3.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
G.R No. 149926 February 23, 2005

Facts:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan
agreement in the amount of P128, 000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural Tractor.

In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum
payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for
the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor.

Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan.
In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City.
Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings,
the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence.
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between
FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union
Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the
RTC of Makati City.

Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United
States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.

Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court,
it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not the joint agreement of partition between the heirs pending the allowance of probate of decedent’s
will was valid and binding.

Held:
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated:

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law
enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
11.

CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and

ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

Facts:
Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor
thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog,
and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.
On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon
duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but
admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that
the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.

Issue:
Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to deny
probate of the will

Held:
No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the
required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate
may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the
duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a
single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity
of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the
witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.
 12.
Agapita N. CRUZ, petitioner vs. Hon.Judge Guillermo P. VILLASOR and Manuel LUGAY,respondents.
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973

FACTS:
Agapita Cruzis the surviving spouse of the deceased Valente Cruz. Agapita filed before the CFI an opposition for the
allowance of the will of his late husband alleging that the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation
and undue influence because the said instrument was executed without the testator having been fully informed of
the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and
testament was not executed in accordance with law. However, due to unfavorable decision, Agapita appealed by
certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the supposed last will and testament was executed in accordance with law.

Held:
Of the three instrumental witnesses, one of them is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was
supposed to have been acknowledged. The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the last will and testament in
question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot
be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will. To acknowledge before means to avow.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having
signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two. To allow the
notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of
having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 805
requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the
required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be that
only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstance, the law would not be
duly observed.
 14.
ALVARADO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO
QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court,
First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993

Facts:
The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted
the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the
notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.
Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already
suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the
notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who
read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial
will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

Issue:
Whether or not notarial there was substantial compliance to the reading of the will.

Held:
Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of
reading their wills. Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness.
However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In this case, there was substantial
compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being
that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and
trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three
instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being
asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement
take place.
 19.
Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-5826 April 29, 1953

Facts:
The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI of Samar which admitted to probate a
will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on Feb. 14, 1949. The appellants insisted that
the will is defective because the attestation was not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although the page
containing the same was signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to law and
may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid

Held:
Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will. It is
required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission of their signatures
at the bottom negatives their participation.
Moreover, the signatures affixed on the left-hand margin is not substantial conformance to the law. The said
signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand margin of
all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add clauses
to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
The probate of the will is denied.