Case No. 1: Armida Perez-Ferraris vs. Brix Ferraris
CA
G.R. No. 162368, 17 July 2006
FACTS: Petitioner in this case filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution denying the petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner contends that she has presented enough evidence
to prove the existence of Psychological Incapacity against
her defendant husband and that her marriage should be
annulled on the grounds presented.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgement of the
trial court It held that the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable
and already present at the inception of the marriage. The
Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony
failed to establish the substance of respondent's
psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she
arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate
that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying
with the essential marital obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not Psychological Incapacity is present in this
case.
Held:
No. Psychological Incapacity is not present in this case.
Petitioner failed convincingly demonstrate to the courts its
actual existence against the defendant. The court find
respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarrelled, the
violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his
family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Therefore, the annulment
of marriage between the parties in this case is not duly
granted as the facts and grounds presented did not suffice to
grant the same.
Psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
Case No. 2: Chi Ming Tsoi vs.
G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997
FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in
1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to
the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during their first night and same
thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have
their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but
Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no
sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a
long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the
living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept
together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a urologist in
Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the
physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of
the husband was kept confidential even the medicine
prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi
Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status
here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with
Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the
latter does not want to have their marriage annulled
because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part
and is physically and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not
evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.
Issue:
Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse
with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
Held:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly
demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses
to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate
children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
Case No. 3: Orlando G. Tongol vs. Filipinas M. Tongol (1) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the
G.R. No. 157610, 19 October 2007 party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;

Facts: (2) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the

Orlando G. Tongol and Filipinas M. Tongol were married on
27 August 1967. Out of their union, they begot four (4)
children, namely: Crisanto, Olivia, Frederick, and Ma.
Cecilia.
In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas.
In 1994, the spouses filed a petition for the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership of gains, which was granted in a
Judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City in 1995. In
1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Filipinas on the ground that the latter was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations. Both spouses admitted that efforts at
reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is
a failure.
To support his allegation, Orlando presented Dr. Cecilia
Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological
examination of both parties. According to Dr. Villegas,
Filipinas is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder
which resulted from feelings of rejection felt by Filipinas as
a child which she carried with her as an adult.
history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and
(3) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Further, the Supreme Court held that the psychological
incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family
Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. Psychological incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, such as the exercise of a profession
or employment in a job.
Hence, absent showing that Filipinas’ personality disorder
incapacitated her to perform her obligations as wife and
mother, the Supreme Court resolved to favor the existence
and continuation of marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.

The RTC of Makati City dismissed the petition. On appeal,

the CA affirmed, in toto, the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the evidence presented by Dr. Villegas is

enough to sustain a finding that Filipinas is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.

Held:

No, the evidence presented by Dr. Villegas is not enough to

sustain a finding that Filipinas is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.

The Supreme Court ruled that Dr. Villegas failed to link

Filipinas’ personality disorder to her conclusion that the
latter was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
obligations as wife and mother. As held in Santos v Court of
Appeals, “psychological incapacity” is confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Such psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Hence,
psychological incapacity must be characterized by the
following:
Case No. 4: Leouel Santos vs. CA & Julia Bedia-Santos
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995
FACTS: On September 1986, Leouel married Julia both in
civilian and church wedding. The couple begot a child and
lived in Julia’s parent. Thereafter, the couple frequented
quarrel over a number of this things. And with interference
from Julia’s parents, their marriage relation worsen,
On May 1988, Julia left for the US to work as a nurse
despite Leouel’s plea to dissuade her. Seven after her
departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return upon expiration
of her work contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel
got a chance to visit the US, he desperately tried to locate
Julia or get in touch with her but his efforts were of no
avail.
Thereafter, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint for
nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36. Summons
was served by publication. On May 31, 1991, respondent
Julia opposed the complaint and later manifested that she
would neither appear nor submit evidence. On November
1991, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. Leouel appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether there was ground for psychological incapacity to
warrant the nullity of the marriage.
Held:
The Court held in the negative. The Family Code provides
that “Marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. The
Family Code did not define the term “psychological
incapacity” but the intent of the framers is that
psychological incapacity refers to lack of understanding or
appreciation of the essential obligations of marriage. Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently
but in conjunction with existing precepts on law on
marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage as
expressly stated by Article 68 which include the parties
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The intent of the
law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to
the most serious cases of personality disorders
demonstrative of an utter inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
The court should established statutory and
jurisprudential parameters in every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent and other
conditions of that incapacity, so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
Here, the allegations stated by the petitioner failed
to meet the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage.
Case No. 5: Salita vs. Magtolis
G.R. No.106429, 13 June 1994
FACTS: Spouses Espinosa were already separated in fact in
1988. Subsequently, the husband filed an annulment on the
ground of his wife psychological incapacity. The incapacity
existed at the time of marriage but the same manifested
thereafter. The wife moved for bill of particulars. In the bill
of particulars, the husband alleged that his wife was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage because she was
unable to understand and accept the demands of his
profession as a Doctor of Medicine. His wife frequently
complained of lack of his attention to her and even to her
mother, whose intervention caused him to lose his job. The
lower court directed petitioner to file her responsive
pleading, however she filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals but the latter denied her petition.
Issue:
Whether the allegations in the petition for annulment of
marriage and in the subsequent bill of particular are
sufficient.
Held:
The Court held in the affirmative. The complaint only needs
to state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause
or causes of action. An ultimate fact has been defined as
those facts which the expected evidence will support. It does
not cover the details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are to be
established. It refers to the facts which the evidence on the
trial will prove and not the evidence which will be required
to prove the existence of those facts.
Here, the bill of particulars filed by private respondent is
sufficient to state a cause of action and to require more
details from private respondent would be to ask for
information on evidentiary matters. The petitioner has been
adequately apprised of the cause of action in the complaint
filed by the private respondent against her that she was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage and she was unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his profession
as a Doctor of Medicine by frequently complaining of lack of
his attention and even to her mother, whose intervention
caused him to lose his job.
 Case No. 6: Ricardo Toring vs. Teresita Toring
G.R. No. 165321, 3 August 2010
FACTS: Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 Cebu.
He pursued her and they became sweethearts after three
months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by
the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get
Ricardo to marry her. Ricardo and Teresita were married on
September 4, 1978. They begot three children: Richardson,
Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 199, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment
before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and
subsequent to the celebration of their marriage.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from
persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify
on the allegedly incapacitated spouses condition at or about
the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that
trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the
time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the
spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes
of Teresita’s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the
spouses eldest son who would not have been very reliable as
a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have
been there when the spouses were married and could not
have been expected to know what was happening between
his parents until long after his birth.

Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the

trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. Petition denied.
Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as
sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company.

Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that

contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresitas
Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that

there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically
incapacitated.

The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to

Teresita.

The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial
courts findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set
by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.

Issue:

Whether the examination by a physician or by a

psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:

Our recognition simply means that the requirements for

nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily
come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other
words, it is still essential although from sources other than
the respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile,
or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause
of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of
marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of
the condition.
 Case No. 7: Republic of The Philippines vs. Lolita
Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
FACTS: On January 14, 1988, Lolita Quintero-Hamano and
Toshio were married in Cavite. Unknown to Lolita, Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only
after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money
to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her
friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not
bother to see her and their child. On June 17, 1996, Lolita
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
The prosecutor filed a report finding that no
collusion existed between the parties. The trial court
granted Lolita’s motion to present her evidence ex-parte.
She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the
ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity, the trial court
held that: It is clear from the records of the case that Toshio
failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner
and father to his daughter. He remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear
manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife
and child, which characterizes a very immature person.
Certainly, such behavior could be traced to Toshio’s mental
incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. The
Solicitor general appealed to the CA but the same was
denied.
Lolita exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no
avail. CA concluded that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his
family, and to “observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support” pursuant to Article 68
of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The CA emphasized that this case could not be
equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and
Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases, the spouses
were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed marriage,”
the husband being a Japanese national.
According to the Republic, mere abandonment by
Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and
incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lolita was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his
marital obligations
RULING: No. We find that the totality of evidence
presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After
respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule,
there was no need for an actual medical examination, it
would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a
ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the
case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of
the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements
in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present
case involves a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a
Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse
and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms
used for determining psychological incapacity should apply
to any person regardless of nationality.
 Case No. 8: Republic of the Philippines vs Court of
Appeals and De Quintos
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
FACTS: Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16,
1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a
child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her second
miscarriage.
As such, On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing
Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any
objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in
the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon,
Pangasinan.
After conducting an investigation, the public
prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between
Eduardo and Catalina. Eduardo testified that Catalina
always left their house without his consent; that she
engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly
refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of
her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the
household chores and caring for their adopted daughter;
that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she
abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie
Castro, her paramour.
As support to his claim of psychological incapacity,
he also presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that
Catalina exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder
that was no longer treatable.
Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted
her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting with
different men and abandoning the conjugal home.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the
ground of psychological incapacity
RULING: No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations,
and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help,
and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her
responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it
is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological illness.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that
psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of
the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle
the confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the
later ruling in Molina, viz:
 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
 The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time
of the celebration” of the marriage.
 Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes.
 The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
 Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state.
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after
a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the
hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own
factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the
assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the
facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor an adverse integral element in the respondents
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Case No. 9: Republic of The Philippines vs. Cesar
Encelan
January 9, 2013 G.R. No. 170022
FACTS: On August 25, 1979 Cesar married to Lolita and
has 2 children, in order to support his family, Cesar on May
15, 1984 work to Saudi Arabia. In 1986, Cesar learned that
his wife was having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. In
1991 Lolita left the conjugal home with their children and
lived with Alvin. Since then Cesar and Lolita had been
separated. In 1995, Cesar filed for the nullity of marriage on
the ground of Lolita’s Psychological Incapacity. Lolita
denied her affair and that she is not Psychological
Incapacitated rather the reason why she left because of
irreconcilable differences with her mother-in –law.
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Further, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.” That Cesar failed to
appreciate the evaluation report which in fact establishes
that Lolita did not suffer from ay illness.
The court also provide that sexual infidelity and
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are
simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations. No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s
allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were
manifestations of any psychological illness. Lastly, the law
protects the marriage as an inviolable institution in which
any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its
existence and continuation and against its dissolution and
nullity.

In the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations, testified

and presented Psychological Evaluation Report on Lolita
prepare by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores with the findings that
Lolita was not suffering psychological incapacity but has
been unable to provide expectations expected of her for a
good and lasting relationship and been reluctant to her
husband.

RTC ruled in favor of Cesar finding sufficient basis

of Psychological Incapacity for failure to comply with
marital obligations. On appeal, CA set aside the RTC ruling
finding that the abandonment of conjugal dwelling and
illicit affair were not serious cases of personality disorder,
since they are contributed to mere refusal. Cesar filed a
reconsideration and the CA found two indicative
circumstance of Lolita’s Psychological Incapacity.

OSG filed the case to the SC, petition argues that

the Evaluation Report did not disclose that Lolita had been
suffering from psychological illness nor establish its
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; that
infidelity and abandonment do not constitute such rather
merely grounds for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the

ground of psychological incapacity

RULING: No. There was no sufficient basis exist to annul

the marriage on the ground of Psychological Incapacity.
Interpreting Art. 36 of the Family code, the court stresses
that such illness contemplates “downright incapacity or
Case No. 10: Silvino A. Ligeralde vs. May Ascension A.
Patalinghug and The Republic of The Philippines
G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
FACTS: The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating
nature fully explained and established by the totality of the
evidence presented during trial.
Private respondent’s act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence
was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. her duties as wife and mother.
His pleas were ignored.
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were
blessed with four (4) children. Silvino claimed that, during
their marriage, he observed that May had several
manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described
her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity,
negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed,
characterized their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:
o’clock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had
watched a video program in a neighboring town, but
admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend
in a hotel.
In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the thought
of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and
the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from
separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.
May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated
when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she
was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her
in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him.
They then lived separately.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the
matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she
was still young and became manifest after marriage; and
that the same was serious and incurable.
Trial Court declaring the marriage null and void due to
psychological incapacity.
RULING: No. In this case at bench, the Court finds no
commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of
the assailed CA decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) in-curability. The incapacity must be
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
It is the Court’s considered view that petitioner’s evidence
failed to establish respondent May’s psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root
cause, gravity and incurability of private respondent’s
condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root
cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not
even rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity” that
the law requires. Private respondent’s act of living an
adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence
was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state.

On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of

Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on
the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-
Basilio.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled

that private respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and
prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave

abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Regional
Case No. 11: Kalaw v. Fernandez G.R. No. 166357 Sep.
19, 2011 and Jan. 14, 2015
FACTS: Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and Ma. Elena
Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973 and got married in 1976.
Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano
who gave birth in 1983. In 1985, Malyn left the conjugal
home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn who bore him three more
children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States with
Jocelyn and their children. He left his children with Malyn
in a rented house with only a househelp and a driver.
Pursuant to their custody agreement, the children stayed
with Malyn on weekends.
In 1994, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. He claimed that her psychological incapacity
was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility
towards him and their children, as shown by her acts: 1) she
left the children without proper care and attention as she
played mahjong all day and all night; 2) she left the house to
party with male friends and returned in the early hours of
the following day; and 3) she committed adultery on June 9,
1985 in Hyatt Hotel.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates, and a
Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. Dr. Gates
explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder (NPD) and that it may have been evident even
prior to her marriage as it is rooted in her family
background and upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital duties and characterized it as grave and incurable.
He explained that her role as the breadwinner of her family
allegedly inflated her ego to the point that her needs became
priority, while her kids’ and husband’s became secondary,
and that playing mahjong and spending time with friends
only constitute psychological incapacity whenever
inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to
the detriment of one’s familial duties.
The affirmative defense of Malyn is that it was Tyrone who
was suffering from psychological incapacity manifested by
his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing and
physical violence. She presented a clinical psychologist, Dr.
Dayan, who determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were
behaviorably immature. They encountered problems of their
personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise
of their marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage void ab initio and that
both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations under Art. 36 of the Family
Code. Parties’ psychological incapacity is grave and serious
such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been
clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave
and incurable.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision as it is not
supported by the facts on record. Their allegations against
each other do not support a finding of psychological
incapacity. Their faults tend only to picture their
immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital
and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient
grounds for a legal separation. Also, the psychological report
submitted by Dr. Gates does not explain how the diagnosis
of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to
satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. Tyrone moved for
reconsideration which was denied.
Tyrone filed a petition with the Supreme Court which
denied the same for lack of legal and factual basis. Tyrone
filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the
ground of psychological incapacity
RULING: Yes. The Court granted the motion, reversed and
set aside its Sep. 19, 2011 Decision and reinstated the RTC
Decision.
Here, the findings by the RTC deserved credence because it
was in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. Dr.
Gates and Fr. Healy sufficiently and competently described
the psychological incapacity of Malyn based on Art. 36 of the
Family Code. The Court upheld the conclusions reached by
the said experts since they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed
after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of Tyrone’s
factual premises.
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed
in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and
be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation. Moreover, the RTC was expected
to compare the expert findings of Dr. Dayan and those of Dr.
Gates. In her evaluation report, Dr. Dayan impressed that
Malyn had compulsive and dependent tendencies to the
extent of being relationship dependent.
In relaxing the rules in Molina, the Court declared that
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Art. 36. Courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, experts’
findings and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as
the foundation of the family, which serves as foundation of
the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under Art. 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons
independent of their will, are not capacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
Although Tyrone, as plaintiff, carried the burden to prove
the nullity of the marriage, Malyn, as the defendant spouse,
could establish the former’s psychological incapacity
because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are
justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Art. 36
of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner
or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity
to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated
with proof. Psychological incapacity may exist in one party
alone or in both of them. If psychological incapacity of either
or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null
and void.
Case No. 12: Renne Enrique Bier vs. Ma. Lourdes A.
Bier and The Republic of The Philippines
G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Renne Enrique Bier met respondent Ma.
Lourdes Bier through his sister. As their courtship
blossomed, they decided to get married. As petitioner was
based in Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician, the
parties decided to maintain two residences, one in the
Philippines and another in Saudi Arabia. They took turns
shuttling between the two countries just so they could spend
time together.
Everything went well for the first three years of
their marriage until the couple started experiencing marital
problems. According to petitioner, respondent ceased to be
the person he knew and married. She started becoming
aloof towards him and began to spend more time with her
friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual
relations with him for no apparent reason. She became an
alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She started neglecting her
husband’s needs and the upkeep of their home, and became
an absentee wife. As a result, they frequently quarreled.
Finally, respondent suddenly left for the United States.
Petitioner has not heard from her since.
Petitioner instituted a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations to petitioner. On the other hand, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested its disfavor towards
declaring the marriage null and void, arguing that no
persuasive evidence was presented warranting the grant of
the petition since petitioner failed to comply with the
guidelines laid down in Republic v. CA and Molina.
The trial court granted the petition. However, the
CA held that petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines
laid down in Molina as the root cause of respondent’s
psychological incapacity was not medically or clinically
identified. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the juridical antecedence of the
psychological disorder and its root cause are required to
determined the existence of psychological incapacity.
RULING: YES
The Supreme Court has been consistent in holding
that if a petition for nullity based on psychological
incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity, root cause,
incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the
time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved.
As early as Santos v. CA, et al., 240 SCRA 20 (1995), it was
already held that:
[P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. x x x This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
These must be strictly complied with as the
granting of a petition for nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This is specially so since the
Family Code does not define psychological incapacity. The
determination thereof is left solely to the discretion of the
courts and must be made on a case-to-case basis.
Petitioner was able to establish that respondent
was remiss in her duties as a wife and had become a happy-
go-lucky woman who failed to attend to her husband’s needs
and who eventually abandoned him. However, the totality of
her acts, as testified to by petitioner and his brother, was
not tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as petitioner
would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking,
failure or refusal to meet one’s duties and responsibilities as
a married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do
not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological (as
opposed to physical) illness.
The Court agreed with the CA that the change in
respondent’s feelings towards petitioner could hardly be
described as a psychological illness. It was not enough that
respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, had
difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral
element in respondent’s personality structure that
effectively incapacitated her from complying with her
essential marital obligations, had to be shown. This
petitioner failed to do. Consequently, the Court is
unconvinced that respondent’s condition was rooted in some
incapacitating or debilitating disorder.
 Case No. 13 Nilda Navales v. Reynaldo Navales G.R.
No. 167523
June 27, 2008
FACTS: Reynaldo Navales and Nilda Navales met in a local
bar where Nilda worked as a waitress. The two became
lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a boarding house
owned by her uncle and studied Health Aide financed by
Reynaldo. Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was prodding
her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting to lose
her, asked her to marry him. This, despite his knowledge
that Nilda was writing her penpals and was asking money
from them and that she had an illegitimate son by a man
whose identity she did not reveal to him. The two got
married.
Problems arose, however, when Nilda started
working again since she could no longer take care of him
and attend to household chores. Things worsened when she
started working as an aerobics instructor, where, according
to Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity
recurred. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a
child with him, as it would destroy her figure. Reynaldo left
Nilda and never reconciled with her again. He then filed a
Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and
Damages claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not cure
Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her
behavior indicates her lack of understanding and
appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the
same void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the marriage
is null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Reynaldo and
Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological
incapacity.
RULING: No. The Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by Reynaldo is insufficient to sustain a finding
that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated.
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that
is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks
and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Molina, the Court further set
forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological --- not
physical, although its manifestation and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known that
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to
establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage, which
flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an
aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo,
i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride home with
another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed
by another man while in a car, and that Nilda allowed other
men to touch her body, if true, would understandably hurt
and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are
insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect
that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of
the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to
a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.
As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda
was not all that bad; in fact, it went well in the first year of
their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good
and harmonious relationship during the early part of the
marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage which
deprived the party of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which
Nilda used her maiden name Bacon to prove that Nilda
represented herself as single. However, the telephone
listings were during after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda.
Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda represented herself as
single while they were still living together. The Court
cannot agree that said telephone listings show that Nilda
represented herself to be single, which in turn manifests her
lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist
Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is psychologically
incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily
on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality, and that there is no requirement that the
defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity may be declared, still, the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained, and said incapacity established by the totality of
the evidence presented during trial.
The Court finds that the psychological report
presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's
psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded
that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature
individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual
urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual
role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or superego,
emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as
seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic,
suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform
to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggresive,
irresponsible and vain. She further defined nymphomia as a
psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor
behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various
men other than her husband.
The report failed to specify, however, the names of
the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the
circumstances surrounding the same. There is not even a
single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit
relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul
did not specify the identities of the persons she interviewed,
which information were supplied by whom, and how they
came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the
conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and
lack sufficient factual bases. The report failed to show the
root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and failed to
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
disabling factor or an adverse integral element in Nilda's
character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting,
and thereby complying with, the essential marital
obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady
existed even before the marriage. Hence, the Court cannot
give weight to said assessment.
The standards used by the Court in assessing the
sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very
strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.
Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to
get pregnant. A review of the records shows, that apart from
the testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to
support such claim.
While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and
appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy,
however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity. A marriage, no
matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void
marriage. And this Court, even as the highest one, can only
apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it
may be.

Case No. 14. Cynthia E. Yambao v. Republic of the
Philippines G.R. No. 184063
January 24, 2011
FACTS: Cynthia and Patricio were married on December
21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July
11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the
marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondents
psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Cynthia narrated that, since the beginning, her and
Patricio’s married life had been marred by bickering,
quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to
comply with the essential obligations of married life.
Cynthia averred that through all the years of their
married life, she was the only one who earned a living and
took care of the children. Patricio, she alleged, did nothing
but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends.
When he would find a job, he would not be able to stay in it
for long. Likewise, he went into several business ventures,
which all failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and
would gamble away whatever money would come his way.
Cynthia also claimed that, when their children were babies,
he did not even help to change their diapers or feed them,
even while she was recovering from her caesarean
operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about
children. Later, he became insecure and jealous and would
get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other
people, even to her relatives. When Patricio started
threatening to kill Cynthia, she decided to leave the
conjugal abode and live separately from him. She then
consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that Patricio was
indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
In his Answer, Patricio denied that he has refused
to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent
job, but was always unable to because of his old age and
lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay
long in the jobs he had because the same could not support
the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not
commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured
into small businesses but they failed due to various
economic crises. Patricio further claimed that he was not, in
fact, contented with living with Cynthia’s relatives since his
every move was being watched with eagle eyes. Patricio
denied that he gambled, positing that since he had no
income, he would not have the funds for such activity. He
alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still
shared in the payment of the amortization of their house in
BF Homes, Paraaque City.
RTC: Dismissed. Cynthia’s evidence failed to
support her argument that respondent was totally unaware
of and incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such
that the marriage was void from the beginning. The court
said that, even as she claimed to be unhappy in the
marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over
thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children
into adulthood without suffering any major parenting
problems. The court also noted that Patricio was faithful to
her and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the
parties lived with her parents, he got along well enough
with her family.
ISSUE: W/ON he totality of petitioner’s evidence establish
respondents psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage?
RULING: No. The intendment of the law has been to
confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be
annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to
suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent
was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that
he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On
the contrary, respondent’s efforts, though few and far
between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty
to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much
success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own
indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external
factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in
showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with
his many failings, does not suffer from psychological
incapacity.
Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal
husband, or may have failed to meet petitioners exacting
standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that,
as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and
strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the petition for
declaration of nullity) of marriage.
To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more
effort on his part, could have been more helpful and could
have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that
he did not, however, does not mean that he is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital
obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the
marriage null and void.
 Case No. 15 Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa vs. Bona J.
Alano G.R. No. 167459
January 26, 2011
FACTS: Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a
young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a
seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out and got
married on 27 October 1973. They found an abandoned and
neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered
as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano
Ochosa. During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to
various parts of the Philippine. Bona did not cohabit with
him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of
Basilan. Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the
Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. They
were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City
where they resided with their military aides. In 1987, Jose
was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in
the failed coup d’etat and was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught
having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin. He got a
military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona
about the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since
then they were separated, and their child, Ramona Celeste,
stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition
directly from the information gathered solely from Jose and
his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the
possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrists is
tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of
sufficient corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Jose filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of

marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations of marriage.

It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse.

Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned
in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with
other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when
they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male
visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their
living quarters.

The trial court granted the petition for the

declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr.
Elizabeth Rondains testimony and her psychiatric
evaluation report as well as the individual testimonies of
Jose and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan
Padernal and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bona was psychologically

incapacitated to warrant the dissolution of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING: NO. There is inadequate credible evidence that

her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior
to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity did
not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical
antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and
abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor
can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage. The
psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which made her
prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity existed before her
marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of
antecedence since the method by which such an inference
was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting
the standard of evidence required in determining
psychological incapacity.
 Case No. 16. Republic of the Philippines v. Nestor
Galang G.R. No. 168335
June 6, 2011
FACTS: In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in
Pampanga and thereafter they resided in the house of the Nestor’s
father. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while Juvy stayed at
home. They had one child, Christopher.
In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article
36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler; that Juvy
suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him
and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely
serious” and “appears to be incurable.”
Having found no collusion between the parties, the case
was set for trial. In his testimony, Nestor alleged that he was the
one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want to
wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors’ care;
and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought
him there. He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his
signature to encash the check representing Nestor’s father’s
pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing
“mahjong” and “kuwaho” three (3) times. Finally, he testified that
Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that
their son was confined in a hospital.
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who
testified that she conducted a psychological test on Nestor. In her
Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang
resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-adjusted
to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations
but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has
a little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests
suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable
emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained
emotional tensions caused by his wife’s behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a
manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and
very lazy and doesn’t manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her
involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho;
(3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and
personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude
towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid
behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact
that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving,
responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few
reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from
incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of
January 22, 2001. The RTC Judge, relying on the Santos Case,
stated in the decision that the psychological incapacity of
respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject
cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and
family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root
cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before
marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the
wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the
ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the
reach of the subject – are all obtaining in this case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the
respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from
psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying
with her essential marital obligations.
RULING: The Court held that there was no basis to nullify
the marriage. The Supreme Court held that the totality of
Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies and the psychologist,
and the psychological report and evaluation are insufficient
to prove Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established.
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine
unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound
by it. In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina,
the Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a
more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.
In the present case, the psychologist did not even
identify the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Nestor and the root cause of Juvy’s
psychological condition. There was no showing that any
mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage.
The report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s
alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the
disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply
with her marital duties; the report did not even
categorically state the particular type of personality
disorder found. The report failed to establish the
incurability of Juvy’s condition. The report’s
pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to change”
and that her mental incapacity “appears incorrigible” are
insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be
treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
her means to undertake. Galang’s petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under
Article 36 of the Family Code was dismissed.
 Case No. 17 Republic of the Philippines v. Lynnette
Cabantug-Baguio. G.R. NO. 171042
June 30, 2008
FACTS: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Lynnette Baguio (Lynnette) and Martini Baguio
(Martini), a seaman working overseas, got married in 1997.
The couple lived at Lynette‘s parents. Martini stayed there
only on weekends and during weekdays, he stayed with his
parents. Because of this, Lynette suggested that they lived
with Martini‘s parents but the later disagreed.
Lynette later on noticed that every time the two of
them talk, Martini would always mention his mother and
his family. She thereafter realized that Martini was a
―mama‘s boy. On Martini‘s mother insistence, Martini‘s
money was equally divided between her and Lynette. In
1999, when Martini returned from work, he stayed with his
parents. Since then, Lynette had not heard from Martini
and stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing
her to inquire from Martini’s employer who told her that he
had already disembarked. Lynette soon found out that he
was in Muntinlupa.
When Lynette and Martini finally met, he informed
her that they should part ways. The last time the two of
them talked was at the airport when Martini was about to
depart for abroad. Since then, Martini never communicated
with Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette learned that
Martini declared in his employment records that he is
“single” and named his mother as principal allottee. Hence,
Lynette filed before Regional Trial Court of Cebu a
Complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of Martini‘s psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital duties and obligations under Articles 68-
70 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Martini‘s being
mama‘s boy manifests his psychologically incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
and that the same incapacity existed at the time the couple
exchanged their marriage vows.
The Solicitor General challenged the RTC‘s decision
before the Court of Appeals. The CA held that Lynette‘s oral
deposition and the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr.
Gerong, a clinical psychologist, declaring Martini‘s
psychological incapacity was sufficient proof that indeed
Martini suffers psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in declaring the marriage
between Lynette and Martini null and void on the ground of
latter‘s psychological incapacity
RULING: Yes. Article 36 of the Family Code on which
Lynnette anchors her complaint provides that “[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.”
Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the
other articles in the Family Code, specifically Articles 35,
37, 38, and 41 which provide different grounds to render a
marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on
voidable marriages, and Article 55 on legal separation. Care
must be observed so that these various circumstances are
not to be applied indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter. And Article 36 should not be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves, nor with
legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment, and the like.
“Psychological incapacity” has been elucidated on
as follows: The term “psychological incapacity” to be a
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. The root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained the mere
showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” does not constitute psychological incapacity
nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons. It is essential that the
parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or
incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to
some psychological (not physical) illness, which insensitivity
or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Here, Dr. Gerong found that Martini’s “personality
disorders” including his being a “mama’s boy” are “serious,
grave, existing already during the adolescent period and
incurable” and concluded that Martini “appeared” to be
dependent upon his family and unable “to establish a
domicile for his family and to support his family.”
The doctor’s findings and conclusion were derived
from his interview of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnette’s
deposition. From Lynnette’s deposition, however, it is
gathered that Martini’s failure to establish a common life
with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It
is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. No evidence was
presented to establish that the root cause of the incapacity
has been medically or clinically identified. The marriage
may not be declared void ab initio on the ground of
insufficient evidence presented.
Case No. 18 Noel B. Baccay v. Maribel C. Baccay. G.R.
No. 173138
December 1, 2010
FACTS: Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua
Institute of Technology where both took up Electronics and
Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were
introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one
another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of
continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels proposal
and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel
as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found
attractive. Noel’s family was aware of their relationship for
he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel observed that
Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to
bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to
attend family gatherings and other festive occasions like
birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel,
however, would try to avoid Noels invitations and whenever
she attended those occasions with Noels family, he observed
that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did
she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would
talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and
she would promise to change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with
Maribel because he was already involved with another
woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel
refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with the
other woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To
give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they
still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly,
however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments
together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually
since Maribel never demanded anything from him except
his company. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel
informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon
advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry
Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on
November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel
agreed to live with Noels family in their house at Rosal,
Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with
Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of
her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and
go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed
to the familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses
for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual
contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of
being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of
pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether
she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed
that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January
1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came
home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a
miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General
Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage
sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into
an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household.
Noels mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted Putang
ina nyo, wag kayo makialam at her.
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years
of marriage, Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the RTC of Manila.
RTC: Found that Maribel failed to perform the
essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure
was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic
Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical
psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a
clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that
Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the
marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but
to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative
particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was
emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of
paper and that she can easily get rid of her husband without
any provocation. CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code?
RULING: No. The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals
that the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly non-cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment
of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient
to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically
incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that
Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after
their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel
when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He
failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly
observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who
concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during
childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential
obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist
even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a
marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain
one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the
incapacity contemplated by law.
MARABLE V. MARABLE, G.R. NO. 178741, JANUARY of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs
17, 2011 during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that
he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction
FACTS: Rosalino Marable, the husband and Myrna with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder
Marable, the wife met in 1967 while studying at Arellano rooted in his personal history. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
Universit. Rosalino courted Myrna and they eventually the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
became sweethearts. On December 19, 1970, Rosalino and “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases
Myrna eloped and were married in civil rites before Mayor of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their the marriage.
marriage was blessed with five children. The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground
As the years went by, however, their marriage for the nullity of marriage, refers to a serious psychological
turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
occurrences. They fought incessantly and Rosalino marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter
(husband) became unhappy because of it. Rosalino insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give
developed a relationship with another woman. Myrna meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has
learned about the affair, and husband promptly terminated contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less
it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
quarrels aggravated. Rosalino felt that he was unloved, to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
towards Myrna. When he could not bear his lot any longer, parties to the marriage.
Rosalino left the family home and stayed with his sister in It is indispensable that the evidence must show a
Antipolo City. Later, he converted to Islam after dating link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
several women. psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
Rosalino filed a petition for declaration of nullity of itself. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general
his marriage to respondent on the ground of “his” conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social
psychological incapacity to perform the essential Personality Disorder.
responsibilities of marital life.
Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family
and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an
early age. His father left their family to live with another
woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused
petitioner’s mother and siblings to suffer immensely. He
further alleged that he supported himself through college
and worked hard for the company he joined. But despite his
success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as
a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship
with his own family.
In support of his petition, Rosalino presented the
Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical
psychologist Dr. Tayags report stated that Rosalino is
suffering from Antisocial Personality Disorder,
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness
and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that
petitioners personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of
rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed
attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that Rosalino is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalino is psychologically

incapacitated.

RULING: NO. Rosalino tried to make it appear that his

family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one
 SUAZO V. SUAZO, G.R. NO. 164493, MARCH 12,2010
FACTS: At both 16 years old, Jocelyn and Angelito were
married in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Binan,
Laguna on March 3, 1986. Without any means to support
themselves, they both lived with Angelitos parents after
their marriage and stopped going to school. Jocelyn took odd
jobs and on the other hand, Angelito refused to work and
most of the time drunk and resulted to violent quarrels.
Jocelyn left Angelito a year after their marriage.
Thereafter, Angelito found another woman with whom he
had lived with. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint.
Neither did he submit himself to a psychological
examination to psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was
presumably hired by Jocelyn).
Jocelyn testified that the alleged incidents of
physical beating from Angelito. The expert witness, her
aunt Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s
testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony
concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated.
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the
Republic of the Philippines strongly opposed the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a
Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what
she said about him was purely hearsay.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that
Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation. The
CA reversed it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art 36 of the Family Code is a basis
to nullify the marriage
RULING: The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The
CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the
RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s
marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish
Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition
only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions
from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her
cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychologist, using
meager information coming from a directly interested party,
could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelito’s.
The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy
the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from
a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and
testimony simply provided a general description of
Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder,
supported by the characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there
must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the
habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job,
while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform
marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations – must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of
the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 159594, obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or
NOVEMBER 12 2012 neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will
on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted
FACTS: Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
Lingayen, Pangasinan.The couple was not blessed with a emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
miscarriage. incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
declaration of nullity of their marriage,citing Catalina’s obligations of marriage.
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential The only fact established here, which Catalina even
marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the
to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment
conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under
Pangasinan.After conducting an investigation, the public the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological
prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation
Eduardo and Catalina. under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand,
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of
house without his consent; that she engaged in petty marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering
arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity
to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made
gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she of marriage. Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such
squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of
worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the factual and legal basis.
conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her
paramour.
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-
psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes,
a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on
Catalina, Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of
Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer
treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was
mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital
obligations.
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted
her Answer/Manifestation, whereby she admitted her
psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal
home without Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different
men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and
that she would not give up her share in the conjugal
residence because she intended to live there or to receive
her share should the residence be sold.

ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient evidence warranting

the declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to
Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code.

RULING: NO. It is not enough that the respondent, alleged

to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the
respondent’s personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
 MENDOZA VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 157649, expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
NOVEMBER 12, 2012 psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root
cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
FACTS: Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to
advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such
been next-door neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while
opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining
they were still in college. After a month of courtship, they became
the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence
intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married
then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other
City on June 24, 1991, after which they moved to her place,
given case presented before it, must always base its decision not
although remaining dependent on their parents for support. It was
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on
petitioner who supported for the family’s financial needs because
the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Dominic’s job has unstable salary. It was alleged in the evidence by
The Court held that psychological incapacity should refer
the petitioner that Dominic had an affair with his co-worker,
to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a
incurred debts and criminal charges which forced petitioner to end
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
their relationship and move away from Dominic. A petition for
must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to
declaration of nullity was filed by herein petitioner before the RTC
the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
on the ground of article 36, psychological incapacity presenting as
include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love,
evidence Dr. Samson, a psychiatrist. OSG opposed the petition.
respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have also
The RTC found that all the characteristics of
held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
were attendant, establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To
no showing that Dominic’s personality traits either constituted
qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or
marriage, a person’s psychological affliction must be grave and
were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code;
serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply
that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not
with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and
conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties’
obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be
separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters
shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
and the criminal cases brought against Dominic. CA held the
Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominic’s
testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish
Dominic’s psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The
medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the psychiatrist is psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature
sufficient to establish psychological incapacity. that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged
immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his
RULING: NO. The guidelines incorporate the three basic dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or
Appeals: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The foregoing
or to share his earnings with family members, albeit
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically
be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence psychological incapacity. Nor were his supposed sexual
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a
be resorted to.
ground only for an action for legal separation under Article
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of
55 of the Family Code.
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality
of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his
psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of
any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the
granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What
was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the “presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition.”
By the very nature of cases involving the application of
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the
 LAURENA V. CA, G.R. NO. 159220, SEPTEMBER 22,
2008
FACTS: Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner) and
Jesse Lauro Laurena (respondent) got married on December
19, 1983 at Saint Augustine Church in Intramuros, Manila.
They have two children, Mark Jordan who was born on July
2, 1985 and Michael Joseph who was born on November 11,
1987.
On October 19, 1993, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent.
Petitioner alleged that respondent was psychologically
incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage,
and the incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage although she discovered it only after the
marriage. Petitioner alleged that respondent’s psychological
incapacity was manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of
his family’s needs because he gives priority to the needs of
his parents, irresponsibity, insensitivity, and tendency to
lead a bachelor’s life.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision with regard to the denial of the petition for
annulment of marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jesse Lauro Laurena (respondent)
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
RULING: NO. Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner)
failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality,
physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to
change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds
for legal separation but no for declaring a marriage void.
She failed to prove psychological incapacity or identify it
root cause. She failed to establish that respondent’s
psychological incapacity is incurable and it was existing at
the time of the celebration of their marriage.
ASPILLAGA V. ASPILLAGA, G.R. NO. 170925,
OCTOBER 26, 2009
FACTS: Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977
while they were students at the Philippine Merchant Marine
Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo
courted her and five months later, they became
sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese
culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and
Aurora maintained communication.
In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and
Rodolfo got married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed
their marriage was tumultuous. He described Aurora as
domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his
friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she
overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions
without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless,
suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the
latters filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an
administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March
of 1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred
that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991,
Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to assume
her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In
August of 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that
while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home
her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged
that Rodolfos cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration
of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992,
Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with
Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba
explained his psychiatric evaluation of the parties as well as his
recommendation that the petition be granted.
On May of 2000 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the
parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision reversed
and set aside the RTC decision and declared the marriage of
Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity of the
parties was sufficiently established.
RULING: NO. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the
parties personality disorder; however, he failed to link the
parties psychological disorders to his conclusion that they
are psychologically incapacitated to perform their
obligations as husband and wife. We cannot see how their
personality disorder would render them unaware of the
essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to a marriage.
Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that each partys
condition is so grave or is of such nature as to render said
party incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed
incapacity is incurable and permanent.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity
must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations. The intention of
the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
At the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the
parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable
differences, which cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity as understood juristically.
Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage.
 Case No. 25: Te v. Te Case Title: 26. Lucita E. Hernandez vs. CA and Mario
Hernandez
FACTS: Edward and Rowena eloped and stayed in the
house of Rowena’s uncle. Rowena’s uncle brought Edward Facts: On 1 January 1981, Lucita Estrella married Mario
and Rowena to a court to get married. The two continued to Hernandez, and they begot three children. On 10 July 1992,
stay at Rowena’s uncle house where Edward was treated Lucita filed a petition for annulment of marriage under
like a prisoner. Eventually, Edward escaped from the house Article36 of the Family Code. She alleged that from the time
of Rowena’s uncle and stayed with his parents. Edward’s of their marriage, Mario failed to perform his obligations to
family hid him from Rowena. Edward asked Rowena to live support the family, devoting most of his time drinking, had
with his parents but Rowena said that it was better for affairs with many women, and cohabiting with another
them to live separate lives. Edward filed a petition for woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, and finally
annulment of his marriage to Rowena with RTC on the abandoning her and the family. The RTC-Tagaytay City
basis of Rowena’s psychological incapacity. RTC ordered the dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the CA.
Prosecutor to investigate whether there was collusion
between them. The clinical psychologist found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. RTC declared the marriage Issue: Whether or not Mario’s habitual alcoholism, sexual
null and void. CA revered and set aside RTC’s decision on infidelity/perversion and family abandonment constitute
the ground that the clinical psychologist did not personally psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
examine Rowena and relied only on the information Code.
provided by Edward. Further, CA found that psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability.
Ruling:No. The Supreme Court ruled that the
aforementioned acts do not by themselves constitute
grounds for psychological incapacity within the
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the marriage in issue is null and contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make Mario completely unableto discharge his
essential marital obligations, and not merely due to his
RULING: Yes. Petition for review on certiorari was youth and self-conscious feelings of being handsome.
granted. CA’s decision was reversed and set aside. The
parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) Judgment affirmed.
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very
nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties. SC held that they are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. SC simply declare that,
as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006), there is need to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once
more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat
for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
 Case No. 27. MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts: Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos
in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the family and
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda
filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological
incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void
under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
Issues: Whether personal medical or psychological
examination of the respondent by a physician is a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show
psychological incapacity.
Ruling: Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring
the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality
of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however
that the respondent be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such
declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced
that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Verily, the behaviour of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of time of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged
psychological illness was traced only to said period and not
to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is
no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability and for her failure to
observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and
Molina.
Case No. 28. Halili v. Halili
FACTS: Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his
marriage to respondent Chona Santos-Halili null and void
on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage in RTC. Lester alleged that
he wed Chona in civil rites thinking that it was a “joke.”
After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband
and wife. RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed
personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-
defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert
witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. On appeal, the CA reversed
and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground
that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish
petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. It was denied.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the marriage in issue is null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING: Yes. RTC’s decision was reinstated. SC
emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. Dr.
Dayan stated that Lester’s dependent personality disorder
was evident in the fact that Lester was very much attached
to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Lester’s
mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help
when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning
that his marriage to Chona was for real. Ultimately, Dr.
Dayan concluded that Lester’s personality disorder was
grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the
celebration of his marriage to Chona. SC held that it has
been sufficiently established that Lester had a psychological
condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply
rooted cause. SC, in the same Te case, recognized that
individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually
have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term. Particularly, personality disorders are "long-standing,
inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe
mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These
disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who
display them and for others. SC concluded that it has been
shown that Lester is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the
marriage between Lester and Chona was declared null and
void.
 Case No. 29. Republic vs. Dagdag
Facts: Erlinda Matias, then 16 years old, married Avelino
Parangan Dagdag, then 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina
Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija in September
7, 1975. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988. Shortly after their
marriage Avelino Dagdag would leave his family without
informing his wife his whereabouts and would be absent for
several months and appearing for months thereafter.
During the times he was present he would spent it with his
friends drinking and he would often force his wife to
submit to his sexual advances and would physically hurt her
if she refused.
On October 1993 he left his family again and that was the
last that they heard from him, Erlinda was forced to move
to Olongapo and work as a manicurist to support herself
and their children. They learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime and that he actually escaped
from jail on October 22, 1985. A certification therefor dated
February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S.
Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date. On July 3, 1990,
Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Avelino never appeared for any of the
hearings of the case and thus jurisdiction over him was
acquired through publication. Erlinda presented Avelino’s
sister as her witness.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-
mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to
comply with the guideline which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since
no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was
not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was
arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor
was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was
prematurely rendered.

It was determined by the prosecutor that there was no

collusion however he asked still asked to intervene in the
case to avoid any fabrication of evidence in the case. The
trial court then ordered the Prosecution to file a
manifestation regarding the case. However the trial court
rendered a decision without waiting for the filing of the
manifestation declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino
null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

The Prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement on

the ground that the judgement was prematurely rendered.
The Solicitor General also filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on the ground that the decision was not done in accordance
to the evidence and law.

The Solicitor General posited that the allegation made by

the petitioner were not enough to show psychological
incapacity. The lower court denied the Solicitor General’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence the petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not contention of the Solicitor General is

proper.

Ruling: Granted.

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given

case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
 Case No. 30. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and
LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
JOSE certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
Facts: Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
Manolito San Jose (Manolito) were married on June 12, personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
1988. Laila was 19 years and 4 months old, while Manolito insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
was 20 years and 10 months old. The couple begot two the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies
children: Joana Marie who was born on January 3, 1989, heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
and Norman who was born on March 14, 1997.F or nine human personality. However, the root cause must be
years, the couple stayed with Manolito’s parents. Manolito identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
was jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. As for nature must be fully explained.There is of course no
Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of Taguig. On August requirement that the person sought to be declared
20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her parents’ psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
house. On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, under Article 36 of the arrive at such declaration If it can be proven by independent
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity, means that one is psychologically incapacitated, there is no
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Respondent refused reason why the same should not be credited.In the present
to get himself a job. Instead, he spent most of his available case, the only proof which bears on the claim that Manolito
time with his friends drinking intoxicating substances and is psychologically incapacitated is the testimony of Laila.
gambling activities. Years had passed but no improvement Petitioner’s portrayal of respondent as jobless and
was seen on respondent’s behavior. He turned out to be irresponsible is not enough. As the Supreme Court said in
worse instead and it was only later that petitioner the Molina case, it is not enough to prove that the parties
discovered that he was into drugs. Said, he prefers to be failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
with his friends rather than his own family. He seemed persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
oblivious to the efforts rendered by petitioner just to make incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
ends meet. She was the breadwinner of the family and physical) illness.
whenever an argument occurred between her and
respondent, she often received the brunt of her husband’s
irrationality. On one of such incidents, she decided to
separate from respondent. The latter however pursued her
and pleaded for another chance. He promised that he would
change his behavior if only petitioner would give him a son.
Seeing his sincerity and unwilling to give up the marriage,
petitioner agreed to the compromise.They reconciled and
she did gave birth to a son, Norman, on March of 1997.
Respondent was happy but his show of good nature was
superficial. Briefly after the birth of their second child,
respondent resumed his old ways and made them even
worse. Still, petitioner remained hopeful that something will
turn out right in their union. However, with respondent’s
continuing irresponsibility, she realized that all her efforts
proved nonsense to him. On August 20, 1998, respondent
went out of their dwelling for his usual late night stints but
he never came back the following morning. They never lived
together since.

Issue : WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT

MANOLITO’S ALLEGED DEFECTS ARE CONSTITUTIVE
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.

Ruling: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of

marriage, has been succinctly expounded in the recent case
of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris.The term
"psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
 Case No. 31 Case Title: ROSA YAP PARAS petitioner
vs. JUSTO J. PARAS respondent G.R. No. 147824,
August 2, 2007
FACTS
RULING
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J.
Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. Their wedding was considered
one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy They begot four
(4) children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased),
Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27,
1993. Rosa filed with the, a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code. She
alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential marital obligations. She alleged that Justo dissipated her
business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage
transaction, lived with a concubine and sired a child, that he did not
give financial support to his children, and has been remised of his
duties both as a husband and as a father. Sometime in 1975, their
daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was Rosa’s
family who paid for her medication and in 1984, their son Raoul
was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his
"barkadas." To cope with the death of the children, the entire family
went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo
abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the
Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other
businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a
conjugal piece of land and even gave free gasoline for the
municipality. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an
illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the
present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in
1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching which resulted in the birth of
Cyndee Rose.
For his part, Justo denied forging her signature in one mortgage
transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal
property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a
sugar crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee. He did not
abandon his family in the United States because he was granted
only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy,
prompting his return to the Philippines. He spent for his children’s
education. He admitted that he resented supporting them at first
because he was just starting his law practice because their conjugal
assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He
admitted though that there were times he failed to give them
financial support because of his lack of income. What caused the
inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him
during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food
for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing
to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern.
This was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine
oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-
infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn
Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She
was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
The RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the
marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal
home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the
gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to
support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell
out his limited salary; and (c) the charge of infidelity is
unsubstantiated. The RTC observed that the relationship between
the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological
incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their
marriage.
ISSUE
I. Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for
reception of expert testimony on the root cause
of Justo’s alleged psychological incapacity is
necessary; and
II. Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.
I. There is no reason to remand it to the trial
court. The records clearly show that there is
sufficient evidence to establish the
psychological condition of Justo.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove
psychological incapacity has its origin in
Molina. One of the Guidelines set forth therein
states: (2)The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological—not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the party, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755 (2000), the Court clarified that the
above Guideline does not require that a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage. What is important is
“the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition.”
However in that same year, in Republic v.
Dagdag that, “the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts”
and this requirement was not deemed complied
with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified on the alleged psychological incapacity
of one party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,promulgated
by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared
towards the relaxation of the requirement of
expert opinion.Under the New Rules, a petition
for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code need not allege expert opinion on
 the psychological incapacity or on its root
cause. What must be alleged are the physical
manifestations indicative of said incapacity.
II. The complaint, as well as the testimonial and
documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main
grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Justo are his infidelity,
profligacy which includes the falsification of
her signature in one of the loan documents,
failure to support the children, and
abandonment of the family.
While the Court is convinced that the charges
hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual
infidelity, falsification of her signature,
abandonment and inadequate support of
children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing
in the records showing that they were caused
by a psychological disorder on his part. In other
words, the totality of the evidence is not
sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
There is no evidence that Justo’s “defects” were
present at the inception of the marriage. His
“defects” surfaced only in the latter years when
these events took place; their two children
died; he lost in the election; he failed in his
business ventures and law practice; and felt
the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely,
these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the
present case only after almost 30 years of their
marriage. Equally important is that records
fail to indicate that Justo’s “defects” are
incurable or grave.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has
gone astray from the path of marriage because
of a conflicting relationship with his wife and
her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While
these do not justify his sins, they are not
sufficient to establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and assume the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse
Case No. 32: MARIETA C. AZCUETA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
180668 May 26, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in
1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married
but got separated after four years of marriage. Petitioner then filed for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that her husband was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. According to her, Rodolfo was emotionally immature,
irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and
perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband. She
further claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that
all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those
of his mother. Apart from that, petitioner complained that every time
Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards
her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had
sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed
this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it
should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a child
yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner
requested that they move to another place and rent a small room rather
than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she
was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he
did not.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage between Marieta and Rodolfo are void ab
initio on the grounds of psychological incapacity
RULING: YES. As laid down by the court in the case of
Republic vs. Molina, the court found sufficient ground to
warrant the annulment of the marriage at bar.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove
the psychological incapacity of her husband. Second, the
root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition,
sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly
explained in the trial courts decision. Third, Rodolfos
psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has
been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the
essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of
Rodolfos dependent personality disorder, he cannot make
his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a
husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect,
and support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to
support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot
independently make decisions regarding even the most basic
and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who
cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional
well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of
Article 36. Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition
which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his
early years was supported by evidence and duly explained
by the expert witness.
 Case No. 33: Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of
Reyes marriage;

Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity

FACTS: Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City
Hall and subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A
child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months
later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying,
insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from
her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but since
her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Only after their marriage that he learned
about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with
Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes
her unable to commit the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by
the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts,
that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that
declared the marriage null and void. Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remains
unchanged.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held
that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to
establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that
the requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been
satisfied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of

action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.

RULING: Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own

testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist
who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of
Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on

the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of
the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered
that respondent had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in

proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;

Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological

incapacity has been medically or clinically identified that
was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly
explained in the trial court's decision;

Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters

before she married him prove that her psychological
 Case No. 34: BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M.
VELEZ-TING
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, NACHURA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and
respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) were wed on July
26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child. The couple begot six (6)
children, namely Dennis, James Louis, Agnes Irene, Charles
Laurence, Myles Vincent, and Marie Corinne.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more
than 18 years to petitioner, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter.
Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological
incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his
family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive
and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which
Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and
the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off
his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same;
and
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by
his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to
his family.
Benjamin denied being psychologically
incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an
active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink
and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also
denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
circumstances.
As for his alleged failure to support his family financially,
Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would
collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he
was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.
In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his
family financial support within his means whenever he
could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly
spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things. He
also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took
care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with
her friends twice a week.
Carmen presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
psychiatrist. Instead of the usual personal interview,
however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during
Benjamin’s deposition because the latter had already gone
to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa.
After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate
concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive
gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear
indications that petitioner suffers from a personality
disorder.
To refute Dr. Oate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr.
Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the
Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center, as his expert witness. Dr. Obra evaluated
Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation
report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the
University of Praetoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s)
interview with Benjamin’s brothers. Contrary to Dr. Oates
findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong
with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track
record as anesthesiologist.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void. The trial court found Benjamin an excessive
drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his
extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with
violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a
personality defect existing even before his marriage to
Carmen.
Petitioner appealed to the CA on October 19, 2000, the CA
rendered a decision reversing the trial court’s ruling. It
faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated at the time he married
Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact, contrary to the
guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals and in
Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare
decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines
set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the
requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void is in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
RULING:
I.
No. Respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised
but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio
v. Reyes. In these cases, the Court explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes
a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar
to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for
two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code.
It is only when a prior ruling of the Court is overruled, and
a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have
to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
II.
No. Far from abandoning Molina, the Court simply
suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set
forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC).
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally
became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving
psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which
is not only contrary to the intention of the law but
unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological
incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours with
another.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to
the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine
the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua
non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given
case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its
decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the
parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of the proceedings.
Each case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
III.
No. The totality of evidence adduced by respondent is
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit
to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and
more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years
ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the
appellate court’s rulings declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s
defects were present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she
already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and
gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on
the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced
prove such defects to be incurable.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not condoning
petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his violent
outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify
such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes
love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter
owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence
presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare
him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in
favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. In this case, the presumption has not been
amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
 Case No. 35: So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009
Facts: The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in
1973 after being introduced to each other by a common friend. The
petitioner at that time was a 17-year old high school student; the
respondent was a 21-year old college student. Their meeting led to
courtship and to a 19-year common-law relationship,[5] culminating
in the exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on
December 10, 1991.[6] They had three (3) children (Jeffrey, Renelee,
and Loni)[7] in their relationship and subsequent marriage.
On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with the respondent.
He also claimed that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as
shown by the following circumstances: the respondent failed and
refused to cohabit and make love with him; did not love and respect
him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional,
spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and
refused to have a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter
into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with
him.[9]
The petitioner likewise related that respondent asked him to sign a
blank marriage application form and marriage contract sometime
in 1986. He signed these documents on the condition that these
documents would only be used if they decide to get married. He
admitted not knowing what happened to these documents, and
maintained that no marriage ceremony took place in 1991.[12] As
noted below, the petitioner, however, submitted a certified true copy
of their marriage contract as part of his documentary evidence.
The petitioner also presented psychological report[20] of clinical
psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr. Gates).
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the
international standards of psychological disorders, Respondent
Lorna Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as
manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility
and a sense of decency in the conduct of her life. Compulsive
Behavior Patterns are also evident in her marijuana habit,
gambling and habitual squandering of Petitioners money. Lorna
Valeras Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior Patterns
were already existing prior to her marriage to Petitioner Renato So.
Continuing up to the present, the same appears to be
irreversible.[22]
Issue: 1. WON their marriage is void for the alleged lack of
essential and formal requisites of marriage?
2. WON their marriage is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the respondent.
Held:
1. No. A careful examination of the RTC decision shows that
the trial court did not discuss, much less rule on, the
absence of the formal and essential requisites of marriage; it
simply recited the claim that [S]ometime in 1987 petitioner
was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage
Contract and a blank application for marriage license. The
petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that the
documents will be signed only when they get married. We
note that the petitioner himself offered the Marriage
Contract as evidence that it is registered with the Civil
Registry of Kalookan City.[35] As a duly registered
document, it is a public document, and is prima
facie evidence of the facts it contains, namely, the marriage
of the petitioner with the respondent. To contradict these
facts and the presumption of regularity in the documents
favor, the petitioners contrary evidence must be clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[36]
2. No. Petitioner failed to establish
respondents psychological incapacity.
Doctrines: The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides
that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It
must be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[39]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic
v. Court of Appeals[40] (the Molina case) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[41] further clarified that
there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
andincurability can be duly established.[42]
Ratio: The factual background of this case covers at least 18
years. The petitioner and the respondent first met in 1973 and lived
together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage,
before they got married in 1991. In the course of their relationship,
they had three (3) children; established a business, and even
incurred indebtedness amounting to P4 million; had differences due
to what the CA described as character faults and defects; and had a
well-described quarrel which the CA observed to be the common
reaction of an ordinary housewife in a similar situation. Thus,
unlike the usual Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the past,
where marriage, cohabitation, and perception of psychological
incapacity took place in that order, the present case poses a
situation where there had been a lengthy period of cohabitation
before the marriage took place. To be sure, this factual unique
situation does not change the requirement that psychological
incapacity must be present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Our own examination of the psychologists testimony and
conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not
sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage.
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note
that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and begot
children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984
developments that show a fair level of stability in the
relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the
parties for some eleven (11) years.
More than all these, the psychologists testimony itself
glaringly failed to show that the respondents behavioral
disorder was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither
did the psychologist testify that the disorder
was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. To directly
quote from the records:
The psychologist, however, failed to sufficiently prove that
all these emanated from a behavioral disorder so grave and
serious that the respondent would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; that it was
rooted in the respondents medical or psychological history
before her marriage; and that a cure was beyond the
respondents capacity to achieve.
Case No. 36 Case Title: Padilla-Rumbaua vs.
Rumbaua G.R. No. 166738 August 14, 2009
Facts: Rowena and Edward were childhood neighbors in
Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they
met again and became sweethearts but Edward’s family did
not approve of their relationship. After graduation from
college in 1991, Edward promised to marry Rowena as soon
as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine
Air Lines (PAL) accepted Edward as a computer engineer.
Edward proposed to Rowena that they first have a “secret
marriage” in order not to antagonize his parents. Rowena
agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993.
Rowena and Edward, however, never lived together;
Rowena stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City,
while Edward lived with his parents in Novaliches.
Rowena and respondent saw each other every day during
the first six months of their marriage. At that point, Edward
refused to live with Rowena for fear that public knowledge
of their marriage would affect his application for a PAL
scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s
daily meetings became occasional visits to Rowena’s house
in Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels. Later
that year, Edward enrolled at FEATI University after he
lost his employment with PAL.
In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their
secret marriage. Edward’s mother tried to convince him to
go to the United States, but he refused. To appease his
mother, he continued living separately from Rowena.
Edward forgot to greet Rowena during her birthday in 1992
and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special
occasions. Edward indicated as well in his visa application
that he was single.
In April 1995, Edward’s mother died. Edward blamed
Rowena, associating his mother’s death to the pain that the
discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by
Edward’s action, Rowena severed her relationship with
Edward. They eventually reconciled through the help of
Rowena’s father, although they still lived separately.
In 1997, Edward informed Rowena that he had found a job
in Davao. A year later, Rowena and her mother went to
Edward’s house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting
with one Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia). When she
confronted Edward about it, he denied having an affair with
Cynthia. Rowena apparently did not believe Edwards and
moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and
anguish that her discovery brought.
Rowena filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Edward. Aside from her oral testimony,
the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their
marriage contract; and the testimony, curriculum vitae, and
psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy
Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she
administered the following tests on Rowena: a Revised Beta
Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI. She
thereafter prepared a psychological report with his findings.
According to his evaluation, the character traits of Edward
reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder –
declared to be grave, severe and incurable. However, at the
end of his findings, Dr. Tayag incorporated his personal idea
about love. Love, according to him, means:
“Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as
it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In
love, “age does matter.” People love in order to be secure
that one will share his/her life with another and that he/she
will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power
to let love grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face
when love is not the love he/she expected.”
The Regional Trial Court nullified the marriage of Rowena
and Edward.
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric
report did not mention the cause of the Edward’s so-called
narcissistic personality disorder, it did not discuss the
Edward’s childhood and thus failed to give the court an
insight into the Edward’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag
likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion
that the Edward’s incapacity was “deep-seated” and
“incurable.”
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was able to establish the
respondent’s psychological incapacity
Ruling: The court follows the guidelines which incorporate
the basic requirements established in Santos.
To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized
by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the
grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family
Code does not define “psychological incapacity,” fleshing out
its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through
jurisprudence
In the present case and using the above standards and
approach, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence
insufficient to prove that the respondent is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.
The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the
respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her;
(b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her
birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during
special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his
visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother;
and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact he
was cohabiting with another woman in 1997. In the view of
the court,
these acts do not rise to the level of the “psychological
incapacity” that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal”
or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations
that characterize some marriages.
 CASE NO. 37
MA. PAZ FERNADEZ KROHN, V. CA AND EDGAR
KROHN, JR.
G.R. NO. 108854 JUNE 14 1994.
FACTS: Edgar and Paz were married. They had 3 children. Despite
their children, their marriage fell apart. Paz underwent
psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital
strain. This proved futile. They finally separated.
Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential
psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio
Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting
the report among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from
the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his
church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at
the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the
decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite." Their
property regime was later dissolved.
Edgar later filed a petition for annulment of marriage
with Paz. The respondent presented again the psychiatric report.
When Edgar was to testify on the contents of the report, the counsel
of Paz objected to it as it was privilege communication between
physician and patient. The court allowed the report to be presented.
The MR was denied. Hence, certiorari was filed.
Issue: WON the report is a privilege communication
between physician and patient in contemplation of the law?
Held: No. In Lim v. Court of Appeals, this case clearly lays
down the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil cases;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in
that capacity; and,
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would
blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery obstetrics. He is simply the patient’s husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within
the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be
considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony
of the physician who examined the patient and executed the
report. The court opined that the counsel should have
objected to it on the ground of hearsay.
Case No. 38
DIGNA A. NAJERA, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO J.
NAJERA, respondent
G.R. 164817 July 3, 2009
Facts:
Digna Najera filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal
Separation against the respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of
marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of the
marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after
marriage: (1) that respondent was jobless and was not
exerting effort to find a job at the time of marriage; only
with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a
seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman; (2)
that while employed as a seaman, respondent did not give
petitioner sufficient financial support; (3) that respondent
would quarrel with petitioner and falsely accuse her of
having an affair with another man whenever he came home,
and took to smoking marijuana and drinking; (4) that on
July 3, 1994, while he was quarrelling with petitioner,
without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her
and attempted to kill her with a bolo; and (5) after the said
incident respondent left the family home, taking along all
their personal belongings, and abandoned the petitioner.
Petitioner reported the incident at the police station of
Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner presented the
psychological conclusions made by Psychologist Cristina R.
Gates on her interview with her, which says that
“respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which
are rooted in the kind of family background he has”. She
diagnosed the respondent to have possible borderline
personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.
RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal
separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the
annulment of their marriage. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, and she appealed the RTC
Decision and Resolution to the CA. CA affirmed the Decision
of the RTC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence
was able to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment
of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
2. Whether or not the evidence of petitioner proved
the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent
3. Whether or not credence ought to be given to the
conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an
expert in Psychology.
Held:

1. No. The evidence presented by petitioner with

regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct of respondent toward petitioner and
respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without
justifiable cause for more than one year are
grounds for legal separation only and not for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

2. No. Article 36 (2) of the Family Code says:

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical.

In this case, SC agrees with the CA that the totality of the

evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily
prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root
cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was
not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable.

3. No. As found by the CA, Psychologist Cristina

Gates’ conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts
relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on
her personal knowledge and evaluation of
respondent. Thus, her conclusion is unscientific and
unreliable. Moreover, the trial court correctly found
that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the alleged personality disorder of respondent was
incurable.
 Case 39
Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Roridel
Olaviano Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Facts: Roridel Molina filed a case for Declaration of nullity
against her husband, Reynaldo Molina. Roridel and
Reynaldo were married. According to respondent, Reynaldo
showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a
husband. and a father since he preferred to spend more
time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served.
The RTC ruled to declare the marriage null and void. CA
affirmed. Hence, this case.
Issue: WON the marriage was validly declared void?
Held: No. psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that
she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a
failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness
and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative,
homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure
of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations,
the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as
the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals
GR no. 127358/127449
March 31, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage stating that his spouse, the respondent Isabel
Singh Buenaventura, is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner
then amended his petition, now stating that both of them are
psychologically incapacitated, to which the Respondent filed an
answer denying that she was psychologically incapacitated. The
trial court ruled declaring that the marriage was null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity, ordered the Petitioner to pay
Respondent moral and exemplary damages with attorney’s fees and
costs of litigation and to give the Respondent one-half of the
Petitioner’s own retirement benefits and shares of stock as proceeds
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property. Petitioner
appealed to the CA but the ruling of the trial court was sustained
and thus Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and review of
certiorari against the appellate court in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages plus litigation and
attorney’s fees was proper.
Whether or not the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
property of the former spouses was valid.
Held:
The court ruled on the first issue declaring that the award
of damages was without merit. The court stressed that
psychological incapacity was not brought on by a willful
impulse of a person but an innate inability beyond the
control of such person. The basis of the award of damages
was on Art. 2217 and Art. 21 of the Civil Code which state
that there the offender must willfully cause the loss or
injury to the offended party to entitle such damages. Thus
the Supreme Court pointed out the inapplicability of the
provisions stated by the CA to the instant case and held
that such cannot be a ground to award damages. In addition
the grant of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation are also
improper since the Petitioner grounded his complaint on
both of the being psychologically incapacitated, therefore it
cannot be said that he unduly forces the respondent to
litigate.
The Court ruled on the second issue upholding the decision
to liquidate the properties in question. The court explained
that their marriage was governed by the conjugal
partnership property regime and that any properties
acquired by either spouse during their marriage is
considered as co-equally owned by them regardless whether
the actual contributions of each spouse were equal or not.
Then their marriage was voided and thus Art. 147 should
apply and that liquidation of the properties, which were
obtained during their marriage in were rightfully divided
under the rules of co-ownership rather than conjugal
partnership property.
 Case 41 incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must
be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable
MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage,
vs. (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
IMPAS G.R. No. 108229 overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage,
G.R. No. 214064 and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.

Facts: The RTC relied heavily on the result of the psychological

Business partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends
and eventually became romantically involved with each
other. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that
Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The
couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the
revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they
reconciled. They eventually got married on April 22, 1984
and were blessed with two (2) children.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was
harmonious prompting her to believe that the same was
made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of
marriage, Felipe resumed philandering.
Thus, on June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite. In support of her case,
Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie
Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report, concluded that Felipe is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the RTC's decision
would reveal that there was no assessment of the veracity of
such allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the
weight of the pieces of evidence presented. Also, there were
no factual findings which can serve as bases for its
conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity.
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on
the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that
she evaluated respondent's psychological condition
indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and
her witnessThe testimony and psychological evaluation
report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the
doubtful veracity of Mirasol's one-sided assertion. The said
report falls short of the required proof for the Court to rely
on the same as basis to declare petitioner's marriage to
respondent as void.

In a Decision dated January 20, 2012, the RTC declared the

marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void.

Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines, through the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the RTC denied.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the

decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from
psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing
marital obligations due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Upon
the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol
elevated the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented

warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the
latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Held: Time and again, it was held that "psychological

incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological