento and Estrada. In
these cases, it gave the petitioners Pamatong, Pormento and
Estrada ample opportunity to present their arguments regarding the
nature of Erap's pardon, to which Erap had also been allowed to
reply. After considering their arguments, the COMELEC issued its
resolutions that the absolute nature of Erap's pardon restored both
his right to vote and be voted for.
C.2(b)(ii) Res judicata through bar by prior
judgment.
Res judicata, by way of bar by prior judgment, binds the
parties to a case, as well as their privies to its judgment, and
prevents them from re-litigating the same cause of action in another
case. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to
a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the
same or other tribunal.
Res judicata through bar by prior judgment requires (a)
that the former judgment be final; (b) that the judgment was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) that it is a
judgment on the merits; and (d) that, between the first and the
second actions, there is identity of parties, subject matters, and
causes of action.
These requisites were complied with in the present case.
C.2(b)(ii)(a) COMELEC as Tribunal of
Competent Jurisdiction.
That the COMELEC is a tribunal of competent jurisdiction in
cancellation of CoC and candidate disqualification cases is mandated
by the Constitution no less. Section 2 (2), Article IX (C) of the
Constitution provides that:
Section 2. The Commission on
Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials
 decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. [Emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
Thus, the competence of the COMELEC to rule on these
cases at the first instance needs no further elaboration. TCASIH
C.2(b)(ii)(b) Finality of the 2010
Disqualification Rulings.
Some aspects of finality of the disqualification trilogy
rulings have been discussed above 131 in terms of when COMELEC
judgments become final and the recourses available to assail these
judgments. But separately from these questions is the question of
the effects of the finality of judgments.
Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may not be changed, altered or modified in any way
even if the modification is for the purpose of correcting an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law. This is the "doctrine of finality
of judgments" which binds the immediate parties and their privies
in personal judgments; the whole world in judgments in rem; and
even the highest court of the land as to their binding effect. 132
This doctrine is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice and that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some
definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts, which is,
to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance
of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality. 133
A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right
recognized and protected by law under the due process clause of
the Constitution. A final judgment is a vested interest and it is only
proper and equitable that the government should recognize and
protect this right. Furthermore, an individual cannot be deprived of
this right arbitrarily without causing injustice. 134
Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. 135
In the present case, the COMELEC's final rulings in
the Pamatong, Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada petitions had been
made executory through the inclusion of Erap as a candidate not
only as a President in the 2010 elections but as Mayor in the 2013
elections.
Thus, the COMELEC's 2010 final ruling
in Pamatong and Pormento had been made executory twice not
only with respect to the interest of Erap, the winning party, through
the inclusion of his name as a candidate, but more importantly, the
public, by allowing the electorate to vote for him as a presidential
candidate in 2010 and as a mayoralty candidate in 2013.
The difference of this case from the usual disqualification
cases is that the 2010 unalterable COMELEC ruling on the Erap
pardon involved the issue of his political status binding on the whole
world and has made his candidacy in the 2013 elections and other
future elections valid and immune from another petition for
disqualification based on his conviction for plunder. This topic will
be discussed at length below.
C.2(b)(ii)(c) Judgment on the Merits.
A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights
and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections.136
In Pamatong's petition to cancel and deny due course to
Estrada's CoC 137 for the position of President in the 2010
elections, the issue of pardon was clearly raised and argued by the
parties, resulting in the COMELEC resolution quoted above,
specifically ruling that the Erap pardon was absolute and not
conditional, entitling him the right to vote and to be voted upon.
Not being conditional simply meant that it was not based on Erap's
promise not to run for any public office. 138
In Pormento (which was consolidated with Mary Lou
Estrada), the petitioner likewise sought to prevent Estrada from
running as President in the 2010 elections. Estrada re-pleaded in his
answer the defenses that he raised in Pamatong and added the
argument that the grant of executive clemency in his favor
removed all legal impediments that may bar his candidacy for the
presidency. 139
That pardon was not an issue specified by the COMELEC
when it defined the issues common to petitioners Pormento and
Mary Lou Estrada is of no moment since COMELEC only outlined the
issues that petitioners Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada commonly
shared. The matter of pardon was raised as a defense by
Estrada and this was duly noted by the COMELEC in its
resolution. 140 Under these circumstances, what assumes
importance are the terms of the COMELEC resolution itself which
expressly discussed and ruled that the Erap pardon was absolute
and had the effect of restoring his right to vote and be voted upon.
In fact, even if petitioners Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada
did not fully argue the pardon issue that Erap raised, it must be
appreciated that this issue was indisputably fullyargued, ruled upon
and became final in Pamatong which was one of the 2010 trilogy of
disqualification cases. This finality could not but have an effect on
the Pormento andMary Lou Estrada rulings which carried the same
rulings on pardon as Pamatong. The Pormento and Mary Lou
Estrada rulings on pardon, which themselves lapsed to finality can,
at the very least, be read as a recognition of the final judgment on
the pardon in issue in Pamatong, as well as the official final stand of
COMELEC on the issue of the Erap pardon.
These antecedent proceedings, the parties' arguments in
their respective pleadings, and the COMELEC rulings
in Pamatong [SPA 09-24 (DC)] and in Pormento [SPA 09-28] clearly
show that the COMELEC rulings in these cases on the issue of
pardon were decisions on the merits that can be cited as authorities
in future cases.
C.2(b)(ii)(d) Identity of Parties,
Subject Matter and Cause of Action.
Identity of parties
Two kinds of judgments exist with respect to the parties to
the case. The first are the parties in proceedings in personam where
the judgments are enforceable only between the parties and their
successors in interests, but not against strangers thereto.
The second type are the judgments in proceedings where the object
of the suit is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established,
and anyone in the world who has a right to be heard on the strength
of alleged facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest; the
proceeding is in rem and the judgment is a judgment in
rem. 141 SATDHE
This rule is embodied under Section 47, Rule 39 which
provides the effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order. In paragraph 47 (a), the rules provide that in case of a
judgment or final order . . . in respect to the personal, political, or
legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship
to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title
to the thing, the will or administration or the condition, status or
relationship of the person . . . . 142
In the present case, the 2010 COMELEC final rulings that
Erap was qualified to run for public office, after consideration of the
issues of presidential re-election and the effect of his pardon for the
crime of plunder, constituted a judgment in rem as it was a
judgment or final order on the political status of Erap to run for
and to hold public office.
In other words, a declaration of the disqualification or
qualification of a candidate binds the whole world as the final ruling
of the COMELEC regarding Erap's perpetual absolute disqualification
and pardon had already become conclusive. The 2010 final rulings of
the COMELEC thus bar Risos-Vidal in 2013 from raising the same
issue in view of the nature of the 2010 rulings as judgments in rem.
I also reiterate my previous discussion that in determining
whether res judicata exists, the Court had previously ruled that
absolute identity of parties is not required but substantial identity,
such that the parties in the first and second cases share the same or
a community of interest. As discussed above, this requisite is
present in the 2010 disqualification cases and the present Risos-
Vidal case.
Identity of causes of action and subject matters
I discuss first the element of identity of causes of action
because, in the process, the element of identity of subject matters
would be likewise covered. On the element of identity of causes of
action between the first and second cases, J. Leonen asserts that the
2010 disqualification cases filed by Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada
were based on causes of action that were different from those in
the present case.
According to J. Leonen, the 2010 cases were anchored on
the constitutional prohibition against a president's re-election and
the additional ground that Erap was a nuisance candidate. The
present case is anchored on Erap's conviction for plunder which
carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. The present case is additionally based on Section 40
of the LGC as well as Section 12 of the OEC. This is clear from the
COMELEC's recital of issues. 143
I disagree with J. Leonen's positions and short-sighted view
of the issues and I maintain that there are identical subject matters
and causes of actions, especially for purposes of complying with the
requirements of res judicata by way of bar by prior judgment.
At this juncture, I reiterate my disagreement with J. Leonen
in strictly applying the requisites for the application of res
judicata through bar by prior judgment. The Court itself, in
numerous cases, did not strictly apply the requirement that there
must be absolute identity of causes of action. In fact, the Court's
rulings on this particular element leaned towards substantial
identity of causes of action and its determination is arrived at not on
the basis of the facial value of the cases but after an in-depth
analysis of each case.
The reason why substantial identity of causes of action is
permitted is to preclude a situation where a party could easily
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the
action or the relief sought. The difference in form and nature of the
two actions is also immaterial and is not a reason to exempt these
cases from the effects ofres judicata.
The philosophy behind this rule prohibits the parties from
litigating the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. In this
way, there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and
their privies over a subject, once the issue involving the subject is
fully and fairly adjudicated. 144
In light of the jurisprudence on res judicata by way of bar
by prior judgment, it is my view that the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in ruling that the issue of Erap's pardon and its
effects on his right to run for elective public office had already been
settled in the 2010 disqualification cases. ISADET
In our jurisdiction, the Court uses various tests in
determining whether or not there is identity of causes of action in
the first and second cases. One of these tests is the"absence of
inconsistency test" where it is determined whether or not the
judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior judgment. If
inconsistency is not shown, the prior judgment shall not constitute a
bar to subsequent actions. 145
The second and more common approach in ascertaining
identity of causes of action is the "same evidence test," where the
criterion is determined by the question:"would the same evidence
support and establish both the present and former causes of
action?" If the answer is in the affirmative, then the prior judgment
is a bar to the subsequent action; conversely, it is not. 146
Applying these tests, it is readily apparent that there were
identical causes of action in the 2010 disqualification cases against
Erap and the present Risos-Vidal case.
Using the absence of inconsistency test, the 2010 final
COMELEC rulings that Erap was qualified to run for Presidency, an
elective public office, would be inconsistent with the ruling being
sought in the present case which is, essentially, that Erap's pardon
did not remove his perpetual absolute disqualification to run for
elective public office, this time as Mayor of the City of Manila.
In short, Erap's pardon and its effects on his perpetual
absolute disqualification brought about by his conviction affect his
qualification to run for all elective public offices. Thus the 2010
rulings cannot be limited or linked only to the issue of his
qualification to run as President of the Philippines but to any
elective public position that he may aspire for in the future.
Applying the "same evidence test," suffice it to say that the
Risos-Vidal's petition rests and falls on Erap's pardon and its effects
on his qualification to run for elective public office. Erap's pardon is
the same evidence necessary for the COMELEC to resolve in the
2010 disqualification cases the issue of whether or not Erap's
pardon removed his disqualification to run for elective public office,
thus qualifying him to run for Presidency.
It must be recalled that Risos-Vidal relies on Section
40 147 of the LGC and Section 12 148 of the OEC, specifically
relating to the disqualification ground of a person's conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude, in this case, plunder. However, if
we are to look closely at these provisions, 149 Erap would not have
been disqualified under these provisions because he had already
served the 2-year prohibitive period under Section 40 of the
LGC. 150 The real main issue of the Risos-Vidal petition is the
perpetual absolute disqualification imposed on Erap as an accessory
penalty for his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude; and
that his pardon did not remit this disqualification. This issue was
obviously directly ruled upon by the COMELEC in the 2010
disqualification cases. Hence, applying the same evidence test,
there is identity of causes of action between the 2010 and the Risos-
Vidal cases. There was likewise identity of subject matters,
specifically the qualification of Erap to run for public office in
relation to his pardon.
As a side note, I observe that in the 2010 cases, had the
COMELEC ruled that Erap had been disqualified to run for elective
public office despite his pardon, the issue of the constitutional ban
against his re-election would have become moot and academic as
Erap would never be qualified in the first place to run for an elective
office. Therefore, the ground for Erap's disqualification based on his
perpetual absolute disqualification in relation to his pardon, which
were raised by the parties in 2010, were material and necessary for
the resolution of the re-election issue. Otherwise, to simply
disregard the pardon issue and proceed immediately to the issue on
the constitutional ban on re-election is not only absurd but would
have been the height of legal ignorance. Fortunately, the COMELEC
correctly ruled on the pardon issue directly and did not gravely
abuse its discretion in doing so.
Since the COMELEC had already decided the issue of Erap's
pardon in the past, it did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it chose not to reverse its prior rulings. Its past decisions,
which became final and executory, addressed this issue on the
merits. This, and the substantial causes of action, subject matters,
and substantial identity of the parties in the 2010 and 2013 cases,
sufficiently justified the COMELEC from keeping the discussion of
the issue of Erap's pardon in the 2013 disqualification case.
3. Grave Abuse of Discretion, the 2010 Disqualification Trilogy,
and COMELEC's Risos-Vidal Ruling.
In light of the above discussions, the COMELEC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in its Resolution of April 1, 2013
dismissing the Risos-Vidal petition for lack of merit. In fact, the
COMELEC would have gravely abused its discretion had it granted
the petition in light of the 2010 trilogy of disqualification cases and
the finality of its previous final rulings that the third Whereas Clause
of Erap's pardon did not affect at all the restoration of his civil and
political rights, including his right to vote and to be voted upon.
Whatever might be said of the trilogy of cases, the reality is
that the issue of pardon was brought to the forefront of the argued
issues when the parties raised it in all the disqualification cases
against Erap and the COMELEC ruled on the issue. That the pardon
issue was overshadowed by the presidential re-election issue, not
only in the COMELEC, but all the way to this Court, may be an
adjudicatory defect, but certainly is not imperfection on the part of
Erap for which he should suffer.
To be sure, the COMELEC resolution is not a model
resolution that is free from imperfections; it cannot serve as a
model for legal drafting or for legal reasoning. But whatever these
imperfections might be, they could not — as above explained —
have gone beyond errors of law, into grave abuse of discretion.
Having been rulings twice-implemented in 2010 and 2013 elections,
these past rulings cannot and should not now be repudiated without
committing fraud against the electorate who cast their vote and
showed their preference for Erap without any notice that their votes
ran the risk of being declared stray.
For all the above reasons, I vote to dismiss the Risos-Vidal
petition for lack of merit. HTDcCE
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
At first glance, this case presents itself as an ordinary
election case involving the issue of who is the rightful winner in the
2013 mayoralty elections in the City of Manila. The matter,
however, is engrossed in a deeper constitutional conundrum that
affects the exercise of one of the most benevolent powers of the
President — the power to extend executive clemency in the form of
pardon. Undoubtedly, the Court's ruling on this case would shape
the parameters surrounding the future exercise of the said power,
thus, requiring a pragmatic stance that would equal the theoretical
and practical purpose of the pardoning power, that is, the
realization of checks and balances in government and the relief
given to the pardonee.
The undisputed facts as culled from the records:
In its September 12, 2007 Decision, the Sandiganbayan
convicted respondent former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada (Estrada) of plunder. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused,
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by
Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the
other hand, for failure of the prosecution to
prove and establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S.
Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder
and, accordingly, the Court hereby orders their
ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser
penalty shall be applied in accordance with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the accused Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to
On October 25, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
Arroyo (PGMA) granted executive clemency to Estrada. The text of
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during
the said pardon is hereunder replicated:
the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
The period within which accused
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
been under detention shall be credited to him in
full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2
of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby
declares the forfeiture in favor of the
government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty Two
Million Seven Hundred Ninety One Thousand
Pesos (P545,291,000.00), n with interest and
income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00),
deposited in the name and account of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty
Nine Million Pesos (P189,000,000.00), inclusive
of interests and income earned, deposited in the
Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a
house and lot dubbed as Boracay Mansion
located at #100 11th Street, New Manila,
Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose
Jinggoy Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are
hereby ordered cancelled and released to the
said accused or their duly authorized
representatives upon presentation of the
original receipt evidencing payment thereof and
subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders
issued against the said accused are hereby
recalled and declared functus oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
Whereas, this Administration has a policy of
releasing inmates who have reached the age
of seventy (70),
Whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been
under detention for six and a half years,
Whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office,
In view hereof and pursuant to the authority
conferred upon me by the Constitution, I
hereby grant executive clemency to Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the
Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full,
including all writs and processes issued by the
Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except
for the bank account(s) he owned before his
tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take
effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th day
of October, in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and
seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President: ACcDEa
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary
[Emphasis supplied]
The next day, Estrada accepted the pardon as evidenced by
a handwritten notation in the same document.
Subsequently, Estrada undertook his second bid for the
presidency during the 2010 elections. This candidacy hurdled two
(2) disqualification cases filed by Atty. Evilio C. Pormento and Mary
Lou B. Estrada (2010 disqualification cases), when these were
denied for lack of merit by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Second Division, and the COMELEC En Banc in its respective
resolutions, dated January 20, 2010 1 and April 27, 2010. 2 The
COMELEC was of the position that Estrada was eligible to run for
president on the ground that the constitutional prohibition on re-
election 3 applies to an incumbent president.
Upon elevation to the Court, however, the opportunity to
resolve the said constitutional issue was arrested by mootness, with
Estrada having lost the elections to President Benigno Aquino. 4
Undaunted by his defeat in the race for national office,
Estrada thereafter sought the position of mayor in no less than the
City of Manila. He filed his certificate of candidacy on October 2,
2012.
Petitioner Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (petitioner) invoked
Estrada's disqualification from running for public office, this time on
the ground that his candidacy was a violation of the pardon
extended by PGMA. She filed a petition for disqualification with the
COMELEC 5 pursuant to Section 12 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code), 6grounded on a sole argument, viz.:
RESPONDENT IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN
FOR PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS
CONVICTION FOR PLUNDER BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
26558 ENTITLED "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" SENTENCING
HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA WITH PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION.
In the main, the petitioner argued that Estrada was still
suffering from the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual disqualification because the pardon granted to him failed
to expressly restore his right to suffrage and to run for public office
as provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, the "whereas clause" in the pardon which stated
that, "Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office" would indicate a condition that
Estrada must abide by under pain of recommitment to prison in the
event of violation thereof. The petitioner likewise finds support in
the concurring opinion of Justice Padilla in Monsanto v.
Factoran, 7 stated in this wise:
An examination of the presidential
pardon in question shows that, while petitioner
was granted "an absolute and unconditional
pardon and restored to full civil and political
rights", yet, nothing therein expressly provides
that the right to hold public office was thereby
restored to the petitioner. In view of
the express exclusion by Art. 36, RPC of the right
to hold public office, notwithstanding a
pardon unless the right is expressly restored by
the pardon, it is my considered opinion that, to
the extent that the pardon granted to the
petitioner did not expressly restore the right to
hold public office as an effect of such pardon,
that right must be kept away from the
petitioner.
After an exchange of pleadings, the COMELEC Second
Division issued its April 1, 2013 Resolution dismissing the petition
for lack of merit. 8 The dismissal was grounded on its resolution of
the 2010 disqualification cases where it found that the pardon
granted to Estrada was absolute and unconditional, hence, entitling
him to run for public office. The dismissal was affirmed over
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in the April 23, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. 9
Impervious to her cause, the petitioner comes to this Court,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
declining to disqualify Estrada motu propio, based on the following
grounds cited by it: 1] the issues raised in the petition have already
been passed upon in the past; 2] Estrada's pardon was not
conditional; 3] Estrada is not disqualified to run as mayor despite
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC); and 4] Estrada's
pardon restored his right to suffrage and remitted his perpetual
disqualification from seeking public office.
During the pendency of the petition, local elections were
conducted on May 13, 2013, yielding a victory for Estrada over his
opponents including then incumbent Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Lim).
Consequently, the latter moved to intervene in the petition, which
was granted by the Court in its June 25, 2013 Resolution. 10 Lim
supports petitioner's theory that Estrada remains to be disqualified
to hold public office as his pardon did not expressly remit his
perpetual disqualification, and, pursuant to the Court's ruling
inJalosjos v. COMELEC, 11 he must be declared as the rightful mayor
of the City of Manila.
 After an exchange of pleadings, 12 the parties were
required to submit their respective memoranda. The parties
complied on different dates. 13
To my mind, the following queries and premises, which are
crafted in a clear-cut and logical sequence, serve as guideposts for
the Court in order to arrive at conclusions that are consonant with
prevailing law and jurisprudence: EScIAa
I. Was the executive pardon extended to Estrada
conditional or absolute?
II. What were the effects of the pardon,
particularly the statement, "[h]e is
hereby restored to his civil and political
rights"? Does this include the
restoration of his right to suffrage and
to run for public office?
III Given that the nature of pardon, whether
absolute or conditional, does not imply
the automatic obliteration of the
pardonee's guilt, is Estrada qualified to
run for and hold a mayoralty position?
I. Estrada's Pardon Was Absolute
After admittedly having failed to argue on this before the
COMELEC, the petitioner expressly elevated this issue for the
resolution of the Court. Her insistence on the conditional nature of
Estrada's pardon is anchored on the latter's expressed acceptance of
the same. In her words, this acceptance became "the fundamental
basis and indiciumof the conditional nature of the pardon." 14 She
contends that had PGMA intended to issue an absolute pardon, she
would have not required Estrada's acceptance thereof. Having
accepted its terms with a commitment of strict compliance, Estrada
should be deemed to have breached the "contract" when he ran for
Mayor.
Amidst this argument, the primordial question continues to
nag: was the pardon bestowed on Estrada conditional or absolute?
For the following reasons, I find that Estrada's pardon was absolute
in nature:
First. I am of the view that the acceptance confers
effectivity in both absolute and conditional pardon.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act
of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and
not communicated officially to the Court. . . . A
pardon is a deed, to the validity of which
delivery is essential, and delivery is not
complete without acceptance." 15
The fact of Estrada's acceptance of the pardon, by affixing
his signature therein, is an insufficient indication of its conditional
nature. Petitioner's reliance on Cabantag v. Wolf, 16 where the
Court ruled that a conditional pardon has no force until accepted by
the condemned because the condition may be less acceptable to
him than the original punishment and may in fact be more onerous,
is misplaced. It merely stated that a conditional pardon must be
accepted in the exercise of the pardonee's right to choose whether
to accept or reject the terms of the pardon. It does not operate in
the manner suggested by petitioner. It does not work the other way
around.
An "acceptance" does not classify a pardon as conditional
just by the mere reception and the placing of an inscription thereon.
I am not prepared to ignore the very intention and content of a
pardon as standards to determine its nature, as against the mere
expediency of its delivery and acceptance. I am much more
amenable to the rule consistent with the benevolent nature of
pardon: that it is an act of forgiveness predicated on an admission of
guilt. To be effective, therefore, this admission of past wrongdoing
must be manifested by the acceptance of a pardon, absolute or
conditional.
Further, the significance of "acceptance" is more apparent
in cases of "commutation," which is the substitution of a lighter
punishment for a heavier one. William F. Duker elucidates:
Although for a pardon to be effective it
usually must be accepted, commutation is
effective without acceptance. In Chapman v.
Scott, the President granted a commutation to
"time-served" to a convict so that he would be
available for prosecution in a state court on a
capital case. The convict refused the
commutation and argued that it was not
effective until accepted, but the court held that
a commutation did not require acceptance:
Although power to commute is logically
derivable from power to pardon, commutation
is essentially different from pardon. Pardon
exempts from punishment, bears no relation to
term of punishment, and must be accepted, or it
is nugatory. Commutation merely substitutes
lighter for heavier punishment. It removes no
stain, restores no civil privileges, and may be
effected without the consent and against the
will of the prisoner. 17
As applied to Estrada's case, his acceptance of the pardon
does not necessarily negate its absolute nature. The more
appropriate test to apply in the determination of the subject
pardon's character is the grantor's intention as revealed in the four
corners of the document.
Second. The controversial perambulatory clause which
states, "Whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to
no longer seek any elective position or office," should not be
considered as a restriction on Estrada's pardon.
Primarily, rules on statutory construction provide that
whereas clauses, do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking;
they are not part of the operative language of the statute. 18 While
they may be helpful to the extent that they articulate the general
purpose or reason underlying a new enactment, reliance on
whereas clauses as aids in construing statutes is not justified when
their interpretation "control the specific terms of the statute." 19
As applied in Estrada's case, the subject whereas clause
does not purport to control or modify the unequivocal terms found
in the pardon's body. In this sense, the "whereas clauses" in
Estrada's pardon cannot adversely affect the ultimate command
which it evokes, that is, executive clemency is granted to Estrada
absent any condition. AaCcST
A conditional pardon basically imposes a condition. I take
this to mean that it must either stipulate a circumstance, a situation,
or a requisite that must come into pass or express a restriction that
must not ensue. I find none in this case. The plain language of the
pardon extended to Estrada does not set forth any of these. It was
couched in a straightforward conferment of pardon, to wit:
I hereby grant executive clemency to
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 Had PGMA intended to impress a condition on Estrada, the
same would have been clearly stated as a requirement of, or
restriction to, the above conferment. I am inclined to posit that the
extension of a conditional pardon to her political rival is a matter
that PGMA would have regarded with solemnity and tact. After all,
the pardoning power is a pervasive means to bluntly overrule the
force and effect, not only of a court's judgment of conviction, but
the punitive aspect of criminal laws. As it turned out, no direct
showing suggests that the pardon was conditional.
For a condition to be operative, the condition must appear
on the face of the document. The conditions must be clear and
specific. The reason is that the conditions attached to a pardon
should be definite and specific as to inform the person pardoned of
what would be required. 20 As no condition was patently evinced in
the document, the Court is at no liberty to shape one, only because
the plain meaning of the pardon's text is unacceptable for some
waylaid and extraneous reasons. That the executive clemency given
to Estrada was unaccompanied by any condition is clearly visible in
the text of the pardon. The Court must simply read the pardon as it
is written. There is no necessity to resort to construction. I choose to
heed the warning enunciated in Yangco v. Court of First Instance of
Manila:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle
refinements which tinge words so as to give
them the color of a particular judicial theory
are not only unnecessary but decidedly
harmful.That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so
difficult for the public to understand and
know what the law is with respect to a given
matter, is in considerable measure
the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found
in statutes and contracts, cutting the words
here and inserting them there, making them
fit personal ideas of what the legislature
ought to have done or what parties should
have agreed upon, giving them meanings
which they do not ordinarily have cutting,
trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until
lawyers themselves are unable to advise their
clients as to the meaning of a given statute or
contract until it has been submitted to some
court for its interpretation and
construction. 21
Suffice it to say, a statement describing Estrada's previous
commitment not to seek any elective office cannot operate as a
condition for his pardon, sans any indication that it was intended to
be so. In light of the clear absence of any condition in the pardon,
no ambiguity warrants interpretation by the Court. At the most, the
subject whereas clause depicts the state of affairs at the time when
the pardon was granted. It should not be considered as part and
parcel of the entire act as it serves neither the ability to enlarge or
confer powers nor the authority to control the words of the act.
Third. The pardoning power is granted exclusively to the
President amidst the constitutional scheme of checks and balances.
While it is most ideal that the executive strictly adheres to this end,
it is undeniable that the pardoning power is still dependent on the
grantor's measure of wisdom and sense of public policy. This reality
invites, if not bolsters, the application of the political question
doctrine. The only weapon, which the Court has freedom to wield, is
the exercise of judicial power against a blatant violation of the
Constitution. When unavailing, the Court is constrained to curb its
own rebuking power and to uphold the acumen of a co-equal
branch. It would do the Court well to remember that neither the
Congress nor the courts can question the motives of the President in
the use of the power. 22
Hence, in determining the nature of Estrada's pardon, the
Court must undertake a tempered disposition and avoid a strained
analysis of the obvious. Where there is no ostensible condition
stated in the body of the pardon, to envisage one by way of
statutory construction is an inexcusable judicial encroachment.
The absolute nature of Estrada's pardon now begets a
more astute query: what rights were restored in his favor?
II. Estrada's Civil and Political Rights Restored
In this particular issue, the ponencia deserves my full
agreement in finding that the third preambular clause of Estrada's
pardon does not militate against the conclusion that Estrada's rights
to suffrage and to seek public office have been restored. Further,
the subject pardon had substantially complied with the statutory
requirements laid down in Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC. The
authority of the said provisions of law was reinforced by the ruling
of the Court in Monsanto v. Factoran. A deeper analysis
of Monsanto, however, reveals that its repercussions actually favor
Estrada.
Consider these points: SDHAcI
1. Monsanto involved an absolute pardon, from
which, Estrada likewise benefits.
2. The issue in Monsanto involved the propriety
of an automatic reinstatement to
public office. In refutation of the
Garland cases, the Court maintained
that while an absolute pardon remits
all the penal consequences of a
criminal indictment if only to give
meaning to the fiat that a pardon,
being a presidential prerogative . . . it,
however, rejected the "fictitious belief
that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved,
he should be treated as if he were
innocent."
3. Monsanto's absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office was
considered to have formed part of the
punishment prescribed against
her. Ultimately, when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed.
4. Noteworthy is the observation of the Court
that she may apply for reappointment
to the office, but in the appraisal of her
suitability to a public post, the facts
constituting her past offense should be
taken into account to determine
whether she could once again serve in
a public office.
After serious reflection, I am convinced that the foregoing
pronouncement parallels that which should apply to Estrada.
In Monsanto, the Court declared that the absolute pardon
granted to her by the President effectively expunged her
disqualification or ineligibility to hold public office because this
formed part of the penalty against her. As in the foregoing
discussion on the absolute nature of Estrada's pardon, there is no
question that his pardon likewise remitted the punishment
previously imposed in his conviction for plunder. As such, he was
released from incarceration and thereafter regained his liberty of
movement, albeit ordered to abide by the forfeiture of his
properties as listed in the judgment of the Sandiganbayan. More
significantly, there was no categorical statement impressed
inMonsanto that banned her from holding public office again. All
that it withheld was an automatic reinstatement to her previous
office and her entitlement to backpay. In other words, Monsanto
may hold public office provided that there is favorable action on her
application.
While I generally acquiesce with the scholarly opinions of
Justices Padilla and Feliciano in Monsanto, I find it difficult to apply
their respective observations (that based on Article 36 of the RPC, it
was clear that the pardon extended by the President did not per se
entitle Monsanto to again hold public office or to suffrage because
nothing therein expressly provided the restoration of the said rights
with specificity) precisely because this was not adopted in the
majority decision. There is a stark difference between the positions
taken by the concurring justices from the very holding of the
majority. The former entirely and perpetually denied Monsanto of
her right to hold public office, while the latter merely disallowed an
automatic reinstatement but permitted her to undergo re-
application with the only caveat that her pardon did not place her in
a state of complete innocence. In other words, her past conviction
should be considered as forming part of her credentials in her re-
application for public office. Between these two conclusions, I
choose with steadfast belief that the holding pronounced in the
majority decision should prevail. The strict interpretation of Article
36 as advocated in the concurring opinion wasnot adopted in the
main decision, hence, rendering the same as mere obiter
dictum which has no controlling effect.
While I do not subscribe to Estrada's theory that Articles 36
and 41 of the RPC have the effect of abridging and diminishing the
power of the President, I also remain unconvinced that the said
provisions of law should apply to his case because the strict
interpretation of these provisions were not encapsulated in
jurisprudence, particularlyMonsanto. Therefore, the statement, "He
is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," as found in the
subject pardon does not fall short of producing the effect of wiping
away the penalties being suffered by the pardonee. As things stand
now, an absolute and full pardon erases both the principal and
accessory penalties meted against him, thereby allowing him to hold
public office once again.
Corollary to this, I am of the opinion that PGMA's failure to
use the term "full," apropos to the restoration of Estrada's rights
does not denigrate its coverage. PGMA's omission to use such term
in the case of Estrada may have been caused by reasons unknown to
the Court. The Court cannot discount the possibility that this was
borne out of plain inadvertence, considering the fact that the
pardon was unaccompanied by a clear condition. Had it been
PGMA's intention to restrict the rights restored to Estrada, she could
have stated clear exceptions thereto, instead of employing a phrase,
which, in its plain meaning, comprises the right to vote and to run
for public office. Besides, the deprivation of these rights is a
dangerous ground that the Court should not tread on, especially
when the intention to restrict their exercise is impalpable.
Applying this to the case at bench, no ban from holding
public office should be imposed on Estrada, because the absolute
pardon given to him had effectively extinguished both the principal
and accessory penalties brought forth by his conviction. Succinctly,
Estrada's civil and political rights had been restored in full.
III. Estrada's Right to Run for Public Office Restored
Consistent with my view that Monsanto reflects the
obliteration of Estrada's perpetual disqualification, I conclude that
he now possesses the right to vote and to run for public office.
Lest it be misunderstood, this conclusion does not
degenerate from the doctrine that a pardon only relieves a party
from the punitive consequences of his past crimes, nothing more.
Indeed, "a person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted
criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment,
though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more
dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it
places no restraints upon him following his conviction." 23 Estrada
was not reborn into innocence by virtue of the forgiveness
bestowed in by the pardon. The moral stain caused by his past
crimes remains to be part of his person, then as now. In no way did
his pardon serve as a stamp of incorruptibility. It is not a magic spell
that superimposes virtuousness over guilt. His past conviction for
plunder would forever form part of his person, whether as a private
individual or a public officer.
Without squabble, plunder is a crime involving moral
turpitude. Nevertheless, this fact alone negates a mechanical
application of statutory provisions on disqualification. One thing is
clear, in the exercise of her exclusive power to grant executive
clemency, PGMA pardoned Estrada, thereby wiping away the
penalties of his crime and entitling him the right to run for public
office. Corollary to this, Estrada's fitness to hold public office is an
issue that should not concern the Court. All that the Court can rule
on is the availability of Estrada's right to seek public office. This
ruling on his eligibility is not tantamount to a declaration that
Estrada befits a person wholly deserving of the people's trust. The
Manileños' decision alone can mould the city's journey to either
development or decline. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign
will of the people consistent with the principle of vox populi est
suprema lex. This is the beauty of democracy which the Court must
endeavour to protect at all cost. As Abraham Lincoln put it with both
guile and eloquence,
Elections belong to the people. It's their
decision. If they decide to turn their back on the
fire and burn their behinds, then they will just
have to sit on their blisters.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to CONCUR with the
majority opinion. HcSCED
LEONEN, J., dissenting:
This case has distressing consequences on the Rule of Law.
By reading an ambiguity in favor of a convicted public officer,
impunity is tolerated.
I dissent.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, former President of the Republic of
the Philippines, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of plunder. A heinous crime of the highest order, the law
penalizing plunder — Republic Act No. 7080 — made possible the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death upon public officers
who amass ill-gotten wealth on a grand scale through a combination
or series of acts. 1 Though an intervening statute 2 now prevents
the imposition of the penalty of death, our laws have no less
abhorrence for this crime.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, former President of the Republic of
the Philippines, was pardoned shortly after he had been convicted.
This case presents to this court a dilemma engendered by
ambiguities in the pardon extended to him.
The court must decide on whether these ambiguities shall
be interpreted to benefit a convicted former President, shown to
have amassed ill-gotten wealth on a grand scale and to have
betrayed the trust given to him through the investiture of the
highest office in the land; or to benefit the public which reposes its
trust on elected public officials. Many other public officials have
been found liable for graft and corrupt practices of far lesser scales
than those for which Joseph Ejercito Estrada had been convicted.
They now languish in jails, deprived of liberties and entitlements.
This case is not about their pardon. They continue to suffer the The dispositive portion of this decision reads:
penalties that their convictions entail, unlike the former President of WHEREFORE, in view of all the
the Republic of the Philippines. foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
This case, in short, will affect the public's attitude to the Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused,
Rule of Law and the possibilities for immunity for very influential Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
public officials. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
Not having been unequivocally restored to a status worthy of PLUNDER defined in and penalized by
of being a repository of the public trust, there is no reason to lavish Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the
Joseph Ejercito Estrada by facilitating his reversion to elective public other hand, for failure of the prosecution to
office. Thus, I dissent from the majority decision. prove and establish their guilt beyond
I reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S.
Through a petition for certiorari, Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal
Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder,
(Risos-Vidal) prays that the assailed resolutions 3 dated April 1, 2013 and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their
of the Second Division of public respondent Commission on
ACQUITTAL. SEHTIc
Elections (COMELEC), and April 23, 2013 of COMELEC, sitting En
Banc, be annulled and set aside. In addition, she prays that a new The penalty imposable for the crime of
judgment be entered disqualifying private respondent Joseph plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, 11 as
Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) from running as Mayor of the City of amended by Republic Act No.
Manila, and cancelling the certificate of candidacy he filed in 7659, 12 is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There
connection with the May 13, 2013 election for the position of Mayor being no aggravating or mitigating
of the City of Manila. 4 circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall
be applied in accordance with Article 63 of the
The assailed April 1, 2013 resolution dismissed the petition
Revised Penal Code. 13 Accordingly, the accused
for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal and docketed as SPA No. 13-
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is
211 (DC). The assailed April 23, 2013 resolution denied her motion hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
for reconsideration.
of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
A motion for leave to intervene 5 was filed by Estrada's penalties of civil interdiction during the period
opponent in the mayoralty race, Alfredo S. Lim (Lim). Attached to
of sentence and perpetual absolute
Lim's motion was his petition-in-intervention. 6Lim's motion was disqualification.
granted by the court in the resolution 7 dated June 25, 2013.
The period within which accused
II Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
Statement of the antecedents been under detention shall be credited to him in
On April 4, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed against full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to
private respondent, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, former President of the abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
Republic of the Philippines, and several other accused, 8 an upon convicted prisoners.
information for plunder, penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as Moreover, in accordance with Section 2
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This case was filed before the of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558. Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby
In the decision 9 dated September 12, 2007, the declares the forfeiture in favor of the
Sandiganbayan, Special Division, convicted Estrada of the crime of government of the following:
plunder. He was sentenced to suffer "the penalty ofReclusion (1) The total amount of Five
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the Hundred Forty Two Million Seven
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification." 10 Ninety One Thousand Pesos
(P545,291,000.00) n 14 with interest
and income earned, inclusive of the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00), deposited in the
name and account of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One
Hundred Eighty Nine Million Pesos
(P189,000,000.00), inclusive of
interests and income earned, deposited
in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property
consisting of a house and lot dubbed as
"Boracay Mansion" located at #100
11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio
are hereby ordered cancelled and released to
the said accused or their duly authorized
representatives upon presentation of the
original receipt evidencing payment thereof and
subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders
issued against the said accused are hereby
recalled and declared functus officio.
SO ORDERED. 15 (Emphasis and
citations supplied)
On October 25, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo granted pardon to Estrada. The complete text of this pardon
reads:
MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of
releasing inmates who have reached the age
of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been
under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office,
 IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the
authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution, I hereby grant executive
clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder
and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
He is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the
Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full,
including all writs and processes issued by the
Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except
for the bank account(s) he owned before his
tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take
effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day
of October, in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and
seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary 16
On October 26, 2007, Estrada accepted the entire pardon
without qualifications. This acceptance is evidenced by a
handwritten notation on the pardon, which reads:
Received [ ] accepted
Joseph E. Estrada (sgd.)
DATE: 26 Oct. '07
TIME: 3:35 P.M. 17
On October 2, 2012, Estrada filed his certificate of
candidacy 18 for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 14, 2013, Risos-Vidal, a resident and registered
voter of the City of Manila, filed before public respondent COMELEC
a petition for disqualification 19 against Estrada. This petition,
docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was filed pursuant to Section 40
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 (the Local Government Code), 20 in relation to Section
12 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code. 21 It sought to disqualify Estrada from running for
Mayor of the City of Manila on account of his conviction for plunder
and having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification. 22
Estrada filed his answer 23 on January 24, 2013.
On April 1, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued the
first assailed resolution dismissing Risos-Vidal's petition for lack of
merit.
In this resolution, the COMELEC Second Division noted that
in 2010, following Estrada's filing of a certificate of candidacy for
President of the Philippines, two disqualification cases — SPA No.
09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) — were filed against him. It
added that, in deciding these disqualification cases — first, through
the resolution dated January 20, 2010 of the COMELEC Second
Division and, second, through the resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc dated May 4, 2010 — the Commission on Elections had already
ruled that the pardon granted to Estrada was absolute and
unconditional and, hence, did not prevent him from running for
public office. Thus, the matter of Estrada's qualification, in relation
to the efficacy of the penalties imposed on him on account of his
conviction for plunder, "ha[d] been passed upon and ruled out by
this Commission way back in 2010." 24
In the resolution dated April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc denied Risos-Vidal's motion for reconsideration. aCcHEI
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal filed the present
petition. 25 Risos-Vidal ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on COMELEC in not
disqualifying Estrada. She assailed COMELEC's refusal to grant her
petition on account of its having supposedly ruled on the same
issues in the disqualification cases filed in connection with Estrada's
2010 bid for the presidency. 26 She asserted that Estrada's pardon
was conditional and served neither to restore his rights "to vote, be
voted upon and to hold public office" 27 nor to remit the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. 28 She added that,
for having been convicted of plunder, a crime involving moral
turpitude, Estrada was barred from running for Mayor by Section 40
of the Local Government Code. 29 Insisting that the grounds for
disqualifying Estrada were so manifest, she faulted COMELEC for not
having disqualified motu proprio. 30
In the meantime, elections were conducted on May 13,
2013. Per COMELEC's "Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation of Winning Candidates for National Capital Region —
Manila" dated May 17, 2013, 31 Estrada was noted to have obtained
349,770 votes. 32 His opponent in the mayoralty race, Lim, obtained
313,764 votes, 33 giving the lead to Estrada. Estrada was, thus,
proclaimed as the "duly elected" 34 city mayor.
On June 7, 2013, Lim filed a motion for leave to
intervene 35 to which was attached his petition-in-
intervention. 36 He argued that, regardless of whether the pardon
granted to Estrada was absolute or conditional, it did not expressly
restore his right of suffrage and his right to hold public office, and it
did not remit his perpetual absolute disqualification as required by
Articles 36 37 and 41 38 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, he
remained ineligible for election into public office. 39 He added that,
per this court's decision in Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 40 he had the "right to be declared and proclaimed
mayor of Manila upon the declaration of respondent Estrada's
disqualification." 41
In the resolution 42 dated June 25, 2013, this court granted
Lim's motion for leave to intervene and required respondents to file
their comments on Lim's petition-in-intervention in addition to filing
their comment on Risos-Vidal's petition.
On July 15, 2013, Estrada filed his comment on Lim's
petition-in-intervention. 43 He argued that Lim lacked "legal
standing to prosecute this case," 44 that the pardon granted to him
restored his right to seek public office, 45 and that Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code are not only unconstitutional, as they
diminish the pardoning power of the President, 46 but have also
been repealed by subsequent election laws (e.g., Section 94 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 47 and Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code), 48 which recognize "plenary pardon[s]." He added
that Risos-Vidal's assertions that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
could not have intended for Estrada's pardon to be absolute as they
were "political rivals" 49 is a factual issue that required the
"remand" 50 of the case to the Court of Appeals or the reception of
evidence through oral arguments.51
On July 29, 2013, public respondent COMELEC, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its consolidated
comment. 52 It noted that the effects of the pardon granted to
Estrada had already been ruled upon by COMELEC in connection
with disqualification cases filed against him on the occasion of his
2010 bid for the presidency. 53 It added that Estrada's rights to vote
and be voted for had indeed been restored and his perpetual
disqualification remitted by the pardon granted to him.
On August 6, 2013, Estrada filed his comment 54 on Risos-
Vidal's petition. In addition to arguing that he was granted an
absolute pardon which rendered him eligible to run and be voted as
mayor, Estrada argued that the present case involves the same
issues as those in the 2010 disqualification cases filed against him,
that "the findings of fact of the public respondent COMELEC relative
to the absoluteness of the pardon, the effects thereof and the
eligibility of the Private Respondent Estrada are binding and
conclusive" 55 on this court, and that the allegations made by Risos-
Vidal are insufficient to disturb the assailed resolutions. 56 He
added that Risos-Vidal's petition before the COMELEC was filed out
of time, it being, in reality, a petition to deny due course to or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy, and not a petition for
disqualification. 57 He also asserted that Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. was
inapplicable to the present case. 58 Finally, he claimed that his
disqualification would mean the disenfranchisement of the voters
who elected him. 59
On August 23, 2013, Lim filed his reply to Estrada's
comment on his petition-in-intervention and to COMELEC's
consolidated comment. 60 On August 27, 2013, Risos-Vidal filed her
reply 61 to Estrada's comment on her petition. On December 13,
2013, Risos-Vidal filed her reply 62 to COMELEC's consolidated
comment.
In the resolution dated April 22, 2014, the petition and
petition-in-intervention were given due course and the parties
required to submit their memoranda. The parties complied: Lim on
May 27, 2014, 63 Risos-Vidal on June 2, 2014, 64 Estrada on June 16,
2014; 65 and COMELEC on June 26, 2014. 66
III
Statement of issues
For resolution are the following issues:
A. Procedural issues
1. Whether the petition filed by
petitioner Atty. Alicia Risos-
Vidal before the COMELEC was
filed on time;
2. Whether petitioner-intervenor
Alfredo S. Lim may intervene
in this case; and
3. Whether COMELEC's rulings in the
disqualification cases filed
against private respondent
Joseph Ejercito Estrada in
connection with his 2010 bid
for the presidency bar the
consideration of the petition
filed by petitioner Atty. Alicia
Risos-Vidal before the
COMELEC, as well as the
present petition forcertiorari.
B. Substantive issues CDHAcI
1. Whether private respondent Joseph
Ejercito Estrada was qualified
to run for Mayor of the City of
Manila; and
2. Assuming private respondent Joseph
Ejercito Estrada was not
qualified, whether petitioner-
intervenor Alfredo S. Lim
should be declared Mayor of
the City of Manila.
At the core of this case is the issue of whether Estrada was
qualified to run for Mayor of the City of Manila. Estrada, however,
has invoked several procedural issues that, if decided in his favor,
would effectively impede this court's having to rule on the
substantive issue of his qualification. All of these procedural
obstacles lack merit and should not prevent this court from ruling
on Estrada's qualification.
IV
The petition filed by petitioner Atty.
Alicia Risos-Vidal with COMELEC
was filed on time
Estrada argues that the petition filed by Risos-Vidal before
the COMELEC should be treated as a petition to deny due course to
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy (CoC) under Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code 67 (Section 78 petition). He claims that the petition effectively
assailed the falsity of a representation he made in his CoC — that is,
that he was eligible for the office he sought to be elected to — and,
therefore, invoked a ground for a Section 78 petition, rather than a
ground for a petition for disqualification.
Estrada adds that Rule 23, Section 2 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523 68 provides that a Section 78 petition must be
filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing a CoC, but not
later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the CoC specifically
subject of the petition. He claims that, since Risos-Vidal's petition
was all but a "camouflaged" 69petition for disqualification, Rule 25,
Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, 70 which allows for
petitions for disqualification to be "filed any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of
proclamation" finds no application. As Risos-Vidal's petition was
filed before the COMELEC on January 14, 2013 — one hundred and
four (104) days removed from October 2, 2012, when he filed his
CoC — Estrada argues that Risos-Vidal's petition was belatedly filed
and, hence, should have been summarily dismissed by COMELEC.
Estrada's assertion is erroneous.
This court's 2008 decision in Fermin v. COMELEC 71 allowed
for an opportunity "to dichotomize, once and for all, two popular
remedies to prevent a candidate from running for an elective
position which are indiscriminately interchanged by the Bench and
the Bar": 72 on the one hand, a petition to deny due course to or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code and, on the other, a petition for disqualification under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68 petition).
The two remedies, and their distinctions, were discussed in
the course of this court's characterization of the petition involved
in Fermin — whether it was a Section 78 petition or a Section 68
petition — considering that such petition was anchored on an
allegation that a candidate for Mayor was ineligible for failing to
satisfy the requirement of residency of at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the election. The problem of
characterization is the same issue facing us at this juncture:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of
due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is
not based on the lack of qualifications but on a
finding that the candidate made amaterial
representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office
he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is
eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of
the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to
the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo
warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the amount in excess of that moral turpitude, shall be
OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or allowed by this Code; (d) disqualified to be a
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction solicited, received or made candidate and to hold any
mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is any contribution prohibited office, unless he has been
filed before proclamation, while a petition under Sections 89, 95, 96, given plenary pardon or
for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of 97 and 104; or (e) violated granted amnesty.
the winning candidate. any of Sections 80, 83, 85, The disqualifications to be a
At this point, we must stress that 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, candidate herein provided shall be
a "Section 78" petition ought not to be k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, deemed removed upon the declaration
interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" shall be disqualified from by competent authority that said
petition. They are different remedies, based on continuing as a candidate, insanity or incompetence had been
different grounds, and resulting in different or if he has been elected, removed or after the expiration of a
eventualities. . . . from holding the office. Any period of five years from his service or
The ground raised in the Dilangalen person who is a permanent sentence, unless within the same
petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of resident of or an immigrant period he again becomes disqualified.
the qualifications to be elected as mayor of to a foreign country shall Section 40 of the Local Government Code
Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not not be qualified to run for (LGC)
established residence in the said locality for at any elective office under
SECTION 40.
least one year immediately preceding the this Code, unless said
Disqualifications. — The
election. Failure to meet the one-year residency person has waived his status
following persons are
requirement for the public office is not a ground as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign disqualified from running for
for the "disqualification" of a candidate under any elective local position:
Section 68. [Section 68] only refers to the country in accordance with
the residence requirement (a) Those sentence by final
commission of prohibited acts and the judgment for an offense
possession of a permanent resident status in a provided for in the election
laws. involving moral turpitude or
foreign country as grounds for disqualification, for an offense punishable by
thus: Likewise, the other provisions of law
one (1) year or more of
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. — referring to "disqualification" do not include the
lack of the one-year residency qualification as a imprisonment, within two
Any candidate who, in an (2) years after serving
action or protest in which he ground therefor, thus: DCcHAa
sentence;
is a party is declared by final Section 12 of the OEC
(b) Those removed from
decision of a competent SEC. 12. Disqualifications. — office as a result of an
court guilty of, or found by Any person who has been administrative case;
the Commission of having declared by competent
(c) Those convicted by final
(a) given money or other authority insane or
material consideration to incompetent, or has been judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the
influence, induce or corrupt sentenced by final judgment
Republic;
the voters or public officials for subversion, insurrection,
performing electoral rebellion, or for any offense (d) Those with dual
functions; (b) committed for which he has been citizenship;
acts of terrorism to enhance sentenced to a penalty of (e) Fugitive from justice in
his candidacy; (c) spent in more than eighteen months criminal or nonpolitical
his election campaign an or for a crime involving cases here or abroad;
 (f) Permanent residents in a
foreign country or those
who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the
same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-
minded.
Considering that the Dilangalen
petition does not state any of these grounds for
disqualification, it cannot be categorized as a
"Section 68" petition.
To emphasize, a petition for
disqualification, on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 or 68 of the [Omnibus
Election Code], or Section 40 of the [Local
Government Code]. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
can only be grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate
that is false. . . . 73 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
The quoted discussion clearly establishes the distinction of
when it is proper to resort to a Section 78 petition as against a
petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code: (1) a Section 78 petition is proper when a statement
of a material representation in a certificate of candidacy is false; and
(2) a Section 68 petition is proper when disqualification is sought on
account of having committed electoral offenses and/or possession
of status as a permanent resident in a foreign country.
Fermin, however, did not just touch on petitions for
disqualification anchored on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, but also on petitions for disqualification anchored on Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code and on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. Fermin made the pronouncement that Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of the Local
Government Code are equally valid grounds for a petition for
disqualification. Nevertheless, Fermin was not categorical on when a
petition for disqualification anchored on these statutory provisions
may be resorted to vis-à-vis a Section 78 petition.
A subsequent case, Aratea v. COMELEC, 74 affirms that
petitions for disqualification may be anchored on Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and/or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code, much as they can be anchored on Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code: "A petition for disqualification can only be premised
on a ground specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code." 75
Likewise, Rule 25, Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9523 indicates that a petition for disqualification is based on legally
(i.e., by Constitution or by statute) prescribed disqualifications. It
provides:
Section 1. Grounds. — Any candidate who, in
an action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent
court, guilty of, or found by the Commission
to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate
invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to
Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or
a combination thereof, shall be summarily
dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Aratea and COMELEC Resolution No. 9523,
like Fermin, are uncategorical on the availability of petitions for
disqualification anchored on Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code and/or Section 40 of the Local Government Code vis-à-vis
resort to Section 78 petitions. Any standing ambiguity was settled by
this court's discussion inDominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections. 76
In Dominador Jalosjos, Jr., this court affirmed the
COMELEC's grant of a Section 78 petition and sustained the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy filed by Dominador
Jalosjos, Jr. in his bid to be elected Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections. This
cancellation was premised on a finding that Jalosjos, Jr. made a
material misrepresentation in his CoC in stating that he was eligible
for election. Jalosjos, Jr. had previously been convicted of robbery
and sentenced to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification. In sustaining the cancellation of his CoC, this court
reasoned: DTEIaC
The perpetual special disqualification
against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact
involving eligibility which is a proper ground for
a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
xxx xxx xxx
A false statement in a certificate of
candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for
public office is a false material representation
which is a ground for a petition under Section 78
of the same Code. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Section 74 requires the candidate to
state under oath in his certificate of candidacy
"that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is
eligible if he has a right to run for the public
office. If a candidate is not actually eligible
because he is barred by final judgment in a
criminal case from running for public office, and
he still states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public
office, then the candidate clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a
petition under Section 78.77 (Citations omitted)
From these, it is clear that a false claim of eligibility made in
a certificate of candidacy despite a prior conviction which carries
with it the accessory penalty of disqualification is a ground for a
Section 78 petition. Nevertheless, it is also a ground for a petition
for disqualification. As explained in Dominador Jalosjos, Jr.:
What is indisputably clear is that the
false material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78.
However, since the false material representation
arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor,
a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code or Section 40 of the Local
Government Code can also be properly filed.The
petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code. The law expressly
provides multiple remedies and the choice of
which remedy to adopt belongs to the
petitioner. 78
 The concurrent availability of a Section 78 petition with a
petition for disqualification should not be interpreted as diminishing
the distinction between the two (2) remedies.
The pivotal consideration in a Section 78 petition is
material misrepresentation relating to qualifications for elective
public office. To "misrepresent" is "to describe (someone or
something) in a false way especially in order to deceive
someone." 79 It, therefore, connotes malevolent intent or bad faith
that impels one to adulterate information. A Section 78 petition
thus, squarely applies to instances in which a candidate is fully
aware of a matter of fact that disqualifies him or her but conceals or
otherwise falsely depicts that fact as to make it appear that he or
she is qualified. A petition for disqualification, on the other hand,
may apply in cases where a disqualification exists but, because of an
attendant ambiguity (such as an unsettled legal question), a
candidate acts in good faith and without any deliberate attempt to
conceal or mislead.
Right at the onset, the petition filed by Risos-Vidal before
the COMELEC on January 14, 2013 asserts that it was filed pursuant
to Section 40 of the Local Government Code, "in relation
to" 80 Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:
This is a petition pursuant to Sec. 40 of
R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as "The Local
Government Code of 1991", in relation to Sec. 12
of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
"Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines", seeking to disqualify former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada from running
for the mayoralty position in Manila in the
coming May 13, 2013 elections, on the ground
of his prior conviction of the crime of plunder by
the Sandiganbayan and his having been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute
disqualification. 81 (Emphasis supplied)
This petition posits that Estrada is disqualified from running
as Mayor of the City of Manila, pursuant to Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, as follows:
Sec. 40 of the LGC provides that a
person sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1)
year or more is disqualified from running for any
elective local position. SCIacA
As earlier said, respondent was
sentenced in Crim. Case No. 26558 to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He was, however, granted pardon by
former Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, thus, did
not serve his sentence in full.
Nonetheless, while the pardon did
restore to him his civil and political rights, it did
not restore to him his right to run for or hold
public office or the right of suffrage because it
was not expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon. . . . 82
This petition unambiguously anchors itself on statutorily
prescribed disqualifications — under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, as well as Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code — which jurisprudence has explicitly recognized as a valid
basis for both a petition for disqualification and a Section 78
petition.
It follows that the petition was filed on time. The petition
was filed on January 14, 2013, after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy, and before the date of Estrada's
proclamation as Mayor on May 17, 2013. This is within the period
permitted by Rule 25, Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.
V policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
Alfredo S. Lim may intervene in the
present petition for certiorari
Citing Section 44 of the Local Government Code 83 — on
succession in case of permanent vacancies in the Office of the
Mayor — and jurisprudence to the effect that "the candidate who
obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified," 84 Estrada
claims that "the party who stands to benefit in the event of [his]
disqualification is none other than the duly elected Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila, Isko Moreno." 85 Thus, he asserts that "it is clear
that Lim has NO LEGAL STANDING to institute his Petition-In-
Intervention." 86
In the first place, Estrada is erroneously invoking the
concept of "legal standing." What Estrada is really questioning is
whether Lim is a real party in interest.
The distinction between the rule on standing and real party
in interest was extensively discussed by this court in Kilosbayan v.
Morato: 87
Not only is petitioners' standing a legal
issue that may be determined again in this case.
It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this
case, since standing is a concept in
constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The issue in this
case is whether petitioners are the "real parties
in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of
the Rules of Court which requires that "Every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party in interest."
The difference between the rule on
standing and real party in interest has been
noted by authorities thus: "It is important to
note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is
very different from questions relating to whether
a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest
or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that
only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader
judiciary in certain areas. (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE
AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 (1985))
Standing is a special concern in
constitutional law because in some cases suits
are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or
by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
the public interest. Hence the question in
standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional
 questions." (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.
2d 633 (1962))
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the question as to
"real party in interest" is whether he is "the
party who would be benefitted or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of
the suit."' (Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd.,
88 Phil. 125, 131 (1951)) 88 (Emphasis supplied)
In seeking to intervene, Lim has made no pretensions of
acting as a representative of the general public and, thus, advancing
the public interest. He merely prays that he be declared the elected
Mayor of the City of Manila following a declaration that Estrada was
disqualified to run for the same post. Though what is involved is a
public office, what Lim seeks to enforce is, fundamentally, a
(supposed) right accruing to him personally to assume an office.
Lim has enough interest at stake in this case as would
enable him to intervene.
Rule 19, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for who may intervene in a pending court action:
Section 1. Who may intervene. — A person
who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed
to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenor's rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding. (Emphasis
supplied)
The requirement of "legal interest" was discussed
in Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 89 as follows:
The interest which entitles a person to
intervene in a suit between other parties must
be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if
persons not parties of the action could be
allowed to intervene, proceedings will become
unnecessarily complicated, expensive and
interminable. And this is not the policy of the
law.
The words "an interest in the subject"
mean a direct interest in the cause of action as
pleaded, and which would put the intervenor in
a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the
complaint, without the establishment of which
plaintiff could not recover. 90 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is true that the principal matter for resolution in this case
is whether Estrada, based on circumstances personally applying to
him, was qualified to run for Mayor of the City of Manila.
Nevertheless, the logical consequence of a decision adverse to
Estrada is the need to identify who shall, henceforth, assume the
position of Mayor.
Lim claims that he is entitled to replace Estrada. In support
of this, he cites a decision of this court 91 and claims that, as a
disqualified candidate, the votes cast for Estrada should be deemed
stray votes. This would result in Lim being the qualified candidate
obtaining the highest number of votes, which would, in turn, entitle
him to being proclaimed the elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
It is worth emphasizing that "[t]he purpose of intervention
is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in order for
him to protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting
claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits more
than on due process considerations." 92 Lim's intervention serves
this purpose. It enables the resolution of an issue which is corollary
to one of the two ways by which this court may decide on the issue
of Estrada's disqualification. ECAaTS
VI
This case is not barred by
COMELEC's rulings in the
disqualification cases filed against
Estrada in connection with his 2010
bid for the presidency
a. Estrada's theory:
case is barred by res
judicata
Estrada avers that in 2010, in connection with what was
then his second bid for the presidency of the Republic, two (2)
disqualification cases were filed against him: one, by a certain Atty.
Evilio C. Pormento, docketed as SPA No. 09-028 (DC); and two, by a
certain Mary Lou B. Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 09-104 (DC). In the
resolution dated January 20, 2010, 93 the COMELEC Second Division
denied these disqualification petitions for lack of merit and upheld
Estrada's qualification to run for President. In the resolution dated
April 27, 2010, 94 the COMELEC En Banc denied Mary Lou B.
Estrada's motion for reconsideration. In another resolution dated
May 4, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Pormento's motion for
reconsideration. 95
Estrada claims that "[t]he issue surrounding the character
of [his] pardon and eligibility to seek public elective office was
already extensively dealt with and passed upon" 96in these
disqualification cases. He asserts that as these cases involved and
resolved "the same or identical issues," 97 the present case is now
barred by res judicata.
Estrada draws particular attention to the following
pronouncement of the COMELEC Second Division in its January 20,
2010 resolution:
Furthermore, there is absolutely no
indication that the executive clemency exercised
by President Arroyo to pardon Former President
Estrada was a mere conditional pardon. It
clearly stated that the former president is
"restored to his civil and political rights" and
there is nothing in the same which limits this
restoration. The only therein stated that may
have some bearing on the supposed conditions
is that statement in the whereas clause thereof
that contained the following: "WHEREAS, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office", but
that is not really a condition but is merely part
of a preliminary statement, referring to what
respondent Estrada had said publicly. There is
nothing stated in the dispositive part that it was
conditioned upon said respondent's purported
public commitment. His public statement
cannot, therefore, serve to restrict the
operation of, or prevail over the explicit
statement in the executive clemency which
 restored all of Estrada's civil and political rights,
including "the right to vote and to be voted for a
public office," including to the position of the
Presidency. This executive clemency granted to
the former President being absolute and
unconditional and having been accepted by him,
the same can no longer be revoked or be made
subject to a condition. 98
b. The 2010
disqualification
cases and Risos-
Vidal's petition are
anchored on
different causes of
action and, hence,
involve different
issues and subject
matters
Res judicata was discussed in Pryce Corporation v. China
Banking Corporation 99 as follows:
According to the doctrine of res
judicata, "a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit."
The elements for res judicata to apply
are as follows: (a) the former judgment was
final; (b) the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) the judgment was based on the
merits; and (d) between the first and the second
actions, there was an identity of parties, subject
matters, and causes of action.
Res judicata embraces two concepts:
(1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness
of judgment.
Bar by prior judgment exists "when, as
between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to
be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action."
On the other hand, the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment finds application
"when a fact or question has been squarely put
in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in
a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction." This principle only needs identity
of parties and issues to apply. 100
The 2010 disqualification cases filed against Estrada in
connection with his 2010 bid for the presidency do not bar the
present case on account of res judicata.
For one, the 2010 disqualification cases filed by Atty. Evilio
C. Pormento and Mary Lou B. Estrada involved issues and were
anchored on causes of action that are markedly different from those
in the present case. These cases were anchored on the
constitutional prohibition against a President's re-election, as
provided by Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, 101 and
the additional ground that Estrada was a nuisance candidate. To the
contrary, the present case is anchored on Estrada's conviction for
plunder which carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification and invokes Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, as well as Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
The COMELEC Second Division, summarizing the
circumstances of the petition for disqualification subject of SPA No.
09-028 (DC), filed by Atty. Evilio C. Pormento, stated: SIHCDA
Petitioner Evilio C. Pormento filed the
first case against Respondent Joseph Ejercito
Estrada on December 05, 2009. It was properly
titled an "Urgent Petition for Disqualification as
Presidential Candidate". This Petition is
premised on the specific provision of Article VII,
section 4 of the 1987 Constitution a portion of
which stated that: . . .the President shall not be
eligible for any re-election." 102 (Emphasis in
the original)
On the other hand, summarizing the circumstances of the
petition filed by Mary Lou B. Estrada, the COMELEC Second Division
stated:
The second of the above-entitled cases
was filed on December 12, 2009, by Petitioner
Mary Lou Estrada alleging that the name of
Joseph M. Ejercito Estrada might cause
confusion to her prejudice. She filed a "Petition
to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito Joseph M. From
running as President due to Constitutional
Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the
Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B" and prayed
for the disqualification of the Respondent and to
have his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
cancelled. She also made reference to the
Respondent being a "Nuisance
Candidate". 103 (Emphasis supplied)
That these disqualification cases involved issues and
invoked causes of action that are different from those in this case is
evident in the recital of issues in the COMELEC Second Division's
January 20, 2010 resolution:
THE ISSUES IN THE TWO CASES
(a) Whether or not Respondent Joseph
Ejercito Estrada is qualified to be a candidate for
the position of President of the Philippines in
the forthcoming elections on May 10,
2010, despite the fact that he had previously
been elected to, assumed and discharged the
duties of, the same position;
(b) Whether or not, former President
Estrada may be considered a nuisance
candidate in view of the Constitutional
prohibition against any reelection of a former
President who has previously elected and had
assumed the same position. 104 (Emphasis
supplied)
This, too, is evident, in the resolution's introductory
paragraphs:
At the very core of the controversy
involved in these two cases which stands like a
stratospheric totem pole is the specific provision
under Sec. 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which states:
xxx xxx xxx
This Commission (Second Division) is
confronted with the dilemma of deciding a
brewing controversy considering the above
Constitutional provision which prohibits
reelection of "the President"; that is, whether
former President Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada
 may or may not be allowed to run in the coming
May 2010 elections for the same position of the
President of the Republic of the
Philippines? 105 (Emphasis supplied)
Whatever pronouncement the COMELEC Second Division
made on the matter of Estrada's conviction for plunder and
subsequent pardon was thus a superfluity. Ultimately, it was
unnecessary to the resolution of the issues involved in the
disqualification cases filed by Atty. Evilio C. Pormento and Mary Lou
B. Estrada. It was nothing more than obiter dictum.
Another disqualification case filed in connection with
Estrada's 2010 bid for the presidency, which, however, Estrada did
not cite in his averments was Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ,
petitioner, vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
SPA No. 09-024 (DC). This case was similarly focused on the
constitutional prohibition against a President's re-election and on
the allegation that Estrada was a nuisance candidate:
The bone of contention of this
controversy revolves around the interpretation
of the specific provisions of Sec. 4 of Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. . . . 106
Its recital of issues reads:
From the foregoing, the Commission
(Second Division) hereby rules on the following
issues:
(a) Can a former elected President be
qualified to become a
Presidential Candidate and be
elected again to the same
position he or she previously
occupied?
(b) May President Arroyo being a sitting
President be allowed to run
for any elected position such
as a member of the House of
Representatives?
(c) Are President Arroyo and Former
President Estrada nuisance
candidates? 107
That the 2010 disqualification cases were anchored on a
constitutional provision relating to the executive branch of
government, while the present case is anchored on the provisions of
the Local Government Code on the disqualification of candidates for
local elective offices, makes evident that the former entailed a
different subject matter. While the 2010 disqualification cases relate
to Estrada's bid for the presidency, the present case relates to his
bid to become Mayor of the City of Manila.
c. There was no final
judgment on the
merits arising from
the 2010
disqualification
cases
Not only do the 2010 disqualification cases involve
different issues, causes of action, and subject matters, but these
disqualification cases do not even have a final judgment on the
merits to speak of.
Cabreza, Jr. v. Cabreza 108 explains the concept of a
"judgment on the merits" as follows:
A judgment may be considered as one
rendered on the merits "when it determines the
rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical
or dilatory objections"; or when the judgment is
rendered "after a determination of which party
is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon some preliminary or formal or
merely technical point." 109
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration by
the COMELEC En Banc, Atty. Evilio C. Pormento sought relief from
this court via a petition for certiorari, insisting that Estrada was
barred by Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution from making a
second bid for the presidency. This petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 191988 and entitled Atty. Evilio C. Pormento, petitioner, vs.
Joseph "Erap" Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections,
respondents. AScHCD
As noted by this court in its August 31, 2010 resolution
in Pormento v. Estrada, 110 the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded
without Estrada having been removed from the list of candidates or
otherwise being restricted in his candidacy as "under the Rules of
Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the
judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to
be reviewed[; moreover,] petitioner did not even pray for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction." 111 Thus, Estrada was able to participate in the May 10,
2010 presidential elections. He, however, only obtained the second
highest number of votes and was, thus, not proclaimed winner.
Not having been elected President for a second time, this
court ruled that Atty. Evilio C. Pormento's petition had become
moot and academic. Thus, it was denied due course and dismissed:
Private respondent was not elected
President the second time he ran. Since the
issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase
"any reelection" will be premised on a person's
second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists. There is in this case no definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy that
touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in
this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein. As such, one of the essential requisites
for the exercise of the power of judicial review,
the existence of an actual case or controversy, is
sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only
adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The
Court is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
result as to the thing in issue in the case before
it. In other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.
An action is considered "moot" when it
no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue
is likely to be raised again between the parties.
There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy
existed prior to the proclamation of a President
who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010
 elections, the same is no longer true today.
Following the results of that elections, private
respondent was not elected President for the
second time. Thus, any discussion of his
"reelection" will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical
purpose.
Accordingly, the petition is denied due
course and is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 112 (Citations omitted)
From these, it is plain to see that the substance of Estrada's
qualification (vis-à-vis Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution)
was not at all discussed. This court even explicitly stated that were it
to make a pronouncement on that matter, this pronouncement
would amount to nothing more than a non-binding opinion: ICDSca
What is the proper interpretation of
the following provision of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution: "[t]he President shall not be
eligible for any reelection?"
The novelty and complexity of the
constitutional issue involved in this case present
a temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal
scholars and law students alike would find hard
to resist. However, prudence dictates that this
Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue
before it has already been mooted by
subsequent events. More importantly, the
constitutional requirement of the existence of a
"case" or an "actual controversy" for the proper
exercise of the power of judicial review
constrains us to refuse the allure of making a
grand pronouncement that, in the end, will
amount to nothing but a non-binding
opinion. 113
Estrada, though adjudged by the COMELEC Second Division
and COMELEC En Banc to be qualified for a second bid at the
presidency, was never conclusively adjudged by this court to be so
qualified. The 2010 disqualification cases reached their conclusion
not because it was determined, once and for all, that Estrada was
not disqualified, but because — with Estrada's loss in the elections
— there was no longer a controversy to resolve. There was no
"determin[ation of] the rights and liabilities of the parties based on
the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections"; 114 neither was there "a determination of which party
is right." 115 While the 2010 disqualification cases may have
reached their literal end or terminal point, there was no final
judgment on the merits.
VII
Estrada was disqualified from
running for Mayor of the City of
Manila in the May 13, 2013
elections and remains disqualified
from running for any elective post
a. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada: convicted,
disqualified, and
pardoned
We now come to the core of this case, that is, whether
Estrada was qualified to run for Mayor of the City of Manila.
It is not disputed that Estrada was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and convicted for plunder by the Sandiganbayan.
This conviction stands unreversed and unmodified, whether by the
Sandiganbayan, on reconsideration, or by this court, on appeal. By
this conviction, Estrada was sentenced to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Per Article 30 of the
Revised Penal Code, this accessory penalty produces the effect of,
among others, "[t]he deprivation of the right to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." 116
Apart from the specific penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification meted on Estrada on account of his conviction,
statutory provisions provide for the disqualification from elective
public office of individuals who have been convicted for criminal
offenses involving moral turpitude 117 and/or entailing a sentence
of a defined duration of imprisonment.
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for
disqualifications for elective offices in general:
Section 12. Disqualifications. — Any person
who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold
any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
This [sic] disqualifications to be a
candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period
of five years from his service of sentence, unless
within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 40 of the Local Government Code provides for
disqualifications for local elective offices in particular:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. — The
following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or
those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of
the same right after the effectivity of
this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is with this backdrop of, on the one hand, Estrada's
conviction for plunder (with its concomitant penalty of absolute
perpetual disqualification), as well as the cited statutory
disqualifications, and, on the other, the pardon granted to Estrada,
that this court must rule on whether Estrada was qualified to run for
Mayor of Manila in the May 13, 2013 elections.
 b. The power to grant
clemency: an
executive function
The power to grant pardons, along with other acts of
executive clemency, is vested in the President of the Philippines by
Article VII, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution: CASaEc
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment,
or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.
The recognition that the power to grant clemency is lodged
in the executive has been made since the earliest days of the
Philippines as a republic. It "is founded on the recognition that
human institutions are imperfect and that there are infirmities,
deficiencies or flaws in the administration of justice. The power
exists as an instrument or means for correcting these infirmities and
also for mitigating whatever harshness might be generated by a too
strict an application of the law." 118
Our constitutional history is a cumulative affirmation of the
fundamental conception of the power to pardon as an executive
power.
Provisions from Title VIII of the Malolos Constitution of
1899 read:
Article 67 — Apart from the powers necessary
to execute laws, it is the duty of the President
of the Republic to:
1. Confer civil and military employment
in accordance to the law;
2. Appoint Secretaries of Government;
3. Direct diplomatic and commercial
relations with other powers;
4. Ensure the swift and complete
administration of justice in the
entire territory;
5. Pardon lawbreakers in accordance
to the law, subject to the
provisions relating to the
Secretaries of Government;
6. Preside over national solemnities,
and welcome accredited
envoys and representatives of
foreign powers.
Article 68 — The President of the
Republic needs to be authorized by a special
law:
1. To transfer, cede or exchange any
part of Philippine territory;
2. To incorporate any other territory
into the Philippines;
3. To allow foreign troops in Philippine
territory;
4. To ratify treaties of offensive and
defensive alliance, special
commercial treaties, treaties
that stipulate subsidies to a
foreign power, and any other
treaty that compels Filipinos
to perform any individual
obligation;
In no case can the confidential articles
of a treaty nullify those that
are public.
5. To grant general amnesties and
pardons;
6. To mint money. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrasting the provisions of the Malolos Constitution with
the present iteration of the pardoning power, it is particularly
notable that the power, as provided for in 1899, is deferential to the
legislative branch of government. While recognizing the pardoning
power as ultimately one for the President to wield, it remained
subject to legislative imprimatur.
Aided by the lens of history, this is most effectively
understood in the context of a "conflict between people, on one
hand, who were determined to secure the kind of freedom and
economic benefits never enjoyed by them before, and groups, on
the other, who wanted to maintain a social status and economic
privilege inherited from way back or recently acquired by the
displacement of elements formerly controlling the destiny of the
colony." 119 The latter — ilustrados — were the driving force
behind the adoption of a constitution, and they endeavored "to
make the legislature the most powerful unit in the
government." 120
The adoption of organic acts under the auspices of
American rule enabled the assimilation of some American
constitutional principles. Not least of these is the grant to the
executive of the power to pardon. The Constitution of the United
States of America includes the grant of the pardoning power in the
recital of the President's powers: cECTaD
Article II, Section 2.
The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United
States; he may require the Opinion, in writing,
of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the Jones Law of 1916 provides:
Section 21. — The Governor-General
(b) Powers and duties. — . . . He is
hereby vested with the
exclusive power to grant
pardons and reprieves and
remit fines and forfeitures,
and may veto any legislation
enacted as herein provided. . .
.
As against the Malolos Constitution, the Jones Law makes
no reference to the need for legislative consent, whether a
priori or a posteriori, for the exercise of the pardoning power.
Equally notable, the pardoning power is mentioned in the same
breath (i.e., the same sentence) as the veto power — a power that
delineates the relation of the executive branch with the legislative
branch.
With the onset of the Commonwealth and en route to
independence, the 1935 Constitution affirmed that the power to
pardon is executive in nature. Article VII, Section 11 (6) of the 1935
Constitution reads:
Section 11. . . .
(6) The President shall have the power
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction,
for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment,
upon such conditions and with such restrictions
and limitations as he may deem proper to
impose. He shall have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of the National
Assembly.
A recollection of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention reveals attempts "to limit the absolute character of the
pardoning power of the Executive:" 121
It was also generally held that, as it was
under the Jones Law and in other countries, the
pardoning power should be vested in the
Executive, although there was a difference of
opinion with respect to the authority to exercise
the power to grant amnesty. There were many
proposals, however, intended to limit the
absolute character of the pardoning power of
the Executive. Of them were the proposal in the
report of the committee on executive power
and in the first draft of the Constitution to the
effect that pardon should be granted to a
person only after his conviction; the Galang
amendment embodying a proposal in the report
of the committee on executive power to the
effect that the Chief Executive could grant
pardon to a person only after the latter had
served part of the sentence imposed upon him,
except in cases where the convicting court
should recommend executive clemency, when
the same could be exercised even prior to the
service of the sentence; and the Sanvictores
amendment providing that no pardon should,
without the recommendation of the Supreme
Court, be granted until the prisoner should have
served at least one-half of the minimum
sentence imposed.
xxx xxx xxx
The Galang amendment and the
Sanvictores amendment would go further by
requiring that no person, even if already
convicted, should be pardoned unless he had
served partially his sentence. The Galang
amendment would permit executive clemency
even before the commencement of the service
of the sentence, upon the recommendation of
the convicting court; and the Sanvictores
amendment, upon the recommendation of the
Supreme Court. . . . 122
As will be gleaned from the final text of the 1935
Constitution, the Galang and Sanvictores amendments were both
defeated. Thus was affirmed the executive nature of the power to
pardon.
The 1943 Constitution, adopted in the interlude of the
Second World War and the Japanese occupation, echoed the
language of the 1935 Constitution on the executive nature of the
pardoning power. The text of Article II, Section 13 of the 1943
Constitution is substantially similar with its counterpart in the 1935
Constitution except for the non-mention of impeachment as beyond
the coverage of pardoning power:
Section 13. The President shall have the
power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction, for all offenses, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose.
He shall have the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of the National
Assembly.
Like the Jones Law, but unlike the 1935 and 1943
Constitutions, the 1973 Constitution (as amended) dispensed with
the requirement of prior conviction. The 1973 Constitution, adopted
during the rule of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is characteristic of
a strong executive. Article VII, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution
provides:
Section 11. The President may, except in cases
of impeachment, grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the
Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.
From the grant of the power made by Section 21 (b) of the
Jones Law of 1916 to the present, the 1987 Constitution, the shifts
in the grant to the executive of the power to extend clemency has
mainly been in the matter of requiring or dispensing with conviction
as a condition precedent for the exercise of executive clemency.
The present, the 1987 Constitution, requires prior
conviction. Nevertheless, it retains the fundamental regard for the
pardoning power as executive in nature. Jurisprudence dating to
1991 123 noted how the 1986 Constitutional Commission rejected a
proposal to render the coverage of the pardoning power susceptible
to legislative interference, particularly in matters relating to graft
and corruption. Likewise, jurisprudence as recent as
2007 124 clarified that a court cannot pre-empt the grant of
executive clemency.
In addition to restoring the requirement of prior conviction,
the 1987 Constitution now includes the phrase "as otherwise
provided in this Constitution."
The 1987 Constitution, in Article VII, Section 19,
enumerates the acts or means through which the President may
extend clemency: (1) reprieve, or "the deferment of the
implementation of the sentence for an interval of time;" 125 (2)
commutation, which "refers to the reduction of the duration of a
prison sentence of a prisoner;" 126 (3) remission of fines and
forfeitures; (4) pardon; and (5) amnesty.
"[P]ardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the
gravity of the King's wrath." 127 It is "an act of grace, proceeding
from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is
the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered
to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. . . . A pardon is a deed, to the
validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete
without acceptance." 128 (Emphasis supplied)
Pardon and amnesty have been distinguished as
follows: TaSEHC
Pardon is granted by the Chief
Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of
Congress, and it is a public act of which the
 courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is
granted to one after conviction; while amnesty
is granted to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted, that is,
it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for
that reason it does "not work the restoration of
the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in
no case exempts the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence". While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no
offense. 129 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
c. Pardon and its
effects: forgiveness
but not forgetfulness
Estrada argues that pardon is characterized by what he
refers to as the "forgive-and-forget rule." 130 He cites several
decisions rendered in the United States 131 (chiefly, the 1866, post-
Civil War decision in Ex parte Garland) and insists that "pardon not
merely releases the offender from the punishment . . . but that it
obliterates in legal contemplation the offense itself" 132 and that it
"forever closes the eyes of the court." 133 Citing this court's
decisions in Cristobal v. Labrador 134 and in Pelobello v.
Palatino, 135 Estrada asserts that pardon "blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offence . . . it makes him, as it were, a new
man, and gives him new credit and capacity." 136
Estrada is in grave error for insisting on what he has
dubbed as the "forgive-and-forget rule."
In Monsanto v. Factoran, 137 this court repudiated the
pronouncements made by Cristobal and Pelobello, as well as
reliance on Garland, on the nature and effects of pardon:
In Pelobello v. Palatino, we find a
reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by
the courts on the various consequences of
pardon: ". . . we adopt the broad view expressed
in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941,
December 7, 1940, that subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action; that an absolute
pardon not only blots out the crime committed
but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. . . . (W)e are of the opinion that the
better view in the light of the constitutional
grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily
restrict or impair the power of the Chief
Executive who, after an inquiry into the
environmental facts, should be at liberty to
atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of
relieving completely the party . . . concerned
from the accessory and resultant disabilities of
criminal conviction."
The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal
v. Labrador cases, and several others show the
unmistakable application of the doctrinal case
of Ex Parte Garland, whose sweeping
generalizations to this day continue to hold
sway in our jurisprudence despite the fact that
much of its relevance has been downplayed by
later American decisions.
Consider the following broad
statements:
"A pardon reaches both the
punishment prescribed for the offense
and the guilt of the offendor; and when
the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If
granted before conviction, it prevents
any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights; it
makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity."
Such generalities have not been
universally accepted, recognized or
approved. The modern trend of authorities now
rejects the unduly broad language of the
Garland case(reputed to be perhaps the most
extreme statement which has been made on the
effects of a pardon). To our mind, this [i.e., the
rejection of Garland] is the more realistic
approach. While a pardon has generally been
regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the
offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The
very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the
crime and the conviction thereof. It does not
wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.
The better considered cases regard full
pardon (at least one not based on the offender's
innocence) as relieving the party from all the
punitive consequences of his criminal act,
including the disqualifications or disabilities
based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him
from nothing more. "To say, however that the
offender is a 'new man', and 'as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense'; is to ignore
the difference between the crime and the
criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense
is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he
may be deserving of punishment, though left
unpunished; and the law may regard him as
more dangerous to society than one never
found guilty of crime, though it places no
restraints upon him following his
conviction." 138 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied, citations omitted)
 Estrada has made much of how Monsanto centered on the
issue of the need for a new appointment of a pardoned officer
seeking to be reinstated to her former position. He posits
that Monsanto could not be controlling in this case, as what is at
issue here is qualification for elective public office. 139
This is but a vain attempt to split hairs. It is clear from the
previously quoted discussion inMonsanto that there was an
unequivocal consideration by this court of the nature and effects of
pardon. This discussion laid the premises for the ultimate resolution
of the dispute and was indispensable to the conclusions this court
reached. As againstMonsanto, Estrada would have this court rely on
a decision, which was rendered nearly a century and a half ago by a
court outside of this jurisdiction (i.e., Ex parte Garland), and which,
this court has observed to be against the grain of contemporary
authorities. In addition, Estrada would have us rely on jurisprudence
which themselves depend on the same archaic and foreign decision.
To do, as Estrada suggests, would be to indulge an absurdity.
Estrada effectively invites this court to irrationality and to arrive at a
conclusion resting on premises that have been roundly renounced.
In any case, from the preceding discussions, two points are
worthy of particular emphasis: AacSTE
I. Pardon is a private, though official, act of the
executive. Proceeding from the power
to execute laws, it merely evinces the
executive's choice to decline from
enforcing punishment so as to mollify
penal misery.
II. Pardon does not erase the moral stain and
the fact of conviction. It retains the
law's regard for a convict "as more
dangerous to society than one never
found guilty of a crime"; 140 the
convict remains "deserving of
punishment" though left
unpunished. 141
It is with the illumination of this fundamental notion of
pardon as a 'private act that does not erase the moral stain and the
fact of conviction' that this court must proceed to make a
determination of Estrada's qualification.
VIII
The exercise of pardon:
limitations and prescriptions
a. Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal
Code do not abridge
or diminish the
pardoning power of
the President
Article VII, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution provides
two (2) limitations on the President's exercise of the power to
pardon: first, it can only be given after final conviction; and, second,
it cannot be exercised "in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution." Elsewhere in the Constitution, Article
IX, C, Section 5 provides that: "No pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission [on Elections]."
Outside of the Constitution, the Revised Penal Code
contains provisions relating to pardon.
Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: "A
pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him."
The same Article 36 prescribes that for pardon to effect the
restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, "such
rights [must] be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon."
Also on suffrage and/or the rights to vote for and be
elected to public office, Articles 40 to 43 of the Revised Penal Code
provide that the penalties of perpetual absolute disqualification,
temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual special
disqualification, and perpetual special disqualification on suffrage,
which attach as accessory penalties to death, reclusion
perpetua, reclusion temporal, prisión mayor and prisión
correccional, as the case may be, shall still be suffered by the
offender even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, "unless .
. . expressly remitted in the pardon":
ARTICLE 40. Death — Its Accessory Penalties.
— The death penalty, when it is not executed
by reason of commutation or pardon shall
carry with it that of perpetual absolute
disqualification and that of civil interdiction
during thirty years following the date of
sentence, unless such accessory penalties
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
ARTICLE 41. Reclusión Perpetua and Reclusión
Temporal — Their accessory penalties. — The
penalties of reclusión perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
ARTICLE 42. Prisión Mayor — Its Accessory
Penalties. — The penalty of prisión
mayor shall carry with it that of temporary
absolute disqualification and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of
suffrage which the offender shall suffer
although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional — Its
Accessory Penalties. — The penalty of prisión
correccional shall carry with it that of
suspension from public office, from the right
to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.
The offender shall suffer the disqualification
provided in this article although pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.(Emphasis supplied)
Citing the same cases of Cristobal, Pelobello,
and Garland, Estrada argues that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code violate the Constitution in requiring that the restoration
of the rights of suffrage or to otherwise vote for and be elected to
public office must be made expressly. Specifically, he claims that
these provisions "abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the
President." 142
This court has previously acknowledged, in Llamas v.
Orbos, 143 that the 1986 Constitutional Commission rejected a
proposal to include in Article VII, Section 19, a statement to the
effect that "the power to grant executive clemency for violation of
corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation." Thus, this
court concluded that "the President's executive clemency powers
may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided
in the Constitution": CAcDTI
During the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, a subject of
deliberations was the proposed amendment to
Art. VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows:
"However, the power to grant executive
clemency for violation of corrupt practices laws
may be limited by legislation." The
Constitutional Commission, however, voted to
remove the amendment, since it was in
derogation of the powers of the President. As
Mr. Natividad stated:
"I am also against this
provision which will again chip more
powers from the President. In case of
other criminals convicted in our society
we extend probation to them while in
this case, they have already been
convicted and we offer mercy. The only
way we can offer mercy to them is
through this executive clemency
extended to them by the President. If
we still close this avenue to them, they
would be prejudiced even worse than
the murderers and the more vicious
killers in our society. . . ."
The proposal was primarily intended to
prevent the President from protecting his
cronies. Manifestly, however, the Commission
preferred to trust in the discretion of Presidents
and refrained from putting additional limitations
on his clemency powers. (II RECORD of the
Constitutional Commission, 392, 418-419, 524-
525)
It is evident from the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the
President's executive clemency powers may not
be limited in terms of coverage, except as
already provided in the Constitution, that is, "no
pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations shall be granted by the President
without the favorable recommendation of the
COMELEC" (Article IX, C, Section 5,
Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty
criminally in court may be pardoned, those
adjudged guilty administratively should likewise
be extended the same benefit. 144
Not only has the coverage of executive clemency been
recognized to be beyond the reach of legislative action, this court
has also noted that the matter of whether the President should
actually choose to extend executive clemency to a convict cannot be
preempted by judicial action. Thus, the determination of whether a
convict shall be extended clemency is a decision that is solely for the
President to make:
This Court cannot review, much less
preempt, the exercise of executive clemency
under the pretext of preventing the accused
from evading the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or from trifling with our judicial
system. Clemency is not a function of the
judiciary; it is an executive function. . . . 145
The 1987 Constitution's recital of the instances when
pardon may or may not be exercised and this court's prior
recognition of clemency as an executive function notwithstanding,
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code could not be
considered as abridging or diminishing the President's right to
extend clemency.
To "abridge" or to "diminish" is to shorten, reduce, or
lessen. 146 Further, "coverage" pertains to scope, 147 it refers to
"[t]he extent to which something deals with or applies to something
else." 148
Articles 36 and 41 do not reduce the coverage of the
President's pardoning power. At no point do they say that the
President may not grant pardon. They do not recite instances or
areas in which the President's power to pardon is rendered non-
existent, or in which the President is otherwise incapable of granting
pardon. Articles 36 and 41 notwithstanding, the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be: (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules,
and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the President remains
capacitated to grant a pardon that works to restore the rights of
suffrage and/or to hold public office, or to otherwise remit the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention
or form. They only provide a procedural prescription. They are not
concerned with areas where or the instances when the President
may grant pardon; they are only concerned with how he or she is to
exercise such power so that no other governmental instrumentality
needs to intervene to give it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the
President wishes to include in the pardon the restoration of the
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission of the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, he or she
should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the
President state his or her intentions clearly, directly, firmly,
precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President
retains the power to make such restoration or remission, subject to
a prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it.
This interpretation is consistent with the clear
constitutional intention to grant exclusive prerogative to the
President to decide when to exercise such power. As in this case,
any ambiguity invites judicial intervention.
Also, it is a basic precept that "public office is
a public trust." 149 In contrast, pardon is a "private, though official
act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for
whose benefit it is intended." 150 Given the contrasting natures of,
on the one hand, elective office as a public trust, and, on the other,
pardon as a private act, it "would not be asking too much" 151 of
the President to be unequivocal with his or her intentions on
restoring a convict's right not just to vote, but more so, to be voted
for elective public office.
Doing so serves not only a practical purpose but, more
importantly, the greater public interest in not leaving to
inference the qualification of a person who is regarded "as more
dangerous to society" 152 but stands to gain from the reposition of
public trust. 153 It addresses the "presumptive rule that one who is
rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense
indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the
same partakes of a privilege which the State grants only to such
classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the
common good." 154
Pronouncing in express and unmistakable language the
restoration of the right to vote and be voted,
therefore, complements the private act of pardoning such that it
enables the inclusion of public effects in the private act.
It desegregates the public consequence of enabling the convict with
the opportunity to lead the community by being the occupant of a
public office. TASCEc
Recall that the manner by which the 1987 Constitution
phrases its investiture on the President of the pardoning power now
includes the phrase "as otherwise provided in this Constitution."
This phrase affirms the imperative of reading and interpreting the
Constitution in its entirety, not taking a provision in isolation. The
pardoning power of the President must, thus, not be divorced from
the Constitution's injunction that "[p]ublic office is a public
trust." 155 Read in harmony with this injunction, Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code impress upon the President the
significance of departing from the purely private consequences of
pardon should he or she stray into the public affair of restoring a
convict's rights of suffrage and/or to hold public office.
Parenthetically, the Constitution also grants this court
jurisdiction to determine "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to . . . excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 156 This
means that no grant of constitutional power is immune from review
if it is done arbitrarily or without reason, capriciously, or on the
basis of whim. However, this court's power of review in the present
case is not raised by any party and, thus, not an issue that this court
must decide.
(b) Clarifying Monsanto
Monsanto, in the course of repudiating Cristobal, Pelobello,
and Garland, declared that "[t]he better considered cases regard full
pardon . . . as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences
of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities
based on the finding of guilt." 157
This "inclusion" should not be taken as authority for
concluding that the grant of pardon ipso facto remits the accessory
disqualifications or disabilities imposed on a convict regardless of
whether the remission was explicitly stated.
For one, this "inclusion" was not a categorical articulation
by this court of a prevailing rule. It was a statement made only in
the course of a comparative survey of cases during which the court
manifested a preference for "authorities [that reject] the unduly
broad language of the Garland case." 158
Second, the footnote to this statement indicates that it It did not.
relied on a case decided by a United States court: Comm. of Met. (a) No express
Dist. Com. v. Director of Civil Service. 159 Thus, it was never meant remission and/or
as a summation of the controlling principles in this jurisdiction. It did restoration; reliance
not account for Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. on inference is
Lastly, even if it were to be granted that this statement improper
articulated a rule, this statement, made in 1989, must be deemed to The dispositive portion of the pardon extended by former
have been abandoned, in light of this court's more recent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Estrada reads:
pronouncements — in 1997, in People v. Casido, 160 and in 2000, IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the
in People v. Patriarca 161 — which cited with approval this court's authority conferred upon me by the
statement in Barrioquinto v. Fernandez 162 that: Constitution, I hereby grant executive
[p]ardon looks forward and relieves the clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
offender from the consequences of an offense convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder
of which he has been convicted, that is, it and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for He is hereby restored to his civil and political
that reason it does 'not work the restoration rights.
of the rights to hold public office, or the right The forfeitures imposed by the
of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full,
restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in including all writs and processes issued by the
no case exempts the culprit from the payment Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except
of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by for the bank account(s) he owned before his
the sentence'. 163 (Emphasis supplied) tenure as President.
So, too, this statement indicating "inclusion" must be Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH
deemed superseded by this court's 2013 pronouncement in Romeo
EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take
Jalosjos v. COMELEC 164 which recognizes that "one who is effect. 166
previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion
From the plain text of this disposition, it can be readily seen
perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory
that there is no categorical statement actually saying that Estrada's
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory rights to vote and be voted for elective public office are restored, or
that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification is remitted.
penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon." 165
The disposition contains three (3) clauses that delimit the
IX
effects of the pardon: ATaDHC
No remission of the penalty of
1. The general grant of executive clemency to
perpetual absolute disqualification
Estrada (i.e., "I hereby grant executive
and restoration of the rights to vote
clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO
and be voted for elective public
office in Estrada's pardon ESTRADA");
2. The restoration of Estrada's civil and political
Having established that the challenge to the validity of
rights (i.e., "He is hereby restored to his
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code must fail, we turn to
civil and political rights"); and
the pivotal issue of whether, in light of these statutory provisions,
the pardon granted to Estrada effectively restored his rights to vote 3. The continuing validity of the forfeitures
and be voted for elective public office, or otherwise remitted his imposed by the Sandiganbayan.
perpetual absolute disqualification. As a cure for the lack of a categorical statement restoring
his rights to vote and be voted for elective public office, or
otherwise remitting the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, Estrada argues that the rights to vote and be voted
for elective public office are political rights; hence, "the restoration
of Estrada's right to seek public office isdeemed subsumed when the
pardon extended by GMA expressly restored the civil and political
rights of the Public (sic) Respondent." 167 He asserts that "[s]uch
statement is already a substantial if not full compliance with the
requirements of Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code." 168
Estrada's use of tentative and indefinite language — such
as "deemed subsumed" and "substantial compliance" — reveals his
own acknowledgement that the restoration and/or remission, if any,
in the pardon are not as unequivocal or as absolutely clear as they
could otherwise have been had the pardon simply stated, for
instance, that "the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification is
hereby removed."
Estrada is noticeably compelled to resort to syllogism in
order to arrive at the deductive conclusion that he is qualified to
run. He rests his position on an inference.
This reliance on inference is precisely what the
requirement of expressly stating the restoration or remission seeks
to avoid. To be "express" is to state "directly, firmly, and
explicitly." 169 It is synonymous with being precise. 170 On the
contrary, to "infer" is to rely on what is implied; it is to
"surmise." 171 Inference is exactly what relying on
an expresspronouncement does not entail.
(b) Even the inference
that Estrada
proffers is laden
with fallacies
In any case, even if Estrada's inferences and reliance on the
characterization of the rights to vote and be voted for elective
public office as political rights is to be indulged, it does not follow
that these specific rights have been restored by the
pardon's generic restoration of civil and political rights.
The concept of "civil and political rights" both as its own
collectivity and in contrast with other classes of human rights
emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Its conceptual
development is more effectively understood in the context of the
emergence of the contemporary human rights regime and the
efforts at enabling the then nascent United Nations to "assum[e] the
role of guarantor of human rights on a universal
scale" 172 consistent with the perceived need that "the individual
human being be placed under the protection of the international
community." 173
As Professor Christian Tomuschat discussed in an
introductory note to the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Second World War revealed that
"national governments could gravely fail in their duty to ensure the
life and the liberty of their citizens." 174 Worse, some of these
national governments have themselves "become murderous
institutions." 175 It was, therefore, evident "that protective
mechanisms at the domestic level alone did not provide sufficiently
stable safeguards." 176
The historical milieu of the efforts taken to enable the
United Nations to assume the previously mentioned "role of
guarantor of human rights on a universal scale" 177reveals how
"civil and political rights" as a concept of distinct rights — embodied
in its own instrument — came to be: TICaEc
At the San Francisco Conference in 1945,
some Latin American countries requested that
a full code of human rights be included in the
Charter of the United Nations itself. Since
such an initiative required careful
preparation, their motions could not be
successful at that stage. Nonetheless, human
rights were embraced as a matter of principle.
The Charter contains references to human
rights in the Preamble, among the purposes of
the Organization (Article 1) and in several
other provisions (Articles 13, 55, 62 and 68).
Immediately after the actual setting up of the
institutional machinery provided for by the
Charter, the new Commission on Human
Rights began its work for the creation of an
International Bill of Rights. In a first step, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
drafted, which the General Assembly adopted
on 10 December 1948.
In order to make human rights an
instrument effectively shaping the lives of
individuals and nations, more than just a
political proclamation was needed. Hence, from
the very outset there was general agreement to
the effect that the substance of the Universal
Declaration should be translated into the hard
legal form of an international treaty. The
General Assembly reaffirmed the necessity of
complementing, as had already been done in
the Universal Declaration, traditional civil and
political rights with economic, social and
cultural rights, since both classes of rights were
"interconnected and interdependent" (see
section E of resolution 421 (V) of 4 December
1950). The only question was whether, following
the concept of unity of all human rights, the new
conventional rights should be encompassed in
one international instrument or whether, on
account of their different specificities, they
should be arranged according to those
specificities. Western nations in particular
claimed that the implementation process could
not be identical, economic and social rights
partaking more of the nature of goals to be
attained whereas civil and political rights had
to be respected strictly and without any
reservations. It is this latter view that
eventually prevailed. By resolution 543 (VI) of 4
February 1952, the General Assembly directed
the Commission on Human Rights to prepare,
instead of just one Covenant, two draft treaties;
a Covenant setting forth civil and political rights
and a parallel Covenant providing for economic,
social and cultural rights. The Commission
completed its work in 1954. Yet it took many
years before eventually the political climate was
ripe for the adoption of these two ambitious
texts. While both the Western and the Socialist
States were still not fully convinced of their
usefulness, it was eventually pressure brought
to bear upon them from Third World countries
which prompted them to approve the outcome
of the protracted negotiating process.
Accordingly, on 16 December 1966, the two
Covenants were adopted by the General
Assembly by consensus, without any
abstentions (resolution 2200 (XXI)). Since that
time, the two comprehensive human rights
instruments of the United Nations have sailed
on different courses. 178
 Professor Tomuschat further summarizes the provisions of
the ICCPR, its manner of recital of civil and political rights, and the
common thread binding the rights recited in it:
The ICCPR comprises all of the
traditional human rights as they are known
from historic documents such as the First Ten
Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States (1789/1791) and the French Déclaration
des droits de l'homme et du citoyen
(1789). However, in perfect harmony with its
sister instrument, Part I starts out with the right
of self-determination which is considered to be
the foundational stone of all human rights
(article 1). Part II (articles 2 to 5) contains a
number of general principles that apply across
the board, among them in particular the
prohibition on discrimination. Part III enunciates
an extended list of rights, the first of which
being the right to life (article 6). Article 7
establishes a ban on torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, and article 8 declares slavery and
forced or compulsory labour unlawful. Well-
balanced guarantees of habeas corpus are set
forth in article 9, and article 10 establishes the
complementary proviso that all persons
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity.
Freedom of movement, including the
freedom to leave any country, has found its
regulation in article 12. Aliens, who do not enjoy
a stable right of sojourn, must as a minimum be
granted due process in case their expulsion is
envisaged (article 13). Fair trial, the
scope ratione materiae of which is confined to
criminal prosecution and to civil suits at law, has
its seat in articles 14 and 15. Privacy, the family,
the home or the correspondence of a person are
placed under the protection of article 17, and
the social activities of human beings enjoy the
safeguards of article 18 (freedom of thought,
conscience and religion), article 19 (freedom of
expression), article 21 (freedom of assembly),
and article 22 (freedom of association). Going
beyond the classic dimension of protection
against interference by State authorities, articles
23 and 24 proclaim that the family and the child
are entitled to protection by society and the
State.
Article 25 establishes the right for
everyone to take part in the running of the
public affairs of his/her country. With this
provision, the ICCPR makes clear that State
authorities require some sort of democratic
legitimacy. Finally, article 27 recognizes an
individual right of members of ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities to engage in the cultural
activities characteristic of such minorities. No
political rights are provided for. Minorities as
such have not been endowed with any rights of
political autonomy. 179
Consistent with this concept of civil and political rights as a
collectivity of "traditional human rights as they are known from
historic documents" 180 is Karal Vasak's conception 181 of civil and
political rights as "first-generation human rights." This is in contrast
with economic, social and cultural rights as "second-generation
human rights" and collective-developmental rights as "third-
generation human rights." Vasak's conception of three generations
of human rights is a deliberate effort to parallel the French
Revolution ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, with each
generation ordinally reflecting the three ideals. Thus, "[f]irst-
generation, 'civil-political' rights deal with liberty and participation
in political life." 182
In our jurisprudence, Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human
Rights 183 discussed the concept of human rights as "so generic a
term that any attempt to define it . . . could at best be described as
inconclusive." 184 Further, it attempted to define civil rights and
political rights as follows: DTIcSH
The term "civil rights," has been
defined as referring —
"(to) those (rights) that belong
to every citizen of the state or country,
or, in a wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected
with the organization or administration
of government. They include the rights
of property, marriage, equal protection
of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.
Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are
rights appertaining to a person by
virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer,
in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil
action."
Also quite often mentioned are the
guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches
and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.
Political rights, on the other hand, are
said to refer to the right to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right
of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government. 185 (Citations
omitted)
The recurring refrain of these discussions — historical,
academic and jurisprudential — is the understanding that "civil and
political rights" is a collectivity. It is a figurative basket of "rights
directly possessed by individuals [that are correlatively] positive
duties upon the government to respect and fulfil
them." 186 Understood in this context, it is clear that the rights of
suffrage and to hold public (elective) office, are but two of
a manifold category of rights "deal[ing] with liberty and
participation in political life" 187 and encompassing the entire
spectrum of all such "rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-à-vis the
management of government." 188
In light of the circumstances of this case, to speak of
"restor[ing] civil and political rights" 189 is to refer to an entire
composite of rights. Estrada theorizes that because there was a
sweeping reference to this collectivity, then everything in the
'basket' has been restored.
Estrada's theory fails on two points. First, it fails to consider
the consequences of statutory requirements which specifically refer
to the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. Second, it fails to
recognize that the language used in the pardon is equivocal at best,
and, worse, the conclusion he derives from this equivocal language
is even contradicted by other examples previously considered in
jurisprudence. Thus, he insists on a conclusion that does not
logically follow from his premises.
Estrada capitalizes on the broad conception of civil and
political rights as including in its scope the rights of suffrage and the
right to hold public office. That is precisely the handicap in his
theory: It is broad; it fails to account for requirements relating
to specific rights.
As against the broad concept of civil and political rights as
an expansive composite or a vast spectrum of rights having to do
with liberty and membership in the political community, Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code specifically deal with the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office.
Juxtaposed with the manifold category of civil and political
rights, the effect of Articles 36 and 41 is that, in the specific context
of the President's exercise of the power to grant pardon to a
convict, the rights of suffrage and to hold public office
are segregated from all other similar rights.
This segregation is not grounded on whim. It hearkens to
the fundamental distinction between public office as a public trust,
on the one hand, and pardon as a private act, on the other. The
special requirement of express restoration or remission affirms
what was earlier discussed to be the need to desegregate, or to
bridge the disjunct between the private gesture of pardoning —
originally intended only to relieve an individual's misery over the
harshness of punishment — and the public consequence (no longer
connected with the basic purpose of mollifying penal misery) of not
only enabling a convict to participate in the selection of public
officials, but to himself or herself be a repository of public trust
should he or she become a public officer. To reiterate, public office
"partakes of a privilege which the State grants only to such classes of
persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common
good." 190
Consistent with the public interest inherent in the rights of
suffrage and holding public office, thus, if the President is to
not actually say that the rights of suffrage and to hold public office
are restored, there is plainly no basis for concluding that they have,
in fact, been restored.
Such is the situation in this case. At no point does the
pardon actually, expressly, categorically, and unmistakably say that
Estrada's rights to suffrage and to hold public office have been
restored. That this court — the Supreme Court of the Republic —
has been asked to step in and settle the controversy is the best
proof of this.
Apart from these, a meticulous consideration of how the
restoration of Estrada's civil and political rights is worded, especially
in contrast with other examples previously considered in
jurisprudence, casts serious doubt on whether the restoration was
as expansive as Estrada asserts.
The exact words of the pardon granted to Estrada are: "He
is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." 191
In contrast, jurisprudence is replete with pardon, working
to restore civil and political rights in this wise: "full civil and political
rights." 192 A fact noted in one case even seems to indicate that the
inclusion of the qualifier "full" is common practice. In that case, the
phrase "full civil and political rights" was "written on a standard
printed form." 193
This is not the occasion to rule on the sufficiency of adding
the qualifier "full" for purposes of restoring even the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office. However, burdened with the task
of interpretation, particular note should be taken by this court of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's deviation from previous,
standard practice. acSECT
The President must be presumed to be fully cognizant of
the significance and consequences of the manner by which he or
she executes official acts, as well as the manner by which they are
formally reduced to writing. It is revealing that former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo chose to deviate from many historical
examples and from what appears to be common practice. Aware of
the significance of excluding the qualifier "full," she chose to grant
pardon to Estrada under entirely generic and indistinct terms.
Similarly, the President must be presumed to be cognizant
of statutes and what they require. In granting pardon to Estrada,
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must have been fully
informed of the requirements of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code if it was ever her intent to restore Estrada's rights to
vote and be voted for elective public office or to otherwise remit the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Not only did former President Arroyo choose to shy away
from qualifying the restoration of Estrada's civil and political rights
as "full." She also chose, contrary to Articles 36 and 41, to be totally
silent on the restoration of the rights to vote and be voted for
elective public office and on the remission of the penalty of absolute
disqualification. These twin circumstances — first, of her exclusion
of a qualifier and, second, her silence on restoration and remission
— can only mean that contrary to Estrada's contention, his rights to
vote and be voted for elective public office have not been restored,
and his perpetual absolute disqualification not remitted.
Lest misinterpretation ensue, I am not here giving rise to a
false dilemma and rendering inutile the restoration of Estrada's civil
and political rights. Indeed, they have been restored, all but the
rights denied to him on account of the unremitted penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification, among these being the rights to
vote and be voted for elective public office. That entire spectrum of
rights "deal[ing] with liberty and participation in political life" 194 —
to mention but a few such as his right to liberty; freedom of abode
and movement; privacy rights; rights of expression, association,
assembly; his right to petition the government and to a redress of
grievances — are his to enjoy except for the select class of rights
denied to him on account of the omissions in his pardon.
Similarly, my pronouncements should not be taken as
rendering illusory the concept of "plenary pardon" — a concept that,
as Estrada pointed out, is recognized in Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The President remains free to grant pardon that
works to restore all of a convict's civil and political rights, even those
of suffrage and to hold public office. What I have however
emphasized is that, should the President choose to be so expansive
in making such a restoration, he or she should be clear with his or
her intentions.
X
The pardon's preambular clauses
militate against Estrada's position
Apart from the pardon's absolute silence on the matters of
restoration and remission, its preambular or whereas clauses
militate against the conclusion that Estrada's rights to suffrage and
to hold public office have been restored.
The pardon's three preambular clauses read: DcaSIH
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of
releasing inmates who have reached the age
of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been
under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office[.]195
 A preamble is "not an essential part of an act." 196 It is only
an introduction which indicates intent or purpose. In and of itself, it
cannot be the source of rights and obligations. Thus, "[w]here the
meaning of [an instrument] is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over
its text."197 Stated otherwise, it may be resorted to only when the
instrument is "ambiguous and difficult of interpretation." 198
In People v. Judge Purisima, 199 this court had occasion to
interpret an act of the President (who then held the power to
legislate) through a reading of whereas clauses. 200People v. Judge
Purisima concluded, referring to "the presence of events which led
to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. . . [as] clearly spelled out
in the 'Whereas' clauses,'"201 that Presidential Decree No. 9
excluded instances where a defendant carried bladed, pointed, or
blunt weapons in situations which were not related to the purposes
of Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. Further
identifying the purposes for the issuance of Proclamation No. 1081,
this court also read two of Proclamation No. 1081's own whereas
clauses 202 and concluded that it was aimed at putting an end to
subversive activities. Thus, this court concluded that the act of
carrying bladed, pointed, or blunt weapons was only punishable to
the extent that it was done in the context of subversive activities.
Jurisprudence and other official acts of this court are
replete with instances in which reference to preambular clauses was
resorted to in interpreting instruments other than statutes and
official acts of the President. In Licaros v. Gatmaitan, 203 this court
sustained the Court of Appeals' reference to a whereas clause in a
contract between private parties (i.e., a memorandum of
agreement) and thereby the conclusion that the parties "intended
to treat their agreement as one of conventional
subrogation." 204 In Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., 205 it was impliedly acknowledged that resort to a
whereas clause is permissible in interpreting a contract entered into
by the government; except that, because the circumstances have
changed, it was deemed unnecessary to proceed to an
interpretation in light of the relevant whereas clause. 206 InConte v.
Palma, 207 this court referred to whereas clauses in interpreting a
resolution issued by the Social Security System. 208 Similarly, this
court's En Banc resolution in A.M. No. 99-8-01-SC, 209 issued by this
court in the exercise of its rule-making power, cited a
statute's 210 whereas clause.
The pardon extended to Estrada is definite by its omission:
There is neither an express restoration of Estrada's rights to vote
and be voted for elective public office nor a remission of his
perpetual absolute disqualification. To this extent, it is clear and
unambiguous. This should suffice to put an end to Estrada's
asseverations that he was qualified to run for Mayor of Manila.
Nevertheless, even if the position that there remains room
for interpretation was to be indulged, a reading of the pardon as a
whole, and an illumination, through the preambular clauses, of the
pardon's supposed ambiguity, will lead to the same conclusion:
Estrada was and remains to be disqualified.
As in Purisima, the pardon's whereas clauses indicate
events and considerations that precipitated or led to the grant of
pardon. More specifically, the third whereas clause reveals that the
pardon was premised on Estrada's prior, public commitment of
disabling himself from being a candidate in an election (i.e., "to no
longer seek any elective position or office"). 211
The preceding discussions underscored the nature of the
power to pardon (in particular, and to extend clemency, in general)
as being fundamentally a matter of executive discretion. However,
that this is a matter resting on the President's prerogative is no
license for the President to heedlessly brandish it. As with all other
powers vested in the executive, it is a power that is not to be
abused. It cannot be exercised arbitrarily, whimsically, or
capriciously. The President may well be a despot, otherwise. CDaSAE
Thus, if the power to pardon were ever to be invoked, it
must remain true to its reason for existence: to correct "infirmities,
deficiencies or flaws in the administration of justice;" 212 to
"mitigat[e] whatever harshness might be generated by a too strict
an application of the law[;]"213 or to otherwise "temper the gravity
of [a punishment's] wrath." 214To the extent, therefore, that the
power to pardon is exercised in a manner that evinces nothing more
than the indulgence of caprices, an issue that may properly be taken
cognizance of by this court arises: grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In stating this, I remain mindful of this court's
pronouncement in 2007 in People v. Rocha, 215 which I have cited
earlier. At initial glance, Rocha appears to totally erode the power of
judicial review in relation to the grant of executive clemency:
This Court cannot review, much less
preempt, the exercise of executive clemency
under the pretext of preventing the accused
from evading the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or from trifling with our judicial
system. Clemency is not a function of the
judiciary; it is an executive function. Thus, it is
the President, not the judiciary, who should
exercise caution and utmost circumspection in
the exercise of executive clemency in order to
prevent a derision of the criminal justice system.
We cannot and shall not deny accused-
appellants' Motions to Withdraw Appeal just
because of their intention of applying for
executive clemency. With the Constitution
bestowing upon the Executive the power to
grant clemency, it behoves the Court to pass the
ball to the President and let her determine the
fate of accused-appellants. 216
However, a meticulous reading of Rocha reveals that its
pronouncements were made in a very specific context, i.e., the issue
of whether this court should allow the withdrawal of the appeals of
accused-appellants in order that they may avail themselves of
executive clemency. In making the quoted pronouncement, this
court merely affirmed the basic precept that the power to extend
clemency is a choice for the President — and not for any other
institution, such as this court — to make. Thus, it would be improper
for this court to take any action that would effectively prevent the
President from even making that choice.
Rocha was a deferential statement that recognized where
the power to extend clemency was lodged. It was a recognition that
this court could not preempt the grant of clemency. At no point,
however, did Rocha sanction the fanciful exercise of the power.
Nowhere did it say that the power granted to the President may be
divorced from its raison d' etre.
While it behooves this court to extend to the President the
presumption that the grant is attended with good reason, so, too,
this court should not indulge a patently frivolous exercise of
presidential discretion.
Presently, this court finds itself grappling with pardon
extended to a deposed President of the Republic who was convicted
for the crime of plunder.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is no common convict. In him was
reposed the trust of an overwhelming number of Filipinos. He was
elected to nothing less than the highest office of the land. Assuming
the presidency, he swore, invoking the name of God, to "faithfully
and conscientiously fulfil [his] duties as President[; to] preserve and
defend [the] Constitution[;] and [to] consecrate [himself) to the
service of the Nation." 217 This notwithstanding, he is a man, who,
tormented with recriminations of massive corruption and failing to
exculpate himself in the eyes of the Filipino people, was left with no
recourse but to leave the Presidency. He stood trial for and was
convicted of plunder: a conviction that endures and stands
unreversed.
A ruling on this petition cannot be bereft of context, both
of the present and of our history. Similarly, this court cannot turn a
blind eye on its own recognition of the gravity and grievousness that
Estrada's conviction for plunder entails.
In 2001, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 218 this court,
against the asseverations of Estrada himself, ruled that plunder is
inherently immoral, i.e., malum in se. In so doing, this court, quoting
the concurring opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, emphasized
that any doubt on the inherent immorality of plunder "must be
deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of
Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death." 219 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
quotingPeople v. Echegaray, 220 unequivocally underscored the
abhorrence that animates the classification of plunder as a heinous
crime punishable by death. This court did not mince words:
There are crimes, however, in which
the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself
to be struggling to develop and provide for its
poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished
the population, the Philippine Government must
muster the political will to dismantle the culture
of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in
the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly
lacking the money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat
to the very existence of government, and in
turn, the very survival of the people it governs
over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are
the effects and repercussions of crimes like
qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to
society. 221 (Emphasis supplied)
Turning its attention specifically to Republic Act No. 7080,
the Anti-Plunder Law, Estrada v. Sandiganbayan stated: AcSCaI
Our nation has been racked by scandals
of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials
in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and
corruption has become more elaborate in the
corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious
ways to bilk the coffers of the government.
Drastic and radical measures are imperative to
fight the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury.
Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale
corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread
like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume
the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other
venalities in public office. 222 Emphasis
supplied)
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended, provides
for the definition of and penalties for plunder, as follows:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of
Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series
of overt or criminal acts as described in Section
1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances, as provided by
the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State.
This technical-legal definition notwithstanding, in common
understanding, to plunder is to pillage or to ransack. It denotes
more than wrongful taking as to amount to common larceny.
Synonymous with despoiling and marauding, plundering evokes the
devastation wrought by hordes laying waste to an enemy. 223 By
plundering, a subjugator impresses the fact of its having vanquished
another by arrogating unto itself the spoils of conquest and
rendering more ignominious an otherwise simple defeat.
Plundering as a crime and by its scale, therefore, entails
more than greed and covetousness. It conjures the image of a public
officer deluded in the thought that he or she is some overlord, free
to ravage and entitled to seize all that his or her realm can provide.
It entails more than ordinary moral turpitude (i.e., an inherently
immoral act) 224 as acts like theft, robbery, bribery, profiteering,
estafa, extortion, and embezzlement have been categorized. 225 It
evinces such a degree of depravity and debasement so heinous that,
were it not for the subsequent enactment of a statute (i.e., Republic
Act No. 9346), it would remain punishable by death.
Recognition must be given to the legislative wisdom
underlying the choice of penalty. This is not only with respect to the
severity of punishment chosen (i.e., deprivation of life or
deprivation of liberty for the longest duration contemplated by the
scale of penalties under the Revised Penal Code) but similarly with
all other accessories that the penalties of reclusion perpetua and/or
death entail. Congress, in choosing to penalize plunder
with reclusion perpetua to death, must certainly have been
cognizant of how these penalties did not only entail the deprivation
of the right to life and/or liberty, but also of how, consistent with
Articles 40 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, they carried the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
To recognize this legislative wisdom is, thus, to recognize
that penalizing plunder inherently entails the exclusion of a convict
from elective exercises for public office, both as a candidate and as a
voter, as well as from offices and public employments. This is
consistent with the recognition that plunder is an "abomination . . .
in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic
context." 226 Through the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, it is, thus, ensured that a person convicted of
plunder will no longer find himself or herself in the same
setting, i.e., holding (elective) public office, which, in the first place,
enabled the commission of plunder.
It is against this backdrop of plunder as a social
"abomination" 227 as well as "corruption and obscene profligacy of
officials in high places" 228 that Estrada insists on a pardon that
worked to restore his rights to vote and be voted for elective public
office. Bereft of any clue as to the intent behind the grant of pardon,
such grant is mind-boggling. It, and its statement that Estrada is
restored to his civil and political rights, appear to defy the disdain
which animates the policy against plunder.
To reiterate, however, a President's grant of pardon must
be presumed to be grounded on the basic nature of pardon as a
means for tempering the harshness of punishment. A reading of the
preamble or whereas clauses of the pardon granted to Estrada will
reveal that, indeed, the pardon was animated by nothing more than
a desire to salve Estrada's suffering.
Consider the recognition made in the first and second
preambular clauses that Estrada was already more than 70 years old
and had been in detention for about six and a half years. These
preambular clauses provide context to why President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo saw wisdom in tempering Estrada's suffering:
Keeping in prison a septuagenarian — a man who could well be
considered to be in the twilight years of his life — may be too
severe; anyway, Estrada had already been deprived of liberty for a
considerable length of time.
The third preambular clause is even more revealing. It
unveils the undertaking made by Estrada (acknowledged and
unchallenged by him through his unqualified handwritten
acceptance) that he would no longer embark on the very same
affair, i.e., (elective) public office, that facilitated his commission of
plunder. The inclusion of the third preambular clause is not empty
rhetoric. It is an indispensable qualifier indicating that Estrada was conditional pardon by the
pardoned precisely in view of his promise to no longer seek (elective) Chief Executive, shall violate
public office. Similarly, it establishes that the grant of pardon any of the conditions of
notwithstanding, there is no betrayal of the fundamental policy of such pardon. However, if
aversion against plunder as an affront to "the larger socio-political the penalty remitted by the
and economic context." 229 granting of such pardon be
Accordingly, any reading of the phrase on which Estrada higher than six years, the
capitalizes — "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" convict shall then suffer the
— must be made in accordance with the qualifier evinced by an unexpired portion of his
undertaking Estrada himself made "to no longer seek any elective original sentence. 231
position or office." 230 Read as such, the pardon could not have Estrada counters that he was "granted an absolute pardon
possibly worked to reverse the effects of the penalty of perpetual and thereby restored to his full civil and political rights, including the
absolute disqualification or to otherwise restore his right to vote in right to seek public elective [sic] office." 232Estrada, therefore,
any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such construes an "absolute pardon" as one with sweeping, all-
office. encompassing effects.
XI As against the pardon's premise of Estrada's commitment
Estrada's re-incarceration is not a to no longer seek any elective position or office is Estrada's
proper issue in this case. acceptance:
Drawing attention to Estrada's undertaking, Risos-Vidal Received [ ] accepted
theorizes that Estrada was granted a conditional pardon, i.e., that it Joseph E. Estrada (sgd.)
was laden with a resolutory condition and that, as Estrada reneged DATE: 26 Oct. '07
on his undertaking, the rights vested by the pardon must be deemed TIME: 3:35 P.M. 233
extinguished. Citing Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, Risos- Made in Estrada's own handwriting, the acceptance
Vidal, thus, suggests that Estrada should once again be articulates no qualification or reservation. Hence, it is an acceptance
incarcerated: CAIHTE that is inclusive of his promise to no longer seek elective public
Thus, clearly, when Joseph Estrada office.
himself intentionally and wilfully breached his Nevertheless, the matter of Estrada's re-incarceration as a
pardon when he filed his certificate of candidacy possible consequence of the occurrence of a resolutory condition is
for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila, no longer essential to the disposition of this case. After all, this case
he is guilty of breach of the conditions of the pertains to a petition for disqualification. What this court is called
pardon which puts and [sic] end to the pardon upon to rule on is Estrada's qualification to run for Mayor of Manila.
itself and thereby immediately restoring the In the limited context that excludes the question of
terms of conviction imposed by the Estrada's possible re-incarceration, the materiality of his acceptance
Sandiganbayan. He should therefore be is in how such acceptance was imperative in order to bring the
recommitted to prisión consistent with Article
pardon to effect. As noted in Monsanto, "[a] pardon is a deed, to
159 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not
ART. 159. Other Cases of complete without acceptance." 234 This, too, is reflected in the
Evasion of Service of pardon's text, the last paragraph of which reads:
Sentence. — The penalty
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH
of prisión correccional in its EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take
minimum period shall be effect. 235
imposed upon the convict
who, having been granted XII
 Estrada's disqualification not
affected by the lapse of more than
two years since his release from
prison
Having settled on Estrada's disqualification, it is worth
emphasizing (in the interest of settling whatever lingering doubts
there may be) that his disqualification is not negated by the
statement in Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code that the
disqualification relating to "[t]hose sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment" shall last for "two (2) years
after serving sentence." This, even if Section 40 of the Local
Government Code is the specific ground relied upon by Risos-Vidal
in seeking to disqualify Estrada. HcSaAD
The relation between Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code
— on the effects of perpetual absolute disqualification — and
Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code was extensively
discussed in Romeo Jalosjos v. COMELEC: 236
Well-established is the rule that every
new statute should be construed in connection
with those already existing in relation to the
same subject matter and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together, if they can be
done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
Keeping with the above-mentioned
statutory construction principle, the Court
observes that the conflict between these
provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In
particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows
a prior convict to run for local elective office
after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he
serves his sentence, the said provision should
not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law
imposes a penalty, either as principal or
accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying
the convict to run for elective office. An
example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC,
which imposes the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification as an accessory to the
principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal[.]
xxx xxx xxx
Pertinently, it is observed that the
import of Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of
the RPC is more direct and specific in nature —
insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for
elective office due to his conviction — as
compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which
broadly speaks of offenses involving moral
turpitude and those punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment without any
consideration of certain disqualifying effects to
one's right to suffrage. Accordingly, Section
40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law
of general application and therefore, must yield
to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with
the principle of lex specialis derogat generali —
general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally is
so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which
the special provisions are not applicable. In
other words, where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the
one specially designed therefor should prevail.
In the present case, petitioner was
sentenced to suffer the principal penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the
RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn,
pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified
him to run for elective office. As discussed,
Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to
cases wherein a penal provision — such as
Article 41 in this case — directly and specifically
prohibits the convict from running for elective
office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years
from petitioner's service of his commuted
prison term, he remains bound to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which consequently, disqualifies
him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly
states that one who is previously convicted of a
crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to
suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification even though pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the said
accessory penalty shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. In this case, the same
accessory penalty had not been expressly
remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any
subsequent pardon and as such, petitioner's
disqualification to run for elective office is
deemed to subsist. 237 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Similarly, in this case, it is of no consequence that, by the
time Estrada filed his candidacy and sought election as Mayor of the
City of Manila, more than (2) years had lapsed since he was released
from incarceration following President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's
grant, and his acceptance, of pardon. HIAESC
In sum, Estrada was disqualified to run for Mayor of the
City of Manila in the May 13, 2013 elections. Moreover, his
perpetual absolute disqualification not having been remitted, and
his rights to vote and be voted for elective public office not having
been restored, Estrada remains bound to suffer the effects of the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, as listed in Article 30
of the Revised Penal Code. Specifically, he remains disqualified from
exercising the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office, and he remains barred from occupying any public office,
elective, or otherwise.
XIII
On the supposed
disenfranchisement of voters and
disregard of the sovereign will
Estrada warns against the "massive disenfranchisement of
votes [sic]" 238 and cautions against disrespecting "the sovereign
will of the people as expressed through the ballot." 239 In doing so,
he makes much of the margin of more than 35,000 votes by which
he edged out Lim. 240
Estrada is very loosely invoking the concept of a
"sovereign" as though a plurality of votes is the sole determinant of
the "sovereign will."
In the first place, what is involved here is merely an
election for a local elective position. Certainly, the voters of a single
local government unit ought not to be equated with the "sovereign
Filipino people." So blithely is Estrada celebrating his 349,770 votes, Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo S. former case the court, after an
he seems to forget that Lim was not even too far off with 313,764 Lim is the qualified candidate who examination of the ballots may find
votes. obtained the highest number of that some other person than the
Estrada celebrates the casting of votes in his favor as a votes in the election for Mayor of candidate declared to have received a
seemingly indubitable expression of the sovereign will in trusting the City of Manila plura[l]ity by the board of canvassers
him with elective public office. He forgets that a mere three years Having settled that Estrada suffered and continues to suffer actually received the greater number of
prior, the voters, not just of the City of Manila, but of the entire from perpetual absolute disqualification, it is proper to resolve the votes, in which case the court issues
Republic, repudiated him and rejected his attempt to once again resultant issue of who must be named Mayor of the City of Manila its mandamus to the board of
secure the Presidency. He placed a distant second, behind by more in lieu of Estrada. canvassers to correct the returns
than 5.72 million votes, to President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. In this court's April 16, 2013 decision in Maquiling v. accordingly; or it may find that the
Estrada did secure more votes than Lim, that much can be COMELEC, 241 we revisited the 1912 case of Topacio v. manner of holding the election and the
conceded; but these votes were cast in favor of an ineligible Paredes 242 from which originated the often-quoted phrase "the returns are so tainted with fraud or
candidate, i.e., one who was no candidate at all. wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate illegality that it cannot be determined
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of who received a [plurality] of the legally
The matter of eligibility relates to
the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots." 243 This was cast ballots. In the latter case, no
circumstances personally pertaining to a candidate, e.g., citizenship,
the progenitor of the principle that a supposed second-placer question as to the correctness of the
residency, age, lack of a prior conviction, and literacy. No amount of
cannot be proclaimed the winner in an election contest. returns or the manner of casting and
votes can cure a candidate's ineligibility. It could not, for instance, counting the ballots is before the
turn a 34-year-old person who filed a certificate of candidacy for As in the present case, Maquiling involved a petition for
deciding power, and generally the only
Senator into a 35-year-old and suddenly qualify that person for disqualification 244 anchored on Section 40 of the Local
result can be that the election fails
election as a Senator. The matter of qualification is entirely beyond Government Code. 245 Thus, the principles laid down
entirely. In the former, we have a
the mere plurality of votes. byMaquiling as to who must occupy an elective position following contest in the strict sense of the word,
In the context of constitutional democracy, the sovereign the determination that a candidate was disqualified are squarely
because of the opposing parties are
will is as effectively expressed in the official acts of public applicable in this case.
striving for supremacy. If it be found
institutions. The Filipino people speak as much through the laws As explained in Maquiling, the 'often-quoted phrase' that the successful candidate
enacted by their elected representatives as they do through the from Topacio was a mere obiter dictum: (according to the board of canvassers)
ballot. Among these laws are those which prescribe the This phrase is not even the ratio obtained a plurality in an illegal
qualifications for elective public offices. Thus, by these requirements, decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court manner, and that another candidate
the sovereign Filipino people delimit those who may be elected to was comparing "the effect of a decision that a was the real victor, the former must
public office. Among these, too, is the Revised Penal Code, Articles candidate is not entitled to the office because of retire in favor of the latter. In the other
36 and 41 of which require the express restoration of the rights of fraud or irregularities in the elections . . . [with] case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
suffrage and to hold public office, or otherwise the express remission that produced by declaring a person ineligible to contest, as the wreath of victory cannot
of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. So too, the hold such an office." be transferred from an ineligible
Filipino people speak through the Constitution they have adopted, a The complete sentence where the candidate to any other candidate when
basic precept of which is that public office is a public trust. Thus, phrase is found is part of a comparison and the sole question is the eligibility of the
matters relating to public office cannot be expediently dispensed contrast between the two situations, one receiving a plurality of the legally
with through the private act of granting pardon unless such grant be thus: IDESTH cast ballots. In the one case the
in compliance with legally established requisites. question is as to who received a
Again, the effect of a decision
The plurality of voters in Manila may appear to have that a candidate is not entitled to the plurality of the legally cast ballots; in
decided contrary to what is expressed in our laws, but this cannot office because of fraud or irregularities the other, the question is confined to
trump the sovereign will as expressed in our Constitution and laws. in the elections is quite different from the personal character and
XIV that produced by declaring a person circumstances of a single individual.
ineligible to hold such an office. In the Note that the sentence where the
phrase is found starts with "In the other case,
 there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in
contrast to the earlier statement, "In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of
the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot
be said to have held that "the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals
that the ruling therein is that since the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of
the person who obtained the highest number of
votes in the election, its jurisdiction being
confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge
exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared
that no one had been legally elected president
of the municipality of Imus at the general
election held in that town on 4 June 1912"
where "the only question raised was whether or
not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to
hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was
disqualified and that Abad as the second placer
cannot be proclaimed in his stead. . .
. 246 (Citations omitted)
By definition, an ineligible individual is not even a
candidate in the first place. 247 It is, therefore, erroneous to refer to
him or her as a "winner," that is, as the "winningcandidate," should
he or she obtain the plurality of votes. Consequently, it is illogical to
refer to the candidates who are trailing in the vote count as "losers,"
which is what labels like "second-placer" entail. As his or her
ineligibility as a candidate remains, the number of votes cast for him
or her is ultimately not decisive of who must be proclaimed as
winner: 248
The ballot cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain
disqualifications be not possessed by persons
desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one
even becomes a candidate. When a person who
is not qualified is voted for and eventually
garners the highest number of votes, even the
will of the electorate expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the defect in the
qualifications of the candidate. To rule
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder
the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as
well write off our election laws if the voice of
the electorate is the sole determinant of who
should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective
positions in our republic. 249
To rule as such is not tantamount to disrespecting the will
of the electorate. As was very recently said in Hayudini v.
COMELEC: 250
[T]he will of the electorate is still actually
respected even when the votes for the
ineligible candidate are disregarded. The
votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate
are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election for these do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. On the other hand, those
votes for the eligible and legitimate
candidates form an integral part of said voice,
which must equally be given due respect, if
not more. 251
Contemporary jurisprudence has seen the repudiation of
the position that a "second-placer" cannot be proclaimed a winner
in lieu of an ineligible candidate.
This court's 2012 decisions in Aratea v.
COMELEC 252 and Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC 253 ruled
that a certificate of candidacy that was cancelled for being void ab
initio, it having been filed by a candidate who falsely claimed that he
was eligible, produces no effect, it "cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes." 254Thus, the votes cast for
the ineligible candidate should be considered "stray votes and
should not be counted." 255
This court's June 25, 2013 resolution in Svetlana Jalosjos v.
COMELEC 256 expounded on the reasons for enabling
the qualified candidate (the erstwhile "second-placer, unless of
course, he is himself ineligible) who obtained the highest number of
votes to assume the contested office. It has also clarified the proper
operation of Section 44 of the Local Government Code on the rules
on succession in case of a permanent vacancy in the Office of the
Mayor:
There is another more compelling
reason why the eligible candidate who garnered
the highest number of votes must assume the
office. The ineligible candidate who was
proclaimed and who already assumed office is
a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of
the Local Government Code cannot apply in
instances when a de facto officer is ousted from
office and the de jure officer takes over. The
ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a
permanent vacancy as contemplated in the
Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to
speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful
winner in the elections, has the legal right to
assume the position. 257
Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. has not only ruled that the votes for
an ineligible candidate are stray votes. It has also impressed upon
the COMELEC that it is duty-bound to "motu proprio bar from
running for public office those suffering from perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment." 258
Even without a petition under either
Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, the COMELEC is under a
legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty
of perpetual special disqualification to run for
public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is
notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of
the convict from running for public office. The
law itself bars the convict from running for
public office, and the disqualification is part of
the final judgment of conviction. The final
 judgment of the court is addressed not only to
the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the
final judgment under the law. acEHCD
Whether or not the COMELEC is
expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed
that the portion of the final judgment on
disqualification to run for elective public office is
addressed to the COMELEC because under the
Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election." The disqualification of a convict to run
for public office under the Revised Penal Code,
as affirmed by final judgment of a competent
court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of "all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a
person to file a petition to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual
special disqualification will result in the anomaly
that these cases so grotesquely exemplify.
Despite a prior perpetual special
disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served
twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly
remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and
administer all laws" relating to the conduct of
elections if it does not motu proprio bar from
running for public office those suffering from
perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a
final judgment. 259
Applying these principles, the votes cast for private
respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a disqualified and ineligible
candidate, must be held as stray votes. Petitioner-intervenor
Alfredo S. Lim is the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes in the contest to be elected Mayor of the City of
Manila in the May 13, 2013 elections. Accordingly, he must be
proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila, lest there
be grounds, not contemplated in this opinion, barring his
proclamation.
Final note
Not so long ago, our people were moved by revelations of know that impunity, in any form, should be abhorred especially
wrongdoing committed by one who temporarily occupied one of the when it gives advantage to the privileged and the powerful.
most important public offices of our society — the Presidency. Our Thus, I dissent.
people's collective voices uttered in private conversations ACCORDINGLY, contrary to the majority, I vote
avalanched into a people's movement. This voice found its way into to GRANT the petition and the petition-in-intervention. The assailed
the halls of the House of Representatives and the Senate in a resolutions dated April 1, 2013 of the Second Division of public
historic impeachment proceeding. Events unravelled, which caused respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and April 23, 2013
the offending President to vacate Malacañang, to be considered of public respondent COMELEC, sitting En Banc, must be ANNULLED
resigned, and to finally be replaced. and SET ASIDE.
His prosecution subsequently ensued. A first in our history, Private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada continues to
the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of committing the highest suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and is
possible crime attended by graft and corruption. This betrayal of the thereby DISQUALIFIED from exercising the right to vote in any
public trust is called plunder. It is statutorily punished by a penalty election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
of reclusion perpetua and permanent disqualification from public office. SHaIDE
office.
||| (Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206666,
The person convicted of plunder now walks free among us. [January 21, 2015])
He did not spend a single day in an ordinary jail. There is no
question that he was pardoned. Today, the majority completes the
circle by reading an ambiguous pardon allowing him yet again to run
for public office. The majority uses the equivocal silence of the
succeeding President who devised the ambiguous pardon as one of
the bases to say that the convicted former President can again seek
public office.
This is template for our political elite at the expense of the
masses who toil and suffer from the consequences of corruption. It
is hope for those who occupy high government offices who commit
crimes as they await a next political term when the people's
vigilance would have waned. It is the denouement in a narrative
that will explain why there is no effective deterrent to corruption in
high places. The pragmatism of politics takes over the highest notion
that public office should be of effective public trust. The rule of law
should unravel to meet this expectation.
The pardon was ambiguous. By our laws and constitutional
fiat, it should have been read as perpetually prohibiting he who was
convicted of plunder from again occupying any public office. This is
my reading of what the values in our laws require.
I do not judge respondent for who he is as a person. That is
not within our constitutional competence. But as a leader, the
respondent will best show that the way forward for the country he
loves should be for him to repent and for him to suffer courageously
the consequences of his past acts. There are things which are clearly
right. There are things which are clearly wrong. For in our hearts we
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 182249. March 5, 2013.]
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 of Trade
and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines (TIDCORP) seeking the reversal of the decision2dated
September 28, 2007 and the resolution 3 dated March 17, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 81058. The assailed CA
rulings affirmed the resolutions, 4dated January 31, 2003 and
October 7, 2003, of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),invalidating
Arsenio de Guzman's appointment as Financial Management
Specialist IV in TIDCORP. The CA subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration that followed.
Factual Antecedents
On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was appointed on a
permanent status as Financial Management Specialist IV of
TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1080. His appointment was included in TIDCORP's Report on
Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was submitted to
the CSC — Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field
Office. 5
In a letter 6 dated September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M.
Bugtong disallowed De Guzman's appointment because the position
of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in the
DBM's Index of Occupational Service. CAacTH
TIDCORP's Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo
appealed 7 the invalidation of De Guzman's appointment to Director
IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC-National Capital Region (NCR). According
to Tambanillo, Republic Act No. (RA) 8494, which amended
TIDCORP's charter, empowers its Board of Directors to create its
own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve its
own compensation and position classification system and
qualification standards. Specifically, Section 7 of RA 8494 provides:
Section 7.The Board of Directors shall
provide for an organizational structure and
staffing pattern for officers and employees of
the Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and
upon recommendation of its President, appoint
and fix their remuneration, emoluments and
fringe benefits: Provided, That the Board shall
have exclusive and final authority to appoint,
promote, transfer, assign and re-assign
personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of
existing law to the contrary notwithstanding.
All positions in TIDCORP shall be
governed by a compensation and position
classification system and qualification standards
approved by TIDCORP's Board of Directors
based on a comprehensive job analysis and
audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private
sector and shall be subject to periodic review by
the Board no more than once every four (4)
years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews
or increases based on productivity and
profitability. TIDCORP shall be exempt from
existing laws, rules and regulations on
compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. It shall, however,
endeavor to make the system to conform as
closely as possible to the principles and modes
provided in Republic Act No. 6758. ESHAIC
On the basis of Section 7 of RA 8494, Tambanillo argued
that TIDCORP is authorized to adopt an organizational structure
different from that set and prescribed by the CSC. Section 7 exempts
TIDCORP from existing laws on compensation, position classification
and qualification standards, and is thus not bound by the DBM's
Index of Occupational Service. Pursuant to this authority, TIDCORP's
Board of Directors issued Resolution No. 1185, s. 1998 approving
the corporation's re-organizational plan, under which De Guzman
was appointed Financial Management Specialist IV. De Guzman's
appointment was valid because the plan providing for his position
followed the letter of the law.
Tambanillo also noted that prior to De Guzman's
appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV, the position
had earlier been occupied by Ma. Loreto H. Mayor whose
appointment was duly approved by Director Bugtong. Thus, Director
Bugtong's invalidation of De Guzman's appointment is inconsistent
with her earlier approval of Mayor's appointment to the same
position.
The CSC-NCR's Ruling
Director Padilla denied Tambanillo's appeal because De
Guzman's appointment failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which requires that the
position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform
with the approved Position Allocation List and must be found in the
Index of Occupational Service. Since the position of Financial
Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of
Occupational Service, then De Guzman's appointment to this
position must be invalid. 8
Director Padilla pointed out that the CSC had already
decided upon an issue similar to De Guzman's case in CSC
Resolution No. 011495 (Geronimo, Rolando S.C.,Macapagal,
Vivencio M. Tumangan, Panser E.,Villar, Victor G.,Ong, Elizabeth
P.,Re: Invalidated Appointments; Appeal) where it invalidated the
appointments of several Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) employees because their position titles did not
conform with the Position Allocation List and with the Index of
Occupational Service. Like TIDCORP, the DBP's charter exempts the
DBP from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation,
position classification and qualification standards. It also has a
similar duty to "endeavor to make its system conform as closely as
possible to the principles under [the] Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as
amended)[.]" 9 THacES
Lastly, Padilla stressed that the 1987 Administrative
Code empowers 10 the CSC to formulate policies and regulations for
the administration, maintenance and implementation of position,
classification and compensation.
TIDCORP's appeal to the CSC-CO
In response to the CSC-NCR's ruling, TIDCORP's President
and CEO Joel C. Valdes sent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-
David a letter 11 appealing Director Padilla's decision to the CSC-
Central Office (CO). Valdes reiterated TIDCORP's argument that RA
8494 authorized its Board of Directors to determine its own
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and exempted
TIDCORP from all existing laws on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. Citing Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, et al.,12 Valdes asserted that the wisdom of
Congress in granting TIDCORP this authority and exemption is a
political question that cannot be the subject of judicial review. Given
TIDCORP's functions as the government's export credit agency, its
Board of Directors has been provided flexibility in administering its
personnel so that it can hire qualified employees from the private
sector, such as banks and other financial institutions.
In addition, prior actions of the CSC show that it recognized
TIDCORP's exemption from all laws regarding compensation,
position classification and qualification standards of its employees.
The CSC has approved prior appointments of TIDCORP's officers
under its July 1, 1998 re-organization plan. It also approved Mayor's
previous appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV.
Further, a memorandum dated October 29, 1998 issued by the CSC-
NCR noted that "pursuant to Sec. 7 of RA 8494[,] TIDCORP is exempt
from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards." 13 AIECSD
The CSC-CO's ruling
In its Resolution No. 030144, 14 the CSC-CO affirmed the
CSC-NCR's decision that De Guzman's appointment should have
complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, as
amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999. Rule III,
Section 1 (c) is explicit in requiring that the position title indicated in
the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation List
and found in the Index of Occupational Service. Otherwise, the
appointment shall be disapproved. In disallowing De Guzman's
appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director Bugtong was simply
following the letter of the law.
According to the CSC-CO, TIDCORP misconstrued the
provisions of Section 7 of RA 8494 in its attempt to bypass the
requirements of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998.
While RA 8494 gave TIDCORP staffing prerogatives, it would still
have to comply with civil service rules because Section 7 did not
expressly exempt TIDCORP from civil service laws.
The CSC-CO also supported the CSC-NCR's invocation of
CSC Resolution No. 011495. Both the charters of the DBP and
TIDCORP have similar provisions in the recruitment and
administration of their human resources. Thus, the ruling in CSC
Resolution No. 011495 has been correctly applied in TIDCORP's
appeal.
Lastly, the CSC-CO noted that the government is not bound
by its public officers' erroneous application and enforcement of the
law. Granting that the CSC-NCR had erroneously approved an
appointment to the same position as De Guzman's appointment, the
CSC is not estopped from correcting its officers' past
mistakes. EHSAaD
TIDCORP moved to reconsider 15 the CSC-CO's decision,
but this motion was denied, 16 prompting TIDCORP to file a Rule 65
petition for certiorari 17 with the CA. The petition asserted that the
CSC-CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution
No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037.
The Appellate Court's Ruling
The CA denied 18 TIDCORP's petition and upheld the ruling
of the CSC-CO in Resolution No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037.
The CA noted that filing a petition forcertiorari was an improper
recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review
under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however,
brushed aside the procedural defect, ruling that the assailed
resolutions should still stand as they are consistent with law and
jurisprudence.
Citing Central Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service
Commission,19 the CA stood by the CSC-CO's ruling that it has
authority to approve and review De Guzman's appointment. The
CSC has the power to ascertain whether the appointing authority
complied with the requirements of the law; otherwise, it may
revoke the appointment. As TIDCORP is a government-owned
corporation, it is covered by civil service laws and is therefore bound
by the CSC's jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to personnel,
including appointments.
Further, the CA cited the CSC's mandate under the 1987
Constitution to approve or disapprove appointments and to
determine whether an appointee possesses civil service eligibility.
As TIDCORP's charter does not expressly or impliedly divest the CSC
of administrative authority over personnel concerns at TIDCORP, the
latter is still covered by the existing civil service laws on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. Its
appointment of De Guzman as Financial Management Specialist IV
should have complied with these rules. SIaHTD
The CA thus concluded that the CSC was well-within its
authority when it invalidated De Guzman's appointment. It held that
an appointee's title to the office does not permanently vest until the
appointee complies with the legal requirements of his appointment.
The requirements include the submission of the appointment to the
CSC for the determination of whether the appointee qualifies to the
position and whether the procedure for appointment has been
properly followed. Until these requirements are complied with, his
appointment may still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing
authority. 20
TIDCORP moved for reconsideration 21 but the CA denied
the motion in a resolution 22 dated March 17, 2008.
The Present Petition
In its present petition for review on certiorari,23 TIDCORP
argued that the CSC's interpretation of the last sentence of Section 7
of RA 8494 (which mandates it to endeavor to make the system
conform as closely as possible with the principles provided in RA
6758) is misplaced. This provision does not bar TIDCORP from
adopting a position classification system and qualification standards
different from those prescribed by the CSC. TIDCORP asserts that it
is not also duty bound to comply with civil service rules on
compensation and position classification, as it is exempt from all
these rules. Instead, TIDCORP is only required to furnish the CSC
with its compensation and position classification system and
qualification standards so that the CSC can be properly guided in
processing TIDCORP's appointments, promotion and personnel
action.
Insisting on its exemption from RA 6758 and CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, TIDCORP emphasizes that
the provisions of RA 6758, which the CSC applied to TIDCORP, is a
general law, while TIDCORP's charter, RA 8494, is a special law. In
interpreting conflicting provisions of a general law and a special law,
the provisions of the two laws should be harmonized to give effect
to both. But if these provisions cannot be reconciled, then the
special law should prevail because it is a qualification to the general
rule.HDaACI
Further, RA 8494 is a later expression of Congress' intent as
it was enacted nine years after RA 6758 was approved, and should
therefore be construed in this light in its relation with the latter. A
new statute should be interpreted in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be
made to harmonize and stand together — interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Under these principles, TIDCORP argued that Section 7
of RA 8494, the provision of a special law, should be interpreted as
an exemption to RA 6758. Thus, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
s. 1998, which was issued pursuant to RA 6758, should not have
been applied to limit TIDCORP's staffing prerogatives.
In its comment, 24 the CSC noted that CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 15, s. 1999, was issued in accordance with its authority
to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of civil
service laws and other pertinent laws (Administrative Code), and not
pursuant to RA 6758.
The CSC maintained that Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of
the Constitution includes government and controlled corporations
as part of the civil service. TIDCORP, a GOCC, is therefore covered by
the civil service rules and by the CSC. It should submit its Position
Allocation List to the DBM, regardless of its exemption under RA
6758.
Lastly, the CSC argued that RA 8494 should not prevail
over RA 6758 because the latter also applies to GOCCs like
TIDCORP; RA 8494 even makes a reference to RA 6758.
Issues
The parties' arguments, properly joined, present to us the
following issues:
1) Whether the Constitution empowers the CSC
to prescribe and enforce civil service
rules and regulations contrary to laws
passed by Congress;
2) Whether the requirement in Section 1
(c),Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, s. 1998, as amended by
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s.
1999, applies to appointments in
TIDCORP; and
3) Whether De Guzman's appointment as
Financial Management Specialist IV in
TIDCORP is valid.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
Directly at issue is the application of Section 1 (c),Rule III of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, to appointments in
TIDCORP. TIDCORP claims that its exemption, embodied in Section 7
of its charter, precludes the application of this requirement. The
CSC, on the other hand, maintains its stance that appointments in a
GOCC should follow the civil service laws on appointments,
regardless of its exemption from the civil service rules on
compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. aIHCSA
While the CSC has authority over
personnel actions in GOCCs, the
rules it formulates pursuant to this the Civil Service Commission — to
mandate should not contradict or promulgate and enforce policies on
amend the civil service laws it personnel actions. Will Commissioner
implements. Aquino kindly indicate to us the
At the outset, we clarify that the CSC's authority over corresponding provisions and her
personnel actions in TIDCORP is uncontested. Both parties proposed amendment which would
acknowledge this relationship in the pleadings they filed before the encompass the powers to promulgate
Supreme Court. 25 But while TIDCORP asserts that its charter and enforce policies on personnel
exempts it from rules on compensation, position classification and actions?
qualification standards, the CSC argues that this exemption is MS. AQUINO.
irrelevant to the denial of De Guzman's appointment because the It is my submission that the same functions are
CSC's authority over TIDCORP's personnel actions requires it to already subsumed under the concept of
comply with the CSC's rules on appointments. a central personnel agency.
The parties' arguments reveal an apparent clash between MR. REGALADO.
TIDCORP's charter, enacted by Congress, and the CSC rules, issued In other words, all those functions enumerated
pursuant to the CSC's rule-making power. Does the CSC's from line 35 on page 2 to line 1 of page
constitutional authority over the civil service divest the Legislature 3, inclusive, are understood to be
of the power to enact laws providing exemptions to civil service
encompassed in the phrase "central
rules? personnel agency of the government."
We answer in the negative. The CSC's rule-making MS. AQUINO.
power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still limited to the
implementation and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40
of page 2 and line 1 of the subsequent
enforce.
page, it was only subjected to a little
The 1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central modification.
personnel agency of the government mandated to establish a career
MR. REGALADO.
service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. 26 It is a May we, therefore, make it of record that the
phrase "...promulgate and enforce
constitutionally created administrative agency that possesses
executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. policies on personnel actions, classify
positions, prescribe conditions of
While not explicitly stated, the CSC's rule-making power is
employment except as to
subsumed under its designation as the government's "central
personnel agency" in Section 3, Article IX-B of the1987 Constitution. compensation and other monetary
benefits which shall be provided by
The original draft of Section 3 empowered the CSC to "promulgate
law" is understood to be subsumed
and enforce policies on personnel actions, classify positions,
under and included in the concept of a
prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation and
other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law." This, central personnel agency.
however, was deleted during the constitutional commission's MS. AQUINO.
deliberations because it was redundant to the CSC's nature as an I would have no objection to that. 28 DTAIaH
administrative agency: 27 SEDIaH The 1987 Administrative Code then spelled out the CSC's
MR. REGALADO. rule-making power in concrete terms in Section 12, Book V, Title I-A,
which empowered the CSC to implement the civil service law and
This is more for clarification. The original Section
3 states, among others, the functions of other pertinent laws, and to promulgate policies, standards and
guidelines for the civil service. 29
 The CSC's rule-making power as a constitutional grant is an
aspect of its independence as a constitutional commission. It places
the grant of this power outside the reach of Congress, which cannot
withdraw the power at any time. As we said in Gallardo v. Tabamo,
Jr.,30 a case which upheld the validity of a resolution issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC),another constitutional
commission:
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to
a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory
authority to grant the Commission broader
and more flexible powers to effectively
perform its duties and to insulate it further
from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its
rule-making power is made to depend on
statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at
any time. Indeed, the present
Constitution envisions a truly independent
Commission on Elections committed to ensure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections, and to serve as the guardian of the
people's sacred right of suffrage — the
citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful
change of government and in achieving and
promoting political stability. [citation omitted]
But while the grant of the CSC's rule-making power is
untouchable by Congress, the laws that the CSC interprets and
enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an
administrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is subject to
the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies. The
rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must be in
harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement. 31 IHCacT
For example, in Grego v. Commission on Elections,32 we
held that it was improper for the COMELEC, a constitutional body
bestowed with rule-making power by theConstitution, to use the
word "shall" in the rules it formulated, when the law it sought to
implement uses the word "may." While rules issued by
administrative bodies are entitled to great respect, "[t]he conclusive
effect of administrative construction is not absolute. [T]he function
of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect.
. . . [A]dministrative regulations cannot extend the law [nor] amend
a legislative enactment; . . . administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law[,]" and in a conflict between
the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, the former
must prevail. 33
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
s. 1998, and CSC Resolution No. 15,
s. 1999, which were issued pursuant
to the CSC 's rule-making power,
involve rules on position
classification
Two questions logically follow our conclusion on the extent
of the CSC's rule-making power. The first is whether Section 1
(c),Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, was issued
pursuant to the CSC's rule-making power; the second is whether this
provision involves compensation, position classification and/or
qualification standards that TIDCORP claims to be exempt from. We
answer both questions in the affirmative. EaTCSA
We agree with the CSC's position that CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, s. 1998, and CSC Resolution No. 15, s. 1999, were all
issued pursuant to its rule-making power. No less than the
introductory clause of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998,
confirms this:
Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 3,
Section 12, Book V of Administrative Code of
1987 otherwise known as Executive Order No.
292,the Civil Service Commission hereby
prescribes the following rules to govern the
preparation, submission of, and actions to be
taken on appointments and other personnel
actions. 34
Both these memoranda govern appointments and
personnel actions in the civil service. CSC Memorandum Circular No.
40, s. 1998, or the "Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and
Other Personnel Actions," updated and consolidated the various
issuances on appointments and other personnel actions and
simplified their processing. This was subsequently amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999.
The assailed provisions in those memorandum circulars,
however, involve position classification. Section 1 (c),Rule III of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, 35 s. 1998, requires, as a
condition sine qua non for the approval of an appointment, that the
position title indicated therein conform with the approved Position
Allocation List. The position title should also be found in the Index of
Occupational Service. According to National Compensation Circular
No. 58, the Position Allocation List is a list prepared by the DBM
which reflects the allocation of existing positions to the new
position titles in accordance with the Index of Occupational Service,
Position Titles and Salary Grades issued under National
Compensation Circular No. 57. 36 Both circulars were published by
the DBM pursuant to its mandate from RA 6758 to establish a
position classification system in the government. 37 SaITHC
Further, the CSC admitted in its comment that RA 6758 was
the basis for the issuance of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s.
1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999.
The CSC said:
The abovecited Sections 4 and 6 of R.A.
No. 6758 are the bases for respondent's
issuance of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
series of 1998, as amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999. To
reiterate, the Circulars mandate that
appointments should conform [to] the approved
Position Allocation List (PAL) and at the same
time be listed in the Index of Occupational
Service (IOS). 38 ITEcAD
Section 7 of TIDCORP's charter
exempts it from rules involving
position classification
To comply with Section 1 (c),Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, s. 1998, TIDCORP must conform with the circulars
on position classification issued by the DBM. Section 7 of its charter,
however, expressly exempts TIDCORP from existing laws on position
classification, among others.
In its comment, the CSC would want us to disregard
TIDCORP's exemption from laws involving position classification
because RA 6758 applies to all GOCCs. It also noted that Section 7
of RA 8494, the provision TIDCORP invokes as the source of its
exemption, also directs its Board of Directors to "endeavor to make
its system conform as closely as possible with the principles [and
modes provided in] Republic Act No. 6758[.]" 39 This reference
of RA 6758 in Section 7 means that TIDCORP cannot simply
disregard RA 6758 but must take its principles into account in
providing for its own position classifications. This requirement, to be
sure, does not run counter to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of
theConstitution which provides that "the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters." The CSC shall still enforce
position classifications at TIDCORP, but must do this under the exempt from existing laws on compensation, position classification
terms that TIDCORP has itself established, based on the principles and qualification standards, including compliance with Section 1 (c),
of RA 6758. Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998.
To further expound on these points, the CSC's authority De Guzman's appointment as
over TIDCORP is undisputed. The rules that the CSC formulates Financial Management Specialist IV
should implement and be in harmony with the law it seeks to is valid
enforce. In TIDCORP's case, the CSC should also consider TIDCORP's With TIDCORP exempt from Section 1 (c),Rule III of CSC
charter in addition to other civil service laws. Having said this, there Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, there remains the issue of
remains the issue of how the CSC should apply the civil service law whether De Guzman's appointment as Financial Management
to TIDCORP, given the exemptions provided in the latter's charter. Specialist IV is valid. Since Section 1 (c),Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Does the wording of Section 7 of RA 8494 command TIDCORP to Circular No. 40, s. 1998, is the only requirement that De Guzman
follow issued requirements pursuant to RA 6758 despite its failed to follow, his appointment actually complied with all the
exemption from laws involving position classification? requisites for a valid appointment. The CSC, therefore, should have
We answer in the negative. "Under the principles of given due course to De Guzman's appointment.
statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from WHEREFORE,all premises considered, we
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without hereby GRANT the petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis is decision dated September 28, 2007 and the resolution dated March
derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 81058, as well as
of intention) and rests on the valid presumption that the words Resolution No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037 of the Civil
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent Service Commission that the Court of Appeals rulings affirmed. No
and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature costs.
is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words SO ORDERED. DTSaIc
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
||| (Trade and Investment Development Corp. v. Civil Service
as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum,or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure." 40 ISCTcH Commission, G.R. No. 182249, [March 5, 2013], 705 PHIL 357-378)
The phrase "to endeavor" means to "to devote serious and
sustained effort" and "to make an effort to do." It is synonymous
with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek. 41 The use of "to
endeavor" in the context of Section 7 of RA 8494 means that despite
TIDCORP's exemption from laws involving compensation, position
classification and qualification standards, it should still strive to
conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes
provided in RA 6758. The phrase "as closely as possible," which
qualifies TIDCORP's duty "to endeavor to conform," recognizes that
the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA 6758, but it should still
try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent of
Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly
comply with RA 6758, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms.
Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavor to conform
to the principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of
this law.
These inter-relationships render it clear, as a plain reading
of Section 7 of RA 8494 itself would confirm, that TIDCORP is
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170589. April 16, 2009.]
OLYMPIO REVALDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review by petitioner
Olympio Revaldo (petitioner) seeking to reverse the
Decision 1 dated 23 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22031 affirming the Decision 2 dated 5 September
1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern
Leyte (RTC-Branch 25), in Criminal Case No. 1652, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession
of lumber in violation of Section 68 3 of the Revised Forestry
Code (Forestry Code). 4 CHEIcS
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal
possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section
68 of the Forestry Code, in an Information 5 which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of June 1992, in
the (M)unicipality of Maasin, (P)rovince of
Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent of gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess 96.14 board ft. of the following species
of flat lumber:
1. Six (6) pcs. 1x10x7 Molave;
2. One (1) pc. 2x6x6 Molave;
3. Two (2) pcs. 2x4x6 Molave;
4. Two (2) pcs. 1x10x6 Narra;
5. Two (2) pcs. 2x8x7 Bajong;
6. One (1) pc. 1x6x6 Bajong;
7. Four (4) pcs. 1x6x6 Magkalipay; and
8. Three (3) pcs. 1x6x5 Magkalipay;
with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine
Currency, without any legal document as
required under existing forest laws and
regulations from proper government
authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented SPO4 Constantino Maceda
(Maceda), Sulpicio Saguing (Saguing), and SPO4 Daniel Paloma
Lasala (Lasala) as witnesses.
Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Maasin, Southern
Leyte, testified that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in the
morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas (Rojas), SPO3
Melquiades Talisic (Talisic) and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit (Sunit) to the
house of petitioner to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner
had in his possession lumber without the necessary documents.
They were not armed with a search warrant on that day. They
confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties lying
around the vicinity of the house of petitioner. Maceda asked
petitioner who the owner of the lumber was and petitioner
replied that he owned the lumber. Petitioner stated that he
would use the lumber to repair his house and to make furniture
for sale. Maceda also testified that the lumber were freshly cut.
Maceda loaded the lumber on the patrol jeep and brought
them to the police station. For coordination purposes, Maceda
informed the office of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) of the confiscated lumber. The DENR
entrusted to the police custody of the lumber. 6 IASTDE
Saguing, Forester II, CENRO-DENR, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, testified that he went to the office of the PNP in Maasin,
Leyte to scale the confiscated lumber which were of different
varieties. The total volume was 96.14 board feet belonging to
the first group of hardwood lumber. 7
Lasala, Responsible Supply Sergeant, Finance Sergeant
and Evidence Custodian, PNP, Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified
that he received the 20 pieces of assorted sizes and varieties of
lumber from the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, but
only ten pieces remained because some were damaged due to
lack of storage space. 8
For the defense, petitioner presented Dionisio Candole
(Candole), Apolonio Caalim (Caalim), and himself as witnesses.
Petitioner testified that he is a carpenter specializing in
furniture making. He was in his house working on an ordered
divider for a customer in the morning of 18 June 1992 when
policemen arrived and inspected his lumber. Maceda, Sunit and
Rojas entered his house while Talisic stayed outside. Petitioner
admitted to the policemen that he had no permit to possess the
lumber because those were only given to him by his uncle
Felixberto Bug-os (Bug-os), his aunt Gliceria Bolo (Bolo), his
mother-in-law Cecilia Tenio (Tenio). The seven pieces of
"magkalipay" lumber were left over from a divider he made for
his cousin Jose Epiz. He explained further that the lumber were
intended for the repair of his dilapidated house. 9 The defense
presented Caalim to corroborate the testimony of petitioner. 10
Defense witness Candole testified that it was Bug-os
who hired him to cut a "tugas" tree on his land, sawed it into
lumber and delivered the same to petitioner who paid for the
labor transporting the sawn lumber. Candole further testified
that while they were on their way to Barangay Combado, Sunit
stopped them but allowed the lumber to be brought to the
house of petitioner. 11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court stated that petitioner failed to present
Bug-os, Bolo, and Tenio to attest to the fact that they sought
prior DENR permission before cutting the trees and sawing
them into lumber. The trial court further stated that
the Forestry Code is a special law where criminal intent is not
necessary. The Secretary of the DENR may issue a Special
Private Land Timber Permit to landowners to cut, gather, collect
or remove narra or other premium hardwood species found in
private lands. Transportation of timber or other forest products
without authority or without the legal documents required
under forest rules and regulations is punishable under Section
68 of the Forestry Code. Petitioner did not present any
document as required by law.
The RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment on 5
September 1997 convicting petitioner of the offense charged
and sentencing him as follows: ETDHSa
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the
accused OLYMPIO REVALDO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and,
crediting him with one mitigating circumstance
before applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law hereby SENTENCES him to an indeterminate
imprisonment term of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO
(2) MONTHS ofPRISION CORRECCIONAL as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
 of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum, and to pay the
costs.
The 21 pieces of flat lumber of different
varieties, scaled at 96.14 board feet and valued
at P1,730.52 are hereby ordered CONFISCATED
and FORFEITED in favor of the government
particularly the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte
which shall sell the same at public auction and
the proceeds turned over to the National
Treasury. 12
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that
motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere
possession of the lumber without the legal documents gives rise
to criminal liability.
Hence, the present petition.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and
seizure conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the
items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against
him. Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed
with a search warrant when they went to his house to verify the
report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber
without the corresponding license. The police officers who
conducted the search in the premises of petitioner acted on the
basis only on the verbal order of the Chief of Police. Sunit had
already informed the team of the name of petitioner and the
location the day before they conducted the search. Petitioner
argues that, with that information on hand, the police officers
could have easily convinced a judge that there was probable
cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant, but they did
not. Because the search was illegal, all items recovered from
petitioner during the illegal search were prohibited from being
used as evidence against him. Petitioner therefore prays for his
acquittal.
In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines
(respondent) contends that even without a search warrant, the
personnel of the PNP can seize the forest products cut,
gathered or taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 13 of
the Forestry Code. TcHCDE
There is no question that the police officers went to
the house of petitioner because of the information relayed by
Sunit that petitioner had in his possession illegally cut lumber.
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the
lumber were lying around the vicinity of petitioner's house. The
lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence. This Court had the opportunity to
summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the case
of People v. Doria, 14 to wit:
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent. 15
When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess
the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely
replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the
repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There was thus
probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber.
There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant.
The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not
have the required permit to possess the forest products cut is
sanctioned by Section 68 of the Forestry Codewhich provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting
Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. — Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the
case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall
be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. acCTIS
The Court shall further order the confiscation in
favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing
timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any
authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents required
under existing forest laws and
regulations. 16
As the Court held in People v. Que, 17 in the first offense, one
can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting, or removing timber or other forest
products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In
the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the
cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products
are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the
lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper documentation asmalum prohibitum.
On whether the police officers had the authority to
arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of
the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of
the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a
warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined by theForestry Code and
to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense or the forest products gathered or
taken by the offender. Section 80 reads:
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. —
A forest officer or employee of the Bureau
or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who
has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He
shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense, and the forest products
cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the
process of committing the offense. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the
necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In
open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession
and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that
he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he
merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his
dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without
the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex
sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. HTAEIS
On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we deem
it necessary to discuss the matter. Violation of Section 68 of
the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, 18 thus:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft
shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prisión mayor or reclusión
temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period, if the value
of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does
not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is
over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of
the next preceding article and the value of the
thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such
value exceeds said amount, the provisions of
any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine
not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the
thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the
offender shall have acted under the impulse of
hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his
family. aIcDCT
Art. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of
qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding
articles, . . . .
The trial court applied Article 309 (3), in relation to
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the
amount involved was P1,730.52. However, except for the
amount stated in the Information, the prosecution did not
present any proof as to the value of the lumber. What the
prosecution presented were the Seizure Receipt 19 and
Confiscation Receipt 20 stating the number of pieces of lumber,
their species, dimensions and volumes, with "no pertinent
supporting document." These do not suffice.
As we have held in Merida v. People, 21 to prove the
amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable
against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal
Code, the prosecution must present more than a mere
uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the absence of
independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the
courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309
or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant
circumstances of the case.
Accordingly, the prescribed penalty under Article 309
(6) of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods. However, considering that violation of
Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as qualified theft
under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to
the Forestry Code, the prescribed penalty shall be increased by
two degrees, 22 that is, to prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods or two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years. Taking into account the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken
from anywhere within the range of four (4) months and one (1)
day to two (2) years and four (4) months of arresto mayor,
which is the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. We
find it proper to impose upon petitioner, under the
circumstances obtaining here, the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.
 WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision
convicting petitioner for violation of Section 68 (now Section
77) of the Forestry Code, as amended, with MODIFICATION as
regards the penalty in that petitioner Olympio Revaldo is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
||| (Revaldo v. People, G.R. No. 170589, [April 16, 2009], 603 PHIL
332-346)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161952. October 2, 2009.]
ARNEL SAGANA, petitioner, vs. RICHARD A.
FRANCISCO, respondent. **
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law
with its spirit. Thus, it is not altogether surprising that two
competing values are usually discernable in every controversy
— the principle of dura lex sed lex versus the notion that
technicalities should yield to broader interests of justice. In our
rules of procedure, for instance, judges often struggle to find a
balance between due process considerations and a liberal
construction to secure a just disposition of every action. In such
cases, where a measure of discretion is permitted, courts must
tread carefully, with due consideration of the factual milieu and
legal principles involved. In so doing, we take steps —
sometimes tentative, sometimes bold — to apply prior
experience and precedent towards an eventual just resolution.
It is these principles that animate our decision in the instant
case.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the 13 August
2003 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66412 which reversed and set aside the 20 September 1999
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99
in Civil Case No. Q-94-22445 and held that there was no valid
service of summons to respondent Richard A. Francisco.
On 13 December 1994, petitioner Arnel Sagana filed a
Complaint 4 for Damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-22445 and raffled
to Branch 99. Petitioner alleged that on 20 November 1992,
respondent Richard A. Francisco, with intent to kill and without
justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right
thigh. As a result, petitioner incurred medical expenses and
suffered wounded feelings, and was compelled to engage the
services of a lawyer, due to respondent's refusal to pay said
expenses. Petitioner thus demanded payment of P300,000.00
as actual damages, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00,
exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On 31 January 1995, process server Manuel S.
Panlasigui attempted to serve summons at respondent's
address at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was
unsuccessful. In his Server's Return, 5 Panlasigui stated that he
tried to personally serve the summons to respondent at his
given address at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City.
However, the occupant of that house, who refused to give his
identity, told him that respondent is unknown at said address.
Panlasigui also declared that diligent efforts were exerted to
serve the summons but these proved to be
futile. 6 Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve
summons to respondent's office through registered mail on 9
February 1995. However, despite three notices, respondent
failed to pick up the summons. ISaCTE
On 30 June 1995, the trial court dismissed the case on
account of petitioner's lack of interest to prosecute. 7 It noted
that since the filing of the Server's Return on 8 February 1995,
petitioner did not take any action thus indicating lack of interest
to prosecute the case.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 8 stating
that after the Server's Return was filed, he exerted efforts to
locate the respondent, and it was confirmed that respondent
indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. On 4
August 1995, the trial court granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, conditioned upon the service of summons on
the respondent within 10 days from receipt of the Order. 9
Thus, on 25 August 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar
again tried to serve the summons at the address of the
respondent but no avail. According to Iconar's handwritten
notation on the summons, 10 he was informed by Michael
Francisco, respondent's brother, that respondent no longer
lived at said address. However, he left a copy of the summons
to Michael Francisco. 11
On 10 November 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default, 12 alleging that despite service of
summons, respondent still failed to file an Answer. On 16
February 1996, the trial court issued an Order 13 finding that
the summons was validly served to respondent through his
brother, Michael. It thus declared respondent in default and
allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex
parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents
were furnished to respondent at No. 36 Sampaguita St.
In the meantime, on 1 March 1996, Michael Francisco,
through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a
Manifestation and Motion 14 denying that he received the
summons or that he was authorized to receive summons on
behalf of his brother, respondent Richard Francisco. He alleged
that the substituted service did not comply with Section 8, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not served at
defendant's residence or left with any person who was
authorized to receive it on behalf of the defendant. Michael
Francisco also prayed that his name be stricken off the records
as having received a copy of the summons.
In the Affidavit of Merit 15 submitted together with
the Manifestation and Motion, Michael Francisco asserted that
he was 19 years of age; that his brother, herein respondent
Richard Francisco, had left their residence in March 1993; and
that respondent would just write his family without informing
them of his address, or would just call by phone.
Thereafter, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco
submitted their respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In
his Rejoinder, petitioner attached a copy of an
Affidavit 16 prepared by respondent Richard A. Francisco dated
23 December 1992, where he declared himself a resident of No.
36 Sampaguita St. Interestingly, the lawyer who notarized the
affidavit for the respondent, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, was
the same lawyer who represented respondent's brother before
the trial court. SDTaHc
On 4 October 1996, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying Michael Francisco's Manifestation and
Motion for lack of merit, holding thus:
It should be considered that earlier, plaintiff had
already sent numerous pleadings to defendant
at his last known address. As also pointed out by
[petitioner] in his Opposition, movant has not
adduced evidence, except his affidavit of merit,
to impugn the service of summons thru him.
Movant herein also admits that defendant
communicates with him through telephone.
Movant, therefore, being a person of sufficient
age and discretion, would be able, more likely
than not, to inform defendant of the fact that
summons was sent to him by the court. 18
Having failed to file an answer or any responsive
pleading, respondent was declared in default and petitioner
was allowed to present evidence ex parte. On 20 September
1999, the trial court rendered its Decision, 19 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and hereby
orders defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (PhP35,000.00)
as and for actual damages, the amount of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (PhP15,000.00) as
and for moral damages, the amount of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP10,000.00) for
exemplary damages and the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP20,000.00) as attorney's
fees.
No further costs.
SO ORDERED. 20
On 23 November 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a
Notice of Appeal, claiming that he received a copy of the trial court's
Decision on 9 November 1999; that the same was contrary to the
law, facts, and evidence, and praying that his appeal be given due
course. 21
On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file
their respective briefs, a copy of which was sent to respondent by
registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. 22 In
his Appellant's brief, respondent argued that:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
IRREGULARITY OF THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF
SUMMONS BY THE COURT PROCESS SERVER.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING
ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY
FIVE-THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) TO THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE ALTHOUGH ONLY
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P17,000.00)
WAS DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS. DaAIHC
III
THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN
AWARDING UNREASONABLE MORAL DAMAGES
IN THE AMOUNT OF FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00); EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00); AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE
AMOUNT OF TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS
NO FACTUAL AND SUBSTANTIVE BASIS FOR ALL
THESE. 23
On 15 August 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution 24 ordering the parties to personally appear for the
conduct of preliminary conference to consider amicably settling
the appeal, pursuant to Sec. 1 (a), Rule 7 of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals and the Court's Resolution A.M.
No. 02-2-17-SC dated 16 April 2002 regarding the Pilot Testing
of Mediation in the Court of Appeals. Respondent was
furnished 25 a copy of this Resolution at his address at No. 36
Sampaguita Street, Baesa, Quezon City. Per Delivery Receipt of
the Court of Appeals, the same was personally received by
respondent on 23 August 2002. 26
On 3 September 2002, respondent attended the
preliminary conference; however the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. 27 Thus, on 13 August 2003, the Court of
Appeals rendered the herein assailed Decision granting the
appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court. The
appellate court held that the service of summons was irregular
and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial
court. Since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent, the trial court's decision was void.
In brief, the Court of Appeals found that there was no
valid service of summons for the following reasons:
1. Except for the notation made by the process
server on the summons, no proof of
service by way of a Process Server's
Return was prepared;
2. The process server failed to state the specific
facts and circumstances that would
justify valid substituted service of
summons, to wit: (a) the impossibility
of service of summons within a
reasonable time, (b) the efforts exerted
to locate the respondent, and (c) it was
served on a person of sufficient age
and discretion residing therein.
3. Petitioner failed to prove that, at the time
summons was served, respondent
actually lived in No. 36 Sampaguita St.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 where
he alleged that respondent did, in fact, reside at No. 36
Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the
original copy of the envelope containing respondent's Notice of
Appeal, which indicated respondent's return address to be No.
36 Sampaguita St. 29Nonetheless, on 29 January 2004, the
Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the
sole issue of whether there was valid service of summons upon
the respondent.
The petition is meritorious. Under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, we find there was proper substituted
service of summons upon the respondent. ASDTEa
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court, the rules of
procedure then in force at the time summons was served, provided:
Section 8. Substituted service. — If the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section
[personal service on defendant], service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
Jurisprudence has long established that for substituted
service of summons to be valid, the following must be
demonstrated: (a) that personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) that efforts were exerted
to locate the party; and (c) that the summons was served upon
a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's
office or regular place of business. 30 It is likewise required that
the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the
proof of service or in the officer's return. 31
In this case, personal service of summons was twice
attempted by the trial court, although unsuccessfully. In the
first attempt, the resident of the house refused to receive the
summons; worse, he would not even give his name. In the
second attempt, respondent's own brother refused to sign for
receipt of the summons, and then later claimed that he never
received a copy, despite his participation in the proceedings.
The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent
through his place of work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts
to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's return,
the process server's notation, as well as the records of the
case. AEIHaS
Clearly, personal service of summons was made
impossible by the acts of the respondent in refusing to reveal
his whereabouts, and by the act of his brother in claiming that
respondent no longer lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., yet failing
to disclose his brother's location. We also note that it was the
trial court which directed that the second service of summons
be made within seven days; thus, the reasonable time was
prescribed by the trial court itself.
Undeniably, no Sheriff's Return was prepared by
process server Jarvis Iconar; the only record of the second
service of summons was Mr. Iconar's handwritten notation in
the summons itself. However, the information required by law
and prevailing jurisprudence, that is, that personal service was
impossible because of the claim that respondent no longer lived
at the stated address, that efforts were exerted to locate the
respondent through the multiple attempts to serve summons,
and that summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
and discretion, were already in the records of the trial court.
Moreover, we find the claim that respondent moved
out of their residence in March 1993 without informing his
brother or parents his whereabouts, despite regular calls and
letters, simply incredulous. What makes this version of events
even more implausible is respondent's admission that he
received a copy of the trial court's Decision of 20 September
1999 that was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita Street. Respondent
even filed a Notice of Appeal coincidentally indicating that his
address was No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. He also
received a copy of the appellate court's order for preliminary
conference that was sent to said address. These were never
denied by respondent, despite being given every opportunity to
do so.
Respondent also wishes us to believe that it was pure
chance that he and his brother were assisted by the same
lawyer, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, and yet it never occurred
to respondent's own brother or lawyer to inform him about the
receipt of summons. All these militate against respondent's self-
serving declaration that he did not reside at No. 36 Sampaguita
St. Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when
respondent left and then returned to his original home, if he September 1999 in Civil Case No. Q-94-22445 holding that there
actually did leave his home. was valid service of summons, and ordering respondent to pay
In view of the foregoing, we find that substituted petitioner the amounts of P35,000.00 as actual damages,
service of summons was validly made upon respondent through P15,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
his brother. damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees,
We do not intend this ruling to overturn jurisprudence is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
to the effect that statutory requirements of substituted service SO ORDERED.
must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully, and that any ||| (Sagana v. Francisco, G.R. No. 161952, [October 2, 2009], 617
substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is PHIL 387-398)
considered ineffective. 32 However, an overly strict application
of the Rules is not warranted in this case, as it would clearly
frustrate the spirit of the law as well as do injustice to the
parties, who have been waiting for almost 15 years for a
resolution of this case. We are not heedless of the widespread
and flagrant practice whereby defendants actively attempt to
frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give
their names, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive
documents, or eluding officers of the court. Of course it is to be
expected that defendants try to avoid service of summons,
prompting this Court to declare that, "the sheriff must be
resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the
process on the defendant". 33 However, sheriffs are not
expected to be sleuths, and cannot be faulted where the
defendants themselves engage in deception to thwart the
orderly administration of justice. aDTSHc
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the
defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may
be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that respondent
was duly apprised of the action against him and had every
opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner.
However, since respondent refused to disclose his true address,
it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him.
Considering that respondent could not have received summons
because of his own pretenses, and has failed to provide an
explanation of his purported "new" residence, he must now
bear the consequences. 34
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is GRANTED. The 13 August 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66412 and its 29 January
2004 Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, dated 20
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL,
and RENE O. MEDINA, petitioners, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
representing the President of the Philippines;
Senate of the Philippines, represented by the
SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives,
represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER;
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS,
representing the mother province of Surigao
del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO
VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province
of Dinagat Islands, respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS,
HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS
A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA,
HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON.
CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, intervenors.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J p:
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to
Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010 filed by
Movant-Intervenors 1 dated and filed on October 29, 2010,
praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and (b)
resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution. CSHDTE
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion,
we present hereunder a brief background of the relevant
antecedents —
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic
approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands). 2 On December 3, 2006, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province
under the Local Government Code (LGC).3 The plebiscite
yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative
votes. 4 With the approval of the people from both the mother
province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat
Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of
provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26,
2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections,
the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who
assumed office on July 1, 2007. 5
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G.
Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political
leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. 6 The Court dismissed the
petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration
was also denied. 7
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of
the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition
for certiorari 8 seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a
new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of
Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del
Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area.
They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a
land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of
only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both
counts, viz. —
Constitution, Article X — Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do
not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its
Decision 9 granting the petition. 10 The Decision declared R.A.
No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the
requirements on population and land area in the creation of a
province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the
proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null
and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the
provision on Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands" for being beyond the
ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is
not expressly provided in the law. 11
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution 12 dated May
12, 2010, 13 the Court denied the said motions. 14 DCSTAH
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their
respective motions for leave of court to admit their second
motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second
motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually
"noted without action" by this Court in its June 29, 2010
Resolution. 15
 Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, the Vice Governor, (6) the names of the Conversely, the ballots for the First
2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit candidates for the said position, (7) positions for Legislative District of Surigao
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan del Norte, will, for the position
dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC Members and, (8) all the names of the of Governor, Vice Governor,
issued Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member, House of
provides — Members, have already been configured into Representatives, First District
RESOLUTION NO. 8790 the system and can no longer be revised within of Surigao del Norte and
WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven the remaining period before the elections on Members, Sangguniang
(7) municipalities, were previously components May 10, 2010. Panlalawigan, show only
of the First Legislative District of the Province of NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system candidates for the said
Surigao del Norte. In December 2006 pursuant configuration, and depending on whether the position. Likewise, the whole
to Republic Act No. 9355, the Province of Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Province of Surigao del Norte,
Dinagat Island[s] was created and its creation Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission will, for the position of
was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare Governor and Vice Governor,
Plebiscite for this purpose; that: bear only the names of the
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will candidates for the said
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was,
be no problem since the position[s].
for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for current system configuration Consequently, the voters of the
Governor, one (1) seat for Vice Governor, one is in line with the reconsidered Province of Dinagat Islands will
(1) for congressional seat, and ten (10) Decision, meaning that the not be able to vote for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Province of Dinagat Islands candidates of Members,
Resolution No. 8670 dated 16 September 2009; and the Province of Surigao Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
del Norte remain as two (2) and Member, House [of]
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R.
separate provinces; Representatives, First
No. 180050 entitled "Rodolfo Navarro, et al. vs. Legislative District, Surigao del
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as b. If the Decision becomes final and
executory before the election, Norte, and candidates for
representative of the President of the
the Province of Dinagat Islands Governor and Vice Governor
Philippines, et al." rendered a Decision, dated 10
will revert to its previous for Surigao del Norte.
February 2010, declaring Republic Act No. Meanwhile, voters of the First
9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with status as part of the First
Legislative District, Surigao del Legislative District of Surigao
the criteria for the creation of a province
Norte. del Norte, will not be able to
prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government vote for Members,
Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 But because of the current system
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
Constitution; configuration, the ballots for
Member, House of
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] the Province of Dinagat Islands
Representatives, Dinagat
for Reconsideration on the above decision of the will, for the positions of Islands. Also, the voters of the
Supreme Court; Member, House of
whole Province of Surigao del
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) Representatives, Governor,
Norte, will not be able to vote
position for Member, House of Representatives Vice Governor and Members,
for the Governor and Vice
representing the lone congressional district of Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Governor, Dinagat Islands.
Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the candidates for bear only the names of the
Given this situation, the
the aforementioned position, (3) position for candidates for the said
Commission will postpone the
Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the positions. elections for Governor, Vice
candidates for the said position, (5) position of Governor, Member, House of
 Representatives, First
Legislative District, Surigao del
Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
First Legislative District,
Surigao del Norte, because the
election will result in [a] failure
to elect, since, in actuality,
there are no candidates for
Governor, Vice Governor,
Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First Legislative
District, and Member, House
of Representatives, First
Legislative District (with
Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del
Norte. ESCTIA
c. If the Decision becomes final and
executory after the election,
the Province of Dinagat Islands
will revert to its previous
status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte. The result of the
election will have to be
nullified for the same reasons
given in Item "b" above. A
special election for Governor,
Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives,
First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte, and
Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First District,
Surigao del Norte (with
Dinagat Islands) will have to
be conducted.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
They further alleged that, because they are the duly
elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be
affected by the nullification of the election results in the event
that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a
legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected
by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put,
movants-intervenors' election to their respective offices would
necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for
governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as residents of Surigao
del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of
their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the
outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as
part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will
affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole
administrative set-up of the province will have to be
restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be
terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4)
projects and other developments will have to be discontinued.
In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their
rights would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution
would attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12,
2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main
arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that
the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from
territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of
two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that
the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, 16 the Court
denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed
to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate
time to file the said motion was before and not after the
resolution of this case.
On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution,
citing several rulings 17 of the Court, allowing intervention as
an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it
should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment.
They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their
legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred
that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of
the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of argument that
they had notice of the pendency of the case, they pointed out
that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple
resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District
of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the
Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that,
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after
they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice
Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte, respectively,
that they became possessed with legal interest in this
controversy.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for
Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above
motion.
At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution
delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions
for reconsideration of the original parties, and neither on
Dinagat's Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our esteemed
colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagat's
third motion for reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for
leave to admit their respective motions for reconsideration of
the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the aforesaid motions for
reconsideration were already noted without action by the
Court, there is no reason to treat Dinagat's Urgent Omnibus
Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to
Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors could not be
considered as a second motion for reconsideration to warrant
the application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. 18 It should be noted that this motion prays for
the recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of
their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution
which remained unresolved. The denial of their motion for
leave to intervene and to admit motion for reconsideration of
the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the
motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, but
only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their
motion for reconsideration of this denial elaborated on
movants-intervenors' interest in this case which existed only
after judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for
intervention and their motion for reconsideration of the May
12, 2010 Resolution merely stand as an initial reconsideration
of the said resolution. jurcda
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears
nothing in the records to support the claim that this was a ploy
of respondents' legal tactician to reopen the case despite an
entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew.
To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory
after the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
The result of the election will have to
be nullified for the same reasons given
in Item "b" above. A special election for
Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte,
and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del
Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have
to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the
peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for movants-
intervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main
case becoming final and executory. More importantly, if the
intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors
would be left with no other remedy as regards to the impending
nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus,
to the Court's mind, there is an imperative to grant the Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.
It should be remembered that this case was initiated
upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back on
October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had
nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be
argued that their interest in this case should have commenced
upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is
obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary
than real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No.
8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain finality
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local
government officials stated therein would only have to be
postponed. Given such a scenario, movants-intervenors would
not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to
the reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they
would simply have remained candidates for the respective
positions they have vied for and to which they have been
elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." Because constitutional
cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely
to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises
as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 19
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will
suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed, they have
sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be
not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions
during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects
would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique
circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without
any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in
this case became manifest only after the case had already been
decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely
work to their disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice,
without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision
would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries
out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-
intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not
only a court of law, but also of justice and equity, such that our
position and the dire repercussions of this controversy should
be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on
account of mootness.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional
issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.20 The second exception attends
this case. ASHEca
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case
of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 21 where technicalities of
procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the
constitutional issues raised were of paramount public interest
or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the
Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for intervention should
be given due course since movants-intervenors have shown
their substantial legal interest in the outcome of this case, even
much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the
novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the
motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of
movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment
of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that must
comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part
of our judicial system, such that courts should proceed with
caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the
judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant,
including those who would be directly affected, would have the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. 22
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned
the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances. 23 The power to suspend or even
disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had
already declared final. 24 In this case, the compelling concern is
not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be
heard since they would be adversely affected by the judgment
in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also
to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of
the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units.
In this manner, the thrust of theConstitution with respect to
local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization
and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated,
will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after
taking a long and intent look, the Court finds that the first and
second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve
affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy
considerations in the creation of local government units are
economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria
prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area,
are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light,
Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative
weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on
which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation
of local government units, particularly of a province, is
economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of
the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from
congressional debates are quoted hereunder —
HON. ALFELOR.
Income is mandatory. We can even have this
doubled because we thought . . .
CHAIRMAN CUENCO.
In other words, the primordial consideration
here is the economic viability of the
new local government unit, the new
province?
xxx xxx xxx
HON. LAGUDA.
The reason why we are willing to increase the
income, double than the House
version, because we also believe that
economic viability is really a minimum.
Land area and population are functions
really of the viability of the area,
because you have an income level
which would be the trigger point for
economic development, population will
naturally increase because there will be
an immigration. However, if you
disallow the particular area from being
converted into a province because of
the population problems in the
beginning, it will never be able to reach
the point where it could become a
province simply because it will never
have the economic take off for it to
trigger off that economic
development. ADSTCI
Now, we're saying that maybe Fourteen
Million Pesos is a floor area where it
could pay for overhead and provide a
minimum of basic services to the
population. Over and above that, the
provincial officials should be able to
trigger off economic development
which will attract immigration, which
will attract new investments from the
private sector. This is now the concern
of the local officials. But if we are going
to tie the hands of the proponents,
simply by telling them, "Sorry, you are
now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand,"
you will never be able to become a
province because nobody wants to go
to your place. Why? Because you never
have any reason for economic viability.
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL.
Okay, what about land area?
HON. LUMAUIG.
1,500 square kilometers
HON. ANGARA.
Walang problema 'yon, in fact that's not very
critical, 'yong land area because . . .
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL.
Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500
square meters, ah, square kilometers.
HON. LAGUDA.
Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the
purpose of administrative efficiency
and delivery of basic services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL.
Right.
HON. LAGUDA.
Actually, when you come down to it, when
government was instituted, there is
only one central government and then
everybody falls under that. But it was
later on subdivided into provinces for
purposes of administrative efficiency.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL.
Okay.
HON. LAGUDA.
Now, what we're seeing now is that the
administrative efficiency is no longer
there precisely because the land areas
that we are giving to our governors is
so wide that no one man can possibly
administer all of the complex
machineries that are needed.
Secondly, when you say "delivery of basic
services," as pointed out by Cong.
Alfelor, there are sections of the
province which have never been visited
by public officials, precisely because
they don't have the time nor the
energy anymore to do that because it's
so wide. Now, by compressing the land
area and by reducing the population
requirement, we are, in effect, trying to
follow the basic policy of why we are
creating provinces, which is to deliver
basic services and to make it more
efficient in administration.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, that's correct, but
on the assumption that the province is
able to do it without being a burden to
the national government. That's the
assumption.
HON. LAGUDA.
 That's why we're going into the minimum
income level. As we said, if we go on a
minimum income level, then we say,
"this is the trigger point at which this
administration can take
place." 25 aDHCEA
Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation
of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as provided
both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz. —
For a Barangay:
LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
barangay may be created out of a contiguous
territory which has a population of at least two
thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office except in cities and
municipalities within Metro Manila and other
metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly
urbanized cities where such territory shall have
a certified population of at least five thousand
(5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation
thereof shall not reduce the population of the
original barangay or barangays to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the
indigenous cultural communities, barangays
may be created in such communities by an Act
of Congress, notwithstanding the above
requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new
barangay shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds or by more or less permanent
natural boundaries. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a
consolidation plan for barangays, based on the
criteria prescribed in this Section, within his
territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be
submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or
sangguniang panlungsod concerned for
appropriate action. In the case of municipalities
within the Metropolitan Manila area and other
metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay
consolidation plan can be prepared and
approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. — (a) Creation
of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan
shall require prior recommendation of the
sangguniang bayan.
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within
MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress,
subject to the limitations and requirements
prescribed in this Article.
(c) Notwithstanding the population
requirement, a barangay may be created in the
indigenous cultural communities by Act of
Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or
LGUs where the cultural community is located.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the
following requisites are present:
(1) Population — which shall not be less than
two thousand (2,000) inhabitants,
except in municipalities and cities
within MMA and other metropolitan
political subdivisions as may be created
by law, or in highly-urbanized cities
where such territory shall have a
population of at least five thousand
(5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
NSO. The creation of a barangay shall
not reduce the population of the
original barangay or barangays to less
than the prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area — which must be contiguous,
unless comprised by two (2) or more
islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
barangay sought to be created shall be
properly identified by metes and
bounds or by more or less permanent
natural boundaries.
Municipality:
LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
municipality may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the provincial
treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred
thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on the 1991
constant prices; a population of at least twenty-
five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office; and a
contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the
creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population or income of the original
municipality or municipalities at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created
municipality shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land
area shall not apply where the municipality
proposed to be created is composed of one (1)
or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund of the
municipality concerned, exclusive of special
funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist
and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be considered regular
municipalities. caSEAH
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. — (a)
Requisites for Creation — A municipality shall
not be created unless the following requisites
are present:
(i) Income — An average annual income of not
less than Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for
the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991
 constant prices, as certified by the
provincial treasurer. The average
annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii) Population — which shall not be less than
twenty five thousand (25,000)
inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and
(iii) Land area — which must be contiguous with
an area of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands. The
requirement on land area shall not
apply where the proposed
municipality is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction
of a municipality sought to be created
shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds.
The creation of a new municipality shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said
creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the
creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
City:
LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred
fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics
Office: Provided, That, the creation
thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation
to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created
city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. — (a) Requisites for
creation — A city shall not be created unless the
following requisites on income and either
population or land area are present:
(1) Income — An average annual income of not
less than Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00), for the immediately
preceding two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by DOF. The average annual
income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income;
and
(2) Population or land area — Population which
shall not be less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the NSO; or land area
which must be contiguous with an area
of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the
proposed city is composed of one (1)
or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a city sought to be
created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the
land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation
to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the
creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:
LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and
either of the following requisites: SHDAEC
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do
not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.
 LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. — (a) Requisites
for creation — A province shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and
either population or land area are present:
(1) Income — An average annual income of not
less than Twenty Million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the immediately
preceding two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by DOF. The average annual
income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and non-recurring income;
and
(2) Population or land area — Population which
shall not be less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as
certified by NSO; or land area which
must be contiguous with an area of at
least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a province sought to be
created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce
the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation
to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the
creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited
provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area
is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to
the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces,
the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are
provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local
government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as
expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if
the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province
under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated
under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands
or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-
created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy
decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and
Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus,
when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9 (2) of
the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the
congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC — and to
reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for
the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the
basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local
autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is
pertinent to this case, provides —
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — (a) It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State
shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end,
the State shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and
resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the national government to the
local government units. SETAcC
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3 (a) of the LGC-
IRR 26 and in the Whereas clauses of Administrative Order No.
270, 27 which read —
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of
the Constitution mandates that the State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared
policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, affirms,
among others, that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals;
WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 requires the President to convene
an Oversight Committee for the purpose of
formulating and issuing the appropriate rules
and regulations necessary for the efficient and
effective implementation of all the provisions of
the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due
deliberations and consultations with all the
concerned sectors of society and consideration
of the operative principles of local autonomy as
provided in the Local Government Code of 1991,
has completed the formulation of the
implementing rules and regulations; . . .
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective
local government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by
the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-
productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several
municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also
consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities
which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land
area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442,
respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to
comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would
mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference
to create a province with contiguous land area over one
composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and
the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This
preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome
if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered
because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as
compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could
trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the
purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in
the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be
read together with territorial contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of
Congress should prove enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Can we give time to Congressman
Chiongbian, 28 with respect to his . . .
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Okay.
HON. CHIONGBIAN.
At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to
apprise the distinguished Senator
about the action taken by the House,
on House Bill No. 7166. This was passed
about two years ago and has been
pending in the Senate for
consideration. This is a bill that I am not
the only one involved, including our
distinguished Chairman here. But then
we did want to sponsor the bill, being
the Chairman then of the Local
Government.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the
Congressmen, who were more or less
interested in the creation of the new
provinces, because of the vastness of
the areas that were involved.
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House
unanimously without any objection.
And as I have said a while ago, that this
has been pending in the Senate for the
last two years. And Sen. Pimentel
himself was just in South Cotabato and
he delivered a speech that he will
support this bill, and he says, that he
will incorporate this in the Local
Government Code, which I have in
writing from him. I showed you the
letter that he wrote, and naturally, we
in the House got hold of the Senate
version. It becomes an impossibility for
the whole Philippines to create a new
province, and that is quite the concern
of the respective Congressmen. IaECcH
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is
concerned, there is nothing to stop the
mother province from voting against
the bill, if a province is going to be
created.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers
here. Why is the province not willing to
create another province, when it can
be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says,
what will happen to Palawan? We
won't have one million people there,
and if you look at Palawan, there will
be about three or four provinces that
will comprise that island. So, the
development will be hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the
letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated
November 2, 1989. This was practically
about a year after 7166 was approved
by the House, House Bill 7166.
On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:
"Dear Congressman Chiongbian:
We are in receipt of your letter of 17
October. Please be informed that your
House No. 7166 was incorporated in
the proposed Local Government Code,
Senate Bill No. 155, which is pending
for second reading.
Thank you and warm regards.
Very
truly
yours,
"
That is the very context of the letter of the
Senator, and we are quite surprised
that the Senate has adopted another
position.
So, we would like — because this is a
unanimously approved bill in the
House, that's the only bill that is
involving the present Local
Government Code that we are
practically considering; and this will be
a slap on the House, if we do not
approve it, as approved by the lower
House. This can be [an] irritant in the
approval of the Conference Committee
Report. And I just want to manifest that
insofar as the creation of the province,
not only in my province, but the other
provinces. That the mother province
will participate in the plebiscite, they
can defeat the province, let's say, on
the basis of the result, the province
cannot be created if they lose in the
plebiscite, and I don't see why, we
should put this stringent conditions to
the private people of the devolution
that they are seeking.
So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the
situation seriously, because, this is an
approved version of the House, and I
will not be the one to raise up and
question the Conference Committee
 Report, but the rest of the House that
are interested in this bill. And they have
been approaching the Speaker about
this. So, the Speaker reminded me to
make sure that it takes the cudgel of
the House approved version.
So, that's all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I
don't believe that it is not, because it's
the wish of the House, but because the
mother province will participate
anyhow, you vote them down; and that
is provided for in the Constitution. As a
matter of fact, I have seen the
amendment with regards to the
creation of the city to be urbanized,
subject to the plebiscite. And why
should we not allow that to happen in
the provinces! In other words, we don't
want the people who wants to create a
new province, as if they are left in the
devolution of powers, when they feel
that they are far away from civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces,
because I am unaware, not aware of
their situation. But the province of
South Cotabato has a very unique
geographical territorial
conglomerations. One side is in the
other side of the Bay, of Sarangani Bay.
The capital town is in the North; while
these other municipalities are in the
East and in the West. And if they have
to travel from the last town in the
eastern part of the province, it is about
one hundred forty kilometers to the
capital town. And from the West side, it
is the same distance. And from the
North side, it is about one hundred
kilometers. So that is the problem
there. And besides, they have enough
resources and I feel that, not because I
am interested in the province, I am
after their welfare in the future. Who
am I to dictate on those people? I have
no interest but then I am looking at the
future development of these areas.
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, it's
incidental; I do not need to be there,
but I can foresee what the creation of a
new province will bring to these
people. It will bring them prosperity; it
will bring them more income, and it will
encourage even foreign investors. Like
the PAP now, they are concentrating in
South Cotabato, especially in the City of
General Santos and the neighboring
municipalities, and they are quite
interested and even the AID people are
asking me, "What is holding the
creation of a new province when
practically you need it?" It's not 20 or
30 kilometers from the capital town;
it's about 140 kilometers. And imagine
those people have to travel that far and
our road is not like Metropolitan
Manila. That is as far as from here to
Tarlac. And there are municipalities
there that are just one municipality is
bigger than the province of La Union.
They have the income. Of course, they
don't have the population because
that's a part of the land of promise and
people from Luzon are migrating
everyday because they feel that there
are more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in
my case, in the other cases, it will
enhance the development of the
Philippines, not because I am
interested in my province. Well, as far
as I am concerned, you know, I am in
the twilight years of my life to serve
and I would like to serve my people
well. No personal or political interest
here. I hope the distinguished
Chairman of the Committee will
appreciate the House Bill 7166, which
the House has already approved
because we don't want them to throw
the Conference Committee Report
after we have worked that the house
Bill has been, you know, drawn over
board and not even considered by the
Senate. And on top of that, we are
considering a bill that has not yet been
passed. So I hope the Senator will take
that into account.
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Thank you very much, Congressman James. We
will look into the legislative history of
the Senate version on this matter of
creation of provinces. I am sure there
was an amendment. As I said, I'll look
into it. Maybe the House version was
incorporated in toto, but maybe during
the discussion, their amendments were
introduced and, therefore, Senator
Pimentel could not hold on to the
original version and as a result new
criteria were introduced. cCTAIE
But because of the manifestation that you just
made, we will definitely, when we
reach a book, Title IV, on the matter of
provinces, we will look at it
sympathetically from your end so that
the objective that you want [to]
achieve can be realized. So we will look
at it with sympathy. We will review our
position on the matter, how we arrived
at the Senate version and we will adopt
an open mind definitely when we come
into it.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Kanino 'yan?
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Book III.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
Title?
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Title IV.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
I have been pondering on the case of James,
especially on economic stimulation of a
certain area. Like our case, because I
put myself on our province, our
province is quite very big. It's
composed of four (4) congressional
districts and I feel it should be five now.
But during the Batasan time, four of us
talked and conversed proposing to
divide the province into two.
There are areas then, when since time
immemorial, very few governors ever
tread on those areas. That is, maybe
you're acquainted with the Bondoc
Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that is
Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a long
stretch of coastal area. From Albay
going to Ragay, very few governors
ever tread [there] before, even today.
That area now is infested with NPA.
That is the area of Congressman
Andaya.
Now, we thought that in order to stimulate
growth, maybe provincial aid can be
extended to these areas. With a big or
a large area of a province, a certain
administrator or provincial governor
definitely will have no sufficient time.
For me, if we really would like to
stimulate growth, I believe that an area
where there is physical or geographical
impossibilities, where administrators
can penetrate, I think we have to
create certain provisions in the law
where maybe we can treat it with
special considerations.
Now, we went over the graduate scale of the
Philippine Local Government Data as
far as provinces are concerned. It is we do not hold it against the province
very surprising that there are provinces because maybe that's one stimulant
here which only composed of six where growth can grow, can start. The
municipalities, eight municipalities, land area for Camiguin is only 229
seven municipalities. Like in Cagayan, square kilometers. So if we hard fast on
Tuguegarao, there are six requirements of, we set a minimum for
municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes. every province, palagay ko we just
leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway,
CHAIRMAN LINA.
the Constitution is very clear that in
Will you look at the case of — how many
municipalities are there in Batanes case we would like to divide, we submit
it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang
province?
tao. Kung maglalagay tayo
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
ng set ng minimum, tila yata
Batanes is only six. mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is
CHAIRMAN LINA. really the thrust of the Local
Six town. Siquijor? Government Code? Growth. To devolve
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. powers in order for the community to
have its own idea how they will
Siquijor. It is region?
stimulate growth in their respective
CHAIRMAN LINA. areas.
Seven. So, in every geographical condition, mayroon
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot
Seven. Anim. make a generalization.
CHAIRMAN LINA. CHAIRMAN LINA.
Six also. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. existing province because of some
geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you
Six also.
called it, stimulate the economic
CHAIRMAN LINA. growth in the area or will substantial
It seems with a minimum number of aid coming from the national
towns? EHaCID government to a particular area, say, to
a municipality, achieve the same
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, purpose?
not even one congressional district. CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.
But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a
Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga province. Usually, tinitingnan lang
ako ngayon. yun, provision eh, hindi na
CHAIRMAN LINA. yung composition eh. You are entitled
Camiguin, Camiguin. to, say, 20% of the area.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. There's a province of Camarines Sur which have
the same share with that of Camiguin
That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities,
and Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed
with a population of 63 thousand. But
only of five municipalities; in Siquijor,
 it's composed of six, but the share of
Siquijor is the same share with that of
the province of Camarines Sur, having a
bigger area, very much bigger.
That is the budget in process.
CHAIRMAN LINA.
Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very
seriously and even with sympathy
because of the explanation given and
we will study this very carefully. 29
The matters raised during the said Bicameral
Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest
intention of Congress to promote development in the
previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by
allowing them to directly share in the allocation of funds under
the national budget. It should be remembered that, under
Sections 284 and 285 of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local
governments, and the sharing is based on land area, population,
and local revenue. 30
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal
application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction, such as the legislative history of the law, 31 or
may consider the implementing rules and regulations and
pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or
legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9 (2)
of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law,
the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was
formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members
of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to
Section 533 32 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the
Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective
implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby
ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as
defined under theConstitution. It was also mandated by
the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted
by Congress, to wit —
Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
(Emphasis supplied.) DEAaIS
These State policies are the very reason for the
enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization
and countryside development. Congress saw that the old
LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new
law, now the LGC of 1991,which is more dynamic and cognizant
of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This
accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of
local government units composed of one or more islands, as
expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with
respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but
inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the
creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was
filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate
and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons
of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot
be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of
the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to
the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands
was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly
stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed
through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the
Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically
insert such an exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR. The
Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and
consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and
considered the operative principles of local autonomy as
provided in the LGC when the IRR was
formulated. 33 Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an
executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect
from this Court, 34 but to legislative construction as well,
especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four
leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight
Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted
to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the
many details to implement the LGC had already been put in
place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too
urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the
LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of
Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No.
9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement,
which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be
found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant
to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and
blood into that exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR and
transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating
the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of
Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively
show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC
that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to
the creation of a province when it consists of one or more
islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and
by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment
of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an
indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more
than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the
creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its
constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather
than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10,
2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which
cannot operate in favor of Dinagat's existence as a province,
they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready
and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held
in League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections 35 —
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the
letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is
within the spirit is within the statute although it
is not within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not within
the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is
within the intent of the lawmaker is as much
within the statute as if within the letter, and
that which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute unless within the intent of
the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to
interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of
the law and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge
against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-
equal branch of government, it behooves the
Court to have at once one principle in mind: the
presumption of constitutionality of statutes.
This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite
system of government and the corollary
separation of powers, which enjoins the three
great departments of the government to accord
a becoming courtesy for each other's acts, and
not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by
one of its official functions. Towards this end,
courts ought to reject assaults against the
validity of statutes, barring of course their clear
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the
theory in context being that the law is the
product of earnest studies by Congress to
ensure that no constitutional prescription or
concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law
duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal
breach of, or a clear conflict with,
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind
of the Court. STIcEA
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October
29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010
Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010
Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in
Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared
as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials
thereof are declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de
Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno,
JJ., concur.
Carpio, Brion and Peralta, JJ., with dissenting opinion.
Del Castillo and Abad, JJ., with concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and Justice Arturo D.
Brion in their dissents. I file this separate dissenting opinion
because the majority's ruling today, legitimizing the creation of
a province in blatant violation of the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, opens the floodgates to the proliferation of
pygmy provinces and legislative districts, mangling sacred and
fundamental principles governing our democratic way of life
and exacerbating the scourge of local dynastic politics.
First. The Dinagat Islands province simply does not
meet the criteria for the creation of a province. To implement
the Constitution and for reasons of political practicality and
economic viability, Section 461 of the Local Government
Code bars the creation of provinces unless two of three
minimum requirements are met. Section 461 of the Code
provides:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, that the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do
not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 461 requires a province to meet the minimum
income requirement and either the minimum land area or
minimum population requirement. In short, two of the three
minimum requirements must be satisfied, with the minimum
income requirement one of the two. The Dinagat Islands
province, whose income at the time of its creation in 2006 was
P82,696,433.22, satisfies only the minimum income
requirement. The Dinagat Islands province does not meet
either the minimum land area requirement or the minimum
population requirement. Indisputably, Dinagat Islands cannot
qualify as a province under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, the law that governs the creation of
provinces. cEITCA
 Based on the 2000 census, Dinagat Islands' population
stood only at 106,951, less than half of the statutory minimum
of 250,000. In the census conducted seven years later in 2007,
one year after its creation, its population grew by only 13,862,
reaching 120,813, still less than half of the minimum population
required. The province does not fare any better in land area,
with its main island, one sub-island and around 47 islets
covering only 802.12 square kilometers, less than half of the
2,000 square kilometers minimum land area required.
The Local Government Code contains no exception to
the income and population or land requirements in creating
provinces. What the Code relaxed was the contiguityrule for
provinces consisting of "two (2) or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province." The minimum land area of 2,000
square kilometers in the Code for the creation of a province was
never changed, and no exception was ever created by law.
Hence, the exception created in the implementing rule 1 of the
Local Government Code, exempting provinces "composed of
one (1) or more islands" from the minimum land area
requirement, is void for being ultra vires, granting a statutory
exception that the Local Government Code clearly withheld.
The implementing rule, being a mere administrative regulation
to implement the Local Government Code, cannot amend the
Code but must conform to the Code. Only Congress, and not
any other body, is constitutionally empowered to create,
through amendatory legislation, exceptions to the land area
requirement in Section 461 of the Code.
The majority argues that since the exception of island
provinces from the minimum land requirement was inserted in
the implementing rules by the congressional Oversight
Committee, the Court should extend great weight to
this "legislative construction" of the Code. This is gross
error. First, in Macalintal v. Comelec, 2 we ruled that a
congressional oversight committee has no power to approve or
disapprove the implementing rules of laws because the
implementation of laws is purely an executive function. The
intrusion of the congressional Oversight Committee in the
drafting of implementing rules is a violation of the separation of
powers enshrined in theConstitution. This Court cannot allow
such intrusion without violating
the Constitution. Second, Congress has no power to construe
the law. Only the courts are vested with the power to construe
the law. Congress may provide in the law itself a definition of
terms but it cannot define or construe the law through its
Oversight Committee after it has enacted the law because such
power belongs to the courts.
It is not difficult to see why Congress allowed an
exception to the land area requirement in the creation of
municipalities 3 and cities 4 but withheld it for provinces. The
province, as the largest political and corporate subdivision of
local governance in this country, serves as the geographic base
from which municipalities, cities and even another province will
be carved, fostering local development. Today's majority ruling,
allowing the creation of an island province irrespective of
population and land area so long as it has P20 million annual
income, wipes away the territorial and population tiering
among provinces, cities and municipalities the Local
Government Code has carefully structured, reducing provinces
to the level of a rich municipality, 5 unable to host otherwise
qualified new smaller local government units for sheer lack of
space.
Despite the majority's ingenious resort to "legislative
construction" in the implementing rules to exempt Dinagat
Islands from the minimum land area requirement, the majority
cannot escape one glaring fact: Dinagat Islands province
satisfies only the minimum income requirement under Section
461 of the Local Government Code. Even assuming that the
minimum land area requirement does not apply to island
provinces, an assumption that is devoid of any legal basis,
Dinagat Islands still fail to meet the minimum population
requirement. Under Section 461 of the Code, two of the three
minimum requirements must be satisfied in the creation of a
province, with the income requirement being one of the two
minimum requirements. The majority's ruling today creates the
Dinagat Islands province despite the indisputable fact that it
satisfies only one of the two necessary requirements prescribed
in Section 461. The majority's ruling clearly violates Section 461
of the Code, no question about it.
Second. It is mandatory that a province must have a
population of at least 250,000. The 1987 Constitution mandates
that "each province[,] shall have at least one
representative." 6 In Sema v. Commission on Elections, 7 we
categorically ruled that "the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative
district." Thus, when Congress creates a province it necessarily
creates at the same time a legislative district. The province
must comply with the minimum population of 250,000 because
the Constitution mandates that 250,000 shall be the minimum
population for the creation of legislative districts. 8 aIETCA
The Constitution provides for proportional
representation in the House of Representatives when it
declares that "legislative districts [shall be] apportioned
among provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants . .
. ." This means that for every given number of
inhabitants, "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
area" will be entitled to one representative. In consonance with
this constitutional rule on proportional representation and in
compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, the minimum
population for the creation of legislative districts in provinces
and cities must be the same. Since the Constitution expressly
provides that the minimum population of legislative districts in
cities shall be 250,000, 9 then it necessarily follows that the
minimum population of legislative districts in provinces shall
also be 250,000. Otherwise, there will be a blatant violation of
two fundamental principles of our democratic system — the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation in
the House of Representatives for "provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area" and the "one person, one vote" rule
rooted in the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, to treat land area as an alternative to the
minimum population requirement (based on the conjunctive
"either" in Section 461) destroys the supremacy of
the Constitution, making the statutory text prevail over the
clear constitutional language mandating a minimum population
through the requirement of proportional representation in the
apportionment of all legislative districts. In short, in the
creation of a province neither Congress nor the Executive can
replace the minimum population requirement with a land area
requirement because the creation of a province necessarily
creates at the same a legislative district, which under
theConstitution must have a minimum population of 250,000.
Because of the majority's ruling today, the House of
Representatives will now count among its members a
representative of a "premium" district consisting, as of the 2007
census, of only 120,813 constituents, well below the minimum
population of 250,000 his peers from the other regular districts
represent. This malapportionment tolerates, on the one hand,
vote undervaluation in overpopulated districts, and, on the
other hand, vote overvaluation in underpopulated ones, in clear
breach of the "one person, one vote" rule rooted on the Equal
Protection Clause. To illustrate, the 120,813 inhabitants of
Dinagat Islands province are entitled to send one representative
to the House of Representatives. In contrast, a legislative
district in Metro Manila needs 250,000 inhabitants to send one
representative to the House of Representatives. Thus, one vote
in Dinagat Islands has the weight of more than two votes in
Metro Manila for the purpose of representation in the House
of Representatives. This is not what our "one person, one vote"
representative democracy is all about.
What special and compelling circumstances have the
majority found that entitle the inhabitants of Dinagat Islands to
such a privileged position? Do the inhabitants of Dinagat Islands
have more than twice the IQ of inhabitants of Metro Manila?
Do the inhabitants of Dinagat Islands pay more than twice the
amount of taxes that inhabitants of Metro Manila pay? Are the
inhabitants of Dinagat Islands the chosen people of God to lead
this country to greatness? Have the Filipino people, in a
plebiscite, agreed to confer on the inhabitants of Dinagat
Islands such privileged position, which is the only
constitutionally justifiable way to grant such privileged status?
Indeed, the gross malapportionment this case presents is just as
constitutionally damaging as that in Aquino v. Commission on
Elections 10 where the population of the reapportioned five
legislative districts in Camarines Sur, based on relevant census,
fluctuated from a high of 439,043 (Third District) to a low of
176,383 (First District).
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, and now this
Dinagat Islands province case, will mangle beyond recognition
the bedrock constitutional principles of proportional
representation in the House of Representatives, as well as the
egalitarian rule of "one person, one vote" universally honored
in all modern civilized societies and rooted in the Equal
Protection Clause. With Aquino v. Commission on Elections, a
legislative district in provinces can be created with no minimum
population requirement. Thus, a municipality with a population
of only 25,000 can have a legislative district. With this Dinagat
Islands province case, a province, and necessarily a legislative
district, can be created with a population of only 120,000 or
even less. In fact, under both Aquino v. Commission on
Elections and this Dinagat Islands province case, there is no
minimum population requirement whatsoever in the creation
of legislative districts in provinces, and thus even a barangay
with a population of 1,000 can be a legislative district. In sharp
contrast, a legislative district in cities can only be created with a
minimum population of 250,000 as expressly required in
the Constitution. To repeat, the majority has thrown into the
dustbin of history the bedrock democratic principles of
proportional representation in the House of Representatives
and the "one person, one vote" rule rooted in the Equal
Protection Clause — both of which are enshrined in our
Constitution and in our democratic way of life. Where is the
majority of this Court bringing our representative democracy?
Third. Quasi-malapportionment laws like RA 9355 are
double-edged knives thrust at the heart of the anti-dynastic
vision of the 1987 Constitution — it fosters entrenchment of
political dynasties and fuels feudalistic practices by assuring
political dynasties easy access to public funds. TAESDH
Members of Congress are entitled to an equal share of
pork barrel funds regardless of the size of their constituencies.
Thus, each seat in the House of Representatives translates to a
potent platform for congressmen to cultivate patronage by
doling out development, livelihood and support projects using
pork barrel funds allocated in annual budgets. For each new
province created — entailing at the same time the creation of a
legislative district — a pipeline to a huge pool of resources is
opened, with the Congressman enjoying wide discretion on how
and where he will dispense such legislative largesse.
Under the majority's ruling, not only land area but also
population is immaterial in creating island provinces. This is an
open invitation to ruling political clans strategically situated in
this country's thousands of islands to sponsor the creation of
more underpopulated provinces within their political
bailiwicks, 11 enabling them to capture more pork barrel funds,
thus tightening their grip on the levers of power. This inevitably
fuels the feudal practices plaguing Philippine local politics by
fortifying patron (congressman) — ward (constituents) relations
upon which dynastic politics thrive. All this at the expense of
taxpayers, mostly residing in city legislative districts with
minimum populations of 250,000, who surely would not want
their taxes to be spent as pork barrel funds of political dynasties
in underpopulated legislative districts in island provinces.
The 1987 Constitution is not neutral on the scourge of
dynastic politics, a phenomenon that concentrates political
power and public resources within the control of few families
whose members alternatively hold elective offices, deftly
skirting term limits. Its exclusionary effect on access to public
service led the framers of the 1987 Constitution to mandate
that the State "guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service" and that Congress "prohibit political dynasties . .
. ." 12 To the Filipino people's misfortune, Congress' non-
implementation of this constitutional directive is now
aggravated by this Court's wantonly loose translation of
the Constitution's apportionment standard of proportional
representation. 13 Thus, instead of ensuring compliance with
the Constitution's mandate prohibiting political dynasties, this
Court has turned complicit to local politicians' predilection for
dynastic entrenchment.
Fourth. Far from being dispensable components in the
creation of local government units, population and land area —
not income — are the pivotal factors in funding local
government units. Under the Local Government Code, these
components determine 75% of the share from the national
taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA) each local
government unit receives, the lifeblood of their operations,
based on the following formula:
1. Population — Fifty percent (50%)
2. Land Area — Twenty-five percent (25%)
3. Equal sharing — Twenty-five percent
(25%). 14
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, population, with a weight of 50%, ranks first in
importance in determining the financial entitlement of local
government units, followed by land area with a weight of 25%.
By treating Dinagat Islands' land area of 802.12 square
kilometers as compliant with the 2,000 square kilometers
minimum under Section 461, the majority effectivelyincluded
in their land area computation the enclosed marine area or
waters of Dinagat Islands. This disposition not only reverses,
without cause, decades' old jurisprudence, 15 it also wreaks
havoc on the national government's allocation of the internal
revenue allotment to existing island provinces which would be
justified in invoking today's ruling to clamor for increased
revenue shares due to increased "land area." In short, other
island provinces, like Romblon, Marinduque, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi
 and Palawan, can now claim their enclosed marine areas as part
of their "land area" in computing their share of the IRA. 16
On the part of landlocked provinces hosting large
bodies of water, like Rizal, Laguna, Batangas, Cavite and Lanao
del Sur, the situation is reversed. Finding themselves holding,
but not surrounded by, water, the submerged territory, no
matter how large, is excluded from the computation of their
land area, thus proportionately lowering their share in the
revenue allotment compared to their island counterparts.
Thus, in its zeal to legalize the creation of an obviously
disqualified local government unit, the majority unwittingly
creates classes of elite and disadvantaged provinces, using the
most arbitrary factor of geographic accident as basis for
classification. Even under the most benign equal protection
analysis, this does not pass constitutional muster.
Fifth. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code are normative guides for courts to reasonably interpret
and give expression to the will of the Filipino people as encoded
in their provisions. Members of this Court go beyond the
bounds of their sworn duties when they second guess the
intent of the Constitution's framers and the people's elected
representatives, pretending to act as if they themselves have
been accorded electoral mandate to amend statutes as they see
fit. No amount of rhetoric singing paeans to the virtues of
promoting local autonomy can hide the blatant judicial
legislation the majority has succeeded in doing here today, to
the detriment of Constitution's requirements of proportional
representation in the House of Representatives, equal
protection under the law and the prohibition against political
dynasties, not to mention the blatant violation of Section 461 of
the Local Government Code. ECTSDa
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Motion to Recall Entry
of Judgment, the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and
Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated 20 July 2010, and the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 May 2010 filed by
the intervenors.
BRION, J., dissenting:
I join the Dissents of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and
Diosdado M. Peralta on the strict merits of the case — on why,
based on the merits, Republic Act No. 9355 (RA 9355),
otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands, should be declared unconstitutional.
Additionally, I submit this Dissenting Opinion to
express my objections in the strongest terms against the
transgressions the Court committed in ruling on this case. The
result, which is obvious to those who have been following the
developments in this case and current Supreme Court rulings, is
another flip-flop, made worse by the violations of the Court's
own Internal Rules. 1 This is not, of course, the Court's first flip-
flop in recent memory; we did a couple of remarkable
somersaults in our rulings in the case of League of Cities of the
Philippines, et al. v. Comelec. 2 This Dissent is written in the
hope that the Court's violation of its own rules in this case will
be the last, and that the Court will re-think its disposition of
this case.
The Court rendered its Decision in this case
on February 10, 2010, declaring RA 9355 unconstitutional. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in behalf of the
respondents, and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-
Villaroman filed their separate Motions for Reconsideration.
These were their first motions for reconsideration.
On May 12, 2010, the Court denied these motions for
lack of merit.
On May 26 and 28, 2010, respondent Governor Ecleo-
Villaroman and the OSG respectively filed their 2nd Motions for
Reconsideration. The Court simply noted these motions
without action as they are prohibited pleadings under Section 2,
Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. This procedural rule states:
Sec. 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. —
No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party
shall be entertained.
The Court's Decision of February 10, 2010 became final
and executory, and Entry of Judgment was made by the Clerk of
Court on May 18, 2010. At that point, the Decision of the Court
should have been beyond recall.
On June 18, 2010 (or a full month after entry of
judgment), new parties, namely — Congressman Francisco T.
Matugas, Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr.,
Hon. Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto D. Galamida, Hon.
Margarito M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol, filed
a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010. They prayed that they be allowed to intervene in
the case since they were the newly elected officials of Surigao
del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections, who were in danger of
losing their positions once the Court's February 10, 2010
decision, declaring R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional, attained
finality. Effectively, they took up the cause of the original
respondent Province of Surigao del Norte then represented by
former Governor Robert Ace Barbers.
The Court denied the motion in its Resolution of July
20, 2010, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court which allows a motion for intervention only before the
rendition of judgment by the trial court. Applying this rule to an
action originally filed with the Court, we ruled that a motion for
intervention could only be filed before, and not after, the final
judgment in the case.
Respondent Governor Ecleo-Villaroman filed, on
October 22, 2010, an Urgent Omnibus Motion (To Resolve
Motion for Leave of Court to Admit 2nd Motion for
Reconsideration and, to Set Aside Entry of Judgment). Thus,
despite the Entry of Judgment, she sought the Court's ruling on
her 2nd Motion for Reconsideration that had simply been
Noted Without Action by the Court for being a prohibited
pleading. The ploy to reopen the case and escape from the
consequences of the final judgment was apparent from the
move to set aside the Entry of Judgment. Effectively, she
was moving for the third time to secure the review of the
February 10, 2010 Decision that had been declared final, and to
re-submit the case for another deliberation on the merits.
Side by side with the original respondent, the would-
be intervenors — despite the lack of personality to act on the
case — filed on October 29, 2010 an Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment. Of course, this move was duly orchestrated
with the respondents whose own motions were filed a week
earlier. This was a motion the would-be intervenors had no
personality to file since their proposed intervention, at that
point, stood denied. ADEaHT
The Court en banc deliberated on the case and by a
vote of 9 in favor and 6 against, decided to lift the entry of
judgment and allow the intervention of the new parties. By the
same vote, it voted to completely reverse the Decision of
February 10, 2010 and declare RA 9355, entitled An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, constitutional.
In acting as it did, the Court did not hesitate, by a 9-6
vote, to disregard existing rules that the Court itself created.
 After this vote, the ponente modified the majority
resolution in reaction to the original version of this Dissent. This
time, the majority Resolution claimed that it was acting only on
the would-be intervenors' Motion to Lift Entry of Judgment, not
on the original respondents' motion to set aside judgment. The
ploy apparently was to avoid the Dissent's position that the
Court acted on a prohibited 2nd motion for reconsideration
without the required vote.
The Court, for reasons of its own, has chosen to live
with the public fiction that 2nd motions for reconsideration are
prohibited pleadings pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules
of Court, cited and quoted above. In actual practice, exceptions
to this Rule are allowed and what governs is Section 3, Rule 15
of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court which provides:
Sec. 3. Second Motion for Reconsideration. —
The Court shall not entertain a second motion
for reconsideration and any exception to this
rule can only be granted in the higher interest of
justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at
least two-thirds of its actual membership.
There is reconsideration "in the higher interest
of justice" when the assailed decision is not only
legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust
and potentially capable of causing unwarranted
and irremediable injury or damage to the
parties. A second motion for reconsideration
can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes final by
operation of law or by the Court's declaration.
[Emphases supplied.]
In the present case, the Court simply noted without
action respondent Governor Ecleo-Villaroman's and the OSG's
2nd motions for reconsideration because they are prohibited
pleadings. The Court thereafter declared its judgment final, and
entry of judgment followed. Thus, when Governor Ecleo-
Villaroman sought to lift the entry of judgment, her motion —
which sought to reopen the case for another review — was
effectively a third motion for reconsideration that should have
been governed by Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules. With
the modified position that the Court was acting on the
movants-intervenors' motion to lift entry of judgment, the
majority sought to avoid the restrictive rule on 2nd motions
for reconsideration.
How the Court acted on the respondents' and would-
be intervenors' motions is interesting.
a. Violation of the Rule on Reconsideration. By a 9-6
vote, the Court declared the entry of judgment lifted. In so
doing, it completely disregarded its own rule that any 2nd
motion for reconsideration can only be entertained through a
vote of 2/3 of the actual membership, or of 10 members, of
the Court. It likewise disregarded the rule that a second motion
for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law
or by the Court's declaration. It conveniently forgot, too, when
it subsequently claimed that the motion it was considering was
not by respondent Governor Ecleo but by the would-be
intervenors, that what an original party could no longer do with
respect to a final decision, would-be intervenors — practically
representing the same interests and who had not even been
recognized by this Court — cannot also do; otherwise, what
is directly prohibited is allowed through indirect means.
Unbelievably, among the majority's supporting arguments to
support their violation, was that (1) a motion to lift entry of
final judgment is not a motion for reconsideration of the
decision sought to be declared non-final; and that (2) no exact
provision of the Internal Rules covers the lifting of an entered
final judgment.
b. Violation of the Rule on Finality of
Judgments. Worse than the above transgression, the Court
turned a blind eye to the finality of the judgment it had reached
in the case.
The judgment in a case becomes final by operation of
law (after the lapse of fifteen [15] days from the parties' receipt
of the judgment) or upon the Court's declaration of the
judgment's finality. Entry of Judgment by the Clerk of Court
follows the finality of a judgment, i.e., if no motion for
reconsideration is filed with the Court within fifteen (15) days
from the parties' receipt of the judgment.
As mentioned above, no second motion for
reconsideration can be entertained once a judgment has
become final. In this case, the Court disregarded its own rules
and entertained a motion to lift the entry of judgment and to
reopen the case. It was not an ordinary violation as the
judgment lifted was already final. The respondent Governor's
motion to lift entry of judgment was effectively a third motion
for reconsideration (as its objective is to open the final decision
for another consideration) and its consequences need no
elaborate argument to be understood. For the would-be
intervenors, it was a matter of putting the cart before the horse
— a move to lift the entry of judgment even before the would-
be intervenors had their personality recognized by the
Court. aDSIHc
The principle of immutability of a final
judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a strong,
credible and effective court. To quote what this Court has
repeatedly stated on this principle:
"It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has
become final and executory, it may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless
of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by the
highest court of the land, as what remains to be
done is the purely ministerial enforcement or
execution of the judgment.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded
on fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgment of adjudicating bodies
must become final and executory on some
definite date fixed by law. [. . .], the Supreme
Court reiterated that the doctrine of
immutability of judgment is adhered to by
necessity notwithstanding occasional errors that
may result thereby, since litigations must
somehow come to an end for otherwise, it
would "be even more intolerable than the
wrong and injustice it is designed to
protect." 3 [Emphases supplied.]
This same principle, incidentally, is what we teach students in
law schools as a basic bedrock principle in the administration
of justice. This is the same principle, too, that is often asked in
the bar examinations. Unfortunately, this is the same principle
that the Court violated, through a 9-6 vote, when it decided to
lift its Entry of Judgment and to entertain the reopening of the
final judgment in the case for renewed consideration. This,
indeed, is a most unusual move. Did the Majority truly fail to
appreciate that the lifting of the entry of judgment is no
different in effect from entertaining a motion for
reconsideration, and can be made, if at all, by the actual parties,
not by would-be intervenors? If a 2nd motion for
reconsideration is prohibited and requires a 2/3 vote, can a
vote that removes the character of finality from a judgment be
any less?
c. Violation of the Rule on Intervention. The Court
disregarded as well the rule on interventions. The motion for
intervention was initially denied since the Court's decision was
already final, and intervention could no longer be allowed. To
go around this rule, the would-be intervenors, without first
successfully securing leave to intervene, instead filed its own
motion to lift entry of judgment — the same 2nd motion from
the original respondents that the Court previously simply noted
without action. The Court granted the motion to lift judgment
by a 9-6 vote, under the fiction that it was an intervening party,
not the barred original respondents, who had asked for it.
To complete this blow-by-blow account, the
respondents' legal tactician used the ploy of first reopening the
case (initially through the original respondents, and
subsequently solely through the would-be intervenors), and
thereafter moved to allow intervention since the original
respondents had by then exhausted their arguments for the
constitutionality of RA 9355. On two previous attempts, the
original respondents had failed. To get around the
insurmountable block posed by the rule on 2nd motions for
reconsideration, they fell back on their modified Resolution
with the position that another party — the would-be
intervenors — wanted to lift the entry of judgment. Once the
entry of judgment was lifted and intervention was allowed, it
was an easy step to reopen the arguments, add to what the
original respondents presented, and submit the case for a ruling
on the merits. The same magic numbers of course prevailed all
throughout: 9 to 6.
In this manner, the original and final ruling of the
Court, in what is commonly known as the "Dinagat case" was
reversed. Unlike the case of Lazarus who rose from the dead
through a miracle, Dinagat resurrected because the Court
disregarded its own rules and established jurisprudential
principles. Of course, it can similarly be called a miracle as no
reversal could have taken place if just one of the series of
transgressions pointed out did not take place. How such
resurrection can happen in the Supreme Court is a continuing
source of wonder!
PERALTA, J., dissenting:
With due respect to the ponente, I register my dissent.
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered a Decision in
the instant case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic
Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, is
hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands
and the election of the officials thereof are
declared NULL and VOID. The provision in
Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is
declared NULL and VOID. cSDHEC
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion
for reconsideration in behalf of public respondents, and
respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, representing
the New Province of Dinagat Islands, also filed a separate
motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10,
2010.
On May 12, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution
denying the motions for reconsideration of the OSG and
respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, representing
the New Province of Dinagat Islands, for lack of merit. A copy of
the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 was received by the OSG on
May 13, 2010, while respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-
Villaroman, representing the New Province of Dinagat Islands,
received a copy of the said Resolution on May 14, 2010.
The Decision dated February 10, 2010 became final
and executory on May 18, 2010, as evidenced by the Entry of
Judgment 1 issued by the Clerk of Court.
On May 26, 2010, respondent New Province of Dinagat
Islands, represented by Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman,
filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for Reconsideration
(of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010) and the said Motion for
Reconsideration, while on May 28, 2010, the OSG filed a Motion
for Leave to File the Attached 2nd Motion for Reconsideration
(of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010) and the aforesaid
Motion for Reconsideration. On June 29, 2010, the Court noted
without action the foregoing motions of respondents, as the
said pleadings were considered second motions for
reconsideration of the Decision, which shall not be entertained
by the Court, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules
of Court, thus:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No
second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party
shall be entertained.
On June 18, 2010, movants-intervenors Congressman
Francisco T. Matugas, Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos
A. Egay, Jr., Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto
D. Galanida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M.
Bagundol filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and
to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010.
Movants-intervenors claimed that they have legal
interest in this case as they are the duly elected officials 2 of
Surigao del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections, and their
positions will be affected by the nullification of the election
results in the event that the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 in
this case is not reversed and set aside.
On March 9, 2010, the Commission on Elections issued
Resolution No. 8790, 3 the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system
configuration, and depending on whether the
Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs.
Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare
that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will
be no problem since the
current system configuration
is in line with the reconsidered
Decision, meaning that the
Province of Dinagat Islands
and the Province of Surigao
del Norte remain as two
separate provinces;
 b. If the Decision becomes final and
executory before the election,
the Province of Dinagat Islands
will revert to its previous
status as part of the First
Legislative District, Surigao del
Norte.
xxx xxx xxx
c. If the Decision becomes final and
executory after the election,
the Province of Dinagat Islands
will revert to its previous
status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte.
The result of the election will have to
be nullified for the same
reasons given in item "b"
above. A special election for
Governor, Vice Governor,
Member, House of
Representatives, First
Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte, and
Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First District,
Surigao del Norte (with
Dinagat Islands) will have to
be conducted. IHcTDA
Since movants-intervenors' elective positions would be
adversely affected if the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 would
not be reversed, they prayed that they be allowed to intervene
in this case and to file their Intervenors' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, and that
their motion for reconsideration be admitted by the Court.
In a Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the Court denied
the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010. The Court held that, fundamentally, the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. 4Under Section 2, Rule 19
of the Rules of Court, a motion to intervene may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. The Court
ruled that since this case originated from an original action filed
before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motion-in-
intervention is before and not after resolution of this case,
citingRepublic v. Gingoyon. 5
It should be noted that this case was decided on
February 10, 2010, and the motions for reconsideration of the
Decision were denied in the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.
The Decision dated February 10, 2010 became final and
executory on May 18, 2010. Movants-intervenors' Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 was
filed only on June 18, 2010, clearly after the Decision dated
February 10, 2010 had became final and executory; hence, the
said motion was correctly denied.
The ponente submits that the Court should grant
movants-intervenors' motion for reconsideration of the July 20,
2010 Resolution, in full agreement with their position that their
interest in this case arose only after they were elected to their
respective positions during the May 10, 2010 elections.
As stated by the ponente, in their motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-
intervenors raised three main arguments: (1) that the passage
ofR.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of
1991); (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when
the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes
the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is
applicable in the instant case.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, the
ponente urges the Court to take a hard and intent look at the
first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors.
Movants-intervenors contended that R.A. No. 9355 is
equivalent to the passage of an amendatory law to the Local
Government Code, as instructed in the case ofLeague of Cities
of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.: 6
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on
the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler,
single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need
not be embodied in the local government code,
albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure,
as much as possible, the element of
uniformity. Congress can even, after making a
codification, enact an amendatory law, adding
to the existing layers of indicators earlier
codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce
the same. In this case, the amendatory RA
9009 upped the already codified income
requirement from PhP20 million to PhP100
million. At the end of the day, the passage of
amendatory laws is no different from the
enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws
specifically exempting a particular political
subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned.
Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s,
effectively decreased the already codified
indicators. (Emphasis and [u]nderscoring
supplied [by movants-intervenors].)
Defining legislative power, movants-intervenors
cited Yakazi Torres Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 7 thus:
The legislative power has been described
generally as the power to make, alter, and
repeal laws. The authority to amend, change, or
modify a law is thus part of such legislative
power. It is the peculiar province of the
legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society. (Emphasis and
[u]nderscoring supplied [by movants-
intervenors].)
In view of the foregoing, movants-intervenors argued
that the Local Government Code is susceptible to all legislative
processes, including amendments, repeals or modifications.
They asserted that there is no impediment for another statute,
including R.A. No. 9355, to amend or modify the Local
Government Code as regards the criteria established for the
creation of a province. They noted that R.A. No 9355 relied on
Article 9 (paragraph 2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, particularly
the provision that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands." Movants-intervenors asserted that the said provision
should be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 9355; hence, they
purported that the land area requirement in the Local
Government Code was modified by R.A. No. 9355. They
contended that "R.A. No. 9355, with the incorporated Article 9
(2) of the IRR of the Local Government Code, became part of
theLocal Government Code." TIaCcD
Movants-intervenors' argument is unmeritorious. As
cited in Yakazi Torres Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
legislative power is the power to make, alter, and repeal laws;
thus, the authority to amend, change, or modify a law is part of
such legislative power. However, in this case, R.A. No. 9355,
is not a law amending the Local Government Code on the
criteria for the creation of a province. Instead, R.A. No. 9355 is a
statute creating the Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, subject
to the constitutional provision on the creation of a province.
The constitutional provision on the creation of a province found
in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. 8
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government
Code of 1991, in Section 461 thereof, prescribed the criteria for
the creation of a province. 9 Hence, R.A. No. 9355did not
amend the Local Government Code, but was subject to the
criteria contained in Section 461 of the Local Government
Code in creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.
Moreover, Section 6 of the Local Government
Code provides:
SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government
Units. — A local government unit may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law
enacted by Congress in the case of a province,
city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision, or by ordinance passed by
the sangguniang panlalawigan orsangguniang
panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay
located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject
to such limitations and requirements
prescribed in this Code. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Thus, even the Local Government Code clearly
provides that Congress may enact a law creating a local
government unit, which in this case involves the creation of a
province, but such creation is subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in the Local Government Code. Hence,
the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is subject to the
requirements contained in Section 461 of the Local Government
Code. Since R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the land area or
population requirement in the creation of the province, it was
declared unconstitutional in the Decision dated February 10,
2010.
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections, which was cited by movants-intervenors, does not
apply to this case. The Court held in its Resolution dated May
12, 2010, thus:
In League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections, the Court held that the
16 cityhood laws, whose validity were
questioned therein, were constitutional mainly
because it found that the said cityhood laws
merely carried out the intent of R.A. No. 9009,
now Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code, to
exempt therein respondents local government
units (LGUs) from the P100 million income
requirement since the said LGUs had pending
cityhood bills long before the enactment of R.A.
No. 9009. Each one of the 16 cityhood laws
contained a provision exempting the
municipality covered from the P100 million
income requirement.
In this case, R.A. No. 9355 was declared
unconstitutional because there was utter failure
to comply with either the population or
territorial requirement for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code.
Contrary to the contention of the movants-
intervenors, Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts a
proposed province from the land area requirement if it is
composed of one or more islands, cannot be deemed
incorporated in R.A. No. 9355, because rules and regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
Thus, in the Decision dated February 10, 2010, the Court held
that Article 9 (2) of the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code is null and void, because the exemption is
not found in Section 461 of the Local Government
Code. 10 There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the
rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law. 11
Next, movants-intervenors stated that assuming that
Section 461 of the Local Government Code was not amended
by R.A. No. 9355, they still sought reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, as they adopted the
interpretation of the ponente and Justice Perez of Section 461
of the Local Government Code in their respective dissenting
opinions. They asserted that the correct interpretation of
Section 461 of the Local Government Code is that of Justice
Nachura. AECacT
It must be stressed that the movants-intervenors'
assertion was already answered in the Resolution dated May
12, 2010, denying the motions for reconsideration of the OSG
and Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, representing the
Province of Dinagat Islands. The Court, in the said Resolution,
answered the same contention, thus:
The movants now argue that the correct
interpretation of Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code is the one stated in the
Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio
B. Nachura.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees
that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the
population requirement. However, he contends
that the Province of Dinagat Islands did not fail
to comply with the territorial requirement
because it is composed of a group of islands;
hence, it is exempt from compliance not only
with the territorial contiguity requirement, but
also with the 2,000-square-kilometer land area
criterion in Sec. 461 of the Local Government
Code, which is reproduced for easy reference:
 SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a)
A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the
following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at
least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less
than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics
Office: Provided, That, the
creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area,
population, and income of the
original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less
than the minimum
requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the
province.
(c) The average annual income shall
include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds,
trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.
Justice Nachura contends that the stipulation in
paragraph (b) qualifies not merely the word
"contiguous" in paragraph (a) (i) in the same
provision, but rather the entirety of paragraph
(a) (i) that reads:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least
two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau[.]
He argues that the whole paragraph on
contiguity and land area in paragraph (a) (i)
above is the one being referred to in the
exemption from the territorial requirement in
paragraph (b). Thus, he contends that if the
province to be created is composed of islands,
like the one in this case, then, its territory need
not be contiguous and need not have an area of
at least 2,000 square kilometers. He asserts that
this is because as the law is worded, contiguity
and land area are not two distinct and separate
requirements, but they qualify each other. An
exemption from one of the two component
requirements in paragraph (a) (i) allegedly
necessitates an exemption from the other
component requirement because the non-
attendance of one results in the absence of a
reason for the other component requirement to
effect a qualification.
Similarly, the OSG contends that when
paragraph (b) of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code provides that the "territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands," it necessarily dispenses the 2,000
sq. km. land area requirement, lest such
exemption would not make sense. The OSG
argues that in stating that a "territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands," the law could not have meant to define
the obvious. The land mass of two or more
island will never be contiguous as it is covered
by bodies of water. It is then but logical that the
territory of a proposed province that is
composed of one or more islands need not be
contiguous or be at least 2,000 sq. km.
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers
and Attributes of Local Government Units) of the
Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a
general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from
one level to another level shall be
based onverifiable indicators of
viability and projected capacity to
provide services, to wit: TcSHaD
(a) Income. — It must be sufficient,
based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size
of its population, as expected of the
local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. — It shall be
determined as the total number of
inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government
unit concerned; and
(c) Land area. — It must be contiguous,
unless it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a local
government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes
and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to
meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing
indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the
National Statistics Office (NSO), and the
Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of
the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
It must be emphasized that Section 7 above,
which provides for the general rule in the
creation of a local government unit, states in
paragraph (c) thereof that the land area must be
contiguous and sufficient to provide for such
basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land
area: (1) The land area must be contiguous; and
(2) the land area must be sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace. A sufficient land
area in the creation of a province is at least
2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section
461 of the Local Government Code.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government
Code, providing the requisites for the creation
of a province, specifically states the requirement
of "a contiguous territory of at leasttwo
thousand (2,000) square kilometers."
Hence, contrary to the arguments of both
movants, the requirement of a contiguous
territory and the requirement of a land area of
at least 2,000 square kilometers are distinct and
separate requirements for land area under
paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c)
of the Local Government Code.
However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides
two instances of exemption from the
requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:
(b) The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the
province.
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the
exemption above pertains only to the
requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly
states that the requirement of territorial
contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of
a province comprising two or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do
not contribute to the income of the province.
Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated
or may it be implied that when a province is
composed of two or more islands or when the
territory of a province is separated by a
chartered city or cities, such province need not
comply with the land area requirement of at
least 2,000 square kilometers or the
requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461
of the Local Government Code.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court
may not introduce exceptions or conditions
where none is provided from considerations of
convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable
purpose; neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated, nor construe
its provisions by taking into account questions of
expediency, good faith, practical utility and
other similar reasons so as to relax non-
compliance therewith. Where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation, but only for application.
Further, movants-intervenors pointed out that
pursuant to R.A. No. 9355, the Province of Dinagat Islands has
been organized and is functioning as a province, which cannot
just be ignored. Thus, a more realistic and pragmatic view
should have been adopted by the Court in its Resolution dated
May 12, 2010 following the Operative Fact Doctrine,
citingPlanters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation. 12
In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,
petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) and private respondent
Fertiphil were private corporations, which were both engaged
in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and
agricultural chemicals. On June 3, 1985, then President
Ferdinand Marcos issued LOI No. 1465, which provides:
3.The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide
Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing
formula a capital contribution component of not
less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution
shall be collected until adequate capital is raised
to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution
shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of
fertilizers in the Philippines. (Underscoring
supplied)
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10.00 for every bag
of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA), which amount FPA remitted to the
depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid FPA P6,689,144.00 from
July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, FPA voluntarily
stopped the imposition of the P10.00 levy. Fertiphil demanded
from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465,
but PPI refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. It questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted
to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI
solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used
the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
The RTC ruled in favor of Fertiphil, and ordered PPI to
pay Fertiphil the sum of P6,698,144.00 with interest at 12%
from the time of judicial demand; the sum of P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and the cost of suit. Ruling that the imposition
of the P10.00 levy was an exercise of the State's inherent power
of taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic
principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, but
deleted the award of attorney's fees. SHaIDE
The Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals
as LOI No. 1465 failed to comply with the public purpose
requirement for tax laws. As regards the argument of PPI that
Fertiphil cannot seek a refund based on the Operative Fact
Doctrine, the Court held:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law
is void; the doctrine
of operative fact is inapplicable.
PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a
refund even if LOI No. 1465 is declared
unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of
operative fact, which provides that an
unconstitutional law has an effect before being
declared unconstitutional. PPI wants to retain
the levies paid under LOI No. 1465 even if it is
subsequently declared to be unconstitutional.
We cannot agree. It is settled that no question,
issue or argument will be entertained on appeal,
unless it has been raised in the court a quo. PPI
did not raise the applicability of the doctrine of
operative fact with the RTC and the CA. It
cannot belatedly raise the issue with Us in order
to extricate itself from the dire effects of an
unconstitutional law.
At any rate, We find the doctrine
inapplicable. The general rule is that an
unconstitutional law is void. It produces no
rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been
passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to
pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded
in accordance with the general civil code
principle against unjust enrichment. The general
rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation
or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse or custom or
practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception
to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden
on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it.
Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in
ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by
Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly benefited
from the levy. It was proven during the trial that
the levies paid were remitted and deposited to
its bank account. Quite the reverse, it would be
inequitable and unjust not to order a refund. To
do so would unjustly enrich PPI at the expense
of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that "every person who, through an act
of performance by another comes into
possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground shall return
the same to him." We cannot allow PPI to profit
from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity
dictate that PPI must refund the amounts paid
by Fertiphil. 13
In this case, the general rule applies that an
unconstitutional law is void, and produces no legal effect. As
stated in the decision above, the doctrine of operative fact, as
an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. The said doctrine recognizes that the actual
existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact, and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The doctrine
was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy 14 or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it in the case
ofMunicipality of Malabang v. Benito. 15
In Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, the Court ruled
that Executive Order 386 creating the Municipality of Malabang
is void, and respondent officials were permanently restrained
from performing the duties and functions of their respective
offices. Nevertheless, the Court stated there was no basis for
respondent officials' apprehension that the invalidation of the
executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of
unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the
creation of that municipality, citing Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank, thus: 16 AEIDTc
. . . The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects — with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified. 17
Therefore, based on the foregoing, any question on the
validity of acts done before the invalidation of R.A. No.
9355 may be raised before the courts.
Lastly, movants-intervenors contended that the
inhabitants of the Province of Dinagat Islands have expressed
their will, through their votes in a plebiscite, to be a province;
hence, the Court should uphold the will of the people and
uphold the validity of R.A. No. 9355.
The contention does not persuade. The validity of R.A.
No. 9355 creating the province of Dinagat Islands depends on
its compliance with Section 10, Article X of theConstitution,
which states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. 18
Although the political units directly affected by the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands approved the
creation of the said province, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply
with the criteria for the creation of the province contained in
Section 461 of the Local Government Code; hence, it was
declared unconstitutional.
As cited in the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, Tan v.
Comelec 19 held:
 . . . [T]he fact that such plebiscite had been held
and a new province proclaimed and its officials
appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be
viewed as already moot and academic.
Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly
profess to have been illegally born, deserves to
be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if
indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the
commission of that error should not provide the
very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For
this court to yield to the respondents' urging
that, as there has been fait accompli, then this
Court should passively accept and accede to the
prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as
respondents so propose is a proposition fraught
with mischief. Respondents' submission will
create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court
decline now to perform its duty of interpreting
and indicating what the law is and should be,
this might tempt again those who strut about in
the corridors of power to recklessly and with
ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or
alter the boundaries of political subdivisions,
either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this
Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring
about a fait accompli.
In view of the foregoing, the Court acted in accordance
with its sound discretion in denying movants-
intervenors' Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010 as the issues raised by them lacked merit
or had already been resolved by the Court in its Decision dated
February 10, 2010 and its Resolution dated May 12, 2010
denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Moreover,
under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, a motion to
intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment
by the trial court. Since this case originated from an original
action filed before this Court, the Court properly ruled that the
appropriate time to file the motion-in-intervention is before
and not after resolution of this case, citing Republic v.
Gingoyon. 20 Further, when movants-intervenors filed
their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010 onJune 18, 2010, the Decision of February 10,
2010 had already become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
Aside from urging the Court to take a hard look on the
first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors, the
ponente also wants the Court to consider his arguments for a
reconsideration of the Decision in this case.
The ponente states that the Court must bear in mind
that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient
administration and capability to deliver basic services, and the
criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code, i.e., income,
population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these
results. He adds that in this light, Congress, in its collective
wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these
three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy
preferential consideration. The ponente calls the attention of
the majority to the primordial criterion of economic viability in
the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, as intended by the framers of R.A. No. 7160.
The argument of the ponente has been discussed in his
earlier Dissenting Opinion. It must be pointed out that from the
congressional debates cited by the ponente, the framers of R.A.
No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 finally came
out with the end result, that is, Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160,
which is the basis for the creation of a province. Section 461
of R.A. No. 7160 provides: HICEca
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least
two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National
Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do
not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.
Thus, the requisites for the creation of a province, as
provided by R.A. No. 7160, is an annual income of not less than
P20 million and either a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau, or a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office. As the wordings of the law are plain
and clear, compliance with the territorial requirement or
population requirement cannot be made light of or disregarded.
In this case, R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands failed to comply with either the territorial or the
population requirement of the Local Government Code. The
Court stated in its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, thus:
As the law-making branch of the government,
indeed, it was the Legislature that imposed the
criteria for the creation of a province as
contained in Sec. 461 of the Local Government
Code. No law has yet been passed amending
Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code, so only
the criteria stated therein are the bases for the
creation of a province. The Constitution clearly
mandates that the criteria in the Local
Government Code must be followed in the
creation of a province; hence, any derogation of
or deviation from the criteria prescribed in
the Local Government Code violates Section 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.
 Further, the ponente states that the provisions of
both R.A. No. 7160 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC-IRR) show that with
respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and
provinces, the three indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land
area, are provided for. He points out that the exemption from
the land area requirement when the local government unit to
be created consists of one (1) or more islands is expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 and
the LGC-IRR with respect to the creation of municipalities and
component cities, respectively, but the exemption is absent in
the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province
under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, but is expressly stated
under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
The ponente opines that there does not appear any
rhyme or reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. He stated that considering
the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is
a greater likelihood that islands or groups of islands would form
part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most
cities or municipalities. According to the ponente, it is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy
decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and
Section 450 (for cities) of R.A. No. 7160, but was inadvertently
omitted in Section 461 (for provinces).
The ponente submits that when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion
was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section
461 of R.A. No. 7160 — and reflect the true legislative intent;
thus, it would be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of
Article 9 (2), LGC-IRR.
The ponente also submits that Article 9 (2) of the LGC-
IRR amounts to an executive construction of the provisions,
policies, and principles of R.A. No. 7160, entitled to great
weight and respect. He contends that it is actually a detail
expressly provided by the Oversight Committee to fill in the
void, honest mistake and oversight committed by Congress in
Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, taking into account the spirit and
intent of the law.
The ponente's argument does not persuade. The Local
Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992, so 19
years have lapsed since its enactment. If the Legislature
committed the "congressional oversight in Section 461 of R.A.
No. 7160" as alleged by Justice Nachura, it would have
amended Section 461, which is a function of Congress.
Substantial "oversights" in the basic law, particularly as alleged
with respect to Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, cannot be
corrected in the implementing rules thereof, as it is settled rule
that the implementing rules of the basic law cannot go beyond
the scope of the basic law. aTcSID
Moreover, it should be pointed out that a province is
"composed of a cluster of municipalities, or municipalities and
component cities," 21 and, therefore, has a bigger land area
than that of a municipality and a city, as provided by law. It is
noted that the former Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) did not provide for a required land area in
the creation of a municipality and a city, but provided for a
required land area in the creation of a province, which is 3,500
square kilometers, now lessened to 2,000 square kilometers in
the present Local Government Code. If only the income matters
in the creation of a province, then there would be no need for
the distinctions in the population and land area requirements
provided for a municipality, city and province in the
present Local Government Code. It may be stated that unlike a
municipality and a city, the territorial requirement of a province
contained in Section 461 22 of the Local Government
Code follows the general rule in Section 7, Chapter 2
(entitled General Powers and Attributes of Local Government
Units) of the same Code, thus:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general
rule, the creation of a local government unit or
its conversion from one level to another level
shall be based on verifiable indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
(a) Income. — It must be sufficient, based on
acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its
population, as expected of the local government
unit concerned;
(b) Population. — It shall be determined as the
total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit
concerned; and
(c) Land area. — It must be contiguous, unless
it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit
independent of the others; properly identified
by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such
basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall
be attested to by the Department of Finance
(DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and
the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). 23
Moreover, the argument that Article 9 (2) of the LGC-
IRR amounts to an executive construction of the provisions,
policies, and principles of R.A. No. 7160, entitled to great
weight and respect, citing the case of Galarosa v.
Valencia, 24 has already been ruled upon in the Decision dated
February 10, 2010, thus:
Further, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, the Office of
the Solicitor General contends that the IRRs
issued by the Oversight Committee composed of
members of the legislative and executive
branches of the government are entitled to
great weight and respect, as they are in the
nature of executive construction.
The case is not in point. In Galarosa, the issue
was whether or not Galarosa could continue to
serve as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan beyond June 30, 1992, the date when the
term of office of the elective members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon expired.
Galarosa was the incumbent president of
the Katipunang Bayan or Association
ofBarangay Councils (ABC) of the Municipality
of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon; and was
appointed as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon pursuant toExecutive
Order No. 342 in relation to Section 146 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local
Government Code.
Section 494 of the Local Government Code of
1991 states that the duly elected presidents of
the liga [ng mga barangay] at the municipal,
city and provincial levels, including the
component cities and municipalities of
Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex
officio members of the sangguniang bayan,
sangguniang panglungsod, and sangguniang
panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as
such only during their term of office as
presidents of the liga chapters which, in no case,
shall be beyond the term of office of
thesanggunian concerned. The section,
however, does not fix the specific duration of
their term as liga president. The Court held that
this was left to the by-laws of the liga pursuant
to Article 211(g) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991. Moreover, there was no indication that
Sections 491 and 494 should be given
retroactive effect to adversely affect the
presidents of the ABC; hence, the said
provisions were to be applied prospectively.
The Court stated that there is no law that
prohibits ABC presidents from holding over as
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. On the
contrary, the IRR, prepared and issued by the
Oversight Committee upon specific mandate of
Section 533 of the Local Government Code,
expressly recognizes and grants the hold-over
authority to the ABC presidents under Article
210, Rule XXIX. The Court upheld the application
of the hold-over doctrine in the provisions of the
IRR and the issuances of the DILG, whose
purpose was to prevent a hiatus in the
government pending the time when the
successor may be chosen and inducted into
office. HSaCcE
The Court held that Section 494 of the Local
Government Code could not have been
intended to allow a gap in the representation of
the barangays, through the presidents of the
ABC, in the sanggunian. Since the term of office
of the punong barangays elected in the March
28, 1989 election and the term of office of the
presidents of the ABC had not yet expired, and
taking into account the special role conferred
upon, and the broader powers and functions
vested in the barangays by the Code, it was
inferred that the Code never intended to
deprive the barangays of their representation in
the sangguniang bayan during the interregnum
when the liga had yet to be formally organized
with the election of its officers.
Under the circumstances prevailing in Galarosa,
the Court considered the relevant provisions in
the IRR formulated by the Oversight Committee
and the pertinent issuances of the DILG in the
nature of executive construction, which were
entitled to great weight and respect.
Courts determine the intent of the law from the
literal language of the law within the law's four
corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear
and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms. If a literal
application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort
to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like
the legislative history of the law, or may
consider the implementing rules and regulations
and pertinent executive issuances in the nature
of executive construction.
In this case, the requirements for the creation of
a province contained in Section 461 of the Local
Government Code are clear, plain and
unambiguous, and its literal application does
not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence, the
provision in Article 9(2) of the IRR exempting a
proposed province composed of one or more
islands from the land-area requirement cannot
be considered an executive construction of the
criteria prescribed by the Local Government
Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended
by the Local Government Code, and is,
therefore, null and void.
The ponente also stated that it may be well to
remember basic policy considerations underpinning the
principle of local autonomy, and cited Section 2, R.A. No. 7160,
which provides:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — (a) It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State
shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end,
the State shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and
resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the
local government units.
Indeed, the policy of the State is that "the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals."
However, it must stressed that in the creation of the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State, the
requirements provided by the Local Government Code must
also be complied with, which R.A. No. 9355 failed to do.
Further, the ponente states that consistent with the
declared policy to provide local government units local
autonomy, he submits that the territory, contiguity and
minimum land area requirements for prospective local
government units should be construed liberally in order to
achieve the desired results. He adds that this liberal
interpretation is more appropriate, taking into account the
rules on construction of the LGC, viz.:
SEC. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
xxx xxx xxx
 (c) The general welfare provisions in
this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more
powers to local government
units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading
the quality of life for the
people in the community;
The ponente seeks for a liberal interpretation as
regards the territorial requirement in the creation of a province
based on the rules of interpretation of the general welfare
provisions of the Local Government Code. General welfare is
clarified in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, thus:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The Local Government Code provides that it is "[t]he
general welfare provisions in this Code which shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality
of life for the people in the community." Nowhere is it stated
therein that the provisions for the creation of a local
government unit, the province in particular, should be liberally
interpreted. Moreover, since the criteria for the creation of a
province under the Local Government Code are clear, there is
no room for interpretation, but only application.
To reiterate, the constitutional basis for the creation of
a province is laid down in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides that no province may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. The criteria for the creation of a
province are found in Section 461 of the Local Government
Code. Moreover, Section 6 of the Local Government
Code provides that "[a] local government unit may be created . .
. by law enacted by congress in the case of a province . . .
subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Code."
Based on the criteria for the creation of a province
provided for in Section 461 of the Local Government, the Court
found that R.A. No. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands failed to comply with the population or territorial
requirement; hence, R.A. No. 9355 was declared
unconstitutional.
The Decision in this case was promulgated on February
10, 2010. The motions for reconsideration of the Decision was
denied on May 12, 2010. The Decision of February 10, 2010
became final and executory on May 18, 2010, as evidenced by
the Entry of Judgment 25 issued by the Clerk of Court. Movants-
intervenors filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File
and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 only on June 18, 2010, or after
the resolution of the case and one month after the Decision in
this case already became final and executory. Hence, the Court
properly denied the said motion. EHSIcT
The ponente contends that there is an imperative to
grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment filed on
October 29, 2010 by movants-intervenors for the simple reason
that the Entry of Judgment was prematurely issued on October
5, 2010 in view of the pendency of the movants-intervenor's
motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution,
which was filed on September 7, 2010.
I cannot agree with such contention. Although Entry of
Judgment was made on October 5, 2010, it must be borne in
mind that the Decision in this case became final and executory
on May 18, 2010, as evidenced by the Entry of
Judgment 26 issued by the Clerk of Court. If the Court follows
Section 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, the date of finality of
the judgment is deemed to be the date of its entry, thus:
Sec. 2. Entry of judgments and final orders. — If
no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided
in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of
entries of judgments. The date of finality of the
judgment or final order shall be deemed to be
the date of its entry. The record shall contain
the dispositive part of the judgment or final
order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a
certificate that such judgment of final order has
become final and executory.
The amendment in Section 2 above makes finality and
entry simultaneous by operation of law, and eliminates the
confusion and guesswork whenever the parties could not have
access, for one reason or another, to the Book of Entries of
Judgments. 27 It also avoids the usual problem where the
physical act of writing out the entry is delayed by neglect or
sloth. 28
In addition, the Court properly denied on July 20, 2010
the movants-intervenors' Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, since it was filed after the
resolution of the case and after the Decision in this case had
become final and executory on May 18, 2010. With the denial
of the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010, the movants-intervenors' did not have legal
standing to intervene; hence, their motion for reconsideration
of the July 20, 2010 Resolution has no bearing on the validity of
the Entry of Judgment that was recorded in the Book of Entries
of Judgments on October 5, 2010. Therefore, the Entry of
Judgment cannot be recalled on the ground of pendency of the
movants-intervenor's motion for reconsideration of the July 20,
2010 Resolution.
Since movants-intervenors' Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 was
denied in the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the motion for
reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution filed on
September 7, 2010 by movants-intervenors was recommended
to also be denied, but has yet to be acted on by the Court.
Further, on October 22, 2010, respondent New
Province of Dinagat Islands, represented by Governor Geraldine
Ecleo-Villaroman, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (To resolve
Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration and, to set aside Entry of Judgment).
Respondent admitted that it filed the Motion for Leave of Court
to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration on May 26, 2010,
twelve (12) days after receipt of the Resolution dated May 12,
2010 denying respondents' motion for reconsideration.
It should be pointed out that the Court has acted on
respondent New Province of Dinagat Islands' Motion for Leave
of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration and the
aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration, which were filed on May
26, 2010 (after the Decision had become final and executory on
May 18, 2010), in the Court's Resolution dated June 26, 2010.
Treated as a second motion for reconsideration of the Decision,
which is disallowed, the Court resolved to note without action
the said motions in view of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010
denying the motions for reconsideration of the February 10,
2010 Decision. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Courtstates:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No
second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party
shall be entertained.
As the decision in this case became final and executory
on May 18, 2010, the decision is unalterable. In Gomez v.
Correa, 29 the Court held:
It is settled that when a final judgment is
executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine
is founded on considerations of public policy
and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments must become final at some
definite point in time. HASTCa
The only recognized exceptions are the
correction of clerical errors or the making of so-
called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there
is no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void.
To stress, the motion for reconsideration filed by
movants-intervenors on the denial of the motion for
intervention should have been denied since to grant the same
would be tantamount to reopening a case which is already final.
Worse, movants-intervenors are not even original parties to the
present case and therefore are not in a position to file a motion
to recall a judgment which is already final and executory.
In view of the foregoing, I maintain that the movants-
intervenors' Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010, which was filed only on June 18, 2010 or
after resolution of the case and after the Decision of February
10, 2010 had become final and executory on May 18, 2010, was
properly denied in the Resolution dated July 20, 2010.
Consequently, I maintain my stand that movants-intervenor's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20,
2010, which motion was filed on September 7, 2010, be denied
for lack of merit. Further, it is recommended that movants-
intervenors' Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment filed on
October 29, 2010, and the Omnibus Motion (To resolve Motion
for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration
and to set aside Entry of Judgment) filed on October 22, 2010 by
respondent New Province of Dinagat Islands, represented by
Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, be likewise denied for
lack of merit.
DEL CASTILLO, J., concurring:
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For
great cases are called great not by reason of
their real importance in shaping the law of the
future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which
appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment. These immediate interests exercise a
kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before
which even well settled principles of law will
bend.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Northern Securities Co. v. United States 1
On the abstract principles which govern courts
in construing legislative acts, no difference of
opinion can exist. It is only in the application of
those principles that the difference discovers
itself.
Chief Justice John Marshall
United States v. Fisher 2
Considering the circumstances which supervened after
the promulgation of the Decision on February 10, 2010 and
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, I find myself reconsidering my
previous position. Mr. Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura has
himself identified factors not previously considered by this
Court, which, in my view, warrant a reversal of our previous
rulings.
The case before us concerns the proper interpretation
of Section 461 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, also known as
the Local Government Code (LGC), which prescribes the criteria
for the creation of a province as follows:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers as
certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do
 not contribute to the income of the
province. IECcAT
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income. 3(Underscoring supplied)
To implement the provisions of the LGC, the Oversight
Committee (created pursuant to Sec. 533 of the LGC)
formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations to carry
out the provisions of the law. Article 9 of said Rules and
Regulations provides:
Art. 9. Provinces. — (a) Requisites for
Creation. — A province shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and
either population or land area are present:
(i) Income — An average annual income of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
for the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, as certified by the DOF. The average
annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring
income; and
(ii) Population or land area — Population shall
not be less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or
land area which must be contiguous with an
area of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city
or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds.
Since our May 12, 2010 ruling (which denied
respondents' respective Motions for Reconsideration), the
Office of the Solicitor General (representing the Republic of the
Philippines) and Gov. Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman (representing
the new Province of the Dinagat Islands), each sought leave to
file a Second Motion for Reconsideration on May 27, 2010 and
May 26, 2010, respectively, which motions were noted without
action. The winning candidates for provincial and congressional
seats in Surigao del Norte also sought to intervene in this case;
however, their motion for intervention was denied on July 20,
2010.
Subsequent to the Motions for Reconsideration,
Justice Nachura has taken pains to compare the requisites for
the creation of the different local government units (LGUs) in
order to highlight what, in my view, is a glaring inconsistency in
the provisions of the law. To summarize:
LGULand Area Requirement
BarangayNo minimum land area requirement. Rather, the
barangay must
be created out of a contiguous territory with a population of at
least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants [Sec. 386 (a), LGC]
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands. [Sec. 386 (b), LGC]
MunicipalityContiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers
Note — the land area requirement is IN ADDITION to the
income
requirement of at least Two Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (PhP2,500,000.00) in average annual income for the last 2
consecutive years AND the population requirement of at least
Twenty Five Thousand (25,000) inhabitants. [Sec. 442(a), LGC]
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises
two (2) or more islands. [Sec. 442(b), LGC]
CityContiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers
Note — a city must have an average annual income of at least
Twenty Million Pesos (PhP20,000,000.00) for the last 2
consecutive years AND comply with either the land area
requirement OR have a population of at least one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants. [Sec. 450 (a), LGC]
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands. [Sec 450 (b), LGC]
ProvinceContiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square
kilometers.
Note — a province must have an average annual income of at
least Twenty Million Pesos (PhP20,000,000.00) AND comply
with either the land area requirement OR have a population of
at
least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants. [Sec.
461 (a), LGC] jurcda
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province. [Sec. 461 (b),
LGC]
As Justice Nachura points out, as regards the creation
of barangays, land area is not included as a requirement.
However, a minimum land area is provided for the creation of
municipalities, cities, and provinces. Furthermore, while an
exemption 4 is provided for municipalities and cities in cases
where the LGU concerned is composed of one or more islands,
in stark contrast, no such exemption exists with respect to
provinces.
It is not difficult to see why no exemption is needed
for barangays — why exempt them from a requirement that
does not even apply to them? In fact, the inclusion of the clause
"[t]he territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands" in Sec. 386 (b) of the LGC appears to be
surplusage. But I cannot see why there would be a difference in
treatment between cities and municipalities, on one hand, and
provinces, on the other. In fact, as Justice Nachura points out,
this may lead to anomalous results. This leads me to conclude
that Justice Nachura's interpretation is indeed correct — that
the legislature fully intended to exempt LGUs from the land
area requirement in cases where the LGU concerned
encompassed two or more islands, as provided in Section 442
(for municipalities) and Section 450 (for cities), but this
legislative policy was not carried over to Section 461 (for
provinces). Consequently, Article 9 (2) of the LGC's
Implementing Rules and Regulations were precisely enacted in
order to correct the congressional oversight.
Our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta, suggests that this interpretation is implausible because
even if there were any such oversight, Congress had every
opportunity in the last 19 years to correct its mistake. To this I
would only observe that Congress has never, in the last 19
years, been faced with a situation where an amendment to
Section 461 of the LGC was necessary or desirable, and no case
concerning the land area requirement for provinces has ever
been brought before this Court since the LGC's
enactment. 5 The only case that has mentioned the land area
requirement for provinces, Tan v. Commission on
Elections, 6 (regarding the invalidation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 885 which created the province of Negros Del Norte)
dealt with the matter only tangentially, at best. 7
Justice Peralta also opines that there is no need to
search for the legislative intent, since the language of the law is
plain, clear, and unambiguous. I would submit, however, that it
is equally true that the statute must be read as a whole, that its
clauses and phrases are not detached and isolated expressions,
but that each and every part must be considered in order to
ascertain its meaning. 8
Therefore, the statute, read as a whole, in the
light of its legislative history, cannot be said to
preclude the interpretation placed on it by the
majority. But in interpreting a statute [such as
the Local Government Code], we cannot take
one sentence, one section, or even the entire
statute alone and say that it has a "plain
meaning" as if there were an objective formula
in the few words simply waiting to be grasped
by the courts. Instead the statute must be read
as a whole, taking all of its provisions and
reading them in the context of the legal fabric to
which they are to be applied. An interpretation
that creates an admittedly anomalous result is
not salved by the majority's apologia that, if we
read the statute in that fashion, Congress
created the anomaly. Instead the question is
whether the statute read as a whole was
intended by Congress to create such results. The
law is not an isolated bundle of capricious and
inconsistent commands by a legislature
presumed to react mindlessly. 9
It is also relevant that the Senate and the House of
Representatives, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, have asserted that Congress intended that provinces CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
composed of one or more islands should be exempted from the Six also.
2,000 sq. km. land area requirement. Surely, the legislature's CHAIRMAN LINA:
will in this case should be given deference, as a co-equal branch
It seems with a minimum number of towns?
of government operating within its area of constitutional
authority. CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
I also cannot help but note that the Dinagat Islands is The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand,
not the first small island-province which has been separated not even one congressional district.
from a larger province through legislative imprimatur. The But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is
Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the island- Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga
provinces of Batanes (previously annexed to ako ngayon.
Cagayan), 10 Camiguin (previously a sub-province of Misamis CHAIRMAN LINA:
Oriental), 11 Siquijor (previously a sub-province of Negros Camiguin, Camiguin.
Oriental), 12 Biliran (previously a sub-province of CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
Leyte), 13 Guimaras (previously a sub-province of Iloilo), 14 and
That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities,
Marinduque (previously annexed to Tayabas) 15 also have land
with a population of 63 thousand. But
areas of well below 1,000 square kilometers each. HaTAEc
we do not hold it against the province
To be clear, I am not making an equal protection because maybe that's one stimulant
argument, since none of these provinces were created under where growth can grow, can start. The
the auspices of the LGC. I only point this out to show that land area for Camiguin is only 229
Congress, in drafting the LGC, was cognizant of the special square kilometers. So if we hard fast on
circumstances surrounding the creation of island-provinces, and requirements of, we set a minimum for
evidently intended that economic development be a more every province, palagay ko we just
significant consideration than size. The Congressional leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway,
deliberations bear this out: the Constitution is very clear that in
CHAIRMAN LINA: case we would like to divide, we submit
Will you look at the case of — how many it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang
municipalities are there in Batanes tao. Kung maglalagay tayo
province? ng set ng minimum, tila yata
mahihirapan tayo eh. Because what is
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
really the thrust of the Local
Batanes is only six.
Government Code? Growth. To devolve
CHAIRMAN LINA: powers in order for the community to
Six town. Siquijor? have its own idea how they will
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR: stimulate growth in their respective
areas.
Siquijor. It is region?
CHAIRMAN LINA: So in every geographical condition, mayroong
Seven. sariling idiosyncrasies eh. We cannot
make a generalization. 16
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR:
Though this Court certainly has the authority to
Seven. Anim. override the legislative interpretation, I do not believe it is
CHAIRMAN LINA: appropriate or necessary in this instance. Rather, we should
Six also. acknowledge the "strong presumption that a legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own
people [and] that its laws are directed to problems made
manifest by experience." 17
I do not propose that the Court overturn its settled
precedent to the effect that Implementing Rules and
Regulations cannot go beyond the terms of the statute. But
under these limited circumstances — where a reading of the
entire law reveals inconsistencies which this Court must
reconcile, where the legislature has informed the Court of its
intentions in drafting the law, and where the legislative history
of the LGC leads one to the inescapable conclusion that the
primary consideration in the creation of provinces is actually
administrative convenience, economic viability, and capacity for
development — then it would be far more just to give effect to
the will of the legislature in this case. cAaDCE
In the words of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a
law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws
that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and
the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not
and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these
words import a policy that goes beyond them."
While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the
law in such a way as to reflect the will of the
legislature. While we may not read into the law
a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the
letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a
statute determines its construction,
hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent. For
what is within the spirit is within the
letter but although it is not within the
letter thereof, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Stated differently, a
thing which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter; and a thing which
is within the letter of the statute is not
within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers. 18
For these reasons, I thus concur in the opinion of
Justice Nachura.
ABAD, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the resolution that Justice Antonio
Eduardo Nachura wrote for the majority. I would want,
however, to reply briefly to the somewhat harsh criticism
hurled against the Court in connection with its action.
The Court is accused of "flip-flopping" in this case as in
the others before it, specifically the case of the sixteen
municipalities that Congress converted into cities. Since the
Court is a collegial body, the implication is that its members or
the majority collectively flip-flopped in their decisions.
But, as I said in my concurring opinion in the Court's
April 12, 2011 resolution in the League of Cities case, 1 the
charge is unfair, as it is baseless. The Court is not a living person
whose decisions and actions are ruled by the whims of one
mind. As a collegial body, the Court acts by consensus among its
fifteen members.
In the League of Cities, 2 neither all the Justices nor
most of them did a somersault as implicitly suggested. Congress
passed a number of laws converting sixteen municipalities into
cities. The League of Cities assailed these laws as
unconstitutional on the ground that the sixteen municipalities
involved did not meet the P100 million minimum income
requirement of the Local Government Code. For their part, the
municipalities countered that their laws constituted valid
legislative amendments of such requirement.
The Court originally voted in the case on November 18,
2008. A majority of six Justices voted to annul the laws, five
members dissented, and four took no part (6-5-4). The lead of
those who voted to annul the laws firmed up with an increase
of 2 votes when the Court took up the motion for
reconsideration of the sixteen municipalities on March 31,
2009. The vote was 7-5-2.
But when on April 28, 2009 the Court acted on the
sixteen municipalities' second motion for reconsideration, the
vote resulted in a tie, 6-6-3. The Court was divided in its
interpretation of this 6-6 result. One group argued that the
failure of the minority to muster a majority vote had the effect
of maintaining the Court's last ruling. Some argued, however,
that since the Constitution required a majority vote for
declaring laws passed by Congress unconstitutional, the new
voting restored the constitutionality of the subject laws. When
a re-voting took place on December 21, 2009 to clear up the
issue, the result shifted in favor of upholding the
constitutionality of the laws of the sixteen municipalities, 6-4-3
(2 vacancies), with the new majority voting to uphold the
constitutionality of the laws that converted the sixteen
municipalities into cities. IESTcD
But when the Court voted on the motion for
reconsideration of the losing League of Cities on August 24,
2010, the majority shifted anew on a vote of 7-6-2. The sixteen
municipalities filed a motion for reconsideration of the new
decision and voting took place on February 15, 2011, resulting
in a vote of 7-6-2 in favor of again upholding the
constitutionality of the laws of the sixteen municipalities.
 To repeat what I said in my concurring opinion in the Six. It did not help that in one year alone in 2009,
League of Cities, 3 those who say that the Court, acting through seven Justices retired and were replaced by an equal number. It
its members, flipped-flopped in the League of Cities case should is such that the resulting change in the combinations of minds
consider the following: produced multiple shifts in the outcomes of the voting. No law
One. The Justices did not on each occasion simply or rule requires succeeding Justices to adopt the views of their
decide to change their minds. There were pending motions for predecessors. Indeed, preordained conformity is anathema to a
reconsideration in the case and the Justices had a duty to vote democratic system.
on them on the dates the matters came up for decision. In this Dinagat Islands case the vote changed when,
The Court is no orchestra with its members playing one acting on the intervention of a third party with genuine interest
tune under the baton of a maestro. They bring with them a in the outcome of the case, the majority in the Court was
diversity of views, which is what the Constitutionprizes, for it is persuaded to change its mind and uphold the act of Congress in
this diversity that filters out blind or dictated conformity. creating the province. The previous voting was too close and it
Two. Of twenty-three Justices who voted in the case at took the vote of just two Justices, changing their previous
any of its various stages, twenty stood by their original positions, to ensnare the victory from those who oppose the
positions. They never reconsidered their views. Only three did conversion of the Dinagat Islands into a province.
so and not on the same occasion, showing no wholesale change Neither the Court nor its Justices flip-flopped in this
of votes at any time. case. They did not take one position, later moved to the
Three. To flip-flop means to vote for one proposition opposite position, and then reverted to the first. They merely
at first (take a stand), shift to the opposite proposition upon exercised their right to reconsider an erroneous ruling.
the second vote (flip), and revert to his first position upon the The charge of flip-flopping is unfair.
third (flop). Not one of the twenty-three Justices flipped- ||| (Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050 (Resolution), [April 12,
flopped. 2011], 663 PHIL 546-665)
Four. The three Justices who changed their votes did
not do so in one direction. Justice Velasco changed his vote
from a vote to annul to a vote to uphold; Justice Villarama from
a vote to uphold to a vote to annul; and Justice Mendoza from a
vote to annul to a vote to uphold. None of them flipped-flopped
since the three never changed their votes afterwards.
Notably, no one can dispute the right of a judge, acting
on a motion for reconsideration that the losing party files, to
change his mind regarding the case. The rules are cognizant of
the fact that human judges could err and that it would merely
be fair and right for them to correct their perceived errors upon
a motion for reconsideration. Even God, who had decided to
destroy the Israelites for worshipping a golden calf,
reconsidered after Moses stood in the gap for them. 4
Five. Evidently, the voting in the League of Cities is not
a case of massive flip-flopping by the Justices of the Court.
Rather, it is a case of tiny shifts in the votes, occasioned by the
consistently slender margin that one view held over the other.
This reflected the nearly even soundness of the opposing
advocacies of the contending sides.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26406. October 31, 1969.]
AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, INCORPORATED, petitioner-
appellant, vs. JOSE B. LINGAD, Secretary of
Labor and RUBEN F. SANTOS, Director, Bureau
of Labor Standards, respondents-appellees.
Benjamin S. Benito for petitioner-appellant.
Villavieja & Villanueva a for respondents-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE; SECTION
19 OF R.A. No. 602 TO BE INTERPRETED IN CONFORMITY WITH
SUCH PRINCIPLE. — Petitioner-appellant believes that Section 19
of R.A. No. 602, particularly that portion prohibiting the reduction of
wages paid to employees in excess of the minimum wage
established in the Act or supplements theretofore granted to
employees only refers and applies to employers in business prior to
and at the time of enactment of R.A. No. 602 and that the
prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements in Section 19
of said Republic Act should not be applied prospectively to
employers coming into existence subsequent to the effective date of
said R.A. No. 602, and that despite the passage of R.A. No. 4180,
such interpretation is not altered since said R.A. No. 4180 amended
only Section 3 of R.A. No. 602 in the amendatory Act. Such
construction is in collision with the constitutional command
pursuant to the social justice principle that the government extend
protection to labor. If the interpretation offered by appellant would
be considered acceptable, then there would be a negation of the
purpose of the amendatory act increasing the minimum wage law.
That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than foster its policy.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORD "NOW" AND PHRASE "FURNISH ON THE DATE
OF ENACTMENT." — In connection with the use of the word "now"
and the phrase "furnish on the date of enactment" appellant would
have this Court accept the view that as it began business after
the Minimum Wage Law was enacted in 1951, the safeguard in said
Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 that would preclude any evasion thereof
becomes nugatory because of the presence therein of the word
"now" which for appellant, would have the effect of limiting its
application only to business establishments existing as of the date of
its effectivity on April 6, 1951. Such view pays no heed to the
constitutional command of protection to labor or to assure that the
legislative purpose be attained. It would defy common sense. It best
amounts to a manifestation of verbal ingenuity but hardly satisfies
the test of rationality on which law must be based.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DUTY OF COURTS. — Courts are not
to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequence. It is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
What the Constitution ordains in its avowed principle
of the promotion of social justice 1 and the explicit mandate of
protection to labor 2 was once again given concrete expression
in a statute of recent date increasing the minimum
wage. 3 Thus, for industrial establishments, a six pesos (P6.00)
daily wage is now the law, a two-peso (2.00) increase. 4 In view
of its explicit language, it would be difficult for a business firm
so minded to escape its operation directly, whether its
employees are paid on a daily or a monthly basis. Likewise, an
attempt to do so has been forestalled by a provision found in
the original Minimum Wage Law which prohibits an employer
from "reducing the wage now paid to any of his employees in
excess of the minimum wage established under [the Act] or in
reducing supplements furnished on the date of
enactment." 5 In this action for declaratory relief, petitioner-
appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company,
Incorporated would seek to construe the above section to
enable it to reduce its liability for its monthly paid employees
from P180.00 to P152.00, by paying them at the rate of six days
a week from Monday to Saturday computed at the rate of the
minimum daily wage.
The lower court was not sympathetic to such a plea. Hence, this
appeal from its decision. It ought to have known better. No court
could indulge in such an unworthy objective especially when sought
to be attained by advancing arguments of the flimsiest and most
insubstantial character. We affirm.
In the petition for declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor,
Jose B. Lingad and the then Director of the Bureau of Labor
Standards, Ruben P. Santos being named as respondents, appellant
Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated alleged that
it was duly incorporated on January 5, 1961 and that from the start
of its operation, its employees were paid on a daily and monthly
basis. 6 It there noted that on April 21, 1965 the aforesaid
amendatory act took effect and that respondents Secretary of Labor
and the Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards construed its
provision "in such a way as to require the petitioner to increase the
salaries of all the monthly paid employees of the petitioner to a
minimum of P180.00 (not P152.00) which according to them is the
applicable minimum wage rate for the monthly paid employees of
petitioner." 7
After an allegation that it had already increased the salaries of its
monthly paid employees to a minimum of P152.00 a month, in
accordance with its own interpretation of the act, it sought to justify
its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin of respondents
requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for
employees paid on a monthly basis in this wise: "That the petitioner
believes that Section 19 of Republic Act No. 602 particularly that
portion prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to employees in
excess of the minimum wage established in the Act or supplements
theretofore granted to employees only refers and applies to
employers in business prior to and at the time of enactment of
said Republic Act No. 602 and that the prohibition thereof against
reduction of supplements as envisioned in Section 19 of Republic
Act No. 602 should not be applied prospectively to employers
coming into existence subsequent to the effective date of
said Republic Act No. 602. This belief has not been altered despite
the passage of the Amendatory Act namely Republic Act No.
4180 particularly so because the latter act only amended one
section, i.e., Section 3 of Republic Act No. 602 and it did not in any
way repeal in its entirety said Republic Act No. 602. Furthermore,
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 602 has not been reenacted in the
Amendatory Act 4180 and for the Bureau of Labor now to construe
the Amendatory Act in such a way as to require petitioner to
increase, by compulsion, the salaries of its monthly paid employees
to a minimum of P180.00 due to a customary practice of the
petitioner in considering unworked Sundays and legal holidays as a
paid day, would be beyond the clear and express provisions of the
law and constitutes legislation by the Bureau of Labor." 8
As noted, the lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: "Section
2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides that 'Any provision of law previously
enacted on the subject matter of this Act that is inconsistent with
any provision of this Act is hereby repealed.' Section 19 of R.A. No.
602 not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 has not been
repealed; on the other hand, the provisions of Section 19 of R.A. No.
602 not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 were deemed and
impliedly reenacted. Furthermore, according to Article 1702 of the
Civil Code, 'In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living
for the laborer.' This is in consonance with the intention of Congress
to protect the minimum wage of laborers. Both Section 19 of R.A.
No. 602 prohibiting the reduction of supplements granted to
employees and the minimum wage of P6.00 a day and R.A. No.
4180 are for the purpose of securing a 'decent living for the
laborer." 9 In the dispositive portion of the decision, it was declared
"that Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 is applicable to the petitioner in
connection with the enforcement of the provisions of R.A. No.
4180." 10
From such a decision, this appeal was taken to us. It cannot prosper.
The lower court decided the matter correctly. It cannot be reversed.
1. To state the construction sought to be fastened on the clear and
explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision
with the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice
principle that the government extend protection to labor. On the
one hand, appellant would recognize that the increase in minimum
wage was so legislatively decreed. On the other, it would impute to
the same enactment, without any support in the statutory language,
a means whereby to frustrate in part such commendable legislative
objective. No such intent could rightfully be imputed to Congress.
Moreover, to cast a suspicion that such a form of evasion was
legislative willed may even raise serious constitutional doubts. For it
is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising from a
legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so
construed that no question as to its conformity with what the
fundamental law requires need arise. Apparently, appellant is
unaware of such a basic postulate, or, if aware; is not inclined to
accord it deference. It cannot expect approbation from any court,
much less from this Tribunal.
2. Even if the plain legislative purpose so evident on the face of the
statute is not to vitalize and implement what the Constitution
enjoins, still there is no escape from an equally authoritative
principle of statutory construction that bars acceptance on what
appellant would foist upon the judiciary as an acceptable
interpretation. As noted in the recent case of Sarcos v.
Castillo: 11 "It is fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the
law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the
judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, decided in 1909, it has been our
constant holding that the choice between conflicting theories falls
on that which best accords with the letter of the law and with its
purpose. The next year, in an equally leading decision, United States
v. Toribio, there was a caveat against a construction that would tend
'to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator.' Then came the
admonition in Riera v. Palmaroli, against an application so narrow "The fact that the construction placed upon the statute by the
'as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator.' This was appellants would lead to an absurdity is another argument for
repeated in the latest case, Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex, in rejecting it . . ." 16
almost identical language." It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered avoid such a deplorable result. That has long been a judicial
acceptable, then there would be a negation of the above purpose of function. 17 A literal reading of a legislative act which could be thus
the amendatory act increasing the minimum wage law. That would characterized is to be avoided if the language thereof can be given a
be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster its policy. It must be reasonable application consistent with the legislative purpose. 18 In
rejected. the apt language of Frankfurter: "A decent respect for the policy of
3. The futility of the appeal is thus apparent. The first two assigned Congress must save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not
errors that the lower court should not have relied on Article 1702 of disingenuous purpose." 19 Certainly, we must reject a construction
the Civil Code, which would require that in case of doubt all labor that at best amounts to a manifestation of verbal ingenuity but
legislation should be construed in favor of the safety and decent hardly satisfies the test of rationality on which law must be based.
living for the laborer and of the continuing of Section 19 prohibiting 4. It would not be easy to imagine an interpretation more clearly
any interpretation of the Minimum Wage Law that would justify the designed to circumvent the statute or more transparent. It did not
reduction of the wage then paid to any of its employees, obviously require the lower court too much effort to see through the scheme.
lack merit. It decided as it ought to having respect for the clear statutory
Much less could it be alleged that the lower court erred in purpose. We cannot reverse it.
disregarding the clear context of the above Section 19, particularly WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of March 30, 1966 is
the use of the word "now" and the phrase "furnish on the date of affirmed. With costs against appellant Automotive Parts &
enactment." What does it provide? "Nothing in this Act shall deprive Equipment Company, Incorporated.
an employee of the right to seek fair wages, shorter working hours ||| (Automotive Parts & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Lingad, G.R. No. L-26406,
and better working conditions nor justify an employer in violating [October 31, 1969], 140 PHIL 580-588)
any other labor law applicable to his employees, in reducing the
wage now paid to any of his employees in excess of the minimum
wage established under this Act, or in reducing supplements
furnished on the date of enactment." 12 Appellant thus would have
this Court accept the view that as it began business after
the Minimum Wage Law was enacted in 1951 the above safeguard
in the act that would preclude any evasion thereof becomes
nugatory because of the presence therein of the word "now", which
for appellant, would have the effect of limiting its application only to
business establishments existing as of the date of its effectivity on
April 6, 1951. Appellant apparently is in no mood to pay heed to the
constitutional command of protection to labor or to assure that the
legislative purpose be attained. It would defy common sense.
Nothing is better settled then that courts are not to give words a
meaning which would lead to absurd on unreasonable
consequence. 13 That is a principle that goes back to In re
Allen 14 decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a
literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results. That is a strong argument against its
adoption. 15 The words of justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5060. January 26, 1910.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS
TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SLAUGHTER OF LARGE
CATTLE. — Section 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147 construed.
2. ID.; ID. — Where the language of a statute is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect of the
manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be
rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions
of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator
sought of attain by its enactment.
3. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. — The
provisions of Act No. 1147 prohibiting and penalizing the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption which are fit for
"agricultural work and draft purposes," held to be a reasonable
and justifiable exercise of the sovereign police power of the
State, under the conditions existing in theses Islands.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
TO PUBLIC USE. — These provisions held not to constitute an
appropriation of private property interests to a "public use" so
as to bring them within the principles of the exercise by the
State of the right of eminent domain and to entitle the owners
to compensation, being no more than a just restraint of an
injurious private use of property.
5. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING USE OF THE
POLICE POWNER. — "To justify the State" in the exercise of its
sovereign police power "it must appear, first, that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the
means are reasonable necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."
(Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U. S., 133, 136.)
DECISION
CARSON, J p:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the
trial court that the appellant slaughter or caused to be
slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in
the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer
of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of
the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, and Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large
cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province
of Bohol, wherein the animal was and slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends
that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147
do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle
without a permit of the municipal treasurer.
Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act as follows:
"SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be
slaughter or killed for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse except upon permit secured
from the municipal treasurer. Before issuing the
permit for the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, the municipal treasurer
shall require for branded cattle the production
of the original certificate of ownership and
certificates of transfer showing title in the
person applying for the permit, and for
unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy
said treasurer as to the ownership of the
animals for which permit to slaughter has been
requested.
"SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter
carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for
agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in
no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for
food any animal of any kind which is not fit for
human consumption.
"SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall
keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued
by him, and such record shall show the name
and residence of the owner, and the class, sex
age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly
known as remolinos or cowlicks, and other
makes of identification of the animal for the
slaughter of which permit is issued and the date
be alphabetically arranged in the record,
together with date of permit.
"A copy of the record of permits
granted for slaughter shall be forwarded
monthly to the provincial treasurer, who shall
filed and properly index the same under the
name of the owner, together with date of
permit.
"SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption or killing for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon
permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less
than ten nor more than five hundred pesos,
Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not
less than one month nor more than six months,
or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court."
It is contended that the proper construction of the
language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in
section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for
food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the
municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal
slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is
applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit
in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition
contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle
for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and
specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty
provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit
duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to
the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
without such permit.
 It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent
language of these sections taken by itself and examined apart
from the context fairly admits of two constructions; one
whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be
taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered"
and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words
"slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption" and the words "killing for food" in the section 33;
and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal
slaughterhouse' may be taken as limiting and restricting merely
the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in
those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and
keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object
of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is
that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of
the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the
recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners, when
lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and
compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of
ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby
owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it
prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle
unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper
officer in the municipality where the contract of sale is made;
and it provides also for the disposition of estrays and animals
recovered from the possession of thieves or persons unlawfully
in possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All
this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one but the
rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or
to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this
elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it
does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each
separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely
impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were
permitted to be slaughtered for human consumption without
requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates
of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be
slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were slaughtered
privately or in a clandestine manner, outside of a municipal
slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, section 30 and 33
prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or
killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals
without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer and section
32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such
permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial
treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these
sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily
be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the
registry and record of the brands and marks of identification of
all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortive,
since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such
cattle could, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the
law by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses,
and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing
themselves to the danger of detection incident to the bringing
of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands
and other identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of
ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of
two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest
intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the
statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected
which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the
statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to
attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that
sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit
provided for in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the
express prohibition in these sections of the "killing for food at a
municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that
this prohibition is clearly included in the general prohibition of
the slaughter of such animals for human consumption
anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the
issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and specifically
mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid
all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the
municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the general
provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or
regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouses.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of
section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion. One of the
secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to
prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural
and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human
consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions
and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such
animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and
unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so
manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the
legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language
of the statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already
indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of
the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to
make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other
sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a
permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him on
the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work
or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant contends that the
statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption as food, without first
obtaining a permit which can not be produced in the event that
the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft
purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of
section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902),
which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel
whether his contention is that this provision of the statute
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of
the right of eminent domain without providing for the
compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But
whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion,
appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the
language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of
Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved
was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing
the taking or carrying away by any person, including the owner,
of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the
town of Chelsea), that the law in question "is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution,
but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights
of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit
condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal
rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests
of the community."
It may be conceded that the beneficial use and
exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners in
these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by
the provisions of the statute; and that, without inquiring what
quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle,
it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their
right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their
exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the
regulations in question were enacted for purely private
purposes, the statute, in so far as these regulations are
concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill relied on by appellant; but we are satisfied that it
is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and title
of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by the State of the
right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to
compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restraint of an
injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had
authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein
the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was
reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the
former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of
eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police
powers of the State, said:
"We think it is a settled principle,
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds
it under the implied liability that his use of it
may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property,
nor injurious to the rights of the community. . .
Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restraints and regulations
established by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them
by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient.
"This is very different from the right of
eminent domain, the right of a government to
take and appropriate private property to public
use, whenever the public exigency requires it;
which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonable compensation therefor.
The power we allude to is rather the police
power, the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same.
"It is much easier to perceive and
realize the existence and sources of this power
than to mark its boundaries or prescribe limits
to its exercise."
Applying these principles, we are of opinion that the
restraint placed by the law on the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft
purposes is not an appropriation of property interests to a
"public use," and is not, therefore, within the principles of the
exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is in fact
a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the
legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare. And
we think that an examination of the general provisions of the
statute in relation to the public interests which it seeks to
safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides,
leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints
imposed upon the exercise or rights of ownership by the
particular provisions of the statute under consideration were
imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion
of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the
exercise of the sovereign police power which every State
possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to
every species of property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute
a virulent contagious or infectious disease had threatened the
total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections
sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as
ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals.
Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and
the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in
the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the
disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital
blow at the material welfare of the country. Large areas of
productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice,
the staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such
an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to
spend many millions of pesos in its importation,
notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to
cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could
easily be made to produce a supply more than sufficient for its
own needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands was
such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in
the breasts of the people, and in many provinces the energies
of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently
hopeless struggle for existence with which they were
confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were
expended by the Government in relieving the immediate needs
of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by
the Congress of the United States as a relief or famine fund,
public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the
provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort
made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread
failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large
measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft
purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily
relieve the situation, because in an agricultural community
material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be
hoped for in the absence of the work animals upon which such
a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the
fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to
market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to
increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as
appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the
future depended largely on the conservation of those animals
which had been spared from the ravages of the disease, and
their redistribution throughout the Islands where the need for
them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were
employed, with a view to the discovery and application of
preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these
measures have proved in some degree successful in protecting
the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the
gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout
the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of
supply and demand, will ultimately result in practically relieving
those sections which suffered most by the loss of their work
animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price
of carabaos rapidly increased from three to five fold or more,
and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative
measures now adopted prove entirely successful, the scant
supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until
the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the
supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected
with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle
stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands,
necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing with the
severest penalties the theft of carabaos and the personal
property by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the
enactment of the statute under consideration that the
legislative authority found that the general welfare of the
Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat
burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of
large cattle, and the supervision and restriction of their
slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the
provisions of the statute touching the branding and registration
of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of
diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper
exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion
that, under all the circumstances, the provisions of the statute
prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fir for work were in like manner
enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified
by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of
the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disasters
incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these
Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and records of the
administrative and legislative departments of the Government,
that not merely the material welfare and future prosperity of
this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of
the disease which swept away the work animals during the
years prior to the enactment of the law under consideration,
but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of these
Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by
the continued destruction of large cattle by disease or
otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no
doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable
measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the
extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary
conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of
rights of ownership and control of the private property of the
citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of
self-protection, and if ever the invasion of private property by
police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable
restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of
the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a
reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the
case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U. S., 133,136):
"The extent and limits of what is known
as the police power have been a fruitful subject
of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly
every State in the Union. It is universally
conceded to include everything essential to the
public safety, health, and morals, and to justify
the destruction or abatement, by summary
proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a
public nuisance. Under this power it has been
held that the State may order the destruction of
a house falling to decay or otherwise
endangering the lives of passer-by; the
demolition of such as are in the path of a
conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle;
the destruction of decayed or unwholesome
food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in
cities; the regulation of railways and other
means of public conveyance, and of interments
in burial grounds, the restriction of
objectionable trades to certain localities; the
compulsory vaccination of children; the
confinement of the insane or those affected
with contagious diseases; the restraint of
vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the
suppression of obscene publications and houses
of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling
houses and places where intoxicating liquors are
sold. Beyond this, however, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand
it, and in this particular a large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the
public require, but what measures are necessary
for the protection of such
interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27;
Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the
State in thus interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular classes,
require such interference; and, second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may
not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private
business, or impose unusual and unnecessary
restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, its determination as to what is a proper
exercise of its police powers is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of
the courts."
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the
enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation
on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss
of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary
gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even
when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland &
Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this
"general police power of the State, persons and property are
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State;
of the perfect right in the legislature to do which, no question
ever was, or, upon acknowledged and general principles, ever
can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed.,
p. 738) says:
"It would be quite impossible to
enumerate all the instances in which the police
power is or may be exercised, because the
various cases in which the exercise by one
individual of his rights may conflict with a similar
exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the
public order or safety, an infinite in number and
in variety. And there are other cases where it
becomes necessary for the public authorities to
interfere with the control by individuals of their
property, and even to destroy it, where the
owners themselves have fully observed all their
duties to their fellows and to the State, but
where, nevertheless, some controlling public
necessity demands the interference or
destruction. A strong instance of this description
is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or
destroy the private property of individuals to
prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a
pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any
other great public calamity. Here the individual
is in no degree in fault, but his interest must
yield to that 'necessity' which 'knows no law.'
The establishment of limits within the denser
portions of cities and villages within which
buildings constructed of inflammable materials
shall not be erected or repaired may also, in
some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of
private property; but regulations for this
purpose have been sustained notwithstanding Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott,
this result. Wharf lines may also be established JJ., concur.
for the general good, even though they prevent ||| (U.S. v. Toribio, G.R. No. 5060, [January 26, 1910], 15 PHIL 85-
the owners of water-fronts from building out on 100)
soil which constitutes private property. And,
whenever the legislature deem it necessary to
the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal
of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they
may establish regulations to that effect under
penalties, and make them applicable to the
owners of the soil equally with other persons.
Such regulations are only ' as just restraint of an
injurious use of property, which the legislature
have authority' to impose.
"So a particular use of property may
sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of
circumstances, and without the fault of the
owner, that which was once lawful, proper, and
unobjectionable has now become a public
nuisance, endangering the public health or the
public safety. Milldams are sometimes
destroyed upon this ground; and churchyards
which prove, in the advance of urban
population, to be detrimental to the public
health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to
be closed against further use for cemetery
purposes."
These citations from some of the highest judicial and
text — book authorities in the United States clearly indicate the
wide scope and extent which has there been given to the
doctrine of the sovereign police power of the State, and confirm
us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in question
being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the
terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that "no
law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law," a provision
which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United
States, and is found in substance in the constitution of most if
not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed
by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174168. March 30, 2009.]
SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY, JOLIE ROSS
TAN, ROMER TAN, CHARLIE TAN, and JESSIE
JAMES TAN, petitioners, vs. SY CHIM and
FELICIDAD CHAN SY,respondents.
[G.R. No. 179438. March 30, 2009.]
SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN
SY, petitioners, vs. SY TIONG SHIOU and
JUANITA TAN, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
These consolidated petitions involving the same
parties, although related, dwell on different issues.
G.R. No. 174168.
This is a petition for review 1 assailing the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2006 and 8
August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91416. 2
On 30 May 2003, four criminal complaints were filed
by Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy) against Sy Tiong
Shiou, Juanita Tan Sy, Jolie Ross Tan, Romer Tan, Charlie Tan
and Jessie James Tan (Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.) before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Manila. The cases were later
consolidated. Two of the complaints, I.S. Nos. 03E-15285 and
03E-15286, 3 were for alleged violation of Section 74 in relation
to Section 144 of the Corporation Code. In these complaints,
the Spouses Sy averred that they are stockholders and directors
of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation) who asked Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al., officers of the corporation, to allow them to
inspect the books and records of the business on three
occasions to no avail. In a letter 4 dated 21 May 2003, Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al. denied the request, citing civil and intra-corporate
cases pending in court. 5
In the two other complaints, I.S. No. 03E-15287 and
03E-15288, 6 Sy Tiong Shiou was charged with falsification
under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), and perjury under Article 183 of the RPC. According
to the Spouses Sy, Sy Tiong Shiou executed under oath the 2003
General Information Sheet (GIS) wherein he falsely stated that
the shareholdings of the Spouses Sy had decreased despite the
fact that they had not executed any conveyance of their
shares. 7 CIHTac
Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argued before the prosecutor
that the issues involved in the civil case for accounting and
damages pending before the RTC of Manila were intimately
related to the two criminal complaints filed by the Spouses Sy
against them, and thus constituted a prejudicial question that
should require the suspension of the criminal complaints. They
also argued that the Spouses Sy's request for inspection was
premature as the latter's concern may be properly addressed
once an answer is filed in the civil case. Sy Tiong Shiou, on the
other hand, denied the accusations against him, alleging that
before the 2003 GIS was submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the same was shown to
respondents, who at that time were the President/Chairman of
the Board and Assistant Treasurer of the corporation, and that
they did not object to the entries in the GIS. Sy Tiong Shiou also
argued that the issues raised in the pending civil case for
accounting presented a prejudicial question that necessitated
the suspension of criminal proceedings.
On 29 December 2003, the investigating prosecutor
issued a resolution recommending the suspension of the
criminal complaints for violation of the Corporation Code and
the dismissal of the criminal complaints for falsification and
perjury against Sy Tiong Shiou. 8 The reviewing prosecutor
approved the resolution. The Spouses Sy moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution, but their motion was denied
on 14 June 2004. 9 The Spouses Sy thereupon filed a petition
for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which the
latter denied in a resolution issued on 02 September
2004. 10 Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in the resolution of 20 July 2005. 11 IHDCcT
The Spouses Sy elevated the DOJ's resolutions to the
Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ. The appellate
court granted the petition 12 and directed the City Prosecutor's
Office to file the appropriate informations against Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al. for violation of Section 74, in relation to Section
144 of the Corporation Code and of Articles 172 and 183 of the
RPC. The appellate court ruled that the civil case for accounting
and damages cannot be deemed prejudicial to the maintenance
or prosecution of a criminal action for violation of Section 74 in
relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code since a finding
in the civil case that respondents mishandled or
misappropriated the funds would not be determinative of their
guilt or innocence in the criminal complaint. In the same
manner, the criminal complaints for falsification and/or perjury
should not have been dismissed on the ground of prejudicial
question because the accounting case is unrelated and not
necessarily determinative of the success or failure of the
falsification or perjury charges. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals held that there was probable cause that Sy Tiong Shiou
had committed falsification and that the City of Manila where
the 2003 GIS was executed is the proper venue for the
institution of the perjury charges. Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. sought
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but their
motion was denied. 13
On 2 April 2008, the Court ordered the consolidation of
G.R. No. 179438 with G.R. No. 174168. 14
Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argue that findings of the DOJ in
affirming, modifying or reversing the recommendations of the
public prosecutor cannot be the subject of certiorarior review of
the Court of Appeals because the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
body within the purview of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners rely on the separate opinion of former Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 15 wherein he wrote that this Court should not be
called upon to determine the existence of probable cause, as
there is no provision of law authorizing an aggrieved party to
petition for such a determination. 16 In any event, they argue,
assuming without admitting that the findings of the DOJ may be
subject to judicial review under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the DOJ has not committed any grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the findings of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. They claim that the Spouses Sy's request for inspection
was not made in good faith and that their motives were tainted
with the intention to harass and to intimidate Sy Tiong Shiou, et
al. from pursuing the criminal and civil cases pending before the
prosecutor's office and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 46. Thus, to accede to the Spouses Sy's request would
pose serious threats to the existence of the corporation. 17 Sy
Tiong Shiou, et al. aver that the RTC had already denied the
motion for production and inspection and instead ordered
petitioners to make the corporate records available to the
appointed independent auditor. Hence, the DOJ did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in affirming the recommendation
of the City Prosecutor of Manila. 18 They further argue that
adherence to the Court of Appeals' ruling that the accounting
case is unrelated to, and not necessarily determinative of the
success of, the criminal complaint for falsification and/or
perjury would unnecessarily indict petitioner Sy Tiong Shiou for
the said offenses he may not have committed but only because
of an outcome unfavorable to him in the civil action. 19 AEIDTc
Indeed, a preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial
function and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency
exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings
of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable
cause. 20 Moreover, it is settled that the preliminary
investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors
and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the
prosecution. 21 This Court has adopted a policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations and
leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of
information against the supposed offender. 22
As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions.
Hence, the principle of non-interference does not apply when
there is grave abuse of discretion which would authorize the
aggrieved person to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 23
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ
gravely abused its discretion when it suspended the hearing of
the charges for violation of the Corporation Code on the ground
of prejudicial question and when it dismissed the criminal
complaints.
A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
since howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jureof the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. The reason behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 24
The civil action and the criminal cases do not involve
any prejudicial question. DHEACI
The civil action for accounting and damages, Civil Case
No. 03-106456 pending before the RTC Manila, Branch 46,
seeks the issuance of an order compelling the Spouses Sy to
render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts,
proceeds and fund paid to, received and earned by the
corporation since 1993 and to restitute it such amounts,
proceeds and funds which the Spouses Sy have
misappropriated. The criminal cases, on the other hand, charge
that the Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from getting inside
company premises and from inspecting company records, and
that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the entries in the GIS, specifically
the Spouses Sy's shares in the corporation. Surely, the civil case
presents no prejudicial question to the criminal cases since a
finding that the Spouses Sy mishandled the funds will have no
effect on the determination of guilt in the complaint for
violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the
Corporation Code; the civil case concerns the validity of Sy
Tiong Shiou's refusal to allow inspection of the records, while in
the falsification and perjury cases, what is material is the
veracity of the entries made by Sy Tiong Shiou in the sworn GIS.
Anent the issue of probable cause, the Court also finds
that there is enough probable cause to warrant the institution
of the criminal cases.
The term probable cause does not mean 'actual and
positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there
is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 25
In order that probable cause to file a criminal case may
be arrived at, or in order to engender the well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, the elements of the crime
charged should be present. This is based on the principle that
every crime is defined by its elements, without which there
should be — at the most — no criminal offense. 26
Section 74 of the Corporation Code reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
The records of all business transactions of the
corporation and the minutes of any meeting
shall be open to inspection by any director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the
corporation at reasonable hours on business
days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy
of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his
expense.
Any officer or agent of the corporation who shall
refuse to allow any director, trustee,
stockholder or member of the corporation to
examine and copy excerpts from its records or
minutes, in accordance with the provisions of
this Code, shall be liable to such director,
trustee, stockholder or member for damages,
and in addition, shall be guilty of an offense
which shall be punishable under Section 144 of
this Code: Provided, That if such refusal is made
pursuant to a resolution or order of the Board of
Directors or Trustees, the liability under this
section for such action shall be imposed upon
the directors or trustees who voted for such
refusal: and Provided, further, That it shall be a
defense to any action under this section that the
person demanding to examine and copy
excerpts from the corporation's records and
minutes has improperly used any information
secured through any prior examination of the
records or minutes of such corporation or of any
other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his
demand. DTcHaA
Meanwhile, Section 144 of the same Code provides:
Sec. 144. Violations of the Code. — Violations of
any of the provisions of this Code or its
amendments not otherwise specifically
penalized therein shall be punished by a fine of
not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos
but not more than ten thousand (P10,000.00)
pesos or by imprisonment for not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than five (5) years,
or both, in the discretion of the court. If the
violation is committed by a corporation, the
 same may, after notice and hearing, be
dissolved in appropriate proceedings before the
Securities and Exchange Commission: Provided,
That such dissolution shall not preclude the
institution of appropriate action against the
director, trustee or officer of the corporation
responsible for said violation: Provided, further,
That nothing in this section shall be construed to
repeal the other causes for dissolution of a
corporation provided in this Code.
In the recent case of Ang-Abaya, et al. v. Ang, et
al., 27 the Court had the occasion to enumerate the requisites
before the penal provision under Section 144 of the
Corporation Code may be applied in a case of violation of a
stockholder or member's right to inspect the corporate
books/records as provided for under Section 74 of the
Corporation Code. The elements of the offense, as laid down in
the case, are:
First. A director, trustee, stockholder or member
has made a prior demand in writing for a copy of
excerpts from the corporation's records or
minutes;
Second. Any officer or agent of the concerned
corporation shall refuse to allow the said
director, trustee, stockholder or member of the
corporation to examine and copy said excerpts;
Third. If such refusal is made pursuant to a
resolution or order of the board of directors or
trustees, the liability under this section for such
action shall be imposed upon the directors or
trustees who voted for such refusal;
and, THEcAS
Fourth. Where the officer or agent of the
corporation sets up the defense that the person
demanding to examine and copy excerpts from
the corporation's records and minutes has
improperly used any information secured
through any prior examination of the records or
minutes of such corporation or of any other
corporation, or was not acting in good faith or
for a legitimate purpose in making his demand,
the contrary must be shown or proved. 28
Thus, in a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74
of the Corporation Code, the defense of improper use or motive
is in the nature of a justifying circumstance that would
exonerate those who raise and are able to prove the same.
Accordingly, where the corporation denies inspection on the
ground of improper motive or purpose, the burden of proof is
taken from the shareholder and placed on the
corporation. 29 However, where no such improper motive or
purpose is alleged, and even though so alleged, it is not proved
by the corporation, then there is no valid reason to deny the
requested inspection.
In the instant case, however, the Court finds that the
denial of inspection was predicated on the pending civil case
against the Spouses Sy. This is evident from the 21 May 2003
letter of Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.'s counsel 30 to the Spouses
Sy, 31 which reads:
Gentlemen:
We write in behalf of our clients, SY SIY HO, INC.
(Guan Yiac Hardware); SY TIONG SHIOU,
JUANITA TAN SY; JOLIE ROSS TAN; CHARLIE TAN;
ROMER TAN; and JESSE JAMES TAN, relative to
your letter dated 16 May 2003. Please be
informed that a case for Accounting and
Damages had already been filed against your
clients, Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46,
denominated as Civil Case No. 03-106456.
We fully understand your desire for our clients
to respond to your demands, however, under
the prevailing circumstance this would not be
advisable. The concerns that you raised in your
letter can later on be addressed after your
clients shall have filed their responsive pleading
in the abovesaid case. EcSCHD
We trust that this response will at the moment
be enough. 32
Even in their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 23
September 2003, 33 Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. did not make any
allegation that "the person demanding to examine and copy
excerpts from the corporation's records and minutes has
improperly used any information secured through any prior
examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of
any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a
legitimate purpose in making his demand." Instead, they merely
reiterated the pendency of the civil case. There being no
allegation of improper motive, and it being undisputed that Sy
Tiong Shiou, et al. denied Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy's
request for inspection, the Court rules and so holds that the
DOJ erred in dismissing the criminal charge for violation of
Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code.
Now on the existence of probable cause for the
falsification and/or perjury charges.
The Spouses Sy charge Sy Tiong Shiou with the offense
of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
paragraph 4; and/or perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The elements of falsification of public
documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the
offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated; 34 (c) the facts narrated
by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of
truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful
intent to injure a third person. 35 On the other hand, the
elements of perjury are: (a) that the accused made a statement
under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b)
that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in
that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn
statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law
or made for a legal purpose. HSIaAT
A General Information Sheet (GIS) is required to be
filed within thirty (30) days following the date of the annual or a
special meeting, and must be certified and sworn to by the
corporate secretary, or by the president, or any duly authorized
officer of the corporation. 36 From the records, the 2003 GIS
submitted to the SEC on 8 April 2003 was executed under oath
by Sy Tiong Shiou in Manila, in his capacity as Vice President
and General Manager. 37 By executing the document under
oath, he, in effect, attested to the veracity 38 of its contents.
The Spouses Sy claim that the entries in the GIS pertaining to
them do not reflect the true number of shares that they own in
the company. They attached to their complaint the 2002 GIS of
the company, also executed by Sy Tiong Shiou, and compared
the entries therein vis-a-vis the ones in the 2003 GIS. The
Spouses Sy noted the marked decrease in their shareholdings,
averring that at no time after the execution of the 2002 GIS, up
to the time of the filing of their criminal complaints did they
execute or authorize the execution of any document or deed
transferring, conveying or disposing their shares or any portion
thereof; and thus there is absolutely no basis for the figures
reflected in the 2003 GIS. 39 The Spouses Sy claim that the false
statements were made by Sy Tiong Shiou with the wrongful
intent of injuring them. All the elements of both offenses are
sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavits.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals' holding,
citing the case of Fabia v. Court of Appeals, that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction no longer precludes the simultaneous filing
of the criminal case with the corporate/civil case. 40 Moreover,
the Court finds that the City of Manila is the proper venue for
the perjury charges, the GIS having been subscribed and sworn
to in the said place. Under Section 10 (a), Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. 41 In Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, 42 the Court
held that the felony is consummated when the false statement
is made. 43 Thus in this case, it was alleged that the perjury was
committed when Sy Tiong Shiou subscribed and sworn * to the
GIS in the City of Manila, thus, following Section 10 (a), Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Court, the City of Manila is the proper
venue for the offense.
G.R. No. 179438.
This petition assails the decision 44 and
resolution 45 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and
29 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897. cDHAaT
On 3 February 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer
of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation), a family corporation
doing business under the name and style Guan Yiac Hardware,
submitted a letter 46 to the corporation's Board of Directors
(Board) stating that the control, supervision and administration
of all corporate funds were exercised by Sy Chim and Felicidad
Chan Sy (Spouses Sy), corporate president and assistant
treasurer, respectively. In the same letter, Juanita Tan disclosed
that Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the
corporation's banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003,
thus the total bank remittances for the past years were less
than reflected in the corporate financial statements, accounting
books and records. Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free from
any responsibility over all corporate funds. The Board granted
Juanita Tan's request and authorized the employment of an
external auditor to render a complete audit of all the corporate
accounting books and records. 47Consequently, the Board hired
the accounting firm Banaria, Banaria & Company. In its
Report 48 dated 5 April 2003, the accounting firm attributed to
the Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and
disbursements from 1994 to 2002. 49
A demand letter 50 was subsequently served on the
Spouses Sy on 15 April 2003. On the same date, the children of
the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash,
postdated checks and other important documents. After the
incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred residence and
ceased reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the
corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery against the
Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila. 51 A
search warrant was subsequently issued by the Regional Trial
Court. 52
On 26 April 2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, corporate Vice
President and General Manager, called a special meeting to be
held on 6 May 2003 to fill up the positions vacated by the
Spouses Sy. Sy Tiong Shiou was subsequently elected as the
new president and his wife, Juanita Tan, the new Vice
President. 53 Despite these developments, Sy Chim still caused
the issuance of a Notice of Stockholders meeting dated 11 June
2003 in his capacity as the alleged corporate president. 54
Meanwhile, on 1 July 2003, the corporation, through
Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for Accounting and
Damages 55 against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila,
praying for a complete and true accounting of all the amounts
paid to, received and earned by the company since 1993 and
for the restitution of the said amount. 56The complaint also
prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or
preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling a
stockholders' meeting on the ground of lack of authority.
By way of Answer, 57 the Spouses Sy averred that Sy
Chim was a mere figurehead and Felicidad Chan Sy merely
performed clerical functions, as it was Sy Tiong Shiou and his
spouse, Juanita Tan, who have been authorized by the
corporation's by-laws to supervise, control and administer
corporate funds, and as such were the ones responsible for the
unaccounted funds. They assailed the meetings called by Sy
Tiong Shiou on the grounds that the same were held without
notice to them and without their participation, in violation of
the by-laws. The Spouses Sy also pursued their counter-claim
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On 9 September 2003, the Spouses Sy filed
their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint, 58 praying
that their attached Third Party Complaint 59 be allowed and
admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said
third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou
and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation's claim for
misappropriating corporate funds.
On 8 October 2003, the trial court granted the motion
for leave to file the third-party complaint, and forthwith
directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan. 60 On 16 January 2004, their counsel allegedly
discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were not
furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court
order, which resulted in their having been declared in default
for failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint; thus,
they opted not to file a motion for reconsideration anymore
and instead filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
In its Decision dated 26 May 2004, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
Tan. 61 The appellate court declared that a third-party
complaint is not allowed under the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No.
8799 (Interim Rules), it not being included in the exclusive
enumeration of allowed pleadings under Section 2, Rule 2
thereof. Moreover, even if such a pleading were allowed, the
admission of the third-party complaint against Sy Tiong Shiou
and Juanita Tan still would have no basis from the facts or the
law and jurisprudence. 62 The Court of Appeals also ruled that
the respondent judge committed a manifest error amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in admitting the third-party complaint and in
summarily declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan in default
for failure to file their answer within the purported
reglementary period. The Court of Appeals set aside the trial
court's 8 October 2003 Order admitting the third-party
complaint, as well as the 19 December 2003 Order, declaring Sy
Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their
answer. The trial court was further ordered to dismiss the third-
party complaint without prejudice to any action that the
corporation may separately file against Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan. 63 aHcDEC
The Spouses Sy filed a motion for reconsideration, but
their motion was denied on 29 August 2007. 64
Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy argue before this Court
that a third-party complaint is not excluded or prohibited by the
Interim Rules, and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
their third-party complaint is not actionable because their
action is not in respect of the corporation's claims. They add
that the disallowance of the third-party complaint will result in
multiplicity of suits.
The third-party complaint should be allowed.
The conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Inter-Corporate Controversies read:
Rule 1, Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings. — The
following pleadings are prohibited:
(1) Motion to dismiss;
(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(3) Motion for new trial, or for
reconsideration of judgment or order,
or for re-opening of trial;
(4) Motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, affidavits or any other paper,
except those filed due to clearly
compelling reasons. Such motion must
be verified and under oath; and
(5) Motion for postponement and other
motions of similar intent, except those
filed due to clearly compelling reasons.
Such motion must be verified and
under oath.
Rule 2, Sec. 2. Pleadings allowed. — The only
pleadings allowed to be filed under these Rules
are the complaint, answer, compulsory
counterclaims or cross-claims pleaded in the
answer, and the answer to the counterclaims or
cross-claims. 65 TAIaHE
There is a conflict, for while a third-party complaint is
not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the
prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by
following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction,
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. 66 Statutes, including rules, should be construed in
the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed and they should be given such construction as
will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the
benefits intended. A statute should therefore be read with
reference to its leading idea, and its general purpose and
intention should be gathered from the whole act, and this
predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import of
particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a
limitation upon some and as a reason for expanding the
signification of others, so that the interpretation may accord
with the spirit of the entire act, and so that the policy and
object of the statute as a whole may be made effectual and
operative to the widest possible extent. 67 Otherwise stated,
the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in the rules in this case, must
be read according to its spirit and intent. 68
This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule
1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:
Sec. 3. Construction. — These Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, summary, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding. 69
Now, a third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person
not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim. It is actually a complaint
independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's
complaint. In fact, were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules
of Court, such third-party complaint would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original complaint by
the defendant against the third-party defendant. Jurisprudence
is consistent in declaring that the purpose of a third-party
complaint is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary
proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one
litigation all the matters arising from one particular set of
facts. 70 DTCAES
It thus appears that the summary nature of the
proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the allowance
of the filing of third-party complaints is premised on one
objective — the expeditious disposition of cases. Moreover,
following the rule of liberal interpretation found in the Interim
Rules, and taking into consideration the suppletory application
of the Rules of Court under Rule 1, Sec. 2 71 of the Interim
Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint is not, and
should not be prohibited in controversies governed by the
Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this conclusion are
rendered beyond question when it is considered that Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan are not complete strangers to the
litigation as in fact they are the moving spirit behind the filing of
the principal complaint for accounting and damages against the
Spouses Sy.
The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of
the Spouses Sy should be admitted.
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some
substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to exist,
whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation,
contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a third-
party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or
to the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against the original defendant, although the third-party
defendant's liability arises out of another transaction. The
defendant may implead another as third-party defendant: (a)
on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on
the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the
plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both
the plaintiff and the defendant. 72
In determining the sufficiency of the third-party
complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the
third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party
complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the
defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
other relief from the third-party defendant. 73
The complaint alleges that the Spouses Sy, as officers
of the corporation, have acted illegally in raiding its corporate
funds, hence they are duty bound to render a full, complete and
true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds and funds paid to,
received and earned by the corporation since 1993 and to
restitute to the corporation all such amounts, proceeds, and
funds which they took and misappropriated for their own use ||| (Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. Nos. 174168 & 179438, [March
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff and its 30, 2009], 601 PHIL 510-538)
stockholders. 74 On the other hand, in the third-party
complaint, the Spouses Sy claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan who had full and complete control of the day-to-day
operations and complete control and custody of the funds of
the corporation, and hence they are the ones liable for any
shortfall or unaccounted difference of the corporation's cash
account. Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan should render a
full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds,
funds paid to, received and earned by the corporation since
1993, including the amount attributed to the Spouses Sy in the
complaint for accounting and damages. In their prayer, the
Spouses Sy moved that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be
declared as directly and solely liable in respect of the
corporation's claim for accounting and damages, and that in the
event that they, the Spouses Sy, are adjudged liable to the
corporation, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be ordered to pay
all amounts necessary to discharge their liability to the
corporation by way of indemnity or reimbursement. CAaDSI
The allegations in the third-party complaint impute
direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan to
the corporation for the very same claims which the corporation
interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is clear therefore that the
Spouses Sy's third-party complaint is in respect of the plaintiff
corporation's claims, 75 and thus the allowance of the third-
party complaint is warranted.
WHEREFORE, these cases are resolved as follows:
G.R. No. 174168
The petition for review is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2006 and 8
August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91416 are
AFFIRMED. aCITEH
Costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. 179438
The petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and 29 August 2007,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897 are SET ASIDE and the
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 46 dated 8
October 2003 and 19 December 2003 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, defendant-appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez for plaintiff-appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr. for defendant-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST
DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the
marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals
decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a
similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the
policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then
Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
rooted in our ancient law; 'porque no se engañen despojandose el
uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,' [according to] the
Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale 'Ne
mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur' of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I,
De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be
doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years
bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the
danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad
Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should
subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out
to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE;
RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of
validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having
exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore
his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the
other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation.
We are called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation
between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a
sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation
made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to
defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant
would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was
made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latter's stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as
noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the
opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who
was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the
appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached
therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within
the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public
policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The
decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating
that in plaintiff's complaint alleging absolute ownership of the
parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that
the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila
Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil
Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership
precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her
marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that
when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was
stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the
defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and
stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the
property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed
of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes
over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which
same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of
the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made
during the common law relationship as husband and wife between
the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said
donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the
deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962;
(5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the
land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon'" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to
plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of
Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses
during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix
Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956,
Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At
that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when
they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of
donation had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the
marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of
Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar
provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy
of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.
Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in
our ancient law; 'porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro
por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV,
Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur' of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et
uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such
irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to
avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed
out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), 'it would not be just
that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who
incurred guilt should turn out to be better.' So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above
pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of
scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a
failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials
cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated,
the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of
what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular
relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be
attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where
the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit
of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it.
Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision
would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied
by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice
Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar
a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.'' 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff
having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of
Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant
was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving
sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965
dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned
donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant
as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case
is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

||| (Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, [March 31, 1971],

148 PHIL 295-300)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 180771. April 21, 2015.]
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE
PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON
STRAIT, e.g.,TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS,
PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES,
Joined in and Represented herein by Human
Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza
Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal
Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as
Responsible Stewards of God's
Creations, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY ANGELO
REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE),SECRETARY JOSE
L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR),LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA,
DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait
Protected Seascape Management Board,
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR),DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO,
JR.,BFAR Regional Director for Region VII
ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION CO.,LTD. (JAPEX),as represented
by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC.,respondents.
[G.R. No. 181527. April 21, 2015.]
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT
CENTER (FIDEC),CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON
YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal
capacity and as representatives of the
SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND
PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES,
AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY
AFFECTED,petitioners,vs. SECRETARY ANGELO
REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE),JOSE L. ATIENZA,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR),LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his
capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region VII
and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait
Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN
ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director —
Environmental Management Bureau-Region
VII, DOE Regional Director for Region
VIII 1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION CO.,LTD. (JAPEX),as represented
by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC.,respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, concerning Service Contract
No. 46 (SC-46),which allowed the exploration, development,
and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a
narrow passage of water situated between the islands of
Negros and Cebu. 2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original
Petition for Certiorari,Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks
to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it
nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987
Constitution and certain international and municipal laws. 3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is
an original Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition,
and Mandamus,which seeks to nullify the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR),Region VII in connection with SC-
46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to
compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to the
pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil Exploration
Project. 4
ANTECEDENT FACTS
AND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to
as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the
toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon
Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians
and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who
allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling
co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for
her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter
to protect the Tañon Strait, among others. 5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC),a non-stock, non-profit,
non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of
the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial
(Engarcial),Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid
(Labid),in their personal capacities and as representatives of the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late
Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE);Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo
R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional Director for Region VII and
Chairman of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management
Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.,Ltd. (JAPEX),a company
organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine
branch office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS),as the
alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as
additional public respondents: Alan C. Arranguez (Arranguez)
and Antonio Labios (Labios),in their capacities as then Director
of the EMB, Region VII and then Regional Director of the DOE,
Region VII, respectively. 6
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines,
acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by
DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well
as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. 7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally
converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the
Tañon Strait. 8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic
surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-
bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was
also done to determine the area's underwater
composition. 9 CAIHTE
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during
the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be
drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan,
where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in
1988, 10 JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental
Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing an Environmental
Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures and for Other Purposes." 11
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management
Board 12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued
Resolution No. 2007-001, 13 wherein it adopted the Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and
favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for
an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII
granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and
gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. 14 Months later, on
November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well,
with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the
western Cebu Province. 15 This drilling lasted until February 8,
2008. 16
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that
petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate
original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from
implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987
Constitution.
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike 17 its
name as a respondent on the ground that it is not the Philippine
agent of JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the
branch office application of JAPEX, 18 wherein the latter's
resident agent was clearly identified. SOS claimed that it had
acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas
exploration activities in the Philippines.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
opposed SOS's motion on the ground that it was premature, it
was pro-forma,and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that
SOS admitted that "it is in law a (sic) privy to JAPEX" since it did
the drilling and other exploration activities in TañonAtty. Strait
Aristeo O. Cariño
under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They argued that
it would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had not Counsel for Respondent Supply 146 Valero Street
yet been joined in the case; and that it was "convenient" for
SOS to ask the Court to simply drop its name from the parties Salcedo Village,
Oilfield Services, Inc.
Makati City
when what it should have done was to either notify or ask
JAPEX to join it in its motion to enable proper substitution. At
this juncture, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and 20th Floor
Stewards also asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a JAPEX Philippines Ltd.
Pearlbank Centre
co-respondent or as a substitute for its parent company,
JAPEX. 19 146 Valero Street
On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Salcedo Village,
No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527. Makati City
On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested 20 that they
were adopting in toto the Opposition to Strike with Motion to
19th Floor
Implead filed by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and JAPEX Philippines Ltd.
Pearlbank Centre
Stewards in G.R. No. 180771.
On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their c/o Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. 146 Valero Street
Manifestation 21 that they were not objecting to SOS's Motion Salcedo Village,
to Strike as it was not JAPEX's resident agent. JAPEX during all Nicolas-Suchianco
Makati City
this time, did not file any comment at all.
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to
ensure that all the parties were given ample chance and Suite 2404
Atty. Maria Farah Z.G.
opportunity to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution Discovery Centre
directing the Court's process servicing unit to again serve the Nicolas-Suchianco 25 ADB Avenue
parties with a copy of the September 23, 2008 Resolution of the
Ortigas Center,
Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Resident Agent of JAPEX
Pasig City
Nos. 180771 and 181527, and which required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. The February 7, 2012 Philippines Ltd.
Resolution 22 reads as follows:
G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine This Resolution was personally served to the above
Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon parties, at the above addresses on February 23, 2012. On March
Strait, e.g.,Toothed Whales, Dolphins, 20, 2012, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH),by way of special
Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, et al. appearance, filed a Motion to Admit 23 its Motion for
vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, in his capacity as Clarification, 24 wherein JAPEX PH requested to be clarified as
Secretary of the Department of Energy, et al.) to whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012
and G.R. No. 181527 (Central Visayas Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it
Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. has not been impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH had
Angelo Reyes, et al.).— The Court Resolved to already stopped exploration activities in the Tañon Strait way
direct the Process Servicing Unit to RE- back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
SEND the resolution dated September 23,
On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special
2008 to the following parties and counsel,
appearance, filed a Motion for Extension of Time 25 to file its
together with this resolution:
Memorandum. It stated that since it received the February 7,
20th Floor Pearlbank Centre 2012 Resolution on February 23, 2012, it had until March 22,
2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX PH then asked for an written power of attorney
additional thirty days, supposedly to give this Court some time designating some person
to consider its Motion for Clarification. who must be a resident of
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a the Philippines, on whom
Resolution 26 granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its Motion any summons and other
for Clarification. This Court, addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for legal processes may be
Clarification, held: served in all actions or other
With regard to its Motion for legal proceedings against
Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated such corporation, and
March 19, 2012, this Court considers JAPEX consenting that service
Philippines, Ltd. as a real party-in-interest in upon such resident agent
these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of shall be admitted and held
the 1997 Rules of Court, a real party-in- as valid as if served upon
interest is the party who stands to be the duly authorized officers
benefited or injured by the judgment in the of the foreign corporation at
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the its home office. Any such
suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.'s foreign corporation shall
allegation that it is a completely distinct likewise execute and file
corporation, which should not be confused with the Securities and
with JAPEX Company, Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Exchange Commission an
Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by agreement or stipulation,
JAPEX Company, Ltd. for the purpose of executed by the proper
carrying out the latter's business transactions authorities of said
here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX corporation, in form and
Philippines, Ltd., has no separate personality substance as follows:
from its mother foreign corporation, the party "The (name of
impleaded in this case. foreign corporation) does
Moreover, Section 128 of the hereby stipulate and agree,
Corporation Code provides for the in consideration of its being
responsibilities and duties of a resident agent granted by the Securities
of a foreign corporation: and Exchange Commission a
license to transact business
SECTION
in the Philippines, that if at
128. Resident agent; service
any time said corporation
of process.— The Securities
shall cease to transact
and Exchange Commission business in the Philippines,
shall require as a condition
or shall be without any
precedent to the issuance of
resident agent in the
the license to transact
Philippines on whom any
business in the Philippines summons or other legal
by any foreign corporation
processes may be served,
that such corporation file
then in any action or
with the Securities and proceeding arising out of
Exchange Commission a
any business or transaction
which occurred in the
Philippines, service of any
summons or other legal
process may be made upon
the Securities and Exchange
Commission and that such
service shall have the same
force and effect as if made
upon the duly-authorized
officers of the corporation
at its home office."
Whenever such
service of summons or other
process shall be made upon
the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the
Commission shall, within ten
(10) days thereafter,
transmit by mail a copy of
such summons or other
legal process to the
corporation at its home or
principal office. The sending
of such copy by the
Commission shall be a
necessary part of and shall
complete such service. All
expenses incurred by the
Commission for such service
shall be paid in advance by
the party at whose instance
the service is made.
In case of a change
of address of the resident
agent, it shall be his or its
duty to immediately notify
in writing the Securities and
Exchange Commission of the
new address.
It is clear from the foregoing
provision that the function of a resident agent
is to receive summons or legal processes that
may be served in all actions or other legal
 proceedings against the foreign corporation. stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND
These cases have been prosecuted in the not held prior to the ECC's issuance. STATUTES;
name of JAPEX Company, Ltd.,and JAPEX In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING
Philippines Ltd.,as its branch office and petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' EXPLORATION AND PROPOSED
resident agent, had been receiving the various allegations of reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations EXPLOITATION FOR OIL AND NATURAL
resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by or discussions with the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior GAS AT, AROUND, AND UNDERNEATH
Registry Return Cards signed by its to the issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that during the THE MARINE WATERS OF THE TAÑON
representatives. seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where the INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE
grant JAPEX PH's motion for extension of time to file its oilrig was located, an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer radius COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL
memorandum, and was given until April 21, 2012, as prayed for, "exclusion zone" stated in the IEE. 33It also agrees in the ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND
within which to comply with the submission. 27 allegation that public respondents DENR and EMB abused their INSTRUMENTS; AND
Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, discretion when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE
2012, filed a motion, asking this Court for an additional thirty and private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
days to file its Memorandum, to be counted from May 8, 2012. compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements CERTIFICATE (ECC) IN
It justified its request by claiming that this Court's April 24, 2012 under the Environmental Impact Assessment system, the ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS
Resolution was issued past its requested deadline for filing, Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and AND HABITATS OF MARINE WILDLIFE
which was on April 21, 2012. 28 regulations. 34 It further claims that despite several requests AND ENDANGERED SPECIES IS LEGAL
On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second for copies of all the documents pertaining to the project in AND PROPER. 37
request for additional time to file its Memorandum and Tañon Strait, only copies of the PAMB-Tañon Strait Resolution Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 181527, petitioner FIDEC
dispensed with such filing. and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk. 35 HEITAD presented the following issues for our consideration:
Since petitioners had already filed their respective Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46
memoranda, 29 and public respondents had earlier filed a Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, EXECUTED BETWEEN RESPONDENTS
Manifestation 30 that they were adopting their Comment dated contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and DOE AND JAPEX SHOULD BE NULLIFIED
March 31, 2008 as their memorandum, this Court submitted Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; AND SET ASIDE FOR BEING IN DIRECT
the case for decision. that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the VIOLATION OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
Petitioners' Allegations various laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC was issued in THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS;
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to furnish
exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFF-SHORE OIL
petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46; and that EXPLORAT[I]ON CONTEMPLATED
Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after
all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to UNDER SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS
the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced injunctive relief. They further contend that the issues raised in
drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE WITHOUT A LAW
these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the BEING DULY PASSED EXPRESSLY FOR
seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15
fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the parties THE PURPOSE;
to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch
thereto effective June 21, 2008. 36
an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced III. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION
fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao," also known as the ISSUES BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THE
"fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef." 31 Petitioners The following are the issues posited by petitioners TAÑON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No. 180771: VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL
incidences of "fish kill" 32observed by some of the local I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS PROTECTION GRANTED TO
fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And they further allege that the STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION; PETITIONERS UNDER
ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because II. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE
public consultations and discussions with the affected 46 IS VIOLAT[IVE] OF THE 1987 LAWS.
 IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE (ECC) FOR SUCH AN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL PROJECT
INSIDE AN ENVIRONMENTALLY
CRITICAL AREA SUCH AS THE TAÑON
STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE
CONFORMED TO LAW AND EXISTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
MATTER.
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS MAY
BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
FURNISH PETITIONERS WITH COPIES OF
THE DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
TAÑON STRAIT OIL EXPLORATION
PROJECT. 38
In these consolidated petitions, this Court has
determined that the various issues raised by the petitioners
may be condensed into two primary issues:
I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in
G.R. No. 180771; and
II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the "'moot
and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." Courts
have decided cases otherwise moot and academic under the
following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. 39
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this
Court deems it necessary to resolve these consolidated
petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present
in this case. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of
the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised
undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents'
contested actions are capable of repetition.
Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards,
"claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action since
they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this
suit. 40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they also assert their
right to sue for the faithful performance of international and
municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for
their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the
right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to
them in multilateral international instruments that the
Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of
stipulation pour autrui.42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should
be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine
Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a
campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of
Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the
primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to
protect the environment pursuant to the public trust
doctrine. 43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
also aver that this Court may lower the benchmark in locus
standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. 44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the
Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be
either natural or juridical persons, viz.:
Section 1. Who may be parties;
plaintiff and defendant.— Only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action. The term
"plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the
counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the
third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term
"defendant" may refer to the original
defending party, the defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the
third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability
of Oposa,pointing out that the petitioners therein were all
natural persons, albeit some of them were still
unborn.45 ATICcS
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents
likewise challenge their claim of legal standing on the ground
that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to
an action. Moreover, the public respondents argue that the
Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to
show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision
in this case. 46
Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the
public respondents claim that absent any proof that former
President Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into
and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her own. 47
The public respondents contend that since petitioners
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' petition was not
brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 48
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate
objects should be given legal standing in actions before courts
of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental
law. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited
the 1972 United States case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B.
Morton,49 wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the
conventional thought on legal standing, opined:
The critical question of "standing"
would be simplified and also put neatly in
focus if we fashioned a federal rule that
allowed environmental issues to be litigated
before federal agencies or federal courts in
the name of the inanimate object about to be
despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and
bulldozers and where injury is the subject of
public outrage. ....
Inanimate objects are sometimes
parties in litigation. A ship has a legal
personality, a fiction found useful for
maritime purposes. The corporation sole — a
creature of ecclesiastical law — is an
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride
on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a
"person" for purposes of the adjudicatory
 processes, whether it represents proprietary,
spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys,
alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries,
beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland,
or even air that feels the destructive
pressures of modern technology and modern
life. The river, for example, is the living symbol
of all the life it sustains or nourishes — fish,
aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher,
deer, elk, bear, and all other animals,
including man, who are dependent on it or
who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life.
The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological
unit of life that is part of it. Those people who
have a meaningful relation to that body of
water — whether it be a fisherman, a
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger — must be
able to speak for the values which the river
represents and which are threatened with
destruction. 50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and
environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects
standing is due to the need to comply with the strict
requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of
Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates
the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-
interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties;
plaintiff and defendant.— Only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action. The term
"plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the
counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the
third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term
"defendant" may refer to the original
defending party, the defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the
third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest.— A real
party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.—
Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted
or defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and
shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or
these Rules. An agent acting in his own name
and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and
environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons
should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for
persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real
parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these
animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many
environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the
petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or
affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given
a more liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine
legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as
Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate
objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of
procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases,51 which allow for a
"citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action
before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit.— Any Filipino
citizen in representation of others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, may file
an action to enforce rights or obligations
under environmental laws.Upon the filing of
a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all interested parties to manifest
their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all
affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749
and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions. 52 (Emphasis ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the
Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
commented:
Citizen suit.To further encourage the
protection of the environment, the Rules
enable litigants enforcing environmental
rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This
provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws and collapses
the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature.The terminology of the
text reflects the doctrine first enunciated
in Oposa v. Factoran,insofar as it refers to
minors and generations yet
unborn. 53(Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before
the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure." 54
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems
Factors Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission 55 held that:
 Remedial statutes or statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do
not create new or take away vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy
or confirmation of rights already existing, do
not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against
retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. ....
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already
taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standiin
environmental cases. In Oposa,we allowed the suit to be
brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned." 56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need
to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment. 57 TIADCc
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident
Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature,
to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth
noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown
in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are
therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition.
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as
an unwilling co-petitioner former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo for the following reasons, which we quote:
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,also
of legal age, Filipino and resident of
Malacañang Palace, Manila Philippines.
Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to
be the incumbent President of the Philippine
Islands. She is personally impleaded in this
suit as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of
her express declaration and undertaking
under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to
protect Your Petitioners' habitat, among
others. She is meantime dominated as an
unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material
time in seeking her signature and imprimatur
hereof and due to possible legal complications
that may hereafter arise by reason of her
official relations with public respondents
under the alter ego principle in political
law. 58
This is incorrect.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.— If
the consent of any party who should be joined
as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be
made a defendant and the reason therefor
shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party
who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or
she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put
the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which
can properly implead him or her through its processes. The
unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition,
without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a
denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners
Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in
their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-
petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-
petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the
functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against
embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention." 59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot
be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her
name is stricken off the title of this case.
Main Issue:
Legality of Service Contract No. 46
Service Contract No. 46 vis-à-vis
Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution
Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura
Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-
owned. 60 Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be
considered as a technical and financial assistance agreement
validly executed under paragraph 4 of the same
provision. 61 The petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos 62 laid down the guidelines for a valid
service contract, one of which is that there must exist a general
law for oil exploration before a service contract may be entered
into by the Government. The petitioners posit that the service
contract in La Bugal is presumed to have complied with the
requisites of (a) legislative enactment of a general law after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (such as Republic Act No.
7942, or the Philippine Mining Law of 1995, governing mining
contracts) and (b) presidential notification. The petitioners thus
allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining
contracts underRepublic Act No. 7942, does not apply in this
case. 63 The petitioners also argue that Presidential Decree No.
87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 cannot
legally justify SC-46 as it is deemed to have been repealed by
the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws, which enunciate
new policies concerning the environment. 64 In addition,
petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandate the
exclusive use and enjoyment by the Filipinos of our natural
resources, 65 and paragraph 4 does not speak of service
contracts but of FTAAs or Financial Technical Assistance
Agreements. 66
The public respondents again controvert the
petitioners' claims and asseverate that SC-46 does not violate
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They hold that
SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1 but
instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution on FTAAs. They also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3,
which refer to the grant of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos,
are not applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not grant
exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor does it otherwise impinge
on the FIDEC's right to preferential use of communal marine
and fishing resources. 67
Ruling of the Court
on the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-à-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for
having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's
marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively
to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow
small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country.In such
agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.(Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether
service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service
contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on
them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length,
portions of the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in
deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were
actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973
Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or
minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime, to
wit: AIDSTE
Summation of the
ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters
established, based on a careful reading of the
ConCom deliberations, as follows:
• In their deliberations on what was
to become paragraph 4, the framers used the
term service contracts in referring
to agreements ...involving either technical or
financial assistance.
• They spoke of service contracts as
the concept was understood in the 1973
Constitution.
• It was obvious from their
discussions that they were not about to ban
or eradicate service contracts.
• Instead, they were plainly crafting
provisions to put in place safeguards that
would eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the marital law regime.In
brief, they were going to permit service
contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors, but with safety measures to
prevent abuses, as an exception to the
general norm established in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII. This
provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens
— and corporations at least 60 percent of
which is owned by such citizens — the
exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources.
• This provision was prompted by the
perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and
the felt need for foreign investments in the
EDU of minerals and petroleum resources.
• The framers for the most part
debated about the sort of safeguards that
would be considered adequate and
reasonable. But some of them, having more
"radical" leanings, wanted to ban service
contracts altogether; for them, the provision
would permit aliens to exploit and benefit
from the nation's natural resources, which
they felt should be reserved only for Filipinos.
• In the explanation of their votes,
the individual commissioners were heard by
the entire body. They sounded off their
individual opinions, openly enunciated their
philosophies, and supported or attacked the
provisions with fervor. Everyone's viewpoint
was heard.
 • In the final voting, the Article on
the National Economy and Patrimony —
including paragraph 4 allowing service
contracts with foreign corporations as an
exception to the general norm in paragraph 1
of Section 2 of the same article — was
resoundingly approved by a vote of 32 to 7,
with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical
or Financial Assistance are
Service Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled
to conclude that the phrase agreements
involving either technical or financial
assistance,referred to in paragraph 4, are in
factservice contracts.But unlike those of the
1973 variety, the new ones are between
foreign corporations acting as contractors on
the one hand; and on the other, the
government as principal or "owner" of the
works. In the new service contracts, the
foreign contractors provide capital,
technology and technical know-how, and
managerial expertise in the creation and
operation of large-scale mining/extractive
enterprises; and the government, through its
agencies (DENR, MGB),actively exercises
control and supervision over the entire
operation. 68
In summarizing the matters discussed in the
ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards
in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article
XII.The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated
in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be
entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant
thereof is subject to several safeguards,
among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be
crafted in accordance with a general law that
will set standard or uniform terms, conditions
and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous
to the country.
(2) The President shall be the
signatory for the government because,
supposedly before an agreement is presented
to the President for signature, it will have
been vetted several times over at different
levels to ensure that it conforms to law and
can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed
agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government
an opportunity to look over the agreement
and interpose timely objections, if any. 69
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court
finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with
the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on
Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the
Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the
Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted
by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery
and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization
of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield
the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to
the Philippine Government. 70
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential
Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless
otherwise repealed, to wit:
ARTICLE XVIII — TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential
Decree No. 87, it would have been done expressly by Congress.
For instance, Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, expressly repealed a
number of laws, including a specific provision in Presidential
Decree No. 87, viz.:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause.— (a)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the "Local Government Code," Executive
Order No. 112 (1987),and Executive Order No.
319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684,
1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders,
instructions, memoranda and issuances
related to or concerning the barangay are
hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3,
and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding
hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special
Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144
as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559
and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as
amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and
Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477,
526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed
and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is
hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-
funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are
hereby repealed or amended insofar as they
are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53,
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74
of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended;
and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972,
as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts,
city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
 with any of the provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that
while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been expressly
repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. As we held
in Villareña v. The Commission on Audit,71 "[i]mplied repeals
are not lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are
in conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted to
reconcile them. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper
Mining Corporation,72 we said: AaCTcI
The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in
the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus
est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,every statute
must be so interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is
that the legislature should be presumed to
have known the existing laws on the subject
and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect
to all laws on the subject. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in
conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in
harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that
construction should be preferred. 73 This Court,
in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections 74 expounding on
this point, pronounced:
It is a basic precept in statutory
construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with
the Constitution and that the spirit, rather
than the letter of the law determines its
construction; for that reason, a statute must
be read according to its spirit and intent. . . . .
(Citation omitted.)
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners'
contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is
no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms,
conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that
while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law
upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the
exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the
present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS 75 area.
2. President was not the
signatory to SC-46 and the
same was not submitted to
Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the
absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a
signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such
contract, renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have
conformed not only to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. TheCivil
Code provides:
ARTICLE 1306. The contracting
parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law,morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. (Italics ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals,76 this Court
held that:
It is basic that the law is deemed
written into every contract. Although a
contract is the law between the parties, the
provisions of positive law which regulate
contracts are deemed written therein and
shall limit and govern the relations between
the parties. ....(Citations omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any
service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46
appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE
through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the
said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents
have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was
subsequently notified of the execution of such contract. acEHCD
Public respondents' implied argument that based on
the "alter ego principle," their acts are also that of then
President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case.
InJoson v. Torres,77 we explained the concept of the alter ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its
limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required
by theConstitution or law to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally,the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
(Emphasis ours, citation omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts
in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on
a much bigger role. As we have explained in La Bugal, they are
the safeguards put in place by the framers of
the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
during the martial law regime." 78 Thus, they are not just mere
formalities, which will only render a contract unenforceable but
not void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed,
not just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the
non-observance of which will nullify the contract. Elucidating on
the concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince
Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,79 held:
 A constitution is a system of fundamental
laws for the governance and administration of
a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute
and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the
nation.It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government
is founded. The fundamental conception in
other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must
be determined and all public authority
administered.Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that
law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect.Thus, since theConstitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.(Emphasis ours.)
As this Court has held in La Bugal,
our Constitution requires that the President himself be the
signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving the exploration, development, and
utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
This power cannot be taken lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show
that the President had any participation in SC-46. Their
argument that their acts are actually the acts of then President
Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as
the requirement that the President herself enter into these
kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute,
but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving
the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present and future
generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that
the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and
likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate
departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has
authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE,
obtain the President's approval for the execution of any
contract under said statute, as shown in the following provision:
SECTION 5. Execution of contract
authorized in this Act.— Every contract herein
authorized shall, subject to the approval of
the President, be executed by the Petroleum
Board created in this Act, after due public
notice pre-qualification and public bidding or
concluded through negotiations. In case bids
are requested or if requested no bid is
submitted or the bids submitted are rejected
by the Petroleum Board for being
disadvantageous to the Government, the
contract may be concluded through
negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in
selecting the best offer for petroleum
operations, any of the following alternative
procedures may be resorted to by the
Petroleum Board, subject to prior approval of
the President[.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La
Bugal to harmonize the 1987 Constitution with the
aforementioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must
be shown that the government agency or subordinate official
has been authorized by the President to enter into such service
contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least
shown that the President subsequently approved of such
contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in
the case at bar.
Service Contract No. 46
vis-à-vis Other Laws
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147 or the Wildlife Resources
Conservation and Protection Act, which bans all marine
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits. They also
aver that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act),
which allows the exploration of protected areas for the purpose
of information-gathering, has been repealed by Section 27
of Republic Act No. 9147. The said petitioners further claim that
SC-46 is anathema to Republic Act No. 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998, which protects the rights of the
fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal waters, with the
exception being limited only to research and survey
activities. 80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the
exceptions under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, the gathering of
information must be in accordance with a DENR-approved
program, and the exploitation and utilization of energy
resources must be pursuant to a general law passed by
Congress expressly for that purpose. Since there is neither a
DENR-approved program nor a general law passed by Congress,
the seismic surveys and oil drilling operations were all done
illegally. 81 The FIDEC likewise contends that SC-46 infringes on
its right to the preferential use of the communal fishing waters
as it is denied free access within the prohibited zone, in
violation not only of the Fisheries Code but also of the 1987
Constitutional provisions on subsistence fisherfolk and social
justice. 82 Furthermore, the FIDEC believes that the provisions
in Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore drilling even
in municipal waters, should be deemed to have been rendered
inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No.
8550 andRepublic Act No. 7160, which reiterate the social
justice provisions of the Constitution. 83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory
construction and argue that Section 14 of the NIPAS Act is a
more particular provision and cannot be deemed to have been
repealed by the more general prohibition in Section 27
of Republic Act No. 9147. They aver that Section 14, under
which SC-46 falls, should instead be regarded as an exemption
to Section 27. 84
Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R.
No. 180771 that there was a violation of Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 9147, the public respondents assert that what the
section prohibits is the exploration of minerals, which as
defined in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, exclude energy
materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive
materials and geothermal energy. Thus, since SC-46 involves oil
and gas exploration, Section 27 does not apply. 85
 The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46
and insist that it does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX;
hence, it does not violate the rule on preferential use of
municipal waters. Moreover, they allege that JAPEX has not
banned fishing in the project area, contrary to the FIDEC's
claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of
the declining fish catch to the seismic surveys and aver that the
allegation is unfounded. They claim that according to the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources' fish catch data, the
reduced fish catch started in the 1970s due to destructive
fishing practices. 86 SDHTEC
Ruling of the Court
on the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-à-vis Other Laws
Although we have already established above that SC-
46 is null and void for being violative of the 1987 Constitution, it
is our duty to still rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other
pertinent laws, to serve as a guide for the Government when
executing service contracts involving not only the Tañon Strait,
but also other similar areas. While the petitioners allege that
SC-46 is in violation of several laws, including international
ones, their arguments focus primarily on the protected status of
the Tañon Strait, thus this Court will concentrate on those laws
that pertain particularly to the Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape.
The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded
by the islands of Cebu in the East and Negros in the West. It
harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered
species of dolphins and whales. For this reason, former
President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Tañon Strait as a
protected seascape in 1998 by virtue ofProclamation No.
1234 — Declaring the Tañon Strait situated in the Provinces of
Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected
Area pursuant to the NIPAS Actand shall be known as Tañon
Strait Protected Seascape.During former President Joseph E.
Estrada's time, he also constituted the Tañon Strait
Commission via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum
and sustained use of the resources in that area without
threatening its marine life. He followed this with Executive
Order No. 177, 87 wherein he included the mayor of Negros
Occidental Municipality/City as a member of the Tañon Strait
Commission, to represent the LGUs concerned. This
Commission, however, was subsequently abolished in 2002 by
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via Executive Order
No. 72. 88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature," 89 Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the
perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the
establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
protected areas. These areas possess common ecological values
that were incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our
natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly
remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that
are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and
animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether
terrestrial, wetland, or marine. 90 It classifies and administers
all the designated protected areas to maintain essential
ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve
genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found
therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest
extent possible. 91 The following categories of protected areas
were established under the NIPAS Act:
a. Strict nature reserve;
b. Natural park;
c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas; and
h. Other categories established by law,
conventions or international
agreements which the Philippine
Government is a signatory. 92
Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected
area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their
unique physical and biological significance, managed to
enhance biological diversity and protected against human
exploitation.
The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234,
was set aside and declared a protected area under the category
of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected
Seascape to be an area of national significance characterized by
the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing
opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and
tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this
areas; 93 thus a management plan for each area must be
designed to protect and enhance the permanent preservation
of its natural conditions. 94 Consistent with this endeavor is the
requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be
made prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the
management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is
obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of theNIPAS
Act shall be implemented. 95
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS)
was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It
prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from
undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical
project or areas without first securing an ECC issued by the
President or his duly authorized representative. 96 Pursuant to
the EISS, which called for the proper management of
environmentally critical areas, 97 Proclamation No. 2146 98 was
enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to be
considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of
the EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30
provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines
an environmentally critical area as "an area delineated as
environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental
impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or
programs are located, developed, or implemented in
it";99 thus, before a project,which is "any activity, regardless of
scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the
environment," 100 is undertaken in it, such project must
undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all
its stages on the environment. 101 An EIA is described in detail
as follows:
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) —
process that involves evaluating and
predicting the likely impacts of a
project (including cumulative impacts)
on the environment during
construction, commissioning, operation
and abandonment. It also includes
designing appropriate preventive,
mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to
 protect the environment and the
community's welfare. The process is
undertaken by, among others, the
project proponent and/or EIA
Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee,
affected communities and other
stakeholders. 102
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an
environmentally critical area, having been declared as a
protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be implemented
pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to
determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
The public respondents argue that they had complied
with the procedures in obtaining an ECC 103 and that SC-46 falls
under the exceptions in Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, due to the
following reasons:
1) The Tañon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or
natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering
information on possible energy resources; and
3) Measures are undertaken to ensure that the
exploration is being done with the least damage to surrounding
areas. 104
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the
public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact
Assessment.— Proposals for activities which
are outside the scope of the management
plan for protected areas shall be subject to an
environmental impact assessment as required
by law before they are adopted, and the
results thereof shall be taken into
consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such
activities shall be allowed without the
required Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
system. In instances where such activities are
allowed to be undertaken, the proponent
shall plan and carry them out in such manner
as will minimize any adverse effects and take
preventive and remedial action when
appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for
any damage due to lack of caution or
indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy
Resources.— Consistent with the policies
declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas,
except strict nature reserves and natural
parks, may be subjected to exploration only
for the purpose of gathering information on
energy resources and only if such activity is
carried out with the least damage to
surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted
only in accordance with a program approved
by the DENR, and the result of such surveys
shall be made available to the public and
submitted to the President for
recommendation to Congress. Any
exploitation and utilization of energy
resources found within NIPAS areas shall be
allowed only through a law passed by
Congress. AScHCD
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS
Act are not without exceptions. However, while an exploration
done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is
allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean
that it is exempt from the requirement to undergo an EIA
under Section 12.In Sotto v. Sotto,105 this Court explained why
a statute should be construed as a whole:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts
or sections and is animated by one general
purpose and intent. Consequently each part
or section should be construed in connection
with every other part or section and so as to
produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper
to confine the attention to the one section to
be construed. It is always an unsafe way of
construing a statute or contract to divide it by
a process of etymological dissection, into
separate words, and then apply to each, thus
separated from its context, some particular
definition given by lexicographers, and then
reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of
these definitions. An instrument must always
be construed as a whole, and the particular
meaning to be attached to any word or phrase
is usually to be ascertained from the context,
the nature of the subject treated of and the
purpose or intention of the parties who
executed the contract, or of the body which
enacted or framed the statute or constitution.
....
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is
not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in
Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides
foradditional requisites before any exploration for energy
resources may be done in protected areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are
incorporated in Section 2 of the NIPAS Act, to wit:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. —
Cognizant of the profound impact of man's
activities on all components of the natural
environment particularly the effect of
increasing population, resource exploitation
and industrial advancement and recognizing
the critical importance of protecting and
maintaining the natural biological and physical
diversities of the environment notably on
areas with biologically unique features to
sustain human life and development, as well
as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared
the policy of the State to secure for the
Filipino people of present and future
generations the perpetual existence of all
native plants and animals through the
establishment of a comprehensive system of
integrated protected areas within the
classification of national park as provided for
in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these
areas, although distinct in features, possess
common ecological values that may be
incorporated into a holistic plan
representative of our natural heritage; that
 effective administration of this area is
possible only through cooperation among
national government, local government and
concerned private organizations; that the use
and enjoyment of these protected areas must
be consistent with the principles of biological
diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby
established a National Integrated Protected
Areas System (NIPAS),which shall encompass
outstandingly remarkable areas and
biologically important public lands that are
habitats of rare and endangered species of
plants and animals, biogeographic zones and
related ecosystems, whether terrestrial,
wetland or marine, all of which shall be
designated as "protected areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that
JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second sub-
phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration
well. This means that when the seismic surveys were done in
the Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was
done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan
of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of
Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1586, which provides: HESIcT
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation
of Environmentally Critical Areas and
Projects.— The President of the Philippines
may, on his own initiative or upon
recommendation of the National
Environmental Protection Council, by
proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as
environmentally critical. No person,
partnership or corporation shall undertake or
operate any such declared environmentally
critical project or area without first securing
an Environmental Compliance Certificate
issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. For the proper management
of said critical project or area, the President
may by his proclamation reorganize such
government offices, agencies, institutions,
corporations or instrumentalities including
the re-alignment of government personnel,
and their specific functions and
responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the
Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a)
prepare the proper land or water use pattern
for said critical project(s) or area(s);(b)
establish ambient environmental quality
standards; (c) develop a program of
environmental enhancement or protective
measures against calamitous factors such as
earthquakes, floods, water erosion and
others, and (d) perform such other functions
as may be directed by the President from time
to time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS
for the second sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will not cure this
violation. The following penalties are provided for
under Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the NIPAS Act.
Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for
the penalty involving violations of the ECC requirement:
Section 9. Penalty for Violation.—
Any person, corporation or partnership found
violating Section 4 of this Decree, or the terms
and conditions in the issuance of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of
the standards, rules and regulations issued by
the National Environmental Protection
Council pursuant to this Decree shall be
punished by the suspension or cancellation of
his/its certificates and/or a fine in an amount
not to exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) for every violation thereof, at
the discretion of the National Environmental
Protection Council.(Emphasis supplied.)
Violations of the NIPAS Act entails the following fines
and/or imprisonment under Section 21:
SECTION 21. Penalties.— Whoever
violates this Act or any rules and regulations
issued by the Department pursuant to this Act
or whoever is found guilty by a competent
court of justice of any of the offenses in the
preceding section shall be fined in the
amount of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) nor more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000),exclusive of the
value of the thing damaged or imprisonment
for not less than one (1) year but not more
than six (6) years, or both, as determined by
the court:Provided, that, if the area requires
rehabilitation or restoration as determined
by the court, the offender shall be required
to restore or compensate for the restoration
to the damages:Provided, further, that court
shall order the eviction of the offender from
the land and the forfeiture in favor of the
Government of all minerals, timber or any
species collected or removed including all
equipment, devices and firearms used in
connection therewith, and any construction
or improvement made thereon by the
offender.If the offender is an association or
corporation, the president or manager shall
be directly responsible for the act of his
employees and laborers: Provided, finally,
that the DENR may impose administrative
fines and penalties consistent with this
Act.(Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere
purpose of gathering information on the possible energy
resources in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties'
rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum
production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist
in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the
exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the
present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.106 Since
there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration
and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected
seascape.
 In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is
no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in these
consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE,the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and
181527 are GRANTED,Service Contract No. 46 is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987
Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree
No. 1586.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J.,Carpio, Velasco, Jr.,Brion, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,concur.
Leonen, J.,see concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, * J.,took no part; prior OSG action.
Separate Opinions
"Until one
has loved an
animal,
a part of
one's soul
remains
unawakened
."
Anatole
France
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, with the following additional
reasons.
I Resident Marine Mammals would assert had they been humans
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity,
alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the
judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead
themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of
the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's
Creations." 1 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 2 as basis for their
claim, asserting their right to enforce international and
domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under
the concept of stipulation pour autrui.3 As the representatives
of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert
that they have the obligation to build awareness among the
affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the
environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as
primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public
trust. 4
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners
also assert that through this case, this court will have the
opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an
exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction." 5
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their
desire to protect the environment and to continue to define
environmental rights in the context of actual cases is
commendable. However, the space for legal creativity usually
required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so
unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the other
values protected by current substantive and procedural laws.
Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set the balance
between competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules
when the necessity is not clearly and convincingly presented.
The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to
create substantive and procedural rights for animals through
their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are
asked to accept the premises that (a) they were chosen by the
Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were
chosen by a representative group of all the species of the
Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate
with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their
animal principals that they would wish to use human legal
institutions to pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us
to acknowledge through judicial notice that the interests that
they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what the
and the legal strategies that they invoked are the strategies that
they agree with.
In the alternative, they want us to accept through
judicial notice that there is a relationship of guardianship
between them and all the resident mammals in the affected
ecology.
Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly
change substantive and procedural law cannot be founded on
feigned representation.
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only
speak for themselves and already have legal standing to sue
with respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on
standing have already been liberalized to take into
consideration the difficulties in the assertion of environmental
rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be the
occasion for abuse.
II
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
in part, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and
defendant.— Only natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or
juridical persons or entities that may be authorized by statute
to be parties in a civil action. caITAC
Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in
our Civil Code:
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost
only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.
Article 40 further defines natural persons in the
following manner:
ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but
the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it,
provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article.
Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept
of a juridical person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical
persons:
(1) The State and its political
subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and
entities for public interest or
purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as
they have been constituted
according to law;
 (3) Corporations, partnerships and
associations for private
interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and
distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or
member.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that
we amend, rather than simply construe, the provisions of the
Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate
Resident Marine Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure further defines real party in interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.— A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. (2a) 6
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury
from the judgment of a case is a real party in interest. 7 When a
case is brought to the courts, the real party in interest must
show that another party's act or omission has caused a direct
injury, making his or her interest both material and based on an
enforceable legal right. 8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are
parties acting in representation of the real party in interest, as
defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties.— Where
the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and
shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or
these Rules. An agent acting in his own name
and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal. (3a) 9
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines a
representative as a party who is not bound to directly or
actually benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings
a case in favor of an identified real party in interest. 10 The
representative is an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the
rule provides a list of who may be considered as
"representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the rule limits
the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of
Court. 11
These requirements should apply even in cases
involving the environment, which means that for the Petition of
the human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the
Resident Marine Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b)
that the human petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules
to act in a representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of
"toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species inhabiting Tañon Strait." 12 While relatively new in
Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have legal
standing before courts has been the subject of academic
discourse in light of the emergence of animal and
environmental rights.
In the United States, animal rights advocates have
managed to establish a system which Hogan explains as the
"guardianship model for nonhuman animals":13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a
well-established system by which nonhuman
animals may obtain judicial review to enforce
their statutory rights and protections:
guardianships. With court approval, animal
advocacy organizations may bring suit on
behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way
court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf
of mentally-challenged humans who possess
an enforceable right but lack the ability to
enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but
pivotal Should Trees Have Standing? —
Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects,Christopher D. Stone asserts that the
environment should possess the right to seek
judicial redress even though it is incapable of
representing itself. While asserting the rights
of speechless entities such as the
environment or nonhuman animals certainly
poses legitimate challenges — such as
identifying the proper spokesman — the
American legal system is already well-
equipped with a reliable mechanism by which
nonhumans may obtain standing via a
judicially-established guardianship. Stone
notes that other speechless — and nonhuman
— entities such as corporations, states,
estates, and municipalities have standing to
bring suit on their own behalf. There is little
reason to fear abuses under this regime as
procedures for removal and substitution,
avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination
of a guardianship are well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers
suggests that such an arrangement is indeed
possible. The court indicated that ALVA might
have obtained standing in its own right if it
had an established history of dedication to the
cause of the humane treatment of animals. It
noted that the Fund for Animals had standing
and indicated that another more well-known
advocacy organization might have had
standing as well. The court further concluded
that an organization's standing is more than a
derivative of its history, but history is a
relevant consideration where organizations
are not well-established prior to commencing
legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff
because it could not identify previous activities
demonstrating its recognized activism for and
commitment to the dispute independent of its
desire to pursue legal action. The court's
analysis suggests that a qualified organization
with a demonstrated commitment to a cause
could indeed bring suit on behalf of the
speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned
guardianship.
 This Comment advocates a shift in
contemporary standing doctrine to empower
non-profit organizations with an established
history of dedication to the cause and relevant
expertise to serve as official guardians ad
litem on behalf of nonhuman animals
interests.The American legal system has
numerous mechanisms for representing the
rights and interests of nonhumans; any
challenges inherent in extending these pre-
existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals
are minimal compared to an interest in the
proper administration of justice. To
adequately protect the statutory rights of
nonhuman animals, the legal system must
recognize those statutory rights independent
of humans and provide a viable means of
enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a
guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not
new and has been urged on behalf of the
natural environment. Such a model is even
more compelling as applied to nonhuman
animals, because they are sentient beings
with the ability to feel pain and exercise
rational thought. Thus, animals are
qualitatively different from other legally
protected nonhumans and therefore have
interests deserving direct legal protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of
enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman
animals threatens the integrity of the federal
statutes designed to protect them, essentially
rendering them meaningless. Sensing that
laws protecting nonhuman animals would be
difficult to enforce, Congress provided for
citizen suit provisions: the most well-known
example is found in the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).Such provisions are evidence of
legislative intent to encourage civic
participation on behalf of nonhuman animals.
Our law of standing should reflect this intent
and its implication that humans are suitable
representatives of the natural environment,
which includes nonhuman
animals. 14(Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of
representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as
individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate
reason (e.g.,cognitive disability),are unable to bring suit for
themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very
nature are incapable of speaking for themselves
(e.g.,corporations, states, and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized
both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue
and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in
interest. The same cannot be said about animals.
Animals play an important role in households,
communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may
feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far
as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore,
speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so
arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and
that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a
case before the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n. v.
Weinberger,15 the court held that an emotional response to
what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is
not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law.16 Such
sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a substitute for an
actual injury suffered by the claimant. 17 The ability to
represent animals was further limited in that case by the need
to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting
animal rights: ICHDca
What ultimately proved fatal to
ALVA's claim, however was the court's
assertion that standing doctrine further
required ALVA to differentiate its genuine
dedication to the humane treatment of
animals from the general disdain for animal
cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing
so, the court found ALVA's asserted
organizational injury to be abstract and thus
relegated ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned
bystander."
xxx xxx xxx
In fact, the opinion in Animal
Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is
indeed possible. The court indicated that
ALVA might have obtained standing in its own
right if it had an established history of
dedication to the cause of the humane
treatment of animals.It noted that the Fund
for Animals had standing and indicated that
another more well-known advocacy
organization might have had standing as
well. The court further concluded that an
organization's standing is more than a
derivative of its history, but history is a
relevant consideration where organizations
are not well-established prior to commencing
legal action.ALVA was not the proper plaintiff
because it could not identify previous
activities demonstrating its recognized
activism for and commitment to the dispute
independent of its desire to pursue legal
action. The court's analysis suggests that a
qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring
suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of
a court-sanctioned guardianship.18(Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept
of guardianship is the principle of human stewardship over the
environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to act as
a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under
environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is defined in
Section 5:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit.— Any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon the filing of a
citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all interested parties to manifest
their interest to intervene in the case within
 fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all
affected barangays copies of said order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical
requirements of this case to implead and feign representation
on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very
anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no
way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone
present that they would wish to use our court system, which is
designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their
responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for
themselves, which of course includes compassion for all living
things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be
further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further
reviewing the broad interpretation we have given to the rule on
standing. While representatives are not required to establish
direct injury on their part, they should only be allowed to
represent after complying with the following:
[I]t is imperative for them to indicate with
certainty the injured parties on whose behalf
they bring the suit. Furthermore, the interest
of those they represent must be based upon
concrete legal rights. It is not sufficient to
draw out a perceived interest from a general,
nebulous idea of a potential "injury." 20
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v.
Casiño 21 regarding this rule alongside the appreciation of legal
standing in Oposa v. Factoran 22 for environmental cases.
In Arigo,I opined that procedural liberality, especially in cases
brought by representatives, should be used with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling
in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at
that time, there was need to call attention to
environmental concerns in light of emerging
international legal principles. While
"intergenerational responsibility" is a noble
principle, it should not be used to obtain
judgments that would preclude future
generations from making their own
assessment based on their actual concerns.
The present generation must restrain itself
from assuming that it can speak best for those
who will exist at a different time, under a
different set of circumstances. In essence, the
unbridled resort to representative suit will
inevitably result in preventing future
generations from protecting their own rights
and pursuing their own interests and
decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our
children and our children's children. Even
before they are born, we again restricted their
ability to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use
of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases
should be allowed only when a) there is a clear
legal basis for the representative suit; b) there
are actual concerns based squarely upon an
existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of
any countervailing interests existing within the
population represented or those that are yet
to be born; and d) there is an absolute
necessity for such standing because there is a
threat of catastrophe so imminent that an
immediate protective measure is necessary.
Better still, in the light of its costs and risks,
we abandon the precedent all
together.23 (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's
jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest
to protect. He or she who invokes the court's
jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right
sought to be enforced." In other words, he or
she must have a cause of action. An action
may be dismissed on the ground of lack of
cause of action if the person who instituted it
is not the real party in interest. 24 The term
"interest" under the Rules of Court must refer
to a material interest that is not merely a
curiosity about or an "interest in the question
involved." The interest must be present and
substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in
interest may institute an action if he or she is
suing as representative of a real party in
interest. When an action is prosecuted or
defended by a representative, that
representative is not and does not become
the real party in interest. The person
represented is deemed the real party in
interest. The representative remains to be a
third party to the action instituted on behalf
of another.
xxx xxx xxx
To sue under this rule, two elements
must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on
behalf of an identified party whose right has
been violated, resulting in some form of
damage, and (b) the representative
authorized by law or the Rules of Court to
represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's
suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any
Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf
of minors or generations yet unborn. It is
essentially a representative suit that allows
persons who are not real parties in interest to
institute actions on behalf of the real party in
interest.
The expansion of what constitutes
"real party in interest" to include minors and
generations yet unborn is a recognition of this
court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.This court
recognized the capacity of minors
(represented by their parents) to file a class
suit on behalf of succeeding generations
based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility to ensure the future
generation's access to and enjoyment of [the]
country's natural resources.
 To allow citizen's suits to enforce Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial No person may implead any other person as a co-
environmental rights of others, including pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent. In our
future generations, is dangerous for three based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a jurisdiction, only when there is a party that should have been a
reasons: right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their necessary party but was unwilling to join would there be an
First,they run the concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3,
risk of foreclosing injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:TCAScE
arguments of others who seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be
are unable to take part in guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to pleaded.— Whenever in any pleading in
the suit, putting into ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, which a claim is asserted a necessary party is
question its well-founded arguments" 26 on behalf of those they represent. not joined, the pleader shall set forth his
representativeness. Second, Creative approaches to fundamental problems should name, if known, and shall state why he is
varying interests may be welcome. However, they should be considered carefully so omitted. Should the court find the reason for
potentially result in that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should the omission unmeritorious, it may order the
arguments that are follow. I concur with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. inclusion of the omitted necessary party if
bordering on political issues, Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
the resolutions of which do narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident The failure to comply with the order for his
not fall upon this Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be
court. Third,automatically standing to file any kind of petition. deemed a waiver of the claim against such
allowing a class or citizen's However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, party.
suit on behalf of minors and namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, The non-inclusion of a necessary party does
generations yet unborn may Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties not prevent the court from proceeding in the
result in the in interest and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of action, and the judgment rendered therein
oversimplification of what the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and shall be without prejudice to the rights of
may be a complex issue, their families, and the present and future generations of such necessary party. 29
especially in light of the Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner
impossibility of determining undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected but whose consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded as
future generation's true their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule
interests on the matter. reduction of their fish harvest. 27 The actual, direct, and 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
In citizen's suits, persons who may material damage they suffered, which has potential long-term
SEC. 10.Unwilling co-plaintiff.— If the
have no interest in the case may file suits for effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a legal
consent of any party who should be joined as
others. Uninterested persons will argue for suit.
the persons they represent, and the court will plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made
III a defendant and the reason therefor shall be
decide based on their evidence and In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal stated in the complaint. 30
arguments. Any decision by the court will be basis for the concept of implied petitioners, most especially
binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party
when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the plaintiffs who should be part of the action but who do not
case are the minors and the future Republic of the Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from
generations. The court's decision will be res consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court
adjudicating unto themselves the status of "legal guardians" of through summons or other court processes. Petitioners should
judicata upon them and conclusive upon the whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, human
issues presented. 25 not take it upon themselves to simply implead any party who
petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal- does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express declaration petitioner at the risk of being denied due process.
kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon
the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Strait." 28
application of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-equal constitutional
department, we cannot assume that the President needs to
enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The
procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained
public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the
contemptuous. The Former President's name should be stricken
out of the title of this case.
IV
I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both
illegal and unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No.
7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992, and Presidential Decree No. 1234, 31 which declared
Tañon Strait as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional
because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2
of the Constitution.
V
Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned. 32 It
further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a
technical and financial assistance agreement executed under
Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987
Constitution. 33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does
not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1, but is a validly
executed contract under paragraph 4. 34 Public respondents
further aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive fishing rights
to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center's right to preferential use of communal marine and
fishing resources. 35
VI
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2.All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's
marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively
to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow
small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to
the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may
participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural
resources, but only through either financial agreements or
technical ones. This is the clear import of the words
"either financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also
the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision
with the versions in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE
PATRIMONY OF
THE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration,
development, of exploitation, or utilization of
any of the natural resources of the Philippines
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or association at least sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in
the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter
into service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person or entity
for the exploitation, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources.Existing valid and binding
service contracts for financial, the technical,
management, or other forms of assistance are
hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis
supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
 or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power,
in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history
prevails over any attempt to infer interpretation from the
Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional
texts are the product of a full sovereign act: deliberations in a
constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on recorded
discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand,
may result in dependence on incomplete authorship. Besides, it
opens judicial review to further subjectivity from those who
spoke during the Constitutional Commission deliberations who
may not have predicted how their words will be used. It is safer
that we use the words already in the Constitution.
TheConstitution was their product. Its words were read by
those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies
upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical
assistance agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it
could not be declared valid in light of the standards set forth
in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36
Such service contracts may be
entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils.The grant
thereof is subject to several safeguards,
among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted
in accordance with a general
law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and
requirements, presumably to
attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the
country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory
for the government because,
supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the
President for signature, it will
have been vetted several
times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to
law and can withstand public
scrutiny. cTDaEH
(3) Within thirty days of the executed
agreement, the President shall
report it to Congress to give
that branch of government an
opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose
timely objections, if
any. 37 (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal,SC-
46'S validity must be tested against three important points: (a)
whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law
that provides standards, terms, and conditions; (b) whether SC-
46 was signed by the President for and on behalf of the
government; and (c) whether it was reported by the President
to Congress within 30 days of execution.
VII
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-
46's validity is Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972. It is my opinion that this law is
unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
The President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according
to the general terms and conditions provided
by law,based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources. (Emphasis
supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the
enumeration of the kind of agreements the President may enter
into with foreign-owned corporations for exploration and
utilization of resources means that service contracts are no
longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, 38 this inconsistency
renders the law invalid and ineffective.
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its
activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an important point,
which is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities,
but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties
should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities
in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected seascape
under Presidential Decree No. 1234 39 requires that the
exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area
are explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically
for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources.—
Consistent with the policies declared in
Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except
strict nature reserves and natural parks, may
be subjected to exploration only for the
purpose of gathering information on energy
resources and only if such activity is carried
out with the least damage to surrounding
areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in
accordance with a program approved by the
DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be
made available to the public and submitted to
the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of
 energy resources found within NIPAS areas
shall be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)
No law was passed by Congress specifically providing
the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil exploration,
extraction, and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no
such activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-46.
The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is
clear that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a
protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be allowed
through a specific law.
VIII
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the
signatory to SC-46, contrary to the requirement set by
paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts
involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into
by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on
behalf of the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in
cases where the Constitution or law requires the President to
act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated to
another public official. 41 La Bugal highlights the importance of
the President's involvement, being one of the constitutional
safeguards against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters
established, based on a careful reading of the
ConCom deliberations, as follows:
• In their deliberations on what was to
become paragraph 4, the
framers used the term service
contracts in referring
to agreements ...involving
either technical or financial
assistance.
• They spoke of service contracts as the
concept was understood in
the 1973 Constitution.
• It was obvious from their discussions
that they were not about to
ban or eradicate service
contracts.
• Instead, they were plainly crafting
provisions to put in place
safeguards that would
eliminate or minimize the
abuses prevalent during the
marital law
regime.42(Emphasis in the
original)
Public respondents failed to show that Former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in the signing
or execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with this
constitutional requirement renders SC-46 null and void.
IX
Public respondents also failed to show that Congress
was subsequently informed of the execution and existence of
SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally important
requisite to the validity of any service contract involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of Philippine
petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to Congress
about SC-46 effectively took away any opportunity for the
legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent
all the requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII,
Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void.
X
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having
complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for
being violative of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In
particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the
requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992.
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No.
1234, 43 Tañon Strait is covered by the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a
matter of policy:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — Cognizant of
the profound impact of man's activities on all
components of the natural environment
particularly the effect of increasing
population, resource exploitation and
industrial advancement and recognizing the
critical importance of protecting and
maintaining the natural biological and physical
diversities of the environment notably on
areas with biologically unique features to
sustain human life and development, as well
as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared
the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino
people of present and future generations the
perpetual existence of all native plants and
animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas within the classification of national park
as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these
areas, although distinct in features, possess
common ecological values that may be
incorporated into a holistic plan
representative of our natural heritage; that
effective administration of these areas is
possible only through cooperation among
national government, local and concerned
private organizations; that the use and
enjoyment of these protected areas must be
consistent with the principles of biological
diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby
established a National Integrated Protected
Areas System (NIPAS),which shall encompass
outstanding remarkable areas and biologically
important public lands that are habitats of
rare and endangered species of plants and
animals, biogeographic zones and related
ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or
marine, all of which shall be designated as
"protected areas." 44 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon
Strait must undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment:
SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. —
Proposals for activities which are outside the
scope of the management plan for protected
areas shall be subject to an environmental
impact assessment as required by law before
they are adopted, and the results thereof shall
be taken into consideration in the decision-
making process.45(Emphasis supplied)
 The same provision further requires that an
Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured under the
Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment System before any
project is implemented:
No actual implementation of such activities
shall be allowed without the required
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
under the Philippine Environment Impact
Assessment (EIA) system.In instances where
such activities are allowed to be undertaken,
the proponent shall plan and carry them out
in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and take preventive and remedial
action when appropriate.The proponent shall
be liable for any damage due to lack of
caution or indiscretion. 46 (Emphasis
supplied)
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of
energy resources, the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be
approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The program shall
also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend
the program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a
law specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources
found within a protected area such as Tañon Strait: cSaATC
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. —
Consistent with the policies declared in
Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except
strict nature reserves and natural parks, may
be subjected to exploration only for the
purpose of gathering information on energy
resources and only if such activity is carried
out with the least damage to surrounding
areas.Surveys shall be conducted only in
accordance with a program approved by the
DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be
made available to the public and submitted to
the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of
energy resources found within NIPAS areas
shall be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)
Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the with candor and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility
procedural requirements of obtaining an Environmental deserving of the grace and power endowed on our species.
Compliance Certificate. 48 At any rate, they assert that the ACCORDINGLY,I vote:
activities covered by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the National (a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they STRIKE OUT the name of Former President
interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They argue that the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this
Environmental Compliance Certificate is not a strict case;
requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Tañon Strait is
(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and
not a nature reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was
merely for gathering information; and (c) measures were in (c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID
place to ensure that the exploration caused the least possible for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic
damage to the area. 49 Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No.
1234.
Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but
instead provides additional requirements for cases involving ||| (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon
Philippine energy resources. The National Integrated Protected Strait v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527, [April 21, 2015])
Areas System Act of 1992 was enacted to recognize the
importance of protecting the environment in light of resource
exploitation, among others. 50 Systems are put in place to
secure for Filipinos local resources under the most favorable
conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape, the institution of additional legal safeguards is even
more significant.
Public respondents did not validly obtain an
Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46. Based on the
records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental impact
evaluation only in the second sub-phase of its project, with the
Environmental Management Bureau of Region VII granting the
project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6,
2007. 51 Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18,
2005 were conducted without any environmental assessment
contrary to Section 12 of theNational Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992.
XI
Finally, we honor every living creature when we take
care of our environment. As sentient species, we do not lack in
the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the
resources that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not
incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly causing the
demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign
representation of any other species or some imagined unborn
generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim any
of our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and