MUOABE

ffiAWffiM SMBTFS & CffiM.frN SHMPSffiN

with Ism ffimvis
a
 " l'rd
ABOUT THE AUTHORS I '.T,.,.i;

David Srnith joined Reuters frorn Oxfo,rd and was ,,'

a corraspondent for them in Spain and Italy before, ,

,'',,,,!l!:
moving to Independent Television News (ITN) in ' ',,..,,'
t978. For ITN he has worked widely,irn Afr,ica . i;:"r
ln 1979 he cornered the Lancaster House :: 'l'
'', ,1

onferEnoe on Rhodesiaand then, from Sarlisbury, ',i'.

the subsequen[ cearefire,and eleotiwr which
brought Mugabe to poner. He and his Amsrican
wife, Pam, lirre in Lond,on.

Ian Davies who hars worked for the Sunday Times

lnsight team is now with the Melbourne Age.

Colln Simpson has been a spocial correspandent

of the Sutulay Times oinoe 1964. He uncoraered
the Rhodesian samctiouls scandal of 1969 and is
the author of rcveral best ellers furcluding
Lusitania, Lawrence of Arabia and, moct rwent,ly,
The Ship That Hunted ltself.
t''"" t

Mugabe
DAVID SMITII and COLIN SIMPSON r-
with IAN DAVIES

SPIMRE EOOKS LIMITED

30-32 Gray's Inn Road, London WCIX gJL
i :firct published in Creat
Britain by SBhere Books Ltd r98r CONTENTS
.;Oopyright @ David Smith, Colio Simpson, Acknowleil gements .vlr
Iair Davies 1981 ,.., ,.

I Finding Himself . 9,..,,-'

2 The Struggle 25.'.
.

3 Prison 5l ,r
4 Exile 75,
5 Lancaster House l2l ,':

6 Waiting t53
7 The Election t74 ,

8 Conqlusion 2W, '

TNADE
}IABI(

e:
This book is sold subiect to the condition tht
it shatl not, hy way of trade or othsrwise, be lent,
. F-bold, hired out or othenvise circulated without
the publisher's prior consent in any form of
: bindlng or cover other than that in which it is
published and without a similar. condition
' imtriding.this condition being imposed on the
: strbsequp{rt purchaser. ' r

Set in Monophoto Times

Frinted and bound in Great Britain by

, @ollinQ., Glasgow
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Robert Mugabe is a retiring man. We are grateful

to the following persons who - each af,ter thEir
fashion - have enabled us to find and folrlow his
fmtsteps. They are: Mr Nathan Shamuyari,sa,
Mr Godwilr Matatu, Mr Lawrence Vambe, '
Mr Marrin Meredith, IUs Heidi Holland, Ms Ruth
Weiss, lvls Judy Tsdd, Father Trabers, PvIs Jenny .

Barraclough, Sister Janice Mclaughlin, L,ord

Soames and his staff, Mr David Martin, Mr Colin
Legum, Mr Neal Acherson, Mr Guy Clutton-
Brock, Mr Robert Blake, Mr Dennis Hills,
Ms Elaine Windrich, Professor Terence Ranger,
the Reverend Bill Clark, Ms lda Grant, Senator
Andrew Young, Mr Mike Aurett, Superintendent
Tony Bradshaw, Mr Walter Kamba and
Lord and Lady Walston. We have a special debt
to Ms Sally Mugabe for being allowed to use
her reminiscencqs, to Mr and Mrs Boohene of
Chana, Mr Eric Marsden, Mr Garfield Todd,
and from our immediate ool,leagues at the Sunday
Tbnes and ITN. In part'icular Sunday Times
editor, Mr Harold Evans, who ailowed us aocess
to the archives of Times Newspapersl Mr John
Barry, the managing editor who organ,ised the
Sunday Times ooverage of the Zimbabwe
Settlement Crisis; David Nicholas, the editor of
i.,i.
:it',.
ii::'r
|.1
!',
:..
ri..
t;,
i,,
, Chapter I -- Finding Himpelf ';
. i,- , ,.,,.-:,,
"t!'''!''"'

In the rainy seasoh, there could hardly-be'a more fss:i:,,,1

saken place on earth. ,
When the rains .urnr, there was only one way to it ' , .'i
'- .

from the desolate railway station eight miles away. On r ' '

foot, through deep bush and tall elephant grass, where . .:

lions were said to prey. It was only 50 miles from ':;',,
salisbury but it belonged to another world and ahottrei l,,'j,ri'
a$e.
At the end of a walk tfrat could take half a day stoodl: ' .,

a Gothic-style church, a primitive ctinic and u .oilotion, .',,,,

t
of damp mud huts.
This was Kutama - literal meaning 'to migrate'-
named after the local African chief *ho io.ttir y.rrr ', ,:! ,' 1'

hfgl: the first World War had converted bo_th himself ..1:; ',;

and his people to Christianity. In return, the Jisuits builf

amissionstation,anelementaryschoolandateacher
training college that was to become renowned throughout " ,, ..
Rhodesia and Africa for the men and women it produced; : I '
,TheJesuitsweresticklersforceremony,beitdaily..l
mass, weekly confession or the rnonthly review of a, ,,., ,

' pupil's progress. For the boys and girls who ,made,,it ' .
'.through elementary
school, the fathers had devised a : ' l

sp-eciaf passing-out ceremony. It was the final day,of , :r'

'school, and for most of them education would end there.
Eac! pupil was asked to appear on the makeshift wooden
^
platform that was the school stage and announce to their' . 1,',;,
l

t9a9h9.rsandparentswhattheiweregoingtodowith
-their lives. They walked into the centre of the stage and '. '',"'
completed the couplet: ,, t,

'When I am a man, I'll be a ... if I can.' .

Some came on with the cape and stick of the herdsman,

- ,qthgrtiiwlth the hammer and saw of the carpenter, or the
, ,axe of the woodsman, This day one little boy appeared
iq gown. and mortar board, 'surreptitiously borrowed
.,,from the mission father. As the audience gave way to a
; collective chuckle, he walked proudly to the middle of
1":the stage, took a deep breath and declared:
-r'iWhen I am a man, I'llbe a teacher if I can.'
' rn. yearwas 1q38. The boy was Robert Gabriel Mugabe.
, It
was said by some that the founder of the mission,
a Frenchman called Jean-Baptiste Loubiere, had been
'transferred to Rhodesia at the beginning of the Great
War because he had fallen in love with a girl at his
previous post, in Portuguese East Africa. If so, he made
up for his 'falling' in the eyes of the Jesuits with his work
at Kutama.
The regime of Father Loubiere.and his African assis-
tant, Joseph Dambaza, assumed an almost monastic-
rigidity. There was little room lor African customs, let
, alone tribal religion. They were both convinced that their
mission in life was to send as many black souls to heaven
' as possible. To achieve that Father Loubiere ordered the
tribespeople to look upon the world outside as a pit of
evil which could only be redeemed through their constant
prayer. Lawrence Vambe, the distinguished Rhodesian
historian, has compared the atmosphere at Kutama in
its early days to that of Lourdes at the time' of a
pilgrimage. The village's patron saint was Theresa of
Lisieux, the Little Flower. So intense was the devotion
to her that the villagers substituted her name for the
Virgin Mary in some of their prayers.
If in the years to come, the most t'amous son of Kutama
I was to insist on 'Africanisation' of his people, it was
, pethaps because his tribe had had its African way of life
, so effectively wiped out at the mission. Father Loubiere
.".: qade the wom.t *.1; high-necked, ankle-tength
1
iR '.,i,1:',
the more informal life of a travelling craftsman and
1934 left the mission and his family for a jobbing . i
carpenter's position in Bulawayo, and ihen the mines iL
;
South Africa. He did not return. It was said, to the,. 'r,::;
chagrin of the missionaries, that he took a second wife. , ,,',,t.',,1,,,'.,
Rarefy, if ever, .did he contribute to the family 1rr 1"11 ' ,,:-
behind. The fam)ly were one of the most devout in the, ,- :,,'.r.,
village. There was his wife Bona, a formidable woman, ' ,: i
imbued with a Christianity that mixed intensity with ,:''t';.; ,,
piety, and her iour children: Miteri (Michaeg, thrildest, i iiif ,,,
Raphael, Robert Gabriel, Dhonandho (Donald), and 1fug ', "
youngest, Sabina. The year their father left, Michael died
,. ;
in tragic and somewhat mysterious circums(ances from ''l:'' '
.
eating-poisoned maize. ',1',, ':,.':''',':'
upbringing, learning to fend for themselves a.nd mdke ,:.:i':,
"
:.money for the rest of the family as quickly as they could. ..:.i
they
helped tend.the cattle of their mother's father, ,
lhey ,'',:,,"
fished in the river, and very occasionally they would be ",'i
atowed to play in the forest neiar the *isty jwanip:that ,' , r, ,
was infested by the anophelerr mosquitd, the carrier sf,' ; ,,:,i.,,;:
a,deadly malaria. Even on its good days, the smell bf ,*, ,, i
quinine hung over this sad settlement. ,, j:';
The young Mugabe absorbed the monasticism of 'the ,,.iT
mission without losinghis sense of proportion. On mor6 ,'',',,:t'ii;i;
'
than one occasion he eschewed, in front of his family , - '
and friends, the'more extreme teachings of the.mission. .li
il"
 \,. "

fathers. He didn't like the idea, fostered by Father

L toubiere,'of calline t[" *hiiu ,,",.riulist man of the ciries
. 'mpga' - mispronunciation of the Shona word :1";t-:

i.l,,' t-andInhel93O.Father
said so.
Loubiere died and was succeeded by
_lr , :

,,tt,',!;
ll riri r .
a remarkable Irish priest called Father o'Hea, who sei
l;','i:
out to reverse the 'spell' cast by his predec.rsoi urd bring
u ''' ' Kutama into the twentieth century.
.i: ..
.1i; '
1,i.,, Devoting his substantial private means to the mission
:i, under his care, he founded a teacher training school to
,.,
' supplement the primary education already ih..r. Then

ment in salisbury tried to block him. They ictively

discouraged any higher education for the African. when
the government
lgfused to herp him build a hospital, h6
welt ahead and did it with his o*n *oney. His contempt
and spirit of rebellion against thq whites found u yorrg
disciple in Mugabe. In return, Father o'Hea caiefu[]
nlrtu_red the young boy. He recognised already whai;
shortly before his death in 1970: he was to cau bn

. 1933 and the newly elected prime minister, Geoffrey ,

Huggins, came-to inspect Kutama. He brought his high

commissioner from London, a Mr O'Keefe. - ,..
'Because he wanted to raise money
for his mission,
Father o'Hea also persuaded the governor, cecil Rod-
well, to come !oo. Kutama had n&er had a day like it
before. It has had one since. Mugabe, as prime Minirt..,
returned to Kutama in triumph in June 19g0.
The school pyt on a dispray for the distinguished
' visitors. The chtir sang. Theie was even meat for lunch.
Father o'Hea was lobbying for money for that hospital.
th-. Africans in the area --it was 10,b00 square miles -
did not even have a clinic or a dispensary.
\
12,\
 ..1.,.
tr. ,.
:,i'

i.::. '
r, began to form his own-ideas, taking from . i..'.

uol
theJesuit, *'^* ,.,i '
'r mouldi.ng them aftel his own fashiJn. Today t"-ilii ' ;
'I w3s, brought up by the Jesuits and I'm riiost -i"r.rii , '.
' . . . I benefitted from their teaching enormourti.,
ft at i ,j
rather hides the manner in which hiisociari;ili;;; ,'
--' --i-:-,.',,;i'i,ii;
, in Kutama.
Men like Father o'Hea did not preach the .Hell and ., ,,
,'," 'I fact that he was younger and smaller
guppo-se the Damnation' of their predecessors. Theirs was , f;;;;;- .','.,,,1,
ll . ,
may have kept him a little apart from er"ryone. I don't tolerant christianity, they aimed to make their Afrild ,..,',i,'lr
,1,-,,f, rgmember him taking part in sport or school plays. He , colrffiunities 'Christian' in thought and deed. . , 'r,,: ,.r.',ii.:,
' always seemed to enjoy.his own company.' Father o'Hea would eventell [is villagers not to come ,! ;',,,,,,;'i'
.- The six grades of elefirentary education over, Father to Mass if it did. nor mean anything tJthem, the kinJ '

,. ,. O?He? *t:a Mugabe a courie in the teacher training of progressive thinking that Loubiere would never 6urr .,.,,',;
, , school. The boy himself wanted to, it was a decision he countenanced.
had made several years before. But there was pressure
:,i.,, from his family for him to take his father', Furthermore, the mission at Kutama preached equality
piu"", learn as a way of life at a time when the reit of Rhodesia,l
and for that matter Africa - was based on discrimiruiirn. .
,.1 ,hir brothers and sisters. A course-in teacher training The white fathers had made themselves part or tnilcorr
would prgye a heavy strain on the family's slender m.uniJv, '
enjgyed little privacy fromihe tribespeople
resources. His mother's only income came from teaching -the-v
who looked to them for almost everything from fo'od
,,"t' the village girls their catechism -
to medicine and education. Father o;Hea -o.u., stopped
: It was typical of his mother's faith that when Father tiy3e o-ut
,

' told her just how much he wanted Robert to go lig own goal: to be 'one' with his n"opiJl--
Slowly, I![ugabe drew his own conclusions. From ;
, 9'H".u
ahead and train as a teacher, she agreed immefliateiy.
:i Whatever the cost to the family, Robert would go. As
Lotibiere, from Father O'Hea, from Geoffrey Hrggili , ,
the day the prime minister came to visit, .r.n frori-tti. ,

.' was,,Father O'Hea himself provided a bursary f6r him

it man Hitler he heard about on the radio. At this stage
[r9, his own
. Mugabe's
income: the other money came from
farmer-grandfather. Robert lrad seen the
of his life, he probably never heard of ttr" *oft '
'socialism'. But that was what he was aspiring to.
'probJems ahead when he had publicly opted for teaching
'^ in the passing-out ceremonyt
" 'ii I can;. Now-ttey rrai ..T: my way of thinking,' he tras iind recalled,
religious cbmmunities, ancienJ and modern, are socialist.
been resolved.
In its own way, Kutama was.
,. ' Years later, Father o'Hea said: 'I would have kept 'Becaur. of that, and ever since then, it has alwavs
':'', him for nothing because of his influence over the other been my firm belief that socialism has ro be mtich il;;
' boys. Before long he was teaching his classmates how to .
christian than capitalism., ': '

teach.'
In the mid-1940s he graduated with a diploma in,teach-
.,',.*ffithenexttwoyears,Ivlugabewastolearnalot ing. In 1945 he left Kutama - a seriour yorng *un, ,enas;
,j
i . more than jusr the ability io t.rlrrt. ro, in. nrst time he thing of a loner, diligent, hard-worting,-u voiacious' 'rii
i!'''
t4
l5
 ;1,..,.f{fcr w-no . ' '.. ,. ; . ' r lt
}seo eygry mrnute of his time, not much
ir:.,,,.:

ii. , EVgn to Iaughtel but, above all, singte-minded. +NC, the dreams of blac[ rnajoiity rute, the dirsugt,iii:
the condition of fellow Afric"rrr. lt.r. *ur ;i;" t#
j^f*i:l1.:.lrj:gjgus followed, uIIl or., the country.
il,.',rRarQly. h;;;:
d idthe quiet, Intense younfi;;
worship, among students there, of Mahai;;-G.iltio_,
1,,;.,t ;;;J rn ore than whose campaign of 'passive resistance' in India'**& '
tl= r;a:ouple.gt term_s_al 9ne school. At one, Dadaya Mission him a cult figure for young nationalists in south Ai;i;;
*r.t Ndabaningi sithote, already ;rp;.;;;;
tii' t:r^l,f_,,_,lt politics. (where Gandhi had been born and brought up). ' t,,,)
il ,lt, }ft"l1$l Yuelbr had time only for siudy-and
teaching. tn te4e, ihrn he was
As the butterfly emerging from a chiysalii, tt suii.l'
i;"i which warmed and dried theyoung Mugate's *irgB" *a-i,
j;;.1
,,.1,,:
:
,
s!|t ^iiiiai 25, he won
he wanted: a scholarship to university.
not revolution, but the morb cerebral aitraction oI non-l
,','' ."It was.t^o.give him his poritical'u"riir*ind his first ---i- :

violence as advocated by Ghandi.

{i taste of African nationalism. Mugabe himself looks back on his years at Fort Hare
*ii, Fgrt .tlTt was an all-black university on the Cape in
::i'i, south as the 'turning-point' in his life. He lua confi;d
^, Africa which during the I940s had-educated the
opposition to everything the likes of Geoffrey Huggins
il;
i.ii1,r,;'!l!!._young wing of the African National congress stood for, indeed there was now operi hostiiity tJ*ihu,
,rt;i j(A.!!c) of south Af.ica. The movement itself was under- whites in Rhodesia. ,:-:-1
,ir,,;,.$oing a vital change in style, moving from a policy of 'when I left Fort Hare I had a new orientation und
lToperation with the authorities to one of confrontation. outlook,' JVlugabe says. 'I came from a country *t.re,
: ifhe young lions of Fort Hare, as they were cuil.O, *eie rno.-rl black people had accepted European
: l"tg.]v responsible for the radical change in black think-
rure us ,uct.
'Most of us believed that all that should be done was
ANC-was trying to instil imong its people.
i,.,, llglh-uf
'',.'t,, .the
tsy the time Mugabe arrived, men like Nerso-n Manaela,
to remove our grievances within the system. After Fort
Hare there was a radical change in my views.
;1 1.,,,,$obert Sobuk*i.1y.t to become respectively heads of . 'I was completely hostile . . . but of
,'l','r 15r ANc and ttri pan-African .orgi.rri,' rt. zuru to Rhodesia to teach within the system., "brrrr.
I came back 1

"
with his Bachelor of Arts degrie, he gor a job at the
,, , tnilitants like oliver Tambo dominated politicallife
on Briefonrein Mission -had
the campus. near umvuna. He :ti"J it i
ANC in his final days ar Forr Hare, but poiiti.urrv t.
was to lie dormarit when he got back home. He pref.r.ed
to study'for a further degree, a diploma in education. "

He'd moved on to a mission school in Gwero by the

: ti*,
------
he got it.
There'he met an old friend from Kutama, Leopold
Takawira. Takawira had been training for the pri"rrrr""a
at the mission as Mugabe was going through ,"t ooi
Though several years older than him, he had Lr.irnoea
1!e boV Mugabe. Now he was teaching at the *ir.i"n.
He had given up^the idea of the priesth-ood, r."ognirirrg
already that his future lay in politics.
e e
t7
 ..', ,

; ,l " : .1.'', ' .'..',, -' r 'i.;' ':.:\

ifl, 5*.*r" iutu*iru'died befiore Mugabe'had'iealty : ,:ri:that the Europeans fa.e up-'io, the truth he baw. tn"y;,,.,'j;i
-,
;r , pergqd as a nationalistleadpr, his.influince on him has didn't. ,. ':;. "
irltie-wet'tben properly iqcognised. Takawira was a il";i _.
" , A British couple, Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock, Werg',irr,. rifi
,,:,:., IBxe energy combined with the most attractive of per- heavily involved in these first attempts at racial concilia-, . ,i
' ; ,ponalities. He could condemn the racial injustice of his tion. Guy used to hold discussion groups among African 'I, '
i*1,-.,,,'country bitterly: but hb always..balarrced it with his belief teachers. He remembers Mugabe from virtually the first =:,'.'.
'ii;i' ; in the good
l1);:"'''
,.'
.
sood of man. annlied that ro
man- He applied to horh
both his orvn
own meeting he attended, with Takawira I
' . ,;",1.
.ri,-
;il,l' ,, IEuplqpeople and
afl(I rne
the wIl[ss.
whites. He
.rte had
na(l left
relt his
nls seminary
semmary because 'I was surprised at just how articulate he was, and how ' :,:
.,1;,,,i,1,hp
'l;,!.]',t .,-! ,,
realised that the way to right the wrongs done to .widely read,' he recalls. 'He neither drank nor'smoked, -;;;,r
,.,,
^ .
;1",,, Africans was not through the Church. Redemption for in fact he could be a bit of a cold fish at times. pul r r.,1rli
" ,, the blacks did not mean saving their souls, but removing . beneath it all there was an extraordinary young mana,,,l,,,;,
'ifijl ,.'the'laws of segregation agd discrimination that madE almost reluctant to emerge from beneath his self-impoqed,,,.,,1,,,i)
;,;*,,. ,:, t'hem helpless, pitiful victims of their own worst traits shell.
ir:':.t 'land tlie system. 'He had this wide range of interests, he could talk, ', ,:;
i
li;.' , '' "''ro Mu[abe, still searching for a philosophy and rather about Elvis.Presley or Bing Crosby as easily as politicsi,o ,', ,
' mofe keenly pursuing his education, Takawira was a Above all he had an overwhelming thirst for knowledge.' r ,r,r'
'
political tutor. It was Takawira who first equated for It was at one of Guy Clutton-Brock's meetings, 8t a ' ,,
,',, , Mugabe the relationship between simple Christianity - mission near Rusape, that retired teacher Alfred Knot- ^"',.,:
i, . ',which he'd learned at Kutama - and the basic principles ' tenbelt met Mugabe and formed a lasting impression of , ,''
', rr of Karl Marx, which he'd been introduced to at Fort him. Knottenbelt had taught in South Afri-cu, one of,, ',1
Hare. his pupils had been Robert Sobukwe. He was something
.]..iNowMugabewassendingofftoLondon,,toamail of a judge of young nationalists. 'Mugabe,' he says, ' . ' ',.
order firm, for copies of Das Kapital, even Engels, Joined in more than anyone else, he knew what he fas '' ,'
Conditions of the Working Classes. And now Mulabe talking about and he wasn't frightened to take over th6\, ,'l
::.!tarted to attend meetings of inter-racial groups like the discussion. '1';
" ,
, Capriiorn Sogiety. ,-
'We didn't talk politics directly- it was taboo in those , ,,'i
. _,,I!" society had. been founded by Colonet Dpvid(.,.,, days - but you could tell that here was a chap with a
ftirling, a hero of Britain's Second World War campaign' .' ,; clear vision of what the blacks needed to progress.'
in North Africa. stirling had come to Rhodesia aftir :
tf,e IfMugabecouldn'ttalkpoliticsthere,hedidocca.
war, and was genuinely shocked by the 'false paradise' 'l sionally in his classroom. During this period, the early ,
he said he found there. He set up the society as a means . 1950s, he was always taking newspaper clips about the
oj bripsing_blacks and whites together. The hope w.as. " , Kenyan nationalist Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau-Mau
that, through discussion, a government ofconsent and the into his lesqons. He would tell his pupils that what was .lt"
$arinq of economic and political power might avoid the happening in Kenya was bound, sooner or later, to-, iii
b-loodshbd that Stirling feared even in thesi early days. happen in Rhodesia. ,r,.i,.,,t.
, -Ihecolonel was to.be disappointed. His plan demanded , Still, for his friends like Takawira, he remained some-
l9

i- ',. 'The fact was that Mugabe had little time for the
,' ,,rnilitalcy and hard line being taken by tHe champions
of nationalism at that stage.
One of them he knew well. James Chikerema, a school-
. mate from Kutama and the son of Loubiere's assistant
, :' Joseph Dambaza, was rapidly emerging as one"of the
. leading lights of African protest in salisbury. He was
',,
three years older than Mugah and had goni to South,
, $fri9a to study before trini. fhere he hai been deeply
involved with the communist party. In I94g rhe south
'c
,;,'. Af 4s had expelled him and he had returned to the
.' for$alislury township.sf Harare to mobilise black supporr
his radical views. By now his Communism had
,r', ," developed into outright rejection of everything Kutama
', stgod for. chikerema's Mirxist Leninism did not abide
'' , tii
the church.
Mugabe could not accept that, his embryonic Marxism
,,, "was still compatible with his christian beliefs. He may
| ,,, : have endorsed Chikerema's aims - to strip the whites of
r,, , their power and win black majority rule . but he could
; r.tot support the means or the philosophy.
Partly to prevent himself becoming'entangled with
-,' chikerema, and partly because he wan-ted to e"a.n ,nor.
he moved to Zambia in 1955 to teach and study,
i,i,', ,. 4toney,
.) ' 20
' Ghana, where he moved in the autumn of 1957, was,t:irl'1i',,,r
'to change all that, Mugabe is reticent abqut wliat .,',i,]',r,
prompted his move, but there is little doubt that it was, ,1 ;.i,
i:. by invitation ':
Ghana was on the verge of independence, the first '
;.ii of Britain's colonies in Africa to achieve it. Kwame : :'-, ':':
.
i , Nkrumah, the leader of the country's nationalists inA i' ,'
t
.,. shortly to be the first president, was inviting literate :,',',',
'Africans from other countries to work, study and teach
i1y,
I, :':
, in his country. Not only did Nkrumah need all the talent ,
i: he could find, he also realised that under his young I .
revolution these men and women could discover the wayg.., .,,.
and means to bring their own countries to independence. ,'i,
Mugabe and everyone who went with him. They were . i,
..heady days, as one of Mugabe's Rhodesian colle&gu€s;.. . ,: i
. thefe femembefs. -..-. .,^. :
... - 'i^ ' '"-n. r'"J 'r n'tt lr'{Lqii{1$i
'Ghanaians were just like the rest of us, but free. I
: r€rrl€ffiber my first visit, around the same time as , ",,,
Robert's. j
'My first desire was just to set my eyes on an, African , ' ,,,,
prime minister and African ministers. When the first' . '. li.
excitement wore ofl it occurred to me that most of these i
rmen were no different to African friends of mine in
Salisbury - but those friends were getting one-tenth of ,, ,
,,)
the opportunities available in Ghana ',1,.
'It wasn't just on the political level, either. Africairs '.',ii.
,were being made directors of companies, headmasters 9f 1r, ,:l ,ji
schools, heads of departments. I, like everyone else, went ..'^,
2t t.,l
 'ii: rn March l98O,.after Mugabe'i
fi.ff#lffi-
erection victory, *" ' i
fi';;'spoke to salv's sister rsttrJi and her t
'Eoohene. Mr ioohene.orra t urdry
uruura
Kojo
'ii
pe a sharper contrast
[" to Mugabe. He's a uusinessman *itr, irt.r"ri,
;r:processing and airtriuut-ion"itroogr,out infood ..
weet Africa.

t*h:J::,]".: tlrroon-t u1,.i U.ro*, ctose friends. " , : ,

.
Ir,; r ou see,' says Kojo Boohene, .Bpp ir-a u..y Jiscernjng' , ,
,
:, ,'iThd -{eyfrons rl€nt out of their way to entertain and
il:man' The basis.gf [is poriticai outrook has been,
;.,always will be, hi, and , ,;
take cafe of the Africans Nkrumah had.inviteJ
^

underdbg. I share that

:' in Ghana. so. wtren-iiirg"u. uu.n.J ii*r"rr,il#; *but we disagree when "ure'ioffi;
it
"o*.rio decidinf.h;;;" get
g,I:felaos rti i*i",.;:#;,n.,o_4 :
,r,
badry ,:,
to need.treatme";l;
irii*:::1lT
,,;' ,r .,?fro1gh. hospitat, iuiiruirited him ,i, operatiVii communes :
.,'lregiularly. It was not, friends say, Iove at whic[ Bob woutd hle ;; ;JTr"i";
firsisight: rather .,- pZimbabW6 ineffici.,ri.
,' '.' ,s grew steadily the more time they, i urn'6ig.tting rhe cake big;Bo.[- ..
' llstant lupprt.-that i;rrjs more intereste-d.
in getting
-r-oig.rlivon. inuorreJin mating
,,',' gP.9dt together. Salry is is strong as she
is unserfish. She , i
' ., has a. toughness and serenity wfri.t i, *r. fi',t* cake, which in t[. run might p..iar.a a cake,
. "ni";il;,; fi,that's not so big. . u.,
'':111 hindsight, Mugabe recogni*J in",'il. needed. ' i

years it has be; Salry *r," r,u,

r,;; il;
Be- r.. Io.*r ugr; ro disagree.,
,. :Y,tj iI?.
''' 'political 11.
instincts into tt. ro*prete ioriti.r., nirg;.; i.: Esther Boohensuuttia in. 'The most irrlpressiv. tling , ],.*..
to!1V; Sally
who has pur the iron iirto his soul.
i; ; abour Bob is thar he's.ve.-y ri*pi., and
,,.1'wh.nnresry!,.she*irr'uvihat,herou",t,]*forhii' "gy 1V-n"thetic.
i|{rousaysomethinghea".',iugreewith,he*,on,tuse :-

' kindness and his integ-rity ur'r.an. llhis great learning to make
vou tJot ,ioi.urourl"ri'.';il ;, ,:,,,,:,
MugaU., *o#r.'io ijust point out where frc ttinf., you are wrong. ,r
.,, ch k, tries to be. i#niirty rnor prosaic about it. .I Even if
; maffied ivoupersisr, wiil,,il rir,.ir'il;l, wourd Mi.miTi,jl,
he
,

' leave mena toGhanaian becaurr- Ghunrian women don?t .,l

do all ,t" *"rr.., "l 'Y" t , '.'thecapitalist,getoutofZimb,b.,;.;;;.,"-Rou.,t
Mugabe if he were a busines*un there?
23
 Chapter 2 The Struggle
-
i; It was 2.30 in the morning when the crowd, its nurnbersrl
; swelling all the time en route, reached the stoddari Hall
i,,in the Salisbury township of Harare.
, Up till now their spirits had been good. They danced, .
.
they sang, they chanted slogans of the National Denio.
By the end of 1960 Mugabe felt it was time to go home.
\ ,,

He wanted sally to meet his mother and famf,y before .' cratic Party (NDP), the fledgling nationalist group tt.v , '
they married. $upported and whose leaders had just been arrestid. ,- ',:,
They had made their minds up on that, but they had They were, they said, going to talk to the prime *iriirt., , t '
-
yet to decide whether they would live in Ghana or plout that, they would walk into the centre of Salisbury i: ' "'
Rhodesia. Mugabe took leave for Christmas ,fr"t lrl,if necessary to present their case for the release ;i-irrtl,. 'i
Vru,
ari'd together they travelled to Salisbury. It *ur, ihry i'i leaders r
said, just to be a holiday
' '
i

But in their hgarts, they both knew that they were

fir6lqhf' for rhe eha nce" tq. j o d,th; n at i o n alir pn4. apply,,,..
trj

They did not have long to wait.

ii promised meeting with Whitehead.

ir Halflhe African labour force in and around sdis6ury
.boycotted work that day, many
=.' of them headed off to,,
.1,
t}u Sto-q{111 Hall. By midday the crowd had grown ro
irabout 40,000. Among them was Mugabe, horie barely.
r'a month from Ghana and only passing through at thit
ilbefore going back to Accra. rtre Oay ias 20 fuiiilO;
the march was called 'The March of the 7000, rnho ,tar#' ,
24
rit, and its significanc€ need only be measured by the fil ,

2s
 thatit finally perquaded Mugabe to commit himself to the
.':reioror"r their barrier.
thlir larrier.
] , ;--e-;'- l'- -:'o" :- -1" l.''j
,Yugube had not returned to sarisbury with the in- ff,tbinforce
'.l3ntion of staying
ye.ry long. He had ,o*i back very I , puring tl" uft.rnoon, they built 1 iiny podium'an4' .,1,,ji1,
temporarily to see his mbther, stilr riving at Katama, l,oo! uv ri. inu'yo,rng men who ;.iiffiI,- . .:,,:.0,
':.urrder the generous leave conditions which the Nkrumah outside, "rpt,,jt;ilj,h.
Stoddart Hall got up to speak.' ,.: ll:
'urrguu";u;;;krd to
llthousands fhe
stand up and address ttre croli?, ' ',i;':
government granted expatriate African teachers.
I,wasn't just.a holiday It i well. He was introduced as adistinguished'zimuauwJun; ,:'':,,,'t
foi them: they would also act as '*t o'had travelled in Africa, ;;;il;;;;ffi;; , '. '
lnformal ambassadors for the achiivements of Ghana ,,
-
back in their own countries. - r ' r' life-,.'
,''degrees, uTd. who didn't want to have the European
styie he might aspire to.
'*"1.: ,li
:"
, Thr:. young nationalists were to change his mind and ,
make him stay: Michael Mawema, LeJ old frf.r*ii" Mugabe was a little nervous to start with. He started - '.
and Edgar Tekere. Takawira, a seasoned veteran of the by talking about Ghana, what he'd seen there, '
nationalist struggle, having been executive officer of the how a new society was being cre6ted. lappening
His-atteripts to,, ,r.i,;,,
multi-racial capricorn Soliety throughout the 1950s; ip,;dil.'"*J;'r,#;;;;#";iAr*;l,ffi:.li'
rfor'others was hard rrrork both for
Mawema, a trade unionist and a nitionalist already Mugabe and his 'i._.
showing the capability to organise meetings, marches and audience
:,rj
rallies; and Edgar Tekere, a leader of tlie youth wing But when turned to his vision of the nationalist move- , ,,'

of the NDP. All of them had urged Mugabe to iemain ment in'Zimbabwe', the crowd warmed to him: first a .

in Rhodesia and devote his talents, intellect and education mu-rmur, then a little, light applause, finally an outburst
to the nationalist struggle. Mugabe had not .r; of,hearty
irr, uEilr. ry uraPPtng.
clapping.
vei oecidea,
when at dawn on 19 Jury poii"" raided trrl no*.s:oi i.' 'The natiirnuriri movement will only succebd if it is
Takawira and Mawema. ,t bas-ed on a blending of all classes of men,' Mugabe said,
N_o-* Mugabe was among the crowd outside the : 'It will be necessary for graduates, lawyers, doctors and
^
stoddart Hall. It was characteristic of rhe man tt ir,.
leadership he showed that day was thrust on him"t he
did not seek it. -
I .Edgur wtiitehead had no intention of seeing the
demonstrators, even meeting a delegation from them.
Now he was infuriated at thi work 6oy"ott. when two
representatives from the NDp arrived to see him he
refusgd to talk to them and instead went on radio to
issue years of watching Africans seduced by the charms and
a call-up order for a battarion of the territorial militia. i.
benefits of European society to which theii training gave
F. :,9pqed only to add that all me€tings would hence_
forth be banned in the-townshiis of Salis6ury. it..ro*a
,
th:T access, Mugabe came as something of,a nor.lty.
',
heard all this on their radios but they stayed calm, He stayed on the makeshift podium, from where it was
decided that the crowd should remain until they received
26
 t_-

.. som1e pgsitive response from the government.

fglloyilg morning they goi it. At first.the police
:,r' r _Jle_,
.- r."'* in with their batons. Then the dogs foflowed.
,;:,,;,Finally_they
"11?yj- simply drove their l,urrOror5is into the
spotter planes buzzedour.h.ud,Grirg ti. p"fh
,1::ly where rhe marchers were dispersing-to and so
rnaking them easier targets.
.,l",9.monstrators retreated to their townships, but
- lTl^rrce chased them.even there. The marchers set up
r vehicles
ba-rlrgades and_ road brocks, they stoned police
cars and
, owned by whites.
,' ' By th-e end of the day, nearry r 30 Africans had been
a*.ested, dozens had been wounded, some of
,, seriously.Jh. them
rownships were littered with r;bble from
the riot. The following weekend the unrest spread !, Own country.
to His confidence and his enthusiasm was transmitted
- to
fire. Eleven Africans *.r. shot.
th9 meegilgs he addressed in the first few *..tr"itJirril
The March of the 7000, as it became known, rnade return. The audience was invariably eager to hear
'from another country and Mugabe qriicklv taG
Mugqte a committed nationalist. lt arso proor..o
argu- g^god story-teller. He wourd .-u.[irt
u"."il--"
-o]
, lbll the most iepressiv,e legisration flrom it. gou..nment. his ,torv
to date. The Law and order (Ma,intenance) in,.no*.ni G,han1's development wirh anecdotes
Act vastly increased the power of the porice in handling
16ilh;;d,
what they are, always reminding them tt lt.V *[., no,
demonstrators: it arso viitualy gave the porice so very different from Rhodesians. "t
the righ;
, to ict with impunity, *itt, not even the icrutiny
of the
courts to face.

,i ch!1{justice, Sir Robert iredgold, it was,oo ru.ir.'^*'

'This bill outraged every bisic nrrnun ,igrri,,
he said
, ' , uj he resigned. 'It-win remoue the rast u"riij.'or
v doubt
about whether Rhodesia is a police state., arru asKeq rum what he did, are being
appointed to positions in the civil service ina*.yl
'The demonstration, , -'Yet herejobs. "no
the Europeans tell us that *"."nnoiinder-
followed by that bill, was to bring
' it home all too starkly to Mugabe that tt. take these Why?' he asked.
v"ais and the
winds of change he'd seen in 6hana were ,titt He was bitterly upset at the porice action outside
u iorg way the
from Rhodesia. stoddart Hall. He rearised that ihi, *u, to be
there were no winds- of change coming'ihrorgh "rAH;;hil.
country. As always with Mugabe, his disaplointmeii

29
"rd
 :,,,t.'i;i:.;":.]...,-.']''.]''..,.'.:
dismay was turned into determination. Now he was deter-
.' rnined to stay in Rhodesia, now he was determined'to
join the nationalists wherever it led.
,. tn the eyes of white Rhodesians in 1960, change could
'only rnean change for the worst. unlike
the white traders
,r' ,', ,.'. Moreover, the white popuJation was expanding rapidly:
-,in 1946 there had been da,bOq by f 9O0 th.., *rr, 223,A00.
z Predominantly English-speaking, well over half hadLen
Their standard of living was high. The average famiiy
:\ income of a European in Rhodesia was much higher than'
I in Britain, and ttie cost of living much lower.
The weather was pleasant and the lifestyle relaxed.
Yuny whites who would have only limited opportunities
'. for success and satisfaction back home, primarily because
of their own limited skills and the economic constraints
in post-war Britain, found the good life in Rhodesia.
, , That life, of course, was sustained by the economic,
social and political inequality between blacks and whites.
And they knew it. So any concessions to the winds of
change could only blow apart the society they had
., stitched so carefully togerher in cities tite satiibrry,
, and Inyanga, down on the cattle ranches and on theii
tobacco farms.
Though many still felt an affinity to Britain, few could
30
'
il contemplate with"equanimityrthe prospect
r'r to thel"S*tipl and frustrations
of return n' ,''t.,'
they had lefr behirrf,, ",',,,
th:fj So they dug in. Auitudes, *t i.i, t i"rL;il; ..
enlightened, hardened. Ideologies which"Jhad justified,,,
.,ri,
, domination of the native population in order tq actri;ve , ,''"'.0
exclusively European affaii. Although the voting qualifi- : ,:.
cation did not exclude non-Europeirrs, it was liniited to .
those who met an extraopdinary combination of educa- ,',',,'
tional and financial requirements. The effect was simple:
',,,i,,'ii,,
it gave the vote to viitually all the whites and iuit a ,'.' '
handful ofblacks. ThenumberofAfricanseligibrctl vote',,,,.,
The restricted franchise, as it was called, was justified
by the Europeans on the grounds that when African
achieved a level of 'sophistication' and'civilisation' which
education and income implied, they would then be
granted a role in governing the state. In this, the effect
was divisive for the African community. Those with
education and money could make it. They were offered'
l',, access to E_uropean circles. The few who managed to take
;' :lat whatever argued
.that .enrering Europ."o sociery,
f:^:ffr1level,-could only give them thi opportuniiy
to convince the whites that alr Africans should have thl
same chance.
Those who took this path during the 1950s and joined
the united Rhodesian party of ttri then prim" rnilnirt.r,
'31
lj,it,' rodd, orlthe various mutli-racial groups like
t"qin @rnqrd
i' z th.e. capricora society, the
llnter-raciir,iA*J"i"tio*'nt
:.Ygpt
t,1,.;,'little Rg.armament, could at the end of the a;il;;er;;
i,,t,,, evidence of tangible results.
.,:,'
l, ,, ,Taking tea with niie liberal Europeans was not going iresults.Insteadwecontinuedtobehumiliated.]
i:i,' cfalsejfre ii
lot of .the vast majority of Africais
;ri' ,1 rq odesia- The short-sightedness of such a strategy uy the
11
The organisation which was now to point the national-
,i ist movement in a new direction had already been going
'educated
'i'::,,,,)bw AfricanJhad been'brdht h"me in l95g for two years when Todd was deposed. It was cailJd th;' ''

,;,,,,i :', yhenf"dd was toppled from the leadeiship for allegedly ' City Youth League. .,
r,
,l liberal views. He was removed for wanting to wiaei ttre The Youth Leagu6 started out avowing confrontation
.ratherthanco.operationwiththewhites.
,

:-,i vpting franchise but just as damaging had been his

i opposition to a bill that sought formally io outlaw sexual 'Do not hang on the backs of the Europeans like
relations outside marriage between whites and blacks. on babies,' its leader, James Chikerema, told an inuagutal i

su$ matters the whites were indeed digging in. meeting in Harare in 1956. 'Rely now on yourselves!'It ,

was quite unlike the language Africans had hitherto used

,'-abrasive in dealing with Africans. Mugabe had already
I
" hld a clash with him during his schoolieaching days. As
'' '.a budgbtary measure Todd cut 60 pence from the three
Fo-utqr a month African teachers iarned. Mugabe, on
'behalf of teachers, challenged him. 'He was an excessively.
,
domineering man,' Muga6e said at the time. .I told him
I would box him if necessary.' Having said that, though,
:
, Todd did at least offer hop! to the Africans. The issues
overrrhich he was deposed and replaced by whitehead
killed that - and the belief that any progresr could be
qnade lhro.ugh the channels of the'iapfrcorn society;
, lhrgugh 'civilised inter-racial conta.t' ar the whiter pii
it. For the nationalists
', ,
" 19 look elsewhere forTddd's overthrow meant they had
a means to change. Nathan
', -shamuyarira, now Mugabe's Minister of Iiform"tla;
i recalls that the failure of inter-racial contact, culminating
, ,. ,in Todd's rrrnorui rpu*n.J r.rious, hard-line national-
,;,', 1q1O.
,, ,.1
' most powerful reason was that such contact pro-
lTh-e
',.,i' ' voked no response of encouragement from the bioad
' , wtrile we sat at the bottom end of town deliberating about
32
in public when discussing politics. Unlike its predecesso$
the CYL did not request recognition of black claims,to
equality and a better standard of living by the Europeans.
It simply challenged their authority.
That same year it organised a boycott of the buses
which carried Africans from the townships to work in
Salisbury. Once they had been owned by blacks, now they
had been taken over by whites. And they had rdised the
fares. At the largest public meeting for years, in
,,' Chamunika square in Harare, the CYL won widespread
, support for a boycott. It worked. The government began
subsidising fares.
In Rhodesian terms, it was a great victory for the CYL
and its policy of challenging rather than asking govern-
ment.
That success encouraged others, In Septenlber 1957 a
national movement, the African National Congress
; (ANC) was launched. It brought together the CYL and
i: the ANC of Bulawayo, which had bean started in the
1930s but had since lapsed into inactivity. Chickerema'
was not chosen as leader. That went to Joshua Nkomo,
a Methodist lay preacher and a one-time leader of railway
33
 authority was exercised.
o''t:,:
'What we are asking for immediately is therefore direct
, ,participation in the territorial legislature and govern-
: rnent. Ahd we ask not as suppliants
,' .,1 , but as people who
'::1,',"',
; know fteir rights cannot indefinitely be withheid from
them.'
',1:'l ,' .. , It wasn't very long before the ANC started winning 'It is a very ancient tradition of the British people
::: ': gonverts in both the urban and rural areas..In the tribal that governments should defer action against subversive
,': ,
' ,lands, it challenged the arrogance and contempt with mov€ments until actual rioting or bloodshed has occurred.
'::i'i': 'which the native commissioners treated the black popura-' My government does not subscribe to this traditiori. I
, 1', ,:,"'. tion. When they attempted to 'de-stock' land of iattle" do not think that it would be an exaggeration to say that
-' . ond crops, ostensibly to prevent deterioration pf arable the security forces have always been a little in advance
, coiryrtry, the movement questioned their powers to do so. of subversive elements in Southern Rhodesia. It had
1. : : For the first time ever the commissioners, who up till now become evident that if these people had been allowed to
il:: had acted u fu* unto themselves, were forced i"FStify
- continue indefinitely in the courses, disorder and probr
, .,their actions. ably bloodshed would be the inevitable result. Existing
-' .i,n. Eqcouraged by the ANC, Africans resisted their ' laws were not designed to deal with a subversive move-
:. attenipts to control as they had always done, reported
,. ment which had as its ultimate objective the overthrow
their actions in
i - in the courts. Onedetail and then challenged their pci*ers
party official, George Nyandoro, eren
of all existing authority; and although many prosecutions
were instituted it soon became clear that completely new *
.i ,::'rtook a court.action against Prime Minister Whitehead measures were necessary to deal effectively with the
,,fs1:sTrongfully using the Land Husbandry Act bgainst menace.'
,"1';,;
By the end of 1959, however, Whitehead felt confident '

:,i:r,''t ' Before ilugot to court, the government moved. A state enough of his position to release most of the detainees.
of emergency was declared. The ANC was banned in The ANC was still proscribed, so on New Year's Day
i,,;l ,1.i 1959, 500 of its m6'mbers lryere rounded up, among them 1960 the NDP was formed. Its achievements were to bL
overshadowed by the parties that succeeded but it remains
3s

i:1 , , , tanOry and I.and Apportionment laws, the NDP focused
'igl,.r,:. '9n constitutional reform and fundamental political
t:.- lhange. No loriger did the nationalists demand that
;I''1 ,
'.i;til:,:li;'.Alncans be treated tatrly
Africads fairly and reasonably.
reasonably.'The
I'he demand
l#,fniiri'aow was the abolition of the constitution which auto--
.,":,
,.'r,, 'We now want to rule ourselves.'
' ';,.1 'They were encouraged by events elsewhere. Men like
,',, ' Miigab were coming home with first-hand accounts of
',,,: :the
change in societies like Ghana; Kenya, Nigeria and
Somalia were rapidly approaching independence.
. ,rr I Britain showed no sign of being ready to intervene in
," dhodesia but the election of John K.nn.dy in the United
r'i States did hold out the promise of a change of direction
ifl
American foreign policy. The advent of Kennedy's
" . thinking that it wasn't their domain.
'new ffontier', the nationalists felt, raised the possibility
, I ,of American pressure on the colonial powers to force
' decolonisation quickly.
lfhe NDP, furthermore, had leaders of some potential.
There-rvas Ndabiningi Sithole, a minister and teacher who
had already produced the best apologia for the nationalist
cause, a book entitled African Nationalism; Herbert
Chitepo, the first black Rhodesian lawyer who had risefi
' from a mission school education to force a change in the
'Land $pportionment Act that enabled 'him to have
chambers in Salisbury alongside white lawyers; and
Mugabe, fresh from GLana, fun of ideas and confidence
,in tfre black man's ability to'win and use 'one-man one-
vote'.
36
held its first party congress and he was elected publicity'il
i,,
secretary.
' I ,i/i l
t't
,t From this relatively humble position, arld within p ::'-
;:' matt€r of*months, Mugabe proceeded to carry out a ";
tl major cornerstone of policy which was to be of lasting ;
i;',' importance to the nationalist movement in the years: ..' ','r'
,
ahead. ., :i "
He'd already been working on it - in those speeches
it 'hett Kutama and to meetings in the townships - even befory.
i was elected to any position in the party. His aim"was' :;r',n;1'
,,' to consciously inject emotionalism into the thinking'of, ,t'ii'
the nationalists. From his experience in Ghana he recog-
' nised that support for the movement would have to rest
. on something more than just intellectual attraction for , ,",, I
;r men like himself. To win broad-based support among all r,'
Africans in Rhodesia, the struggle had to be made part ''' ,:,:,
of the people's daily life. The barrier between politicat .,",. i,
,l activity and all others had to be broken down. The people ,t',, ,
must be made to recognise politics without the taboo of
,,,
,i He appealed to their emotions and to their spirilual. I
i,' and cultural values. He encouraged them, through paity,' .:''
i,' publicity, to value their heritage. For alrnost a generation r',,, '
, Africans had been taught to scoff at traditional religion; '
dancing, food, dress, customs, even names. Drawing on ,' ,.,
'hisexperiencefromNkrumah,syouthleague,Mugabe
began organising the NDP Youth Wing with these ',i
, appeals to search for what he called 'cultural rootsr, ,,,.:,,'.
Nathan Shamuyira has recalled the excitement that
;r, Mugabe's leadership of the youth created.
!"
'From the
---- position
r of
--
publicity secretary,
r--------J ---------J' Mugabe
\ proceeded to organise a semi-militant youth wing, which
; he felt to be a vital arm of the movement. Youth started
influencing and controlling some party activities. Thud-
37
 ti:'ir:|,,t;:t,ji:,1i;.,i;{i.,il;,.r:.i.i,..i, r,l,irr,-,,-,,.,

rn.n8 ;;;*or"o t as,wdned in its ihfluenceon them ur.i,','' i,'i.

6m U ahd ancestral piayers beganto fi ' *hioh itr had,ctearly hadi ar tnr iil; ;i;ffi'..l*tl#,:,,,.I;ii
It.1* more prominently ,thdn before. A public rhieting . Muga6e recogn-ises even today that the church fi;st'',,i,',i*i
jii,'l'Setin*e amassive rallybf residents of a given township.. 1. taughr him {he equality of man, regardless of race, in the. ';: ,i i,;{i
i': ;ltfhe -Youth Wing,.yvith"a srnall executive taking chryge 's: eyes of God. The catholic.churrch alone was prepalsdli.
t' ,,',-.:
:j, ,, of of fifty'trorii:s in'each township, knockedlt every :. to speaft out for that .'
in the e{rly days of the nationalio ,",,':'ig
,,door-on"nits Saturday.evening to remind residents abdut
;ij.. struggle. . ",,,i1,
1,', t,r,*!ings. Nsxt Sunday r4orning, thudding drums, and Even on their *edding day, they admitted to each dther : '.:i1i;i:,i.
,j": f. singing
.,.:,.,'.
'-1-c,---G,
groups
p- - again reminded the residents, until the i the uncertainty of their future together. But 'sally, then ' , ,',,",!'
;t t meeting started. The usual Sunday pastimes of church, ;r and ever since, harboured no doubts. , , ,,;1"i1
.,f"'r,,. .6J611king ani'women:were given second place. The last
,i- 'When I went to Zimbabwe,' she says, rI didn't think': ' '".
!,',,i ,meeting of the NDP, held in Highfield on 3 December i;:I was just going to sit on the fence. I knew *tren i *;; ' -'"i,
t;;':;,,, ' 1962, was proof
of the ernotion that had been evoked.
::. j
':, ,' ,'' An horlr before it was to Start, every path
A,- fr^rr. Lof^.o i+ .troo rla ola# ,.,^- L.;-^
-^+L
,i,:':'.r *11ed black snake of wriggling bodies heading for the
was one
^-^ huge, She could, however, have scarcely imagined as .they. r
" .j
exchanged vows what that involvement would Oost hei
1
t,r,r,
central Cyril Jennings Hall. At the hall, Youth Leaguers
','oldered attendants.to r:mov: their
and Mugabe. she, like him, was to be imprisor.d for her ',;' ::',
_.
, $oes,
ties andj.ackets, political activities. she, along with him, was to suffer,the I , : ; ":
..'r:.'.,' '.a,s one of the first signs in rejecting European civilisation. traumatic loss of their two children- in infancy. For years
, lVater served in traditional watir-potJ replaced Coca- she was to know her husband only through his l.tt.rs ,'. ,

Cola.kiosks. By the time the first speaker, a European jail. Nineteen years later, witfi Mugubo', triumph .,
i, . in bare feet, toot the platform, the whole square *ut u from
in the 1980 election, she was to remark siinply: lln nine- ,,
sea of some 15,000 to 20,000 cheering and cheerful blaqk
f"i.,
teen years of marriage, we have had six"togither.'
',fagcs. The emotional.impact of.such gathtirings " By the-tiine of their marriage,
'-,; n, went far thb NDp i", plr.ruing. : r,:;
r'.,.i ,' beyond claiming to?ule the country - it was an"ordinary
;qran's.participation in creating something ngw, a. new
a new policy of trying to force Britain to curb the extreml ' ,,'
actions of the white government in SalisLury. Britain
,',.Eation.' ' alone, the leadership felt, could force the w-hite, into
,.' Because at the outset Mugabe had-intended only to
rlpdy a tempoiary visit to Rhodesia, Sally had returribd Now ihe Fg.reign brnc. orguni*d a conltitutional ' t,''
,' to Ghana. Now he wrote to her, asking her to join him
1, in:Rhodesia'and marry him there
confeience in $alisbury under the commonwealth secre- ' :

tary, Durrcan Sandys. The NDp,'now led by Nkomo

l'1,., ',On 2l.Fetiruary l96i they were married in the simple, :,r who had returned in November
1960, represented the
,' white-washed Roman Catholic Church in Harare. It was nationalists. The deal that Nkomo, Sithole and chitepo
, .a formal ceremony. He wore his favourite black suit, Sally
iia'pretty accepted was to leave lasting doubts in the minds of.
'i, white *.bding dress she had brought with hei. : subordinates not only about the intentions of the British , , , .1",
'Before they were married, they took instructicins --butaIsothecommitmentandabilityofNkomo.The
together. Sally converted to Catholicism. Over the years whites wanted the last vestige of British rure removed: ,l
,:'since they have stopped going to church, but thht doesn't i. lhe resOrve powers which gave whitehall the right to veto
38 39
 discriminatory legistation, Britain, for its part, wanted.
',:ff:#TillJ"#il?"ilfi il;#ffi ;;'iit"i;;i;;;;iirl
The package satisfied them both'
il,,tuttbnafly.
There was to be no further intervention by Britain in
:rt,:,,,'
'r'Rhod.ria,s constitutional affairs. In reply, the whites: ,

i 'gave- the blacks l5 seats in a 65-member parliament. On

i,','Ihe b-asis of this, majority rule was decades away. Never-
" iheless, even to Duncan Sandys amazement, Nkomo
accepted it.
i: . But his subordinates didn't. Takawira, by then direct-
ing ifr. NOp's external relations from London, ltf-
' . gri**ed his anger. 'We totally reject Southern Rhodesia'
. ' Ionrtitutional agt..*.nt as treacherous to future of three
inittion Africans. Agreement diabolic.al and disastrous.
outside world shocked by NDP docile agreement. we
have lost sympathy of friends and supporters. unless
you take firm-stand .. . future means untold suffering
and toil. Pray you denounce uncompromisingly and reject
unreserved tonference agreerpent. Demand immediate
' reversal of present position. Future of three million
Africans depends on immediate action''
Within five days of the conference ending, the NDP'
executive met and overturired the leadership's agreement
to the constitutionally coinplgx franchise arrangements
under which the black MPs would have been elected. It
' was a fierce, at times noisy, debate lasting four hours.
frfuguU. spoke out bitterly against the bargain struck by
. Nkomo. It *ut a sell-out, he said.
, At his insistence, the NDP executivd had told Nkomo
get an equal number of seats for blacks as for Europeans.
ilothing less. How could Nkomo have accepted such a
defeat, he asked? | In July that year Nkomo returned from a trip to London
Nkomo was furious. He left the meeting muttering
threats of action against Takawira, and Mugabe'
40
board. Out in the tribal areas, they would call people frory ' : ,,,",,i,',',,'ji
t
the villages out into the open bush. By the tirne the police ' ,:tl':ii
r, arrived from the nearest town the meeting was either over ' ':", ,i.i,,
.= or if it wasn't the NDP turned it into a perlectly legal
i' ':';,,,i
party.
By now Mugabe was not just attracting the attention.r
of Nkomo and other NDP leaders, he was also coming
under the watchful eye of the police special branch.
In April 1961, the public at large heard of him for the
first time. The Salisbury newspapers reported aherce row
between 'a Robert Mugabe'and the police at Salisbury
airport. The police had accused an NDP supporter of
carrying a weapon on the airport grounds.
'We are taking over this country and we will not put
up with this nonsenseo' Mugabe told the police.
It was a first hint of what was to come.
with bad news. He had, a conversation with a junior
British minister, the Duke of Devonshire. The duke had
told him that, because of the large amount of British
4t
 ri;-r,r. ,, 1_l ,,.1r,,,.,.,,i

Britain wouldl not'han{ over I 959,; ;the' niitioqelists

. power to the'Africans. It 'feared political instabflity too
i .much.
The NDP's reaction was immediate. No one mentioned
,,the word''war', but the executive agreed on a strategy
, , to make British investors and companies realise that their
:' holdings in the country would be endangered more by
' the political unrest that would inevitably grow with white
rninority rule than by an uncertainty created by Africans
,coming to power
, I[ was left to Mugabe to announce the new NDP policy
of 'positive action'.
,'Europeans,' he said, 'must realise that unlesi the
legitimate demands of African nationalism are recog-
nised, then racial conflict is inevitable.'
In conjunction with this, publicity secretary Mugabe
announced a campaign of self-denial which would indi- Mugabe was sent to a tribal reserve about 50 miles from
cate, he said, the willingness of the Africans to make salisbury. His home was a mud hut with a tin roof. An
sacrifices to achieve their goal. English professor, claire pailey, saw Mugabe during the l'
Fasts were organised and there was a boycott of the restriction period. i.
bper halls in the townships. At NDP meetings shoes were
removed - a symbol, it was said, of rejection of the white
'o 'I.was engrmously impressed by him,' she says. .The:"

man's custom.
On 3 December 1961, Mugabe told the 20,000 support-
ers at a rally in Salisbury: 'Today you have removed your
shoes. Tomorrow you may be called upon to destroy them
altogether, or to perform other acts of self-denial.
'If European industries are used to buy guns which are
aimed against us, we.must withdraw our labour and our
custom ind destroy those industries.'
Language like that was enough for the government.
Within six days of the meeting the NDP was banned, its
, qylit-y post apparent was his inteilectual rigour. ff. had
thii ability to listen to argument, then disslct it, tut. .n
to bits.
'His politics at this time? He struck me as not so
i' a doctrinaire-Marxist ;nuch
' but an old-fashionJ ar.i.un
nationalist. Even then I would have put him among the
Later Mrs Palley saw him holding a meeting with party
--irrl-
supporters. Alreaijy, she says, nI nao a.i.ropri
'collectivist' style which was to be a hallmarf of his'
leadership in years to come. -- ,

;
ftrnds and vehicles were seized, its leaders prohibited from
addressing any public meetings for four months. . .'Everything was thrashed out by everybody. Mugabe
' As his language had showed, however, Mugabe and himself wds a very good chairman. . . was very d ;;J
the NDP were prepared for it this time. In contrast to
at keeping order und ,.ry fair with ,il;i G*r,'gil;; ,,
them a hearing.'
' ,the confusion which followed the banning of the ANC But Mugabe at this stage racked the confidence to" t .

42
43
:,r ,.., .:.':\' ,..,r : ,::. ,,, ,1., ; I:
,,;.i alsoume ihe leedership
the'party needed sordesperatelyr in
tho face of the government crackdown. And now the
', qctions of Joshua Nkomo, his initial indecisiveness and
", then his ill-conceived strategy of leaving Rhodesia, were
:i ,to undermine seriously whatever attempts the nationalists
made to regain ground.
The ban on Zapu and the restrictions on its leaders
r' found Nkomo out of the country. This had been the case
when the ANC leaders were detained in 1959 and it was '

, to be a characteristic of Nkomo's political leadership that

"his emphasis on international support rather than con-
,rsolidation of his domestic political base meant that his
: international reputation as a leader of the nationalist
struggle *us corsiderably greater than his domestic
following. His international activities and his frequent
absence from Rhodesia meant that he avoided detention
several times when most of the other senior nationalist
leaders were incarcerated in Rhodesia.
On the day of the ban and the detentions, Nkomo was
in Lusaka conferring with President Kenneth Kaunda,
on the final leg of an international trip. He was due back
in Salispury within a day or so. Nathan Shamuyarira
recalls: 'It was expected that Nkomo would return home
at once to give leidership to his followers. Inste'ad, after
a few days hesitation, he decided to motor to Dar+s-
Salaam despite being advised against this by the national-
ist'leaders in Zambia.'
Only after the repeated urgings of other nationalists
and after another member of the Zapu executive,
Ndabaningi Sithole, had flown from a conference which
he was attending in Athens to talk to him, was Nkgmo
'persuaded
that he should provide the moral leaderqhip
required by returning home and facing restriction with
the others. Nkomo did. But his inability to make a
decision and stick to it cost both him and his party dearly.
Bgfore the restriction period was finished he summoned
.'tlhe.Zapu executiveito the Somukwe reserve near Plum-
M
 r.j,r'

'ii,, r aftacted Britail for abandoning' ttre blacksf in nrrJlsi"

i i'i,ari( sajd: ,ihe They decided,
gg thw *"ri:pU"i[e,
eumn can go to hell., !r themselves,
to
she had already been senlenced totwo years
(t5
imprison- l}11"P1::.1.,1+pola.ni,.iroourrs*menrNveretlii
had apparentry oqo*irrd Th.y;;;;;"br:il1f;':ff
,',fT:Pjj}_qtr*".e
',1"i,to her refraining from T:linu
of it suffiari ,uuju.t o,:i:-r;rulaam.
politicar activity)'Iri; she was :fl,J::l:
surprised, indeed amazed, .Nr.*r. told them;iiil" was
baillendiri u"-uppeal.
,

,*' , -rel.egsed on
,;r'ir: Nkomo had arso been arrestid and charged for holding Rhodesia. It was very "iitrir decision ,o i,lfl.t
ill-ai"iJ.
a-.meeting.in the town of Rusape, east r?nu.'.
;r ,t too
;,,. of Su[sbury. He _"1]::::,Ly:: .qr91:nce in Dar-es_saruam aori i
; '
waited on an appeal. welcomed. rhe fundi wrrien Nr"*" nJ i"riitJffi ifi
,,',
Again Nko^Tg changed his mind and tried
to go against ffi:f fT aii,o ti-;;;iuii-,f'rn y
,th. wishes.of his exec-utive.'This time he succeeded. In didn't even
"11:l:gtl.-::
have-enough money to house ,,
i'l r" and their families, let -alone ,t. .**iffi,
lleeting lasting five days, he persuaO.J tt r*;;;;; ,tL ,urfr-;;-O* ffi;;;
equipment back to Rhod*iu.-
tvtug"u. *ur'uffi X';
led the depressed. cut off from-tt poiiii"ar
Y:t?h. opposition ulong wittr-ratawira and . movement which he
rirthore, insisting that whatever thelunishment felt he should b: bu:t r,glrr rrs#;;,
of stayin! and sense of betrayal by Nko_Jt ffi'ffiration
' rt.rft f";;i;;;;
.rather than allow them to brtirr, ,rilv *ei"
Jnwilling to
made no secret oriis uhiriri";
In May, when a six-man iip team
Ni;; iro ioir: ,

, make the sacrifices they il"J rrg.a on

others. Ababa to lobbv support from thebrganisation went to Addis
Nkomo herd the trump card. rt n"oi;;;;;rnrd
from unity (oAu), Mrs"u" ofAfrican
I trjn overseas. It was, i" ,"i0, the view of Nkomo. He had more
,-, leaders and president the African than just 9r,"ii;G;
reservations abour-N?;,ilb;;;;:
Nyererere of T;g;;vita i, par_. -*u, ii.' kn.*
, ticular that they should they were wrong' ttrat Ntcomo
leive Rhodesia;;? dht the Field set on a course ,to
government from exile tt disaster' sithore;;o
,tuy and be ,r.uni.O iffi;; fr5"*"".J,rJ*rbd him. But hest,l
"r,
the detention that was inevitable. Iacked the power and tt. p"riti"'" to get rid of Nkomo,
Mugabe's finar impassioned plea fa,ed. ,T*i9,:::1, ;i ;.0 uo u n so ved d ou bt.
His disappoint- !l.y*,i"oe,."ri"inry
The views orihe l, _l; r
ment at Nkomo's stance was eased only
by the tefief that *r.ln;iin"i."tT.,, ,,,
if their allies in zambi" uoo r"nganyika wanted
them go home and organise, show
to leave, they must. H. [rr* war was inevitabre iri"t yiu t'#iil.l rooo* ,
to fight the strugglg.lng then wL
you. - ,
:,'
; and he knew that Nyerere "t..uayand Kaunda
;rH iliJ; ' Evcn Nkomo
cotildn't
will assist ,:j.
the outcome of that war with the t.fp
tt eV ;AG;;. r*irt tt. pressure now. when',
: :,:

Bu_t-for the Mug4bes the trip was particularly

danger-
they returned to Dar_es_sri""_
ifu;;;;'iil;r?r# ..,
ous.'Not only were both he and saliy on uuiiJJfiable
for arest if they. were caught attempting to f"urr.
51lrgl .Tllilg rrim tlat r,.-.rrt return il-ilffiffi ,;::

Now. at State House. Nkomo .un.rll.a

S.ally rvas well inro a dilficul, pr.gnu;r.y.-ii.v
already lost their first child at uirth-a y"i,
rr"o and went back. It wasn't totai 1^;6J; frgn ru"i" I ,,.,

befoi arro sacrifice, he *"rioping .

he could ward ofr the-pr;;r
the constant moves and threat of detentiln
** *a$ng ;f ire .reberr, rit. rriBg&[s : ,,,. ,,,,,

rhis second pregnancy equaltv pr"ui.*"ii,

;;; $ily.
'and sithole to remou. tirn.
a plot - Ierters which Eddison
rt.*
he found evidence of , ,1,

'M ZuoUeo, il;;;;;"? ,

47
 H..,:,1[d.,**1.rye o{ the party for l0 eugust. .
when the rebels heard they countered imriediately..,.ti,
.r.;-
Two davs before it, a *", .riled ;';'# f,l"#; . -'* lt
'ni.ting Highfieras.
of zapu mititant Enos Nkarain
presented as the leader of the new
iiitrorri#; :r'*, tl'i
biear.u*uv puil,;h;
Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu).' r'1'r' ","
While Nkomo was.to-spell out a policy ,:
of isolating , ,,riri;,
the government politically and economically,
pressure on Britain froin the international
tiiffi,,' ,-",,ii,
.,..,,i;

zanu was to dedicate itself from the start

,6--d,iii,
," ,tJ##, ., ,1,
struggle. Littre did any of them, Mugabe inci;d;;:
just how long it would take ihem to r.utiil, ' ..,,

a reality. make ,t.- uil;i , - ,;

,struggle r ,,,,:,

,:""q,ber, with the baby just three months old. the

Py :

Mugabes made up their minds..They both

imprisonment if they went back and, muct
faced ,.itrio .

s"rrv, ,,,i
detested the idea of separation, she did ".
not ,.riri it# ,
,

Mugabe insisted that ihe could not go with

him. sh;. ,,'"'
would take the chilg to Ghana, to heriarenti
go home to a Rhodesian jail.
il;il,
wv*^t ' ,,r',

,l,l
The same month he reiurned to salisbury.
with hi; ' , il
was Herbert Chitepo, who was to ugt
tris fawye;.'ri; , ,:
was arrested on arrival and remanded-":in l

custody until
E^rL' ,
his trial. It lasted from January until March'lgii. , ,, ,

Yugu-u9's speeches from the iock rtu"J u, ' ,.,'

to his dedication to. the struggle throughor,
tt."irrtilony
r"rg vJari ' ,,,
of imprisonment that followed. . .

" He refused to retract any of the subversive statements

he was accused.gf, He ripeated tit
governrnent would declare
*u-inilil.ril
uDI, he denoun..oio..
the.'hanging' clauses in the Law -oi.
insisted, as he was sentenced to 2l"rOOra.;;.;;;;;
months, ,t", fr.i"'i
not fled Rhodesia to avoid the charges. --.-, ,

'It was necessary in the interests or tn. nation thut

Il',',
speedy action and left,' he told the court.
.too-k
hadtosacrificeourpersonalintereststotheintere;';i
rirJ;rr' ',
49
 i,tji;,
,,. ;

Chapter 3 Prison
-
lot ll fears, beginning with his arrest on his return tol:,
salisbury from Dar-es-salaam in Decemuer rgo3-;ii
ending in December 1974 with the .detente,- ;dld ,
Mugabe was to speng almost his every moment
b.hi;;
the bars of Rhodesia"s jails ar;d deteniion .rotrrs--'-"-- '
It was notjust frighteningrv fon.rv, uui in trr. il.ginniog
nomadic as well. Mugabe *ur rnor.d time
-i;;i
and ugui"n
prison to prison ur ihr government tried
to prlvent the
i fl:tu of nationalisr-.btocks' in *. "I;;;;1"iil,
He started off in salisbury prison,"rv was moved to wha
wha detention centre near the midiands town or c*;ro,:
,
then transferred to sik-ombela jail at
eue qr.. o"rv ii
1969, when he was taken to Salisburj, toih.
sec1i9.n o_f_ the prison, was he to know unytt
,;il;
-lil;
ing
J-----'
stability. He remained there for eight years.
- Mugabe himself says it is imposiibre for anyone who
being moved so frequentry. 'It rerieved the tedlunlH;
made us all so much more uncertain and frighi.;;a .:.
from whom we had tittti oi no information as to what ,

was in store
for us.,
,

Whatawaitedthemattheendofthelongrideinan
enclosed prison van were the most severe tiring
condi-
tions. At Wha Wha, Mugabe was kept along ;fih
;;il;
political detainees in a daik, squalid cell. A b"uckeitr;t,e
corner served as a toilet for half a dozen men.
BV day
the cell was unbearabry hot, by night often rr,rir*]i
cold. There were not enough beis to go round
uoa tnry
had to take turns in sreeping on the floor. si"tr"r',
followed inevitably. some aio ,ot survive, locked'rrX ,

50
5l
 ,t,] ,,_j3,the fce,of this,
M_uA*birove'deeperatity:to i*f&" ,
who barricaded themselves inside died in
morale-not onrv i, r,i*srii ui,t ur*in the blazes. Mob ,..1i
i,, ; P_95irliy,and
'.-, :*€ meh who would one day join
rule had taken over in the African.townships of
sarisburyi, .l#
, him in freedom and
#iil#l#:fl"f#::
and some of the triuriir*t i;;r a'FY , ,lrj;
where tr,. purtiJi"#J
t
""lrri,r.rr.".*ir.;rirffi
it',.i-ry.f
rl, t*Iil,b:ll]:: with the authorities _ a way of keeping
been winning support. .-- , i,,*
'- " ,.,ii
The government was prepared to stand back
alive y$.'I u,. .*.iryire i.ai*I3r and let
!p|, lit-11?1 iiffiI[:,: ithappen. The inter-paity warfare, ,o ring;;;;; , t.: f,
iriii, n.*rll as establishin-g his leadershipF potentiat
.i;;. " fellow inmates.
rvrv--r wittr tris confinedto the African communities, reini"r..d-tt"i, ,,':,.:
argument that the Africans were simpry not capabr.
i:r*, ,_iI" wanted political status at his trial in early 1964
on
o, ',,:
worthy of having any role in running t-t. .o.rrri-ry. t :, , ,:,,:ir1;;,
::,'.*l charges. And he wanted the same ior a[ the Mugabe was dismayed, indeed fearful of a total.tiluor,
":subv.ersion
_.., ,,i1i3i11s. frst he was hetd in SarisU"rt;i;d,;;;;
{t in the movement. But at sikombela detention
,.,r,,:;

common criminals, r
,i;;.:, , he was not allowed to ,tuAy uira ni, saw the opportunity to reverse the course "rniie'rrJ
to disasr;;.:.- , rt,.ui:
ii:r;:;t:;: aode-ss to reading material was limitea. rt r*gh constant Sikombela had been specially chosen fo, tfr. gr;*l*
aomytlaints, ard- bi.kering, he, obtained the status he ,,,,i,,,
i:',,:;,,i:,:'

, ,., by the time he was moved the government

number of detainees. At first it was barbeo wire
right off the dusty, humid and inhospitabie
eicbrffi ' :

_Y111,.d 1n9
. . ,y1 *.grnnrng to concede that men like Mugabe could bushland north of Gwelo. The government built
a;.-h;" , r,.,.
,
i,' bu kept aparifro- tte c.iminals, in 'political wings, homes , .,,i;,
of for guards. It left the prisoiers to malce;#-;;
their jails. 1!e ,,!,)
mud huts ' , .,,,
,.'-,i'' , ' Nevertheless,the government had effectively crushed They had already built most of them when they
'1:,,;: "
the natioqalist mov.irrnt" 6y the simple tactic heard - ,j'
of arrest- Mugabe was on his way from Wha Wha. In his'h;;;
, ing their teaders. within tnr#rnon;#iil;;;be,s the zanu detainees uuitt him a to*" oitir'o*o ,4 i , ,,,;,,
:;t,: ia,psrly I50 zapu arrest, .

ua
iiiijeaders were detained. Two ,
,i; r trionths later Nkomo was sent to a detention
thatched'daga' hut with a door made painstaki"dr-*d :,ir
.They pur him nexr to his ment*,
centre at
' ' 9:_lakudrtngwa, in south-east Rhodesia. finatty, in June
,
f..dr.
Takawira
top;il _
,.
1964 Mughbe. was joined in priso, uy sirrroii
r.,'
' .' same subversion airurgr*. ' ri"irg irr. A meeting of the zanuexecutive was calred as Mugabe "
arrived, He took the floor to deliver the first
or;;;; ,r ,.
,

August the goulrn-.nt banned both Zanu speeches in detention. He offered them only
and
-In and arrested the few militants stifl at large. hard ;;;i
Lapu
t T.g* them and sithole Mugabe and the faith that they would succeed. ' -*.' ,'.
-, , learned ofit . airurr"y They should not expect quick release, rather years
" , and the wrangling that was t i*ng the nationulirt ,

places Iike Sikombela. They should nor

in ; i.
ment apart. There was now, they said, open warfare -ou.- .*p..iit r ;;; . : .

,,,., , -tlefweenzanuandzapu. The anger which the nationalists

!origeintheirsupport,itwouldtakeyeirsi;;d;;,
: boI9anarmythatcouldthreatenthegoverrrmerrt.-
had previously channeueo-ug"-i-;J ,t,,
,t.'," wirs how turnld back on thJAfrican .o*,nunitv.
ffi; iliilrd; They must have faith, however, in thlir auilitv
to win, '
i1" ' majority rule, and independence. In the *.urriir- -.',rii ',,i
$r9ups of supporters of both parties fought frequentry, therefore, th.y had to,se thri. time in prison,;;;;;;
g1|"]-1lenttV, The homes ofrthose who had openty allied . ,

,. , forliberation..Thesemonths,thesey.u,,,t,o*.i.-i";;
themselves with one side or the other were
,,'j burned, ;";; it takes, must not be wasted,; he said. ;, , . ,i, r

52

.
ii1'r;. 'de,gree through a correspondence course from the Uni-
rrcrsi3y of London. His own timetable was as busy as it
;i,,' ,r,'[a.d evdr been in his days as a schoolteacher. He was
ri.r , , studyrng himself and spending hours teaching, encouiag-
ing and correcting others.
-'One of his fellow detainees there, who taught in the
.,,-;rnoroing and then received tuition from Mugabe in the
,,, "t-'afternoon for an English GCE 'O level' examination,
'' ,rpalled years later: 'It was the first time that I witnessed
. Fperson turning the nights into days. Mugab-e would read
, 'and-, t1rye thioughout the night - ;
,.,t' .'
,', Th-;;t- surr.ir" he wouLl simply wash and join thr
1,,r', otl.rgrs in.the daily roufine of washingplates and getting.
,'tl - ready for inorning classes.
'i' .,, ,.
rEvery'morning there was a hush in and around the
'. whole=camp. Occasional visitors werq even advised to
:, , , ' ,cbrle in theafternoons in order to leave time for teaching
The roltine, the orderliness and self-discipline Mugabe
;"; : ,' preached at Sikombela has remained his own hallmark.
,'.::' o this day he maintains the practice; which he started
,,,',' during detention, of rising at 5 a.m. and doing what he
,rr,,'1,,--oalls'my yoga': a combination of calisthenics and medi-
t::l| t tatton. His censorious attitude towards smokers, which
54
howeVer, ease the harsh living conditions. The pqor ,t'',,:;:t,ii.::i
*quality and the lack of variety of food took"a toll of ,:.'iil
,', '
everyone's health. The prisoners cook-ed ttleir own food . ',i"
from rations which were brought to the detention centre ,l.':i
*by the police, usually on Fridays. If,they were lrcky; they ' ,i
got a small amount of meat which"they would dry in the ",,,'',i!1
sun so they could eke it out without it rotting. If they :,,:', t,,1;l::i,i,
weren't, it was an endless diet of beans and maize-meal
which they would cook into traditional sadza porridge. ."i;i
of prison life that eves tldav Mugabe ",;
:$i:L"r,,Hr.Xu"t
' On I I November 1965Ian Smith announccd ithodesial, ,
l-,'
"if
unilateial Declaration of Independence from Britain.: ',',r'
'.;
The first Mugabe" knelv of it was when security wa'i1 " ,*ti
strengthened at sikombela and he asked the new'ivaqdbrs r,'. ..i,'
why. The Smith regime feared that UDI would. spark ff : . ,,,:,
'an increase in sabotage
and guerrilla activity. An attempt ',.',,..-,
to free the detainecs at sikombela was suspected b the .: l ,l.
authorities. The fact was that zanu and zapu were too : , , ,' ,:;,i,
disorganised to mount any serious challengr to S*ith o, :,.'.1 ,
UDI.
From Sikombela the zanuexecutive set up clandesting ,;, .1',.,
communications to the party militants still at lurgp irr I,,;,i
Rhodesia and abroad. Some of the African warderi, even '.' ',r:l;,'i l,
though they worked for one of the more repressive anns , ,:,"i,:;: I
of the Smith regime, were nevertheless sympathetic to the , ;: ,.,, ' 1
,
cause. They smuggled out letters to the activists. One
'" ,
reached Chitepo, by now'in Lusika organising the very ' ,',' , ,
55
iirl.,,. were ill-equipped and poorly trained and badly led. But
,1',',,,'. in a raid on a white farm near Hartley, just 50 mites from
i,,,1.,, .Salisbury, they killed farmer Hendrik Viljoen and his
'iit,t". wife. Within days they had all been killed by the security
,i.,'', ' for,ces. Zanu glorified the failure by calling it 'the battle
,,-r' ', of Sinoia'. T[at it most certainly *u, nJt. But it was
' I the symbolic starting-poifit of the gubrrilla war for in-
', t, dependence. The penetration of the guerrillas so far into
Rhodesia and so close to Salisbury, backed up by the
willingness of the men to turn their guns on a European,
' boosted the nationalists immeasurably. It also left a dent,
, however small, in European self-confidence. It was a
measure of the.panic which the Sinoia incident produced
among the Europeans that shortly afterwards the govern-
ment transferred the Zanu executive and 30 other Zanu
detainees to the remand section of Salisbury central
prison.
: Mugabe and his fellow prisoners might.have expected
conditions to improve in Salisbury. Instead 40 of them
w€re'held in four communal cells designed to take half
that number. Again there were not enough mattresses and ,]t'
for months many of them slept on cold, concrete floors.
''
And againMugabe insisted on discipline and education . r ,i 'l

as the only answer to the tedium and ha'rshness of pfison

'life. He pushed ahead at a furious speed with his own
'., ,,t -.

study. It was no idle or indulgent acquisition of university

qualifications. When asked by friends why he was study-
'ing so hard, he would say: 'I do it for myself and
.56
 : ' ,One rnorqing he was supmoned to:gn interview room.
r
'Tony flradshaw lof had undiagnosed diabetes, a condition which. even,it ;.lttti{i
,There he. found Inspector the " most cursory medicaloexamination u ,.
would have Jri[t.al .,,f1*
,Rhodesian police special branch, a prison guard and his
sister Sabina. Tears were running down her cheeks.
In the six months prior to his a."tr,-r.[;;i;;;;dil
fell frorir 195 to r45 poundr, uuiit. prr*, o*i",
,,ltiii
She told him that his Son Nhimodzenyika had died it was a psychological .;;aitio;r.
r"-iri.j ;..iji
'orrt''r'""r,:'.;ri
'ftom enGphalytis - cerebral *uiuriu --;ffi; il*. or
Sally's parents in Ghana. Sally's sister Esther, a doctor
Mugabe's anguish and dismay and the death of
the bov 1'',...! 1,

and the ensuing row over whet-her he ,t ouiau" :i

hersglf, saw- the baby in hospital. .If from the very was rarely shown - certainly not to the prison
;;;;;;
beg4lning, the baby had been strong, he might havi and only occasionally ro his fellow priro*rs.
dr;f;;;ir* ,,.il,l"
survived. But the difficult conditiors und"r which he was himself into his study, burying his sadness in
H;-il; ,,lti
conceived and raised made.hiqr particularly susceptible tris il;;: 1ir;'
mination to survive. Now Sally-, who left ct ,;il
to any infection. death of the child, was to helf him. """ "n;i. - -- . ;,tiii
, ':, .. does not cry easily. But he sobbed openly
"
',,,
-Mugabe
when he heard the news and could not be consoled for - Deprived of her son and of the companionship of her ,,*''
husband, Sally resolved that she too wburd p..p'ur.'rrrr-
,,. days afterwards. He implored rh;;o;;;r;; ;" allow him self for the time when Rhodesia was free
,, r,,

and would be in need of skilred Africans.

il;p."ir", . ,,:.;,,,
""4 B"f;;;;i; i,..,
his son and be with Sally, however briefly. He was hoping move to Tanganyika in 1963, and, ironically
zlgainst hope that they would grant him permission. ;1il; :,.':

evening of her own rereary fromprisgn, salry

had dined in salisbury with penis Grennan "ni
nou"ri t,,' ,

shaw in the past and had no reason to believe that he of the Arier' -,',,,n:
Foundation. The evening was memorable. The
. "' had any particular sympathy for him. yet Bradshaw also
.
' staffst'::; , iii
to attention as they arrived and anyone .r* nuo-itttl; .:
glun.: of getring served as alr eyes were riveued;H
?" ruv 1,0,,'
Mugabe party. , ,
l
tron. It had been decided that in the evenr of Robert .ueing l'|,;t
imprisoned the ArieL Foundation *"rro proui;;
. abide by, the conditions, and reasoned that if permission . ,,,,r.
' soholarship for sally in London. A number
"' was granted it might give the government some influence
wgre availabre, and when the time came st
or.Jui..i '
,, ,tir,,,
;

r with Mugabe. Nothing came of .ith"r plea. The govern- .t ose to

1$: degree
" in Home at eueen Elizabeth Crff.g " i;ffi; , ,,,'
" Almost every leading figure inzanucan point to some
university Economics, concentiating " ;il;;
and nutrition:'areas of neglect in Rhodesia,s"i-ro;i"i ,
',r,

pqrsonal traggdy durini ti. y.u., of deteniion and war. ;.

societv. she remained in Lo-ndon until itti;;kil;
, over the years many of them have reca[ed them in
, .explaining the resentment and bitterness felt towards the the Runnymede Tryst after she had finished
h., ;;;;;, i ,i
a period of intense activity into *ti.h i?i;: -,
whites. The death of his son was Mugabe's, but .it -.-trt _w_as ,,,
Iike Mugabe, threw herserf with characterisric . .t.,
, qrovoked profound sorrow rather than ing., in him. ffi;:
'

she attended many receptions wiere she *., iliil;i

, Ahger was to follow four years later when Tatawira died members of parliamenr, who shelobbied feiventry:'-;; ,'
,r
u,. b.ruuse of the wilful neglect of the prison authorities. He
, ' times
following them back to the uour. oi Coil*on$ :
,, ,,,
,

.; : ,r
'i 58
59
 ,t

. to continue her case fior Mugabe's release and the future

of her.adop.Fd country. R;t"h* ti;; ;h;;;;;ilil;
.'with'the miliantly Ieft wing,and anti-aparthiid groups
:.$he concentrated on those-in power,
a strategy which
later proved invaluable as the wheels of bureaJiatic red
" tape turned against her.
. . ,As a Ghanaian, and no longer a student, she had no
adequate visa to remain in Britain. Had she been
.Rhodesian the situation would have been different. The
fact that she was Robert Mugabe's.wife was never
questioned, it is unlikely that uiyon. dealing in alien's
' visas had even heard of him. It was a simple question of
bureacracy and precedent. There was no precedent for
her to remain, therefore she should go. She had made
many friends at westminster who collectively wrote to
the Home Secretary, pointihg out the consequences of
deporting the wife of a political prisoner. Eventually she
'was 'without precedent' allowed to stay.
Many of her evenings were spent in London,s libraries
summarising, and sometimes Copying out in full, books .

{or Mugabe's studies in jail. In the early 1970s the The years 1967 and 196g were a low point
Rhodesian prison authorities had imposed i number of in nationaiist
activity in Zimbabwe. The Sinoia .baitle, rruo
restrictions on study material for the-detainees, limiting rr.uitilra', ,t
the nationalists with the knowilge ttut
the number of books they received and forcing them to tt.i, gilrrilas ,,;
surrender thb books to the prison authorities when w€re able and prepared to attacf Europeunr:il'i;;
two years afterwards, the nationarist cause
courses were complete, thus preventing them- being failed ;;"k
gy -t*4way. More guerrilla groups wer€ infiltrat*.ilil,, :.
passe{ on to other detainees embarking on iimilai
courses. The only means around such restrictions was Zimbabwe from zambia Tu*ania but ttre reautil :.:

for Sally to make copies of the references Mugabe were disappointing. "ni
requit'ed and send these copies to him as retters. Blizabeth Many of the fighters were inadequately armbd
and
,)Valston, wife of a Labour peer in the House of Lords, trained. Since UDI the Smith regimi h"ei;;ilr,;;
the- security forces and the rtraight-forwarJ-ffli-d;
baame a close friend of Sally's during those days in
London; problems which the guerrillas faced had
increased. It
i She remembers Sally as 'a quiet power in her own bocame in*eaiingly dlfficult to innttr";;;;;il-;";
right'.
' 'The way shg wrote out Robert's law books by hand 3:::::*:::sl.dttu'gJr,ir,.-a.rt*.,1*"i*"fill'itll
was hoped would serve as symbolic rallying points
to the
nationalist cause. Since the banning oi z;;;
was quite extraordinqy, she used to spend hours *riting
in 1964 and
;"d;"";
60
the detention .o ,"*r"orp"[vlJalrs the
 .,i
r.l': r^ ..

covert civil politics of the nationalists had lapsed into tliat therg would be. ao retrogrepsive amenaror;t d,' ,-:
Aclivists had beerr detained, increased security
.,.J,
trji.'-,,-:
,, ,inqqtivity.
r-ll-l-----J." w=rrL,
i:' . *.. meant that people were reluctant to.be identified in any t" -*l.titutiorr affecting the fositi"" or eiri[ni.if,
zimbabwe.and a vague plomise ttrat there wourd be;; ,
.,,.,

'.'l
,i;,,,'' . '
.'', ' rrrarr.rri+h
way with +Li aarraa and
nationalist cause
the -oii^-oli-* -al *^-., ^8+L^^^
many of who L^l
those --,L^ had rmprovement in the pglitical status of Africans in '
,i,l done so before fled as refugees to Zambia and Tanzania.
til; l'ii; . :In the villages people became more docile arid compliant,
Zimbabwe. The nationiiists had, however, rqi*,.a
the .,,,
196l constitution (after the intitial indecirir.n"r, oi
Nkomo at the 1960 constitutional conferenr. io i"ri*r'
',
bury).before it was introduced and Nkomo
'"i

from that stand now, in 1965.'

v "na--sirroil'
made it-clear towilson.that thcy were not going
--*ii*i
e t,
* ,,
wilson remained- eager to extract Britain from j'.. ,

,,,',::' ,
The Smith regime introduced stiff penalties for failing Rhodesia, particularlv a9 his government's failure
to t"t*
, 'to report the-prJsence of guerrillas. Reiribution was taken any action against the illegal UDI had made nritain
a
,r, . against whole villages when guerrillas were detected in targEt for increasing criticism within the united N;io;
,'.,j an area: the government would take their cattle or drive and the Commonwealth.
--,
- -
,''', ,them off their land. It was a vicious circle for the In 1966 smith and wilson held tarks on board the ,

' cru]yrl{MS Tiger moored at Gibraltar. These"Jf"pff

' \ nationalists: because the level of guerrilla activity was so
low they were unable to offer
-protection
against the and in october 1968 fresh talks wene held on boar.d
,

: punishment meted out to the villages for assisting them,

rinti ,,

learle11, again moored at Gibraltar. On b;th ;;;;

the talks cenrred on the 196l constitution ,Fiiroi
- '
,

not infrequently betrayed them to the security forces. made it clear that Britain would be prepar.i
"nat" grfi
,. ', Against this backgroirnd of a weakened nationalist independerye ol the basis of the l96l-constit"tion,]pius
movement, the Wilson Labour Government, which had some additional safeguards for Africans in zimbaLil.
come to power in Britain 12 montsh before UDI, resumed
, its talks with the Smith regime. \ on the table and an agreement between smiih d"a
to discuss the proposals with their own parties and
*ilroi
;-r",
,,,r'' Smith in a desperate effort to avoid the impending UDI interested groupsr
' on Novemuer
r.,aod in October 1965, a month before Smith made the 7 George Thomson, British Minister ro,
i

.
breach with Britain, Wilson had flown to Salisbury for state without portfolioiwho had speciar ;"$;;-urrr;,
:,,r
, . talks. In Salisbury he had spoken to the representatives for Rhodesia, and Maurice Forey, Foreign -, ,"
,

:,,1' of virtually all political positions in ZimbaLwe. He had "ilb;m

," : even managed to force Smith to temporarily release
'., ' ,'-talk with them. But Wilson's strategy had been to prevent
1., UDI by attempting to reach some agreement with the
l"lirb.ry. There they had ;96;ir"te talk with M;;;;:
Takawira and Sithore. In order to prevent the rooul*"-
tion being _bugged by the Zimbabwe authorities ,h-
walked to the centre of the base and there, una..
,iC, , i'
.

,ll,- , Smith regitne based on acceptance of the 196l constitu- "

Foley and Thomson tord the Zanu representatives-wtili
,i.:,,,. : tion, plus additional safeguards which would guarantee had emerged from the Fearress talks I prr.iour'ii,r[.-- '

62 Nil:-C 63
',r i

people here and in danger, or

to use force, shed some '
blood but.put tr,iner-rifrtl iil;b"r-ffi
courd do anvthing witri the Afric;; "_ s;ripru*,,
could use their military force, detain,them il;-il
hrie thry, ,,
we explain to them that the British
a,. Nor,can ,

t";;Jil
Governm*
cannot use force. They will not believe
*. fii*uril"ni ,'
had been invaded beftre it beca;il;;.,i'*"rii ----,, .
the British have sat back?,
- 'In Swaziland we had an army and a police
replied Thomson. 'we would ha;;ilrry'p-rt for.u,l
,,,,,|!,j:r

ao*il
,

any rebellion. We had an army there., ''-' ,i.,,ri:

:i,i;,
Mugabe, in an effort to clarify Britain's ',ii
refusar do w;t,
then asked: 'Ar.e
Africa would
the prospects as you see them tt
hlre if you used force?, "i
ioi-tii , i";i
'I have no {gt
.i
1
doubt that tt.y *ourJngit. I have
several meetings with South African had :

left in no doubt that south Afri; wourd

oif.i"r; iliffi l,i,l

fight,? Thomson
replied. - ., ,,..,.,

.,
on this dismal note the meeting ended. Thomson and
Fotev flew back to Britain and thi zanud;il;r #; : r-.

. Th. proposals went into timuo. The nationarists made

it clear that they would never consider
:

tt.*r"irJrlo',ilj ' .',.

a3r agreement based on the 196l constitution
!v
the Smith regime baulked at the proposal and .;,r,
,r'I.rf,;l
-""':' ,,.1
appeals to the Prity Council. ,,r:,
In June 1970 the conservative party, '-',')i
under sir.Arec
Douglas-Home, was returned to government
tiations with the smith regime'were and nego- .., ,.

resumed yet again.

time agreement was reached not on
IT:
,

the basis;ffi;
l96t constitution but for independence ,.
base; ;ffi#il
(nore restrictive franchise of i ,',

-v': *r'-' .:i

new republican ,:
tion which Smith had introouceo in tbog. ---- constitu_.,

subject to some sign that the settlement

*ir
t^o^t!" 'people of Rhodesia as a whore'.
u.*ptabre , ,,,,,.

of
A referendwn
African opinion was ruled out and insteaJihoffi; ,,,,

.,,, ,,
65
 b.y va rio us ci rga_-nisari oni ana' ui
P":d *a*,l'i
devio us rou*,
being held,
accounts.
it was ilui*"d, io ,*rir ,r'i" prrr"i. #1;
l

with
n",Pllol,:,lyl,,:::-pntment
hetd on to it until he was .;Gh; in the.his ieadership, he .,,.
instructions encased in il;i;rr?iff
to members of his party ,nf,o, or*pr.-"Ja;;;;anr-,,
"rn!., ttre prison war, , ,
,uy
ror'ttre
,,-

well before the Fearless talks the Zanu detainees, +'#::::"":,::'1":,laiting eites ;;-b"
ilned. l

t:l'Mugabe, were harbouriog ,.iious Ied by

doubts about the
There were also memu"* oitrr"
r;ffi;"i',ril,Jffl"ri -
''; l€adership of sithole. He trai failed
to adjustiol,npriron- 19untl' They confiscated the o*og.r. The fruit had brea ,,'l
',
cut out and exoertry stuffed wittr-iori*iio*
,:' rnent. tle was not only permanently
irritabf., tfr.V sai4 Prime Minister Smiih Jiffi#'',
*;r;; brlrsursinated., ..
r,

his behaviour was abL lrrational to ttre d;;

- ;;il Reverend Clark says that Sitt
oi, *",
tt .nl.unrfrrrud
..,,
,l
-other members of the executive committee conspired to to a cell welr away from the otherr
rit. nirg"i.] ,"n, ii, *^':
l"k:. decisions without him. They ttren p.rr.nJ.a them ji'
ro nlm as tart accompli.
an urgent message saying Clark

F?ffi;re
had to ririt"t i-*
was a changed
*"' ''ri
,'.'

-Maurice
"sho.rtly-after
the bearless talks Sithore suggested to
Nyagumbo, an executive member, un ii*rrunu_
"':ll^T.11,:9*ll,
'The wercome r received *;;;i;h;;,;ffir."riifrft ',,
recalls.
tron.attempt on Ian smith and two other Rhodesia Front 'I'll hang for this,' Sithore announced. .unless
ministers-, Desmond Lardner-Burke and Jack Howman. do;gm9thing to form the Uasis-of I can
j\{.ugrTbo, while intrigued by the idea, said he just didn,t. *y defence., :

it could be carried off. sithore pressed on regard- lilhotr.wanted to send retters to president Kaunda ,.
.believe and Hastings Banda of Malawi,
as wett- as Eni"p" ii
less.
In october
Lusaka. .. :,
1968 he tried to smuggre rettdrs out of 'They were all along the same
i
lsalisbuv j{l lines,, Clark says, .pur_
instructin g zanucontacts in Highfielils to
'carry out his assassination orders.
. ,

heart and intention, whi.f, ,n.unt-that he was

The Reverend Bill clark was chaplain General to all to dispense with revo^rutionu.y t".tics ,r.fJ.f, ,,

, ,Rrfols,in Rhodesia and was one of the *.y f.* to have tions through peaceful mean's.;--'.--
and uwA'rD
*ur4 hir;spira_
ir ;k
to the_detainees ar the #; In 1980,
= Iil,_Trr:S
b.efore the "?*..r l*l*1.,1": q. finished writing them.'
elections, he felt free to talk fo;A; fiist time
.,"h1t- the men he counselled in prison. Y$ do youL'Ijgr:^y.h.,
think?'t. url"J'ffii,fril;: ".'-''
clark said it a[ ,i']'
, - lf'[.$abanr!a sithore, during his years of detention in
seemea rattrer sudden. He doubt.d it
ana ttre oi;;;* " . '
would har're the supporr
of llugabe ,r
salisbury.piison, became o,* and ,ro.e remote from Sithore told him: 'r^am. n*iing
,

',thory of his comrades locked up in the same uroet,'crark produce something

nrr *y-rirr. J Lu* :
i.
of evide-nce i,
r€caued. letters must be put in
tn. Ff _v t;ilr;.'ffi: ,
r,unar q rrrJ'rirr.rJi'irin.t.,
-' 'There were constant murmurings of discontent against ' At the end of January q69
histeadership. Party funds into wlich contributions were r sithrr. *roi il t.iut ,
charged with conspiring ; assassinate
smith.,:The ,. ,t,;
.;,

,''"t 66
67
 :\
.

*?,T.tl^pl3r1l* executive in prison oreanlrrd u,**ii,

lill:: f "*' ry:*
Y:q:T:I:
.'rur$e.{
^P,l:: sitmr",
.
n*1;.i,#ffi
___, i,rl;,U;;;
-vv.Erve rr\rlll ffi
ffi
ffi .Itr
LtIg IEUf ffiii;ft
ulc,:
,

Ti11111
security
$nB,.was approacnrA
the speciar branclu suplrintenffi
Uv ifr;*d ;;
iliiii;uilrrd. iiffi#I,,,.
to agree to a deal whereby
t. *oui*;ffiI;;
l^li",lqT
11::",1"':::.TI::ir*...p".ru!ri"',ir"il"#,#i"d,il:
where he could live in exile.
Sithole put the
they might join lO"uj9 Mugabe and Takawira, hintihg ,'

lir.. now They .iprrr"o amazLment mixed

with outrage. Mugabe i;Iil; Hil;;ilH#
broken completeli UV ttre auttrorities.
'i;i,,:;':,;., ,, Mugabe, told in his cell of Sithole'-s statements to the Aatoriing ,o
Nyagumbo,SithoIi'srLactiontotheirangerwas:.Tfrat,s
expressed dismay at this 'treachery,. privately he
il,:,11, :!oUrt, all right, you have turned down my
I', . was not too dismayed at all. He now knew sithole was constructiu.
tion' But I assure you that I ; not going *g;rl
ii;;:)'finished as leader-of the-party. As Reverend clark the six years in prison. I
to spend all
', remembers: 'There was much rejoicing among Sithole,s 1* goirg to extricate myself., .,
sitt-rore's. prans to get himierf
' erstwhile disciples in the remand section of the prison. - out proved
in prison ind in March igll h,fut,e.
- He
remained
'' ftrry made no effoit to hide their glee. ;;j;;*;
1,:

,t, .
' :' 'They made it plain they had got rid of him forever. Mugabe and the rest of tt. e*r.u;i;.-;;;;ir#il;;
had not yet taken any form"r a;r;;"
:, ' tRobert Mugabe was declared his-successor., from the committee. but yqg"b*as
i'" ,.*o"* t ir"
,: Clark's mernories of Mugabe at this time are very not the undis|;;;
leader of the men-in jail. slthor.
lclear
- he recalls him as a torigh, ,r.o-promising leader
on.. dil;;;posed
Oisuat{ine Zinu, il-;;;rrn he wourd obtain .
f1 .of
guarantees for their release. ---l'* :

, lMugabe,'says Clark, 'was intelleciually ani acaAemi Some wanted him suspended
c{ly a man of strong moral fibre and a disciplined sense Mugabe, anxious to avoid urv -fro*
the committee..,
of purpose. He had long since revealed all the attributes rprii-.Li,,irii'il1.,n"
required of a leader . . . i had every reason to resfect him plPli: and so suggest another;;;'
disarrayl preferrea
Sithole, he said, was .beyoni'tfr. pale,.
during the eight years I was privileged to know him. He was to be
'tle is, without doubt, a horse of true unsurpassed
pedigr-T whom all the other runners recognise as the one
From 1970 onwards the rittre good
most likely to"win the election ra'" ... tre has been received came mostry from M&ambique.
news Mugabe
that :
'descriH as the chosen one. He will not There ;ft; .,r
be side-tracked . much of it in retters saily and
{rom friendil; i;;; , ui:

'His emotions remained unruffled in adversity. He will

enough to teil him what he wanted to tro*. errirrrj ' ,,
the Mozambique liberation frori,.
rule and govern with his h;;el-
steady progress in its^war against
*T ;;ling ,fo* Uut .

within a few days of Sithole being sentenced to six government. By 1972, their guerrillas
tt e rort.rgu;ie cltoniat
*.r."in
,!
68
69
,':
"oii;;i;i
 lt".:
' ,,..:':,'

..1''. .'..," '' r. . .-\ ,." . , , i.'-, .)'+

liue defence was Rlod€sia's-
the.zambezi.
over that ivourd ."y ;d"ra#i"l;&;T'q'Xi"r.ry Anyin"r.rioi I ,, t'
it did in Salisbury. The rnili-tary .':.,,,*
of Gen"ri "s.
in Ljsbon m- _o,;.it ililffi;;d
overnight. No toqs.rcould--tie
spin
"oupir;;r#;#tn"_pr*
gza' , ;,:;,;f,
,;;..:ii!
,

to stand as firm "igainrt. tt,

Fo*ugro. u.r.ii.o upon .,. ., .;i;;
and Angola now it al- rlJ gr?rals euerrili;s i; M;;;;bique r ,",,.::,,,,,,:r,j#
Lisbon' vowins to pu, ttr.iiur*ies were in charge in,, ,,,,iirl;;o:
decolonisr u' out and ,i.,r,,)
as possibre. No longer "iarii.u
'i-on
south Africa's front ri,* Nr* was Rhodesia rri+,

'Mozambique. In,the .i..urri"rces,

it wur"trr" ;;;;;. with . ,,.,;;;;rir
once that he could not affoJio
vorster rearised s1 t,,,),,.r:i:i:
.o*rnit himserf';;"hi- , ,rffi
country ro a war in Rhodesia
own fronr door
withoil;il;il;; ;.i.: ,.,
i*u.ring th, *rrth-oi'hi,
iy,r: Ut"rt , l::
if::m?*:::::^.:y *"it99 n""""
cost: and he was prepared to any
;;;i',ily ,
,*rin i i;fth"i"r*o,,
:,, ,;i.:i,
, ,,i"ri
Sensing yet more ,t,
of change, heTsaid
r,,
winds
",,1f*":T:,::q ".b.d.rr"i, "r'.rrr.
i, erguri1-1iiiil.'?riil t
one, two or ten fril! ,
we are p..purrJ i" ,ra.iirrff;
out " ' settrementl..u.r.,
is desirabre but onry on our
By, October Vorster *ur- r"lking,to--i;;;", t.rrii",
directlv but throrlgh their r.rpr.,i'u.';#ili no, ,

Togetherunw aides.
i:lLl
tions' Kaunda showing3riir,. q'round_pran
,ni-husiasm that
for
belied the
d;il.
economic consequenceJhe"n
of
had suffered from the crosure , ,
his border wiitr RhoOrriu in
igzf.
For the present.th.y ugrr.J";il;
immediate rerease ' -
ofall political detainees, ,fr.LrA
oirfr,,rui. oirirr#A;
and the resroration of iegalr,y
nationalist parties.
,;'r;;ffi;ilft,other
For the fu,ur"l_r.ley drew.up
a basis for talks: a transi_
tion period of five years t.aoi,g;';E""-iy'rul., .

qualified franchise that was u

nu*rnough to one man one
vote to satisfy Kaunda; and
the
to senior posts in both gorulr*r1t
"ppoi,ii*."nioiiTri."n,
a1d- the civil service.
Derente was under,i"v wiiui .

nritrrei vorster nor

Kaunda nor Nyerere heff;;ffi;"# ;:: *"J,
 tl"

ffieffrctive leadlr of Zawinjail, Smith, from his spgcial
bianch briefings, did.. But he wasn't saying. ',
He did, however, give Kaunda's aide Mark Chona a
typically blunt warning when Chona came to collect the
detained nationalists for talks in Lusaka in early Novem-
ber. 'If you can achieve unity,- Smith said wagglng-a
finger at him, 'you can come back and cut this finger off.'
was sitting yet more,e1 ms in the sarne rbom. He iiut,l:,
down his,pgn and joined in. choira produced a leiter,;
from Nyerere, Kaunda, Frelimo's Samora Masfugt; ard.':.,.r
seretse Khama of Botswana, urging,sithole to comeits,';,,
thd talks.
Back in their cells, the executive decided to send
Mugabe and Malianga to Lusaka. After all the years in
detention, the deprivation, the aching boredom, ,the,, .

' Throughout 1974 the detainees were moved several times. humiliation and the fearful loneliness, Mugabe was ,

Mugabe stayed in Salisbury, still studying and reading
mofe and more about the situation in Mozambique and
the collapse of the dictatorship in Portugal with exoite-
ment and fascination. Nyagumbo, Nkala and Tekere
; w€r€ transferredto Que Que-. From there they began to
driven to the airport in a chauffered limousini and put
aboard an executive jet. It was to be a brief taste of ihe , '.',
.other side of Rhodesian political life. ' , .,:
When. they arrived in Zambia, Nyerere could barely
conceal his anger. Mugabe was not the leader of_Zanu, ,
_

'
urge Mugabe to suspend Sithole. If it did come to talks, he said. Sithole was. Mugabe and Malianga *... ,'..1'
they could not afford to be 'saddled' with Sithole as their promptly slsparsne(l
prLluprry dispatched back
DacK [o
to Da[SDUry and jail.
Salisbury anc Jail. i
r, ,.,, :
,r11i!]
leader. Mugabe and Malianga were strongly opposed to The whole process, Mugabe said on his return to his ' ':':,,;;,
the idea, aocording to Nyagumbo. But as word began cell, was a 'sham ... farce'. :,,,;i;
to filter through from Zambia of 'detente', they In the next few weeks he went along with the talks, ."' ",.',',,

recognised the need to move. On I November, the knowing that he could so buy his freedom. sithor€'ro- , ,,;'i;,

executive voted to suspend Sithole assumed the mantle of leadership. But it was no more ,'-, i,:;
than that, as even the president began to realise ,
'' ' ,

The timing oould not have been more fortunate. The :.'
following day.they heard for the first time that negotia- It was at the end of one shuttle by jet to Lusaka that ''i'i
tions w-ere now imminent. he saw Sally for the first tinie in l0 years. She had flown '.
Mugabe, from the first hint of talks, had not only been
bitterly opposed to the idea of detente - he also poured for him, and sally herself hadn't realisedjust what a sirock
scorn on Kaunda for instigating it. it would be. 'I saw him in a flash in the group that arrived ' , ,:
'We wondered,' said Mugabe, 'how Kaunda, a man . from Salisbury,' she says. 'And then I collapied, I fainted, -. ,
'',i
dedicated to pan-Africanism and to our national cause, I went straight out on the floor. ,.- .:
could now hobnob with our enemy.' 'The next time I saw Robert was in president Kaunda,s ; '
The Zanu executive in prison rejected the offer of talks private clinic in State House. It was very moving but
as long as they stayedin prison. Kaunda sent Chona to there was no time. Two days later they took.Robert back
r
talk them out of that - or rather to persuade Sithole to jail in Salisbury.' ,."ri;
beause the Front Line leaders, Kaunda and Nyerere, Not for long, however. In mid-December Mugabe, ,
,
,,t.
j
still believed he wCs the leader of the party. Sithole did along with Nkomo, Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzoiewa' :";:i:

nothing to discourage the idea. Sithole was called in to was released as Ian Smith announced a ceasefire. But
a prison office to see Chona. Quite by chance Mugabe there was no truce in Mugabe's mind as huge crowds ,

72 73
 i, gather,od in the black toqnships to welcome therrr hbme.
",r- iWe had decided to accept detente purely as a tactic
;,,., :- 1e buy the time we needed tir organise and intensify the
,', ;armed struggle,' he said. Chapter 4 Exile
-
word for freedom. Freedom to wage war.
of the forces, knew his life was in danger.
His fears had been aroused as.early as 1973. In .
September of that year Zanu's bi-annual conference in ,

Lusaka had been marked unmistakably by the personal

ambitions of members of the party leadership. There
were few pglitical differences among. them but the lust' I

for power sought a base by exploiting the ethnic com-

position of the party, and especially its fighting forces.
A challenge to Chitepo's chairmanship never material, '
ised, but there were radical changes in the composition ,,'
' ofthe leadership under him at thai conferen@. Zanuhhd
,

always been predominantly made up of Karanga and

Manyika groupings, historically the two rival peoples of
the Shona tribe. Now the Karangas, from which the
central command of the guerilla force was drawn, secured
several key portfolios: finance, information and defence
in the form of Josiah Tongogara. The Manyikas, led by
Chitepo, were left with his chairmanship, external rela-
tions and political,commissar.
For the next year the power struggle simmered, then. '
boiled as the Zanu army suffered serious setbacks in the
field for lack of ammunition, food and men while follow- l'l
ing the orders of a new"battle-plan conceived o*y Chitepo
and Tongogara after the conference.
'The strategic aim is to attenuate the enemy forces by
.causingtheirdeploymentoverlheentirecountry.The
subsequent mobilisation of a large number of civilians ,

from industry, business and agriculture would cause

serious economic problems. This would have a psycho-
logically deyastating effect on the morale of the whites,'
Chitepo wrote in November 1973.
74 75
 , * The theory made sense, the practice did anything but.
By November 1974, at the end of the first y.ur of th"
' ,oew strategy, the Rhodesians were sustaining one loss
:r:: among their own men for every l0 guerrillas kilLd. Barely
'' 150 zinu men remaindd in the noqth-east of Rhddesia.
By taking rhe war to the whole of the .ouniry, ih;il;;
.- spread themselves too thinly and the ronr.q,r.nces were
Mozambique, others in Zambia. More than a hundred'.
The conspiracy, in the eyes of the hunters, had to lead
to C-ryteqo, and his position was rapidly becoming ult-"
tenable..,some of his friends had been executed undli hisl',,,-'
authority, now supporters who had survived accused
him ,;
of betraying them and the Manyika
.

-uet element. ti; ,. ,'t

Karanga group believed he had been ino the rebellion
' The same month there was rebellion. In a zanucamp to remove Tongogara. .,r i,.,i
,'ot chifombo on the zambia-Mozambique border, a During January and February, Tongogarals men
group of guerrillas arrested their commanders, took assumed effective control of the party. c[itEpo was o-y ;,,,,
.

control of the central command;and elected one Thomas
,Nhari,- a law graduate from Salisbury who had joined
" zanu five years before, as their leader. AIi of them were
Manyikas and they were quick to denounce Tongogara,
, a Karanga, for the failurei in the field.
On 9 December Nhari arrived in Lusaka with a gang
' , 9f 20 guerrillas. They abducted rongog-als wife and
this,time little more rhan a figureiread. oa l6'March,h6.. .,,',
told President Kaunda that Zanu was no longer undei :r
his control: his own life was in danger, he sald. wil; ,,,..:
Kaunda asked him 'who was threatening him', he replied:
Tongogara and Hamadziripi. '----' I r, :r.',,
some 36 hours later, as chitepo was starting his car
up at his house in Lusaka, a bomb explodea in'sioe the ,

brother-in-law, then kidnapped thrle"party r."orrs vehicle. It killed him instantly. ,

Mukudzei Mudzi, executive secretary; Kumbirai Kangai,

The murder created serious disarray in both the army
welfare secretary, and Henry Hamadziripi,treasurer. The
and the parly. Tongogara fled to Mozambique, his afliel '
rebel convoy was heading for Tongogara's house when . 't.;
,

to Tanzania. Kaunda was furious and promised.no stone

- it was spotted by Rugare' Gumbo; the information unturnd'in the hunt for the assassini. :--
,.-'.,,:'-
r,,,ir'';''

secretary. He called the police and most of the rebels ''

were arrested.
'Tongogara was despatched to the front to crush the
rebellion. Early in the New year he stormed the &*p
at chifombo: 45 people were killed. His own rorce
- regained
within two' weeks of the murder, he announced
special international commission to investigrtrlii,o.]^
prising of officials from 14 African states. II took ;ffi '
a year to reach their findings. Tongogara was returned
.. ^: .,

control. According to the commission, the Zanu high com_ t,l

On 22 January a committee of three, headed by mand under Tongogara's chairmanship authofrseJG
chitepo, tried the rebels at chifombo. Those convicted
- it took a matter of minutes for some - were executed the Zambians was ruled out.
a few hundred yards from the hearings. Thai wasn't the
Tongogara, to the day of his own death, was to deny
only summary justice meted out. coniinced in their own -
the charge
minds that the Manyika group had started the rebellion
At the time he accused smith, vorster and Kaunda,
against them, the Karanga faction launched a wave of
kidnappings and eiecutions. Some were murdered in
insisting that chitepo stood between them and the,rr."r, -

of their policy of detente. Mugabe was later to :i

76
77
"'gr.r.
 .,.:f t-hink,,it is an act'done through or by direct
participation
. of the Zambian gover"*.rij'n" ,"id ili-gi;.
Jndeed on the?ay u.i"..-i,il;;;;;,^,iri
, . - o..ember
undisputed leader of the party. That was not possible.in
Rhodesia, where he was liable to arrest at any moment.
Now, witb the death of Chifepo and Kaundais ensuing ,.

!9,7.?;Tongogaru "rir.d Samora Mache[';D;y;, believe frry, it would not be possible in Zambia either.
I killd auyone?,
By mid-April Mugabe and Edgar-Tekere'were ready
_.:, . 'The President answered .No.'
to leave. They had enough evidence to suggest that they
could expect hundreds of guerrilla volunteers to follow
if they made the move. They, like other detainees released ,,

in December, had been on secret recruiting drives in thpii

own home areas. The recruits would need training camps

Tekere's commitment to Mugabe was unstinting. ,

'Then, as now, I loved Mugabe,' he was to recall three.

years later in Mozambique. 'I owed so much to him. He
irad taught me so much, he had made me study during
And in the vacuum left by Chitepo,s murder
,,.
r.ongogara's imprisonment, Mugabe was
and all the years in detention.
to emerge as 'He educated me about myself and the struggle" I had
t' the rnain, if not the unchariengei, i;"J; or uott, ir,nv no doubts about going with him. there was no other way.'
and party.
' For MuglEr enjoying some rare freedom in They couldn't go freely, they had to escape. In the end
they literally walked out of Rhodesia. Mugabe was to
, r,r
Salisbury,
the death or cirit.pJ .J.Lin"o with the
triar of sithore make it across the hills into Mozambique in secret, the
, ' to convince him trrut t. t onri on;-;d;;r, to flee to sarne way across the same hills his men were to attack
Mozambique. "a
in the years to come. By car and by foot they reachd
sithole had.been charged, just a week after
the assasin- the border within a few days. Then they stopped at the
ation-inlur:.k1.*itt-r-.""aing an unrawfur organisation,
,," namery- zaiu. The triar *"Jl r days
otJ *n n vorster
Nyafuru agriculture co-operative a few miles short of the
border.
", stepped in to teil Ian Smith that ii.oura
/ the chances onty damage A community of about 3,000 tribespeople had been , '"i.
,

of peace. Smith u".[.0 i"*;;; fighting their own war with the Smith government for , ',.,,'
a$ {ltrin 24 hours Sithore was on his way ioreructantry years. Chief Rekayi Tangwena had ancestors buried on
'
':, , with Nkomo and Muzorewa in Tanzania.' ' a summit ,

the land dating lack to well before the arrival of the first
' -'makers,
he was positively contemptuous. smith, and
whitesettlers.ButthatmeantlittletoiheSmith
Vorster, were simply leading Nkomo, Muzorewa
government. Their lands were in the half of the country :,,1
and apportioned to the white community and they were ' ,.1

,: ,sithole into a selr-oui or tne Afri.rnr.

he insisted, because the true Zanu, ti,
i **ra;iil;l: squatters, the government said. The buildozers movedjn , ,',i
zunu, ivoutd never to knock down the irud huts, the people took to the
: accept it.
help i
hills, eventually they formed a co-operative with the
,'t , First of a[, though, he had to establish himserf as the of British missionaries. ,' :i

78 79
 ;' ,Mi"^oLo' *'
's: r_
.:.-
- f^^-:--- r r ..
:. '
--Y:g',h.y.T-f?^Y""'*.
.two
of the
--
bv it. Hg and Tekere spent One strong leader, recognispd another. Each approci;.
; , I?,yTtjhrry, most eO.."iion.t weeks of
my life?, Mugabe later recalled- Th;t;;;J, ated the other's qualities. It was not quitethe attiaitimt',
;h,ir*,i, of opposites, rather an uncanny, indifinable sense they '
$r::::*:11!:'o-op"i"ti1 1"*, J, ;;;i:
A group of
in late April.1i;*:
jl'fl-":'1T Fr d;dq;
,,, #fffiL'T*'H-l
I,,',' Still, Machel at this stage was in no position ts offer
,r,.
:lldsht fte route tt ry toot ;;; *t ;h; Mugabe anything qrore than a safe harbour. In addition, ,;
',:
'easiest way into the
iili;;l,.', areas.controlled ui ttre Frelimo army
the Mozambican leader wanted clear proof that Mugabe,,,,i
i|:
.r":.. ,Pf_Yg3.yque.
...-,"- . -.----.-=-v'
into
But
v59 it took
r_r Ll^rA tt-.ro,; il*"be,s mslst-
Lrlvtll, al MugaDe's insist_ was the undisputed leader of his party and, more im. ,,i,
zones where Zanla guerrillai ;;.; ;;;
. . 1T, .the
:T. :ryrtbeen.sent
i"g.
Some of the guerriltas he met atong the
portantly for Machel, his army. Machel.was convinood :,,,,
that the future leader of Zimbabwe would emerge from lr
lr,', . T,lJ,ruo to Mozambique after his own clan_ the ranks of the fighting forces, as he had done. He was ';:
,1iii':r,{estine reeruitilg meetingr in nrioaoiu in-Jil, previous not yet convinced Mdgabe was the man.
ii'ii,',,, l[?y-months.. y*liog tfi; men again was cruciat to :
As a result, he put Mugabe'under wraps', placing nrrn I

Yusrbe, enabring hirito

,
'h;*;;j#;;;; iiilirjrrijii"il in a house in the port city of Quelimane. It wasn't quite ,,
,,,
house arrest, but Mugabe wasn't entirely free to rlov€, .,
';i.:"'
';'r:
.i
' 's-ortences
wltnln w-eeks seven senior
lribesmen were given prison either.
:

for. helping- peopr., io.iuaiol-rft"gabe,

,,i , escape. HardJI to The months that followed were some of the loneliest
JlfirG'that .diEig*ro" uoa in Mugabe's whole life: they were also arguably some of
hundreds of.his were among the first to
^tribespeolre the most important, because it was now that he had the
follow Mugabe. t"d6;6
',
the first to come back after opportunity to establish himself as leader, to consolidate
l}9tp"Td..nf Chi:! Tangwina returned to Nyafuru in
,, triumph that'vote'in prison.
in June 19g0. M-ugabe haa arrivea io uorr*_ He needed permission to travel, but he did so fre-
DlqueJust two months before Machel was
to take power. que-ntly. To the burgeoning guerrilla and refugee
was over and, ioi i[,'io,,.n,, the "rrnpu,
,'
T:,rvar ,there
' , , prEsident-designate was involved in the immediate in the northern provinces; to Tanzania, to set up the
' .,tems of a couitry adjustiog,fo*fytop.o..' prou- training camps that.were to be the.springboard fs1 [[,1s,: ;r:'
, ''l
l.Th: two men metlor warfromhereon;tomakethefirsttentativeovertures
ttri first time. Macher doubted for the foreign support he knew he would need. ' :l
,,,,i Su.qabe's ability to read zinoand, furtherrnore, he had As Nkomo, Sithole, and Muzorewa pursued detente
'," n6 time for the kind of rivalry ,quubbli,g that had with Smith through Vorster during l97S - culminating ,
,: "rd
,

lT _c!ife"':j;q.-{';"d. r,irn al,.piv ffii.ioos of

resident, before he met hfi: fnat
intheabortiveatternptatasettlementatVictoriaFaIli
11 .r:*.:st
change the minute he did.
il.o in August that year - Mugabe was carefully nurturing
his personal standing with the Zanu army. He wasn't, ;,
aS dg-velgnment. Macher'the entirelycomfortablewiththeroleofguerrillaleaderbut
i: whose
,r, sclool had been the bush war of ",u*iorlpi"rillot
Frelimo; Mugabe the
no one who heard his impassioned advocacy of the armed
struggle in any of his numerous visits to the camps
" academic revolutiooury whose education
Suiet
Dased on his reading in prison.
had been doubted his commitment. And judging by the number
'' coming over the border into Mozambique, he knew he
80
8l
 t'
lt , his ovrn battre to creare his own power
*:p-ynnlns base. provided the commander inr the burly ;.u*e,of RJ* :,, iiij
l: rW-ithin_1r1 mon$s.
of.leaving Rhodesia, he ffiffi;; Nhongo, just 27 but already proven as a guerrilla leader :, ' :j!l
t ti{,t$*lg::s.rorrowinf many or them il;, ilffj| Tongogarao from his jail in Zambia, had to sanction his' .
,,,., Ty, The point was notlost on lan Srnitt, an;;;Jffi
,-,,

appointment. He was also asked, discreetly by Machel, ''.,'ti'

l.ii :, *1TT*:.:j:..Y?lt'. .fj ulouglrl 1r,.ry i,o,, readly if he supported Mugabe. The answer was yes. 'ii+

ffi1iffi ;E:l*#t;ffi i**xJH;LH,Hffi

.,j1fiififf;
Now the arms that Mugabe needed began to come ,'J,,,i.i
through, not so much a flood, more a trickle. Bu[ enough ,li
Init! would n.r#.onlo. ;r*n;
i;:,,,;
sithol.e,. Muzorewa to give him the firepower to at least prove more than: i;,];iii
r,:
,r or Nkomo in .on a settrement. He just an irritant to Smith and Walls.
right. The failure at victoria F;il, ;. i
ii,,filr,r.tuas
i;7;";,';,",suaded the Front l,ine presidents,
il finally per_ Russian rifles and ammunition, originally destined for '. ir":'
p.ii.rfirly Kaunda Nkomo's Zapu units, began to arrive through Mozam- ' .:i
: lll.Y-re, tlr.1t nli;;;
no arternative
ii".' thel n9e$ed, Iike Machel, was proof ofbutMugabe,s war. Alr bican ports. Mugabe widened his net to get clrinese' ..',,t:',,,:l'ii,,
- '
,
. c[Edentials.
The New Year of 1976 saw the first major infiftration ,.,;,
It wasn't long in coming. In October dozens
. of officers on any scale from Mozambique - nearly a thousand ,";t:. ,. tl,
lt.YguB?o, the largest fanu camp in Tar,,ania, issued
.-''': a''bitter guerrillas, many of them raw and fresh from training , -
denunciation of Muzorer^iu, Sitfro[
*O James camps in Tanzania, trying to inveigle themselvgs as *- ri.
,' chikerema, the me,, *rpfol;;;;;ffiff;
, i,clainied the guerrillas of Zaiuas their own. to have surreptitiously as possible,into the Tribal trust lands all . , ,.
along the eastern border, where theycould expect support
"' 'These three haye proved io u" .ornpili.ly
hoper.sg from local tribes that.had close ties with the Mozam- '
' and ineffwtive as Ieaders of the Zimburi*. ,"rorution,, ,

' , the officers wrote in a memorandum to the oAU, bicans. The tactics were much the same as always. They
and still attacked white farms and stores; sq too,,was the '.1

,," iho sovernments of Tanzania;ffil;rli,n'rr. .They

' have done everytfn, ,., result. The security forces still claimed many dead for rr',,,'

E;per the struggle through

,' 'their gyn no*-.r struggre. They have no intirest in
every one of theirs. But now the battle-plan of Tongogara
revolution the and Chitepo, of spreading the war as far and wide as ,,rr'
or the peopl- at heart, but only
their;;;;;;;;
interests.
possible to undermine white morale, had to be taken
Thev chirist
' added: 'Robert inruiiuu[il;Hr;;;1r., They seriously because of the weight of numbers on the
Mugabe "n is the
]'^v onry man
'v I
who can act as guerrilla side.
rniddle man.' The effect was just what Tongogara and Chitepo had ' '
' r

collapse of detente at vicroria Fars

-- rhr a truce
, ,spalvned had arso hoped for. The call-up was stepped up, the Rhodesians ' .1

' *,pu and Zanu- Ih and pact between Nkomo,s army in increased their forces.by 50 per cent, every man under
Nlve-u.i, after *;k; oi patient 38 was forced into duty I'
,

; [fgotialions between the two, ; new anny was formed. In February 1976 Mugabe had the Front Line presi- .',
Ih: title was the Zimbabwe'people,s u*rr,-2irA,
command an rg-man council its dents in his new adopted home town. Machel, Nyerere, i,
'hi&
tives from each.
*ith;i;;ffisenta- Kaunda and Seretse Khama of Botswana came to Queli- ., ,

': mane for a summit. Nkomo told them that his negoti-
Because Zanu had many more men
. in the field, it ations with Smith - the final attemot at detente - had
:,:. g2
83
 ;ir;, "t llT}.chance cif"sugrgss,,'gu gn}r,,,iiitio,s p*rien!try'on thf off in Gharra to see his son's grave. As alwayq, that wrs ,

iiut, linew that trf was ,t"r"Ji;"b"'tiil-Ari;

iii. i lia*tT"j,
Dgne[Clary.
.r, He did not have much success in raising money or
;
;;:. r .
.,-,,-S1u1da's warning was clear at the end of the meeting. support in Zurich, despite the fact that eviryone who
: Ihg patience of the Front Line states with Smittr wis
met him was impressed not only by the quality of his ;.':",r,
;i,.,,gpqa,**!?d: The West had failed tfr"* Uy iuiiing to back intellect but also his comrnitment to his cause. r'
rt brd l.oT pelT.-He offered only the bleak prospect ,

;1,. t
of.yy and, implicitly, the Marxism of men like Mugabe.
Then, towards the end of his stay, a Zanu support .
' ''I he worst they have feared all along the factor of organisation called 'Kampfendes Afrika' ('Fighting ..'
- Africa')presentedhimwithl0,000Swissfrancs.Itwas
,,, ', -
mmunism must now inevitabry
,';, '' rrrb-bwe because majority
#
introouced in the first large contribution he had ever received on behalf
,1.' ,^.- rL^ l-^rrl r t r
iule must now be decided of his party and it made a great impression on him. It ' ..!,
, .rof the battlefield,'he said. was precisely the boost he needed, the money in itself '' ,t.,
^
, : Pqtel Walls was quick to reply. .We will not be pushed
;i.,,, was not as important as the commitment it represented , ',t.'
i',,,, Iro"T$ glsurrender to any Maixist-inspired land grab,,
he said. 'We are going to fight.'
: All that Mugabe nieded was The little girl who actually gave him the money at a , :. .

'',Bot Machel's backing. He small ceremony in Zuriqh was not forgotten. Four years ' ',
' it at Queli-ior un;.;;r, days later, the Rhodesian later Mugabe was to make sure that she was invited to .",-,:,1,.
,l' Air Force attacked a villagr just inside IVfozambique, the Independence celebrations. Many of the leaders, ambas.' ' I ..,
; qresigerrt went a step further. He closed the border with ,

; Rlo-desia and put hisyoung revolution on a war footing.
' -More importantly, he gave Mugabe his permission and
ful'l_support for the nortfiern province of Tete to be used
as the bare for military strika on Rhodesia.
Mugabe recognised all too clearry that he needed
^ .Br1
friends in the outside world too. The fo[owing month
sadors'and diplomats at the receptions in Salisbury -'l
wonderedaloudjustwhothechildwasaSshewasgiven
the same status and treatment as them, including the
occasional hug from the prime minister-elect. She was ,t i.
the little girl from Zurich, a symbol of the days when he , ,'', i
was short of friends
r, ,'
On his return to Quelimane, Mugabe felt sufficiently . ',

he travelled to Switzerland, to zarich, the fi?st time

secure to now begin to put his stamp on the party, its- .
, abroad es the recognised leader of Zanu. philosophyandpolicy.onl5Aprilheissuedamemoran.
It was a major ch-allenge ror trim ana-i'r"-, at a time dum to allZanu offices and members. Its humble origin ', .'):
of great uncertainty. yis, he had established himself was reflected in the address at the top, 'PO Box 279, .,',1
yjtliuhe party but the of a 'military leader' eluded
ease
Queiimane,Mozambique.,Itbegan:.bearComrades,.
,

him. That title belongd to Tongo gara, and he was in
jail in Zambia. The chances of ni; d"iliil-;ogether
'wgre slim, the suspicions about each other in both forces
ran too d"ep.
, ,:-Furtherrnore, he was in poor health
:atthe best of times an unpieasantly humii- euelimane was
l and he was tired of it. dn route io Europe"n"irorrrr.ot
he stopped
,,.,84
Congratulations! Zaou is once againin its full revolution-
ary stride.'
It continued: 'As you are all well aware, for,nearly a
whole year after 7 December 1974, Zanu battled for sur-
vival against the most, tremendous of odds posd by the
wily architects of detente. In the wake of that struggle,
some of our weak-kneed comrades chose the softer road
85
 $rther q.nd,cou llf,tneianuianmt', He.kiiowe fut,N.tg66*;;;xffi
by now in conrrcl of tht ANC, and si,tGlrr.i* iii,' "::'ii#
get qn external'win!',of the ANc.called tt" zi.iu"[*e , ,l'":ffi
"
Liberation council (zlLc) off the ground, hive oisitea I ,,..;,.,lffi
the camps in Mozambique, Tanzania and iambi"
past few months.
io-il; i-
:,,i
1 :,;;,'ij,,

.. Mugabe is as_-uncompromising and scathing as he be-. i,i

'Let me seize this opportunity to clear one issue which .,1..:',
continues to cause concern. The break between Zanu-r ' ,i..,".','
Tanla and 'ANc-zLc is complete. The Army ,"il 1 ,,i-';,;
NEVER, NEVER, NEvER come under the-inter- ' -l
'It has been necessary for us to allow members of a . "t.,,,.ii,,
lThe one is small zapuarmy to join our forces so that the possibility . i
a {ow quality metal, varies with circum-
stance and is a king of'a second army developing disappears, But ttre require- '
to rrplai.n.y, the other is a trigrr- ment from us is that thry murt divorce themselves com- ...,,,;,i,*
quality metal, defe.s chan[e urA
.i..um*u*. u# i, pletely
constant as principle., ", from Nkomo and his counter-rrnoruiio*.y
Having asserted the quality of his claim approach
to power, ;Th.r.ir, therefore, ajoint military front between Zann
I' ':,i'i

Y:q:*,lrg to
'r-o.gunirutitn
rh: make-ip,
ofit,,
th.-i;;;d;il,h: ffi;;r#,ffl "
and zapu, .
but only at the hghting rlvel and no other'. . ,, ; ' 1,,,'" ,
9i9:"::ltl ffi;:Ti
jr* there should not be any mix-up on this matter. There is ' :
f#:"ill.::Tl,i*lryirrei.rruu*t-._ji,""r-t#i,
for health, social services nothing more than a joint miiitary front with.Zap,, in ,i,ir,
.
f:r,: out. " ,, ','*,;'
spelt
'' All
"rJ;;;;;il;r;fi which we have the majority of the-forces invotved.,
,
He ends this first message to the comrades with a subile :, ,; :'..,;
the questions raised are answered.
blend of courtesy and firirness. , , ,,,,',.
I:::l*:fllTdl,yd,TMugabe,.tharinformulating
. 'Please let us have your suggestions, if any, for the
,
9u"3,:*y::y1 _q" " ?uniIi is excrud.d; d,ffi ust
r

improvement of the re-organisationar pian. r

r,r.ternat membership i, t;;;;ffi. ih;ffi;;
,r
31T vou t
zambta is still r,Jriil. t..ri,ory. ril
t/4Dt ll
lon9, "re
please get the organs on to tli. *"r=p"th, and r',
1-:f::lyJpl i z^oo implement the schemes without waiting for 6rth;; ' ; . , ,:,,,
paf,^fril,,-l^.lrtheless, continue * ;p;; quite
fl :Ir:!,.atbeitunderor;;;;;;-;.-";;;";ffi .H:';
. instructions from us.
Y;;' i;ii' st*eer. : ':''
therefore, re founti" N;il"ftH,T;:
I::f:ry,r:,
United-{ingdom and Europ. *t..,;;;
.external following is to be found.,
;;;; greatest *.*"^{,:&X', ,* runu; ' ,,",
Finally, he turns It was his first and last memorandum from euelimane.
!o the m,iiary and the war. Here his
"
ground is shaky, Mugabe is still g*.pirg ioi l"ppor, Tr, sp.ring he. traveiled frequently to tutupito, where
the president allocated the Mugabei a small b"t pt.rr"ni
87
 , __.s____ --J^: viila
iiP.6rt+IIugse-style at the
-...E E. .uv end of:a,road
vtrlr LrI
-. of,terraced
4 l(ra(I uI rcrTaggg chbo#' our friends: sndl purs'ue any potri.qy ;which,*p:,r- rj;l';,,i*
houses just off the coast road. Avenida oon" rrrr.i,
: siegulda, one of
the few portug[ese
portuguese road names thought best suited for our country. : '' : i i;:",'i
,r-,, ,,,uegunoa, to survirae 'Because we get artns from them, it doesn't mean that I ,..,.uI
anywlere in Mozambique, wis to ue tt eii-rr;;;;i',h;
. we are married to them.' ' |{ii;
,r, next t-our years. Sally, with her flair for making the most
He added: 'We will not give in to any pressure to i ,r:;ij:
out of little, qu,ickly turned it into home. chickens were
abandon our Chinese friends. They are very good to us.' ':' .,j.;;
, ,soorl running
11
backyard, she settled into cooking
lt" He was a regular visitor to most of the Western , ,;;,1
once again, und Mrgabe ai last felt he could build ,
himself embassies, most of whom were desperate to give their . ,:i,.-"
a base. An office followed, in a"high-rise block in the
'' governments a fuller picture of the man who *ur building ' :, , ;,)
l
, :Ibrrb o! Pollona, the fashionabre, dipromatic area of his base in Mozambique. Mugabe, polite yet tenaqou$ .':,:,,i:.:::',
in telling them what he thought, was.to make a lastinsl ,.,. ,'iir,i
'' were on the floors above and below zanu. But
start.
it was a first impression on aknost all of them. ' ";i;',i;":,;'
.Myimmediatefeelingabouthimwasthathefarand
:. . From the word go, Mugabe's relations with the
away'outstripped every other nationalist leader,' recalld . 1,',,,f;,r
Russians in Maputo were at Gst frosty, at worst rrriour.
: '' one Western diplomat who met him then. 'I remember, ', ',:,:';'
fF Soviet Union had already chosen its .man, for thinking that this is the man who ougtrt to be running .
zimbabwe, and that was Joshua Nkomo. over the next
thr99 years Mugabe wourd talk to them time and again,
Rhodesia.' . ,;,1,,,,:.

,t seekilq hardware for his arqy but careful to insist th"re

It was a view -shared by New York.congressqr^o ';t;:,':;:,

I Stephen Sollarz, one of the very few Western politicians , ,,:,',;-

would be no strings attached.
He, tlugabe, would have to admit that Nkomo was
"number one in the nationalist leadership.
At one point,
' ': w[en the Russians
did offer him anns,',h; iemanded
written admissionsfr-om Mugabe that he *outa recognise
Nkomo as leader. Mugabe, incensed, refused to go any
further. Instead he turned more and more to the c[inese.
. By the middle of I 976he*u"forli-njrh; ktrd;f
;;;;;:
ment [o Peking that raised the-inevitable question of
what they would demand in return.
tosee Mugabe in Mozambique during the first year there;. , :
,.1:
";
Sollarz, on a fact-finding hission through Soi,rthern ',,:,-
Africa, was surprised from what he heard about Mugabe
that he agreed to see him in Quelimane at the end of his , t
'He impressed me then, as he does now, as one of the .:':
most able leaders on the African coirtinent,'said sollaru '.1,i'
after Mugabe's election in 1980. 'The most striking thing i,:'
about him was his intelligence and sophistication, th;
way he was so receptive"to all ideas and points of view,
whether they were coming from Peking, Moscow or :
Washington. He certainly didn't strike me as a fanatic. t ' :, ',i':,
t',::

a servant of China.
'our war could not be waged without the assistance Sollarz was also struck by the way Mugabe put his ' i,,',
party before, himself. 'He was very candid and it was i
of china. But the chinese havi never attached any condi-
clear there had been divisions among his people. But he .

, tions to their supply of weapons . . . tt... ir an under-

said again and again that he put the integrity and the / ,'

standing between the chinese and us that we are free to

88
 ,ilfl, Mueeqe;ffi ;;ffi il d;;H.IffiiltoffiH
were infiltrated across the border. That was in April.
kind 9f wholesale oompromises that had been the basis : .+,r,
on which he had argued and won support among ih" , ,,lliiii
In afmy.
i,11 ,Jtlge furlher- 306
3 ;;; oiJfu,.t.d. The guerrillas were
,,,',..1#i'tn

The Kissinger shuttles back and forth across southern ' ",,,ii;!;I;
'i.'1 pinyd in the border ur*g but as tr"irirg organ-
ls-till
iiii l.'r, isation improved, so too dtd the regults. Now "nd for the Africa in mid-1976 did, tloweyer, 'enable Mueabe to, ' lffii
emerge as the internationally recognised leader olzennu.
llLii,., I
. IT,1ti1e they succeeded in subverting ttre local *Oul
- ---- r-r:
, :,i
The Front Lines states, willing af least to entertain the , ' , :,i'
I,i,,,,,,, Pl1o": I.n th9 s1.gl and wheat-growin! country around
mercurial American secretary of state, tried to resolve : ,':i.;i;,1
-, iplantation
cairedzi and chipinga, they started Issuing orders to
,,: - ' workeri the divisions and differencJ, the ."ti;;;ri; -*t
t*tuy away from work: Ir tn y were- "*oog From therr ow,R . r,..r,r;,,,"
. ' diso-beyed, they ambushed .o.puoy buses en route to before any peace conference started.
soundings, the Front Line presidents now knew Mugabe .'
work. They mined the roads, even used mortars on mills
and pumping stations. had the support and confidence of most of the iunu "ltr,;,,i :

The reply from salisbury was a further calr-up. And
!!.o, in August, the first large-scale raid into
Mozambique itself.
There had been hit and run strikes in the months before
guerrillas arid zipa units. They rejected sithole ab-',,' ',,,i.:i:;
solutely, they viewed Nkomo with suspicion ano aaegrei /
ofloathingforhishegotiationswith$mithinthe*oith'
before. .

by the time the Rhodesians artacked a camp at
3$
Nyazonia, about 35 miles from the border, they were
well rehearsed. They advanced in convoy, wearing Fre-
limo uniforms, witl Frelimo insignia on tt.i, trucks,
e-ven singing Frelimo songs. Hundids of the
refulees in
the camp - there were also about 700 guerrillas gaihered
- e --
to welcome them.
ltwas then they opened fire.
smith said it was a guerrilla training camp. Mugabe
and Machel insisted it iasn,t.
That left the zapu forces loyal to Nkomo isolated and ;;,ii!.,:,
- threatened. Already they had clashed with zanurn.n io ,;:;,";;
camps in Tanzania, they fled when they should have bee4 ,. ,,
', integrated .,:
under the zipa banner and the teaderstrip;i, '' ','.r..r
Rex Nhongo.
_ _In september, the Front Line presidents called iri,l.,.
lvIugabe, Nkomo, sithole and Muzoretoa to Dar-es-,' ,li i
Salaam.Ifthepresidentshadhopedtobringthemall
it was an unqualified failure. Mugabe and "r'
together,
Nkomo did not even attempt to reconcile thiir diftei- .,rrr, .' ,r.

The united Nations envoy sent to investigate told the ences. Mugabe, in particular, was scathing about
Nkomo, , ,
|
,,',,

press' that 670 refugees accusinghimofpullingZapuoutofthewarandallor:yins

- horepeated the w6rd refugees zanu-zipa tocarry the battle and thelosses alone. sitho6
- had been killed..
withdrew from the ANC, and said he would form his . ,,:,
for a whirlwind own indep.endent zanu. Muzorewa left for Rhodlsi" in , *,
F..nr-v Kissinger's prans peace in
thehopesofbeingtheonenationalistwithabaseback
,

. Rhodesia were, in Mugabe's view, doomed fromihe start.

The fact that he had cajoled, persuaded, finally pushed
Ian smith into accepting 'majority rule; lsmiit'*outa Three weeks later Smith made his historic address to
I
no! 'black_majority rule') did not even begin to the natioa accepting the principle of majority .utr
- *a" .,, ,

*uu.-accept
Mugabe believe that the whites would malie the offered the 'opportunity we have never had befor.
- * . l'
offer to Rhodesians to work out amongst-themselves,
90
9l
 ,"', . t:. ',1'' .' : : .

i0ithout interference fiom outiide, our futune.' I{ngti he stood'to iose bbth his irmy tfle,'zuppirr,''
nf th: Flonl Line. _nesiaent "nd
Nyerere brought ifri im .,..
together in Dar-es-salaam at the beginning of October,
They spent seven long days talking and on 9 October ,
announced the alliance. They called it the Patriolis pjsn1, ,;
Tliere was no common philosophy, stratery or even. the . . ,
bond of tfust and friendship. Convinience ,na .ri
expediency dictated.
: In the wake of the failure at the conference in Geneva,
''" ' 'Muga'ne'. was to get more than his share of blame for his Together th'ey issued demands for the Geneva con-
apparent refusal to compromise and his attempts to inside '
ference: the lifting of restrictions on political parties
' ' undermine the credibility of the conference beforelt had Rhodesia, the cessation of political trials, freedom for ,r. ,.
even started. political prisoners and the integration of Smith's *16 'r
The i".tlr
that Mugabe believed wnroleheartedly at gation so it was reduced to being an 'arm' of the British
lhis in
stagethe arm.A struggle as the only means of team in Geneva.
bringing smith to real negotiations. And Mugabe was At this stage, they came to no firm agreement on the
: still seeking to shore up his own credibility with the ,

guerrillas, realising that without their loyalty and faith
he would never be in a position to'force iny worthwhile
concessions from Smith.
'Wh1t is required,' he told the geurrillas oo27 Septem-
ber'is the total destruction of Smith's army and-immedi-
and Mugabe insisting that Nkomo throw more men into
the field. Privately, Mugabe was not concerned that
command was arguably more organised. He felt that hel
was one step ahead of Nkomo in that his men would be .

ate replacement by Zanu forces . . . we shtuldn,t worry better qualified and more adept at winning and ftinds, r i ,
about the Kissinger-British proposals. They can put in which in the end he knew would count. Mugabe's con-' ,

any puppet government they want, but a puppet govern-
ment cannot contain us.''
Now, in their desperation to find a united nationalist
front,'..1hs Front Line tried to marry Nkomo and
-not
Muzorewa. It might have worked had the two of
'.
them been eaten up by jealousy of each other. They both
fidence about handling Nkomo was decisivJin making
him accept the aliiance when it was suggested. Aitd hi ,
was to be proved right. As two armies in the field, Zipra
(Nkomo) was a much more disciplined, effective force ,' '
Zipta was a poor rival when it came to setting up party ,

rdturned to salisbury io talk to their supporters about committees and cadres in the 'liberated zones'.
an alliance. Muzorewa got home to a huge crowd, a few
; hundred turned out for Nkomo. AJ always, they Mugabe went to Geneva as the unknown factor. Kis- ,.

measured their popularity in terms of the numbers who singer had not met him, the British had carefully nurtured ;
came out for them. Muzorewa, acrcordingly, felt he didn't a relationship with him through the embassy in Maputo
"need Nkomo. Now there was only one way out for
,,, *Uo-o, he woulil have to come to ierms with Mugabe. their intentions. He aocepted copies of the London Times
92 g3
 '':&
from embassy staff, which he read avidly, but he refused
to allow relations to move beyond the cordial and polite.
when he and his delegation were ca[ed to ihe embassy
to bb given their tickets to Geneva, they said they could
not accept them as some were:.first-class (for Mugabe,
Muzenda and two others). what followed was a c.,rious
wrangle,in which the tickets had to be turned in and the
money used to send more delegates, all of them economy
class.
It was typical of the way relations between Mugabe
and the British were haunted by misinterpretation of each
other's motives.
As such Mugabe remained inscrutable. And when the
west turned to the records of the man, they found only
bald statements of militancy that did not uugu. well for
Geneva. Yet well before this Mugabe had Lpened the
- way to compromise.
-Yes, we are Marxist-Leninists,'he
said in an interview
earlier in the year. 'The main principres of socialism do
not vary but the application varies. In our particular
circumstances you have about five million people in the
rural,areas, the peasants, and about one million in other
areas. You have got to take into account their own
receptive customs and the economic situation which has
been established by the settlers.
'You can't, you see, bring a set formula to the situation \
in Zimbabwe overnight.' \
when the Patriotic Front was unveiled, president Machel
was photograirhed with Mugabe and Nkomo. The
pictures appeared in the papers in Mozambique, the radio
reported every word of it. At last, after lg months,
fylugabe had won the full acceptance and backing of his
host.
On 18 October Mugabe arrived in Lusaka for pre- I '"=f ':tr:s'"n;"

conference talks with Nkomo on board the president's I | .:rll

Wcdding Day, February 1961 in the Salisbury township of Harare.
plane. At once there was a row with the Front Line states
7,\ttttdaS, Times)
94
Mugabe shortly after his release from prison after eleven years in N4rrgabe, the unknown nationalis! meets the world's press for the first
detention, December 1974. (Gary woodhouse, camere press) Irrrrc, in Geneva, October 1976. (Associated press)

Nkomo and Mugabe, 'The Patriotic Front', arrive for the Geneva [r'trrgrrbe and Nkomo fielding questions after a stormy meeting with thc
Conference, October 1976. (Sunday Times) llrrlish at Geneva, November 1976. (Popperfoto)
 In 91le - Mugabe with Simon Muzend-a,_ t i, a.puty rutuguu.;, r.nj Mugabe says 'No' to British peace proposals and leaves Lancaster F{ouse
and ZANU office workers in Maputo, Mozambiqr. 1o.,
) lzi (-sunday tlcfiant mood, November 1979. (Neil Libbert)
rrr

m,

^9:'"1:llr in Rome, November lg7g. r*G'- la,ffiadressing a press

stoRRine poinrs on a rife in
conference, (popperfotZ)
'[,ord Carrington can go to hell'- Mugabe addressing the press conference tE
f,
a*
on the deadlock at Lancaster House talks, November I 979. (Neil Libbert) .-drc.
ffi
Mugabe, at home in Maputo, talks to author David Smith just
before his
rt.lrrrn to Salisbury, January 1980.
GTg

'I will talk

about everything except the Lancaster House agreement'-
Mugabe signs for peace, December 1979. From left to right Muzorewa,
Carrington, Gilmour, Nkomo, Mugabe. (Frank Herrmann, Sunday
Times)
 - :..

over whether or not sithole should be allocated a place

in Geneva- He claimed one as a right. Nyerere r.it t a
should have one. Mugabe was ronG*ptutur. 'He is a
reverend herring, if you pardon the pun,, he said. .He
has left the party.' At the end of the day, sithole was
invited.
In his meeting with Nkomo, the two men agreed on
a degree of co-operation and consultation thit woutd
have been unthinkable even just a few days before.
when they arrived in Geneva, Mugabe at once seized
the initiative. Asked what kind of Rhodesia he wanted,
he replied: 'what I am saying is that we are socialist
and
we shall draw on the socialist systems of Mozarnbique.
' and ranzania. org cannot get rih of alr the trappings of
free enterprise. After all, even the Russi*nr und china
have their petit bourgeoisie.
'But in Zimbabwe none of the white exploiters will be
allowed to keep an acre of their land.,
That, combined with leaks to the press that Mugabe
had told his delegation en route thai their airn was .to
destroy the forces of smith', gave Mugabe the image oi
the'bioodthirsty ogre' that was to haunt him thoughout
the Geneva talks.
But whatever the labels, Iike Ian Smith's suggestion
that he was 'riding arou,d on cloud nine in a camiuflage
uniform', Geneva was to provide another vital oppor-
tunity for Mugabe to assert his control of the party.-His
decision, just before it opened, to request theielease of
Tongogara and the others held in Zambia was a bold
one, reflecting his 'new-found confidence. Tongogara,
who arrived offering bland war-rike staternents iuch as

i re-,,l
li,-,..,"",

,,,
""1 ffii,,,.''..;i

.&G,
Back after five years - Mugabe leads his homecoming rally atZimbabwe
Grounds, 27 January 1980. (Hagar Shour Camera Pres$
'Smith is my enemy', was now in Mugabe's debt. Out
of circulation for l8 months, he owed him allegiance and
support. And while in the following year,Tongogara may
have entertained thoughts of a rebellion againsl Mugabe,s
leadership, he was never to forget that Mugabe had made
his release a prime requisite in agreeing to go to Geneva.
95
 the;iri,Onby front iympathetic groupg. f,i*Ili,
ulvernment stepped in and paid the bill,, , ,

For the first time he was on the world stage- the

dairy
pless conferences, the c-rowd of reporters waiting outside.
his hotel and the conference hali, the endrerr"r.q"ri,
, Mukudzei Mudzi, one of those freed from newspapers and terevision for interviews. rt
iiJr;,
,

' of
with Tongogara,
the opening: .you
so much bother him as amazehim. He realised
,rru, rro- l

,;,;;:;_., lfllfrYi:l:::1.,r,:r*^l."ih..u*
are just a lor oiou*rJ ri*;.:"srrurs: rou now on he could no longer enjoy the privacy he
,In1i[we cherished frrO-
.

,
,,"," ' that Richard *T
rhe patriIiir Front objected always
In the final weeks of the conference he took to getting -r-
not
",yff:l::,,T1:r^l:llr,.,
:ipptv senior enough i:';.tirffi up.very early, about 5 o'clock for an hour of yoga,
medi-
drew it, but the air of nort,itv,-;p;;i", tation and exercises. Then he wourd go ro, roii walks,
so srrong thar.the prospects.foi-a
lnd hate was while the rest of the city slept. He relishJd the opp&rrrrrv
*i,i;;;r; had arready
: be11 dlmaged beyondffiir.
The first obstaire *ur-th.
to wander unnoticed through the centre oi'tte ,i;y,
stopping to window-shop at the expensive r,or"r.
period reading to r, *u'r,
independence. Smitt, ttirtingnrmty
^interim he said, his one chance of the day io be incons"pi.uorr.
io it. iir.irgerplan
which carried heren t pro te-tion After five weeks, Rex-Nhongo, command.,
he had agreed.inon t*o
io, ih;;rrii.r, insisted
flew in to join the_Mugabe delegation. A rew days
tf Zipa;
12 mOnthS.
v.u^. Mugate
'-'Boqvv r;ifi
rcrrtll ll had to be
a fire broke out in his hotel roo^, Nhongo woke
later
tongo-
gara and orhers staying in the to-.-"uioil'rri
tfi.v
none of the parties.could alree escaped unhurt. The cause of the fire was never
on what form the interim dis-.
government should take. e- covered. Zanu suggested it was a Rhodesian plot,
the
In conferen"gt yugabe sometimes Rhodesians hinted darkry that it was factionui
,iuilry
seemed to enjoy
himsetf hu*ety, his naiiio.
o;;i; within zanu. within a few weeks of the coflapse of the
and argum.nt o.r.rop-
ing all the time ur^!,., conference, they had reason to think they were right.
and tlie griti.h recog-
ra;;;;. p.i;;;i,"#;:
nised the quarity orhis "pprrrri.
to go home within days of tt. ready After the conference, Tongogara set about re-establishing
.onference opening. He
thought it was a waste of time hisauthority. zipa had got nowhere, the armies of Zanu
f i.;"*r;.# o
an,
and zapu continuing to fight each other wherever
iff
ffi ;,T I.r;Ji' ii!
i
they
", 5r out.
disagreement over-tt "1"i;I.il
ror-i'noependence. He
j

I
I
met. It still existed in theory, but in fact it wasjust another
about the financiar cost ," z"r. worried I name for Zanu's arny.
tion out of their oroerea rri. o.r.gu- I

"10 into Three men in the Zipa high command stood in Tongo_
"rp.nri**ilr.rr
houses. Despite yu;"b.h smaiilr" gu.r, gara's way. First Nhongo; then Dzinashe Machingura,.
cooked by themservJs ,";
l;;;r.e
-;'t-h.I on simple meals a young Marxist extremist who had taught
Tanu ended uo leaving c.r.uu'io,ooo
cost-cu*ing devices, economics in
zambia and was more of a theoretician than a soldier;
hotels' Mugabe left pa"rty;h;"il francs in debt to
behind to,try to raise
finally Elias Hondo, an experienced guerrilla *t o frua
been in the Front Line since the late tqOOs.
96
97
 ,'Ev'en belore
Cene.3-.o1ft^fi:"."ra
;1,
[e
:felease, they had posed tne nirt serious 1iE4,,
bhailenee to
,'Mugabe's assumedleadership. itrey
rejected the Geneva
conference in toto, even the idea
of going. They feared
,that Mugabe, whol ttrey viewel ,, ;;;?.;;;;
inevitably be drawn into a ,.ttril"nt woutd
that-wourd excrude
the gue*illas. In September riii,Machingura
rejected.Mugabe ,irit. ,p.ut inj impricitry
on Maputo radio. .We
do.not identify ourselves with"any
one of the factions
trying'to lead us,, he said.
There was more to it than that. Machingura
strongly pro-chinese and had bu,t was
,q rroir,o;f; among
Maoist g-r9ups at the .Chitepo.college,
northern Mozambique, where rilitrry
in Chimoio;
' trained cadres of
-poritical
above-ayug.. ability were
courses. They were unhappy aq9"t
!iu.n ir;;;;;
fU"guU"t Jepeated
attempts, without ,r..rrr,.-tl offset
arms' Even before Geneva' therd
Z";;,r;;ortug,
-"io* of
college.
were ptans to tt,
Nhongo and the Machingura group,
the dissidents as
they became known, came to Ginev'a'il;"Mrgabe,s
banner very reluctantly. Th; th.v 'ilugabe
r*ne ,hr;
and Tongogara had formed a poliii"rr--,ii"il
In return fo, ypfme uitiun...
promised Mugabe. his full-militaiy
.o**and,
Tongogara
,rpport as party leader. Machel
was informed and privaiely deligt t.O.
_was
By the time the dissidents goihome, they found them-
'"selves
isolated. The presid#il given them free access
to Maputo radio, now it was cut
off, within a fs-w weeks
the entire Machingr.l_group, about
90 in all, were
arrested on the orders of Machei
high-rank ing Zanu *.*b.rr,
a.ong;h;;; some
1..., "niii?"irir"rr,r,
deputy director of securi ty unolnt.ttig.n".;
iro*il-rguu.,.
Nearly 100 'dissidents' in the .u*pu, in Tanzania
also detained. were
The war was going badly, an offensive
timed to
98
 It was in this uncomprornising mood that the Central
Committee gathered in Chimoio in northern Mozam-
!iqr9 on 3l August 1977 for a nine-day meeting that was,.,'1,,
finally to seal'Mugabe's leadership. Under the open rOi.r ,:,,,;
in the Chimoio refugee and guerrilla camp, Mugabe was .,,
proclaimed President of Zanu, both party and army. :'..,,:';
'It was clear,' said Edgar Tekere three years later, 'clear ,',

to all of us, on'the Central Committee, on the high .'1,,1,

comrnand, on the general staff, and in the army, that at ,. '',,,.,
long last we had the man to lead us.' .: ',:,
Mugabe's call was for dedication, efficiency and effec- l,
tiveness, both in the army and the party. He denounced l
the latest attempts at a settlement,'the Anglo-American ''.',,.1.,,
initiatives of Britain's foreign secretary, Drbavid Owen, . , ,,.', :

and America's UN ambassador, Andrew Young. tl,',,,,'

'They are just imperialist manouevres aimed at the ':.!;'

neutralisation of our war effort and negating our succesbbs : .

and are being advanced through the instrumentality of ,,ii

ahome-basedstoogeandreactionaryleadershipwhich,
while in theory it pays lip service to the principle of
majority rule, is in practice pandering to the bidding of , ,'

its imperialist and settler masters to the detriment of the

people's struggle.'
It wasn't just rhetoric. Mugabe had no faith at all in , r

the Owen-Young moves. Publicly, in Dar-es-Salaam and

Lusaka, he was forced to show at least willingness because . , , -
of pressure from the Front Line. He recognised'at once .,,
that Owen's brash, aggressive style of negotiating was ' ,,,',,;
bound to unite the Patriotic Front and the Front Line ,".,
into resistance. To Young he was more well-disposed, but ,,i,.,

'he never believed the appointment of one mun Uy presi- ',f

i
: dent Carter signalled wholesale changes in American . ,:::
,i policy. Owen and Young would still not exact the right' ' ,,i,,
r. concessions from Salisbury and Pretoria, of that he was ' ,,"i
convinced.
Nevertheless, he did appreciate that the two of them
l0l
 !i,:,
, ' y11e letermined to bring the patriotic Front into any ,'lasted just T0 rninutes. Together thJv t
rrl: 1,
* far more so than Kissinger had been. eccoro_ F rejected out of lr;,r.:*I

ii{Ir *t "y. il
" fettlement,
i'1,:.; y;s;il;;ffi6;s to bu,d their
throughout 1977.They'met regurarry,
P:l to
rorce
ando-American idla of a uN
.tf1ensure ;;;;k*ping ',-,:ii,
a ceasefire, they wanted their o*n f-c"i,
';+
ii,:li
., ',.-u
fl1tio.us-alliance
either in Maputo or Lusaka. As always, tvtrrgabeirrt.j
to police it. Furtherrnore, said Mugabe, ther;;;;
point in simply declaring a ceasefire: there , ,.:'j?i
.;: :
r
. NkOmO for a greater eornrnifrnanr
j)Io*o,ror t,i ;^
commitment to the .,,^- ^1-^-^:- -
war, stressing must bepLil ':,,)r,10

, the need for personal ambition to be sacriflced for

thf Smith showed as little inthusiasm as Nkomo ,,,,ry
l.',1t: ::, gaurre. Nkomo would inrirt that negotiations could still Mugabe. He was arready looking to an
and
', 'internal settre-
r lead to.aassettrement:
l: the
Mugabe arg-ued for the .armed
only solufi91. Emnity was still strong,
rirent'with the nationalists at hoLe, sithole
rfr'"r,I_ ,,,,1:
,

,,: llj-u-S8tr' rewa. First of all, he had to contain, if ".0 '::;:

Mugabe's growing army and the threat it'porea

,o, ,rilil- '
, terntory'as he cafled it. For months, their pblitical union
the border with Mozamtique because
ail;bd ."
'

,, stalled short of becoming a military pact.' any'internar settre- , :,,;'.:7

ment' withbut Nkomo wourd in.uituuty l;d;;; ,,,';,,,i
offensive from zapuarong the western front
wrecked by the meeting of lan S;1fi;;; K;;;;;; withZambia
and Botswana.
: ,Kaunda in iate Septembeiin Lusaka. There was no doubt
In November, the Rhodesians struck deep into
::'
' that smith *ur pirpared to countenance an agreement
Mozambique on their biggest raid so far.
,' with Nkomo ttriougtr Kaunda, who had arways seen It did not
change the course of the ii"r, u, walls
Nkomo as the mostiit.ty and suitable to succeed ano smith had
to the hoped: But it did give them the breathing
space to pursue
a settlement independent of Washingt6n,
When the news of the secret meqtingcame out, Mugabe
Pretoria. e----' il;J;;;;
was furious. The meeting, he said, cJurd onry
have been It was about 7.30 in the morni ngof 23November
designed to promote Nkomo's chances of returning when
home the Rhodesian squadrons reached Chimoio.
and making deal with Smith. Within t i, pariy, there jet bomb.rs, fighter planes, helicopte; iil;;;;;;;
_1
13: anggr at Kaunda's part. Memories of the arreits after
;;;t;;; para-
troopers from the Air Force base at umtali
Chitepo's murder wers still fresh. uuout Eo miles
' Mugabe denounced Kaunda for meeting Fmith and
away' They strafed.the camp, then bombrJit,
nnuily tn.
paratroopers were_ dropped to finish
further demanded to know if Nkomo had b'een pr.rrnt. off whoeur.- ana
whatever remained
Kaunda said he hadn't. Mugabe said he did noi believe
that. Now, said Mugabe, hJ knew why Nkomo would Anne Tekere, Edgar Tekere,s wife, was found by
Tongogara three dayi later hiding in * iutrin.
not put all his forces into the war: he was waiting
on a she stayed out of sight from the units
pii *fr.r,
settlement with smith, even perhaps for smith io of the Rhodesian
falr African rifles who itayed for 4g hours arter -itre
under pressure from South Airica ind the West. nrst
attack. Her account of the raid is worth recording
when the latest envoy of peace, Field Marshar Lord here
not just_for its gruesome testimony
p_Tver, arrived in Dar-es-salaam at the end of october, - urt ur* io, ,t.' orep-
rooted hatred of-the white gourir*.nt
Nkomo^and Mugabe did manage to go as the patriotic it engenJered in
her husband and some of-his colleagues
t:or, A two-day meeting had been- flanned, il;; i; ,il:Z;;'
Central Committee. ";
r03
,gyaged !V tlris attack. Ranting at British diplomats in
Ivlaputo, he demanded to know how Britain could sit b,y
and watch the'slaughter of irmocent refugees, women and
clildren.'
He was further incensed by comments made by Dr
Owen - and quoted by the BBC, which Mugabe listened
to every day at his Maputo. The raids, said Owen, showed
just how determined the Rhodesians were. 'How can I
be expected to negotiate with that man (Owen) when he
talks like that?' Mugabe said.
Whatever the fac* about the number of guerrillas in:
the camp - the Rhodesians claimed they killed 1200 of
them in the raid - -the attack on Chimoio made any
compromise from Mugabe impossible. It also prompted
the final attempt by'dissidents' to overthrow him.
For some time leading members of the Central
Committee had questioned Mugabets leadership on
ideological and military grounds. They now tried to feed
on the disarray and discontent created by the Chimoio
raid to stage a coup against both Mugabe and Tongogara.
They were led by Rugare Gumbo, information secre-
tary, and Henry Hamadziripi, manpower secretary. They
were supported by several capable Zanlacommanders in
the.camps. In trying to gain support, they made Mugabe's
leadership and the direction he was taking the main issue.
He was attacked for lack of military knowledge, for
reluctance to go into the field with'the guerrillas, and for
even allowing himself to be seen to negotiate with the
likes of Owen and Young. Mugabe and the high com-
mand were blamed for the Chimoio debacle. According
to the rebels, the Chimoio camp was pitifully short of
any defence system. (Privately, even the governments
of Tanzania and Mozambique were appalled at the lack
of security.)
Above all, they accused the leadership of failing to
foster seriously the 'Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung
thought'as laid down by the Chimoio Central Committee
105
 i:,ri ' ,.,:t '.'i i.,:. . .'., ,., , ,.,,'.-.: :.'
;ii,,,. argument. When, however, in January he heard that its
: :,leadefs had made contact with Nkomo in an attempt to
',|,' ::gain power by combining Zanu with Zapu, he moved
,, quickly. They were arrested just in time. They already
r , had plans to kidnap Tongogara.
.' , The rebellion was a bitter disappointment to Mugabe,
,,,,,'
, who knew it might weaken his hand in dealing with Nkomo
i drand
' 'i the West. It saddened him because he knew that
,',, could divide the party and the arny. Even when Gumbo,
' '' Hamadziripi and former field commanders like Joseph
u, ,r Chimurenga were in jail, he refused to sanction the calls
I for executions made by some on his Central Committeb.
: ,I Instead, he opted for a thorough 'clean-up' of the entire
,i :r party. Not so much a purge, more a return to the
,:,', principles of frugality and abstinence that Mugabe him-
;,,,', self lived by. One of the charges against Gumbo had been
that he had squandered party funds, travelling widely and
living far too well throughout Africa and Europe. A party
official in London was soon under investigation for buy-
ing a house there with party money. In Maputo, there
were orders from Mugabe himself to all party members
to watch their behaviour in public. Presidert Machel had
personally told him to put an immediate stop to the heavy
drinking and the womanising that some senior Zanu men
indulged in at the capital's few nightspots, like the Polana
hotel.
At the end of January 1978 Mugabe, his house-cleaning
well underway,.left for talks in Malta with Nkomo,
Young and Owen. Smith had 4lready opened talks with
Muzorewa and Sithole on an internal settlement. All the
indications were that they would succeed and a transi-
tional government would quickly follow.
Washington and Whitehall now wanted to prepare the
106
.,_)
ground for negotiations between that government and the, ,
Patriotic Front. Malta helped. The PF accepted that the. ','
UN peapekeepers could have a role: but Mugabt tri11 .,,
insisted that the guerrilla leaders had to control security i
during the transition.,
'The trouble with Robert Mugabe,'said Young after'
wards, 'is that when you've got a Jesuit education mixed
with a Marxist ideology you've got a hell of a guy to
deal with.' Nevertheless, despite his public obduracy,'.'
Mugabe was mbving slowly towards a compromise on,
the basis of the Anglo-American plans'
it Both he and Nkomo were worried that Britain might.
yet recognise an internal settlement. If the 'puppets
'
Muzorewa and Sithole', as they liked to call them, were
recognised then sanctions could be lifted and that might
swing the war decisively in Salisbury's favour at the very ,
time their guerrilla armies could take control.
By March, and a meeting of the PF in Tanzania,
President Nyerere was forecasting quick agreement
on the Anglo-American package. President Carter an-
nounced a fresh plan for an all-party conference, the'
momentum was growing for a settlement including the PF.
Carter's secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, Owen .and.
Young got concessions but a rude shock when they met
Mugabe and Nkomo in Dar-es-Salaam in April.
There were important agreements on the role of the
president commissioner who would oversee the transition
period; on the part to be played by the UN force; even
that the Patriotic Front would not insist on controlling
the governing council.
But Mugabe held out absolutely for his forces having
'the dominant role' in the security forces during the
transition; and he stuck firmly to his demand that the
only negotiating parties would be the Patriotic Front and
the British.
Despite all that, Mugabe said yes, they were prepared
to attend a conference.
107

i.,i;,
;patently clear
t .':,r. 'r-------J that they had misjudged the influence the
i"",, ., ,two
--'
;:, 1*o
, Nationalists had.
.:,,,:,.^':.:,,.
:,';:., ,
.:,
Just dozens, not hundreds, of guerrillas had taken
''' . iidvantage of an amnesty. Now Muzorewa and Sithole
, set about building their own armies. i
,,,'
j,,' Zanu's strength in the field now stood at about 8000
:i' men, Zapthad infiltrated about a quarter of that number
- 1' into the western front. It meant that the white farming
' mustered their customary superiority in firepower.
', ' communities were now in the front line, isolated and often
'. , surrounded: they were ambushed, kidnapped, blown up
' , by landmines. The reasons for staying on diminished
, rapidly as the guerrillas stole their cattle, wrecked the
, :. cattle-dips which prevented disease among the herds, and
forced an increasing number of their African labourers
,,'r ,:to
desert. For settler communities now going into their
,' third generation, 1978 was the beginning of the end. In
the beautiful Penhalonga valley, north of Umtali and just
'l across the border from Mozambique, just a handful of
families stayed where there had once been over a hundred.
Those who did now formed beleaguered pockets of white
,,resistance. Mugabe's war meant they didn't go out at
night, they travelled for supplies in heavily guarded con-
voys, their wives even worried about answering the phone
' for fear of telling guerrilla spies that they were on the
farm. Ian Smith liked to talk about the inventive spirit
of the.Rhodesians. They now turned to making abizarre
assortment of mine-protected vehicles, often converting
landrovers into mini-armouries with automatic machine-
r08
prevent 'subversion' by the guerrillas and stop them t':a'lit,'
giving help to Mugabe's men, were no longer deemed ';,;i";;,
i...riury 6y the gor.rrr*.nt inthe eastern highlands and ', ' :i,:ii,
the south-east. The men who guarded them were needed ,-,';,',,:iT:
to hold off the guerrilla advance towards towns in the ", ,,'!;:,t:.'
area. :, . '..,ljri'
The government wouldn't admit but there was little , ',,irli,
point in having protected villages when the guerrillas ,' 1,,,,,;1,
already controlled most of the surrounding countryside. '
":';
Guerrilla claims to control of up to 70 per cent of the ' '.'."i
countrywerepatentlyfalse.Therewere,infact,fewareas
that the security forces could not go into once they had
1
But the tide of the war had turned. The guerrillas, for :
the first time, were winning. It was, as Mugabe would
tell journalists visiting Maputo, only a matter of time.
It might be one yeat, possibly five, but the result would
be the same.
From May till October Mugabe was to launch an inter-
national offensive, travelling thoubands of miles in search "
of moral and material support. He visited Moscow (where
his poor relations with the Russians in Mozambique
precluded him seeing any one of great importance),
Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. The Chinese were
having their own problems at home after the death of
Mao and the arrest of the gang of four. Supplies of arms
and ammunition from Peking were running low. Through
patient negotiations Mugabe was winning help from the
Eastern bloc, never from Russia directly, bdt through
Romania, Yugoslavia and Iraq. When he met Castro for
the secon( time in a few weeks, at Ethiopia's revolution
day celebraiions in September, they formatty sealed long-
109
"'" , passing of capital punishment, but we will have him tried
rir-i ,:[v in."p.opte - if Uv the time we take over he will still
, '
be around.'
i'. '"
Smith, it seemed, had every intention of being around
for some time to come. The internal settlement had got
him nowhere. To end the war, he had to have recognition
Britain and America. He might get it if he could
i. , from
persuade Nkomo to join it. Smith's summer offensive was
) the British helped.
Smith and Nkomo met in Lusaka with absolute secrecy
about it to theirrespective 'paltners', Muzorewa and
Sithole on Smith's side, Mugabe on Nkomo's.
Nkomo was, to say the least, attracted by Smith's offer
to make him effectively head of government until elec-
tions were held. Nkomo, out of self-protection more than
, anything else, wanted Mugabe included in the settlement.
If not he would have a war on his hands too.
They agreed to meet a few days later and invite
Mugabe. What followed was arguably the most bnarrc
highlight of years of distrust, suspicion and emnity not
only between Nkomo and Mugabe but amongthe nation-
alists in general. Nkomo simply could not bring himself
to tell ('confess'migtlt be more appropriate) Mugabe that
' he had been negotialing with Smith without him. It was
left to the Nigerians, who had actively encouraged the
talks. They called Mugabe to Lagos and gave him the
news. He was enraged and refused on the spot to see
Smith. So, too, were Nyerere and Machel when they
found out about Kaunda's'involvement.
Mugabe and Nkomo met in Lusaka at the beginning
of September. Nkomo's version,- that Smith seemed
ready to surrender, so he had talked to him - did little
to palliate Mugabe who was reported to have told
' Nkomo: oYou would just be another of Smith's puppets.'
tt2
Ivlugabe's iesistance.
Nkomo's men shot down a Viscount airline, ,"ur',,,''''""'
Kariba and massacred most of the survivors. There wai l, ,,,,
no way that Smith's white constituency would counten- :'i1
ance any negotiation with Nkomo. ,f i
within weeks the Rhodesian Ail Force was conducting, ', ,.i
bombing raids into Zambid with impunity. And thi , , ,, ,it:
'Unless Nkomo joins the internal settlement,' ssi6 :',:
Mugabe, 'we are confident that the Patriotic Front will ' ;,,1r
stick together. In the past few years we have managed, ' :,',,
against considerable odds, to keep Nkomo on the right . .,'ii
side. We have learned how to work with him and with tll
Zapu. In addition, there is the pressure from other l
African States and, of course, from the Zimbabwean , ,,I
people themselves. ,,
'No, I am certain there will be no war between the two '.,, r';!r;
components of the Patriotic Front.' , ', ,,.',.,'
There was still the war against the Salisbury Govern- ," ",,,
ment, however. And at the end of 1978 Mugabe ' ', ,.,
christened the new year'The Year of the People's Sto-rm'. .,',
However much Mugabe may have disliked the rhetoric ,:
,
of slogans and hyperbole - ancl he did - he recognised
theirpiopagandavalue.AndheusedthernwhenneceS.
' ' ;;
'The final blow, the most decisive knock-out by the _,',
people's mailed fist, must be effected soon,' he wrote to l',,
theZanla cadres in the field.'The enemy is battered and :
mustered reserves, remembering always that ours is a
,,.''',
people's war, fought by the people and for the people. ',ri ,.,.,,
'Victory assuredly awaits us and cannot elude us. . ",.
Never!' Others had seen another Mugabe, the leader ,,,
shorn of the dogma and need to lolster morale in the ,,',
field. A man, it seemed, of that African rarity, of both ' ",
intellect and principle. One such'viewing'of Mugabe was
u3

of his self-education, his understanding of world politics
and his belief in the ethics of his cause.
Above all, he showed just how adept hewas at tailoring
his vocabulary, presentation and theme to suit his audi-
ence. He was mastering t{re arts of political life which
.were to serve him so well as Lancaster House and after
independence. Here, for the first time, he was to reveal
them in the West.
To evident Italian amazement, he began with a mini
disqourse on Italian history - its transformation from
empire to democratic republic, through Mazzini and
Machiavelli to Mussolini and then to the present-day
Italy.
Southern Africa was going through something similar
and it needed help from those who had already reached
democracy. 'Our fighting front will forever need your
reinforcing rear,' he said.
He then took his audience through the history of the
'past year of negotiations: the impasse at Malta; PF
-the
icceptance of cardinal issues at Dar-es-Salaam; Smith's
secret talks with Nkomo; and abandonment by both
Washington and London, of the Anglo-American pro-
posals. ihrough the power of his argument, and the flne
weaving of his thesis, Mugabe led his audience to his
concluJion. 'Our belief remains that armed struggle is,
in our circumstances, the Only effective instrument for
achieving our goal of national independence and thus
creating peace in our countrY.'
It was the kind of verbal mastery that the Italians love,
especially their politicians. It won him a standing ovation.
'Whatever you may think about his politics and his war,'
said one cabinet minister from Italy's ruling christian
Democrat party, 'he convii.rT ,., because he seems to
almost all the,sides to the argument * and;still betiirve$i
is right.'
' At the end of the year Sally Mugabe wrote to Lady, ' j:,.j#
Walston. She had been in London in-the autumn, uirfti"; , ,'.'.ii1,1
a younger brother bf Mugabe's who was dying in hos- . ,it;*,
pital. But she had missed seeing the Walsto.ns. Now she . ,',irf'
brought them up to date. 'Regarding our struggle, we 'i 'ir;
are still at it you know. This year we congratulate our- i :-ii
selves for many achievements but we continue to be
cautious and guard against complacency, for the enemy '
',1'.',
has now been driven to desperation,' she wrote , -l
r,:;.,,.,,,i\
'All the fighting is at home inZimbabwe but the enemy ',, 11
continues to attack our rear base countries, inflicting .. l,:.
untold sufferings upon the people of Mozambique arld r ::
Zambia. The-reason is quite simple, to force these , .., ;l'{:;-i
countries to stop supporting the just struggle for freedom . . ,-i;
Fortunately, we have good friends who will always stand ,, 1.ro1'
byus. ' .
'Above all, we ourselves have the will to free our r , ,
country.... Sure, victory will be ours.' ',
Early in the new year Mugabe warned his Central ,, -,'
Committee that they should expect major diplomatic and ' ',
military offensives from the Western powers and Salis: '" ,..,
bury in the year ahead. , ',
He knew that Peter Walls would pe under strict order.s
to produce the best possible climate for the 'internal
settlement' elections in Aplil. Whatever chances the
settlement had of winning international acceptance
depended largely on a high turn-out beingcomplemented
by a down-turn in the war. That might persuade the West
to call the Salisbury Government 'representative'.
Mugabe's battle-plan was to step up the war, taking it
closer to the cities than ever before, while making his
army spread the message that the people must-boycott
the poll. This was the year of the People's Storm in the
People's War. The guerrillas must be educated to under-
'stand that they were now not just fighting but also
u5
;t'ituttCt ing, building a constituency for'whenever the party
'needed it now to'
;,: ilish|;;A-i. it prevent Smith,
ii',Miior"wa and Sithole winning'enough African support
, for
.,, . their settlement.
,|n December, the guerrillas had pulled off their most
audacious and embairassing attack of the war
to date, '
fibhg the biggest fuel depot in the heart of Salisbury
,,,l"nJ rt"iting a-five-day fire that consumed nearly a
most
;;thk r".T *pplies, Now Tongogara. issued the
, detailed orders fbr attacks on the capital tn January,
t of men were moved into the tribal trustlands
"nJr.ds
I I closest to SalisburY.
- -M"gabe he went the wrong way. 'If the people ate '
if '::,
realised that, if the election was even moder- sequences
, , ately sluccessful, he would come under pressure immedi- not prepared to fight in the struggle,' Mugabe said, 'then ' ' '

;i;ii from Britain and America to make his peace with
til;rw leaders in salisbury. To resist that, he needed
t i. independence more than ever' And he needed new
friends. In the first few weeks of the year' he was to
;;td;;usly nurture contacts, with the Ethiopians, the
C"Uurt una hit allies in the Eastern .bf9c.(nomania'
to Maputo in Maich. Mugabe did not see them' he care-
fully rcft it to Simon Muzinda. The Chinese invasion of
. vietnam,,was on their minds and before talking aid and
.-, arms, they asked Muzenda to issue'a statement with them
condemning Peking.
Muzenda, for ail his kind, avuncular charm' has a
temper. He told them he was extremely insulted by the
.trrgg.ttion.IfZanuwantedtoissueanysuchstatement
help from
- ira it didn't - it certainly would not require between
ttre iast Germans or anyone else. The'contract'
East Germany and zanu was over before it had even
. begun.
t:,1.1t1'.
diplomatic sorties had two very important effects on the
, W-ert..By moving, albeit very slowly, towards the Soviet
they must not expect to find themselves at the helm of
gor..n*.nt which is the result of the victories of the
ot8o"';;rred
to what had been feared, the elections were
a qualified success. Walls put on a massive show of fire'
power throughout the country in the final week of the
campaign, and, although there were clashes in the trust-
lands u-ear Salisbury, the guerrillas quickly opted to lie
low when they saw the enemy's numbers and affnoury.
The turn-out was better than expected. In the cities it
'was high, in the rural areas the guerrillas clearly were
able to keep the voters away. Muzorewa's victory was
by no means meaningless, as several independent ob-
servers noted: but the election overall still fell some way
short of persuading Britain and America to recognise the
government. Or did it? On 3 May Margaret Thatcher was
by a large majority, returning the Conservatives
" elected
to power for the first time sinde October 1974, the days
;rwhen Mugabe was still in detention and men like Sithole
,,',.rtere recognised nationalist leaders.
Loyd Boy.d, a former Conservative colonial secretary,
been sent by Mrs Thatcher to observe the election.
is verdict was that it had been as 'free and fair' as

ll6 tt7
 aaiionalists, be it on a military or a politicdl level,'inriiiiy
, !. ,.
several weeks
oossible. suir, Mugabe:was in Sweden'for
talks throughoul the countrv to
fi;;;;;
:irriirit,
.r""ii"n drine
university undergradu- Not even Mrsthut.htt thought she would succeed i1'
pipils ,,

.rrrgh-t.irJol getting an agreement for an all-party. conference at the'

-and
itbs. When sfre return.d.to Maputo' she foundJvlugabe
. seriously about the approutq.o-f the Thatcher
.ot..r*d Walston'
Government. She shared them, as shetold ludy
:t[r p.ritical situation in Zimbabwe, is ":*.11:::
;il"t,ttit time it seems, t"4v
t:h;';;.
':
Luruliu summit. Mugabe certainly didn't. He sent Edgar '.'
Tekereasanobserver-cum-lobbyistandhissecretary-'
general arrived in town with a statement positively,,. ',,
r1"':l:I: 6ristling with animosity towards the new British prime
i

"r"'# minister.
[off"#;i'"*
t3\'Ywr'r'v - u""i on doing ."*'til9-:1'-:lli:: 'Mrs Thatcher will be fighting to have the conference ',
irdinary, by lifting sanctions aid
,r-- .rrr.ti.rr't* and recognlslng an
I,llegal
totally ignore the vitally important question of the need
reglme. to get rid of the evil settler racist armed forces and have
-:

'It would create a very sad state of affairs' if' for her
the
to compromise them replaced by the people's patriotic force.
.ut. rtio,o6o *nittt, ilritain were
'She will fight hard to ignore this vital question because
"r Should this happtn, il: q"tttll-l would be:
pii*ipf.t. her racist mind deeply appreciates that the minority racist
;;, did gritain;ot t.tog"itl Smith's go"tn,,,tnt in 1965 settler interest will remain securely entrenched by the
. . . if Smith committed no
illegality? -.
on millions of people - racist settler forces on whose back treacherous Muzorewa'
'And'why suffering
"iiittit
sanctionr,.*.*,ions,decadesofimprisonment'broken
rides.'
,It may have sounded to Mrs Thatcher like something
niarriug.s, orPhans, widows etc etc? oirt of a Marxist primer, but she was not to be deterred.
that she is
'What dt.Ji;t Thatcher want to prove'
only be a racjst who She arrived exuding phrases like, 1I will not be bullied,
a racistt t srspect-st'e is ' " it would you know.'
regime"
.would unders-'co.e the Smith-Muzorewa She knew her greatest element would be surprise, and
But Mrs Thatcher was to surprise everyone -at lhe
in Luiaka at the b6ginning she played to it. When she made her opening address to
common*;il;;ference the conference virtually every delegation would have
of August. predicted bitter disagreement by the end of it.
was just like
On the face of it, the summit in Zambia Instead, they heard what they thought was an olive
made over the years
urry orr. of ttte dozens of attempts
branch. It quickly turned into what they could only inter-
the same
to get un ugr..*ent on Rhodesia' There were nee'd of pret as wholesale compromises from the British.
circumstances working for peace - the-desperate
The British prime minister was saying that her govern-
enable them
;h. f.on, Line Statt' fo' a peace that would and ment *ur p..iared to decolonise Rhodesia and bring it
togetheragain'
;.*"iitt.it tt ";;;ta ttono*its back
Kaunda and Nyerere to to independence just like they had Kenya and Tankan-
itte p.*onal wishes of men like
uroia having un irr.*utional conflict
in southern Africa. .yika. She knew Britain's responsibilities and she was
-determined
to fulfil them. Furthermore, she was saying
and Nkomo could not be the internal settlement was'defective' because its consti-
,': , -.primarily-ttrat Mugabe
anlthing less than equality with the tution gave the whites power disproportionate to their
.*i..,.0 to u"""pt 'l l9
ll8

,,.hammer out the details. Layer by layer, step by step, they
i','built a working agreement for an all-party conference to
r: CoilSider. Some wanted a peacekeeping force but that had
orninous memories of the Anglo-American plans. The
' transition and elections 'under British government
rrity wittr Commonwealth observers' cleared that
"rtt
,long-stanaing obstacle. After years of bitterness, suspi-
cion and distrust, there was agreement within a few hours.
No one exactly danCed in the streets, but Mrs Thatcher
did manage a waltz with Kenneth Kaunda.
No onryet knew whether Mugabe and Nkomo would
attend the conference, called for London in September.
But the agreement of'the Front Line States made it a
request theY couldn't refuse.
seemed a trifle lost for words. 'An
Fot on.., Nkomo
all-party conference?'he asked. 'What are all the parties?
We.(the PF) are ihe only factor in the situation''
When word came from Maputo, it was Mugabe
I d"rn"nding that the Rhodesian security forces be dis-
banded and replaced by the guerrillas. That was just one
pre{ondition for elections. Mugabe wouldn't say it, but
he was alreadY negotiating.
t20
Chapter 5 Lancaster House
-
It must have been an incongruous sight. The opening day
of the Lancaster House conference. The formalities over,
60-odd delegates retire to a reception in one of those
magnificent, huge gallery rooms overlooking St James's
Park. In one corner Ian Smith, sticking closely to mem-
bers of his own delegation, spies Josiah Tongogara in
another. Mugabe's General and Mugabe's enemy number
one nod at each other. They had last met in Gdneva four
years before, but their ties went back a lot further - to
Tongogara's childhood in Selukwe, Smith's home town
south of Salisbury. As a child 'Tongo' had helped on tfre
Smith homestead. Come harvest time he, along with the
rest of his family, would work on the Smith farm. It was
25 years since Tongogara had been there but he remem-
bered Grandma Smith, Ian Smith's mother.
Tongogara's massive-frame belied a ruthless general.
It also concealed his extraordinary gentleness with those
he liked. He made the first move.
JHow is the old lady?' he asked Smith.
'V.ry well, thank you, although she's much older now,'
Smith replied.
Tongogara smiled.
, 'Please send her my warm wishes,' he said. 'I've often
thought of the old lady. She used to give me sweets, you
, Smith would never talk about that conversation.
I Tongogara liked to and weeks later - when the conference
was set to collapse, with the Smith-Muzorewa Govern-
m-ent going home to probable recognition from Britain
and war from Tongogara's men - he was to recall it as
, the moment when he realised for the first time there could
be a negotiated peace.
t2t

flnd,Tongogara versus Smith and Walls, it wasn't.about
,i:i,,
i',' Black versus White, but the system, the system of oppres-
slon. ..
' 'I didn't want to destroy'Smith or the
,,
i, ,
old lady. I did
wanl to destroy the system he had built.'
The Mugabes had arrived in London on 7 September.
British Special Branch had specially chosen the Royal
,: Garden Hotel in'Kensington Uigh Street for the 40-
, :strong Zanu delegation. It's.a modern, high-rise block
r:, felatirrely easy to secure and they were genuinely worried
about Mugabe's safety, more than any other delegate to
the conference. At once security became an issue.
Memories of that hotel fire in Geneva were long. Mugabe
was uncomfortable enough already in an expensive hotel
' which his frugality didn't need. He wanted his own body-
guards. The British insisted on special Branch being theie
as well. They won, and Mugabe was to spend the next
fifteeq weeks surrounded day and night by two members
of Special Branch and two of tris o*n lunu .protocol'
unit. The closest the four of them got was in a discuspion
over respective hand weapons.
Nkomo, lvfuzorewa, even Smith had some to the con-
: ference quietly optimistic of a settlement. Mugabe was
, anything but. More than anyone, he had always believed
, i, the 'Armed Struggle' almost as an end in itself to
prepare his party for power. By the time he arrived, he
was not only sceptical but also cynical about the chances
of an agreement. If he had to return to war, it would
be no great loss. He was deeply suspicious of Mrs
Thatcher and the Conservatives. He believed, to a large
extent, that Lancaster House would simply enable t[e
' Tbries to justify recognition of the Muzorewa-Smith
, Government and so palliate the right-wing of the Con-
:' 122
servative Party, 'The Julian Amerys of this world,? as he
.called them.
' caught very briefly in the lobby of the Royal Garfu,'ll
on the weekend before the conference opened, hs \r/as,an .i
apparent model of intransigence.
'we have not come here to negotiate with Sniith, orl ,,
principle of majority rule. we have come here 6 negotiate
with the British the transfer of poqer. Nothing-else is
for discussion.'
It sounded like a replay of Geneva. Except that this time
Mugabe was determined not to make the same mistakes.
For a start, he wasn't going to lose the propaganda battle.
Mugabe knew from d.n.ua that there wouri u. ur *".r,
negotiation in public - on television, in the papers as
-
in the conference room. Accordingly, this timl Zanu *u,
goilg to negotiate with the hel[, if not through, the
media. For that purpose Mugabe himself had -chosen
Eddison Tvobgo,an American-educated lawyer who had
become de facto Information Secretary in zinuafter the
purge of Gumbo two years earlier. zvobgo liked to boast
that he'd been the master of ceremonieJat the very first
zanu press conference, in Sarisbury in 1963, that he had
friends from Ethiopia's bolonel irrlnegistu to
_ranging
Teddy Kennedy, and that, above all, he had M-ugabe,s
ear. In the weeks to come he was to grab headlines-Quite
literally. His flair for producing the qrict and easy quote
for pressmen, and performinglor thi terevision cameras
was very conscious. It culminated in one bizarre evening
just l0 days before peace was signed, when he was
to
tell Mrs Thatcher to 'jump in the Thames'and suggest
that she was 'in.concubinage with satan Botha,"lthe
So11h African prime minister).
The tone and nature of both his argument and language
led the Foreign office to denoun.. hi,n in private as ttre
wild man of the conference - 'he likes a drink a little too
t23

.i;:ri,r, ,otily too well how his partner in the Patriotic Front could
.',, put his foot init. Zvobgo, as a constitutional lawyer, was
plade the senior Front spokesman to avoid that. He
;r,, .,,
',,,,'wo'uld handle the media, usually for both of them.
,
Furtherrnore, Zvobgo was under strict orders to push the
hard line. While Mugabe might be making concessions
,':. ,, :i'fi conference, Zvobgo would be fighting for and defend-
',,i ing the Armed Struggle in the eyes of the world.
,,' ' , The only other pessimist on Day One was peter
,',,, Carrington. When Mrs Thatcher won the election in
,'r,, May, the Foreign Secretary quite clearly had options
other than this quest for an all-party settlement. The tide
,r in the Conservative Party, as Mugabe knew well, was
of sanctions, and the chance flor General Walls to do what
I .he'd always preached. Smash the Patriotic Front. It
would have been condemned by every government in
Africa apart from Pretoria, decried at the United
:
nations, hammered by the Commonwealth. But it would
have palliated the right-wing of the Conservative party,
':
,
Mrs Thatcher's own power base after all. And the right
argued: 'Do it now and weather the stgrm; Put it off and
', you'll never get the likes of Mugabeio the negotiating
, table anyway.'
'", , That Lord Carrington didn't take that low road .= as
, , it undoubtedly would have been - says everything about
".1 ' ' the mpn and his particular brand of politici. ttrere have
, been those even among his supporters who have thought
'', . of him as 'the gentleman amateur'. The label devalues
, ,r the quality of his intellect and the strength of his purpose.
t.' ' 124
. Carfingtoru in hi1 earlr days,in politics, was ,a
disciple
of Harold Macmillan. As such, hii first piir., or.ei.["
was the'wind.of change'speech. Macmilran's trigh i;ry
tine in that had been sitain's,er;;;;il-tiiil;;;;coronies
in Africa. Historically, Macmillan said, *L .Ou.utl;;;;
li
lifted the people of Africa, we supplied everythingf;;
missionaries to armies, teachers to traders. Now-it was
I B_ritain's duty to lead them to independence r.rporriuty.. ,
I
His warning was thar failure to rutru that responisbiliiy
would see the west outflanked by Moscow in the ,o*
'
It was this philosophy that had now brought carring-
ton to the high road on Rhodesia high-risk rnaybe bit
-
the only route f9r a politician with hiJstrong principtes. -
Ethics apart, however, carrington'had g6f tr.t y, as
one of his aides joked after Lusaka. The coirmonwealth
summit - and that remarkable meeting of the Front Line
states - had shown a genuine appetite-for peace. Nyerere
' of Tanzania couldn't afford- ihe war much ronglr,
Kaunda of Zambia might not survive if it went on,
Machel of Mozambique had realised it was a ttrreat-io
his young revolution. Individually none of them was
likely to persuade Mugabe and Nkomo into peacel
collectively they gave carrington a strong lever on them
both to pursue a settlement. Not at any pri.e, Uuf .Lr_
tainly on terms that wourd have been unthinkubre even
a few months before.
carring,or'r Fo..ign office riked to tark in euphem-
isms. Rhodesia, they said, was 'ripe for, the pickingr.
carrington himself had another phrase. He wanted io
'lance the boil' once and for a[. Still, in the ouv, juri
before Lancaster House, the Foreign Secretary was pessi-
mistic. He really didn't believe, ,"h., it cami to it, that
he would succeed where so many others had failed.
He knew he could have an agreement with Muzorewa,
the low road, the 'second-cliss solution' as the press
called it. He sensed that he could bring Nkomo in too.
t25
 But Mugabe? Time and again in the weeks to come
carrington would be asked that one. And time and again
he would come with the answer that no politician likes
to give: 'I don't know.'

Mugabe, even by his own admittance, made a srow start

to the conference. He was at best 'quiet' (his own
at tirnes 'downright bullish' lthe Foreign
estimate),
office), to his enemies 'disinterested becauie he's going
to walk out anyway' (Muzorewa). FIe realisea rrorn oay
one that this was going to be a long conference unless
-
he did walk out. By the end of September, wittr the
conference still haggling over procedure, he and sally
moved to an apartment in Bayswater. some delegates,
Iike Ian smith, took a delight in sightseeing and titirrg
in a football match every weekend. The Mugabes had i

time only for the conf,erence and the long cen-tral com- Sally driving home her own message
mittee meetings that followed almost every session at 1980. (Neil Libbert) - zjmbabw. Groundr, 27
Lancaster House. The.ir huge flat was always crowded,
!p to 20 people stayiirg at times. Sally had brought a
handful of zanu of,fice girls from Mapuio. From the way
she organised the shopping, the laundry and meals, it was
clear the Mugabes were digging in for a long stay in
London.
As his performance in conference betrayed, Mugabe
was unhappy. The rows with smith and Muzorewa
through the chair over who controlled what in Rhodesia
and who had a right to be at I-ancaster House were
routine rhetoric. what worried him was the stance of the
British. He already recognised a policy of attrition in
carrington, designed to wear him down into concessions.
Orcasionally, Milgabe lost his temper with .the good
Lord'as he called hirn with his best strain for the sardonic
- and suspicion.
'We will not be bullied, Mr Chairman,' he would tell
carrington in a voice trembling with anger and frustra-
tion. 'we have n't fought the war to give it all away in
126
 'Lord Soames must choose
u:ffiry&
Mugabc spc:rking at thc Fort
between war and pcacc' Mugabc Victori:r r':rlly. thc last ol'his
A face in the crowd - zimbabwe Grounds,2T Jantary 19g0. (Neil rtddresses an clcction rally at Irort crunlxrigrr. ( lt nt rt lt I I errmu nn,
Libberr) Victoria, l0 February 1980, about Surtduy'l'imc,s)
an hour before an abortive
rrssassination attempt . ( popperfoto)

&
A party worker covers the leader
with the cockerel, symbol of
ZANU (PF) as Mugabe chats to
Muzenda, Mugabe and Edgar Tekere at the press conference after the
supporters in Salisbury. February
attack on his home in Quorn Avenue, February 1990. (popperfoto)
1980. (Neil Libbert)
 rd

53q
. . .tit

. .- 'a-:,-i.t:
.: 1.-1.r*11.'ir:.rl

Mugabe hears the news of the landsliJe ar home in

Avenue -
4 March 1980. (Frank Herrmann, Sunda-y Times) eriom
 &
'€

t )ld rivals, old enemies in one goverrrment'- prime Minister vr"gru. *a

to
lrrlcrior Minister Nkomo take up their seats in the new Zimbabwe iE
The new First Lady of Zimbabwe - Sally at home on the day of the 1-:
election result. (Geolf Dalglish, Camera Press) I';rrlianren! March I 980. (Popperfoto)

The Mugabes at home in Quorn Avenue after the result is announced, N lrrl';rlrt'. Lord Soamcs and Nkomo share a joke as thc new Govcrn
4 March 1980. (Geo/f Dalglish, Camera Press) inil()unccrl :rl Cior,cl'nrncnt IJousc. March 1980. ( PoltJttrlitlo)
 a matter of minutes.' Before long Mugabe had come to
the conclusion that the Foreign S.cr.tury was prepared
to go ahead with the second-class solution. Indeed, he
believed the bargain had been struck even before the con-
ference started. But he was determined that, if the con-
ference were to fail, international opinion would not
condemn him for going back to war. unlike Geneva, he
would be seen this time to have exhausted all the possi-
bilities for peace.
It was in this spirit that he and Nkomo agreed to the
British constitution on l8 october. 'It's no more than
a way of lettipg the conference go forward,' Mugabe
confided to a handful of reporters that night, .it rdoesn't
mean we like it.' It wasn't surprising zanu didn,t like it.
I-t was hardly a blueprint for Sociariim. The whites, even
though they'd lost the de facto veto they had under the
smith-Muzorewa settlement, would be guaranteed z0 per
cent of the seats in the new parriament. And on land ihe
constitution protected property rights to a degree that
made Zanu's long-time promise to redistribute i=he white
farmlands to the people look hollow, if not downright
false. Mugabe didn't say it but he was keeping his powder
dry (if the Foreign office riked farming ind medical
terms, zanu always turned to guns) for the two issues
that mattered most to him -1te transitional period
Ieading to elections and the ceasefire.
)

Nevertheless, Zvobgo fired a shot for him with the first

of the warnings that were to haunt the conference from
here on in. 'If ca*ington carries on the way he has
begun,
plotting with the puppers (Muzorewa and -Smith), we will
go back to war. And have no doubts, Lord caiiington,
there will be no peace.
There were those at the Foreign office who berieved
that up till now Nkomo and Mugabe had been stalling
for time to get their men back across the borders from
Zambia and Mozambique. The conference, they argued,
would now push ahead. They failed to recogniseitre grave
M. -E t27
 ri

: certainry didn't- The commander-in-ct ffiU;*:H::f,X ] noriticar sorution. Do you stlr

ffik',believe that's possible? :.
or^P.ete1!va[s
the Rhodesian Forces i"r ,ii, Walls: Yes, I think we are getting it. Surely what is
i*,. third
week or october. H; ;; ;"r.i"J-in-i;il;;i"
;;;. the minds-ofbveryone. ,, happening now is exactly what people like myself have
.'i'IlI,3l Smith had confi"ra-t
,, of Mugabe
i*r.rr,it r-"Jriiolrur snipe r, been suggesting should happen. I don't believe that you ',
across the conference table, General
Walls
''
can have a political solution without having military ,
, wry. to stop little short or a rrlsn decraration
r

strength and stability, without having economic stability .: ,

, six months before, walls ilJbr;;;;iirire of war.

and growth, resilience, but the point iJthatwith theevolu-- r,
that salisbury wourd be threatened priratety ,

within a year unress 1 - tion that we have now, with ourgovernment's acceptance
thele was a settlement. Now te
ra* a dear with the British of [he British proposals, I beliive there is a way opgn ,

," as the way to finish off the patriotic for a fairly quick return to normality as far as the ioliiics
' 0nished him. On.Saturday
Fr;; b.f;re they
Zl OctoAer, after th. torgt.rt scene is concerned.
backstage barc.lining of'the *irrp-
conference, Bishop Smith: But with or without the patriotic Front?
Muzgrlwa swallo*rd hi, nrrce pride Walls: With or without the Patriotic Front, thank you,
,o air_
mantle his government, step down "rd;g.r;h
as prime ,inirtrl you have answered it. I don't care. But there is a chance
hand over. power to a British governor. "-J
Carrington,s , for political stability. In fact if the British proposals go
game-plan - of getring Muzorewiand throug(r there will be political stability. Sanctions will be
first, then turning
tt, *uJ[,
io ugr., ,

6 M;il; and Nkomo with the lifted, we will be recognised not just by the British but
second-class sorution arreaiy achieved by the rest of the world, I hope, by all fairminded people
The pressure was on the Front to - ;;; *orr,ing. and I believe most of them have already indicated t[at
accept or be locked
out. At Mugabe's apartment, some they will acbept us.
of his aides ru* ioril
comedy in it. Smith: But if the Front doesn't come in, General, the
, you heard about the conversations
^'Have
Carrington and Muzorewut, on.-oiii., between
Walls: That's right. And then the Front will
.rlro. be
'Peter (Carrington) rings up_Abel demolished.
will youf'-
@r;;;a) and says
,. :,1.b:! on, Peter, i; *[i.n r*a*o..*" ;;;ilr, ..Before Mugabe was incensed, Tongogara no less so. And
-r--' worse still for Carrington, Walls had imrieasurably
Yo}€;o the answer's yes.,',
walls was anything but right-'t;;.ted about deepened the Front's mistrust of Salisbury at the very
the agree-
ment between Murorr.*; ,;; ilre nritisrr. moment when the Foreign Secretary was trying to per-
'' i;; days later
suade Mugabe and Nkomo that they must'accept the
lt. agreed to give his first inilrrir* to David smith. Even
*lo'{ once gi; his troops the simpre
for the man machinery of the Salisbury Government as the only one
,1 'the terrorists don't *tJn iunduyr, n.itt r, *i[ we,,edict and
capable of leading the country to electirons. The British
.,:wgs apt-to rymaqk-that any one of his men.could see proposals for the transition leading to a poll were un-
t,: offa helluva lot of terrorists;, it was a- ..,,u.r.uure
'v'r'srr\s( dispray
equivocal: the governor would base his administration
of strength. on the white-dominated civil service of Salisbury and he
Smith: General, you have said for some Would keep law and order during the campaign through
,,t, time now that
the existing Rhodesian police force. The iupieme com-
t.'; 128
129
 goli::,rr.r.u ruas peter waus. '
'
ilii'" ' *.?l*l:l^t*l
"-,- -r beriev_e the English have a phrase about smelring a 'but b-ecause the native people themselrres took up,arrns
iilnd fgught
fouaht and conditions then became rirht for
hecsme right i^" th.
i'';:,: f:;'i:1 1:P*" inlgne oit i' rtsil,ifuil;onferences, the
'",iiili'lrl' i,r,lnrell,
we smell a rat.' iiiipolonial power to appoint a governor ... nrJgritirt ,re
l, appointing that governor because the Patriotic Front
t,'.,, , .twodays that interview,
Mugabe , decidea to ngnt Smith ... so really the patriotic Front
l_,' the offensive inside 1ftr,
',3rnlj:l.lbet
y_:Tlgn the conference room for the , i 31s rlhes of the British and really
Britain, he said, was using the conference thly ought to be reated,r'
,1"-. Ill_riTr.auout the capitulation of the patriotic Front.
to ' that way ... and Walls ought to be sacked.'
!ry.s The
British plans we.e a ptot to bring M;;;;;u i'
,J ro*.r. off to have Lord and Lady Walston to lunch. At last,
The country would u. tra to .rtiion,
stration biased towards Muzorewa.
;;;;""i;;i: Mugabe felt free to talk - and Lord Walston felt strongly
enough about their meeting .to write personally to
, 'Bring in the uN with a peacekeeping force, he insisted. Carrington the following day.
:

p3"trilston's 'No' *ur i one-word irr*.i.

l{ugabe's voice was now raised in genuine anger. .If
The point of principle.made by Nyerere in Dar-es-
evel Salaam was crucial, Lord Walston wrote.
theS was case for a UN peacekieping for;,
this 'To understand Mugabe's approach, one has to recog-
was it. But we will win without tt i,
coniJ.ir*, .r"n nise that his thinking ,and attitudes are based on the
through it may take time ...-unf.rs Lord
Cuiiingron deep-rooted conviction that the British government is
relents, we will pack our bags and go
back
-not to *ur., negotiating with what is still a rebel regimi and that any
Peter Walls, by all accoun-ts, did *V
"-*"iO '' moves ih the past few years towards a settlement haye
been brought only by tlre Patriotic Front's activities.
In the next f.y d1Y:l Mugabe was ro enlist the
support 'In addition, Mugabe has a mistrust of Lbrd Carring-
. oj his friends in Africa. da*ington, lr. i;it;"had to be ton and some other political figures. We hope we may
.shocked out of the belief that th-e F;o;; iin, bt"tes did
want peace at almost any price and wourd pressure have had some influence'in allaying these feirs at least
him ". so far as the Foreign Secretary is concerned. However, we
;,,' into.ending the war, whatever the concerrioor.
'First :, would urge some informal personal contacts
the Mozambicans.
'The ultimata, the blackmail and the '4pa.t fiom the fact that he undoubtedly wishes for
constant sugges- a peaceful settlement, our main impression was that
Patriotic Front are arrogant Mugabe had grave doubts about the openness of the
.On
attitud!;-rrd;; govern- British side in the negotiations. while hi accepted that
many occasions, ifr" i.p...entatives
iTlir,y"pulo:
ot Britain
HMG was very anxious to achieve a settlement, he
lreat have tried to substitute the need forcrear
and cohstructive dialogue with threats,- pirrru.,
', believes that they are strongly in favour of Muzorewa,
impositiol .:: they areirlunirirg the conditions una i' and are working to ensure that he is head of the nexi
for a Government.
civil war in Zimbabwe.,
talks would succeed and the fighting would stop, he was
.l' not prepared for a peaceful itution
because the coroniar powri;;;; r"rgrriir,* r"u"t,
except under the
"ia ,,r,,:,'4ght conditions, and would continue the armed struggle
130
r3l
 .: ..:),: l:.:'i.:,r,1....::.,. .''',,,,_,t..;.;;t..., . .'t ., ,': -t .' i, ,

i *
i.',,., Taeeoyltllot ger:satilfabtion on thg:outsrarrdit gpuirtr.i
,.i, ,l ,*,,Yg gryUl to ernphdsise justithat;'Mffiue"f,il;;
ffi',,rrrgabe
ffi;iners, iiwas
and Nkomo had always been unhappy purr- '
a coalition of convenience rather than mutual ' , ,li+
, or commgn goals._It wasn-t just the tribal rivalry ' '
,,|,jhropra 3ust two days after that lunch tJsee colonei ,fl;i :re-sryect '.tl
and discuss the training of zanrareiruits, - Mugabe being Shona; Nkomo, Ndebele. Ideologically,..
x:,lgfprnstructof, under ,

, yruDun lt a camp just outside Addis Ababa. they were worlds apart. Nkomo was a nationalist before
'i' $9a3-yhil-e the voice or zimuabwe, the radio station he was a socialist, Mugabe a socialist before he was a
f , Machel had set up for Mugabe in Maputo nationalist. Mugabe disliked what he saw as Nkomo's
' llll9-tqt for
,, ,lT^1"_ lroaclclst to-his men in the bush, carried a per_ expediency - arms from Moscow, financial support frory
message from him to the troops. He the Lonrho mining Empire. He himself jealously pro-
,t9"ul told them to
,,, r'rignote Lancaster House and step up operations inside tected his independence ('China is a friend but no more,,i',,:'
. Rhodesia.. He
:rg:q Uv ,"ying,
;coirria..,'ii u, guin I than that') and had always insisted that there would be ..:, ,
, ', freedom from British.Lrooiui rure. A Lotta continua!, no strings attached to any help he got. Above all, there
'r^Sulr-r:_g,,?: was to remark that despite all the warnings, was the deep mistrust of allies who know they will :

ne'o neard no one suggest that Mugabe had ultimately be rivals. Mugabe had had little faith in
: warked o-ui
,, ,sf 11r. conference. peace
was sti[ on. Just. Nkomoeversincehe,dflirtedwiththeinternalsettlement
of Smith and Muzorewa back in the autumn of 1977. ,i,;
', , on 8 November Kenneth Kaunda, never a man Furthermorb, Mugabe privately accused Nkomo of not , -,:
; the internationar stage, flew to London. His worriesto weremiss
takingafairshareofthewar.Mugabe'slos.seshadbeen
t rgjly the same as Nyerere,s and Machel,s _ that Nkomo
,'.,':
much greater in the past few years, and it was no secret ',,' ,,

' ardYyglU. would not be given a f;ir;h;n.r ro negotiate that even now Nkomo was keeping back well-traineO ,,,_
"' u deal and so would ibandon'the units in Zambia. Indeed, it was to be one of the most
tir
But Kaunda
conference..
had something erse on his mind as well. alarming discoveries for the Commonwealth monitoring ,'.
force that when they arrived in Rhodesia they were to ' ,,i
findunitsofthetwomen,sarmieshadbeenfightingfor
peace that might not bi worth the pape; ii *"r signed control in certhin areas in the weeks leading up to peace
!n: He'd come to urge unity and moderation, in
that . - mainly in the south-west near Beitbridge and around ,l
orcer. the Midlands town of Gwelo.
",: - Mug.abe and many leading members of his centrar In the conference to date, the two leaders kept up a
, committee always
',t
ihat Kaunoa trao been ansuspected 'show of unity but it was clearly little more than ttiat. For
:, , architect of peace at Lusaka because he felt
trr* ti.t *1, the television cameras they would appear together,
right for Nkomo to return to Rhodesia ngrr, Mugabe always uncomfortable, uncharacteristically
""0
election. And that Kaunda would have sanctioned "i
an quiet and subdued in the presence of Nkomo, who seemed
, lgreement-that excluded Mugabe. Kaunda was, in fact, to enjby dominating the interview. On one occasion
' ' desperap fo1 peac.e more betause of the .ffoo-;f;; Mugabe, entering a studio in the basement of Lancaster
war on zamb-ia thdn any hopes he nurtured for House and seeing Nkomo waiting for him to join him,
Nkomo.
,., 1:d^ he was bitterly upr.t oier the decision to sprit the backed off saying that he was sure both of them would
for the election' prefer to be interviewed separately. Realising how em-
r32 133
 'f,gfrassinel'*efusut *iffi be','li"' Jid,,tn"l'fi e*,witfi polpe siren$ and'outriderd eieorting: tiiim, When't li
Nkomo - and then promptly totd his puur"iiv
,''to allo:w it to happen sgiir,
-:- rr"" n.'# foundeach other, in heavy trafhc on the Bayswater
opposite Hyde Park, one of Mugabe's aides totl
:

..
The8ritishw&i ail tio aware of the tension between press: 'Carrington can cool his hols for a while.'Th'e,.;,
the-two and there was no doubt that, if carrington
had Foreign Secretary'was not amused. He.was furious, his :,

settled for the seoond-class solution, he woulo trav

triei apger barely veiled in the statement gtven by his spokes- :

pj.t in on it. There *u, rcrii;;Hd;oreisr rnan, Nicholas Fenn, at four o'clock. 'The Chairman,' : ,,'
.
oq:: \komo
that Nkomo was at heart "a frieni of thl -British,
said Mr Fenn, 'regrets their discourtesy.'
.malleable' -' . 1,,,i
f1,r11^?-?ng :nore than Mugabe.l. migt i 'On the seventh floor of the Londgnderry hote['
Denc_to the right package. It had always been
a *r[o, Kaunda heard Mugabe and Nkomo list a series of bitter
plemise in the carrington strategy that to j.i-t
tug"b., complaints against the British proposals.
and Muzorewa in one siitrement uh trrr.r'i-ri
.Nkl.q
nao to leave tancaster House berieving ihey.wourd
- Mugabe said he couldn't accept Salisbury'scivil sorvice'- -,,
win trnd"police force run the country till elections. 'Thei efe
the election. For no one was that more applicable,
the both under the control of men who have been loyal to
Foreign Office believed, than jornuu Nkomo.
Smith since the beginning of UDI,' he said. ' rr'r",,'; "
loyalties, their prejudices will not change and their io6ir- '1'';:
C.arrington met Dr Kaunda at Heathrow, concerned
r about what his message ence at every level, especially the grass roots, could ruin
would be, but pleased to see him. our chances in an election.' . ' ,:
The conference needei a catalyst, prrh"p, .Ka,
,

was the In reply, Kaunda offered no easy solutions but a simple , ,

' -man.. T.he zambian prestd;i said similv tr*t he was warning. There was no stomach in Zambia, in Mozam: , ,.
,,1

worried, profoundly, at the lack of progi*r at

Lancaster bique, in Tanzania for the war any more. That didnit, .,
f,Iouse, and then took himself off to in" r"roonderry
medn peace at any prige, but it did mean a lot more grve , ,
Hotel in Park Lane to await the steady stream of calrers.
and take by both'sides than there had been so far..ttre
lpven the leader of Britain's opposition Labour party, conference had come further down the road to a settle-
James callaghan, turned up toiay that he fert just [[e
- Kaunda. The Governmeni must do the .h";;;;i;
ment than anything before, he said. Surely there was fl
way out of the deadlock? Nkomo had expected"this
thing'and include the patrioticF;.;;";;r.;"", in
,

any counsel of conciliation, Mugabe had noL Perhaps for the

settlement, he said.
2.3-q tha! afrernoon Mugabe left his apartment,
-.At
-Nkomo
his hotel. At three o'clJck they werl JIL to giu.
carrington an answer on the British pr"p"*rr for the
transition, at Lancaster House. But neitil.riruJuny
inten-
tion-9f1foing that, or even showing up at trr".".r.rence
3t all. T!., were off to see presid.ni K"rnda instead.
It was to be one of the comic moments ortne conference.
w_ent to Nkomo,s hotel, Nkomo drove
Yugu-U"- to
Mugabe's flat, and they missed each other in
the wail
first time he realised that he could be going back to war
alone. And that was a prospect to sobei the rnost militanl
on his Central Committee.
That night President Kaunda saw Mrs Thatcher at
Downing Street. To her, he also urged compromise. It
, was no afterthought that he stressed the import-
' . once of sudden
re-starting maize supplies up through Rhodesia
from South Africa to the starving of Zambia. Kenneth
i(aunda, said a senior member of tn" Foreign Office,
knew peace could mean his political salvation.
. r35
 .:1]i.i.:.:,'-:-,:-'.'.:,,.1',.1:';
-. The predident left three days later, quietly optimistic
,,that Mugabe afid Nkomo would agree-to pedce even-
r tually. He was giving little away on what the compromisel
liii i r i,I9re, but it -wa-s a clear quid pro qu6. .\I-ugabe and
ig'1.' ,. Nkomo would have to accept that the civil service in
iilu , . ,qaHsbury.provided the only machinery of government for
,' : the transition, there was no time to build another. In
",'r.
,;';',.j return, their armies would be given exactly the same
: : status as the forces of Salisbury. Peter Walls would have
I t'.i,- to keep the peace just like Nkomo and Mugabe.
, Ian Smith didn't know the outcome of Kaunda's
,,. , mediation Qut his instinct told him what to expect. Flying lour forces are now lawfur
,' ,:" horfle to Salisbury on the final day of Kaundals stay, he forces,' he said with un.',.,..:.iuf
-blard mistakable jubilation that night.",io
;. ,r'1" gave one of those extraordinary and bluff inter- added: 'What more do we *uoi?l
which ,;;bg; ,,,,iiii
, .:,
' . views that had become his trademark over the 14 years Iot more,' said Mugabe.
.

of UDI. 'I have no doubt that the Patriotic Froni will 3

The British wele derighted. 'To those
,, ,;i,',;
loin the settlement,' he said. lAnd I must accept that. been working at Rhode-siu ior 14
of us who have ,;|,,,r{i
, There's no point in Smithy staying out in the cold. The ;;;,"i, il.,,,
miracle,' said one of carrington's top adviser;.
like a :

'referee has blown the whistle, the game's over.'

walls was less enthusiastic. ft's nonsense,o
e;;:; ,, , ,,,,,,,

; Not quite. It was only'four days later that Mugabe, rrgg;;r-r,

have equatstatus with us,'he tord jo;;;;Iil. .iF"nyuoo
:, ,,..i1;i

-uno y :,,:il.:
shoots at us, we.will stop them Ii;; ;il;;
,,orr,, . i ,,.:
,,;

The fact was that cariington was two-third's

dry language of negotiation that Mugabe's precision home. And the patriotic Froot *"",rifii"rir;'
mind insisted upon. 'In the light of the discussions we "i'r,ilH;
, _ , i,' ,,,,,

The momentum was now everything,

as Nicholas r,inn '1 , ,,;.ti

"
have had;' he told the Foreign Secretary,'if you are
'prepared to include our forces in Paragraph 13 of the
y:J11",:l1ll,_lf:s formalry qia inr6._uir;;;;,j;il:, ;.,

,,{}?, i' i;;;; ffi #; #,ffi 1'#ffi,il'r:l'fl,l,1:::

posals.'
Foreign Office. Most days Mr Fenn
,' correspondents
li1lh" *outO .#.1I
to the conferencL. private r.rrion, in-r'irrv,
Without a trace of the emotion he was feeling, Carring-
: iton replied that a sentence would be added to the para-
i crowded rooms yhere th., ;;;ij'[;;"iire back-,
graph in question. It read: 'The Patriotic Front forces i: ground information to rn"ble them to broaden their
.'reports beyond the straight verbiag. oi,t. .";r.r*;
\rrill'be required to comply with the directions of the
governor.' fenl's sharp, agile .ryind -was as much a weapon for
,'i carringron
',, , In that one sentence Mugabe had obtained the.legal as anything said in conferenc. g"rry
.igili
;:' 'recognition for his army and, in hiS own mind at least, [:: woutd assid]uousry
I1 line,.realising
I:T,1, f;;; ihe;;il office
that come mornin; il;;b;;f Nf#;
'..., ; no longer'terrorists'or'guerrillas', they were on an equal ,f::f Pl ::"1,:e
tpeed ahead'.
the message. rn. ;rr*;;-;.J ffi
The government would ririr"niiioii,.r"oo
',t" ',' \ 136
137
 [r ,r

l*:f9 wilh lF rygod-class solution

[i, It
:tr didn't suit Muga$.
:,
:r--' , ,"r1
already assured
- the ceasefire arrangements. rna t"Jfr. .ir
{*qconference
r1,,ipf rtake " 'rt is necessary to have direct involvement,, . ,,r;ii:
it or it' had worked ,o I* for Carrington.
reave he told the
The briefings were to uJo un r*tr" degree of pressure press.' calming down now in front a"r*ras. lThe ,,r:,:;."i
on two betligerenrs musr tark direc;iy"ri-tr
-t ;"]-ui[^;ffi; ;rii
rvE^v vta

o * g. sto ry- the p'r"s irlrieo sayi, g ;:,*;

Britain in the chair. That has not upp.n"A.,--" ,,,i$#
,,. oPe1ry
rn sight' made Iurw
H:ryT-".1d,Y,k
, '"veafo^ in it offi;;ff;;ffiffiffili
more difficult for them to baci
g,rt. 1n{ larringron, by this stage, sensed that he had
olo again came the veiled *#i;;-li **, if rhe ,,r,; ,,

conference failed. 'considering the

:
i'1,' them lockect in. Fiis on" douuirffi;il; uiiuv"erugabe. adiances ;1;; ,,,,ts
:;'. carrington's view he wourd travJio
.' , dragged
{n r-'' maybe
-- purii.o,
-- u.
made in the war, we cannot .". th.* rwersed
at the stroke of
r, il"fr;
,,,irrii!,,
to peace. a pen, our victory transposeo intoir'til il.
', , ' caTington gave Mugabe and Nkomo six days to muil f5*,y:1i,ffi tXfi ,:hlil.",ie,
H o * se *il
h.-rbifiii.,,, ii,i
over his proposals for the ceasefire _ tt.n 'o;r;; t''li
Mugabe refused to ru.ntknowredge
ultrmatum- or rather ultimata because there were - the carriogrou'
'i ofthe-:o1 22 Novemberhesaid two ultimatum. The only way out of the
deadroct was"iJiri ,,''.;i
hewantedundertakings discussion of the pairiotic Front's own proposars
', '' rvithin 24 hours from both sldes tt t[.v iould stop [" ,r,t ;,1,.
ceasefire - for a two-month truce u"i"*'lt;ffi#ifu' , ,:,,,,;ii,
cross-border from zambia and"tMozlmbique into
:. Rhodesia, andraids
from Rhodesia into those t*o .ouotries.
campaign itarted and a commonw_ealth
peac;i;;;.td .,r!ii
force of severar thousand men. Mugabe
, By the folloying Monday, three auv, t, wanted knew that : ,; .::r
carrington courd not concede eithe, oi"trrorr';;;d#::
"*ur, demands' But just as the Foreign
.,,,,,'.1

' try to ionceal his anger. He stormed

n4u-g1be'did_n't G;"ry ffilffi ,
", out of the conference and told zvobgo f;. *ouro handle
Mugabe locked in, so MugabJ knew
,rr"i C"rri'"ffi ,,j,
",'';,,,;;

could not now countenariceitre diplomatic

the media that night. By the time he gJt to the press failure of not- , :,ir
room, having him in,on the setrlement._carring,on
come too far, Mugabe reasoned. It was
ili'ulbl ',,''-i,tl
.' ghouted. 'Thp g.ood Lord is trying to be ioo clever by ff;;;,;fi; ,,,',n,

half.'
cqrd, and he was determined to eke rurri;;;ilid;irn'-
tage out of it. He turned to the Front
,,'

' carrington had known this would be the most difficult more. The day after carrington issued
Lil, st"tes oRce , ,,.

slage of the conference. He feared the hostility

between Mugabe and Nkomo n"* io p?r-es-saraam
ti, a."oriffi r,:
the likes of wa[s and rongogara wourd breat for a meeting ^
out on arranged with the haste that reflect.a
trrr-rrii-iror* of .
l

the conference floor, quickfu wrecking all the achieve- l

the grisis. As they were en route to Tanzani;,

ments of the negotiation, ,o far. He'i..*ririrv ,n. niirrr, ' I
moved through Mrs Thatcher. .Nothing,,
' the conference to bilateral talks with the ,*"-ria.rl
nI I"pllqd
'nothing must happen to damage the talks.:Sud-ss
ilffi;
would see Salisbury in the morning; the patriotic is in
Front sight.'
,' io the afternoon. Ii suited walls, who believed he could
an extent it also suited carrington. oni suri.uury
t uo
" agreed, he could once again go back to fufrlube
and
'
.",' t l3g
 I l_n_q."
walk-out, but he did want a show of strength'vno
from the Front 1o.1he
Rhodesians. 'I am not going to stand for my fo*, ;i ,;i
,,,
- !4lu
h|:aster- Hoise,
Line nations to bolster trls hand Fioe herdld like cattle into-ttreil;;rrrri;;';ffi; . ,,;,i;
i' He w1s t9.get it, but once again with the mercy of the Rlol.tr.un
,i. , 11
"r,t'lgnorrgh reseivations to make him realise that a r.ttlr..nt
l*y and
clfd be destroyed within daysi Mugibe
-' u*y ,,_,,.,i
air force. f"fy
oid.- ,o^"':, ,t;j,d
:'r 'tp1s not just desirable, but imperatire Nyerere and Machel,'rike Iiaunda Eefore-tt
President Machel arrived beiore Mugabe and Nkomo, conciliation, if not instant concessions from
r*, urspd l..ifd
,:
-
the seriousness of it all ernphasised evl-n Lv-ili" or.r,
,rr"
Machel is reliably reported to have toro na-usabe.'rwr. ,,
F,Jit
, ,'dil;
I the full military uniform, even cuban heels, he wears onry
- hear-what you are siying, but we know
vou"*iri'rr"l ,.;ii
,,.': 9l the most important occasions. He and Nyerere em- us when
Jve
say the war must end.' At the Lno ofl ron* ;, .i *.u,",,
uraced on the tarmac, somehow symbolic of not just the
: I father-son relationship
meeting, Mugabe remarked only: 'we will
to London to negotiate.,
b";"idili ,
,,,.,,:i,
between the two of them, il - . ',i
the-sland they were to take together against the British"ir; ' As he and Nkomo flew back to the
and the Patriotic Front London winter-
Nyerere called British television and radio
. i;;
;;;;;i
including David smith, to-t ir home o, tile 6"u.6. , ,.r.,iLi ,
- long session at state House. Mugabe una ivr.orr; hr;
1.I:,
rPublicly, in the
*r.,,vry, ru .,.
rne rnrcrvlew Srritfr, t,
interview he gave Smith, he ;";*d
accused r
, : their.support for opposing the nri-tistr proporui, as they carrington of 'praying tricksr to secure p.*;;l; .
stood - but they must accept; if certain concessions were Muzorewa, and warned of the disaster that would ,;
rnade by the liritish, particuiarly if carrrrrlttn courd follo*',',,..r1i
if the Foreign secretary failed to pursue an al-parry:
,,:;1i
llrengthen the commonwealth mtnito.ringe fo;,
---- to give agreement. Privatery, he fert that. carrington
,i*pr!r,, ,;;;i;
it a size equal to the task. couldn't allow the conference tci collaps. *iit .,,,',',;;i.
-r - At five o'clock on a sweltering saturday afternoon the tt
of the international community so hijtr. rr. *"r "-rr"ies. .,i:,;,
two presidents were joined by Mugabi, Nkomo and rndeni- "
ably optimistic, berieving both rio.s would budge.nJiil
envoys from Angola, Botswana and zambia. Kenneth '
in the end. 'They both have too much to lose for t[9
Kaunda stayed away. He'd put his country on u *ui -conference to fail.,
footing following Rhodesian iaids into zambia and only "|Y,
The next few day.s saw the conference swing
back
and forth between disasterand succe*.
Salisbury like 'a spineless hyena' d;;r;ariof t-ord
,
Carrington, Mr lgoo pursued *ria*iii;;;'Ji;;
, Il splendid oak-panelled room overrooking the
Indian"ocean, Mugabe put hiscase. Everything suggested
"
",y]rl-?Il*ip. 'The room for manouevre i, ,.ry ,ii;li, ' '
nesatd,.andthere.isverylittletimeleft.rheg'iti'i,
,delegationremainshopefuiofasuccessfulconclusionto
' :he said. By talking firstto Salisbury and then to them, this conference.'
v'vu Lv
, carrington was showing bias and tended to accept every- unwittingly
perhaps,'arthough Mugabe believed other-
.
.',wis", Joshua Nkomo fuelled tf,e foriign Office;;;;-
been given equal status with'salisbury on the armies but
they were only words. How could it be equality, he , tu1 towards
i ::lr: Luwarss p?1@t
peace. Un
On JU
30 November,-after
November, after yet another ,.,;;ffi;;
Carringron, Mugak
argu€d, when the Rhodesians would stay where theywere ;, ;:ltj 1t1,s11n,yith he^a-nd emerged
of the Fo.reign Office.to be greeted*by
and his men would be moved into assem-bly camps krown ii,.1t1T-1.lide.door
tta crowd of,pressmen and television .u*..ir. A few
,.:l4o li
l4l

'lwas Dday, for the papers. It or no', now or
,":. was 'yes-
,, never. Carrington was in Dublin that day with Mrs
:.': T,hatcher, arguing with the EEC about Britain's contri-
,,, bution to the Common Market. He didn't have much
: joy there and when he returned to the Foreign Office at
, :';stx o'clock, ahead of schedule especially for a meeting
-, I with.the Patriotic Front, there was more bad news from
' Mugabe.
Instead of an answer, Mugabe had new proposals. He
wanted the forces of Peter Walls back in their bases well
' or Dar-es-Salaam, but from Marlborough House, just
before his units came in from the bush. Furthermore, he
, wanted the strongest possible guarantees that the South
' Africans.would withdraw the forces they now admitted
having in Rhodesia. At that lunch with Lord Walston
in eariy November, Mugabe had spoken at length about
foreign involvement. He said that, from the Patriotic
Front's side, there was no threat from Russia or Cuba
; or China. Only if South Africa entered the conflict might
. the situation charige. In the last week of November the
::r South African prime minister, Pieter Botha, disclosed
that he had up to two battalions protectin! trade routes
in Rhodesia, flying helicopters for the Rhodesian Air
Force and providing heavy artillery and logistical sup-
.' port. Without these guarantees, there could be no deal.
- Carrington was genuinely shocked. He had expected
'agfeement, instead he was left tantalisingly short of it,
,' so near,yet so far. Not for the first time did he acknow--'
i buta formidable opponent capable of playing him at his
t42
Jhe Foreign Office was in deep dismay, partly out ,
eihaustion, partly lecause they were victims of their ryn,,i
rhetoric in the previous davs Suddenly
orevious few days. Cir"i'rmo',
Srrddenlw iirrington
i, realised that he might have to go for the secondilass
solution. And now he was worried about how and if he
i . could mend fences with Mugabe. Mugabe had grown
, increasingly resentful at whit he saw=as the Flreien
Secretary's high-handed tactics: now, more than eyer, Le
' was determined not to be hustled. carrington sensed that .-
the personal antipathy between them was as responsible
as anything for the deadlock. Carrington kniw that
Mugabe saw him as the aristocrat politi.iun who, by
definition, could neither understand nor sympathise witir
the perceptions and goals of the so-calred teriorists. Both
men'were to recognise that weekend that the conflict of
personalities and ityles could yet wreck the conference.
Mediation was on its wily, though, Not from Lusaka
round the corner from Lancaster House.itre r.".etury-
general of the Commonwealth, Shridath .Sonny' Ram_
phal, slarted work rhar Friday night arguing ihat the,
Comm6nwealth had started the peace process, now it
would clinch it. Ramphal had the ear of Nkomo and
.
Mugabe - he'd intervened back in october to remind all
: that anything but an all-party settlement would be a
+ disaster. A fine lawyer
- he drafted the independence
;constitution for his native Guyana back in 1966 Ram-
-
: phal was now to be the devills advocate to both the
Foreign office and the Patriotic Front. He told Mugabe
that his worries about the disposition of the enemy armies
rin the ceasefire was a matter for the final stage of the
ponference
- there was no point in holding it up i{
Carrington gave the right assurance about fui, piuy.
i;Mugabe agreed, albeit reluctantly.
But what about the South Africans? Mugabe had by
wbecome almost obsessed by the fear thalthey would
mb his arrny once they had arrived in the aisembly
t43
 .
:' :
.,'.
.:'.: .I i.. ,

rlul if necessary,r Britain would go ahead

let it be known
without the patriotic Front., ''
By any standards,
it w1s a dangerous gamble. Mugabe
called it reckless. In.the days to r'o,,. cirrington
receivlTlly plaudits for iris brinkmanrt ip.-nrt, was to
in,the
e.ves Mugabe he deliberately induced
_o{ crisis
that Monday. In the word, of Ru-phal,";;;;
fufrsubr*.jr;
his heels in for the rast fight.' would
the bruff work?
carrington's argument wasthat it had,o
Bention of South Africa. He was right. Carrington was " had to be hustred *oir.lrtr;;;L
i.;i,i,' , : haBpy enough - he wasn't, after all, being asked for that however muctr he disliked it. There
it:-.' ,, ,,, ,*,r"h. The Rhodesian forces, both on the ground and was no other way of getting a settlern.nt.
any-dr,h;
', in the air, would be subject to exactly the same scrutiny delay could onry mean Mu-zorewa, or
more probabry
.l;, i ', and rules as the armies of the Patriotic Front. The
,;',:, ,,
Walls, qoilq baci on their co-rnitrrr.nr,
,o tfrr'packag+i: .
',, monitoring force, from Britain and a handful of so far. As Mr Fgnn put it, .the whot,
;htd;i il-.gio ,o
Commonwealth countries, would be expanded from the unravel like a bafl of woor.'That would
leaie the Foreign
',.', origrnal concept of about 600 to 1200 men to make sure Sqcretary with nothing, not even the
second-class
vYvvr
solution.
,' ;':1:, ,.it was big enough for the task. And yes, the Foreign
,,,,,
' 'Secretart'
accepted the importance of precluding any ,I .. .Ru.*phal appeared to the Foreign Secretary once more,
,' foreign involvement under a British governor. But he this time stressing that
llugabe wourd not gi*ln. wasn,t
baulked at mentioning South Africa, knowing full well l, the clause on South Africi a smalt pric.;;;;; for the
,- that it would anger and embarrass Walls. Walls had gone l' triumph of a ceasefire? rne eoreign office
spoke to wafls '
and the South Africans.
, home agreeing to the ceasefire proposals only on the geierat *", ;;;rr; Uut fre
fh. aiainst
, Gondition that they weren't changed. knew the tide was running him. He didn,t so . .

So on three words, 'including South Africa', the ryuch agree with it. He said nJO fve wittr ii.-ru;il ;;
,h: h.rT o_f equal starus, Mugabe t uO *on t irloint
" conference hung for thieedays. Mugabe fett he had con- 1I
principle. But the concession 6n the of
South Africans was
rea.l gain. The British proposals,
Carrington believed he could not do it. It was a battle of , *.":]f urur,Trorl?
rew cosmetlcs, remained largely unchanged. .Mugub"
'willpower that .threatened everythjng. The Foreign ,won that argument, but he lost ihe +
,, Office's official line that weekend was that there was no war,'i.*urt.o orr.
African diplomat-observer to the conference
,., contact with the Patriotic Front. On Monday, Carrington '' At the session which sealed th_e_ceasefire, C:rrington
,. called a full session of the conference. He had to brief
'night
: rMugabe
the cabinet thaf and he wanted an answei from Y:1::,.:.,lli:,-ay
pleasure
to assuase Mugabe. H, -ilrrnrr,
with .the Front s ugi..rn.,it ;; ;; fid;;
;ii .',, and Nkomo.
,..'' '. piugube said he had no answer to grve. Carrington *91!, all
1131*rsible'way q:,: gnaf rv aio p,ai s; ih,6Jiii, uod
, tuncelled the meeting at tl;. rn""est notice He simply
llrr,,,,,
qides had negotiated. Muzorewu
y gone home. His deputy, Silas fvfuoOu*urunu, ilJ
l4s
 t,'
*v6ot aS f,arl as to cail,Mrrgabi aad Nkomo' brir :brotheri
in peace'.
l', , "'i4inutes later, Carrington was down in the basement
, gf Lancaster House for the first of the dozen interviews
,,he had scheduled for this, the big day. By the time he
, r reached the television studio
- his first call - he was
breathless, genuinely excited, admitting that he had still
'r to take it all in. Carrington has often doubted himself
ii frortt: of the cameras - he worries about projecting
himself and his message this way - but tonight he was
himself, the adrenalin flowing to produce the occasional
chuckle to himself.
i j:i.
: rThis is a great breakthrough,' he began. 'We have a
' constitution, we have a transition, and now, we have a
' c€ilsefire. That's not bad, is it?'
.i Could any party turn on it?
' ',:' . :I jolly well hope not. I should hardly think so.'
" ' Did he ever think it was going to fail?
agreat dangerbf the whole thing collapsing. And I kept
' ,' ' thinking what a tragedy it would be if it did collapse
n,- because we really had come such a long way.'
Mugabe arrived just as Carrington was finishing.
Would he like to sit down for a joint interview with the
Foreign Secretary?
'No, .I don't think my good Lord Carrington would
liked for television appearances, had over the weeks
,.. become something of a master of the media. He was all
, , . terrorist', 'hard-line Marxist' and he tried very
consciously to dispel the myth on the screen. He was
so softly that he had'to be reminded to keep his voice
'
,, up. He. wanted to be heard, listened to, he wasn't going
t46
to indulge in shouting matches that would orlly make
him fit the labels
Tgnight he was in good form, clasping the hand of
..
his interviewer and winking as if to say,r*tut,s urit[e
fuss been about?' He even managed to teil tt r t .t nl"i"n,
that lre hoped zimbabwe televiiion wourd have il;
"ii
- , He looked a satisfied man. Was he?
'I don't knoru if I'm satisfied. If I look it its because
I'm glad we've got this far, arrd *r;* g"i;;^;ffi;;;
was he looking forward to erections, did he berieve he
would win?
'Ah,'sure, sure,' he replied with a broad grin. .Who
can win if not our movement? I'believe *riur. done
the most mobilisation of the masses during the years
of
9ur struggle. our object in the war was alilays:tL create
!h; pase for power. we wilr nor be wantine. w, h",t
IaKen care ol'ourselves in advance.'
had refused that night to name his governor
i ,. }.rdngt9.n
i lut it was little more than an open secret. chiistopher
Soames, like Ca*ington a prot6g6 of Macmiil";;l;i*;;
wry minisrer, former secretaiy of ex-
idmbassador "gti."ii,i*,
to France, and a ron-irr-lu*-or tn" iutu si,
Mnston Churchill. He,d been chosen we.kr;;f; A;
'rd President of the council, he was announcing cuts
Britain's civil service when he was.told that he iould
going to Salisbury within four days. frfugub.,
onse sounded surprisingly hostile, in fact he iidn,t_
t47
 zambia,so enlisting the good favours of both Macher
and KaUnda. : 'i ' -- -- ---" '
Whatever the logic, it was an audacious step.
" he.asked when told the news. -
Zvobgo' ever the apologist for the cause, il;
to otrtrine
It was an inauspicious start to a relationship that was the implications at a presi conference
ffi ;; h"rr after
' to have a decisive influence on the success.of putting the
,'[,ancaster House agreemeqt into effect. he sajd (and by now every.or."rpondent
reco!"ir.a those
, r Soames had never worked in Africa before, his health wo.rds the signal to get pen and paper
had been none too strong after a seriousheart operation rolling),-a1'wirh the.Britisli gorr.rnor in sutiruuiv
";J;;;;;;
'Sorrte years befdre, and some doubted his commitment a British war against the Fatriotic Front.'
ri-.."i,
---"-f :
-

to whatever job he held. But he was to prove an out- .:

Tg add to the Front,s exacerbation, Carrington
,,
,standing choice, his ability to.handle a crisis with good the day:.f tltr governor's departure as the ,
present his final plans for thl ceasefire,
mom;-;"hore
humour, patience and princifle proving crucial in the maps-;;J;ir.
.'months to come. 'I suppose we will simply have to live The Rhodesians were to. have 47 operaiionj
their inen, the Front 14. you didn,t have to
b"*; fu;
from hour to hour,' he said on the day his appointment be, ;;;:
job to be going into sayer to hear Mugabe's cry of .Foul,. As far
'wa6 announced. 'Its not the kind of h;;;
with any preconceived notions, we'll all have to be. ooncerned, it was merely ", thai
insult to injury
flexible.' neither he nor Nkomo trad-adding
been*given onr.u,irp in the
Nevertheless, Soames had already made his mind up economic heart of the country tt" white
- armr'anos in
the midlands, ringed by SalisLury in ttre nortr,-efst
on one or two matters. One was that handling Mugabe, aoa
was going to be his toughest problem. Two, that Mugabe
was the most likely winner. This was the most strategic area in the country,
With Soames, Larrington was to take yet another prime region for white settlJments and whitofarts, the
for
gamble. The conference was now bogged down over pre- main tr_ansport roures, for industry, for ,o*nl
oi'uny
cisely how, where and when the war would end and the sy9.- Mugabe insisted that his exclusion
from the
;easefire begin, but Carrington dispatched Soames and midlands would have a crucial political ;J;;y.h"i"gil"i
his wife Mary to Salisbury. Briefing British journalists impact on his supporters. Guirrillas moviig
out'or trre
himself the same night, he justified the move on the 1y_!o gamps elsewhere would u" ,..o ,GJri"e
grounds that he still believed Mugabe would have to be zANLA's "", fact that
defeat. Just as important was the
pushed over the last hurdle. Mugabe and Tongogara did ntt believe;il;;;;li
The governor, he reasoned, would do three things. to persuadJso*e
f "-Ul:held units to pull out of '"n urru
jKeep the momentum going and the pressure on the they'd for so long.
Patriotic Front. 'Do you know who drew these maps,, he remarked
-
lWin the new Rhodesia friends in Africa. Those maize that night.
supplies so important to President Kaunda could be 'I'll tell you. peter Walls.'
restarted. carrington was not to be deterred. He set his
-
ll a.m. on Saturduy, tS Deoember. Thenfinal
1,
l Stop all Rhodesian raids into Mozambique and ,deadline.
the
148 149
 gvery coi.respondent he could find at Lancaster House.
He had an urgent message from his president '".|,,,fi
r fof the story Zvobgo was.to give them. tb Mui"il;
'Carrington can go to hell,' he shouted. .Thatcher can I1::il*:f: p lllieng-, a comradi. s,t iilrd'Mri;ed',, ,tl
''. r ; jtrtp in the Thames.' all too clearly that the *ar was over. H. *uri
peace of Lancaster
ilffi;#--'- , .,,'
., Furthermore: 'Thatcher is in concubinage with Satan
Ho_use, however much
:'Machel had known for some
it h;;.-- ;.,,
,r:
,,1.:Bothp.l And, finally, brandishing the British maps and time that his own futuri ,;;;;i!i
was threatened by Mugabe's war. Indeed,h;
, ,,, ,giving a shake of, his head directly into camera for each Mugabe so in the monr[s berore run""rt"iil;:;;
t"a-i;iJ ::,'.1,i1
;. -: gfr the television networks there: 'The answer, ' ,,)
Lord. clearly at the summit of non-alignuJ *-ti"* ,
Carrington, is NO .. . NO ... NO.' a.few weeks before Mugabe
ilH;il;
r , ::;,,,i,
to London. ,,,,,,:
It wasn't just the burden""ri.
of tensiii[our"nds sf
Cgfrington for Zvobgo's iri'moderite language. That was refugees dotted in camps throughout
the only thing he was giving away, because his answer Northe.n rtao-ori-,
'was still NO. bgyr, or the flight from the couiltry to thetowns;;til"
ofl by the Rhodesian raids. For months now, Macher
The foJlowing morning, Carrington left for Washing- had known that Walls had contingency plans
ton with Mrs Thatcher for an official visit. He was quietly to i;;;;;',
Northern Mozambique and put an enA to
hopeful, he said. He was more than that, he hrmly Uug;b. il;
and for all - if the conferrn"" riiteo. Arr;"Jy;[;;.
a so-called Resistance Movement in
d; ,

Because Lord Carrington already knew that he'd had the North, $;;r';;
apparently by the Rhodesians and the souttr-.drrtans.
the final lucky break. And this was a request Mugabe It was no more than an irritant at this stage, bui i,
could not refuse. a clear indicator of the tactics Salisbury ;;;ki *u,
Fernando Honwana could seem too ybung for the job Lancaster House failed. -: ",," l;
he holds. He's 28, and looks no older than that. He was There had been pressure from the Foreign
office for
Machel's intervention. Furthermore, Macher
when President Machel came to power in Mozambique e-xaqRle of Kaunda
rr.i' it ':r_l
in in zambia. 'The rt.rtugy o[i*fi:',
1975. He flew home, had a ihort spell of military ,i',

Zambia's backbone,, he wrote to MugaU..

into the president's ofifice as a specialist on Souihirn resumed Walls would concentrate his uti".Lr
if'rfr. **
Africa affairs. Within a matter of months, he became nir;*: on
bique, he said. 'we will not be in any position
, ;
, one of Machel's closest advisers, valued because he'd ,.ril['
Machelwrote.Heevenmentioneait,i,"'iiir,.tioat. to ',- ]

been educated in the West and understood the West. In for his own fall: July 19g0.
t5l
 ' . .,:,,-".'+
Il *u, have been christmas morning but Mugabe, ever ,i:[,[:

:*jT::jifl ylTtd
with fatherl/disapprJuur-r* r,is.,, ,
,'jf
, ardes turned the flight home to Mozambique'inio;
;ri;: , ,::';"i,,
',, , same time the Foreign office was offering a concession rh.y opened up the duty-free whisky theyld uouit i ii ''' ,i.-.
";', , - one assembly camp in that ecbnomic heartland of the -hlAo.n airport, they shouted Zanu,logunr, ;hry-;; ;
I . , oountry was almost academic
-
broke into a serenade of revolutionary p-.rty'*n6r
th"d ,, .j-
,r,,,
, The Mugabes went back to their flat, Sally cooked
drowned out the
_engines on board rii r^*uniJ Rigrrt.: ,;r.,,i,
i'rr,,' dinqer.for him and the Walstons. According to Lord Eddison zvobgo asked Mugabe for permission for
walstoi:, M.ugabe was close to tears throughout the meal. the :

" ', For a man whose head had ruled his heart for so long,
. Mugabe had in the end been swayed by the emotional llt", all right with me if it,s all right with hirn,, Mugabe , ' ,,"
Said.
u ,t -,.r tl:.::,,

' "- not zvobgo and some slightry inebriated cofleasu;",) -.,]',,i
have believed it. But he knew that Machel did tottered off to the fron_of the plane, singing all the
' 'honestly believe that his own revolution would
collapse A few minutes later, Mugabe got up and s-lroiled down
ia i. ,
,

. ,,:,.,t,

.r to bring him to peace, but on that Sunday Mugabe did the aisle, shaking the hand, of .r.ry p.rr.rrg.;il ,
holding up their babies to kiss. yes, the .t..tion cimpaigrl ,:
not believe it was to take him to victory. i;i ',:

had begun and Mugabe was looking every i;;h ;[, ,'''"1,
candidate -- -.-'- ,,
,:;,!i;

-
At Maputo airport there was a pleasant surprise go, .,,,i
them all. waiting t[rere, in a rong receiving rinr,-*t, ' I
President Machel and most of his cabmet. -Fr;;
on Mugabe would be treated here as though h; il
noi "r,,ii
already won the elections, as though he werJ"
"i.iii",
,',

Head of state. It took him about half an hour,"r*Lru"E

not only the Mozambican dignitaries but also r*v
of the hundreds of zanu workers who had- rr.*ir .p
o", , ' ',,

carrying banners saying .the struggle continues'. - - -r

to be here for a matter of days before ,rtr*in! io :

Salisbury_to open his campaign. Instead, t, *". ti U.
here fol five long weeks.
t52
153
'1;,': $sge of the conflict, the 'People's War', as much
.ii,',, ' ,sg11orned with organising and educating the people as
1,,..-.r ,winningcontrol of towns and villages. With his men now
'i:,' ',,ro
be in camps, Mugabe felt they would be cut off from
the vital task of spreading the word and 'mobilising the
, ' masses' during the campaign. They had, Mugabe felt,
''.i, .. , beCn deprived of a role in their victory.
.

,.1' But that was not as worrying as Mugabe's real fear on the face of it, it was a dangerous gamble. Togethe.,.i,i
analysis, he did not believe that Peter Walls and Salisbury
thev did look invincibre. Nkomo] the fai'her;iil#;;;
would'adhere to the ceasefire. The small number of
nationalism as his campaign was to proclaim;
Uuiit . ,,,
the guerrilla teader.whose-army had born th;
1 assernbly camps and their ruial, isolated locations made the fighting that had forced smiih to settre. ro,
il;;-Ji' r'
.,

, his men extremely vulnerable to attack. Mugabe belie$,ed

ruruguui; .
there were advantages. Nkomo was much better
inside the country ,t
known .

of them being bombed by the Rhodesian Air Force. If
,.
he had nightmares about it all, he kept them very much
' to himself. He had had a hard enough time of it con-
vincing the hardliners on his Central Committee, notably
T him and, despite the furore;;; .,,.,
the attacks on the viscodnts6y Nkorno's -.o. iuis,',,',
generally thought to be much more or
*oi".u,il, ,
Furthermore, they could porentially divide"tt.
electorally between them. Nkomo would,;;;it
*irritrlr,' .,',

'. Edgar Tekere, to accept the agreement as it was. in his native Mahbeleland, while Mugabe ,o.,tO
iake all ' ,,

io When peace was signed.in the great hall of Lancaster to match, if not outpoll, Muzorew" i'nong &;
House on 2l December, his misgivings were all too
tt, Sfrlrl
:;: apparent. Nkomo enjoyed the ceremony h,.,g.ly, shaking *i1[ Mozambique.
t,, I hands enthusiastically with everyone in the room, with
Nkomo had never made any secret of his berief
they ' '
General Walls twice. should fight the el^e9-t1on togeiher _ .rriili
': 'You are now our commander,o Nkomo told Walls. divided we might fall,' he sJmetimer uJ*itt.J.
;;r;;A
r, Mugabe studiously avoided Walls and posed reluc- nut n,
. did rrsvv
Y.v a price
have Cr Prrvtr for it.
rul IL.
;, tantly for the cameras along with Muzorewa, Carrington the independence struggte, he argued,
ard Nkomo. Muzorewa seized the opportunity to make ;, ,^tjT:_:r.:rr.of
ng must surery become prime minister in the
wale
i,'i the first speech in the election campaign ;. victory. Mugabe and key: members .f hi; -C;;tr;l a;:of
r .,'. 154
155
 ,; ';1 mi(tee foqnd that hard to stomach. All of
./ them, in fact,
]i,.:' ^t. '
fli[$i.,.exept
r1:Ur'-. :t, Josiah Tongoga ra.
iritr,.l t'i '.
'Tongogara, in the final:week in London, had argued
,ii,,,1,:,
fi1;;,.-''timr uiO*uguin for a joint campaign with Nkomo. There
ii,'"
':,"
', wa$ more
I .. .. . . .r rt
to it than just the expediency of^ going to the
i,, ,'
', . - , .polls with the best possible chance. At Lancaster House,
Ii. ",,' ,Tongogara had come to respect, indeed admire, Nkomo's
:
,i,," , pofitical know-how and cunning.
1., : They met several times alone during the conference,
, '' with Nkomo making strong overtures about the necessity
:'" for the Patriotic Front to stay intact for the election, even
.hinting at the kind of seniority in government Tongogara
.,.would enjoy under him. Tongogara was not swayed by
'i 'the suggestion of a top post. He had never seen himself
., 8s a politician, rather the kingmaker of them. He pre-
ferrcd to keep the talks focused on the campaign and
' plans for his army to join forces, integrate with Nkomo's
,' once the ceasefire was in force.
They got on well, both men realising that they were
a lot closer than they had ever imagined. Tongogara was
impressed by Nkomo's platform for a joint campaign and
he had become increasingly convinced that without it
' Mugabe and Zanu ran a grave risk of being kept out of
power, as Tongogara knew that Nkomo might be
' tempted into an anti-Mugabe alliance that would include
' 'Muzorewa and the whites. Characteristically, Mugabe
let the debate run its course inqide his own Central Com-
mittee. Now more than ever,'he opted for committee
: decision, colli:giate style leadership, rather than making
his own independent choice and pushing it through. In
' did not try to conceal their anger at the moves made by
the past it had often made for indecision, now it was to
produce a quick, decisive move. Tongogara was outvoted
oner*helmingly. Tekere, Muzenda, Zvobgo, Sally, all
decried the idea that Nkomo would be an asset. Many
of their supporters, they argued, hated Nkomo because
' he had entertained the idea of a deal with Smith in the
' past. A joint 'Nkomo-Mugabe' ticket could pull less
' 156
votes than Zanu,alone, perhaps prompt many to vote for ,i",iiri
i,nr,.i.
Muzorewa, especially in Mashonaland , .i,i},
By lhe time Mugabe and his delegation left London
on22 December the matter seemed to have been settled. :,.,1i
one of Mugabe's closest aides, careful to insist ttrat tris t ,:r*, l
remar-ks should not be attributed to him, said: .peorls '. t*t,
will say why should we vote for Mugabe if it means that ',i{
we will vote for Nkomo as well. That is why we will i"ii;:
campaign as zanu and not as the patriotic Front. If ;; :;,'-J
are tied to Nkomo, people will vote for Muzorewa.' , ,
, tle first stop was Dar-es-salaam for a meeting with ,, -,..t
the Front Line states. And there Mugabe ran intoof,pori-
,,
over the years, President Nyerere and hii fellow ppe11g, ,,,',,,.;;i.
Line leaders had painstakingly nurtured and established'
the Patriotic Front. often he had heard recriminations''...r,, ..,,
from Mugabe and Nkomo about each other. l*t ur olt.n
he had counselled unity and forgiveness. Nyerere was not
,',,
',, '.;;:;
just unhappy abciut the split, he was positively frightened
',."t
9{th. consequence-s. Running separate rrrnpuigni would ,.1,rr
divide the nationalist vote and help Muzor.*i. .,if,'
'You could be playing into Muzorewa's hands,' , ,,i
Nyerere told Mugabe. 'i'.1
- Mugabe failed to convince Nyerere with his belief (a,r,d ,' :: ,',,:;,i,
that of his committee) that Zanu's support mighi be ,.,,
seriously eroded by a.formal alliance wittr Nto-i. nut , :,'.;1:,:;,',,
he promised to have the central committee consider it
,ij,
once more when they all got home to Maputo.
That was not the only hitch during the short stop-over
in Dar-es-Salaam. Some of MuglaG,s most senior men
Nyerere and Machel to persuade them into signing the
peace agreement. They had, they said to anyone who
would listen, been 'railroaded'into abandoning the war
and. agreeing to peac9. Mugabe was cautiorr,l"r.fully
avoiding any trace of resentment.
'we have been making the best of circumstances not
'
t57

:.:,,' . , \. .
;i;,'. ,of ourchoosing for'more thaR a decade:and.we'll:hake
,r,l , the best of present circumstances,' he said as he, left
r ' " ',Tanzania.'
i lr:: ., '
r:, Despite the party on board the plane, the Central Com-
,' mittee got little sleep on return to Mozambique. They
. I.were in almost continuous session, more than one meet-
, ing lasted throfigh the night. Again Tongogara argued
: for a coalition with Nkomo, this time he could .all on
,yMachel and Nyerere for support. Again the hardliners
opposed him, now more determined than ever to defy
tho'presidents who had forced them into agreement baci<
in London.
.. Over this, the Christmas holiday, Nkomo sent adelega-
tion from Zambia to talk to Zanu. They carried warnings
," of 'election failure'if the two parties did not stay together.
As always Mugabe was careful not to insist, refusing to
be rushed and rush his committee. He did make it clear,
in one all-night session, that he preferred to campaign
alone. It was the crucial factor, and Nkomo's team went
''' home. empty-handed.
* At that same session, Tongogara made his final plea
for dropping the name Zapu and Zanu and running
, simply as the Patriotic Front. The war, he said, had not
been about'persbnatties or parties but the removal of
discrimination and oppression.
To u silence that was rare in any'of their meetings,
Tongogara insisted that it would be ridiculous for.Zanu
to refuse to consider Nkomo as a leader of the Front
after they had sat down and negotiated'alongside him
for 14 weeks in London.
Tongogara knew then that he'd lost. He was more dis-
appointed than angry and did not resist when he was
: dispatched
- before the meetirlg which formally took the
decision to campaign alone - t-o guerrilla camps in central
and northern Mozambique to explain the Lancaster
House agreement and the election strategy to guerrilla
'\i
,] 'i.i
commanders. Mugabe saw Tongogara offfrom his home
in_llaputo. It wal the last timi-hi'w'asito see hiF *fuil',
News of rongogara's death in a road acciocni r.".nul,,':,
Maputo with a call from a Mozambican official stationeJ
near. the northern port of Beira to Mugabe's deputy,.
Simon Muzenda. Th; official spoke no En[lish, M;;;;;
little Portuguese, and the line:was bad.
" Nevertheless,
Muzenda g6t the gist of it all. , '
TongogTa's Mercedes had crashed into the back bf ,.
a truck while it was trying to overtake a lorry oR a
notoriously poor, bumpy road near the town of palmeira
about 100 miles north of Maputo. It was pitch dark at
the time of the accident and the truck which they hit did
not have its lights on.
Tongogara, who was sitting in the front passenger sea!,
had been decapitated as he was hurled through th'e wind.
sc59n on impact. His driver was seriously injured, the
official said. Muzenda tried to call Mugabe. But by then
he was on his way to president Machel's home. The
president had called him personally and told him to come
at once. Machel was close to tears as hp gave Mugah
the_n_ews. He had alvyays felt a great p.rronil attachment
Mlgube's general, perhapr *orl than for Mugabe
19
himself.
J, Mugabe was clearly distressed when he called at the
British Embassy a few hours later. He did not suspect
foul play, he said.
, He had already told the central committee that he
would personally supervise the funeral arrangements. His
attempts to get the body back to Maputo quickly turned
into a fiasco that served only to fuei the suspicion and
li' rurnours that Tongogara had been murdered.
l:, A Mozambican government plane was sent to pick up
,,,lh. body. But when the pilot landed ;;;;il ui.rtrii
in central Mozambique, near the scene "i of the crash, hL
,' there was no. fuel for the return trip. The plane
Ibr,r9
;i, had to:stay where it was. His message did not reach
M"-F 159
 :.-;;.,.i"].,,'...l.:
' *, , r'!
, ;, .'":r'
il, .";,,...;:i
.,
,** ,,
ii1*in"*o titi'fng ilo duv,'*h"i a rand rover w-4u ;.* , ..1.:...:'' ,)i.,t..1.'..
, ll_y,1 ,Tgrc- 1hari two days befor,e Tongogarais
-: body
- --J
glli.tJidqw.to, the nlgrtuary and ltren arrangea'ftc;.fa!',i
Iof Zaa:r+,,,, :,
,:1.,', ,r-etghed Mpyto and the mortirary!
Khodesian^ m ortici
,TE 1n f ?n: a long,tirne friend
to be flown in from Satisbury ,ru"rrr;.";;ff
ili :yr.ricions of murder - to *t i.t the Rhodesians, tJ .',..1
,,,,,
,.,1 ,
Mugabe knew the worrd ui rurg, *o"li'^-
lhe .Brilish, and even Nkomo were to uOrii f ;;;;
t1}-gJitaule, They were even
o*it'lf,e ' , '
'murder'. He calred the few foreigi .oi..tpono"rr,;;
ii,i aroused among rrrogpur's own
i, tfobps- Mo_s-t of them, inside Rhodesia, nrrit.urd Maputo to his home. 'There was no sprit betw..,
-'--"' ,":,
-vrrir"
. the ,

;:r ntltrs on a Rhodesian Broadcasting news bulletin which or.1ny other Zanu leaders, and Tongo,, he
said.
t' ,eru"rJio ;il;;:;;.;ffi;:iil:rJ;:.:il:H#ff: 'I admit that Tongo was arways tIoling ro, *ays
heal the rift betwe en2,uru and Zipu r;J
to'.'i
l',;, i; .,*111, r-9ngo8ura,. the arch-opponent:of splitting the
, ;;;;.
;i'::, l1:?Iq Front, the man whohad pursue'dan indEpen- few_people who
.commanded respec* "rit.
it2ii".iiiirrir. ,

*TJ djarogue with Nkomo and the only strong voice,of

: .'But Tongo, like everyone elsl on the C;;;;i'"d;*_
mittee, saw the need for Zanu to go it
,t;* drs$ent on theatcentral committee should dii in such elections.' alone ;"the
e ,

such a vital stage. Just three days after

, :flTrt^nces
uhristmas, hewas due to have been in salisbury to over- statements rike that did not disper the suspicion
that 'i
Tongogara had been murdered. They did,
.": s:" the assembling of his guerrillas and address them in h;;;;;;
some Western diplomatr_ yho presumed lmurder-i;-;;;
ii.#
, t-!e camps where they would stay.
i',t, .' Privately, the Briti;h were dismayed. that, if there was a plot, Mugub. *u, pr"U"iivignoru,nt
Tongogara had
)' of it.
' lsurpTr.{
|, . 'as a leader
them at Lancaster House with his emergence
The fact is that ail the evidence gathered
''' rylo looked beyond partisan interesrs. hr,iv Western embassies managed to get their - and some ',,,1
feared that his death *outa jeaopardise not only the o*n u.r]i;;;
' , p*ediate ceasefire but the stability of the country in the
,Et happened - sussestJthat ri*"r', i.;;ii.';;iH";: ,
,

,1, , future. - -For

two days. Tongogara's body I"; il;i;;;
,h"
IVlaputo hospital mortuaiy . On 2furuury, a; ,h;
his men began to^arrive. in. any numbers u, ff;
r' ppn a plgt were later to point to the fact that Rex urr.*tiy i

Nhongo,
longogara,s suc"issor, issued specific orders Mugabe led the mourners in filing puri
,f9r hyn{redg of guerrillas to stay out of the camp, Ouring the coffin in l

''. the electionbampaign. They alsL painted a grim scenario a tiny room at the mortuary. BehinI iri_
.u*.;;;;;
.. ofjfe Patriotic irront without Tongogara.- o.f Zanu guerrillas.in
T1y faiigues, U"t inO
dozens more in wheelchairs,
if,.ri"i;;;;
, ,r ,The one man
,, who
-capaUfe
6firinging Mugabe
wa_s fr. *o.rnded from tr.."wu.]
and Nkomo together, of forming As they passed by the open casket, they
or. u.riyT.o* their
.. two, had gone. The likelihood of c-ivil *ur r.-"ined, they
sang party
and-raised their fists to chant 'zanu,. irrugJui
soiil' .

to tears as he watched the crippled pass, U"rt

*is close .

:
argueil.
composure enough to keep the line moving
..tuin.il;;
The fact is that Mugabe himself was genuinely shocked, fairly swiftly.
.,, and.lnsel. On the the news reached Maputo, he Samora Machel had bien expected at-the
mortuary , ,

': 'went to the Tongogara"ighthome and spent

the whole nigh;
instead he sent word that he was going
direct to the
, *,1r, his family. wi'.o the bodf;;",ffi: fongo- il#l cemetery- The Zanu militants crowded in-to
and trucks availabte to ,Ti
the r.*.ui,
,,
160;, rongod.;,r";;fi" ir;
,il ,' I
 ,*
t;1, I
ar rntr nea(r oI In€ prgcesslon. rlundred$'of
;,;,.;.,,i{vl5ruelrgn "';
,1 na.ths split absolutely. Mugabe went into teaching, then,
;,:,- $ozambicans lined the streets,bowing their traO-a, tt" prisgn, developing
:" "
, anldeolog,r, Orring;fi;il'h;
1iii'i;:gntoqraggpassed.. in_to
spent in detention. Machel's Marxism was-nort,irrd,*J,i: ,l
grew as he led Frelimo's war against the portug".rr,
ratherthanthroughtheIiteraturiwhichr.uo.oni.'t.i
[, M]gabe.'war is the best university.'Machel iitrri",""- ,

The priests who taught Machei u, u Uoy ;;J

;il
to go into the priesthood but he refused. Iil;;d 1r.,,, ..,
became a nurse. As such he travelled widely- in-na-oa*-, ,'.
bique and most of what he saw angered and dism*yra ,, - '

Mugabe's address was delivered in his usual soft-

!i* In le6t he joined Frerimo and-went fb, t;i;Gii ,,";
Algeria. when he returned, he was to lead Freri-o
,' spoken, Iow-kei, way. Tongogara, he said, had bben the militarily and ideologically. In the late 1960s ru.rim
uittr .' ,
foyndi.ng. father of the liberation movement, he had-.
,, crelted *ui
strongly anti-white. The guerrilra army recruited largeijl ,'
r

. the zanla army. He would be impossible to' through their pledge todestroy the portugr.r. *t;[;i
exploited and abused the African. Machir, as a nurse,
Machel was anything but low-key. .Farewell, Comrade
,

had found discrimination at every revel of sLi.tr:;;;;

Tongagara,' he cried at the beginning of his emotionaf in his skilled capacity, whites were earning severar,*"s ,, ,.
"';
' -- '
euloly. more for doing the same job as him.
': president spoke in Portuguese and even those, like But Machel was arready rooking beyond the shortrterm
;
_ _The
Mirgabe, who didn't speak the language quickly under- needs of the armed struggre, tolhe-day when
Frrii;;
'stbod the main thrust of his addreis.
eulogy was_both a pledge to Tongo gara,.a dear
would take over, and when the great dibate within
the
.His movement started over whether Frelimo was engaged
friend and cornrade,' and i lecture to thJ Gntral com- in
a rabe or a class war, he was at the forefront
mittee of Zaw. Tongogara, he said, had spent his whoie
,

{commanders who argued if thor.

, Hfq seeking unity among the liberation forces.
against racism.
, Black nationarism could be just as exploitive as white,
'I call on all those present,' Machel said, .to honour colonialism, he argued. Frerimo must not be racist,
the m€mory of comrade Tongogara by now making unity instead it had to crush racism in Mozambique.
a reality.' Machel won and from then
It wai too late for that but it was-not too late for Machel Freli-o *us rommitted
colonialism,. rather than the whites.. Frelimo,
to play a vital role in persuading Mugabe tt ut *larration l:*:fb",ing
,, unlike most other African revolutionary
would now be the key to victory. p;.ti* h;;
attracted a growing number of whiter, eriun,
coloureds. whites were brought into the cabinet "nO
To those who have met both men, the in tqgo.
' sirnilarity between Machel and Mugabe liesmost
'
in
striking
the razor-
I!. qas an important distinition, just the ,u,,.
i, tt
;flade by Tongogara when he talked about lan Smith and "t
. .sharp quality of their rninds. Interestingly, they wql.e both , his mother at the beginning of the Lancaster
', educated,as youngsters.by catholicJ.-Then their two . ference. Both Tongogara -and rrr"guu.
-;; House con-
l;red it
:, . 162
163

Siffi,'tt*echii aorils ths yoais of exile .il your*bi@
if,iil1$anA .MUgabe was Rorv 1p,pin'his,b,id for power firmly
:;il'';',"g"ohel himself defined their cbmmon enemy in 1977,
when most of the whites had already fled and the presi-
Irr' dent was left to rue.the day they did. 'Colonialism is a
iler-manent crime
. . lrw4trrorrvrrc vt tlllv ctScturDt humanity -- 4a vatllugl
against rrulu4r.u.LJ cancer which
wlllull
corrodes daily, nourished by the blood of the poor and
iRacism is a permanent crime against mankind, de-
',',:,, priviilg man of his personality and dignity, humiliating,
i him to the point where he believes he is inferior because
,of the colour of his skin. It is hard for outsiders to imagine
':, how we suffered
- even wishing that we had been born
, with a different-coloured skin from that of our parents.
, Why was I born with such an unfortunate colour? Only
. 'coloured people can really.understand the permanent
affront to our human dignity.
'Now here in Mozambique we have established real
equalitybetween men. It is from this so many Portuguese
are running away. They cannot face up to real racist
equality. We are the most obdurate and uncompromising
enemies of racism. But we also feel that by putting too
much stress on the apartheid issue the danger ii that
revolutionary forces may be diverted into waging an anti-
'white campaign
'That is why we say let us defiire the enemy.
'It is not the whites, it is not a question of skin
pigmentation. )
I 'It i9, in our area of the world, colonialist capitalist
oppression.' '
For Machel and'Mozambique, such a candid declara-
tion of the enemy and goali t uO cbme too late. The
damage had been done in the last few months before
independence, when the Portuguese settlers fled in droves
in anticipation of Frelimo atrocities. Its never been
established whether their flight was simple panic or the
' 164
) ':-. '
,r
'result of intirniohtion or coircion 'by.Fori*o,: c.rtaint"
,','ii
there was little visible evidence olharrassment or tnl '.iir','
' -iti
whites, few had homes auacked, enen l.ss hffi;;;r;ri"r,
stolen. .,:,-!.
Most likely they were simply scared by the onward ,.,,{#
march of a revolution that trumpeted iti .Marxismo- '
Leninismo'. The white specialists - engineers, agrono- "t'iiX ul?
mists, doctors - felt they had been forewarned by tlie tone ', ,,'!,
and nature of Frelimo to expect that they would be ,,.;
'nationalised' overnight. The exodus of a
Quarter of a .,;.,tt;,
mi[ion Portuguese was underway before Frelimo could '; :;;
do- anything to reverse it.
:
Machel, more than anybody, had come to regret that. ,
At independence he inherited a country banlrupt of,
educated,skilIedIabourbecausethePortugu.'.hadcare-
fully ensured that only the whites were trained to any
proflessional level. The statistics tell the story. on2lJuly
!275, independence day in the re-nar.d .upital of
Maputo, Machel hadZ Mozambican engineers, 3 ugroro-
mists, 5 vets and 36 doctors. For a fopulation-of 12
million.
As he tried to give his people the basics his revolutia;n ,
had--promised them - food, clothing, education, work,
medieal treatment - Machel recognis.d time and again
v
the vacuum left by the white exodus.
Furthermore, as the president was fond of saying, it
wasn't just.their departure that threatened his revolution,
it was also the manner of it. onerof his crose aides put
it like this: _
'It's not just that the portuguese went. It's that when
they.aia t_!ey destroyed .u..yihing they had, they left us
,,,
nothing. If they wrecked a tractor, they also uuineo ttre
rnanual that made sure we couldn't ppt it back together.'
Five years on, Machel was still'suffering the-conse-
,.,'
r,quences of a war that had
been perceived 5y the white
. communiry to have been racist.
' Those consequences were all too visible'in the Maputo
3
165
 witrril. r. few weets the iaigon .'*"r' ,i;#
lrsrrorsl.,rr *rlt'
"*s transrated:
action. And dramatic chang;. "---

l::f."frl., *'tilfinationat chain of lpeopre,i

-"9:1, which had handred food
-shops" ano .roitiil
been such a dismal failure. Those who ran,h"*{;;*#,
ffii;ii
gaid mo^re than nurses, preisdent Machel n;,.O;;J;*;
little to find goods to self so the_ir
' Doln on the hundreds of collective,
,, example. state farms, for In such circumstances thops *;"il.;;;;ry.
Lacking th-. equipment it was 'Leftir- i" J."vl IoiI
il',,t
,i, nowhere near production levers or
and expertise, they were private traders, it had been a mistake
to take tu.r"rriuii,,',.
f..-iralpendence businesses as rhe government had. within
u fr; ;;i;
l3ll. - Mo,zaybique, whjch shoutd be a *uJo, food
-'
,'exporter, Machel was saying: The state will create
, had to import huge quantities of basic foods. ttre ."rCI,iuis,,:,
to. support private traders, farmers and indurtriutiuisl'','
Private activity has'an important rore to pruvin;i;;ifi;--
;,r,'"-r.,'-h.ad reached 230 million dollrrr, more than the country,s ,

ening out our country.,

total exports in 1978. It would have been twice that had
rt not been for a substantiar amount of foreign aid, He followed it up with daily visits to shops,
factorips, '
farms, power. stations, even Maputo airport,
',,,, 'notably from Sweden.
sonallyu18eworkerstogetridofincomp..',.i;;d6. ,,
,o-[iii
' .; .
- {igures like
, horizon
that - with no likely improvement on the
tion and bloth. It meani that by the time MGiliX,
l1

- had made peace imperative for Macher. And

back from London Macher *", not only advocrting ,, ,

,, l with peace, came a respite foihis revolution. the ,,,

.
,,

The president used ii to go o, th.;ff;;;. with his lll,::^:lgrg."ryT,

in
he was practising
tactics and the advice he was now to give
i,. nir.i?#, "
, ,'', own people back home.
a profound effect on Mugabe as he prepir;
*u, to'ilri, .rr,
'
, In e.arly December, as Mugabe was inching slowly ;;;#l ,

tow.ards peace in London, Macher made trre first of

a
major series of speeches designed to make Mozambicans ..on9JanuaryY"'|.1,q9kuqalong.standinginvita.
, recognise their own failings. Il was a fundamental change
tion to speak to Mugabe's centrai comilit*.ilfi{;;;. j,
of th.V..werg busy at work on their manifesto ior tfre
P"ji:r ?V the president. He wanted to shock his peopie
,

asain Mugabe allowed til i.ir;;t

out of the bureaucracy, apathyand inefficiency thatcould i :,^tpn1..o1ce
,- otTt.. of-eve_ry And LrIltJg
oJrr,ti;
, wreck both him and ile revolution. ;, :._ -,-'-,
issue. raus
-.: -'-,.1..oo-l: once agaln.tne
again the nafdlinefg
hardlinere
'' pushed the militant rine: a full-blooded Marxist pro-
_the jargon there was a sharp message for
Beneath
that would have incruded targe-scat. iliion"rio-
everyone. 'I will not have opportunists and pettylour- ,, fu*Te
geois radicals trying to break down authority wit-h
. tlon, the immediate transfer of land from the whites t
ultra- thlAflgans,-e-rer the breaking of ties *itr, i"urii
" democracy and leftism,'he said. 'They are creating a false , Africa.
, egalitarianism where unskilled men and women have __lfrident Machel's interven-tion, as the ,.ir;;f;;;:
,i erationand pragmatism, was decisive.
jobs for which they are not fit. They are so
T?y.* into
debilitating the entire economy., , ll was.no secret that for some time Machel and
his
1,seruor aides had doubted Zanu,s .om*it*.n; ;;
166
t67
-,;,:,,
would be extremely dangerous for Zanu to even talk
;:,,'. 'about Marxism: it was a goal they could never achieve
:"ii r ,with any disunity at the to; and to talk of it would only
:',',,-:
s€rve to panic white Rhodisians.

mind when he addressed the

' , " was, he said, a clear distinction central commiitee. There
between the'lackadaisical,
, corrupt and cruel' Portuguese colonials and the whites
. ,'' in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian whites, whatever their fail-
' : :ings,- had much to offer the new Zimbabwe in building
,, the economy after independence. He offered the Mozam-
.'
:,,
bican example. He, more than anyone, knew how
' catastrophiC a white exodus could be. .Cut out the
rtietoric because you will scare the whites away,and you
need them,''Machel said. 'You will face ruin ilyou force
.. ' the whites there into precipitate flight.'
Acrording to Mozambican sources, Machel turned to

It was a remarkable display of candour.and common

sense.
.l'Don't try to imitate us,' he said. .Don't play make-

:. Marxist party as yet, so you can't create Marxism.

'It's difficult enough in Mozambique and we are a
Marxist party.'
' instantly. The message of mod.ruiion in the manifesto The British were fgny aware of the advice president
produced a few days later was all too evident. Machel was giving Mugabe. But still the barrier
trust kept Government House in Salisbury
;f d;:
passing reference to socialism. From the issue of ine apart They distrusted his commit*.nt,-jurr;,
"nJ'f*,frguL
i. Oia
168
since other politicians, among them Bishop Muzorewa
and the Reverend Sithole, wanted to hold rallies in the
capital on the Sundays Mugabe planned to return, he
cquld not come back on those days. Nkomo had returned
on 12 January to a huge crowd. Mugabe did not wish
to be seen to attract less than Nkomo or Muzofewa. The
only day his supporters could all turn out would be a
Sunday. The governor's argument was simple - the police
could not guarantee law and order if two rival parties
held rallies in the same place on the same day: and his
rivals had booked ahead of him. Then followed a demand
from the governor that Mugabe have 7l political oppo-
nents, 'dissidents', purged from Zanu two years earlier,
released from jails in Mozambique. Mugabe, said Lord
Soames, could not come home until the likes of Herbert
Hamadziripi and Rugare Gumbo had been freed.
This came quickly after news from Salisbury that a
handful of guerrillas had been killed by the Rhodesian
security forces for failing to report to the assembly camps,
and the announcement frqm Salisbury that Lord Soames
had agreed to allow a small number of South African
troops to be stationed inside Rhodesia, protecting vital
road and rail links like Beitbridge across the Limpopo
river.
r Mugabe smelt a conspiracy.
When he spoke to David Smith in Maputo on 14
January he gave full voice to his theory of a plot. 'The
British are working against us, working against us on two
170
w carnps. ,,
,' ,
[l, -here under all kinds
lonthepolitical ffont,'Britainis.delayingourdepartufe, t't
of false excuses. one excuse given . ,, i
f,
us was that Muzorewa was holding a rally one.weeierd ' r.
[ir.
i and we couldn't get our people into Salisbury. aJtist' . ,- ':i
i!,, because Muzorewa was holtling his own rally. ' .
;' 'I couldn't believe that Lord soames couid..act in a ,,,. ,.:
manner which would obviously show that he was pro- ' '.'
.:j-
.;,i
: Muzorewa and against us.' ' ':1
Smith: Do you still have faith in the British? ?,' ;rJi,iii
MugAbe: No, no, I...I...I just have lost...I mean ,,l, l
I have no faith in_tlrem, I have just lost every ounoe of ' ,,;l
faith I had in the British Government. I never knew they.. :,,':l;J
were capable of this dishonesty. [t,s really shocking. ;,,..i.,
, Smith: Do you believe you can still win? i :,,
-
Mugabe: Ah, yes, sure, sure, sure, thelevidence is 11 ' , {',.,
. 'there. we have full support throughout the country, we.
i, believe our calculationJ wiil be proved correct.
';t. Smith: You talk of evidence, what evidence?
t Mugabe:
i,', "ordinary Evidence? Evidence of support. Talk to the
mal in the street and he will tell you he supports
i;t us. Talk to the rural people, the,peasants, and ttriy wift
t t.tt you that by and rarge ttrev support us. we don't need
any more. And the reason why the British Governrnent
and the Rhodesian forces are hounding up our forces and
making it difficult for us gen'erally is that ihey realise that
we are going to win and they want to place every obstacle
in our way to prevent that.
l7l
 _: '4: ;. :i
;i:',r';':'',:l

il.!,'ijt.,. ): '' ." i

iii!.,,, .;;--,,y!ryever itrongly,fllisabet T3ir.'Bry lbeliived lhere'

conspiracy agaitsj hiT, his belief in himself and
r,, ' his party was stronger. Now that the hurdle of the cease-
fi,;jrr;t,IPs,a
,il'r, $re had been crossed - without the Rhodesians destroy-
iTg,lrit
f'-' 11n{.- he was convinced- he _w_ould win the
'{ii:,,,,;,,: r,lffition. That's why he gave way when Machel insisted
. that'the detainees be released and that he retuqn imme-
;,l d el on the first Sunday 'free'.
l

:, .' I few days after that interview with Smith, Sally

I Mugabe wrote to Lady Walston. 'At last it seems we can
, .gd,back home soon. We planned to leave earlier but the
Governor has sent a message saying we can:t, Mind you,
",'',
there will only be one month to elections. Alr the others
have been allowed in and are actively campaigning, some
openly supported by this governor. . .
'We are totally disappointed about his biased stance.
l, ConOitions u.. ,o hard io, us, even now that the country
' .has returned to so-called legality. we shall in spite of ail
this carry on and with the help and support of broad
, masses of the people who stand solidly UetiinO us, we shall
overcome . . . if his lordship governor Soames allows it.,
In the final l0 days of exile, Mugabe had the time for
something he had always promir.d hi.r.lf: the study,
the reading, the policy discussions that he knew needed
' if [re were to be an effective prime minister. He hehad been
doing it on and off for years but before it had always
been a distant prospect.
To the few visito;s he received in those last few days
in Mozambique, he was a man transformed. He was not.
.concerned, as he had been for years, with the decision
of the moment, the politics of today, tire latest news from
Salisbury: rather the politics of jornorro*, Zimbabwe
under his rule, the problems he would face. He read
, almost.everything he could find on Rhodesia. Industry
in particular preoccupied him, especially the mines. The
mines were almost wholly in the hands of the private
sector. He did not want to nationalise them, but he did
t72
 ..;
-' .''.,
I': ',
.
r ,, l,

.gis! lerrgrist',lto sofiei thg hero:to o,thei.C. , li '

,

The plane.touched down at 9.3Q am. sarisbury airport

was deserted, just a few members of the monitoring
7 The Election fbrce
waiting in their tenrs gn t!. edge of the *nrn"v, Juitir*s
- i og! for Mugabe'but for RAF planes a,i. i,
iaG
!i , Mugabe hadn't slept well for years. It
was a legacy of, : with supplies and equipment. "argo , ,

,1i .the time in prison. This night was no exception. He
,,t,, managed just a couple of hours sleep and by 4.30 in the
,, tnorning he was up at the house in Maputo for his usual
,, 'hour of calisthenics, exercises and meditation. He
',
face any breakfast. It was the day he'd been
, , "nrrdn't
waiting for all his life but, as he was to admit later, he
,," 'was too excited to really enjoy it.
', By 7.30.a.m. he and Sally were at Maputo's Mavalane
A Boeing 727 of Deta, the State carrier, was
. ,,oirport.
waitingfor them. Only a few monthi before Mozambique
The gor.rnor had banned all demonstrations at the
airport f6r 'homecominls' wer since nex Nrronlo and
other zanla commanders had returned on 26 pec"ember,
:,Tens of thousands of Front rupporter h;d ''
patriotic
I turned out to lay siege to the affi; #Iipt;; ffi;
moved in with dogs, and there were many arrests.. The
governor wanted to avoid confrontation like that,
hence
the ban.
The Mugabes were first down the steps, waving to the
small crowd - almost all of them pressmen up"on tn"
'

, barely had an airline, now a British company (British -

balcony of the terminal. Mugabe strode torn"rJ, iiiJ .
' : Midland Airways) had been contracted to provide the terminal, bounding arong as ii he courdn't wait to g.i
,

, planes, the pilots and the technicians. Travelling back the formalities over with. There was no vlp treat*.f,i, '
as well were 100-odd Zanu workers, many of whom had they had to clear customs and immigration like everyore ,

spent five years in Mozambique like the Mugabes. They
had followed him into exile. Now they were following
him home to Zimbabwe.
- It was 90 minutes to Salisbury, just an hour and a half
, for him to prepare for the biggest challenge of his career.
, He spent most-of the time running over the statement
he was to give the press on touch-down. He knew it would
'. tbe crucial to his chances, it was vital to create the right
, impression from the outset. Nkomo, after all, was alreidy
two weeks into his campaign, Muzorewa had been cam-
paigning for months. Occasionally he.looked out of the
, -window, reflecting in a matter of seconds upon all that
had happened in itre past. The I I years in detention, the
: newsmen crowded
loss of the children he never knew, the years of war, the
bitterFeaceof Lancaster House. All that, he told himself,
-
had been building towdrds this the moment when he
would come home to Zimbabwe, 'the bloodthirsty Com-
174
else. comingthrough theterminal,
*t it.airport *o*., , : '
" within earshot, lou(
swore at them, not to their faces but
enough for them to know what he thought. Three months ,,,
lat91 with Mugabe elected, sally rr.uil.d that moment.
'Now when I go to airport, I am escorted i" viii '''/
f,ashion,'she wroti to Elizabeth walston on r Muv 19g0.
.Butonlythreemonthsago,January27,whenwearrived.
after.five ygrs of exile for Robert and 17 for me, I was
Ig"g\ handled and 13s_told a lot of insulting words by
r ,the white_airport staff. They are the very one"s.r.oiiing
. rrp now. Was that behaviour neressary at all?,
The press room at the airport was tiny, and dozens
of
in to hear Mugabe. Zvobgo,
v' as
alw_ays, produced a line to fit the occaiion.
'[ adies and gentlemen,
-- not present, introduce it's my great pleasure to present
to you again _ the nexi prime
minister of the free Zimbabwe, Robert Gabriel Mugabe.,
t75

' ,;"''.,,X'rh€ statement was a model of precision. fhanks to
.;'cctrso-ishipfew Rhodesians, white or black, hadevdr seeh
,,:,Mugabe before. He knew that for the first tirne the papers,
,:television
' rcpoft it asand radio would report what he said -'qnd
the statement of an election candidate'not
';:,;a" ;:;.
lteffOiiSt!. i-
;i',:* , 'He weighed every word heavily, frequently looking 4t
ro-;,J'':*hisraudience to mdke sure they were listening and to-see
;.1 : ' ",[19w they reacted. For mairy Rhodesians, watching him
.6n television that night, this was a new Mugabe, not the
,i ,:,,
,,; ,'' . Mugatr fhey'd been told about. But anyone who had
,,,,"',,,., {ollowed him in the previous few months recognised the
-who
',;, ,., .,,lfuijughtful,intelligent, articulite politician ha{
:. Legotiated so skilfully at Lancaster House. He had. an
,1r
, n,',' ippassioned statement of moderation and peace, frying
to allay the fears'of all Rhodesians and dispel the thing
that could damage him most - the myth built up around
'' ,, ; his' very name. 'The State of Zimbabwe must be truly
, democratic,' he said. 'In other words, there must be a
r,*,
,r :cornplete reversal of the situation where you have
:'; : 'fequals" and "unequals", superiors and inferiors, whites
and blacks.
.*We shall reverse that. But we shall not create o0t of
the-majority an oppressive race. We shall attain equality
thr.ough democracy, where there won't be any discrimina-
tion on the basis of race and colour.
't' 'We are pledged to that type of democracy. We are
,,. "pledged to giving everybody, regardless of race and
'golour, a place in society. There is, therefore, no need
;,
for anxiety or fear, We mean what we say.
t76
l-'W€ were honest in itre,rtm66,'fouglrt'
gallantly for ,
what we considereil were our h-onest ofr."ti-n*, *nd ;;
,.
shall be honest in peace to achieve a siciett;ilr;;ll
They started arriving shortly after dawn. A few hadcome
by car, hundreds by bike, thousands by bus. Teni of,
thousandSmorehadwalked.Byllo?clo&thatmornihs
Zimbabwe grounds in the township of Highfierds was noj '
just packed, it was overflowing. They Jarried banners t ,,.
,
saying 'viva Mugabe' and 'Lotta continua', they wore : ,'.
1r
tee-shirts emblazoned with the cockerel symbol if zann , ,,,
(PF), and they held portraits of the man above their ",1
heads.Suddenly,Mugabe'siomment l0daysearliertbut-,,,;",,,
the strength of his support didn't ro.rnd like elestio& ;":,.,:"'':."
They had their marshals, rigorously body-cheling; -,,,.,
everyone at the gates. They had their own first-aid unitsl.' ,,
handling the dozens who fainted in the heat. And they. ' '
had their own choir, keeping up an endless rendition o-f
the Zanu anthem, 'Zimbabwe,.
r
,
Mugabe was late, but no one cared. when his white ,r' ,,'
Mercedes pulled into the grounds up behind the rostrum, .
dozens of supporters threw themselves over the bonnet,
climbed on the roof. He didn't so much climb the steps
atthebackofthestage,hewassweptalongbythetidie,
liftedoffhisfeet..Bynowhiseyesweremoist*itt.-u-i;*
private tears. He_.d lost Sally, she was back among the
ttirongsurroundingthecar.Whenhereached-^,the
podium, 200,000 voices were raised as one, screaming,
.Mugabe,Mugabe,Mugabe.,Forfiveminutestheykep,i
it up, this Zimbabwean standing ovation, Mugabeiuired
both hands above his head like some gladiat6r, turning .1
in full circle to each section of the crowd and bowing: ,
Tlqpuglic figure beamed a huge smile, the privat. ;;
cried a little. when it finally died down, his'first words

' l*len it erupted into long and loud applause.
'i.
, -- Mugabe was home. And he had four weeks to win an
election he'd been preparing for for over 20 years.
: -The. evidence had been building up ovcr the weeks,
. 'rrThroughout January. A report from a polic+station in
Gwelo, a phone call from an election commissioner in
,,Uintali,'a personal visit to Government House from a
partyofficial.Allpointedtothesamething=thekind
bf serious intimidation that could make a farce'of the
. r*elections.
Sooner or later they would end up on the desk of Sir
, John Boynton, therelection commissioner, or his deputy
Malcolm Carruthers. And sooner rather than later they
passed them on to the iovernor.
Fro{n the moment he had arrived in mid-December,
'' Lord Soames had realised that intimidation was the one,
i unknown factor that could not only wreck the chances
r.rndrr his authority.
,i a first warning. At 9.45 that morning a blue Peugeot
diove past the house of Mugabe's sister in Highfields.
'back past the house. Two Africans in the car opened up
a Russian-made grenade- It faiteO to eTrplode 6ut in the ,ii
final',burst of gtrnfire two o{ Mugabe'i r.rephews wcte,';.,
injured. Everyone blamed Mruore*a said
"r.ryonJehe.
it was the work of rebel elements in Mugabe's own party, ' :1
the police in Salisbury hirited that it was Nko*o'J men. .
Mugabe, leaving London that night for Africa, pointed
the finger at the Rhodesian Security forces. -fn-e governor ,
could only reflect that, 'it was shocking ..; and must be :
stopped'.
Stitt, the British were consoled by the remarkable
success of the ceaseflre over Christmas and the New year.
Privately men like John Acland, the blunt but admirable
-'
commander of the Commonwealth monitoring force, hu{
feared for his men as they were sent out in small groups ,
of l!-20 men to wait for the luerrillas to come into tire
assembly camps. They were walking into the unknown,.
armed with hand weapons and c-rations but little'else.'
When just a few hundred reported in the first few days,
'
the men from the Royal Marines, the Irish Guards, the l
Kenyan Rifles and the Ne.w Zealand Infantry appeared
-not only badly exposed by downright foolhardy. In many
camps' they knew they were surrounded by the guerrillas
.
who, suspicious to the last, were"isniffing them out'before
coming in. That it worked said much for the discipline
in both guerrilla armies, a lot more for the nerve and
patience of Acland and his men. Mugabe's general, Rex
Nhongo; and Nkomo's commander, Dumiso Debengwa,
urged Acland and Soames to extend the deadline foi the
guerrillas to report beyond the one agreed at Lancaster
House - midnight on Friday, 4 January. Acland would
have none of it. 'lf we don't get the buggers in now, we
neyer will,' he said. Soames agreed; and the gambte
worked. That night, and the following morning, thou-
sands came in, the camps doubled in size within 24 hours.
Everyone at Government House breathed a colrective
sigh of relief. The first hurdle had been cleared. The one
that remained was much bigger. To ensure free and fair
t79

,':{i,'r,' ,want to. His main weapon, he decided, would be the
it...', power of persuasion.
''ijt . '. Just as principle_had led. Carrlngtol to .Lun1?Y.
'i{ouse,
ii;,;"': ,' so it made Soames dbtermined to bring all the
1:i:',,1,,,',, parties to election day. The governor, being a horse-
ft',: ,'":,,'racing fan, had his own metaphor for his strategy.
::p't,,' "
'In this particular race,'he told his staff, 'all the horses
',,*re going to get to the starting-line come what may. We
il,,r:.,l',
r,:r, , ,. rnay have to pull a jockey or two out, even hold an
,i:,'',. enqiriry. But they are all going to start.'
' , Acland may have been delighted with the final outcome
-' ,', ' Muzorewa from the guerrilla who had taken advantage
. oJ the ceasefire, but by mid-January he was getting the
,,'.r,r ,
,, ' ' tilnO of intelligence reports that told another story.
''''-,-"r Between 22D*,ember and 6 January, more than 3,000
' , I' men of Mugabe's army Zanla' had(so-breaking
';';
infiltrated from
'r ,Lancaster
MozambiquJinto Eastern Rhodesia the
, House agreement, which prohibited iross-
,.', ", " border movements). Some had gone to the camps' many
".
",,:
., had not. And, more disturbingly for Government House,
they had stored their arrns in caches all along the border.
2000, were apparently under orders from Rex Nhongo
: not to do so. Theevidencecame from 3}}ZanlagUerrillas
captured by tho Rhodesians after the ceasefire deadline,
Inierrogatea Uy British police advisers, they said Nhongo
had givin them orders personally to stay away from the
" camps. Nhongo, they said, had also told them that any
subJequent countef-order should be ignored if it ap-
peered to have been made underduress- Not surprisingly,
, Wh.n Nhongo broadcast appeals for them to come in at
the governor's insistence, they didn't. This meant that
Centenary in-
throughout the Eastern Highlands - firom
,
1
,,
the iiorth,to Chiredzi in the south - there were hundreds,',
of guerrillas still at large, capable of.making:a mockery' ,
At once the reports started coming into the Election
Commission. By the time Mugabe got home, a team of
eight British election supervisors were putting ths finistr-,',' l
ing touches to an interim report on the progress of the
campaign. Their verdict was frightening. More than half '
the people of Rhodesia were being intimidated by
Mugabe's guerrillas and supporters, they said. Condi- ,
tions for 'fair and free' elections did not exist in five of
the eight electoral districts in the country.
Contrary to the claims of Mugabe, the supervisors I.
found little proof of intimidation by Rhodesian security
force auxiliaries - the army of about 23,OOO created by
ofhis amnestycampaign in 1978 and l979,and theyoung,
Only in Victoria province did the supervisors report
that the auxiliaries had used'armed electioneering tactics'
to encourage peasants to attend.a Muzorewa rally.
It was from victoria province that the worst evidence
had come - and, more damagingly for Mugabe, it had
come from his old ally Joshui N[o-o. Nkomo iold the
governor that three of his workers, a candidate called
Francis Makombe and two helpers, were putting up :
posters in chibi tribal trust land near Fort viitoria when
they were aMucted by two gunmen who identified them-
selves asZanla'fighters'. The three of them were marcled
offto nearby villages, the peasants assgmbled. an{ordgred;
. to ignore Nkomo's party. The gunmep,-Nkqmci iaid;then
told the crowd that Mugabe's party,had. egulppent iq
i detect how people voted. Anyone-who:vbiedior.any
': r
; candiate other than Mugabe's '
would have theiiheadr.rt ' ,
off.
r, The two helpers were beaten, the candidate was last
;.seen with burning coal being stuffed down his throat.
l8l
 '1.

tt.1",,ir ,.!rv uEurB u;rTul-Iu6t. It,I$ tgfror".loere Is IGar ln pg'rop&:s

j,.:.:,' eyes.' It was, of course, by no means as one-sided ai the
'i',1,',': ..:,
: . interim report suggested.
r

,:: , A visitor to the squatters'camp in the Salisbury town-

,ship of Harare, where there was little intimidation, could
find any number of victims of the Bishop's auxiliaries.
,A ybung trader called John Sekere, for example. On 27
January, he was at Zimbabwe grounds to welcome home
Mugabe. He went home to Goromozi district, about 30
ryriles east of Salisbury, with his car loaded with Zanu
GD posters. He promptly started pasting them every-
,where in his village. The auxiliaries, from a unit of Pfumu
Reyanhu ('spear of lhe people'), were quickly alerted.
Sekere fled but they found his nephew at his shanty, and
shot him dead. The hut was burned down. Or Patricia Mugabe was about to move in when he received
and Irene, both.mothers of large. families, also from call he'd been expecting - the
r"Y
Goromozi. Early one morning in February, they said, the 'Hallo, Mr Mugabel it's the governor,s office
auxiliaries arrived in their village, fired shots over the here '.
Lord Soames would like to see you. l0 o'.ro.k,
heads of the peasants and then started systematically 6liii''
beating everyone they found. The reason? They said -heMugabe is a fastidious time-keeper. A few *..t
s i"iur,
was literally one minute late for a ;r.il;';;;'d
Zenla guerrillas had been in the village the day before.
,Soames. Bounding up the s_teps, he said: ;S"..yl*Jii:
- ---J'
Bishop Muzorewa, challenged about instances like these,
said the people had been 'brainwashed into telling lies'.
running on African time today.' ' -"." ,
He drove to Government House at a furious
The fact remains that all these'victims'were takeri back speed,
determined not to be late. when they pufled
to their homes and their fellow villagers, totally un- inr" ;h.
prepared for journalists, supported the allegations. armed with machine-guns. one of the gou.*or's
Still, zosr of the evidence coming into Government aides ,-
came-out to greet him and found himseif looking
House pointed to Mugabe's men being responsible for at the
barrels of seveial gonr. He stood on the ,i.pr-',ii,r,
most of the intimidation. It meant that by the time he anns outstretched and told Mugabe they coulb
iri;
returned, Lord Soames knew that some kind of show- in.
not;;;
down was not only inevitable, it was imperative. And one Mugabe was a rittre surprised but he turned
or two of Soames aides, in their gloomier moments, wene guards and said: 'No, no, it,s alright. you
to his
admitting that perhaps'one jockey and one horse might ,u"iiout;;;.;
soames and Mugabe had never-met before.
not make it to the starting-line.' r, tt.,,uin
reception room adjoining the governor,s
For about 30,000 pounds, the Mugabes had bought.a office, ,tte;
shook hands. By nature soamesls a warn,
house in the predominantly white iuburb of Mount. affectionate
mah, and in the few meetings he'd alre"dt
il-;rh
182
t83
 $o*gJhey;d taken to putting their arrns around each l' ll
ii,uo.{r1 ii1'r"#i#*til*.r$;the,;s6wrnq{
otler.lhe oqeling meeting with Mugabe was decidedry olaJi;1,t$j
frosty. Nkomo and Muzorewa had simply come
- 3trga{V ban Mugabe's pariy fronn tte
eiectior-N;;-li: ,,,.;i:i,{j
,91-ore that.glabted him to restrict part1, ,.,i{j
yth their advisers. Mugabe was whorry mor'e irofes- ::T.:::...illliT
meetings, suspend a candidate from ;;;;il;r"lri i ,:,rri
sional. disqualify a party in any one district. r ---e''- , ,,,.;
.on.saturday, l0_ Febiuary Enos Nkulu, a hard-liner'
.Ju] "ni$
y.ho lrad spent 15 years in detentio, ,nd ffi . ;j;{
Mugabe's teading candidate in ruaieuriri"il],#;
there that the war would resume ir rvrugabe'd;;;;H , ffi .
l

the election. He had arready been quotJd ,"r,,l

' ur.*]i"g,trrai,,.:r.t{j
'the governor can go hang'.
Tliat, saia soail.r,
-iu,
incitement. Government ..it'+'
House announced on the"sundav that
"' Soames began by saying that he hoped Mugabe did Nkar.;;
clerk who had become the party;s treasure.,
;;:;,*, , ,1,
, not feel tooiggrieved about the delay in coming campaignrng. ;;r Ye"uvY , :::*
t"nned. ,,
r'. back.
'fndeed, I d;-,' answered Mugabe. .And ,t ur'r"*r-uif
from ,,1',,1i
,, That Sunday Mugabe was in Fort Victoria.
It was only
,
i:,', . . i the ceasefire has been broken repeatedly by the thesecond major rally of his campaigr.ih;;;;-ou, iit
, security forces and the auxiliaries .. .. there are South *r. , : /
African units in many places ... this is not what I had fgatlnV. enough, about 25,000;
Muchoke. They heard Mugabe's most
the fi
t*"#r"li
expected.' date on rhe governor. He l6uld, he
bitter urr"Jr. ,"; r ',.
' soames patiently heard him out, then replied with the_ said, orJ., irilil ,,
to leave rhe assembly camps if Lord a";;;;;;;ri
,

, ' charge of intimidation against zanla units: ruruguu. aiJ- to ban.his party lnot just individuars like Nkala)'ir#
not concede that some of his.men had stayed out of the ,i-
camps deliberately, he did adririt there had been problems 'If Lord Soames shourd u* fiir n.-*
no*.rs to bro
l' i-','.t;t,,

in getting the message through to his forces. zanu (PF) then

'The death of Tongogara caused great confusion,, he
zan_y (pF) wilr consider itserf
from rhe Lancaste: House'agreem.r;. \t;;ilI
uu*rrt ,,.
',:i'

tinue to keep our forces in th? ur.ernUrv

il, .oo- ,,
too friendly, Lord Soames had the last word. camps ii;.;;-
banned,' Mugabe said. : ,

,.,,,
Mugabe's motorcade had been herd up
by the crowd, ,
"i,
Three days later, 15 black civilians were killed and airstriptomeettheplanetakinghimbacki"s"rr'iI.y]
100 miles east oi salisbury on the rgad to umtali. The {s th9 convoy turned into the ui".r, road readingio
airstrip, it happened.
tv the
u^:v ,,.-:
,,
,
.,

,,
" . rockets and small arms ur.d.uggested zanlawas respon- A huge bomb exploded underneath the motorcade.
sible..A peace that had atways Len fragile, said one of Mugabe was shaken, badly, but not hurt.
, 'peneral walls'aides, ** noi3ust cracki-ng atttre seams, tne car behind him were injured. It was
Five luards
it was falling apart. il
or escapes.
the narrowest

184
l8s
 :
rl1ir€ placed in a culvert under the road. It did not go
;i;; ; off. The Rhodesian bomb experts who detonated it later
'i,,1: ,,'',&

,-;i' ' rimarked that its construction showed a great deal of

',,.,, - expertise. The following day Mugabe, back at his home
,','..',',',' in'salisbury, went on the offensive against the governor. papers, reported in the Rhodesian press. Mugabe claimed, i j,...;tt
that missing.
at two million had gone missing. ., 1' ,"- ,,:':'1,','r'rr,:il
o, forces whom the governor has chosen to deploy,'he told
.: Lord Soames madelt clear thuih. would take actiou .' ":';;;$
),.ir:i.ij

,,,, a press conference in his back ga.frden. 'Its just one of the
',,l" strategies which have been worked out by' the
l,"l*; M;;-b. ;6p"d ;ffiil;;; ;il; i,J;i,i,iil "-'ir
' ' many in certain areas - notably Manicaland, along the border : ,.'.;
:

British, the South Africans and the Rhodesians to prevent with Mozambique. Nkomo, Muzorewa and uit tt. ott ii' i ,j
parties said they simply could not campaign there for fear ,' ,,",,,\r:i
'' , Taking treatment like this, he said, made him look like of reprisals, Lord Soames declared.
' . a traitor to his men in the camps.
"', Mugabe seized vr.on this at vtlvw.
r.r.u ql once. ,,
),

,.1,i,
' 6I won't continue to insist on my forces remaining. in 'Look, Lord Soames,' he said. rl'm not new to 11ri, ,.,,,r.
. assembly points if thb people continue to be exposed to game, you know. That's
Ty part of thecountry, Manica-
i
the Rhodesian Forces and the auxiliaries. If Lord Soames lan4 that's mine. The fact that Nkomo can't iamriaisn ' -
doesn't check them ... we will restart the war.' there is down to the fact that I control it, I've had a.In
"
system there for five years. It is surprising th6t people ,..
yet the following day Mugabe was to change the course don't turn out there for Nkomo? Woutd I [o to l.iko*o 1.

of it all with a display of defiance, honesty and reason country (Matebeleland) and expect to raise a crowd there? '.'
that astounded everyone at Government House. Of course, I wouldn't.' '.. '
, Soames called Mugabe to Government House for six Soames, quickly gathering his thoughts, repeated his l'' ,l
olclock in the evening. Mugabe arrived with his two most warning of a few days earlier. ,,'.
senior men on the Central Committee - Simon Muzenda, 'I still look to you, Mr Mugabe, to stop the intimida- ',,,,,1,

his deputy, and Edgar Tekere, a militant who had held tion. I want all candidates and all partiis to hold free ' .',,i
meetings wherever they are,' the governor said. ,,,
'

ment: Mugabe did not give Lord Soames much of a Government House's approach to Mugabe after that, :,

assault on the ethics of electioneering was never the sarne.

To say that they treated him with a lot more r€spect is: ' " ,,
I . not just the Fort Victoria attack, now there was evidence an understatement. They knew that there was no answer,, , .,'
-.
186 187
 ,......,..'..,,,:.'l'..,.,.-j*'1.,

showi: tr,.p had been death threats.agbinst him;: , :,+ ' i j.,jr",,,,,iii
That same Sunday, Cornbined Operations Head: r;, ,'';*
quarters in Salisbury. put oit an unprecedented .com: .,,: . : fil
.muniqu6 explaining a spate of bomb atiacks in the capital ' ,'' :r:.
a new war.
the previous Thursday night. The security forces tried'tO ' ii#$
'There was, however, one other alternative, and'over
,,.

the weeks it had become a favourite talking-point in

hide their embarrassment, but they could not conceal thi " ,,*,;.'i
_
strongest evidence of a campaign of 'dirty tricks' aimed 'i:,l;i
white, business and British circles in Salisbury, including
those at Government House.
at Mugabe and his party. The bare facts of tne case were ,*;*rr
thattwochurchesinthecitycentrewere severplydamaged .,r,r,ij
' simpleOn the likely assumption that Mugabe would win a
by bombs. The blast from one of them also cauied severe , .,,,-
majority of seats (3Hp was the most popular
damage to the Monomotapa Hotel in. the city centre, ',
,. projection at this stage), but not a clear one (50+)r.qiq ,lri:

where several British officials, including John Boynton, , ,:i;

itrri. exist a coalition of forces that would exclude him?
r , An anti-Mugabe coalition looked good on paper to the were s,laytng. No one was seriously hurt , -:,'it'''
The saEre night an explosion occurred near a ctiurch,':;.,:,'
'"
Government House (not Lord Soames, it must be said).
in tlie black township of Harare. To be precise, it occurred . ni
in the back of the car of the bombers, and it kitled them .,
It tvas particularly appealing if it included Joshua Nkomo.
him .on board, probably as prime minister in a both instantly. Both were black. ;

, With At once tire police lei it be known that they had ,t;'''"
, , coalition including Muzarewa and the whites,'the new
'c6ncluded' that it was a campaign of terrorism against .',:,,, .:,,;
Zimbabwe would get the backing of at least two Front
Christianchurches. Bishop Muzoiewa and the RhoJesian ;.' ,,:.,,
, . I-irre States, Zambia and Botswana. Add to them South
' Front said it could only have begn the work of Marxigts, ,' , '.1,,r.'
Africa, the EEC, Nato and the Soviet Union (Nkomo?s
arms supplier, after all) and it made sense. At.least it
After all, had not Mugabe, once said that all Christiat i ii,'.,,
. holidays would be banned under him? And that the State ,i,,r,
would make sense. to many Western governments and
international business. ,. religion would be his own atheism? He had also said in ,'','
his manifesto that there would be religious freedom.
It was no secret that some senior figures at Government
House did more thanjust nurture the idea, they positiveli
The following day another unexploded bomb was ';i;1:;

found at the side of the Roman Catholic cathedral in

' encouraged it. Nkomo himself did nothing to discourage
them. He would prefer to form a coalition with Mugabe.
But he was really leaving all options open.
Salisbury. On it were written pro-Mugabe sloganq :,,', i
admittedly in bad Shona. But they were in Shona which, ':,,:,1'
. as the police noted immediately, was the language ofihe ,r;'.,;

"',to campaign. On 17 February, he was due to appear at

the Barbourfields football stadium in Bulawayo.'Two
Some Mugabe supporters had got to the bombed-out
weeks before Nkomo.had drawn a huge crowd there,
' ",."
car in Harare before the police and found the vehicle's. .'
Estimated at 200,000.'About 50,000 waited for Mugabe,
which made nonsense of his claim that he could not expect
registrationcertificate.' I

to raise a crowd in the part of the country. He did'not '

188 189 .;

.i;,-,, . nien had
made a telephone report to their duty officer.
They had information about th. ptes.nce of two Zanla
.,.l'infoimationandtoreportbackwhenpossible.'
'"'', ": The communiquE did not explain how two soldiers
' '! i ' came to be sitting in a car with a bomb in the back; why
,,;' ,' they had taken it upon themselves to do police work; even
, what two soldiers were doing on duty in a township
, when they should have been in barracks under the cease-
nrr.
' '
Not for nothing, said one of Mugabe's spokesmen that
': ' night, were the Silous Scouts trained to disguise thEm-
selves as guerrillas when the occasion called for it.
A week later on the final weekend of the campaign,
the left-wing newspaper Moto appeared on the streets
I '. Or" to put the question once more, did it?
Motohadnot long been back in publication; its support
' ' for the Patriotic Front had seen it banned for years under
Smith and Muzorewa.
. The dateline on this, edition, saying 'Saturday, 12 Feb-
: ruary 1980,'did not necessarily give it away. Everything
else purported to be the real thing. The banner was the
':t stories favourable to the Front.Its front-page splash was
,' anything but. It was headlined 'Robert Mugabe - profile
,', ,of the man.'
:,, I , It was a savage indictment of Mugabe, crediting him
i, i' 190
:, , I
with everything from,an 'oedipus corlrplei'to a liistlfor,'
power that would stop.at nothing. Every myth surround-',
'Who is Robert Mugabe?'it began. '!s he an enlightened .l
progressive Christian leader of a people seeking theif .,r
destiny 'or is he a ruthless, power-hungry Marxist
.
heathen?' ,,,ii,
It ended: 'One cannot escape the conclusion that he' .i
ls a psychopath suffering from paranoia - in layman's
terms the man can be considered mentally ill.'
At 2 a.m. the morning after the fake issue of Motto was ,
circulated, the Mambo printing press which normally'.
i published the newspaper was blown ",
up. No doubt it was
designed to be seen as a reprisal by Mugabe's supporters
for the scurrilous attack-. But again the bombers were the ,
victims: they died in the explosion too. And the charredl
remains suggested they were not Mugabels saboteurs.
Because one of them was white
Under 'free and fair elections' that final weekend of
the campaign would have seen the candidates out on the
:
hustings, driving home their message to the voters. At
least that was the design of Lancaster House.
Instead, Mugabe was at home in euorn Avenue. A"
rally he had planned in umtali was cancelled when police
found rockets and mortars hidden just a few hundred
yardsfromtheshowgroundwhereitshouldhavebeen
held.
---Nko*o
was in Gwelo, the town picking up the pieces
after the bombing at the Mambo prerses thi night bifore.
Nkomo had fought a skilful, clevir campaign,6ut he had
rarely got outside his native Matebeleland to prove it.
On this; the last real campaign day, he was to show what
might have been. It was not a fighting speech, more an
impassioned statement of his credentials as the father of
,
Rhodesian nationalism, depicting himselfas the only man
under whom everyone could unite.
Bishop Muzorewa was in Salisbury, leading the final
li. -6 l9l

,-i,,. election. Those who attended the Bishop's rally learned
', ltheir
,
'i.,'rr first lesson. 'I can't believe it,' said one Dutch
i ,,' r' ' sbserver. 'This man is buying votes, with no shame.'
'General Walls spent that final weekend of the cam-
,', ;,t';,'..
game of tennis on Saturday morning he and Ken Flower,
j' ," the head of Rtiodesia's central intelligence, flew out in
:secret on one of the most dramatic missions of the entire
r.,,,, ' ,Rhodesia story. It was very much at the behest of Govern-
' ment House, John Acland;n particular.
:' ' The official version was-that General Walls and Mr
Flower met ministers of the Mozambican Governmqnt
to discuss the post-election period in Rhodesia. In fact,
they went specifically to get President Machel's assurance
' ,that he would accept the result of the poll, whatever its
r-:
gave Machel's ministers a guarantee that there would be
,, . no military coup if Mugabe won.
When Walls came home on Sunday night, he had a
,, ing, just 48 hours before the elections were due to start,
about 600 men of Nkomo's army Zipra were to report
,': in,a camp at Essexvale near Bulawayo for training with
' ' ,Rhodesian units. It had long been Nkomo's dream to set
'up"ajoint army of guerrillas and Rhodesian regulars, oIlG-
', 'oftime enemies in the same force. It would be a symbol-
,'' the new order in Rhodesia, said Nkomo. It also held
,. " ,tpossible solution for one of Government House's main
,'' 192
lhought it was positive steg but he was not sure whet6gl ,'i",i
p..ur;:i;;'".*ar",'ffiffi;il;''iiti
a
it woirtd solve tt" .:11lj
question. , i'';
things on his mind. A coup was not otrt of the question. ,
walls would not lead it - he was being honest when he .;j
said that he would serve if asked whatever governmer, , ;,;l"ii,
came to power - but he knew that his .midJle manage- ., .,::jiir
ment' of white officers might ask him to sanction it. Lt I ,
this stage, walls simply did not know how he wourd react,, - ''i"
to that.
His prime sentiment, in the run-up to the election, was ' ". ';ri.,.
, frustration
- frustration with the way, in his view, ,', jii;
Muzorewa had been outwitted at Lancaster House and . ,o
outfought in the election. He sensed Mugatc would win, t,
';r
by what margin he could not know, and that is *fry te
had agreed to go to Mozambique. But that did not mean ili
he liked it. He was to vent his frustration by writing to :' ,'
Mrs Thatcher asking that she declare the resurt null and ,: ::r,,'1
That Sunday, Lbrd Soames made his final review of ,
ir;
the situation. The question in front of him was whether ', ,
ornottobanpollinginareaswhereintimidationwas
, ,1
rife. His stqf had maps, showing that in mcire than a ' ", '',.
quarter of the country no parties other than Mugabe's ,
.hadbeenabletocampaign.Thelatesttallyfromthe ' ,
ceasefire commission showed that the vast majority of the I ,'
207 breaches reported had been attributed to Mugabe's
anny. The number of contacts between the Rhodesian - ,!
forcesand.bandits'(guerrillaswhohadnotgoneinto
the assembly camps) was now running at nine or ten a , ,
day, twice the level of a few weeks earlier and mainly ,
,.
in the Eastern Highlands, Mugabe country. It was, in thl " ,:
viewofsomeBritishadvisers,asystematicandcalculated
campaignofviolenceandintimidationbyZaw(PF).
'You have a situation,'explained one of those advisers, ; '
'where eight black parties are trying to carry out a

,:i,,
party. But in the context of Rhodesia, of a country at
t war for seven years?
i, ,'
' , Soames decided, in his own mind at least, on the lesser
riOf two evils. He would let the election go ahead, whatever
the doubts about its integrity, rather than ban polling
,and so provoke a probable civil war.
, ,', Lady Soames' good work and innate political skill
,. should not be overlooked in assessing her husband's role.
. Not only did she help build relations with all the party
':
leaders, she was also a tireless worker on behalf of
charities handling orphans and refugees. That was to
, itnpress Sally Mugabe, who wrote to Elizabeth Walston
in May: 'Lady Soames has great feelings for the suffering
children. She did some good work. I only wish she could
have stayed longer.'
,,', That afternoon the governor and his wife Mary
'attended an inter-denominational servlce at the Salisbury
I showglound. Along with about 500 others, mostly whites,
they prayed for peace whatever the outcome of the
election.
By Monday mgrning SirJohn Boynton and his election
staff were ready to go. It was a massive operation; they
had been working at the logistics non-stop ever since
December. Not least of Boynton's problemsrwas that he
did not knowjust'how many people could or would vote.
,The black population was thought to number abut
sevqn million. Less than three million were believed to
' In
beentitled to vote (all adults, over 18, including foreigners
if they had lived in the country for more than two years).
There was no electoral register, indeed no reliable census.
To prevent anyone voting more than once, a simple
chemical precaution would bb used. The voter wouid, on
arrival at a polling station, have his fiands examined by
194
I i :gliiing machihC.If',the rnecfri* Uia not,respond, he.
wourd be given a bailot paper and his hands wourd
be
aiqne{. igto cotourtess chimicat *hi;h';.fl#i;a
_a
violet light- If heor she attempted to ;;i;;;;;o-ru
ifi#
' ti*,,
the scanner would react to the chernical. Th.
was, of course, designed to leave traces for more"h;;il;i
the three days of polling.
**
t
There were 657 polring stations and nearry harf of
them
w€re mobile, vans travelling round the ruial urr^
und
the remote tribal trustrandJ. At such there *;rld
b"';
British policema-n, something of an unurfrron[;- it
seemed, but in fact a figure of au,thority that i"*
'
Africans did recognise. It was his job to ,nuti,u*
only.
the voters entered the stationr and that no on,
sing-ing, chanting or shoutinj prrty srogans wittin
,ir.i"i
y"l9r of the polling booth. At the eni of ,t. AuV ,ie
i'iil
policeman would make sure the boxes were seared, if
necessary he would sleep with themto make ,;;. ;h;
were not tampered with
Early on Tuesday morning the great airlift stdrted.
Millions of ballot papers, triousands of ball", il"-.r,
hundreds of those scanners flown from Salisffiii,
tt orj
stations throughout the country. The plan.r t ui
.r*;
!9* Britain, America, Canada. T'he ,ru.[, ;;;;
Rhodesian, each one escorted by the security ior"., io
-mine-protected
vehicres. No one was taking.t un...;i;;
of all-Generat walrs. come that Tuesdry ;;;;ing,
.u"*
available soldier and porice,rnan was on duty. Lea've
been cancelled weekJ before,. now Walls trad
h;;
."il;^;;
almost every reserve, young and old. It gave trim
OO,OOO
men for a massive, highly visible displa! of security.
Salisbury, roadblocks weie put on every way into
tfr..ity,
manned by police and backed by army units,
some of
them with decidedry heavy artiliery ui th.ir'disposar.
Truckloads of policemen and sordiers patrorteo
ilrJto*n-
ships and infantry units guarded key instarr"rir* rilr.irrl
radio and television station and the ministries.
ih;;;;;
195

drnd the'bandits'.
',,' At 3.30 Mugabe arrived at Government House with
MunangBWB, Nyagumbo, and Miss Otil. The governor's
private met them at the door.
' 'The secretary
governor would tike to see you alone,' he told
Mugabe.
' 'Alone?' asked Mugabe. 'What .. . you mean without
my secretarY?'
'No... alone.'
' 'I suppose you'll be there,' said Mugabe.
i'No, just You and Lord Soames''
fvfugibe went into the reception roonl, where the
governof was waiting for him. He led him into his office
and shut the door.
SoameS began by asking why Mugabe was delaying
in getting his men into the camp where Nko-ryq's units
*.i. training with the Rhodesians. Mugabe denied that
he had beeri'dragging his feet', as he put it: he wanted
:to start integrating ttie armies as soon as possible and
he would gJto see John Acland about it as soon as he
had finished talking to the governor.
-- -n"nging
subjects quickly, Mugabe said that the police,
', behaviour in the pas! few days had been 'scandalous'.
rAbout 5000 of hii supporters had been detained in the
previous week, he claimed. Lord soames disregarded
, ihat, but sincc Mugabe had brought up allegations of
196
1J'
intimidation,' what'about ihe carnpaign it Zarrui (pF)f il,
will not forget it,''thogovelnor told him. 'You kniwiuit.
what a big factor intimidation, by your people, has been ,i,,i
in this election.'
Mugabe did not answer the charge.
Nevertheless, said Lord Soames, he would not beusing, 'l
hispowerstobanpollinganywhereordisenfranchise
voters in any part of the country.
'I think its in the best interests of Rhodesia that all
parties start this election,' he said. I
Mugabe may have been delighted, but he did not let
it show. The formalities over, the governor asked what
his plans were, how he saw the future.
Mugabe paused for a sscond, then explained. There
would be no instant, radical change, no sweeping national-
isation of either industry or land, and no ho-unding of r
the whites. He wanted the whites to stay, he said, without
them the economy could be wrecked. He also wanted
Walls to stay on, to ease the fears of the whites and build
up a disciplined military from his own forces and those
of the Patriotic Front.
Then he turned to independence.
'When I'm prime minister,' he said, 'independence
ought not to come too quickly. We need time, Lord
Soames ... and I would like you to stay on for as long
as possible.'
The governor thanked him for that. It would be con-
sidered, he said. After an hour, Mugabe went off to see
Acland about the integration of the armies.
'Goodbye, Robert,' said Soames pointedly as he left.
The two had not been on first-name terms till now.
'Goodbye, Lord Soames,' replied Mugabe.
It had been a crucial meeting, both men looked back
on it as the 'turning-point' in the relationship. It was
significant for a number of reasons. Not least the fact
that neither had doubted who was going to be prime
minister.
t97
 ' tv€ro: makingtheir final appeals to the nation with
:i r:recorded messages on radio and television, a silver
:Mercedds pulled up at the house in
Quron Avenue. It
::i :*'ug waved through the minute Mugabe's guards saw who
: it was.
;.-"" General Walls had come at Mugabe's request. Walls
i,, ,
rtoldhim there would be no coup r/he won. Mugabe asked
,;rr ,him tq stay on as commander of the armed forces when
, he did.

In some places, notably the townships of the major cities,

they started queuing in the middle of the night. By five
iin the morning, the line at the main polling station in
Harare was half a mile long. There were the occasional
shouts of a party slogan, some of Mugabe's supporters
even pranced up and down the line flapping their elbows
I and imitating the shrill of the cockerel, the party symbol.
By dawn, loudspeaker vans were out in the towns remind-
ing people to vote.
At seven o'clock that morning, the stations opened.
In the cities, there was a rush to vote before work started,
in the rural areas it was more leisurely (many there would
have to wait until the mobile booth came round). But
from the first few hours it was clear the turn-out would
be massive
There were a few hiccups. The woman in Bulawayo,
for example, who realised she had put her cross against
the wrong party, cnrmpled her paper up and stuffed it
into her brassiere before going to the back of the line
to try again She was arrested, taken before a magistrate
and cautioned.
198
 .

I
Once fgain, Mugabe *u, *irirurtedl'and susoected br, l
,lntove in, albeit in smallqumbers.'A few nionitors, all
'volunteers, should stay behind to keep the poace if
the. weekend, Nki*oir"iJ
-
some of the most senior figures at Goverrrm"ni
..ci*;;Ifji6'
House,
',,necessary. I ^
,FTr ,
i Acland had a formidable reputation with all his men. |9lan! spelling out the orders crearly. rnstlbo oi', .

Like most soldiers, they distrusted politicians but they 'Mugabe, simon Muzenda visited theza,nia.u*frr"iii "-..

trusted Acland. One of the factors crucial in keeping up there the atmosphere was decidedly tense.
mgrale and nerve in the early days had been the common
The last to vote wg.re the guerrillll in the camp$:
soldier's reasoning that, if things were going wrong. -Friday On .t,1,
Acland would get them out. Now Acland wanted-them night, the polls closed-, the ballot boxes *.ri flown. , ,', ,i
out, he saw no point at all in having them all at risk if thd
pack to salisbury. on sarurday mofning rh; ;rn;.rl
i- -"1' '',",.1
result went against the leader of the guerrillas they had Fgun.
t
,,,1

charge of. _
Everyone now waited, Lord Soames, John Aeland, , ,'i{:
Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa. Everyone, it,r;;.
Walls was persuaded to move in small units of his army, '.i:
quietly, discreetly on the day before the result. Six apart from Mugabe. He flew in from Tanianiaori suna"i, ,
ri
.monitors, most of whom had built up a good relationship
and told the press: 'The governor is duty-bound to.h;; ':

with the guerrillas, would stay with them for the day of pe to form a government, It is ineviiable, wtether we
, rv rrw Ltlvt Wg ,,rtl, . ,

have'an overall majority or not.,

,,,,
. :,..

the result, with plans well laid for evacuation if necessaryl , .:,.,,,\.:;.

In one of the largest Zanla camps the British major was It started as informed speculation, leaks from the oartv , ,r.,1;;;j

to brief journalists on those plans the night before the and election commissioners who had s.en tnl
3g,..nt$ ',
Dallots. being counted. By four o,plock on the
result. 'If it goes wrong,' he said 'we all beat it up Monday i,,,
afternoon, 17 hours before the declaratiori, it washard , ,,.
the hillside, where we've got enough mortars to hold'
news for the 800-odd journalists in Salisbury.- -- t,,
them off for a couple of hours. By then the choppers
had won. And won so convincingly a ' ..
[helicopters] will be in.' 'wanted to {u.sabe that ,,,,

Eddison Zvobgo explained that Mugabe

In.salisbury of ,,,,,,,
heal the breach between Nyerere and Machel over the llon-e, the agent, nua seen a quarter
-validity of the poll. Just two days before Nyerere had a million votes for Mugabe, just 50,000 for Muzor.*", r , .11,
claimed the British would rig the election in favour of
half that for Nkomo. Mugabe had swept the il;.il '' i.
Ivlanicaland, victoria provi-n@, even the midlardr;;;
Muzorewa. Machel had argued that the poll would be
valid, whatever the outcome. The fact was that Machel
Nkomo had hoped to do well. '
,---- ,,'',',t','.,
had Fernando Honwana in Salisbury to brief him, Zvobgo,asaIways,providedthequotesforthepress.
Nyerere had no one. ,
Arriving^atthepreSscentreintheMeikleshotel;.th;
Acland was ihfuriated. Mugabe had no more im- centre of Salisbury, he predicted 60 seats for Mugabe.
.Itisnolongeraquestionofwhetherwewiuw]nuut
irortant task than telling his men'to behave, he said. The
governol's staff shared his anger, particularly when they only by what margin ... that shourd be no surprire-t,o ,',-,
checked with Machel in Maputo and found that the
anybody. ,) ,

trip was not at the president's request, but Mugabe'S He could even afford magnanimity towards Nkomo. , .1.
initiative. 'we want him to join us,; Zvobgo said. 'rur, Ntoro 'r i .i
200 20t

Soames went first. 'This is a solenin hour for Zim'
' 'and no hatred or bitterness . . . but anybody who gets out-
of line will be dealt with effectively and swiftly, and, I
may say, with quite a lot of enthusiasm.'
Mugabe was last. 'Let us join together, let us show
respect for the winners and the losers.'
It could have been an anti-climax - he knew, after all,
, that he had won- but Mugabe was determined to savour
every minute of it. At nine o'clock the following morning
he, Sally and dozens of their helpers, comrades like
Muzenda, Nkala, Tekere, were waiting in front of the
television set in Quorn Avenue. Some of the girls, the
, girls who had been in Maputo, Geneva, London, could
not bear to watch. Sally made them sit down.
' On the stroke of 9 a.m., John Boynton began to read
the roll calt of the parties. Cheers for Nkomo-s 20 seats.
' Jeers for Muzorewa's 3. Zanu (PF) was right at the end.
The Mugabe household only heard'57'- The rest was
drowned out in cheers. Sally hugged everyone in sight,
Mugabe himself stood up motionless for a few seconds,
numbed it seemed by the size of victory.
'My heart went bang, bang, bang,' he said as he beat
,his chest with his fist.
' The phone rang. It was Soames'secretary.'10 o'clock,
oK?'
202
sitty went out$ide to join the few dozeu who nr, ',ii:ii
gathered in Quorn Avenue to hear the news on the
radio. ;';riii
lVhen ,Mugabe left for Government House, she w#, ,,,,,,:ffi
dancing in the street. ' ,
',,1
At assembly camp Foxtrot, about 200 miles south-east , r:,,$
of salisbury, the black and white Rhodesian soldiers .; i'r;
stood to attention on their tipy ad hoc parade ground . ,]ii
surrounded by the tents in which they hadjust spe:nt theil tii
first night. They-had arrived at dusk the Lvening before ..,',^',,.*
, and made camp about 500 yards from the main bodv ,i.
of guerrillas. Their commanding officer told them not to ,,,,,'
About half of the 6000 Zanla troops in the,camp
marched to the hyee training compound exactly l0 min-r , ,.
utes before the declaration. 'At ease,' said their corir- . ,
mander,'promptly pulling out his radio and playing with '
the aerial to get decent reception. Dozens of his rn.n] their
Kalishnikov rifles on their shoulders, crowded round.
Nkomo's patriotic front, Muzorewa's uANc, sittrote;s ',
Zj'nu. r''
"
Then the result . . . and pandemonium. It took the,
commander t0 minutes to calm them down.
'Viva President Mugabe,' he shouted.
'Viva,'came the deafening reply.
Major Tim Purdon, of the Irish guards, watched frbm
the sidelines. 'Who would have thought. . . ?' he said.
In the major cities - Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali some
-
white children had been sent to school with bags already
, packed in case the rumours of a Mugabe viciory *.rL
proved correct at nine o'clock. Husbands did phoni wives
and tell them to get ready to go to South Afriia. Resigna-
tions poured in, to the banks, to the mining coqlpaiies, ,
to the ministries. Estate agents had been busy f"oi years
with the white exodus. That morning they pui trundreds
of houses on the market.
203
t l.n"u
all'lthe excitLment, Mugabe was on,ii^tieat
Gove.n*ent House. It would have been improper'foithe
gov€rnor to congratulate him. He thought that Mrs
Thatchsr would do'it in the House of Commons. But the
mood of the Conservative was as gloomy as that of the
whites dnd she pointedly refrained from any public con-
glatulations that day. One of her MPs said: 'We were
told peace was preferable to the bullet. We weren't told
that the effect would be the same.' Lord Soames simply
shook Mugabe's hand and beckoned him into his rgom.
Mugabe had brought Enos Nkala, the candidate Soames
had banned.
.' 'I don't think you know Mr Nkala,' said Mugabe-
'Ah, yes, Mr Nkulu,'said the governor. 'I don't think
I've heard you making many speeches lately.:
The next minister of Zimbabwe was not amused.
, He had not been elected in Matebeleland and he said
so. 'You cost me my seat,' he told Lord Soames.
Mugabe smiled, nervously. He and the governor retired
alone. The winner was full of praise for the governor.
Lord Soames had been magnificent, he said. Mugabe had
not expected him to allow the elections to go ahead
'unhindered' and the fact that he had said much for his
courage.
'We must join hands and work together, all of us,'
Mugabe said.
Lord Soames told him how important it was for him
to create just that impression when he spoke to the nation
later. In the next 45 minutes Mugabe and the governor
hammered out the draft out of the broadcast, not on
paper but in Mugabe's mind.
- nVere I in your position,'was how Lord Soames put
it to him, 'I would do this. ..'
At the end of their meeting, Mugabe said: 'Goodbye,
Christopher, and thank you.'
The next to arrive was Nkomo, close to tears, clearly
very tired and dispirited. One of his first comments
204
the polls separately
'We should have fought the election
Robert let me 6*n.'
Lord Soames gave him a stiff drink but Nkomo could
not be consoled. i
'f'm too old for all this,' he said. 'I will get out of,.]
politics.' :'r,';:l
The last visitor of the morning was Bishop Muzorewa.
w!.1hisdeputy,SilasMundawara,beganiocarpabout
intimidation, Muzorewa snapped: .Stop it . . . its ill over
now'.
He-told Soames: 'The most important thing is that we ,
'don't have persecution of the losers.' l
The celebrations in the black townships lasted all day:
as did the sense of shock and mourning in the w}itE"l ,
suburbs and down on the white farms. By eight o'clock ., :
that night, however, the nation was united in something: '
watching or listening to the new prime minister-elect. ,,,i
Aratherstiffwhiteladyintroducedhimontelevision
as 'Comrade Robert G. Mugabe.' That was the only
moment that could have worried anyone. i
The'bloodthirsty Communist terrorist', the man who
once said he would execute Ian Smith when he came to
power, the mhn who lan Smith once accused of .walking
around on cloud nine in camouflage' was articulate,
compassionate, thoughtful, above all conciliatory.
, ' 'There is no intention on our part
to use our majority ,
to victimise the minority. We will ensure there is a place ,
fo-r everyone in this country. We want to ensure rcnr"
" said.
of security for both the winners and the losers,' he r
. He spelt out what he wanted - a broadly based
coalition to include the whites as well as Nkomo
20s
 ,..
th:l_.""trgt Murotr, $rUi U"gae senr, a postcara t" i,.,j;il,
*1
*d;;;;':yI,,
ElizabethWalston. : . ,,rrit
Etizabeth, hy dear, it,s victory unO I ','ii
To the business community: there would be no sweep- It's simply beautiful to walk the,streets oi r,-. -i
peace at last.
,,',j' ing nationalisation. Salisbury without harassment. Everyone is a human ,, " ,iii
'',.
. .),.To white civil servants: your pensions and your jobs
' now.
'Delng ' .;::di,i
.,,i
Does this mean war is good because it brings peace?' ; li
ii,,j', , ' To"farmers and house-owners: your rights to youl:
:" ) ))' r:
t i .'':;i'
l;''., pf,operty will'be respected. ,
: 1 ' And to the world at large: Zimbabwe will be tied to , .:
' '''ll,,,,;.
1,,a;.li

...'':: tb one, it will be strictly non-aligned.

,', '
- Even to South Africa: we offer peaceful coexistence. -tt t
"
::,,1,

': ' ', 'Let us forgive and forget, let .rs 3oin hands in a new 'l il'l
' i t. '

: : amity.'
",',',

By Wednesday morning, all but a handful of those

resignations had been withdrawn. And hundreds of

'''"
...,
'''Rhodesians,' said Ian Smith, going'as far'as to call
Mugabe practical and sensible, 'have learned to live with
;:' a crisis. They will see this one through.'

,' A week later lMugabe started fulfilling some of those

promises. Walls was indeed made supreme commander

'commerce rninister. And Dennis Norman,

the president
' of the white farmers' union, was appointed to the agn-
,. culture portfolio. That was the ultimate compromise, the
final statement on Mugabe's politics of pragmatism,
Land was the reason for his war, to win it for his people
had always been the goal. Now he was putting a white
into the ministry that would oversee the full utilisation
of all the land rather than the instant expropriation of
r.,'it, from the whites to the peasants.
:r

206 207
 Chapter 8 Conclusion
-
At midnight on 17 April r9g0, Zimbabwe was reborn, '
amidst jubilation, at the Rufaro stadium. on the stroke ..
of l2'00 4.D., to a mounting crescendo of noise ,',. ,
the terraces, the last British flag over Africa was "rouoJ
hauled ,',',
" down to be replaced by the flag of the new Zimbabw; ,.

stlpes of green (for the land), gold (for the minerals)', , ,

ryd (for the blood spilled), and-black (for the prtpr.l. ,

There was no national anthem because urugaue had' , r

insisted that they got it right, rather than wriirrrg,;: , ,

thing in haste, and they hadn't.

It had been a strange enough sight at Government ,t)),
House before the independenJe ..i..ony' u ;,i'
";;k;ii , .lli
party at which old enemies like peter walls and Kenneth
Surnf mingled with Prince charles, sally JVlugabe and :
Mary Soames. Now, on the podium at Rufarolan even ,,',
TgIe unlikely group sealed the transfer of power to thl ', '..
Africans after 89 years of white rule. . '',,,,
There was Mugabe, almost having to pinch himself to , t,'

believe that it was really happening; the Rlverend Canaan

Banana, the first president of the new country; Lord '

Soames,hisjoytingedwithreliefthathehad,"tu".,
the governor of blood chaos;r prince Charles, who haJ
seel
T-uly- an indep_e_ndence day but never one like this; l.
',
and Chief Justice Hector Macdonald, resplendent, in .',"
robes and wig.
'In terms of section 28 of the constitution of zim- , ',

babwe,' he said as he swot-e in president Banana. Some ,t,,

of those present, remembering the judge from his earlier r,,
days, said they almost expected him to add:-'I order you ,,,,'
to!9 hanged by the neck until dead.' . ,,,',
The themes of that heady nighf in sarisbury were
.:

209

'l
,,,,'r,',ffi
i,t"

,lt, ji':speeking of Lord Soames, he said: 'Fmust admit that
', I was one of those who originally.never trusted him. And
;,. ')€t I have ended up not only implicitly trusting him Qut
ii{:-i also fondly loving him as well.'
And turning to his nation at large, he deciared:'If
1.;',,1 .r
,,,,,i yesterday I fought you as an en.my, today you have
,1',,'^ begome a friend. If yesterday you hated me, today you
,:,,,,,.;cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to
:,:? All the dignitaries picked up where he had left off.
Prince Charles: 'To heal what has been hurt and
''i,
,wouoded, to reunite what has been divided, and to recon-
, ' icile-where there has been emnity is the fiirest foundation
',rs11 which to rebuild and increase this quality of life in
your unique country,'
. ,
And the Queen, in a message to Mugabe himself: .It is
I a.,moynent for people
of all races and all political
I, work together to build a better future for their country
pbrsuasions to forget the bifterness of the past and to
I and for their citizens.' ,
When Zimbabwe woke up, the newspapers reported
, singing and dancing throughout the country. They alse,
. carried the 'in memoriam' columns
The parents of one white grieved for their son 'Killed,
in action one year ago today, lSth April 1979... what
. it meant to lose you no one will evei know. We often
wonder why. Was it all for nothing?'
'trn the months since independence, it's a question many.
: Rhodesians - black and white - have asked of Mugabe.
In the past year the pressures on him have -U"rn
tre-mendous - from within his own party, from his owi
arfty, from old rivals like Nkomo, from old rivals like
Peter Walls.
. ,, ,Mugabe's voice of moderation and conciliation has
never faltered but it has been an increasingly difficutt
positio:r to maintain. Because on almost every major issue
he has been forcedto try the impossible * please aU the -
people all the time.
The fact remains that after just one, extremely diffieult '
year, Mugabe has already strengthened his own position,
immeasurably by his own performauce so far. :
''' When he came to power, there werb three ways:
Mugabe's rule was threatened, three scenarios, if you like,
of how Mugabe could fall: tt,,,
jBecause of a split between himself and Nkomo ,
jBecause of a massive exodus of whites which would ,;i:';r:;
economy.
destroy his plans for the ,' ;,*
Take-the guerrilla armies, for example, and the latenl . :,ii
threat they have always posed of a civil war. Lancaster , .1;,,,
House found them homes, in the Assemblycamps, during :' :,:ir;
1
the ceasefire and the election campaign. It never even "t.l
began to tackle the problem of whit to do with them ':':,
afterwards. For months they have been left there, bored, ' ., ,,
restless, questioning what they would get out of peace
having fought the war. Most wanted to stay in the army, , .,,ti,
but only hundreds, not their thousands, could be , ,'
integrated into the new ndtional forcg. Inevitably,. ,. '
violence has followed.
At some camps, like X-ray near the town of Mtoko ' :,
north-east of Salisbury, they took the law into their own '
hands,seizingcontrolofthemainroadsaroundthetown
and arbitrarily ambushing bivilian and military vehicles: " '.
Policemen and farmers in the town have been killed. For
months, the Government seemed unable,'or reluctant, to
find those responsible, even enforce discipline in an' ':,
agound camp.
Mugabe had long since known there would be troubie, , i,'
likethis.And,,intheeyesofthewhitesirparticular'the
'ztt ' ,
 trc hts taken ha$',onl} served'to, eiaborbatd,tho
the home affairs ministry grudgingly, although it tlid gue ,,,,;i
In September I98O lre moved about 17,000
most loyal to him but:some f,rom Nkomo's him a power base with its control of the police. Taunted ,'t,,,i,
by some of Mugabe's militants, like Enos Nkala, Nkomo r
fli ,, q*ry too, into temporary a@ommodation at Chitung-
has consistently refused to be drawn into open conflict ,'..
,,,,,, wiza,,just 15 miles from the centre of Salisbury. A huge with the government.
lill. ,fprro was put up around the housing estate where the Nkomo knows that, if it came to war, his chances
i.i;' soldiers were given homes. Guards manned the exit gates.
':,, it and guerrillas were ordered to hand in their weapons would be very slim. His well-trained.anny, Zipra, might ",i.| r.:
li;il:,tt going out. Within days Nkomo's men were fighting take the towns for a while but they would face a much | ,i
l,; ' i:when 9- e---- ---J-- "-----e-----e

Mugabe's'units. Onty heavy anny and police reinforce- bigger anny and now an air force as well. That sober . ,),
." prospect, more than anything, has made him compliant ,, :,r.; ,

So much so that when nine members of his party wert ,''..;ii:g,,

arrested without his knowledge, indeed his permission 6s ,:,',::,.);
the minister responsible, Nkomo said: 'I feel like a china ',
,' 200 were wounded in 24 hours of street battles between ornament sitting in the showcase.' ':,',,;:,,,,,

- the two rival armies for control of another of these 'And what of the whites, whom Mugabe petitioned,so ,'.; t
temporary homes. Mugabe personally ordered in the new strongly to stay? For most of his first year, Mugabe'hasi :,.. i
. national army and their air force to keep the peace. been losing them at more than a thousand a month. At ,;.

theend of 1980, the figures went higher. Many had waited i;

' On the face of it, the battle in Bulawayo was as
for their children to complete the school year before i
,;, - damaging to Mugabe as anything so far. In reality, it may
going. Its more than he would have liked, the figure is
,.just be another step towards securing his own self,
comparabletotherateofexodusattheheightofthewar.
,:. , preservation. His problem with the guerrillas had always
' been how to disarm them, how to separate them from But there is more than a little consolation for him in . 'r,
the break-down of precisely who has gone and what gaps
the. Kalishnikov rifles, their grenade launchers and
they leave in the ranks of skilled workers. Most of those
mortars. In these temporary homes at least they could
I whohavegonehavebeenrqtiredpeople.Inthefirstthiee
" ,not go out with their weapons. And in the wake of
months after independence, forexample, Mugabe lost the
Bulawayo, Mugabe had a perfectly adequate 'political
gxcuse' for ordering the army to strip the guerrilla units following among the 'economically active' sectors of his I
people: 28 engineers, 2l electricians, 19 production super-
of all heavy weapons.
intendents, eight male teachers, and three carpenters. He
Not for the first time since independence did some
: .west€rn diplomats in Salisbury conclude: 'Mugabe is
had a net gain during the same period of doctors: one
, streets ahead of his own people, and us.'
more came than left.
There's no ground forcomplacency, as Mugabe knows
.' Joshua Nkomo, the man who some western observors all too well. ihe fact is, though, that he .ould hope to
,,',
',..,
I' have long since believed, could precipitate war. Nkpmo
have a strong core of whites, about 80,000 of them, in
took defeat in the election harder than anyone, for a while
five years time if the departure rate continues as it is . .,

, ' ,he genuinely could not believe he had lost. He accepted Aiguably the greatest threat to lvfugabe has been the '

.,.r 212
2t3
 Walls' retirement in July last year came as no surprise.
, ,her.had'long since declared his intention to do so when
:;,.:,;!e got the chance
r.,1' That he should retire and rnake it perfectly clear that
: .he had such little faith and confidence in Mugabe's
,,, ,leadership was very damaglng to the fragile Government
, iilliance Mugabe was trying to strengthen.
Walls, perhaps
,, ' more than any other, *rJa symbol of Mugabe's deter-
i ,.. gination to make the whites feel they could bury the past
, and stay on under him. If Walls, the arch-enemy, could
live in peace with Mugabe, why not all the other whites?
, . Now Walls was gone, and in a manner calculated to
hurt him. The geneial, it turned out when he was inter-
: vie*ed, had even tried to have the British gou.rn*.nt^
declare the election null and void amid stirring in his army
of a coup against Mugabe back in March.
Not only had Mugabe lost the white most crucial to
his policy of reconciliation, he now had militants in his
party demanding retribution for'this white treachery'.
: It was with a sad heart that Mugabe sacked and exilld
' Walls in September. It symbolised failure, maybe just
with one individual, but an individual with undue
. influencc on the whites.
,u,' . In the wake of Walls, the Tekere case was enough to
niake the whites believe everything Walls had hiirted,
' heir apparent. Now, in the wake ofthe trial and acquittal,'
, without ever saying, about thi country's new rulers.
In itself, the murder of a white farmer did not shock
, &rlooe in the new Zimbabwe. There had been sporadic
,,incidents like it ever since the election. But the fact that.
.:, Tekere, cabinet minister, driving force in the party and
214
with him in 1974, who had been with him through.the, ; ,,ril.:
year of uncertainty in Quelimane, who had loyally
[e$ed ,,]'1,, ,
him to secure the-leadership, would have to be [ried'for '
,
emuarr"*ir*, '
' 1,.
murder. It was to be humiliating, intensely ,
'not just for Tekere
but also for Mugabe and his gou.rrr'- ,; ,
,-?l'oon't look like a minister now,,
after ;ij
said Tgkere
Mugabe recognised the frustrations that Tekere was ' 'i
.
giving vent to: he also acknowledged that a growin! r
number of party members fert he ind his gorJ*rrni
,
were being just too moderate, too conciliatory, too':,;
i
,':,,
Tekere's departure from the political scene, which most .:.
expected, would have undoubtedly strengthened
Mugabe's control of his party. with Tlkere ,
way, Mugabe could have spiked the guns of his trouble- ' ,'
"d;i;il
some left wing. Instead rekere's acquittal made him even ,,..
stronger, a greater threat to Mugabe - and a serious ' ,
obstacle to his hopes of winning it e confidence pf the
whites, who thought that Tekere had been given iircn.e
" pow€r. ,.i
to kill. The militant faction Tekere leads, his solid
base in his home province of victoria and his repuiation
as an architect of the war always made him a possrble '',1,'
;,
he was more than ever the man most likely to suceed. '.
,
If the men who fought the war expected pride of place : ,: .
intherevolution,ifNkomowantedagieater'ot"io
government, if men like Tekere were impatient for radical
,,,,,,,
change, then the trundreds of thotrsandi of Africahs who -' "
' 2t5
t,;.,' ,, ' .
ii;t'":.,i.> ,' ..'.,:',:
;,voted Mug.nbe':rirtto,
rl, !.
tia.
"
i,1j, ,vof,ed -MlquU" into power
power zare also waiting for their so very different if the international comrnunity w"r,r,.t
i!r,',,,'rwards,.J-he.cf rluqf ;*p*aiil"'li;ilffi ;;d;l; :,phpd ro put '.
his fldgring revorution un'iii''fuiiel*:l|iiili
-;ir; 'l;
i,,,:' ,5un*n million blacks is now arguably the greatest dan[er
to Mugabe.
before coming to [wei, he
approaching more than 60 governments. "rr."o
,;;ir': , ',i:
The *r*oil ,';:;,i:
' T!r.y expected immediate fruits, be it in higher wages has been a bitter disappoininent. uis catts-i;;;1i,ifr ' r...,
i"ir.";;ffi;il:' ,
'i'"
ir',, or {ull"r employment. The revorution, aftJr a[, was Marshan pran' from tr,i weii r,"", ,,.i,
')''"'., made in their name.
;:,;!,,' ars,.plime minister,
Even before Muga6e was installed
ilk ;;rkers in Salisbury wielded:a .heldFven those, like Britain, which promised .id h;;;-b*; . :ii:

, ,right to strike they had never had under Ian Smith. Now
back by rhe state of their o*n.ronomies. wirr,
Soames as a strong advocate for his case,
iJii, :,.',,:'
( there is another battle on the shop-floor: not
M"g;; ;; "1,

"fi;*;;;;
or conditions, , rather the right to represent
been pledged about 180 milrion dollars uy
wt ii.t riffi; . ,,',''
the black
worker. Mugabe's party, Zanu (pF), has been trying to
reconstruction. But almost as quickly as,'r,"
made, it fell victim to Treasury constrictions in
pro*ir. *Iu :' ' I

'assume control of the unions Londopf 1,,1,11,i,I

which up till now have ue.n The initial help has been sent, bur the rest will . ',, ,:i
in the hands of those who workeri with tt, p..riou, r;ri.i;,
r-egime, and supported it. recession.
The Americans, stymied by a congress which is very ,1,
to produce instant panaceas. Indeed, his goals are too 'cautious ,

about the direction'MugabJ might iuii., have , ,,.

long-term for him even to wish to do so. rn tfeJuy, b"fo* produced about 30 million dollari. The west
he left Mozambique in January, he identifieo itre aw€-
G.r*;: "
the Dutch, the Swedes have come for*uJ il'ffi;
"

sqme problems ahT!. And the greatest was undoubtedly
the re-settlement of the million people who had fled from
their homes because of the war.
pledges of aid have been limited to ore y;-;i;: ,,
. The combined response of the internationar ;.*ft;;i,
falls well short of Mugabe's needs. Indeed, it,
;;; of th! r., ' ,,.
:

As Mugabe was taking over the wearthiest country of ironies of a peace that both tsritain and Amer;;;
.,,
its size on the continent, the salvation army *u, *urniog taken such pride in that the aid to support it
of the poverty ahead. falrs-;;i
:If nothing is done about these people within year
short even of the bnrion-douar fund d; [ir;ird;ffi
into his first Angro-American proposars back ii tgli. -
; r,,
a . .. ; .i'
there will be wi-$espread starvation, dirrure, abairdoned ' In the face of this, Mugabe iru, ,r*uineo
and orphaned children, alcohol addiction and violent ,r.urt
constant. Yes, he has hinted that Zimbabwe ,"ight, "[ty ,, .',, .
crime affecting the entire population.' become a one-party state: and yes, there have
within a year a lot has been done. The 220,000 Zim- suggestions that he might take over white-owned
been ., i..
babweans who were in refugee camps in Mozambique, rand.
But Mugabe's visions of a on._party state i, f;;,
zambia and Botswana have been repatriated. Hundreds ;;; :,1

" l, ;;i; I .,
cgy from dictatorship: and the land in questi";
of thousands more have been rnoved back to the triuai
,

that which has been left to rot.

trustlands. Surprisingly, the first harvests of maize were
good. They needed to be. poverty remains a way of life
The man himself remains as committed as ever
to the , , :.,i,
principles he outlineo to ttie uN c.n.rurd;;iy
in many areas of the country. " --:" , ,:11.,,
when
Mugabe says, with some justification, that it could be
he made his debut there last Septernber.
2t6
iii'. ,in the spirit of our one nationality, our common freedorn
and independence, our collective responsibility.'
,, ' , .About the same time Mugabe was askedhow he, the

"" psychopathic killer, the ogre, the terrorist of yesterday,

Har
BY BRENDA McBRYDE
(illustrated)
, ,had-become the pragmatist, the moderate, the statesman
' , of today. His reply was a testament to himself as man IT TOOK COURAGE TO LIVE THROUGH IT-
. and politician. 'The change', he said, 'is not in me. I am
not the one who has undergone q metamorphosis. The, McBryde's uniquely moving story began on the eve of
'Brenda
\fiorld War II when she enrolled-as a trainee nurs at the
rwho once upon a time regarded me as an extremist, a , Royal Victoria Infirrnary, Newcastle. The next six years saw
murderer, a psychopathic killer .. . they are the people . Sister McBryde nursing civilians through ttre Blitz,
' who have had to adjust to the change. I have remained volunteering for service in ttre Maxillo-Facial ('Max-Fastod)
/ plasdc surgery unit, ioining the fioops in the early days
rny constant self. What I was, I still am.'
following the D-Day landings, and serving in the Field
Whether Mugabe can remain his constant self in the Hmpiuls in the front line of fighting. Then, as the war drerr
face of the'crises that await him is an open question. ' to a close, she faced the greatest challenge of her caneer:
'His dilemma is that if he takes too much away from , tlrc restoration to health and sanity of Gerrnany's
the whites they will leave. '' concentration camp victims.
.'But'if he gives too little to the blacks they will revolt.'
'This book clurches the heart'
That, in the words of a British diplomat who had Cambridge Eoening News
,' worked with him at Lancaster House and during the
election, was the tightrope he had to tread after indepen-
dence.
It is a tightrope he has to keep walking. A ditemma that
,, cannot be solved until he has won the economic freedom
that only the whites can give him.
: No one should doubt his commitment, only whether
: he can buy himself enough time.

AUT0BI0GRAPHY 07221 57746 ft.25

 mffr-rr" 4
,
,,
THEI[$ BY GEOFFBOYCOTT
--
(Lrusrnatebj
(

ENGIJII\DIQIo, r BATSMAITPS OWN

COMPELLING STORY

story q{thr four-month cddr*

tour which resurted
in England's triumphant ot ,,tio" of ,h"-Aril.
Givettrrcm H
the pleasure of choosing
no.ygft discusses the extraordinaryprelgde to
the to,r; Book bkens can be bought
T'-*:H*:_log,ut the i oini iors ;f ,fi ;;*pii"iry and exchanged at most
of,f,",i;[hT'1H,flffi &Hlf "r
H?,n;t*f.,
ayry-and his ultimate decision to,ay
bookshops
*itn O.-Ciub.
And with cric$t i! turmoil .fil the Kerry packer
effair, he takes a hard look at the-;4;; i-rr,iii
ilffir,i"g
cricket and himself
playe1 in the history of the
t:f^:H,-Ty,_gtr.r
Doycorr vrudlv.conveys what it really same,
- out in the middle, q"* ti Ue-
6eh fike
,.r"rio" Uy ,iri*.
His frankness and candour !t !"*
i" tnitp.rsonal account-'make
PUT TO THE TEST a ild"
",5*p.Uir,g

AUToEIoGBAPI|Y O 7221 t79t I ft.25

 .:- :,r' I ,';.. ..: .., .

' '
t .. r l., .. : '., t , i"

A,sdection of bestsclters froln SPIIE8E

THE GRAIL VAR _-Nancy Thaycr f,;.25 t3

Rictrard Monacp {;.t1 E]
UNHOLY CHILD C,atherine Breslia t r.Z S u
,', . TO LOTYE AGAIN Danielle Steel {r.ii t]
,. SIE ELDORADO NrrVOnf Derck Robinson [,r,Slo u
FII.M AIYD TV TIE-INS
ff-OYD GEORGE David Benedicnrs g,::r.r,5 D
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK Donald F. Glut {l.oo tr
CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF
,THE THIR,D KIND Steven-spielberg '85p
u
"BUCK ROGERS IN THE
Addison E. Steele 9jp u
:o BUCK ROGERS z: THAT
;. MAN ON BETA Addison E. Steele 95p, El
A I4ATTER OF LIFE R Edwards &
suPERLEARNING {I.5O D
Sn"," o,I.;,i,i3JE
. Lynn Schroeder with
Nanry Ostrander
S,ACE $r,15 tr
Martin Ince {r'5o tr
I4ENACE: The Life and
Death of the Tirpitz Ludovic Kennedy f,r.25. tr
AII sphere books are avaitable at your local bookshop or
newsagent, or can be ordered direct from the publis-her.
Just tick the titles vou want and 6ll init"Ioril'Iior".
Narne

ITrite to SpherSi C,ash Sales Department, p.O. Box r r,

Falmouth, Cornwall TRlo 9EN'
Please enclose cheque or postal ordei io-the-t"alue of the
cover prioe plus:
@k plui rzp per copy for each
Y5, ,Sq for $e {rst
a{d_itiojral
"#g.; f ;5.
book ordered to a maxim'um
OVERSEAS: 4op for the nrst Uooi:and-iri-t*L*,
additional book.
BFPO & EIRE: z5p-for-the nrst Uoot< plus rop per-copy for
the nort-8 books, ttrereatteri;;;bti:' -
Sphae Books ?esen)_e the right to show neat retail Drices on
which ryay diflq lroithose r*ioiiiy A;;;irrd in the
text or elsewhere, and io increase_-postal raieiiiiiiiaori,
with the PO.
wffiffi ffiffiffi ffiffiffiffiffiffi wffiffii ffi
For twenty yeors, Robert Mugobe hqs been
typecost os sn extremist: q colourless
Morxist-leninist ideologue qnd o fqnqticql
guerrillq leoder. Now, in his fifties, with the
bitter experience of politicol imprisonment
behind him, he represents the long
sought-ofter reconciliqtion of q nqtion - qnd o
continent - thqt hqs been mqny yeqrs in the
moking.
Mugobe wos the lqst person the British, the
Americqns, qnd even the Russions, either
expected - or wqnted - to be Prime Minister of
Zimbqbwe. His victory in thqt country's f irst
democrqtic elections come qs o surprise to, ond
terrified, his opponents. And yet Mugobe's
moderotion, prqgmqtism ond qppqrent
sympothy for his opponents, hqve utterly
mystified them.
Who is Mugobe? Whqt influence will he hove
on Africqt f uture? This biogrophy presents qn
in-depth profile of the mqn who is the most
influentiql qnd qrticulote of Africq's
stqtesmen, the blqck leqder who holds the key
to the f uiure of Southern Af ricq.

0 1221 78
UNITED KINGDO
Ausr