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Domingo v.

Court of Appeals that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
GR No. 104818, 17 September 1993 purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of
FACTS: property relations governing them.
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been
previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage
when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from
Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with
another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by
Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of
such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage

RULING:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in
good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the
said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith,
his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children
of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted
the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of
law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad
faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be
void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by
one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion
CASE DIGEST: ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:

Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children
with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in Makati, which he
purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the
houseboy about him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro.
Atienza did not bother to wake up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care
of his two children.

After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the
affection of his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to
Zenaida Ongkiko.

The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated
twice without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los
Angeles, California was because he believed in good faith and for all legal purposes, that his
first marriage was solemnized without marriage license.

He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case because his
first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991
under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his act to
cohabit with De Castro

Held:

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in
1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know
that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO,
complainants,
Vs.
JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070. February 12, 1997

Facts:

In a letter-complaint dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter
Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge
Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu,
among other causes of action to have allegedly having committed bigamy. The respondent
judge in his comment explained that for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage
was only dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and
purposes on the matter, without my consent freely given. As a matter of fact, I was only
called by my parents to go home to our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party
celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to
appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our signatures
appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20
years of age, and at my second year high school days.

Issue:
WON a decree of nullity of marriage is needed to declare the prior marriage
Void

Held:

Yes, Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x
x x a judicial declaration of such fact" before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise,
the second marriage will also be void." This was expressly provided under Article 40 of the
Family Code. However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their
children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of
respondent.
Ty v. Court of Appeals second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000 accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the
existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second
FACTS: marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one terminated by the death
ofhis wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. In Odayat v. Amante (1977), the Court
Edgardo M. Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, adverted to Aragon and Mendoza precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge
1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, of immorality on the ground that his marriage to FilomenaAbella in October of 1948 was
1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same
and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.The church wedding on August 27, 1977, year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void
was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. marriages.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, the court applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.
wed Ofelia P. Ty on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of The Court held that since the second marriage took place and all the children there under
Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila. were born before the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. The first
160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need
had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case,
petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while
his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.

ISSUE:

Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage of Reyes is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly.

RULING:

Private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively,
are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Pertinent to the present controversy, Article
83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code
contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on that time provides the
following:
People v. Mendozaand People v. Aragon, this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu.
Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the
death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the
Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012
Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH
FACTS: GR 200233
July 15, 2015
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, Facts:
respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage 4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were
with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article served an information for Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that Nicanor was still married
36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of to Estela when he entered into the 2nd marriage; he was able to escape while petitioner
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when she married him, she thought he was single.
13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from She soon averred that their marriage was void due to lack of marriage license, wherein she
the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against should not then be charged with bigamy. 11 years after inception if criminal case, Estela
respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was already declared void ab Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner
initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio and introduced herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and stated that she met
on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been Estela only after she had already married Nicanor.
consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in
favor of respondent on the ground that both wedding were governed by the Civil Code, and
not the Family Code, hence, no judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition Issue:
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.
W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.
ISSUE: W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid

Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her. Held:

Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage as shown
HELD: by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting and visiting
petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him (2) it was
NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status (3) Estela,
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested who was the more credible witness, compared to petitioner who had various inconsistent
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondent’s testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions
clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges that the former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla, knowledge of the second
against her. wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
She is not co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m
arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.

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