BILL OF RIGHTS

by: J. Paul R. Tan

A. Private acts and the Bill of Rights

Q: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of another person’s
constitutional rights, be invoked against the state?
ANS: As a general rule, no. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State (People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561,
January 18, 1991).

However, the constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and

correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is [a private person]
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception
to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding” (Zulueta v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996).

Q: Can a violation of the Bill of Rights be considered as a cause of action against private
individuals?
ANS: Yes, in an action for damages pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code. A violation of the
Bill of Rights precisely as a constitutional guarantee can be done only by public officials. But
almost all these liberties are also guaranteed by the Civil Code, Article 32 thus makes private
violations actionable even if the violation does not have a constitutional consequence (Silahis
Internatinal Hotel v. Soluta, G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006).

B. Rights to life, liberty, and property

1. Procedural and substantive due process

Q: What is the concept of due process of law?

ANS: It is a law that hears before it condemns, which proceed upon inquiry and renders
judgement only after trial. It is responsiveness to supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693,
20 SCRA 849).

Q: What are the aspects of due process? Give their requirements.

ANS: The aspects of due process are: (1) Procedural due process; and (2) Substantive due
process.

The following are the requirements of procedural due process:

(1) There must be an impartial tribunal;
(2) The court must have jurisdiction;
(3) There must be opportunity to be heard; and
(4) The judgement must be rendered after trial and in accordance with law.

The following are the requisites of substantive due process:

(1) The means are reasonable for the accomplishment of the purpose of the law; and
(2) The law must be intended for the interest of the public rather than for private interest
(Albano, Political Law Reviewer, 2017 Edition, p. 74).

Q: Is the right to due process waivable?

ANS: Yes. The right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly so, as long as the
party is given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf. If he opts to be silent where he has a right

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to speak, he cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced (Stronghold Insurance
Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 88050, january 30, 1992).

2. Void-for-vagueness doctrine
Q: What is the void-for-vagueness doctrine?
ANS: When a statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, that
law is deemed void. Such kind of statute violates the first essential element of due process of law
because it denies the accused the right to be informed of the charge against him. (Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).

3. Hierarchy of rights
Q: What is the basic purpose of the Bill of Rights?
ANS: The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and
discriminatory use of political power. The bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our
natural rights which include personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or
any of its branches and instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights
takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other,
the scales of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported
enforcement of criminal law where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of
justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner,
and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights (Allado, et al. v. Diokno, et al., 232
SCRA 192, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994).

Q: Are the Constitutional rights provided under the 1987 Constitution of the same weight
and value?
Ans: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized because these freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society and the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions. Further, the SC held in the same case that human rights are
imprescriptible (Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Phil. Blooming Mills Co. Inc.,
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973).

It was ruled by the SC that freedom of expression ranks higher than property rights in the
hierarchy of constitutional rights (Salonga v. Pano, G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985). Also,
religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a
preferred position in the hierarchy of values (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, G.R.
No. L-25246, September 12, 1974).

C. Equal protection

1. Requisites for valid classification

Q: What are the requisites for a valid classification?
ANS: The requisites for valid classification are:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions;
2. It applies equally to all members of the same class;
3. It is germane to the purposes of the law; and
4. It is not confined to existing conditions only (People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5,
1939).

2. Rational basis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny tests

Q: What is the rational basis test in relation to the equal protection clause?
ANS: The rational basis test is described as adopting a ‘deferential’ attitude towards legislative
classifications. This ‘deference’ comes from the recognition that classification is often an
unavoidable element of the task of legislation which under the separation of powers embodied in

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our Constitution, is primarily the prerogative of Congress (Central Bank Employees Association
Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004). It applies to
legislative classifications in general, such as those pertaining to economic and social legislation
(White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, Janualy 20, 2009).

Q: What is the strict scrutiny test in relation to the classification under the equal protection
clause?
ANS: A legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classsification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest (Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009).
Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to
equal protection (White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, supra).

Q: What is the intermediate scrutiny test in relation to the equal protection clause?
ANS: It is used as a test for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy. The
government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and
that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest (Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010).

D. Searches and seizures

1. Requisites for a valid warrant

Q: What are the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant and warrant of
arrest?
ANS: The requisites for the issuance of a valid warrant are:
1. A determination of probable cause;
2. The determination of probable cause was made personally by a judge;
3. The determination by the judge was based on an examination under oath of affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
4. The complainant and/or witnesses testified to facts within their personal knowledge; and
5. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched or the persons or
things to be seized. (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 2).

Q: What is meant by probable cause?

ANS: Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched (20th Century Fox
Film Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 76649-51, August 19, 1988).

2. Warrantless searches and seizures

Q: In what instances are warrantless searches valid?
ANS: Warrantless searches are valid in the following circumstances:
1. Consented warrantless search – When right has been voluntarily and intelligently waived
(People v. Omaweng, G.R. No. 99050, September 2, 1992);
2. Incident to a lawful arrest – A person caught in flagrante delicto and lawfully arrested
may be searched, provided that the search is contemporaneous to the arrest and within
permissible area of search (RULES OF COURT, RULE 126, Sec. 13) or the place within
the immediate control of the person being arrested (Espano v. CA, G.R. No. 120431, April
1, 1998). It is essential that a valid arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed (People v. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999);
3. Searches in moving vehicles - Searches of vehicles, vessels or aircraft for violation of
fishery, immigration, and custom laws (Roldan v. Arca, G.R. No. L-25434, July 25,
1975). Searches and seizures without warrant of vessels and aircraft for violation of
customs laws have been traditional exception to the constitutional requirement because
the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search

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 must be sought before the warrant could be secured (Hizon v. CA, G.R. No. 119619,
December 13, 1996);
4. Customs search – Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders for violation
of immigration and smuggling laws. Custom searches however are not available in
dwelling places (Papa v. Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968);
5. Body checks in airports – Holders and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search
for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substance. Holder refusing to be searched shall
not be allowed to board the aircraft which shall constitute a part of the contract between
the passenger and the air carrier (R.A. No. 6235, Sec. 9);
6. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations (Valeroso v. CA, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009);
7. When there is a genuine reason to “stop-and-frisk” in the light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions to warrant a belief that the person stopped has
concealed weapons (Malacat v. CA, G.R. No. 123595, December 1, 1997);
8. Visual search at checkpoints (Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29,
1989);
9. Conduct of “aerial target zoning” and “saturation drive” in the exercise of military
powers of the President (Guazon v. de Villa, G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990);
10. Where prohibited articles are in plain view (Chia v. Acting Collector of Customs, G.R.
No. L-43810, September 26, 1989);
11. Doctrine of exigent circumstance – enunciates the rule that under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, search warrant should be lawfully dispensed with (People v. De
Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994).

3. Administrative arrests
Q: When may administrative officials issue warrants of arrest?
ANS: Generally, only a judge has the power to issue a warrant after the proper procedure has
been duly taken. The exceptions are the following:
1. The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may issue warrants to carry out a
final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly
authorized for the purpose (CID v. Judge De la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, May 31, 1991
and Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-10280, September 30, 1963);
2. Warrant of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of violation of law and not for the sole purpose of
investigation or prosecution. It may be issued only after the proceeding has taken place as
when there is already a final decision of the administrative authorities (Vivo v. Montesa,
G.R. No. L-24576, July 29, 1968).

4. Evidence obtained through purely mechanical acts

Q: Is there an exception to the application of the right against self-incrimination during
physical examination?
ANS: Yes. It was held by the Supreme Court that an order requiring the accused to write so that
his handwriting may be validated with the documentary evidence is covered by the constitutional
proscription against self-incrimination. Writing is something more than the moving of the body,
or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention (Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, September 23,
1929).

E. Privacy of communications and correspondence

1. Private and public communications

Q: What factors must the court consider to rule that there is a violation of the right to
privacy of communications?
ANS: In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether
a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation
has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion (In the Matter of the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo I Sabio, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006).
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Q: What is the coverage of the right to privacy of communications and correspondence?
ANS: The protection of privacy should not be confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. It therefore
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long
as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe in his right to privacy
(Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013).

Q: What objects of communication are covered by the guarantee?

ANS: The constitutional protection to privacy of communication and correspondence includes
tangible and intangible objects. Examples:
Tangible objects – include letters, telegrams, signals, cables, telephone, client’s file and other
documents.
Intangible objects – under the Anti-Wiretapping Law, it is illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means
of tape recorder (Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995).

2. Intrusion, when allowed; exclusionary rule

Q: When is intrusion allowed?
ANS: Intrusion into the privacy of communication and correspondence of individuals is allowed
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescrived
by law. It is submitted that the basic ground for courts to allow intrusion is that the requirement
of probable cause be followed.

A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitutes matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be
invoked to resist publication and disseminatiopn of matters of public interest. The interest sought
to be protected by the right to privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the
wrongful publicizing of private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm
of legitimate public concern (Ayer Productions PTY. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L-82380, April
29, 1988).

F. Freedom of speech and expression

1. Prior restraint and subsequent punishment

Q: What is prior restraint?
ANS: Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraints is
largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship,
and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legistative, or judicial branch of
government (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008).

Q: Is the freedom from prior restraint absolute?

ANS: No. The following may be subject to prior restraint:
1. Movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous
people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of
unprotected speech (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009);
2. Pornography (Id.);
3. False of misleading commercial statements (Id.);
4. Advocacy of imminent lawless action (Id.);
5. Press statements made by persons, for and on behalf of the government, uttered while in
the exercise of their official functions; and
6. Danger to national security (Chavez v. Gonzales, supra).
7. Sub Judice rule – restriction of comments and disclosure pertaining to judicial
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice (Romero II v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009).

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Q: What does freedom from subsequent punishment mean?
ANS: It refers to freedom from any punishment as a consequence of or in connection with a
speech, utterance, or writing (Suarez, Political Law, supra at 238). The mere prohibition of
government interference before words are spoken is not an adequate protection of the freedom of
expression if the government could arbitrarily punish after the words have been spoken. The
threat of subsequent punishment itself would operate as a very effective prior restraint
(Dissenting opinion of J. Carpio, Soriano v. Laguardia, supra).

2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations

Q: Are all forms of prior restraint on speech invalid?
ANS: No. Although prior restraints on speech are generally invalid, there are those which may
be permitted under the Constitution if the restraint to be imposed meets the burden of proof
necessary to uphold its validity. This burden of proof depends on whether the restraint is in the
form of content-based regulations or content-neutral regulations (Chavez v. Gonzales, supra).

Q: What are the differences between content-based and content-neutral?

ANS: Content-based regulations and content-neutral regulations can be distinguished in this
manner:

Content-Based Regulations Content-Neutral Regulations

Restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the Restraint aims to regulate the time, place, or
expression. It distorts public debate, has manner of the expression in public places
improper motivations, and are usually imposed without any restraint on the content of the
because of fear of how people will react to a expression (Osmeña v. Comelec, supra).
particular speech (Osmeña v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 132231, March 31, 1998).
Test for Validity of Regulation
Strict Scrutiny: Speech content may be Intermediate approach/O’Brien Test:
regulated only to further a compelling public Government regulation is justified if:
interest in a way that does not impair speech a. it is within the constitutional power of
more than is absolutely necessary to further the government;
that interest (Primicias v. Fugoso, G.R. No. L- b. it furthers an important or substantial
1800, January 27, 1948). government interest;
c. the government interest is unrelated to
Clear and present danger test: Congress may the suppression of free expression; and
prevent speech only when the words used are d. the incident restriction on alleged
used in such circumstances and are of such a freedom of speech and expression is no
nature as to create a clear and present danger greater than is essential to the
that they will bring about the substantive evils furtherance of that interest (Social
(Roque, Jr. v. AFP Chief of Staff, G.R. No. Weather Stations, Inc. v. Comelec, G.R.
214986, February 15, 2017). No. 147571, May 5, 2001).
Application
A rule such as that involved in Sanidad v. Regulations of time, place and manner of
Comelec prohibiting columnists, holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880,
commentators, and announcers from the Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Osmeña v.
campaigning either for or against an issue in a Comelec, supra).
plebiscite must have a compelling reason to
support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny (Osmeña v. Comelec, supra).

3. Facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine

Q: What is the concept of ‘facial challenge’?
ANS: A facial challenge is an exception to the rule that only persons who are directly affected by
a statute have a legal standing to assail the same. This is only applicable to statutes involving free
speech, impeached on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness.

The facial challenge principle is a challenge against the constitutionality of a statute that is filed
where the petitioner claims no actual violation of his own rights under the assailed statute, but

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relies instead on the potential violation of his or other persons’ rights (Spouses Romualdez v.
Comelec, G.R. No 167011, April 30, 2008).

Q: What is the overbreadth doctrine?

ANS: The overbreadth doctrine is a ground to declare a statute void when it offends the
constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms (Adiong v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992).

4. Dangerous tendency, balancing of interests, and clear and

present danger tests
Q: What are the tests for valid government interference to freedom of expression?
ANS: The tests used in this jurisdiction for valid government interference are:
1. Clear and Present Danger Test – when words are used in such circumstance and of
such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent (Roque, Jr. v. AFP Chief of Staff, supra):
a. Clear – causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the
utterance questioned; and
b. Present – time element, identified with imminent and immediate danger; the
danger must not only be probable, but very likely inevitable.
2. Dangerous Tendency Test – words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil
which the State has a right to prevent (Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-8974,
October 18, 1957).
3. Balancing of Interest Test – when a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of
public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, and partial
abridgement of speech, the duty of the court is to determine which of the two
conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances
presented (American Communications Association v. Douds, No. 10, May 8, 1950).

5. State regulation of different types of mass media

Q: What is the state regulation for broadcast media?
ANS: Broadcast and radio media are subject to dual regulation. First, by procuring a legislative
franchise and second, by registering and being subject to regulations set by the National
Telecommunications Commission. The scarcity of radio frequencies made it necessary for the
government to step in and allocate frequencies to competing broadcasters. In undertaking that
function, the government impelled to adjudge which of the competing applicants are worthy of
frequency allocation. It is through that role that it becomes legally viable for the government to
impose its own values and goals through a regulatory regime that extends beyond the assignation
of frequencies, notwithstanding the free expression guarantees enjoyed by broadcasters
(Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009).

Q: Is the print media subject to the same regulation as the broadcast media?
ANS: No. Because of the physical limitations (in radio waves) of the broadcast spectrum, the
government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them.
There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the print media (Id.).
Note: All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger test. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media (Eastern
Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, Jr., G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985).

6. Commercial speech
Q: What is commercial speech?
ANS: Commercial speech means communication whose sole purpose is to propose a commercial
transaction. Advertisement of goods or of services is an example. It is not, however, been
accorded the same level of protection as that given to what is called a “core” speech such as a
political speech (Bernas, Philippine Constitution Reviewer, supra at 275).

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Q: What are the requisites for commercial speech to enjoy the constitutional protection?
ANS: The commercial speech must “concern lawful activity and not be misleading” if it is to be
protected under the First Amendment. Next, the asserted governmental interest must be
substantial. If both of these requirements are met, it must next be determined whether the state
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interst (Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. Nos.
203335, 203299, etc., February 18, 2014).

7. Unprotected speech
Q: What is unprotected speech?
ANS: Unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or “fighting words,” i.e., those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and
expression endangering national security (Soriano v. Laguardia, supra).

G. Freedom of religion

1. Non-establishment and free-exercise clauses

Q: What is the non-establishment clause?
ANS: The non-establishment clause means that the State cannot set up a church, nor pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over another, nor force nor
influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief I any religion, etc. (Everson v. Board of Education, 30 U.S. 1, 1946).

The non-establishment clause calls for governmental neutrality in religious matters to uphold
voluntarism and avoid breeding interfaith dissension. As a general rule, the clause prohibits the
government from using its rights, authority, funds, and resources behind an activity that is
essentially and intrinsically religious (Albano, supra at 255). However, the following are
expressed exceptions to the non-establishment clause in the Constitution:
1. Article VI, Sec. 29 (2) – salary of religious officers in government institutions;
2. Article VI, Sec. 28 (3) – tax exemption of church property; and
3. Article XIV, Sec. 3 (3) – optional religious instruction.

Q: What are the two aspects of the free exercise clause?

ANS: The aspects of freedom of religious belief and worship are:
1. Freedom to believe – absolute as long as it is confined in the realm of thought; and
2. Freedom to act on one’s belief – subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare (Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July
26, 1996).

2. Benevolent neutrality and conscientious objectors

Q: What is benevolent neutrality?
ANS: Believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may
be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise religion without hindrance. This is what we apply in our jurisdiction, as
the intent of the framers was to adopt a benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the
religious clauses in the Philippine constitutions and the enforcement of this intent is the goal of
construing the constitution (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003).

Q: What is the Conscientious Objector test?

ANS: Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modern reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs (Spouses
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 18, 2014).

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 3. Lemon and compelling state interest tests
Q: What is the test to determine whether the State has violated the non-establishment
clause?
ANS: We apply the Lemon Test:
1. The statute has a secular legislative purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion (Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 1971 adopted by the SC in Estrada v. Escritor, supra).

Q: What is the Compelling State Interest test?

ANS: When a law of general application infringes religious exercise, albeit incidentally, the state
interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount and compelling as to override the free
exercise claim (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398).
The test involves a three-step process involving inquiry of the courts, to wit:
1. Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of
religion? – The courts often look at the sincerity of the religious belief, but without
inquiring into the truth of the belief.
2. Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of
religious liberty? – In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are
legitimate for the state and that they are compelling.
3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state? – The analysis requires the state to show that the means
in which it is achieving its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means (Estrada
v. Escritor, supra).

H. Liberty of abode and right to travel

1. Scope and limitations

Q: What rights are covered by the liberty of abode and freedom of movement?
ANS: The rights covered are the right to choose a person’s abode and the right to travel both
domestically and internationally (Bernas, Philippine Constitution Reviewer, supra at 93).

Q: How are the rights to liberty of abode and freedom of movement limited?
ANS: The liberty of abode may be limited only upon lawful order of a court, whereas, the right
to travel may be limited by administrative authorities as may be provided by law in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health. Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution
should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry out their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. A court has
the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon an accused
to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc v. CA, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986).

Q: What does the right to travel mean?

ANS: The right to travel means the right to move from one place to another (Reyes v. CA, G.R.
No. 182161, December 3, 2009).

Q: Is the right to travel absolute?

ANS: No. A person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very
necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be
permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound
discretion (Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989).

2. Watch-list and hold departure orders

Q: What is a Hold Departure Order (HDO)?

9
ANS: A Hold Departure Order (HDO) is an order issued by the President, Secretary of Justice or
the proper Regional Trial Court commanding the Bureau of Immigration to prevent the departure
for abroad of Filipinos and/or aliens named therein by including them in the Bureau’s Hold
Departure List (DOJ Department Circular No. 17, s. 1998).

Q: Who may issue a Hold Departure Order?

ANS: A hold departure order (HDO) may be issued either by:
1. The Regional Trial Court pursuant to SC Circular 39-97; or
Note: SC Circular 39-97 dated June 19, 1997, limits the authority to issue hold departure
orders to the Regional Trial Courts. The MeTC, MTC, MTCC and MCTC have no authority
to issue hold departure orders in criminal cases (A.M. No. 99-9-141-MTCC, November 25,
1999).
2. By the RTC sitting as a Family Court pursuant to A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC.
Note: in which case, the court, motu propio or upon application under oath, may issue ex-
parte a hold departure order, addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
directing it not to allow the departure of the child from the Philippines wihout the permission
of the court while the petition for legal separation, annulment or declaration of nullity is
going on.

I. Right to information

1. Scope and limitations

Q: What is covered by the right to information?
ANS: The people’s right to information is limited to “matters of public concern,” and is further
“subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” Similarly, the State’s policy of full
disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law” (Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989).

Q: What are the requisites for the successful invocation of the right to public information?
ANS: To invoke the right to public information, it must be shown that:
1. the information sought must be a matter of public interest and concern; and
2. the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.
Note: These are political rights available to citizens only (Bernas, Philippine Constitution
Reviewer, supra at 93).

Q: What are “matters of public concern?”

ANS: “Public concern” like “public interest” is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case to case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public
(Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998).

Q: Does the right of information on matters of public concern and the right to access to
official records carry with it the right to compel the public officer in custody of the record
to prepare the same?
ANS: No. As long as the data are open and made available to the public, this is sufficient
compliance with the law. The constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information or matters of public concern (Valmonte v Belmonte, supra).

Q: Is the right to information absolute?

ANS: No. The right to information is not available in the following instances:
1. National security matters and intelligence information;
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions;
3. Criminal matters; and
4. Other confidential information which include diplomatic correspondence, closed door
Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either Houses of Congress and the internal

10
 deliberations of the Supreme Court (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9,
1998).

2. Publication of laws and regulations

Q: What right is enforced and protected by the requirement of publication of laws and
regulations?
ANS: What is enforced is the right to due process in relation to the conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law under Article 3 of the Civil Code. It is no less important to
remember that Section 7 of the Bill of Rights recognizes the right of the people to information on
“matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially,
the legislative enactments of the government (Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, December
29, 1986).

J. Right of association
Q: What are the two notions comprehended under the right of association?
ANS: The right comprehends at least two broad notions: (1) liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence
of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and
(2) power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association
(Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, supra).
Note: The right to associate also guarantees the right not to join an association (Sta. Clara
Homeowners Assoc. v. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002).

Q: Does the right of government employees to organize include the right to form unions
and the right to strike?
ANS: The majority view is to the effect that the right of government employees to organize
include the right to form unions but not the right to strike and to engage in similar activities (SSS
Employees Association v. CA, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989). This is affirmed by Aticle IX-B,
Section 2, par. 5 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “the right to self-organization shall
not be denied to government employees.”

Q: Are the rules on compulsory IBP membership of members of the Bar in violation of the
right to associate?
ANS: No. The integration of the Philippine Bar is dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies
the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession (In Re:
Marcial Edillon, A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978).

K. Eminent Domain

1. Concept of public use

Q: What is the expansive concept of public use?
ANS: Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expanded meaning to
include any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit of the public.” (Vda. De Ouano v. Republic, G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011).

2. Just compensation
Q: What is just compensation?
ANS: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss (Republic v. Kabacan,
Inc. et al., G.R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012). The concept of just compensation embraces not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the

11
payment of the land within a reasonable from its taking (Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R.
No. 137285, January 26, 2001).

Q: How is just compensation computed?

ANS: The formula for determination of just compensation is consequential damage to the
property not taken minus consequential benefits to the property taken plus the fair market value
of the property, i.e. [(Consequential Damage –Consequential Benefits) + FMV]. However, in no
case shall the owner be deprived of the fair market value of his property (RULES OF COURT,
RULE 67, Sec. 6).

Q: When should just compensation be paid?

ANS: Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the
order of expropriation is issued (Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, supra).

Q: What is the effect of delay in the payment of just compensation?

ANS: Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, for the delay to
constitute a violation of due process it must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be
deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice. Should any further delay be
encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any patrimonial property or cash savings of the
province in the amount necessary to implement this decision (Provincial Government of
Sorsogon v. Villaroya, G.R. No. L-64037, August 27, 1987). The private person is entitled to the
payment of the just compensation plus interests owing.

Q: What is the effect of the non-payment of just compensation?

ANS: As a general rule, non-payment of just compensation in an expropriation proceeding does
not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots. However, the
Court has held that recovery of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken
or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a
rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been
assessed or agreed upon; or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid (Reyes v.
National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003).

3. Expropriation by local government units

Q: Who exercises the power of eminent domain if it is the local government unit that
exercises it?
ANS: It is exercised through its Chief Executive pursuant to an ordinance (Sec. 19, LGC).

Q: What are the requisites?

ANS: The exercise of the power of eminent domain should be for: (1) public use; (2) public
purpose; (3) public welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless; and (4) there should be
payment of just compensation (Sec. 19, LGC).

Q: What matters must concur in order that a local government unit may exercise the
power of eminent domain?
ANS: Several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain,
to wit:
1. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose, or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
2. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec. 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
3. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property (Beluso, et al. v. Mun. of Panay,
Capiz, G.R. No. 153974, August 7, 2006).

Q: May the local government unit immediately take possession of the property upon filing
of the proceedings?

12
ANS: Yes, provided that it makes a deposit of at least 15% of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaraton of the property. The deposit must be with the proper
court (Sec. 19, LGC).

Q: What is the basis of the determination of the value of the property?

ANS: It shall be based on the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking (Sec. 19,
LGC).

Q: Is the power of eminent domain of local governments inherent in them?

ANS: No. They can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the Legislature, as it is merely
a delegated power and the legislative department may retain certain control or impose certain
restraints (Province of Camarines Sur, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993).

L. Non-impairment of contracts
Q: What is the scope of the non-impairment clause?
ANS: The term “contract” refers to any lawful agreement on property or property rights, whether
real or personal, tangible or intangible. The agreement may be executed or executory. The parties
may be private persons only, natural or artificial, or private persons on the one hand and the
government or its agencies on the other hand. But it does not cover licenses and marriage
contracts.

Q: What is the effect of the non-impairment clause?

ANS: The non-impairment clause renders null and void a law which changes the terms of a legal
contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions,
or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that
provided in its terms (Lepanto Consolidated Mining v. WMC Resources Int’l. Pty. Ltd., G.R. No.
162331, November 20, 2006).

Q: Are all laws impairing contracts invalid?

ANS: No. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, the law must effect a
change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other, and not with respect to non-
parties (Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association v. Secretary of DILG, G.R. No.
143076, June 10, 2003).

Q: Is the non-impairment clause absolute?

ANS: No. The exceptions to the non-impairment clause are the valid exercise of the inherent
powers of the State – police power, eminent domain, and taxation.
Note: In every contract, there is an implied reservation that it is subject to the police power of
the State (Ortigas & Co. v. FEATI Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979).

Q: How is the non-impairment clause applied in employment contracts?

ANS: To come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect change in the rights of
the parties with reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties. The contract in this
case cannot have the effect of annulling subsequent legislation for the protection of the workers
(Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-71813, July 20, 1987).

Q: How is non-impairment clause applied in tax exemptions?

ANS: There is no vested right in tax exemption, more so when the latest expression of legislative
intent renders its continuance doubtful. Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its lawmaking
power, can enact a law withdrawing a tax exemption just as efficaciously as it may grant the
same (Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 168584, October 15, 2007).

Q: How is non-impairment clause applied in franchises?

ANS: A franchise partakes of the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution. Hence, the provision in R.A. No. 9337, Sec. 1 amending
R.A. No. 8424, Sec. 27 (c) by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income
tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR’s transactions with private parties, is not

13
violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution (PAGCOR v. BIR, G.R. No. 172087,
March 15, 2011).

Q: How is non-impairment clause applied in license agreements?

ANS: Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted
by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced, or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause (Alvarez v.
PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. Nos. 162243, 164516 & 171875, November 29, 2006).

M. Free access to courts and adequate legal assistance

Q: What is the basis of this right?
ANS: The basis is the free access clause embodied in Art. III, Sec. 11 of the Constitution. A
move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was
already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional
stature to such specific protection of the poor (In Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi, A.M. No.
09-6-9 SC, August 19, 2009).

Q: Who is an indigent party?

ANS: An indigent party is one who is authorized by the court to prosecute his action or defense
as an indigent upon an ex parte application and hearing showing that he has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family
(RULES OF COURT, RULE 3, Sec. 21).

Q: Are corporations working for indigent people covered by the Constitutional provision?
ANS: No. Only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. A corporation
being a juridical person has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as
incur obligations and bring civil and criminal actions. Second, exemption may be prone to abuse
particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumverting the rule on payment of fees. Also,
the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming
and wasteful for the courts (In Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi, supra).

N. Custodial investigation rights

Q: What are the rights of suspects?
ANS: The rights of suspects are:
1. Right to be informed of his right to remain silent and right to independent and competent
counsel;
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent, anything he says can and
will be used agianst him;
3. Right to remain silent;
4. Right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice;
5. Right to be provided with counsel, if he cannot afford the services of one;
6. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him;
7. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited; and
8. Confessions or admissions obtained in violation of these rights are inadmissible as
evidence (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 12).

Q: When are the rights of suspects under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution
available?
ANS: The rights under Section 12 are accorded to any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, hence, these rights may be invoked when a person is put under
custodial investigation. An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an

14
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense (People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, march 3, 1997).

Q: What is custodial investigation?

ANS: It is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way on suspicion
of committing an alleged offense (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989).

Q: When are the rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution inapplicable?
ANS: These rights do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through
questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense (People v. Guillermo, G.R. No.
147786, January 20, 2004).

The rights under custodial investigation are not available in administrative proceedings (People
v. Ayson, supra). The rights do not apply to police line-ups generally since at such point, it is the
witness or the complainant who is being questioned (People v. Piedad, G.R. No. 131923,
December 5, 2002).

Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reports on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence (People v. Andan, supra).

O. Rights of the accused

Q: What are the rights of the accused?
ANS: The rights of the accused are:
1. The right to due process;
2. The right to presumption of innocence;
3. The right to be heard;
4. The right to assistance of counsel;
5. The right to be informed;
6. The right to speedy, impartial, and public trial;
7. The right of confrontation;
8. The right to compulsory process;
9. The right against trial in absentia; and
10. The right to bail (CONST., Art. III, Secs. 13-14).

Q: What are the requisites of criminal due process?

ANS: The requisites of criminal due process are the following:
1. The court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
detemine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
3. Accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgement is rendered only upon lawful hearing (Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652,
March 9, 1998).

Q: What is bail? How is it different from recognizance?

ANS: Bail is a security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him
or by a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under conditions
specified under the Rules of Court (RULES OF COURT, RULE 114, Sec. 1).

A recognizance is an obligation of record, in lieu of bail, entered into before a court or

magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual
condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial. A recognizance is valid
though not signed by the accused (People v. Abner, G.R. No. L-2508, October 27, 1950).

Q: When is bail available as a matter of right?

ANS: Bail is a matter of right if a person is charged with an offense not punishable by reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death (RULES OF COURT, RULE 114, Sec. 4).

15
When a person is convicted of a crime before the MTC, he may, on appeal, be admitted to bail
(RULES OF COURT, RULE 114, Sec. 4).

Q: When is bail a matter of discretion?

ANS: Bail is a matter of discretion before conviction when a person is charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death.
Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is also discretionary (RULES OF COURT, RULE 114, Sec. 5).

Q: What is the presumption of innocence?

ANS: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 14, par. 2).

Q: What are the legal effects of the presumption of innocence?

ANS: The principal effect is that no person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has proved
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Further, it also has the following effects:
1. Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account;
2. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgement (People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971);
and
3. When the evidence of both sides is equally balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused [Equipoise Rule] (Corpus v.
People, G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991).

Q: What does proof beyond reasonable doubt mean?

ANS: Proof beyond reasonable doubt means moral certainty, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. It does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty (RULES OF COURT, RULE 133, Sec.
2).

Q: What is the right to be heard?

ANS: The right to be heard can be understood to mean the totality of the rights embodied in
an adequate criminal procedural system, which can be viewed as expressing both the
qualities of the hearer and the manner of the hearing (Bernas, Philippine Constitution
Reviewer, supra at 131).

Q: What are the elements of the right to be heard?

ANS: The elements of the right to be heard are the following:
1. The right to be present at the trial;
2. The right to assistance of counsel;
3. The right to an impartial judge;
4. The right against self-incrimination;
5. The right of confrontation; and
6. The right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses (Id.).

Q: What does the right to assistance of counsel mean?

ANS: The right to counsel means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, and not simply
a perfunctory representation (People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999).

Q: What are the duties of the court whenever an accused appears before it without
counsel?
ANS: When a defendant appears without an attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with:
1. It must inform the defendant, in a language he understands, that it is this right to have an
attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information, the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney;
3. Whether or not the accused desires to procure an attorney but is unable to employ one,
the court must assign a counsel de officio to defend him; and
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own, the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor (People v. Holgado, G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950).

16
Q: Is the waiver of the right to counsel available in all stages of the criminal proceedings?
ANS: No. The right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver (Flores v. Ruiz, G.R. No.
L-35707, May 31, 1979). It also cannot be waived during the act of executing the waiver of the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel.

Q: What is the purpose of the right to be informed?

ANS: The purposes of the right to be informed are:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (People v. Quitlong, G.R. No.
121562, July 10, 1998).

Q: How is the right to be informed complied with?

ANS: The right to be informed is complied with when there is an actual recital of facts in the
information or complaint which determines the real nature of the criminal charge; the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint not the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated is insufficient to satisfy compliance with the right to be informed (People v.
Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, January 18, 2012). An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that
is not clearly charged in the complaint of information. To convict him of an offense other than
that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation (Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11,
2012).

Q: What is the right to an impartial trial?

ANS: It is the right to a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal; every litigant is
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, G.R.
Nos. L-34756-59, March 31, 1973).

Q: Is the pervasive publicity in the media of a case, a violation of the right to impartial
trial?
ANS: Not necessarity. Allegations must pass the “totality of circumstances” test, i.e. there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they may
have been influenced, by the barrage of publicity (Martelino v. Alejandro, G.R. No. L-30894,
March 25, 1970). The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible with a free press, and
that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in
the deprivation of the right to a fair trial (Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the
multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC,
June 14, 2011).

Q: What does the right to a public trial mean?

ANS: The right to a public trial means that the trial of the accused possesses that character when
anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom,
may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no
moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown (Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104,
July 25, 1973).

Q: Is the right to a public trial absolute?

ANS: No. The general public may be excluded when the evidence to be presented in the
proceeding may be characterized as sensitive or offensive to decency or public morals (Id.).

Q: What is the purpose of the right of confrontation?

ANS: The right of confrontation has a two-fold purpose:
1. To afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-
examination; and
2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness (US v. Javier, G.R. No.
12990, January 21, 1918).

17
Q: Is the right of confrontation absolute?
ANS: No. There are two principal exceptions:
1. the admissibility of dying declarations pursuant to the RULES OF COURT, RULE 130,
Sec. 37 and
2. trial in absentia pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 14, Par. (2) of the Constitution in relation to the
RULES OF COURT, RULE 120, Sec. 6.

Q: What compulsory processes may the accused be entitled to?

ANS: The accused is entitled to the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum for the purpose of compelling attendance of the witnesses and the production of evidence
that he may need for his defense (Fajardo v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-38675, July 2, 1980). Subpoena
ad testificandum is used to compel a person to testify while subpoena duces tecum is used to
compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified.

Q: What are the requirements for the accused to avail of the right to compulsory
processes?
ANS: The following requisites must be complied with:
1. That the evidence sought to be obtained is really material;
2. That the accused is not negligent in previously obtaining attendance of said witness;
3. That the witness will be available at the time desired; and
4. That no similar evidence could be obtained (People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128280, April 4,
2001).

Q: When is the criminal case allowed to proceed despite the absence of the accused?
ANS: The trial may validly proceed despite the absence of the accused if the following requisites
have been complied with:
1. The accused has already been arraigned;
2. He has been duly notified of the trial; and
3. His failure to appear is unjustifiable (Parada v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1353,
March 11, 1997).

Q: Can the accused be absent in all stages of the trial after having been arraigned?
ANS: No. Unless he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the
person named as the defendant in the case on trial (People v. The Presiding Judge of RTC
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, G.R. No. L-64731, October 26, 1983), the right to be present at one’s
trial may be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses
who will identify the accused (Republic v. Agbulos, G.R. No. 73875, May 18, 1993).

P. Right to the speedy disposition of cases

Q: What does the right to speedy trial mean?
ANS: A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The concept of
speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been violated
involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay,
the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert
his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused (People v. Tee, G.R. Nos.
140546-47, January 20, 2003).

Q: State the purpose of the rule on speedy disposition of cases. Explain.

ANS: The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of
spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen
by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to
a speedy trial, its “salutary objective” is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever
legitimate defense he may interpose.

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended
to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our

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judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an
orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be
promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases
renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile
(People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 199151-56, July 25, 2016; Coscolluela v. SB, G.R.
No. 191411, July 15, 2013).

Q. Right against self-incrimination

Q: What is the scope of the right against self-incrimination?
ANS: The prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition against the use of physical and moral compulsion in order to extort
communications from him. It is not meant to exclude the accused’s body as evidence, when it
may be material. The prohibition is simply a prohibition against any process intended to extract
from the defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt (United States v. Tan
Teng, G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912).

Q: In what cases is the right against self-incrimination applicable?

ANS: The right against self-incrimination is applicable not only in criminal proceedings, but also
in all other government proceedings, including civil actions and administrative or legislative
investigations. It may be claimed not only by the accused (when called to testify) but also by the
witness to whom an incriminating question is addressed.

Q: When can the right against self-incrimination be invoked?

ANS: The right against self-incrimination can only be invoked in instances of testimonial
compulsion and production of documents, papers and chattels in court except when books of
account are to be examined in the exercise of police power and the power of taxation (Nachura,
Political Law Reviewer, supra at 215-216).

Q: Is the subjection to physical examination covered by the self-incrimination clause?

ANS: No. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee is the use physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion an inclusion of his body
in evidence, when it may be material (Bernas, Philippine Constitution Reviewer, supra at 148).

Q: Does taking photographs of the accused violate the right against self-incrimination?
ANS: No. The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being
purely a mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination
(People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 27, 2000).

Q: Does compelling the accused to permit his body to be subjected to medical examination,
e.g. blood tests, drug tests, and pregnancy examinations, violate the right against self-
incrimination?
ANS: No. Such inspection of bodily features by the Court or witnesses cannot violate the
privilege because it does not call upon the accused as a witness – it does not call upon the
defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is
not testimony by his body but his body itself (United States v. Tan Teng, supra).

R. Right against double jeopardy

Q: What is double jeopardy?
ANS: When an accused is acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him is dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information, or when a formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense (RULES OF COURT, RULE 117, Sec. 7).

Q: What are the requisites for double jeopardy?

ANS: The requisites are:

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 1. Valid complaint or information;
2. Filed before a competent court;
3. To which defendant has pleaded; and
4. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted or the case is dismissed or otherwise
terminated wihout his express consent (People v. Ylagan, G.R. No. L-38443, November
25, 1933).

Q: What are the crimes covered by the rule on double jeopardy?

ANS: The crimes covered are:
1. Same offense, or attempt to commit the same, of frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
original complaint or information; and
2. When an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall bar another prosecution for the same act (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 21).

Q: What is the effect of the doctrine of supervening event on the rule on double jeopardy?
ANS: The doctrine of supervening event allows the prosecution for another offense if subsequent
development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have already been
charged or convicted (People v. Villarama, G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992).

Q: When is the rule on double jeopardy not applicable?

ANS: The rules on double jeopardy do not apply to the conviction of accused for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense originally charged when:
1. A graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission;
2. Facts constituting the graver offense arose or were discovered only after the filing of the
former complaint or information; and
3. A plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent of prosecutor or
offended party (Id.).

Q: Can there be a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of acquittal?

ANS: As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused
under double jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.
But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting to loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of
such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
(Lejano v. People, G.R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011).

Q: Can a judgment of acquittal be appealed?

ANS: A judgment of acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation and cannot be
recalled for correction or amendment because of the doctrine that nobody may be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense (People v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 137953-58, April 11, 2002).

Q: Is the prohibition of an appeal of judgment of acquittal absolute?

ANS: No. An appeal from order of dismissal shall not constitute double jeopardy if:
1. Dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant;
2. Dismissal is not acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or on the merits of
the case; or
3. The question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the
dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant (People v
City of Manila, G.R. No. L-36528, September 24, 1987).

Q: What are the rules on the dismissal of the complaint with the consent of the accused?
ANS: As a rule, dismissal of the case with the consent of the accused does not put the accused in
a jeopardy. However, there are instances wherein a dismissal sought by the accused put him in a
first joepardy:
1. When the dismissal is based on the ground of demurrer to evidence, as it results in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, it is tantamount to an acquittal of the accused (People
V. City Court of Silay, G.R. No. L-43790, December 9, 1976); or

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 2. When the dismissal is based on the right to speedy trial, as it is equivalent to an acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense (Esmena v.
Pogoy, G.R. No. L-54110, February 20, 1981).

S. Involuntary servitude
Q: What is involuntary servitude?
ANS: Involuntary servitude is the condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or
imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Aclaracion v.
Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-39115, May 26, 1975).

Q: What are the rules on involuntary servitude?

ANS: The general rule is that no involuntary servitude shall exist. The exceptions are:
1. As punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted (CONST., Art. III, Sec.
18, par. 2);
2. Service in defense of the State (CONST., Art. II, Sec. 4);
3. Naval enlistment (Robertson v. Baldwin, G.R. No. 334, January 25, 1897);
4. Posse comitatus – obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and
good order of his community (U.S. v. Pompeya, G.R. No. 10255, August 6, 1915);
5. Return to work order in industries affected with public interest (Kaisahan ng Mangagawa
sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, G.R. No. L-1573, March 29, 1948); and
6. Obligation of children to obey their parents as long as they are under their parental
authority (FAMILY CODE, Art. 211, par. 2).
7. Appellate courts may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe stenographic
notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is part of
its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its
jurisdictrion and essential to the due administration of justice (In the Matter of the
Petition For Habeas Corpus of Segifredo Aclaracion, G.R. No. L-39115, May 26, 1975).

T. Right against excessive fines, and cruel and inhuman

punishments
Q: When is a fine considered excessive?
ANS: A fine is considered excessive when it is clearly shown that the nature of the violation
compared with the fine is disproportionate, or if it exceeds the utmost limit of the punishment
which the vindication of the law demands (U.S. v. Valera, G.R. No. L-8956, February 4, 1914).

Q: What factors are considered in assessing whether a form of punishment is excessive and
should be prohibited?
ANS: To violate the constitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and plainly oppressive,
disproportionate to the nature of the offense, as to shock the senses of the community (People v.
Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953). Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in
themselves cruel and unusual punishment (People v. Dionisio, G.R. No L-25513, March 27,
1968).
Note: Effective June 24, 2006, the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by R.A. No.
9346.

U. Non-imprisonment for debts

Q: What are NOT valid causes for imprisonment under the Constitution?
ANS: The following are not valid causes for imprisonment under the Constitution:
1. Debt – any civil obligation arising from a contract. It includes even debts obtained
through fraud since no distinction is made in the Constitution; and
2. Non-payment of Poll Tax – a specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain
class without regard to property or occupation (e.g. Community Tax) (CONST., Art. III,
Sec. 20).

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Q: Has B.P Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) transgressed the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt?
ANS: No. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions,
the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects
on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-
63419, L-66839-42, etc., December 18, 1986).

V. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder

Q: What are the kinds of ex post facto laws?
ANS: The kinds of ex post facto laws are:
1. Laws which make an act criminal which was not so before its passage;
2. Laws which aggravate the penalty for a crime committed before its passage;
3. Laws which inflict a greater or more severe penalty for the same offense;
4. Laws which alter the legal rules of evidence and allowing the receipt of less or different
testimony than what the law required at the time of commission, in order to convict
accused;
5. Laws which assume to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a
penalty of deprivation of right for something which when done was lawful; and
6. Laws which deprive the accused of some lawful protection to which he had been entitled,
such as protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty
(Salvador v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 135080, March 6, 1987).

Q: What are the characteristics of ex post facto laws?

ANS: The characteristics of ex post facto laws are:
1. Pertinent to criminal matters;
2. Retroactive; and
3. Prejudicial to the accused (Nachura, Political Law Reviewer, supra at 230).

ANS: A bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial (Cummings v.
Missouri, 4 Wall 277). In more modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of
judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty the
deprivation of life or liberty or property not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by
legislative fiat. (Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves, G.R. No. 181704,
December 6, 2011, citing J. Feliciano).

W. Writs of habeas corpus, kalikasan, habeas data, and

amparo
Q: What is the writ of habeas corpus?
ANS: The writ of habeas corpus is a writ issued by the court directed to a person detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at designated time and place, with
the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever the
court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf (Nachura, Political Law Reviewer,
supra at 199).

Q: What is the scope of the writ of habeas corpus?

ANS: The writ of habeas corpus shall extend to the following cases:
1. Illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty; or
2. When rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto (RULES
OF COURT, RULE 102, Sec. 1).

Q: Does the writ issue only for physical or actual restraint of a person?
ANS: The liberty of an individual may be restored by habeas corpus where he is subjected to
physical restraint, such as arbitrary detention.

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Psychological compulsion so powerful as to place a person at the mercy of another may be a
ground for the issuance of the writ. Freedom may be lost to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not
blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice
or the unhampered exercise of the will (Caunca v. Salazar, G.R. No. L-2690, January 1, 1949).
This is to be distinguished from mere moral restraint, which is not sufficient ground to issue the
writ.

Q: What are the grounds for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus after judgment of
conviction?
ANS: The grounds for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus are:
1. Deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in a restraint of a person; or
2. The court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
3. An excessive penalty has been imposed, in which case the sentence is void as to such
excess (Feria v. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February 14, 2000).

Q: What is the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

ANS: It is the right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of
physical liberty of a person (Bernas, Philippine Constitution Reviewer, supra at 146).

Q: What are the implications when the privilege of the writ is suspended?
ANS: The suspension of the privilege of the writ means that during the period of suspension,
once the officer making the return shows to the court that the person detained is being detained
for an offense covered by the suspension, the court may not inquire any further (Id.). The writ, in
any case, may still issue as a matter of course because it is not the writ itself but only its privilege
may be suspended (Cruz, Political Law, supra at 623).

Q: Does the suspension of the privilege of the writ also suspend the right of the accused to
bail?
ANS: No, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, after the filing of the information, in
granting bail in proper cases, the court does not determine the legality of his prior detention
which has already been superseded by a detention under judicial process, but merely preceeds
with and carried into effect its jurisdiction over the criminal case and grants a right guaranteed by
the Constitution (Nava v. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-4855, October 11, 1951).

Q: What is the legal basis for the promulgation of rules on the writs of amparo, habeas data,
and kalikasan?
ANS: The promulgation of the rules governing these extraordinary remedies is based on Art.
VIII, Sec. 5, par. 5 of the Constitution, which empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.

Q: What is the writ of amparo?

ANS: It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with a violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity acting under the directions of or with support or acquiescence of the
state. (Rule on the Writ of Amparo, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Sec. 1).

Q: What is the purpose of the writ of amparo?

ANS: The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilities
the subsequent punishment or perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and
action (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011).

Q: When may the writ of amparo be issued?

ANS: For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject
thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substanctial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing

23
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in
an Amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation (Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012).

Q: What is the writ of habeas data?

ANS: The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty, or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
party (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Sec. 1). In order for the privilege
of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other (Gamboa v. Chan, supra).

Q: What is the writ of kalikasan?

ANS: The writ of kalikasan is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, or entity
authorized by law, people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces (Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases, A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC, Sec. 1, Rule 7, Part III).

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