G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
Heirs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay
City through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them
had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. Then Jose contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3,
1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993,
Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground that
the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between
Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code
were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that
the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained
that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab
initio?
RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the
requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa
executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started living together
five months before the celebration of their marriage. That according to the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license
shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It
covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
fraud against innocent and unwary parties.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
Enrico vs.
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC,
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner
Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June
1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004,
Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the
Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage
license. Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued that Article
34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from
securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio.
Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad
was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was
barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised
the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious
illness which made its performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together
as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly;
hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license.
She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the
Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor.
As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can
file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUES:
Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Eulogio and Lolita
RULING:
No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14,
2003, covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not
allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August
26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares that
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under
the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and
8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in
a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void
for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption
that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file
an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife
for at least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license
under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband
and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years
immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is,
unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due
to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the
Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically
involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for
divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court
Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree
took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina
and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to
register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto.
Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics
Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian
divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that
Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the
principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen
to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants
aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of
a foreign divorce decree?
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
 G.R. No. 193902: June 01, 2011
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior
thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam.
Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge
Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City. A little after year,
Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of
their marriage was confirmed byy the Shari'a Circuit District Court,which
issued a Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously
done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum,
Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she
worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order
to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed
their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the
RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De
Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny,
namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon. Despite their three
children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour
and the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their
minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the
former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of
cases against Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a
criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and disbarment from
the civil service.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum was bigamous.
HELD: NO.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of
whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim
who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites.
Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such
marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as
confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and
attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry
Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without
jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. VS. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
FACTS:
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala
of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December
6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in
jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even
arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court
even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage
was void ab initio for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not
fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be
rendered futile.
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
RULING:
NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage,
as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. None
of these are present in the case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
 Morigo v. People OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA,
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004 respondent.
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.

FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost
contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was
then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment
since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void
ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the
regional trial court seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court
of Appeals. After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the regional trial court alleging that
his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Respondent filed an
answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping. The trial court grated her petition.
Issue: Is the action of the husband tenable?

ISSUE:
Ruling:

Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy
case.
RULING:
No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo
acquitted in the Bigamy case.
As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “A marriage ceremony
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior
judgment” or “estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a
bar to the prosecution of the second action upon the same claim, demand
or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res
judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause
of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity
of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived
any defects therein. The Court finds then that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license
is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2 articles,
Morigo’s first marriage is considered void ab initio.

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was
no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing
officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner
does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he
contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ, vs. NILO CRUZ G.R.
No. 201988 October 11, 2017 Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Marivi met Nilo and they became sweethearts in 1986. The
couple married in a civil ceremony followed by a church wedding. The
marriage produced two sons.
Sometime in 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. In support of her
claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological incapacity, Marivi
presented Dr. Villegas, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Encarnacion, a clinical
psychologist. According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each
others’ weaknesses and that the incapacities of the parties are grave
because they preferred to satisfy their own needs rather than to give in to
the other’s needs. Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas’ diagnosis. The
RTC denied the Petition. From the RTC’s verdict, petitioner appealed to the
CA. The CA united with the RTC in rejecting the alleged existence of
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under Article 36 of
the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
RULING:
No.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must
be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence
(i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage);
and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)."
"Mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities'
[as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity."59
"Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons" amount to psychological incapacity. 60 We further
elucidated in Yambao v. Republic that the psychological condition should
render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital
obligations.
Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.
Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH
GR 200233
July 15, 2015
Facts:
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and
Nicanor Santiago were served an information for Bigamy for the
prosecution adduced that Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he
entered into the 2nd marriage; he was able to escape while petitioner
pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when she married him, she
thought he was single. She soon averred that their marriage was void due
to lack of marriage license, wherein she should not then be charged with
bigamy. 11 years after inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the first
wife, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner
and introduced herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and
stated that she met Estela only after she had already married Nicanor.
Issue:
W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.
W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid
Held:
Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the
first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: (1)
when Nicanor was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-
laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for
a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status (3)
Estela, who was the more credible witness, compared to petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal
wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla, knowledge of the second wife of the
fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes her responsible as
an accomplice. She is not co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an
accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision
correccional.
CASE DIGEST: ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN v MARCO DAN
GR 209031 April 16, 2018
Facts:
Abegael is a Filipina and Marco an Italian national met on a
chatroom on the internet. They tied the knot on January 23, 2006. During
their honeymoon, she noticed that he was not circumcised and he refused
circumsition. When the couple lived together in Italy, she found that he
was addicted to video games and marijuana. When confronted he pushed
her and hit her in the arm. He was also dependent on his mother and he
has poor hygiene. He would only give her money for food and spent most
of his income for video games.
On 18 April 2007, Abegael flew back to the Philippines. Since
then, there was no communication between them. She took this as lack of
interest on Marco’s part to save their marriage, reason why she decided to
file the petition. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist was presented. With
only examining the petitioner and her mother and not Marco, she made a
conclusion that Abegael was not suffering from any psychological
incapacity while Marco, based on Abegael’s description, is suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Anti-Social Trait. Both the
RTC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to satisfy the
requirements to declare the marriage null and void under Art. 36 of the
Family Code.
Issue: WON there was sufficient evidence to annul the marriage.
Ruling:
No. “Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not
merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability.
Petitioner admitted that before and during their marriage, respondent was
working and giving her money; that respondent was even sweet and they
enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that the
respondent was psychologically unfit for marriage. Addiction to video
games and cannabis are not incurable condition and petitioner has not
shown that she helped her husband overcome them – as part of her marital
obligation to render support and aid to respondent.
In addition, with the declared insufficiency if the testimonies of petitioner
and her witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr.
Tayag’s expert findings. However, her determinations were not based on
actual tests or interviews conducted on respondent himself – but on
personal accounts of petitioner alone. Lastly, the rulings of the trial and
appellate courts – identical in most respects – are entitled to respect and
finality. The same being correct, this Court finds no need to disturb them.