South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies

ISSN: 0085-6401 (Print) 1479-0270 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csas20

The Making, Ambiguity and Sustainability of

Intercaste Accommodations in Rural India

James Manor

To cite this article: James Manor (2019) The Making, Ambiguity and Sustainability of Intercaste
Accommodations in Rural India, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 42:2, 406-422, DOI:
10.1080/00856401.2019.1583789

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2019.1583789

Published online: 15 Apr 2019.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 40

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=csas20
SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES
2019, VOL. 42, NO. 2, 406–422
https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2019.1583789

ARTICLE

The Making, Ambiguity and Sustainability of Intercaste

Accommodations in Rural India
James Manor
School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, UK

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
In recent years, the increasing refusal by disadvantaged castes, Accommodation; caste;
especially Dalits (ex-untouchables), to accept caste hierarchies has Dalits; hierarchy;
increased intercaste tensions and violence in rural India. But inter- negotiations; violence
caste accommodations aimed at avoiding violence have also
increased, more sharply than violent incidents. This study explains
how accommodations are made, almost always between senior
Dalit and ‘higher’ caste leaders. Contrasts and parallels between
their calculations and perspectives are examined, along with their
views of the painful ambiguities that attend such accommoda-
tions. The authority of these senior leaders within their castes is,
for the present, crucial to making accommodations sustainable.
Changes that undermine their authority may make accommoda-
tions more difficult to forge and to sustain, but those changes
may also provide a new basis for such agreements.

This paper is one part of a broader study of the implications of a fundamentally import-
ant change: increasing, and increasingly evident, refusals by Dalits (ex-untouchables) to
accept caste hierarchies in rural India. Since those hierarchies served as a central pillar
of the old social order in rural areas—where two-thirds of Indians still reside—their
waning acceptance represents one of the most important changes to occur since Indian
Independence. And yet the implications of that change have had precious little attention
from scholars.
In recent years, this change has triggered greater intercaste tensions and a rising
number of violent attacks on Dalits. But it has also led to a marked increase in intercaste
accommodations which pre-empt violence. This is an analysis of how those accommo-
dations are made, of their ambiguous character, and of the sustainability over the longer
term of the processes that lead to accommodations. Evidence for this analysis was col-
lected in nine diverse Indian states—and in multiple (and again, diverse) sub-regions of
three of them—mainly between 2011 and 2016. Additional material was provided by
social scientists with specialised knowledge of four further regions.1 The regions studied

CONTACT James Manor james.manor@sas.ac.uk

1. The nine states were Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan, Tamil
Nadu and Telangana. Fieldwork was conducted in Rayalaseema and coastal Andhra sub-regions of Andhra
Pradesh; in southern and central sub-regions of Karnataka; and in the Gwalior sub-region and in districts near
Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh. Specialists provided additional insights on Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and

ß 2019 South Asian Studies Association of Australia

 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 407

ranged from areas with acute disparities in wealth, land and access to government
benefits—which are always important since caste possesses and is shaped by material-
ity2—so that traditional caste hierarchies have been deeply unjust, to areas where more
equitable material conditions have eased injustices, greatly or somewhat. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with individuals and groups in villages. Some
groups consisted of members of single castes, while others involved multiple castes.
Interviews focused on incidents which sparked intercaste tensions and on ensuing proc-
esses which—usually but not always—entailed efforts to address those tensions. Most
interviews dealt with events within respondents’ villages, but some also elicited informa-
tion on villages very nearby which were well known to interviewees and which had
experienced significant violence. Those interviews were then discussed with social scien-
tists who specialise in the various regions.
The diversity of the regions, sub-regions and villages examined for this study cannot
be captured in a paper of this length. What emerges here is an account of predominant
trends in most of these varied settings. It is in no sense a definitive or final assessment of
local social dynamics in Indian villages. Instead, it is intended as an initial, tentative
report which seeks to persuade others to delve more deeply into a crucially important
topic that needs further study.
This topic is excruciatingly complex, so to keep this discussion at least semi-
manageable, three limitations have been imposed. First, it excludes urban areas where
caste interactions are far more complicated. Second, it does not consider Scheduled
Tribes or Adivasis who mostly stand at one remove from caste hierarchies. Finally, this
paper (but not the book of which it will be a part) omits interactions between Dalits and
‘Other Backward Castes (or Classes)’ (OBCs)—intermediate groups which have domi-
nated some but not most villages. The focus here is on Dalits’ relations with the so-
called ‘higher’ castes—that is, those that have traditionally dominated village societies
thanks to their control of land and wealth.3
Tensions between the ‘higher’ castes and Dalits in Indian villages sometimes become
acute as the result of a dispute, an unsettling incident, or what one group (usually from
the ‘higher’ castes) perceives as a serious affront. That raises the possibility of violence—
a word which here refers to physical violence, attacks on persons and property—by

West Bengal. Supplementary evidence emerged from separate and extensive studies of the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, and of five government initiatives that were intended to tackle
poverty and inequality. Both of those latter studies have resulted in books: R. Jenkins and J. Manor, Politics and
the Right to Work: India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (New Delhi/London/New York: Orient
BlackSwan/Hurst/Oxford University Press, 2017); and James Chiriyankandath, Diego Maiorano, James Manor and
Louise Tillin, The Politics of Poverty Reduction in India: The UPA Government, 2004 to 2014, forthcoming.
2. For detailed discussions of this theme, see James Manor, ‘Prologue: Caste and Politics in Recent Times’, in Rajni
Kothari (ed.), Caste in Indian Politics (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, rev. ed., 2010), pp. xi–lxi; and Jeffrey Witsoe,
‘Caste Networks and Regional Political Economy’, in Surinder S. Jodhka and James Manor (eds), Contested
Hierarchies, Persisting Influence: Caste and Power in Twenty-First Century India (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan,
2018), pp. 39–59.
3. Here, the term ‘higher’ castes refers to landed, traditionally cultivating castes—such as the Marathas in
Maharashtra, the Jats in North India, the Lingayats and Vokkaligas in Karnataka, and the Kammas and Reddys in
Andhra Pradesh and Telangana—who are the main ‘higher’ castes that Dalits face in most villages. In some
regions, certain landed castes have sought and gained ‘Backward’ status in order to access government benefits.
But in most villages, OBCs stand below landed castes in the old, waning hierarchies. As a result, their status
and their relations with Dalits are more ambiguous—and often more prone to conflict. That subject is omitted
here, but it will be examined in the book-length study to follow.
408 J. MANOR

‘higher’ castes against Dalits. In such circumstances, ‘higher’ caste leaders—usually male
elders—often propose to their caste fellows, some of whom may advocate violence, that
an accommodation should be sought with local Dalit leaders.4 They do so because they
calculate that violence would have unacceptable consequences for ‘higher’ castes, for the
reputation of the village as a whole, and for the leaders’ own authority within both their
caste and the village. Those ‘higher’ caste leaders are sometimes influential figures on
elected panchayats (local councils) which are formal political institutions, but they often
have little or no involvement in them. (It is quite unusual for panchayats to play a role
in intercaste negotiations.) Their leadership roles within their castes usually have much
more to do with their influence within informal caste organisations, which may take the
form of mono-caste or of multi-caste councils to which Dalit leaders may be invited
from time to time.5 Interviews in numerous regions indicated that such informal coun-
cils do not always exist, and when they do, they may meet only occasionally, as issues
arise which require attention. They are far less structured than urban peace committees
that seek to prevent or reduce social conflict.6 Dalit and ‘higher’ caste leaders then
engage in discussions, seeking to ease tensions in order to avert violence. Those talks
often lead to an accommodation which achieves those aims.7 Field visits to a large num-
ber of villages in numerous, diverse Indian regions indicate that while both violence and
accommodations have been on the increase in recent years, accommodations outnum-
ber violent clashes. The accommodations which are agreed contain painful ambiguities
both for ‘higher’ castes and for Dalits. They also have ambiguous implications for cur-
rent and future social dynamics within the village.
To gain an understanding of all of this, a study by Avishai Margalit is a helpful
guide.8 It makes no reference to India, but it is cited extensively here because it reso-
nates uncannily with the processes in rural India under discussion. It provides many
acute insights into them and may facilitate comparisons with cases elsewhere which are
beyond the scope of this analysis. Margalit argues that negotiators in any serious dispute
between unequals should always avoid a ‘rotten compromise’. He defines that as ‘an
agreement to establish or maintain an inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty and humili-
ation, that is, a regime that does not treat humans as humans … ’. (The word ‘regime’
here refers not only to political regimes, but also to ‘a regular pattern of behaviour’ in
social interactions.) Inhuman regimes seek
to eradicate the very idea of morality—by actively rejecting the premise on which moral-
ity is predicated, namely, our shared humanity … compromises are vital for social life,
even though some compromises are pathogenic … [but] we need to actively resist rotten
compromises that are lethal for the moral life of a body politic.

4. ‘Higher’ caste leaders usually take the initiative because they have greater wealth and status than Dalits, and
because it is they who might launch a violent attack on Dalits.
5. For useful insights, see Kripa Ananth Pur, ‘Rivalry or Synergy? Formal and Informal Governance in Rural India’,
in Development and Change, Vol. 38, no. 3 (May 2007), pp. 401–21.
6. For a perceptive analysis of this and related issues, see Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus
and Muslims in India (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2002).
7. They also sometimes produce stalemates which stop short of accommodations but avert violence. Stalemates
will be analysed in the book of which this text will form a part. But to keep this discussion manageable, they
are omitted here.
8. Avishai Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2010).
 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 409

In some Indian villages where untouchability is aggressively and uncompromisingly

practised, inhuman regimes exist. In these extreme cases, local caste systems have the
effect of ‘(e)xcluding humans from the human race, thereby rendering them unfit for
human relations’. Margalit warns that compromises with such inhuman regimes are
always ‘rotten’ and ‘never justified’.9
But the accommodations that emerge from negotiations between ‘higher’ castes and
Dalits do not qualify as ‘rotten compromises’. They are, as we shall see, too ambiguous
for that. They do not end all injustices suffered by Dalits, and they usually permit
‘higher’ castes to persist with unfair treatment of Dalits, and they may facilitate the
emergence of new forms of domination by the ‘higher’ castes.10 But they also require
‘higher’ castes to make at least modest concessions which represent gains for Dalits in
addition to the avoidance of violence. They often lead to outward gestures of courtesy to
Dalits and their leaders. Examples include allocating Dalit chairpersons of elected local
councils (gram panchayats) prominent seats on the dais at local events (seen in villages
in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra), and treating Dalits more inclusively
in important village festivals (seen in six of the nine regions studied). These actions may
be largely empty gestures, but they imply ‘higher’ caste recognition both of Dalit leaders
with whom negotiations have occurred and of Dalit perspectives on local affairs. They
also lend legitimacy and substance to numerous previous tacit understandings which
have developed between ‘higher’ castes and Dalits in small, everyday matters (a theme
discussed below). And because they facilitate such understandings in the future, they go
beyond mere empty gestures by promoting civilised bargaining over issues which may
be minor, but which have a material impact. They are what Ashutosh Varshney calls
‘Small Steps’ towards ‘civic linkages across communities’ and ‘quotidian civicness’,11
which can ease (at least somewhat) abusive treatment of Dalits and the risk of violence.
Even when accommodations amount to what Margalit calls ‘shabby deals (exploitative
ones, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the weak party)’, they may have some jus-
tification. That becomes clear when we consider the alternatives12—which in our cases
are violent attacks on Dalits and the toxic social relations that they produce over the
longer term. Even ‘shabby deals’ acquire some minimal merit because the very process
of negotiations leading to accommodations requires ‘higher’ castes to acknowledge the
humanity of Dalits. That begins to humanise what, in villages with extreme caste
inequalities, were inhuman regimes.
Let us assess first how accommodations are achieved, and then the contrasting per-
ceptions, dilemmas and calculations of leaders of the Dalits and the ‘higher’ castes who
engage in negotiations. That will be followed by a discussion of perspectives which the
two sets of leaders share. The ambiguous character and implications of accommodations

9. Ibid., pp. 2, 4, 22, 64, 89.

10. See, for example, Suryakant Waghmore, Civility against Caste: Dalit Politics and Citizenship in Western India (New
Delhi: Sage, 2013); Surinder S. Jodhka, ‘Ascriptive Hierarchies: Caste and Its Reproduction in Contemporary
India’, in Current Sociology, Vol. 64, no. 2 (Dec. 2015), p. 15; Barbara Harriss-White and Judith Heyer (eds), Rural
India Facing the 21st Century: Essays on Long Term Village Change and Recent Development Policy (London:
Anthem Press, 2004); and Judith Heyer, ‘The Changing Position of Agricultural Labourers in Villages in Rural
Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu between 1981/2 and 1996’, Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper Series 57 (2000),
pp. 1–27.
11. Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, pp. 281, 283, 291.
12. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, p. 4.
410 J. MANOR

are then discussed. Finally, we must turn to the problems which leaders in both groups
often face in gaining acceptance within their castes of agreed accommodations, in mak-
ing them ‘stick’—as well as certain trends that may make that more difficult in
the future.

How accommodations are achieved

Let us consider how accommodations are made in most Indian regions. (There are, so
far at least, a few exceptions: regions or sub-regions where accommodations become dif-
ficult or impossible because acute caste conflicts develop across wide areas, as a result of
provocations from above by political leaders and/or change of ruling parties.)13 We
must pay attention to things that facilitate and impede them.
It is difficult to negotiate accommodations when intercaste tensions run high, but the
task is often facilitated by small but far from insignificant prior events. In many villages,
barely perceptible adjustments and tacit understandings have often developed between
‘higher’ castes and Dalits in minor, everyday matters.14 Examples include arrangements
for village festivals, the provision of services by various groups, and the distribution of
benefits from government programmes. ‘Higher’ castes and Dalits also interact in local
panchayat politics. In recent years, panchayats (elected local councils) have gained in
importance because they have acquired substantial funds15—so that the decisions taken
by them materially affect all groups within the village. That has often drawn people
from all castes into proactive participation in council politics. Reservations of council
seats for Dalits and the voting power of Dalits at elections have often required ‘higher’
caste leaders to engage with them. Those changes tend to intensify tensions between
castes, mainly because they dismay ‘higher’ caste leaders who are accustomed to domin-
ance. But they also entail some negotiations and compromises—not least by ‘higher’
caste leaders who need the Dalits’ votes in panchayat elections.
Those prior adjustments and understandings are usually the result of (often fleeting)
discussions between individual Dalit and ‘higher’ caste leaders. They do not remotely
amount to ‘dense networks of reciprocal engagement’,16 and whatever reciprocal actions
occur are saturated with inequality and Dalit subordination. Interviewees in all nine
regions consistently indicated that these adjustments tend (especially among Dalits) to
be wary and (especially among ‘higher’ castes) grudging. But they acquaint the leaders of
different castes with one another and with the practice of arranging bargains.

13. Examples include the severe antagonism in parts of Tamil Nadu (which resulted in clashes in Dharmapuri and
elsewhere), widespread assaults by Thakurs on Dalits after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the 2017 state
election in Uttar Pradesh, and the attacks by Marathas on Dalits in Maharashtra during the Bhima Koregaon
controversy in early 2018. These episodes are—at the time of writing in early 2019—exceptions to the more
prevalent pattern discussed in this paper.
14. I am grateful to Sobin George for stressing this point. His arguments are based on field research in villages in
northern Karnataka, but the patterns that he assesses can be found—to varying degrees—in all of the regions
where fieldwork for this paper was conducted.
15. These abundant new funds have come through the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act, and as a result of a decision by the 14th Finance Commission to provide panchayats with a greater share
of government resources. See in this connection, James Manor, ‘When Local Government Strikes It Rich’,
International Centre for Local Democracy, research report no. 1 (Visby, Sweden, 2013).
16. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1993), p. 167.
 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 411

They provide familiar precedents for negotiations when acute anger and tension arise that
might lead to violence. At such times, they often facilitate accommodations. They do not,
however, guarantee successful resolutions of tensions when inflammatory issues are
involved. The novelty of negotiations and accommodations in times of severe tension lies
precisely here: in the unusual sensitivity of the matters being discussed. It involves ‘more
than interests … it involves principles and ideals … . What is negotiated in serious dis-
putes is sometimes the self-identity of the sides to the dispute … self-recognition’.17
Intercaste inequalities always colour prior adjustments on less sensitive matters, and they
come into play more forcefully when discussions occur amid acute tension. But since the
(at least somewhat) consultative processes leading to those prior adjustments on minor
issues in all nine regions have become familiar and often routine in many villages, they
have been institutionalised as part of the local ‘regime’. It is thus natural in such localities,
when marked intercaste tensions arise, for leaders on both sides of a dispute to turn to
negotiations that may lead to an accommodation that avoids violence. When that hap-
pens, each side necessarily recognises, at least to some degree, the point of view of the
other. That confers, as noted above, at least a limited legitimacy on the other’s perspective.
Amid caste inequalities in Indian villages, it does not entail the emergence of ‘a semblance
of equality’ between the two sides.18 Never, in over 150 interviews across regions, was
there even a suggestion of that. But it is a step in that direction.
We must beware of overstatement here. An observer of interactions across caste lines
in villages might conclude that this is a ‘low-trust’ society.19 There is substance in this
perception. Decades of exploitation and humiliation undermine Dalits’ trust in ‘higher’
castes. The latter also tend to see Dalits as unworthy of their trust. Or their leaders may
fear that their caste fellows will see their engagement with Dalits as beneath their dig-
nity. The references in the previous three sentences are to trust/distrust between groups,
but we must also consider trust/distrust between individuals. In many (probably most)
villages, prior adjustments in small matters have at least required individual leaders of
‘higher’ castes to extend some tenuous recognition to their counterparts among the
Dalits—a significant concession.20 Individual leaders in both groups have engaged with
one another often enough to enable them to develop at least some familiarity with the
interests and concerns of their individual counterparts and of the groups that they rep-
resent. And both sets of leaders usually have at least some knowledge of the internal
dynamics within the other caste, which their counterparts must manage.21

17. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, p. 44.

18. Ibid., p. 41.
19. Most commentaries on India as a low-trust society focus on urban settings—often on the financial sector and
business. This is unhelpful here in a study of rural arenas. For a partial exception to this comment, see Aakar
Patel, India: Low Trust Society (New Delhi: Random House India, 2015). For other helpful analyses, see Michael
Levien, ‘Social Capital as Obstacle to Development: Brokering Land, Norms and Trust in Rural India’, in World
Development, Vol. 74, no. C (2015), pp. 77–92; and most notably, Anirudh Krishna, ‘How Does Social Capital
Grow? A Seven-Year Study of Villages in India’, in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, no. 4 (Nov. 2007), pp. 941–56,
esp. pp. 952–5.
20. Margalit’s comment, ‘Sometimes, recognizing the other as a legitimate side for bargaining is harder than
reaching an actual agreement’, is especially true of ‘higher’ castes. Thus, compromises are made not only
during negotiations but on the way to them—when ‘higher’ castes acknowledge that Dalits are legitimate inter-
locutors ‘worthy of cooperation’. Indeed, a ‘move from non-recognition to recognition can constitute a major
concession’. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, pp. 42–4.
21. There are also villages where few or no prior intercaste adjustments have been made—where different castes
have operated largely separately, so that constructive interactions between them have scarcely or never
412 J. MANOR

The transition in the previous paragraph from groups to individuals is important.

The initial references are to collective perceptions across caste lines which are obstacles
to trust. But when prior adjustments are considered, they mainly refer to interactions
between individuals (usually leaders) across caste lines. In Western societies, and in the
literature on trust or the lack of it within them, the focus is on relationships between
individuals. In discussions of India as a ‘low-trust’ society, the main emphasis rightly
falls upon collective perceptions between groups—in this case, castes. But the prior
adjustments mainly occur between individuals—who acquire greater familiarity with
counterparts across caste lines. The transition here is a small step towards the kind of
interactions that are assessed in the literature on Western cases.22 To speak of this, in
the context of rural India, as ‘trust’ is to exaggerate. These steps are too small to warrant
that. But there is at least a limited recognition and understanding of other groups and
their leaders—which, crucially for Dalits, entails at least a tenuous acknowledgement of
their humanity.23 If ‘trust’ is too strong a word, another one—‘empathy’ across caste
lines—is even more inappropriate. That term refers here to ‘the ability to understand
and share the feelings of another … ’, or putting it slightly differently, ‘[t]he activity of
understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feel-
ings, thoughts and experience’ of another.24 In the many villages studied for this project,
there was next to no sign of empathy among ‘higher’ castes for Dalits, or vice versa—
whether we speak here of individuals or of groups. In just two villages—both in
southern Karnataka where the distribution of land has long been more equitable than
elsewhere, and where intercaste relations have thus been less invidious25—I may have
seen faint suggestions of it. In the rest, there were numerous indications that ‘higher’
castes had some limited awareness of the thinking and dilemmas of Dalit leaders. But
there was no sharing of those things. The openness of ‘higher’ caste leaders to negotia-
tions with Dalits is thus the result of a change of mind, but not of heart.26
In many, perhaps even most villages, not just the dominance,27 but also the strong
influence which ‘higher’ castes once exercised over local affairs has been substantially
eroded over time. This has occurred as a result of an array of changes: educational and

occurred. In such villages, where there is no precedent for negotiated understandings, it is exceedingly difficult
to resolve serious tensions—although because interactions occur only infrequently, severe tensions arise less
often there.
22. One reviewer of this text offered helpful comments on this point. For a valuable discussion of this theme,
mainly in Western contexts, see A. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2000).
23. For the importance of this, see Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, p. 37.
24. These phrases come, respectively, from www.oxforddictionaries.com and www.merriam-webster.com, emphases
added. Margalit, unusually, departs from this common usage by adopting a more limited definition. He defines
empathy as ‘an attentive effort to understand’ the concerns and viewpoint of another. For him empathy stops
short of sympathy: a stronger thing that entails an ‘identification’ with others’ concerns. Margalit, On
Compromise and Rotten Compromises, pp. 42–3. In the present analysis, the broader and more widely accepted
definition is used.
25. James Manor, ‘Karnataka: Caste, Class, Dominance and Politics in a Cohesive Society’, in Francine F. Frankel and
M.S.A. Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modern India, Vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989),
pp. 322–61.
26. I am grateful to K.C. Suri for stressing this point at an early stage of field research. His insight was consistently
borne out across every region studied.
27. The classic study of this is M.N. Srinivas, ‘The Dominant Caste in Rampura’, in American Anthropologist, Vol. 61,
no. 1 (Feb. 1959), pp. 1–16. It is reprinted in M.N. Srinivas, The Oxford India Srinivas (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 74–92.
 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 413

economic advances by Dalits and other disadvantaged groups, occupational diversifica-

tion, political contestation over elected panchayats,28 the penetration into villages of
government development programmes and the response to them of local political entre-
preneurs from non-elite castes29 (whose constructive potential in times of tension are
discussed below), etc.—plus a socio-political awakening and greater ‘political capacity’
(their political awareness, confidence, skills and connections) among Dalits.30 In times
of social tension, these things often enable intercaste negotiations to proceed on less
unequal terms than a generation ago—and facilitate accommodations. But they can also
produce the opposite result. If there is a shortage or even a near absence of a socio-
political ‘order’ in a village,31 doubts may arise over whether anyone has the authority
to conduct negotiations, and over whether an accommodation, once agreed, can be
made to ‘stick’ (see below for more details).
Let us now turn to the perceptions and concerns of leaders of different castes as
negotiations that may produce accommodations proceed. We must first consider con-
trasts between the leaders of ‘higher’ castes and of Dalits, before examining certain
things that they share.

Contrasting perceptions, dilemmas and calculations of negotiators:

‘Higher’ castes
Some ‘higher’ caste leaders calculate that an accommodation with Dalits will be a tem-
porary measure which can gradually be disregarded over time—so that the compromise
reached ‘is never peace but only a truce’.32 Many more of them reckon that it will not
preclude efforts to salvage much of their ‘honour’33 by sustaining hierarchy and Dalit
subordination in new ways.34 Such ideas were expressed—usually mutedly, but some-
times blatantly—in interviews with members of ‘higher’ castes in all nine regions. Post-
accommodation efforts to maintain ‘higher’ caste pre-eminence have revived intercaste

28. See, for example, G.K. Karanth, ‘Caste in Contemporary Rural India’, in M.N. Srinivas (ed.), Caste: Its Twentieth
Century Avatar (New Delhi: Penguin, 1996), p. 106; Adrian Mayer, ‘Caste in an Indian Village: Change and
Continuity’, in C.J. Fuller (ed.), Caste Today (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 32–64; G.K. Karanth,
Change and Continuity in Agrarian Relations (New Delhi: Concept, 1995); S.R. Charsley and G.K. Karanth (eds),
Challenging Untouchability: Dalit Initiative and Experience from Karnataka (London: Altamira Press, 1998);
Dipankar Gupta, Caste in Question: Identity or Hierarchy? (New Delhi/London/Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004);
Surinder S. Jodhka, ‘Caste and Untouchability in Rural Punjab’, in Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 37, no. 19 (11
May 2002), pp. 1813–23; and Surinder S. Jodhka and P. Louis, ‘Caste Tensions in Punjab: Talhan and Beyond’, in
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 38, no. 28 (12 July 2003), pp. 2923–36. See also Manor, ‘Prologue’, pp. xi–lxi.
29. Anirudh Krishna describes them as naya netas (new leaders), and this writer calls them fixers, but we are
referring to the same people. See Anirudh Krishna, Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and
Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Anirudh Krishna, ‘Alternatives to Caste-Based Channels
of Influence’, in Surinder S. Jodhka and James Manor (eds), Contested Hierarchies, Persisting Influence: Caste and
Power in Twenty-First Century India (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2018), pp. 87–110; James Manor, ‘Small-Time
Political “Fixers” in the Politics of India’s States: “Towel over Armpit”’, in Asian Survey, Vol. 40, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct.
2000), pp. 816–35, reprinted in James Manor, Politics and State–Society Relations in India (New Delhi/London/
New York: Orient BlackSwan/Hurst/Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 176–97.
30. This point is discussed in greater detail in Jenkins and Manor, Politics and the Right to Work.
31. For a compelling account of such a village, see G.K. Karanth, V. Ramaswamy and Ruedi Hogger, ‘The Threshing
Floor Disappears: Rural Livelihood Systems in Transition’, in Ruedi Baumgartner and Ruedi Hogger (eds), In
Search of Sustainable Livelihood Systems: Managing Resources and Change (New Delhi/Thousand Oaks, CA/
London: Sage, 2004), pp. 265–74.
32. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, p. 77.
33. See Waghmore’s comment about ‘Maratha honour’, in his Civility against Caste, p. 63.
34. There is plenty of evidence to support that expectation. See the studies cited in note 10.
414 J. MANOR

tensions in some villages—as Dalits often emphasised, especially in Maharashtra and

two regions of Madhya Pradesh. They might even lead to violence at a later date,
although the research for this study found little evidence of that. But the expectation
that the old inequalities can be sustained after an accommodation makes the prospect of
an agreement appear acceptable to leaders and others within ‘higher’ castes. Another
consideration weighs more heavily with ‘higher’ caste leaders. They know that violence
against Dalits may trigger unwelcome interventions in their village by external actors.
Such interventions rarely occurred twenty or thirty years ago, but they are very real pos-
sibilities today. So when intercaste tensions arise, these leaders often calculate that they
need to seek accommodations with Dalit leaders to pre-empt such intrusions.
If violence occurs, such interventions may take various forms. The media may send
in reporters to provide accounts of clashes. Delegations of middle-class urban Dalits
may be sent by Dalit organisations to investigate, and progressive non-Dalit civil society
organisations may do the same. Public interest lawyers may initiate cases against ‘higher’
caste perpetrators of violence under the draconian 1989 Atrocities Act.35 If (local- or
state-level) politicians need Dalits’ votes, they may intervene. The widespread use of
mobile telephones enables Dalits to reach potential external allies instantaneously—
even before violence occurs, if it appears to be likely. If the police are not in the pocket
of the ‘higher’ castes, they may file charges under the Atrocities Act which entails the
immediate incarceration of the accused, merely on the basis of an allegation—and the
burden of proof is mainly borne by the accused. Conviction rates in such cases are quite
low, but those charged face long, expensive legal battles which prevent them from get-
ting on with other important things. These things cause ‘higher’ caste leaders anxiety,
even in regions with marked caste inequalities36—as interviews revealed in such places,
including the Gwalior region, and in inequitable parts of Maharashtra, Rajasthan and
Mandya district of Karnataka. That impels those leaders towards accommodations (see
below for certain painful ambiguities).

Contrasting perceptions, dilemmas and calculations of negotiators: Dalits

Dalit negotiators are seldom naïve. They know that violence would do immense, pos-
sibly lethal damage to their caste fellows; that it would undo any progress that has been
made towards minimally civilised intercaste relations; and that it would poison social
interactions in the village for years to come. They are also aware that even if an accom-
modation is reached which averts violence, the possibility of future violence will
remain—as will the certainty of continuing injustices. The latter may be eased at least a
little by restraint among the higher castes after an accommodation takes hold, but they
will not end. Dalit leaders seldom have a strong negotiating position, so they proceed
cautiously, factoring these considerations into their calculations. Dalit leaders inter-
viewed in villages in all nine regions consistently displayed shrewd, soberly cautious and
realistic understandings of these things. But even if negotiations do not produce accom-
modations, even if they lead only to an uneasy stalemate, those same Dalit leaders saw
attractions in discussions which seek such agreements. ‘Higher’ caste leaders’ decisions

35. The full title of the Act is The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
36. This became apparent during visits to many villages in such regions for this study.
 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 415

to negotiate entail a grudging acknowledgement of Dalits’ humanity, and often of a

degree of interdependence between castes. That may lend further substance to a wel-
come change seen in many villages over the last twenty or thirty years. Even though
Dalits refuse more often and more openly to accept caste hierarchies, in many localities,
it has become less common to see ‘higher’ castes attacking an individual Dalit in order
to ‘teach him a lesson’. ‘Higher’ castes’ willingness to negotiate may also help to counter
another more depressing trend: outbreaks in recent years of more savage, often lethal
collective violence which have occurred more often than a generation ago.
When Dalit leaders look beyond the negotiating process to the potential achievement
of an accommodation, they see further advantages. This point was made forcefully by
such leaders in interviews in two regions of Madhya Pradesh and in coastal Andhra
Pradesh, but it was evident across all regions. If an agreement can be reached, it will
help to erode another vile element of the old hierarchical caste order: the idea among
‘higher’ castes that brutalising and terrorising Dalits legitimate the unequal social order.
Accommodations undermine that notion by indicating, more firmly than does the mere
willingness of ‘higher’ caste leaders to negotiate, that those leaders acknowledge that
they and Dalits share a common humanity. The old notion denied that. It was a con-
scious attack on and rejection of morality itself—which must be based on the assump-
tion of a shared humanity.37 Thus, accommodations may lead not only to a reduction in
abusive actions by ‘higher’ castes, but also to a key change in their thinking. In
Margalit’s terms, change occurs not just in practice but also in doctrine.38 This point can
be restated and elaborated in another way. The old caste order entailed ‘unrestricted
domination’.39 In most Indian villages, that has been undermined in recent years by
multiple changes briefly noted above: material and educational gains by many Dalits;
reservations in education, employment and posts in (increasingly important) elected
local councils; a consequent increase in material autonomy for many Dalits and the ero-
sion of bonds of dependency upon ‘higher’ castes; greater ‘political capacity’ among
Dalits;40 the ‘democratisation of public spaces’;41 and consciousness-raising among
many Dalits. Their leaders see that negotiations which may lead to accommodations,
and the accommodations themselves, are in part acknowledgements of these changes.
Interviews in all nine regions indicated that Dalit negotiators also calculate that an
accommodation holds promise for the future, in two ways. If intercaste tensions rise
again, it will serve as a precedent that makes it easier to revive negotiations to address
the problem. And the achievement of an accommodation is likely to enhance the
authority of Dalit leaders within their caste, despite resentments among understandably
impatient (often younger) caste fellows over persisting injustices.

37. In Gopal Guru’s words, the old hierarchical mindset ‘cancels out or erases the human being from the memory’.
It entails a ‘total rejection’ of Dalits which makes them ‘un-seeable, unapproachable and untouchable’. See
Gopal Guru, ‘Rejection of Rejection’, in Gopal Guru (ed.), Humiliation: Claims and Context (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 210, 212.
38. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, p. 196.
39. Ibid., p. 189.
40. For detailed arguments on the erosion of dependency and increases in political capacity, see Jenkins and
Manor, Politics and the Right to Work.
41. Waghmore, Civility against Caste, p. 69.
416 J. MANOR

Perceptions shared by leaders of both groups

As noted above, an intercaste accommodation reaffirms the authority of both the Dalit
and the ‘higher’ caste leaders who negotiate it—despite the discontents of some mem-
bers of one or both groups (a topic elaborated below). The alternative—violence—is
unwelcome to both sets of leaders. It would cause serious injury to Dalits and hand the
initiative to members of the ‘higher’ caste, who reject the restraint and the authority of
their leaders. An accommodation will also sustain the influence of ‘higher’ caste leaders
over the entire village. Dalit leaders know that this will enable caste inequalities to
persist—as interviewees in all nine regions stated. But they added that at least ‘higher’
caste leaders have been willing to counsel some restraint and to practise it—in part by
compromising during negotiations.
We have seen that ‘higher’ caste leaders seek accommodations in order to prevent
unwanted interventions in the village by external actors. Such interventions often bene-
fit Dalits, but their leaders also sometimes expressed anxiety about potential damage
from some external actors whom they regarded as hostile: police, bureaucrats and politi-
cians who harbour anti-Dalit prejudices and corrupt or unsympathetic judges in lower
courts. Thus, at times, both sets of leaders see an accommodation as a way to keep
potentially troublesome outsiders at bay. It also ensures greater predictability in village
affairs—which, not incidentally, helps to sustain the influence of both sets of leaders
within their castes. In some cases, leaders on both sides of the caste divide may make
common cause in order to avoid damage to the village as a whole. Two types of damage
may occur: first to caste interactions within a village, and second to the reputation of an
entire village. A severe spasm of violence can poison social relations in a village for
many years. This is especially well understood in villages located in the vicinity of others
where extreme violence has occurred. People of diverse caste backgrounds repeatedly
stressed that strife-torn villages nearby served as object lessons about the lasting damage
that violence can do. They warned that visits to such villages would yield little other
than insights into the long-term survival of toxic social relations there—and subsequent
interviews in such places confirmed that view. At times, threats to the reputation of an
entire village also impel Dalit and ‘higher’ caste leaders to act in concert. This becomes
an especially acute problem when amorous relations develop between a young man and
a young woman from opposite sides of the caste divide, or when such a couple elopes,
or when a rape (usually of a Dalit woman) occurs. The main response to such events is
usually to hush them up because if they become widely known, the village may be seen
unfairly (in the case of amorous ties or elopements) as a place where loose morals pre-
vail, or (in the case of a rape) where the chastity of all young women is open to doubt. If
those perceptions take hold beyond a village, it will become extremely difficult to
arrange marriages for young people there. Since a serious outbreak of violence in reac-
tion to any of these events is likely to make them more widely known, intercaste nego-
tiations to avert violence often ensue—along with negotiations about the vexed question
of how to deal with the initial event.42

42. The complex difficulties that attend efforts to respond to such events require more space than is available here.
They will be examined in the book of which this text will form one part. They often entail not negotiations
but coercive action by ‘higher’ castes. For a characteristically perceptive analysis of one dimension of this, see
 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 417

We must beware of overstatement. ‘[F]orms of mutual aid and solidarity’43 across

caste lines are severely underdeveloped. But to a very limited extent, the interests of
Dalit and ‘higher’ caste leaders correspond. Modest though these commonalities may
be, they often suffice to achieve accommodations.

Summing up: Accommodations’ ambiguous outcomes

If by way of summation we revisit some of the points set out above, we see that this
study is saturated with ambiguities. Changes inspire both hope of less abusive social
interactions and a sense of foreboding. Interviews across all nine regions corroborated
the findings of an analysis by Grace Carswell and Geert De Neve of Dalits’ resort to the
1989 Atrocity Act. They argue that it provides Dalits with valuable leverage to challenge
‘higher’ castes’ power. But that law not only intimidates members of ‘higher’ castes, but
also triggers greater resentment and solidarity among them—which may make them
more truculent in their dealings with Dalits.44
The same is true of intercaste accommodations. Accommodations always entail painful
ambiguities for both Dalits and ‘higher’ castes. That is inevitable because neither side gets
all that it wants—and because each side’s idea of ‘justice’ is different,45 so accommodations
leave both feeling that less than full justice has been done. They inspire both optimism and
worries. For Dalits, accommodations never sweep away all inequalities. They usually have
only a modest mitigating effect on abuses that they suffer at the hands of ‘higher’ castes.
And accommodations are often intended by ‘higher’ castes to preserve whatever they can
of the old unequal social order. Village-level Dalit leaders in all nine regions routinely
expressed both cautious optimism and anxiety. Accommodations prevent ‘higher’ caste
leaders from sustaining old injustices in their entirety, which frustrates them. And the very
process of negotiation requires them to accept Dalit leaders as partners—to acknowledge
their social utility, their worth as interlocutors, and thus their humanity. That represents a
significant gain for Dalits, but it often generates resentment among ‘higher’ castes.
Accommodations are nonetheless for the most part encouraging. Talks that lead to
them begin to undermine whatever inhuman elements may have characterised the local
social regime, and the achievement of an accommodation reconfirms that change more
firmly. So for Dalits, despite the troubling ambiguities that confront them, accommoda-
tions stop short of being ‘rotten compromises’—in which their humanity would be denied.
They also avert violence, which would brutalise Dalits and reaffirm a more inhumane
regime than will emerge from an accommodation. Dalit leaders agree to an accommoda-
tion in order to achieve peace at the cost of allowing some injustices to survive. So there is
a trade-off between peace and justice. They opt for peace, partly because it is unrealistic to
expect injustices to be fully swept away, and partly because the process leading to accom-
modation entails an acknowledgement of the common humanity of all.46 When some
(usually younger) Dalits argue that any accommodation is rotten, they overlook this.

Pratiksha Baxi, ‘Justice is a Secret: Compromise in Rape Trials’, in Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vol. 44, no. 3
(2010), pp. 207–33.
43. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 169.
44. Grace Carswell and Geert De Neve, ‘Litigation against Political Organisation? The Politics of Dalit Mobilisation in
Tamil Nadu, India’, in Development and Change, Vol. 46, no. 5 (2015), pp. 1106–32.
45. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, p. 70.
46. Ibid., pp. 55, 64, 66.
418 J. MANOR

Two further points are worth stressing. First, if violence occurs, it—like any
accommodation—also produces an ambiguous outcome, as several points noted above
indicate. Dalits suffer from it, often grievously, but a violent incident can also trigger
greater solidarity and mobilisation among Dalits in other localities. If it causes Dalits
elsewhere to become more proactive in the public sphere in order to defend their inter-
ests, that enhances their ‘political capacity’. The damage done by violence in one locality
also offers ‘higher’ castes in others in the vicinity salutary lessons about the benefits of
restraint.47 They see that within the affected village, social relations are poisoned for
years. It may also destroy the reputation of the entire village. A violent incident is also
likely to lead to unwanted interventions from outside, which (at a minimum) cause
‘higher’ castes immense inconvenience. Second, accommodations tend to strengthen the
key caste institution at the village level: jati (an endogamous group, within which villag-
ers nearly always marry off their children). By sustaining the pre-eminence of leaders
within both Dalit and ‘higher’ jatis, accommodations reconfirm authority structures
within them, but they may inspire discontent among some individuals within either or
both castes.
Jati has proved to be the most resilient pre-existing social institution in Asia, Africa
and Latin America—not by resisting change, but by adapting to it and often taking
strength from it. Accommodations are but one example among many of that process.
They are not equitable bargains, but the fact that they are on the increase indicates that
the power of the old caste hierarchies has waned. In other words, it is not caste (jati)
that is losing substance and potency, but hierarchies among castes. The continuing
strength of interpersonal ties and solidarity within castes helps to make accommoda-
tions between castes broadly acceptable, but it is not an unmixed blessing for relations
between ‘higher’ castes and Dalits. Solidarity within a caste is a product of ‘bonding’
social capital,48 which tends to weaken ‘bridging’ social capital—that is, ties between
castes.49 It makes human relationships within a caste close and ‘thick’, but it tends to
make relations between castes more distant and ‘thin’ (insubstantial). In their interac-
tions with other members of their caste, individuals may be unselfish which ‘ … gives
them the illusion that they belong to a moral order, since they identify morality with
individual unselfishness’. But those interactions may also perpetuate invidious social
relations with people in other castes which ‘invites tension’, and which in extremis
undermines a morality based on the belief in the common humanity of all.50

Afterword: Gaining broad acceptance for accommodations

To the summation of the main themes of this paper must be added a comment on one
potential problem which arises after accommodations are made, which worried many
Dalit and ‘higher’ caste leaders interviewed for this study. The discontent that

47. This point was repeatedly made by interviewees of all caste backgrounds who were located near villages where
severe violence had occurred.
48. This term refers to ‘features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’. See Robert D. Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining
Social Capital’, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, no. 1 (1995), p. 67.
49. Deepa Narayan, ‘Bonds and Bridges’, World Bank Policy Research Paper (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
50. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, pp. 122–3.
 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 419

accommodations often generate among some members of both castes might cause an
agreement to unravel. Leaders on both sides must seek to win broad acceptance for it
within their castes. During the negotiations, leaders on each side understand that they
have an interest in sustaining the authority of their counterparts in the other caste.
Thus, both recognise the need to give some ground so that intercaste accommodations
never amount to complete sell-outs by either side.
There is of course an imbalance in status and power between ‘higher’ caste and Dalit
negotiators. That has serious implications, but we need to consider them with care. The
imbalance might suggest that Dalit leaders operate under such unfair pressure that they
are coerced into making compromises. That impression gains further credence from the
patent threat of ‘higher’ caste violence if no accommodation is reached. And there is a
contradiction between coerced concession and genuine compromise.51 But the reality in
most intercaste discussions is more complicated and (again) ambiguous. Dalit leaders
clearly negotiate under duress, but as we have seen, their ‘higher’ caste counterparts also
have compelling reasons to seek genuine compromises. Most Dalit leaders understand
that, so they proceed in the knowledge that they hold some cards in the game—not least
because (as ‘higher’ caste leaders know) if threats become extreme or violence actually
occurs, they are usually able to raise the alarm among allies outside the village via
mobile telephones. They operate under unfair pressure, but they are not utterly helpless
victims of coercion. The ‘higher’ caste leaders’ interest in an accommodation implies
that they are prepared to make at least some concessions. This willingness to comprom-
ise is the result of careful calculations by leaders on both sides. It ‘does not in any way
mean that … [they are] swept by a spirit of altruism … ’. Nor, as noted above, do they
feel empathy towards those on the other side. The negotiators make limited concessions
in the hope that this may make an ‘agreement stable’52—that is, acceptable to most peo-
ple on both sides. ‘Higher’ caste leaders, whose negotiating position is stronger, care lit-
tle for social justice. However, they usually recognise that if they offer Dalits too little
even to achieve an accommodation, or if Dalits gain very little from it, a strong sense of
injustice among (especially younger) Dalits may generate instability that could destroy
the authority of Dalit leaders and lead to unwelcome disorder. That would in turn
threaten the authority of ‘higher’ caste leaders over their own caste fellows and their
influence within village society. In interviews, such leaders in several regions often said
that they were anxious to avoid such an outcome, which would cede power to impatient
Dalits or to members of ‘higher’ castes who favour violence, or to both. Negotiators on
both sides naturally seek a settlement that will gain their own side the greatest possible
advantages. That contributes mightily to the ambiguous character of accommodations,
and to discontents among some people on both sides. But the negotiators also recognise
the need to prevent those discontents from becoming too acute. They face a delicate bal-
ancing act.
What kinds of discontent emerge? Let us first consider Dalits. Because accommoda-
tions do not end all injustices, some understandably impatient (and again, mainly
younger) Dalits—whose ‘self-identity’53 is grounded in a determination to achieve full

51. Ibid., pp. 20–1.

52. Ibid., pp. 43–4.
53. Ibid., p. 44.
420 J. MANOR

equality—feel cheated. The idea that they should be ‘required to trade justice for
peace’54 causes them deep unease. Because accommodations often permit ‘higher’ castes
to develop variations on the old theme of hierarchy—often in new ways—they feel
tricked. They also see that, given the imbalance of power between the two sides, accom-
modations do not split the difference equally between them.55 That rankles.
Dalit advocates of accommodations reply that the willingness of ‘higher’ castes to
engage in negotiations represents an acknowledgement of Dalit leaders and concerns,
and that this is a significant advance over earlier abusive practices. They add that this
change may have some lasting effect by altering dynamics in ways that do at least a little
to ease injustices, even though they stop far short of full equity. They also argue that
even unsatisfactory accommodations are preferable to violence, which would be severely
damaging to Dalits and perhaps even lethal. The more impatient Dalits do not see nego-
tiations and accommodations as important advances. Some even note that violence can
spark a greater awakening and mobilisation among Dalits. It is true that those gains
often occur, but they happen outside a strife-torn village—in other nearby localities, and
sometimes well beyond.56 In villages where attacks take place, Dalits pay a heavy price.
Some members of ‘higher’ castes also object strongly to accommodations, and even
to decisions to seek talks with Dalit leaders. They regard these as beneath the dignity of
their caste and prefer time-honoured doses of violence to provide object lessons to
troublesome Dalits. ‘Higher’ castes engaging with Dalits may merely be ‘couching dis-
gust (towards Dalits) and caste hubris under a new form of politeness’,57 but for discon-
tented members of ‘higher’ castes, even that is unacceptable. Their self-esteem has taken
a battering in recent years from changes and forces beyond their control. Those who
own land have seen their holdings fragmented as they are parcelled out into increasingly
uneconomic plots among multiple heirs. That problem is compounded by what is com-
monly called the ‘crisis’ in agriculture. Close family ties suffer when children leave the
village, preferring urban life. Sons who can be persuaded to remain as farmers struggle
to find wives because young women in their caste prefer husbands with white-collar
jobs in towns and cities. Many members of ‘higher’ castes feel driven to vie for influence
within local panchayats because those bodies have lately acquired substantial funds. But
in doing so, they face infuriating contestation and cross-examinations from Dalits and
other disadvantaged groups who no longer defer to them. These and other changes cre-
ate insecurity about their status, their ‘self-identity’ and the social order as they have
known it. When intercaste tensions rise, those anxieties have contributed to the increase
in violence in recent years. They also threaten the durability of accommodations which
have outnumbered violent incidents, as well as the authority of ‘higher’ caste leaders
who negotiate them.
The great bulk of interviews for this study inspire both optimism and pessimism
about the outlook for intercaste accommodations in the teeth of these discontents.

54. Ibid., p. 81.

55. Ibid., pp. 48, 51.
56. This often emerged in numerous interviews for this study in localities within the same region as a village where
violence had taken place. See also Waghmore, Civility against Caste, p. 65.
57. Suryakant Waghmore, ‘From Hierarchy to Hindu Politeness: Caste Atrocities and Dalit Protest in Rural
Maharashtra’, in Surinder S. Jodhka and James Manor (eds), Contested Hierarchies, Persisting Influence: Caste and
Power in Twenty-First Century India (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2018), p. 121.
 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES 421

On the one hand, it is unusual—so far—for accommodations to come unstuck. The

authority within their castes of leaders on both sides of the divide has in most cases suf-
ficed to prevent their discontented caste fellows from wrecking agreements. On the
other hand, there is evidence to suggest that, over the longer term, leaders may become
less able to make accommodations ‘stick’. The same changes which have made Dalits
increasingly unwilling to accept caste hierarchies—economic change, occupational
diversification, educational advances, etc.—are eroding deference among both the Dalits
and the ‘higher’ castes towards their own caste leaders.
However, it is important to recognise that some of these recent changes may ease
intercaste tensions and even facilitate accommodations. ‘Higher’ castes and Dalits may
become more preoccupied with exits from village society that have become increasingly
available to them—for the ‘higher’ castes, investments in or residences for themselves
and their children in urban centres; and for Dalits, opportunities to migrate or even to
commute for (often well-paid) work on construction sites in towns and cities. Members
of both groups may become distracted by such things outside the village. These changes
sometimes exacerbate caste antagonisms in villages, but they often make people less
concerned with disputes over status within their villages—and that can ameliorate ten-
sions and make accommodations more possible, even if they undermine the authority
of leaders within their castes.
The increasing importance of village-level political entrepreneurs—many of whom
come from non-elite caste backgrounds (see note 29)—also undercuts the authority of
caste leaders. But as such entrepreneurs gain broad respect for their ability to bring ben-
efits from government programmes to villagers, they become capable of influencing
events in times of intercaste tension. And since they tend to have a vested interest in
limiting social disorder, they may compensate for caste leaders’ loss of authority by
helping to facilitate accommodations—as they have already done in some cases.58
If the changes noted above make still deeper impacts, which is likely, the basis for
intercaste accommodations will need to change. The old basis was the authority within
their castes of Dalit and ‘higher’ caste leaders. If their authority diminishes markedly,
the new basis will have to be a different set of intercaste dynamics in which most villag-
ers of all social backgrounds accept that ‘caste’ now denotes difference rather than hier-
archy59—and in which the differences that emerge are not so inflammatory that they
trigger violence. The evidence collected for this study indicates that this benign change
has already occurred in numerous localities. But in many others, the main impact of the
erosion of caste leaders’ authority has been negative. In such villages, most members of
‘higher’ castes have not accepted that intercaste dynamics must be more equitable. They
harbour resentments which—in the absence of strong moderating authority by their
caste leaders—will make it more difficult both to achieve accommodations and then to
gain broad support for them. And if we see an acceleration of the recent tendency for
acute caste conflicts to develop across wide areas—as a result of provocations from
above by political leaders and/or by changes of ruling parties60—intercaste tensions may

58. This has occurred in a non-trivial minority of the villages visited for this study. There are also suggestions of it
in Krishna, ‘How Does Social Capital Grow?’, pp. 941–56.
59. This is Dipankar Gupta’s formulation. See Gupta, Caste in Question.
60. For examples, see note 13.
422 J. MANOR

become unmanageable. If the benign change noted above occurs as caste leaders’ influ-
ence wanes, then accommodations will continue to predominate over violence. But if it
does not, that predominance may turn out to be merely a passing phase.

Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the South Asia reviewers and to many colleagues for valuable com-
ments on this research project. Especially helpful insights came from Sobin George, Hugo
Gorringe, Gopal Guru, Surinder S. Jodhka, G.K. Karanth, Anirudh Krishna, K.C. Suri and
Suryakant Waghmore.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
Most of this research was supported by a grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim
Foundation. Separate and extensive studies of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act, and of five government initiatives that were intended to tackle
poverty and inequality, were funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council
[ES/J012629].