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20. Diaz vs Encanto | GR No.

171303, January 20, 2016


Facts:
Elizabeth L. Diaz has been in the service of UP since 1963. On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-
application directly with U.P.'s Office of the President (Abueva) for sabbatical leave with pay for one
(1) year effective June 1988 to May 1989. The Chair of the Broadcast Department, initially
recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that Diaz's sabbatical application be granted. Thereafter,
Encanto referred Diaz's sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P., recommending its denial. He
requested to hold Diaz's salary effective July 1, 1988 until further notice considering that her
sabbatical application has not yet been approved and that she did not teach that semester.
On July 4, 1988, it was recommended that Diaz be granted a leave without pay in order to enable
the CMC to hire a substitute. Diaz requested to teach for the second semester and Encanto was
instructed that until Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty,
and the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report for duty, she is considered AWOL for the
University.
On November 8, 1988, Abad, then as OIC, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid
Encanto's reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical. Later, he also informed
Diaz of her lack of service during the first semester of AY 1988-89, hence, she is not entitled to be
paid and asked her to clarify her status of being on leave without pay.
Thereafter, Diaz instituted a complaint claiming that [respondents] conspired together as joint
tortfeasors, in not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year 1988-
89, for the entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the salaries
she earned from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May 1989. She likewise
claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue:
WON respondents acted in bad faith in denying petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave and
in withholding her salaries.
Held:
No. Petitioner Diaz's complaint for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on the alleged
bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-a-vis Articles 19 and
20 of the Civil Code.
The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the RTC to this Court, have already established
that a sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore petitioner Diaz cannot demand its grant. It does
not matter that there was only one reason for the denial of her application, as the approving
authorities found that such reason was enough. Moreover, not only the Court of Appeals but also the
Ombudsman, and this Court, have ruled that the respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner
Diaz's sabbatical leave application was denied. Those three separate rulings verily must be given
great weight in the case at bar. While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been granted
a sabbatical leave, it is important to note that the RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely
for the unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave... application,
and not its denial per se. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and
that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same.
Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held liable for any
damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. "The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have been appropriately...
denominated damnum absque injuria." Similarly, the Court cannot grant petitioner Diaz's claim for
attorney's fees as no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. "Even when a claimant is
compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to... protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be
awarded where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other
than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
21. Sps. Carbonell vs Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company | G.R. No. 178467, April 26, 2017
Facts:
The petitioners alleged that they had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule,
humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to Bangkok, Thailand because of the
respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that turned out to be counterfeit.
They withdrew US$ l, 000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros
branch. While in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$
100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no good."
Because of currency’s rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon
Bank in Bangkok, thereat the dollar bill was declared “fake, and was confiscated by the bank teller.
On the next day, they had been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four
US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit after they had bought jewelry.
Upon the petitioners’ return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of the respondent's
Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had released
to them were genuine, for the bills were certified by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) after
examination. They had demanded moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages.
Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the respondent's
representatives. In the course of the two meetings, the latter's representatives reiterated their
sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners had encountered, and
offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-
expense-paid trip to Hong Kong, but they were adamant and staged a walk-out.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners appealed, but the CA ultimately
promulgated its assailed decision affirming the judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting
the award of attorney's fees.
Issue:
WON the respondent should be liable for moral and exemplary damages.
Held:
No. It is true that the petitioners suffered embarrassment and humiliation in Bangkok. Yet, we should
distinguish between damage and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result
of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the
consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. Indeed, the lack of malice in the conduct complained of precluded
the recovery of damages.
Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit
US dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure
in handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty towards them. Being neither
guilty of negligence nor remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature
of its obligation as a banking institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation
being one of damnum absque injuria, they could not be compensated for the damage sustained.
22. Obana vs Court of Appeals | G.R.NO. L-36249 March 29, 1985
Facts:
SANDOVAL is the owner and manager of the "Sandoval and Sons Rice Mill" located in Rosales,
Pangasinan. He is engaged in the buying and selling of palay.
On November 21, 1964, SANDOVAL was approached by a certain Chan Lin who offered to purchase
from him 170 cavans of clean rice, delivery to be made the following day at petitioner's store in San
Fernando, La Union, with payment to be made thereat by Chan Lin to SANDOVAL's representative.
The following day, the shipment was accompanied by Chan Lin. Upon arrival, the goods were
unloaded but when the truck driver attempted to collect the purchase price from Chan Lin, the latter
was nowhere to be found. The driver tried to collect from petitioner, but the latter refused stating that
he had purchase the goods from Chan Lin and that the price therefore had already been paid to
Chan Lin.
Due to repeated demands to collect the payment, Sandoval filed a case with the Municipal Court
which rendered judgment in his favor.
When the case reached the CA it held that, on principle of equity, it is but proper that plaintiff-
appellant be allowed to recover the one-hundred and seventy cavans of rice or its value. Being the
undisputed owner of the above mentioned goods, the appellant cannot be deprived of its ownership
without the corresponding payment.
Issue:
WON Sandoval be allowed to recover the 170 cavans of rice or its value.
Held:
Yes. Having been repaid the purchases price by Chan Lin, the sale, as between them, had been
voluntarily rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was thereby divested of any claim to the rice.
Technically, therefore, he should return the rice to Chan Lin, but since even the latter, again from
petitioner-defendant's own testimony above-quoted, was ready to return the rice to SANDOVAL, and
the latter's driver denies that the rice had been returned by petitioner-defendant cannot be allowed
to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another by holding on to property no longer belonging to
him. In law and in equity, therefore, SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice, or the value thereof
since he was not paid the price therefor.
23. Republic vs Lacap | G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
Facts:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid."
Respondent was doing business under the name and style Carwin Construction and Construction
Supply (Carwin Construction). Respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the contract
for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Thereafter, a Contract Agreement was executed by
respondent and petitioner. Accordingly, respondent undertook the works, made advances for the
purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs.
After the completion of the project, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.
The DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of COA disapproved the final
release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of
the execution of the contract.
Issue:
WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects.
Held:
Yes. RA 4566 does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor
whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine
prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment,
however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.
Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet
lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury). The rules thereon apply equally
well to the Government. Since respondent had rendered services to the full satisfaction and
acceptance by petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to
acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the
petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
24. RCPI vs Verchez | G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006
Facts:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Verchez was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an
ailment. Her daughter, Grace immediately went to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to
her sister Zenaida asking for money.
Three days after since there was no response from Zenaida, Grace sent another letter through JRS
Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.
She immediately received the letter and went to Sorsogon and claimed that she did not receive any
telegram. The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15, 1991. RCPI
reasoned that the address was not located at first.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died. Thus, compelled Grace and Zenaida together with their respective
spouses filed a complaint against RCPI. They alleged that the delay in delivering the telegram
contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they prayed
for the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Issue:
WON the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court found that there was no direct
connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts
Held:
Yes. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind
not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the
"filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an
emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous
to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict
when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
25. Zulueta vs Court of Appeals | G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner to which the RTC and CA ruled in his favor. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
WON the documents and papers are admissible in evidence.
Held:
No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person,
by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
26. Loria vs. Munoz | G.R. No. 187240 October 15, 2014
Facts:
Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. (Muñoz) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Carlos A.
Loria (Loria). In his complaint, Muñoz alleged that he has been engaged in construction under the
name, "Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. Construction." In August 2000, Loria visited Muñoz in his office in Doña
Maria Subdivision in Daraga, Albay. He invited Muñoz to advance P2,000,000.00 for a subcontract
of a P50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in Guinobatan.
Loria represented that he would make arrangements such that the owner of Sunwest Construction
and Development Corporation, would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project. Elizaldy Co
would pay ₱8,000,000.00 to ensure the project’s award to Sunwest. After the award to Sunwest,
Sunwest would subcontract 20% or ₱10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Muñoz.
Since Muñoz had known Loria for five years, Muñoz accepted Loria’s proposal. The project to dredge
the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan was subjected to public bidding. The
project was awarded to the lowest bidder, Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation.
Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers without
subcontracting Muñoz. With the project allegedly finished, Muñoz demanded Loria to return his
₱2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did not return the money.
Issue:
WON Loria is liable for ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
Held:
Yes. Loria must return Munoz’s ₱2,000,000.00 under the principle of unjust enrichment
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." There is unjust
enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been benefited
without a real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another person’s
expense or damage.
In this case, Loria received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a subcontract of a government project to
dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the
parties’ agreement, Muñoz was not subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the
₱2,000,000.00.
Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muñoz’s money without valid basis or justification.
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria must return the ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
27. Ledesma vs CA
Facts:
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas
College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans
from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. The petitioner claims that the said
act of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President
of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership
of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed
to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. The Director rendered a decision in
favor of Delmo.
The petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the case. The
Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as
ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records
plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish Delmo
with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the
latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof.
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director
ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include
Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain
student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against
the petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an
Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.
Issue:
WON petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
Held:
Yes. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about
by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.
“There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission."
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. The rationale behind
exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for
the public good.
Sarmiento v. CA(G.R.No.96740, March 25 1999)
Facts:
Petitioners V.Sarmiento and A.Catibayan, daughters of T Pangilinan and L Arguelles(died in
1946), filed a complaint for partition of a piece of land covered by a TCT issued on September 1941
to co-owners, F Arguelles, who died on 1949, and P Reyes, who died earlier. L was the daughter of
F and E Pineli, who died on 1950. Private respondent S Arguelles is a half brother of L, with F
Arguelles as their common father.
Petitioners claim that as granddaughters of F, they and private respondent S are co-owners
of the 1/2 portion of the land, as the only heirs of the late F. But according to S, petitioners are not
the legal heirs of F because their mother L was allegedly an illegitimate child of his father, F Arguelles,
and E Pineli who were not married. Under the old Civil Code, which should be applied since F
Arguelles died in 1949, before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, an illegitimate child did not have
successional rights.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners offered sufficient evidence to substantiate their submission that F
Arguelles and E Pineli were legally married.
Held:
No. In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which the trial court
premised its decision, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that petitioners tried to justify the
non-presentation of the marriage certificate of Francisco and Emilia by submitting a certification.
However, the one who issued said certification later admitted that it was signed without without
verifying its correctness. Upon the trial court’s checking of the records, it was found that there was
no marriage solemnized between F and E. So also, the death certificate and the said TCT of F says
that he died as a widower.
As proof of marriage the following may be presented: a)testimony of a witness to the matrimony;
b) the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the
birth and baptismal certificates of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial
in subsequent documents. In a belated attempt to establish the legitimacy of L Arguelles, petitioners
have theorized for the first time, in the present Petition, that the birth certificate of L Arguelles which
they allegedly presented during the trial, shows the legitimate status of L Arguelles. Concededly,
such birth certificate may be used to show the alleged marriage. But be that as it may, the totality of
evidence for the private respondent S preponderates over petitioners. Preponderant evidence means
that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared
with the evidence introduced by the private respondent, petitioners rely heavily on the legal
presumption of marriage which, as earlier pointed out, has been effectively rebutted.
Esguerra v. CA(G.R.No. L-40062, May 3, 1989)
Facts:
This is a case for the recovery of a cargo truck, alledgedly, unlawfully seized by the agents of
GAMI. The cargo truck was sold by GAMI to Hilario Lagmay and Bonifacio Masilungan. It was then
bought by Montelibano Esguerra, who assumed the unpaid purchase price of P20,454.74. In so
doing, Esguerra executed in favor of GAMI a promissory note and a chattel mortgage over the said
truck. Esguerra defaulted in his obligation, but GAMI granted his request for extension, and a new
chattel mortgage new promissory note were executed to secure the unpaid balance of P16,000.00
plus interest. On May 18, 1966, Esguerra had paid GAMI the total sum of P1,297.00.
In June 1966, the truck was taken by GAMI’S agents while it was in the possession of
Esguerra’s driver, Carlito Padua. Despite Esguerra’s demands to return the truck, GAMI did not
comply.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgage vendor of personal property sold on installment is legally
obligated to foreclose the chattel mortgage, and sell the chattel subject at public auction in case the
mortgagor-vendee defaults in the payment of the agreed installments.
Held:
Yes. Esguerra admitted that he is in arrears in the payments of his account. Consequently,
the mortgagee has the option to foreclose the mortgage either judicially or extrajudicially and in case
of foreclosure, it was expressly agreed by the parties that the mortgagee may take the property
outside the municipality or city where the mortgagee may conveniently sell the same.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that there was no forcible taking of the cargo
truck. Esguerra consented to the repossession of the truck or at least did not make any objection
thereto. He simply requested that he be given a chance to settle the account, which was evidently
granted as on the following day, appellant sent his wife with P500.00 with which to partially settle his
account. Under the circumstances, both courts concluded that it was not unlawful on the part of the
appellee to repossess the cargo truck in question. It is well settled that these findings are binding on
the Supreme Court; as it is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again,
its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower
court.
However, the respondent appellate court did not err in holding that while the mortgagee can
take possession of the chattel, such taking did not amount to the foreclosure of the mortgage.
Otherwise stated, the taking of Esguerra’s truck without proceeding to the sale of the same at public
auction, but instead, appropriating the same in payment of Esguerra’s indebtedness, is not lawful.
As clearly stated in the chattel mortgage contract, the express purpose of the taking of the mortgaged
property is to sell the same and/ or foreclose the mortgage constituted thereon either judicially or
extrajudicially and thereby, liquidate the indebtedness in accordance with law.
More than that, even if such automatic appropriation of the cargo truck in question can be
inferred from or be contemplated under the aforesaid mortgage contract, such stipulation would be
pactum commissorium which is expressly prohibited by Article 2088 of the Civil Code and therefore,
null and void.
Having opted to foreclose the chattel mortgage, respondent GAMI can no longer cancel the
sale. The three remedies of the vendor in case the vendee defaults, in a contract of sale of personal
property the price of which is payable in installment under Article 1484 of the Civil Code, are
alternative and cannot be exercised simultaneously or cumulatively by the vendor-creditor. In Cruz
vs. Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation, the Supreme Court construing Article 1484 of the
Civil Code, held: “Should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property default in the payment of
two or more of the agreed installments, the vendor or seller has the option to avail of any one of
these three remedies ___ either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obligation, or to cancel
the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased personal property, if one was constituted.
These remedies have been recognized as alternative, not cumulative, that the exercise of one would
bar the exercise of the others. It may also be stated that the established rule is to the effect that the
foreclosure and actual sale of a mortgaged chattel bars further recovery by the vendor of any balance
on the purchaser’s outstanding obligation not so satisfied by the sale.”
(It will be observed, however, that the award of exemplary damages is apparently unwarranted,
there being no showing that the mortgagee acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or oppressive
manner. The trial court did not find blatant fault on the part of the mortgagee for not immediately
proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgage, especially so where the filing of the instant case
has put a legal obstacle to it. On the other hand, the appellate court is of the view and rightly so that
the mortgagee should have immediately foreclosed the mortgage and offered the truck for sale at
public auction as provided under the chattel mortgage contract. It will be recalled, that under the
chattel mortgage contract, the mortgagee is expressly authorized to sell the mortgaged property and
the mortgagee had already commenced foreclosure of the chattel mortgage but the sale presumably
could not be immediately made because of the request of the mortgagor himself to give him a chance
to settle his account.)
Landicho v. Relova(G.R.No. L-22579. February 23, 1968)
Facts:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the CFI presided over by respondent
Judge, with the offense of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully
married to Elvira M., which marriage has not been legally dissolved, contract a second marriage with
Fe P." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the CFI, likewise presided by respondent
Judge, by plaintiff Fe P, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio
because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and
because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case,
filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira M, the first spouse, praying that
his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by
means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with
her before the Justice of the Peace.
Issue:
W/N the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.
Held:
No. The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused
in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions
as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage
be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be
the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly
different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on Feb. 27, 1963, the fact that two
marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second
spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a
third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared
null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was
null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of
the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Jimenez v. Averia(G.R.No. L-22759. March 29, 1968)
Facts:
In a Criminal Case, respondents Ofelia V. Tang and Estefania de la Cruz Olanday were
charged with estafa, the information filed alleging that, having received from Manuel Jimenez the
sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat known as "Basnig", with the
obligation on their part to return the money in case they should fail to buy the fishing boat, they
misappropriated the amount aforesaid, to the damage and prejudice of Jimenez. Before arraignment,
the accused filed a Civil Case against Jimenez contesting the validity of a certain receipt signed by
them wherein they acknowledged having received from him the sum of P20,000.00 with which to
purchase for him a fishing boat and its accessories, and the further sum of P240.00 as agent's
commission, with the obligation, on their part, to return the aforesaid amounts in case they were
unable to buy the fishing boat. Their complaint alleged that they had never received any amount from
Jimenez and that their signatures on the questioned receipt were secured by means of fraud, deceit
and intimidation employed by him. Several days later, they filed a motion in the aforementioned
criminal action to suspend proceedings therein on the ground that the determination of the issue
involved in the Civil Case was a prejudicial question.
Issue:
W/N the determination of the issue raised in the civil case mentioned heretofore is a prejudicial
question, in the sense that it must be first resolved before the proceedings in the criminal case for
estafa may proceed.
Held:
No. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative
of the case before the court and that jurisdiction to try and resolve said question must be lodged in
another tribunal. Alleged pre-judicial question is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
parties charged with estafa. Even if the execution of the receipt in the civil case was vitiated by fraud,
duress or intimidation, the guilt of the accused could still be established by other evidence by showing
that they actually received the complainant the sum of P20,000 with which to buy a fishing boat and
that instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and refused to return it to him upon
demand. Were the SC sanction this theory advanced by the respondents and adopted by the trial
judge, there would hardly be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily. The accused could
easily block the proceedings by simply filing an independent civil action against the complainant,
raising the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been
misappropriated. A claim to this effect is a matter of defense to be interposed by the party charged
in the criminal proceeding.
Geluz v. Court of Appeals(G.R.No. L-16439. July 20, 1961)
Facts:
Nita became pregnant by Antonio Geluz before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant physician. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was
then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant.
Accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant’s clinic in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted,
of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos. The plaintiff was at this time in
the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of,
nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff’s basis in filing this action and award of
damages.
Issue:
W/N the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
from the physician who caused the same.
Held:
No. Abortion, without medical necessity to warrant it, is a criminal act, and neither the consent
of the woman nor that of the husband would excuse it. The minimum award for the death of a person
does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of
having rights and obligations. Also, since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to
the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can
recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them.
However, in the case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an
award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee’s indifference to the previous abortions of
his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs(G.R.No.169202 March 05 2010)
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was
then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following
entries appear in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and
“Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose
marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) office in U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement
passport.
Issue:
W/N petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert
to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.
Held:
No. A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any
of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of
the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman
marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in
consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname
or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new
passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The
DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. Once a married woman opted to
adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name,
except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of
husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her
husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage.
Laperal vs. Republic(G.R.No. L-18008. October 30, 1962)
Facts:
Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp. Proc. No. 433) a petition which
reads:
“1.
That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the
date of the filing of this petition;
“2.
That petitioner’s maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married Mr.
Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on January 18,
1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled ‘Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria’,
Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision
is now final.
“3.
That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name,
that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she
has also ceased to live with him for many years now;
“4.
That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has
likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her
name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.“
Issue:
W/N petitioner should be allowed to change her name by reason of their legal separation and
non-cohabitation.
Held:
No. A woman’s married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum, and under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must continue using
the name and surname employed by her before the separation.
It is doubtful whether Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, which refers to change of name in
general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regard to
married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103, the fact
of legal separation alone is not sufficient ground to justify a change of name, because to hold
otherwise, would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of said Article
372.
Joaquin vs. Navarro(G.R.No. L-5426-28. May 29, 1953)
Facts:
In Feb 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses of JN, Sr.
and AJ, together with their three daughters, P, C, and N, and their son JN, Jr. and the latter's wife,
AC, sought refuge in the ground floor of German Club bldg. During their stay, the building was packed
with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the
Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to
escape. The 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and JN. Sr. and his son
decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not convince AJ to join them so
JN, Sr., his son JN, Jr., and the latter's wife, AC and a friend and former neighbor FL, dashed out of
the burning edifice. As they came out JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the
bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside,
presumably including AJ: JN, Sr., Mrs., JN, Jr. and FL managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby,
and stayed there about three days, when they were forced to leave the shelter because the shelling
tore it open. They fled toward an Academy, but unfortunately met Japanese patrols, who fired at the
refugees, killing JN, Sr. and his daughter-in-law. At the time of the massacre, JN, Sr. was at the age
of 70; his wife was about 67 years old; JN, Jr. about 30;. P was two or three years older than her
brother ; while the other sisters C and N were between 23 and 25. With this, three proceedings were
instituted, which were jointly heard, for the summary settlement of the estates of the deceased, by
the petitioner, an acknowledged natural child of AJ and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and
by the respondent son of JN, Sr. by first marriage.
Issue:
W/N the mother, AJ, died before her son JN, Jr. or vice versa.
Held:
The facts are quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between AJ and JN, Jr., and
keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted
by FL, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely : that JN, Jr., died before his
mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or
conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory—that the mother
outlived her son is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender
the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by
which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance,
cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the rediculous, where in an action on the game
laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was charged with shot, but that
the bird might have died in consequence of fright.
(The evidence of survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial or
inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made,
the presumption does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence controls. Section 68
(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein
provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred"
that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule
can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact."
Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence another. An incredible witness
does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted,. But when the evidence is
purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction
to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts
are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the
question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions
supported by substantial evidence. But substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least
evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the general rules.)

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