PHILIPPINE STATE COLLEGE OF AERONAUTICS

Piccio Garden, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City

INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY
AERO DEPARTMENT

AE 213
ELEMENTARY ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

Research

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT:

THE LAST FLIGHT OF UNITED AIRLINES BOEING 727-22C FLIGHT 266

CAMPOS, DENESSE
CASABUENA, JEMMIL JOHN
CORNEL, COCOY
DOLOROSA, MARK GERRY
JARINA, JUSTIN
LADAGA, IVAN
SANTIZO, VAN ERIC
TIZON, MIGUEL

BSAeE 2-6

INSTRUCTOR
ENGR. ROMEO GOROSPE JUNIOR
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Executive Summary 2

Introduction 3-6

Analysis 6-7

Alternatives and Decision Criteria 7-8

Recommendation and Implementation Plan 8-10

Conclusion 10-12

References 13
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 2

A. Executive Summary

It is the aim of this report to spread awareness and knowledge to its readers
about aircraft accidents due to electrical failures. It is useful to know that incidents like
this may happen and being knowledgeable of its solutions is advantageous to
newcomers in this industry. It is also the objective of this report to avoid accidents or
inconveniences. This report will provide recommendations and alternative solutions or
procedures that may regulate the occurrence of the same incident.
United AirLines, Inc., Boeing 727-22C crashed into Santa Monica Bay on
January 18, 1969 after experiencing an electrical failure. The aircraft was destroyed
due to the impact with the water. According to the aircraft accident report, prior to the
departure of the flight, the UAL dispatcher was informed that the No. 3 generator was
inoperative but the aircraft was still airworthy with only two generators operable
provided that there were certain procedures to be followed and things to be monitored.
Two minutes after Flight 266 departed from Los Angeles Airport, Departure
control receive a report that there was a fire warning on the No. 1 engine and engine
was shut down. Shortly after shutdown of No. 1 engine, the remaining generator lost
electrical power. Then the standby electrical system was either not activated or failed
to function. Based on the investigation, the probable cause of this accident was loss
of attitude orientation instrument that were disabled by loss of electrical power.
The board was unable to determine the reason why the generators lost power
and why backup electrical power system was not working. The recommendations
presented were based on the flaws of the Boeing 727 upon the Loss Upon All
Generators accident which were then rectified by the National Transportation Safety
Board revising its flight manual.

B. Introduction
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 3

B.1. Background of the Study

Flight 266 of United Airlines, Inc. flies regularly from with its N7434U, a Boeing
727-22C from Los Angeles, California to Milwaukee, Wisconsin and a stop at Denver,
Colorado. On January 18, 1969, this plane arrived in Los Angeles, California from
Denver, Colorado at about 1530 I/ on that date. A routine of inspection was performed
by professionals while the aircraft was on the ground. The mechanics noticed nothing
unusual and found the plane to be serviceable. The professionals performed an
exterior and interior visual inspection to check the aircrafts condition. It was raining
hard during the inspections of the mechanics. However, the aircraft was furnished with
a defensive canvas cover intended to keep water from pouring down into the electrical
areas. As demonstrated in the logbook M7434~ had been working since January 15,
1969, with the No. 3 generator not working. The second officer immediately expressed
that the “inoperative” tape had been put over the No. 3 generator breaker circuit open
light, the No. 3 generator CSD (constant speed drive) and the Do. 3 generator field
transfer open light during the flight. The officer also believed that it was placed
adjacent to the No.3 generator position of the Alternating Current meters selector
switch. The UAL dispatcher was informed 35 minutes before the departure that the
No.3 generator wasn’t working. The Minimum Equipment List states that the aircraft
is airworthy with only two generators are operating provided that they will follow certain
procedures and they will monitor electrical loads during the flight. After referral to the
Minimum Equipment List, he approved the dispatch. Conversations that were
recorded on the cockpit indicates that the crew onboard knows that the No.3 generator
wasn’t working. Procedures advises that when two generators were only operating,
one of the two air conditioning packs and the galley power switch should be turned off
before the aircraft’s takeoff. The switches can be turned on during the climb out when
the flaps have been raised. Flight 266 should depart at 1807, delayed from what was
scheduled at 17:55 due to loading problems and inclement weather. At approximately
18:17, the flight started its takeoff roll on runway 24. The local controller in the tower
noticed nothing abnormal. At 1818: 13, flight 266 contacted the Departure Control and
was instructed to turn right heading two seven zero report leaving three thousand feet.
21 The cockpit voice recorder indicates that, at 1818:30, the engine fire warning bell
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 4
rung in the cockpit. At 1819:05, Flight 266 reported to Departure Control that “we've
had a fire warning on number one engine we shut down we'd like to come back.” And
that was their last communication. The Departure Control attempted to contact Flight
266 repeatedly but they were unsuccessful. The departure controller reported that the
flight responded to his heading instruction of 270'. Approximately 5 seconds after the
transmission from the flight reporting the fire warning, the transponder target of the
Flight 266 disappeared from the radarsope. The movement of the primary target
shows that Flight 266 continued to track a straight course on 270 ° At 1820:30, the
departure conroller instructed them to turn right to a heading of 060 ° when the aircraft
was about 10 miles west of the shoreline but there was no response. At this point, the
target movement shows that the aircraft turned left, after which it disappeared from
the scope within two seeps. The controller also reported that the speed of the aircraft
during this time increased greatly. Appropriate emergency procedures were
performed following the disappearance of Flight 266. It was then discovered that the
aircraft crashed at approximately 1821 at a point 11.3 miles west of the airport. There
were two ground witnesses that observed the takeoff of the aircraft from runway 24 at
a time corresponding to the departure of the aircraft. One of the witnesses noticed
nothing unusual. The other witness noticed that there were many sparks, reddish in
color from the right side and rear engine of the aircraft.

B.2. Problem of the study

Flight 266, a Boeing 727-22C, B7434U, United Airlines, Inc., crashed into Santa
Monica Bay, approximately 11.3 miles west of the Los Angeles International Airport,
at 1821 P.s.t. on January 18, 1969. A total of 32 passengers on board and the six
crewmembers were all fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed during the crash. An
engine fire warning bell was heard in the cockpit at 18:18:30. The cabin crew reported
a (no. 1) engine fire warning and requested that they wanted to return to the airport
immediately. Shortly after shutdown of the (no. 1) engine, electrical power from the
remaining generator (no. 2) was lost. Following loss of all generator power, the
standby electrical system either was not activated or failed to function. Electrical power
at a voltage level of approximately 50 volts was restored approximately a minute and
a half after loss of the (no. 2) generator. The duration of this power restoration was
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 5
just 9 to 15 seconds. The Boeing descended until it struck the sea. The ocean depth
at this point was approximately 950 feet.
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was loss of
attitude orientation during a night, instrument departure in which all attitude
instruments were disabled by loss of electrical power.

The Board has been unable to work out (a) why all generator power was lost
or (b) why the standby electric power system either was not activated or did not
operate.
These recommendations primarily involve measures directed toward
guaranteeing (a) that the standby electric power system are going to be effectively
activated, either mechanically or by the crew, within the event of the loss of all
generators, and (b) that the crew will have available attitude indicator instruments
following disruption of electrical power.

B.3. Recommendations

 The researchers recommend the automatic switching of the essential power to

standby power so that in case of power loss upon all generators the captain would
have the instruments and lights necessary to fly the aircraft while the second officer
would troubleshoot the electrical system.
 The second officer should be provided with a positive indication on their panel that the
standby system is being powered by a battery. Such indication could be in a form of
light which could be installed in the aircraft that would be illuminated when the
standby system is activated.
 Transferring of standby feature from the essential power selector switch to a separate
ON-OFF toggle switch. The implementation of such switch will not only simplify the
activation of the standby system but also facilitates the troubleshooting of generators
while the standby system is on.
 Provide a means to prevent inadvertent operation of the battery switch
 Install a capacitor for the purpose of filtering out electrical interference which may be
present in some extent that under an overloaded condition, the generator control
panel may disable the generator before opening the bus tie circuit breaker.
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 6

B.4. Supporting the Recommendations

 The recommendations were based on the flaws of the Boeing 727 upon the Loss Upon
All Generators accident which were then rectified by the National Transportation
Safety Board revising its flight manual.
 The recommendations abide by the recommendations which the National
Transportation Safety Board suggested to the administrator of the FAA.

C. Analysis

C.1. Contributing factors to the problem

The problem being faced by flight 266 are of the following;

I) Alleged electrical Sparks occurring on the left-wing engine
II) Alleged fire that started on engine no.1

The Board determines that the likely cause of this accident was a loss of
orientation of attitude during the night, an instrument departure in which the tools of
attitude were disabled by electrical power failure.

The Board has been unable to determine;

I) Why aU generator power was lost
II) Why the standby electrical-power system was not activated or failed to operate.

C.2. The steps used to reach the recommendations and implementation plans.

By letter dated 11 July 1969, the Chairman of the Safety Board suggested to
the FAA Administrator that a compulsory requirement for all turbine-powered aircraft
be made to automatically switch essential energy to standby power at the expense of
all generators. It was further recommended that until the above requirement could be
implemented throughout the industry, the emergency checklists for all airlines related
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 7
to "Loss of all Generators" require that the second officer or captain, if appropriate,
check to ensure that the battery switch is ON, then switch immediately to the standby
or emergency position. It was the opinion of the Safety Board that this would give the
captain the tools and lights needed to fly the aircraft while the second officer could
"resolve" the electrical system.

C.3. Course Concepts

The course concept applies to this case as the report is heavily influenced by
electrical components and is being named as the probable cause of the plane crash.
The course teaches us to look at the problem as a whole and divide it as parts, to
eliminate any other probable cause of the incident. Being in this course specifically,
we should not only rely on the visual checkups as there could be underlying problems
that are not visible to the naked eye. There should have been an actual test on the
circuits and electrical components, especially to the core parts of the plane to ensure
the safety of the crew and flight.

D. Alternatives and Decision Criteria

D.1. Alternative Decisions

• The essential power should be automatically switch to standby power upon loss of
all generators on a turbine aircraft.
• Upon the loss of all generators, the second officer or captain should make sure the
battery switch is on then immediately switch essential power to standby power or
emergency position.

D.2. Evaluation of the Alternatives

• The first thing to do is to ensure that the essential power would automatically be
switched to standby power and make sure that the battery switch is on, so that in case
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 8
of a “Loss of all Generators” problem the captain could have the instruments and lights
necessary to fly the aircraft while the second officer could “troubleshoot” the electrical
system.

E. Recommendation and Implementation Plan

After reviewing the official accident report released by the National

Transportation Safety Board under the Bureau of Aviation Safety, and published news
on the Boeing 727-22C Flight 266 incident, the researchers were able to create the
following recommendations to the United Airlines as mentioned below:

E.1. Airline Company (United Airlines)

They must ensure that the monitoring and maintenance of their aircraft’s
overall condition are well supervised. Every System of their aircraft especially the
sound maintenance and engineering practices should be inspected consistently and
strictly. Special and additional training to the maintenance personnel should also be
given priority by the company.

 The aircraft maintenance and engineering department of the United Airlines

should be the one strictly implementing the recommendations provided by the
researchers, whereas the repair of the aircraft’s systems must be beyond with the
necessary operating condition on a particular equipment those required by MEL
(Minimum Equipment List) for classifying the airworthiness of the aircraft.
 The Pilots of the airline must undergo training provided or required by the aircraft
manufacturer (Boeing) before operating the aircraft to ensure that appropriate
procedures on the cockpit of the aircraft during an emergency will be done
properly.

E.2. Aircraft Manufacturer (Boeing)

 Provide the necessary configuration for the aircraft’s electrical system to aviation
administration (FAA) to determine if it is within the standards and requirements.
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 9
The configuration must also be given to the operator’s maintenance department
to ensure that repairs will be in accordance with the proper structure of the system.
 Redesign the electrical systems and components of the aircraft to avoid electrical
overload with the help of the engineering department. A battery must also be
installed with automatic switching of power to give electrical power during the
standby power system to maintain the power on the cockpit incase the generators
of the aircraft had failed. The second officer should be provided with a positive
indication on their panel that the standby system is being powered by a battery.
Such indication could be in a form of light which could be installed in the aircraft
that would be illuminated when the standby system is activated.

E.3. Aviation Administration

(Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board)

 Inspect the manufacturer of the aircraft involved in the incident whereas the
designs and blueprint specifically the layout of the aircraft’s electrical system
relative to the fire alarm and electrical load of generator buses.
 Review the airworthiness directive on the aircraft’s wiring system that are currently
used and applied to all the aircraft model, and determine the weak points in the
directive to establish prescribed procedures consistent with the Safety Board’s
recommendation. The parts of the systems that are potentially dangerous which
may result to possible future problems in the aircraft’s system.
 Gather the data from all the aircrafts with the same model currently in service and
determine the common problems encountered by the maintenance department to
address the problems to the aircraft manufacturer and create appropriate changes
to the system to solve the risks of accidents and hazards.
 Apply certifications and reinforce the guidelines of aircraft wiring maintenance
procedures and improve the training of maintenance personnel to appropriately
perceive and fix possible faults in the electrical system.

The recommendations above should be performed by the Federal Aviation

Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, Airline companies and Aircraft
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 10
Manufacturers like Boeing together at all times. This will help effectively review and
check the aircraft’s wiring systems. This will produce findings that will be evaluated by
the aviation administration to determine the risks and hazards that may be found.
Thus, Aircraft manufacturers will be able to fix the problems before it would result into
serious accidents.
These required actions might cost both the aircraft manufacturer and the airline
company since it will require more labor work. It requires the redesign of the electrical
system of the aircraft and an extensive maintenance procedure to ensure the safety
of the aircrafts.
With these necessary actions considered, the accident happened to flight 266
which occurred as a result of several electrical system failure and loss of electrical
power in the electrical configuration of Boeing 727-22C will be avoided. The Federal
Aviation Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, Airline companies,
Aircraft Manufacturers, staffs, and passengers may rest assured that the aircrafts are
now safer than before as a result of strict implementation of these recommendations.

F. Conclusion
Based on the findings, the researchers came up with the following conclusions:
 Regular inspection on the aircraft was performed on ground
 Professionals took interior and exterior inspection and found the aircraft to be
serviceable
 There was an inclement weather during the inspection; the aircraft was covered with
defensive canvas intending to keep the water from pouring into electrical areas
 The plane has 3 generators with generator no. 3 inoperative
 The plane was declared airworthy with only 2 operable generators as it passed the
minimum equipment list provided that certain procedures are followed and electrical
loads are monitored during flight
 Engine fire warning bell rung in the cockpit few minutes after take-off and discovered
engine no. 1 triggered the fire warning
 Flight crew reported to departure control that they received a fire warning and they
wished to come back; This was the last report the departure control received
 Shortly after the shutdown of engine no. 1, engine no. 2 lost power
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 11
 Departure control attempted to regain communication but failed
 Electrical power at approximately 50 volts was recovered at about a minute and a half
after loss of no. 2 generator
 The aircraft continued with its path and showed no signs of turning back
 Departure controller instructed the flight to turn right at 060* but there was no response
 Target movement shows that the aircraft turned left and the speed of the aircraft
greatly increase at the same time
 Emergency procedures were conducted following the disappearance of the flight and
discovered that the aircraft crashed
 There were 2 ground witnesses, 1 witness noticed nothing unusual, the other witness
noticed there were many sparks, reddish in color from the right side in the rear engine
of the aircraft
 The board failed to determine why all generator power was lost and why standby
electrical power system was not activated or failed to function

Recommendations
Based on the findings, the researchers came up with recommendations that
will be beneficial for the airline company, aircraft manufacturer and the aviation
administration.
The airline company must ensure that the monitoring and maintenance of the
aircraft’s overall condition are well supervised. Aircraft maintenance and engineering
department should strictly implement that the repair of aircrafts’ systems must be
beyond the necessary operating condition. Pilots of the airline must undergo training
by the manufacturer before operating the aircraft to ensure that procedures
especially during emergencies are done properly.
The aircraft manufacturer must provide the necessary configuration for the
aircraft’s electrical system to determine if it passes the standards and requirements
and to ensure that repairs will be in accordance to the proper structure of the system.
Electrical systems and components of the aircraft should be redesigned to avoid
electrical overload. A battery must also be installed with automatic switching of power
to give electrical power in case the generators of the aircraft had failed. The second
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 12
officer should be provided with a positive indication on their panel that the standby
system is being powered by a battery.
The aviation administration should inspect the manufacturer of the aircraft
involved whereas the layout of the aircraft’s electrical system relative to the fire alarm
and electrical load of generator buses. Review the airworthiness directive on the
aircraft’s wiring system and determine the weak points in the directive to establish
prescribed procedures. Gather data from all the aircrafts with the same model
currently in service and determine the common problems encountered by the
maintenance department to address the problems. Apply certifications and reinforce
the guidelines of aircraft wiring maintenance procedures and improve the training of
maintenance personnel to appropriately perceive and fix possible faults in the
electrical system.
With these necessary actions considered, the accident happened to flight 266
which occurred as a result of several electrical system failure and loss of electrical
power in the electrical configuration of the aircraft will be avoided. The Federal
Aviation Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, Airline companies,
Aircraft Manufacturers, staffs, and passengers may rest assured that the aircrafts
are now safer than before as a result of strict implementation of these
recommendations.

G. References
o Aircraft Accident Reports on DVD (2006) Flight Simulation Systems, LLC
o Barnett, A., & Lofaso, A. J. (1983). After the Crash: The Passenger Response to the
DC-10 Disaster. Management Science, 29(11), 1225–1236. doi:
10.1287/mnsc.29.11.1225
o Crash Of a Boeing 727-22C off Los Angeles: 38 Killed (1990 - 2019) Bureau of Aircraft
Accidents Archives Rtrieved from https://www.baaa-acro.com/crash/crash-boeing-
727-22c-los-angeles-38-killed?
FLIGHT 266 ACCIDENT Page no. 13
o Electrical failure and crash into ocean, United Air Lines, Inc., Boeing 727- 22C,
N7434U, near Los Angeles, California, January 18, 1969 (1970, March 18) National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Bureu of Aviation Safety; Washington, D. C.
20591
o Heath, W., & Surbaugh, W. (1970). Minimum equipment list - A manufacturers and
users viewpoint. 2nd Aircraft Design and Operations Meeting. doi: 10.2514/6.1970-
900
o Trevino, M. B. (n.d.). National Transportation Safety Board. Encyclopedia of
Transportation: Social Science and Policy. doi: 10.4135/9781483346526.n344
o United Airlines flight 266, a Boeing 727-22C (1996-2019) Aviation Safety Network
(ASN) Retrieved from https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?
o United Air Lines, Inc., Boeing 727-22C, N7434U (n.d.) National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) Retrieved from
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAR7006.aspx?
o (n.d.). Practice for Application of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Federal
Aviation Regulations Part 21 Requirements to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). doi:
10.1520/f2505-06