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● PFR Cases

April 24, 1985, G.R. No. L-63915
Tañada vs. Tuvera

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be
informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication
in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
● The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
CITATION: G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders
amounting to about $7000 but failed to ell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after
the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular
No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of
P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective
and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the
Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically
informed of such contents including its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.


G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996


The controversy springs from the issuance by the PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION (PITC) of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89- 08-01,under which, applications
to the PITC for importation from the People's Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a
viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the improper
himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the
importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one.


domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippine laws, individually applied for
authority to import from PROC with the petitioner.

They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers, and after they
executed respective undertakings to balance their importations from PROC with corresponding
export of Philippine products to PROC.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the
value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private
respondents, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC.

Whether or not Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89- 08-01 issued by PITC is valid.
The court ruled that PITC's authority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC
and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has already been
repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino.

The court declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not published,
contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code which provides, that:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless the law otherwise provides. . . .

March 31, 1923, G.R. No. L-19826
LUCIANO DELGADO, plaintiff-appellant,

In November of the year 1917 Alonso purchased twelve parcels of land in the municipality of Goa
from one Stickney. On February 1, 1918, Alonso conveyed the same property to Luciano Delgado;
and in order to secure the payment of the purchase money Delgado contemporaneously executed a
mortgage in favor of the defendant upon the same land and also upon two other large parcels
already owned by the plaintiff situated in the municipality of Tinambac, of the Province of
Camarines Sur. A simple calculation shows that the interest agreed to be paid upon the purchase
price of the land which had thus been bought by Delgado was at a rate well above fifteen per
centum per annum. This mortgage therefore offends against the provisions of the Usury Law, which
limits the rate that can ordinarily be secured by mortgage upon real property to twelve per centum
per annum (Act No. 2655-2). Delgado filed a complaint against Alonso to recover the sum of P2,625
paid upon February 1, 1919, by way of interest. To this complaint the defendant answered with a
general denial; and by way of special defense he alleged that the contract in question had been
entered into by him innocently and in total ignorance on his part of the existence of the Usury Law
and, further, that he had been maliciously inveigled into said contract by the plaintiff, with full
knowledge on the part of the latter of the illegality of the stipulation for usurious interest, and with
the design of taking advantages of the Usury Law to the prejudice of the defendant.

Whether the defendant is justified in raising ignorance of the usury law as defense to escape its
legal consequences.

No. The defendant cannot use ignorance as an excuse. However, both parties were victims, at once
of their own ignorance and of economic practices inherited from the past; and ignorance of the
provisions of the Usury Law does not relieve either from the legal consequences of the contract into
which they voluntarily entered.

People Vs. Bidtu Case # 5
52 Phil 817


Mora Bidtu was first married to Moro Halid in accordance with Mohammedam customs and
about twelve years later, she married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji. Likewise, the second
marriage was in accordance with Mohammedan customs. The second marriage contracted by
her with Hajiro took place after she had been divorced from her first husband Halid, having
taken place before Datu Cuevas of Isabela, Basilan.


WON the divorce is legal.


No. The defense presented no evidence to show that the conditions prescribed by the Koran
had been complied with by the parties when they obtained their divorce before Datu Cuevas.
The divorce between the defendant and Halid does not satisfy the conditions prescribed by the
Koran. In the Philippine islands, we have a law (Act No. 2710) enumerating the causes and the
conditions under which divorce may be secured and granted. A divorce cannot be had except in
that court upon which the State has conferred jurisdiction, and the only for these causes and
with those formalities which the State has statute prescribed.

#7 D.M. Consuji VS CA 357 SCRA 249
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was rushed to [the] Rizal
Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the
attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
According to investigation and police report by PO3 Rogelio Villanueva dated November 25, 1990
that Jose Juergo, construction worker of D.M. Consuji Inc., along with Jessie Jaluag and Delso
Destajo were performing their work on board a platform at the elevator core of the 14th floor of
Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building. Jose fell and crushed to his death when the platform fell due
to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and platform but without safety lock. Jessie and Delso on the otherhand were able to jump to
Maria Juergo, widow of Jose, filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was
rendered a favorable decision to receive support from D.M. Consuji Inc amounting to P 644, 000.00.
D.M. Consuji Inc. seeks reversal of the decision on the defense that widow already availed of the
benefits from the State Insurance Funds(SIF).
Whether or not Maria Juergo could still claim benefits from D.M. Consuji Inc apart from that
received from SIF.
Yes, she can still receive benefits from D.M. Consuji Inc. She was unaware of the petitioner’s
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from SIF. The court’s ruling is based on
Floresca VS Philex Mining Corporation where the claimant who has already been paid under the
workmen’s compensation act may still sue for damages under the civil code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the
total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit
"K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from
November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was
P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will
eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by
the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such
determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments
already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial
court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent
double compensation.

Cui vs. Arellano University
G.R. No. L-15127
May 30, 1961
Ponente: Concepcion, J.
The plaintiff, Emerito Cui, a law student and a scholar of the defendant Arellano University,
transfers to Abad Santos University on his final year in law school. After completing his studies in
the latter and to secure permission to take the bar exams on 1953, Cui requested for his transcript
from the defendant. Defendant then said that before the release of his transcript of records, the
plaintiff must first pay a sum of P1,033.87 as the sum of Cui’s tuition fees during his stay in the
defendant university. The defendant cited that this is under the scholarship contract signed by both
parties where the plaintiff waived his right to transfer schools unless he pays the total tuition fee
during his stay in the institution. Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as
above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to
transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of
my scholarship cash. “
Plaintiff paid the amount to be issued the transcript. In May 30, 1961, Cui requested to be refunded
the said amount from the school. The Director of Private Schools also upheld the plaintiff’s request
and advised Arellano University to refund the said sum following a memorandum issued by the said
office on 1949 on Scholarships stating that, “The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to
these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide
to quit school or to transfer to another institution.” The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant,
and thus case was brought to the Supreme Court.
Whether or Not the contract signed by both plaintiff and defendant is enough basis to waive the
right of the plaintiff to transfer to another school without paying the cost of his education in former
No. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower court. The stipulation in question, asking
previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to
public policy, sound policy, and good morals. It also undermines the security of individual rights and
hence, null and void.
The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the
legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing
defendant’s counterclaim.

#9 Juan Miciano vs. Andre Brimo

50 Phils. 867
November 1, 1927

FACTS: The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, filed a scheme of
partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.

According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased requests that all his relatives respect
his wishes, otherwise those who opposed the same shall be cancelled in said disposition in favor of
the oppositor.

The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the deceased
was a Turkish citizen, that his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.

ISSUE: WON the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws

WON there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the appellant-oppositor

RULING: No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be governed by
Philippine Laws and those who opposed the condition of the provisions given shall be cancelled
from the disposition, the fact is that the condition itself is void for being contrary to law. Article 792
of the Civil Code provides:

“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.”

March 7, 1933, G.R. No. L-37048
BARRETO GONZALES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, defendant-appellant.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.
The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919
until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they had
4 minor children together.
After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her childrens
support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that
the title of certain properties be put in her name.
Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that
jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he
went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3 children with her.
When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of
Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the CFI-
Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of
Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what
would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died
intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be
declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the
expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the
After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced
the attorneys fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the defendant, Hence, this
appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision.
WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction,
except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a
NO. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because:
The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorce done in Reno,
Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce.
Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that the entire conduct
of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted praying the ratification of the
Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not
authorized by our laws.
The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquired by the
husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state
to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919.
Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to be done, the
effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their
own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of
divorce of foreign courts in manner which our government believes is contrary to public order & good morals.
The decision of CFI-Manila was REVERSED & Defendant is absolved from the demands made against him in
this action.
Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15 says that Laws relating to family rights & duties or to status,
condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign
The last part of Art 11 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 17 also states ...the prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts & their property, and those intended to promote public order & good morals, shall not be
rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgements or by anything done or any agreements entered
into in a foreign country.
Divorce Laws of the Philippines The hardships of existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known
to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say such laws are too strict or too liberal.
At the time this decision was rendered there was still absolute divorce in the Philippines on the ground of
Adultery on the part of the wife, and Concubinage on the part of the husband; the divorce, however, could
be granted only upon showing that the defendant had been convicted by final judgement for the adultery or
concubinage as the case maybe. The new Civil Code has abolished absolute divorce, leaving only legal
separation, which is equivalent to relative divorce.


HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the respondent to the case, and Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about
three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January
1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before RTC of
Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of
Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery alleging that,while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain
William Chia and Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon.
Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to
quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus
charged with direct contempt and fined.
Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against the petitioner is still valid given the fact
that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should only be the offended spouse. Thhe fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country in 1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of
Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent has been
finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila, the marriage of the couple were already
finished, thus giving no merit to the charges the respondent filed against the petitioner. Private respondent,
being no longer married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case as the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The questioned order denying petitioner’s motion to quash is set
aside and the criminal case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in
this case was made permanent.

#12 Wolfgang O. Roehr vs. Carmen Rodriguez


G.R. No. 142820. 20 June 2003

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on
December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan,
Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine. Carmen filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati RTC. Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce
from Germany. The decree provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss the nullity case as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, which
was granted by respondent Judge Salonga. Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the case should proceed
for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling
the issues of support and custody of their children.

Whether or not the granting the motion to dismiss the nullity case valid; it is valid to assume jurisdiction to
tackle child custody and support.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. The court can modify
or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering
its decision unjust and inequitable. Where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognized in our jurisdiction, but the legal
effects thereof, such as custody must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect
of res judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given
the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. The trial court was correct in setting the
issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children.

October 2, 2001 G.R. No. 138322
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1,
1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the
Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Mr. Recio, the defendant, became an Australian
citizen. Subsequently, he entered into marriage with a Filipina, the petitioner, on January 12,
1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior
marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is
legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to
The Supreme Court remanded (return a case to a lower court) the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy.
This is because based on the records, the court cannot conclude if the respondent who was
then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the
court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner
as result of the divorce decree.

#14. Bellis vs Bellis, G. R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children
with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate
should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to
probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid
the entire bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000
delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each
or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7
equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as
illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to
Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as
to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants,
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and
that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be
determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the
testate of Amos Bellis.


#16 Magbanua VS IAC 137 SCRA 328

G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985
BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed PEREZ, respondents.
Romulo A. Deles for petitioner.
Jose Valmayor for respondents.

Magbanua and the other petitioners are share tenants of an agricultural land owned by the
private respondents. The petitioners alleged in the case they filed in the trial court that the
private respondents diverted the free flow of water from their landholdings which dried up
their farm and wilted their palay crops. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners. They
were maintained as agricultural lessees and granted each one of them the amount of P10,000
as moral & exemplary damages and P5,000 for the attorney’s fees to be paid by the private
respondents. However, the private respondents appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court but removed the award of
payment of damages and attorney’s fees granted to the petitioners. The IAC said in removing
the damages award that there was no evidence that private respondents acted fraudulently or
in bad faith, and no reason either in the recovery of attorney’s fees under Art 2208, Civil Code.
And so the petitioners filed in the SC for the reinstatement of the damages and attorney’s fees
awarded by the trial court, on the ground that the IAC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
removing the said award.
Whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to moral and exemplary damages and the attorney’s
fees which had been awarded by the trial court.

Yes, plaintiffs were entitled to moral and exemplary damages. The SC granted the
reinstatement of the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, subject to
modification of the amount. Art 2219, Civil Code states that moral damages may be recovered
when a person willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. Under Art 2232, Civil Code, “In contract and quasi-contracts, the court
may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.” Art 2208, Civil Code states that attorney’s fees can be
recovered, among others, when exemplary damages are awarded. The private respondents
acted in an oppressive manner in closing the free flow of water into the farm lots of the
petitioners in order to make the latter vacate their landholdings. The closure caused losses on
the petitioners’ palay crops. The foregoing entitled the petitioners to payment of moral and
exemplary damages, and as such, entitled them also to the recovery of attorney’s fees. And so
the SC granted the payment to each of the petitioners in the amount of P1000 as moral
damages, P500 as exemplary damages, and P1000 for attorney’s fees payable by the private

# 17
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

FACTS: On the evening of 13 October 1994, Roberto Reyes popularly known as Amay Bisaya alleged
that while at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, his friend of several years Dr. Violeta Filart, approached and
invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the
hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. When Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table as soon as it
was ready, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of Nikko Hotel and told him to
leave the party in a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests. Mr. Reyes
tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, a Makati
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel like a common criminal. Hence, Mr.
Reyes asked for moral and/or exemplary damages.

Ruby Lim denied the allegations of Mr. Reyes claiming that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party
but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter.

After trial on the merits, the court rendered a decision in favor of Ms. Lim. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling and favored the testimony of Mr. Reyes. Hence, this petition for review
was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by
the hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times and very
unlikely for her to make a scene in the party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being
turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence
even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-
crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to support any of his claims. Since he
brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.

April 3, 2002, G.R. No. L-142943
SPOUSES QUISUMBING, plaintiff-appellant
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), defendant-appellee

The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house
located at Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s
inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on spot
inspection of all single phase meters at the house. . Permission was granted by the plaintiff’s
secretary. After the inspection, it was found out that the meter has been tampered. The
information was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the
house. The inspectors brought the meter to their laboratory for further verifications. In the
event that the meter was indeed tampered, the defendant has to temporarily disconnect the
electric services. After an hour, the inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the findings of
the laboratory and asked the Quisumbing couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,
875.01 representing the difference in the bill, their electric supply will be disconnected. The
plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously an malevolent manner done without due process,
lack of regard for Quisumbing’s rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore
held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

The Supreme court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay
respondent the billing differential of 0f P193, 332. 96. On the latter, MERALCO was ordered to
pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may
be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property
without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by
way of example or correction for public.
The Supreme Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity.
However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. “Under the
law, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) may immediately disconnect electric service on
the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulator Board”. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative
was present.
Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof an was not
granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only upon Lorna’s testimony. These are
compensation for an injury that will injure position where it was injured before it was injured.

219 SCRA 115
Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for
the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan, he was
an Iranian medical exchange student. He later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner
even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents.
The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him in his apartment. She filed a complaint
because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the
apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the
petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is
already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage, neither
sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of
his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private
respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause claim for damages.
Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that when a man uses
his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud
and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive
promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal
knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.

21. Globe Mackay & Radio Corp. vs. CA


G.R. NO. 81262. August 25, 1989

Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which
caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it
to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General
Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one
suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said
leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test,
and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation.
Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete;
the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and
from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed
with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent
Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973,
effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company
(RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe
Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s
fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing
damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry
told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him
until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be
trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO
stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six
criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are
motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private
respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the
Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not
be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.
If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages
under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

PE vs. PE
5 SCRA 200

Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance
on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works
as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. Defendant was an adopted son of a
Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the
similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a
member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love
with each other and conducted clandestine trysts and exchanged love notes The rumors about
their love affairs reached Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless.On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from their house but her brothers and sisters
found a note written by the defendant.

Whether the defendant is liable according to Article 21 of the Civil Code

Because of the frequency of his visits to the Lolita’s family who was allowed free access because
he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell
in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. Even when the defendant is
prohibited to see Lolita, the defendant continued his love affairs with her until she disappeared
from the parental home. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury as contemplated
in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.Defendant is sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations.
#23. Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648

Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get married. They applied and acquired
marriage license and set the wedding on September 4, 1954. Necessary publication and
preparations including sending off invitations were done.

Two days before the scheduled wedding, Francisco went home to his province without properly
notifying Beatriz. He sent a telegram that they have to postpone the wedding because his
mother opposes it. He gave an assurance that he will return but he never did.

Beatriz sued for damages, Francisco filed no answer and was declared in default. The Court
ordered Francisco to pay for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders and motion for a new trial. The court then
proposed for amicable settlement.

Francisco contended that his failure to marry beatriz was due to fortuitous event and
circumstances beyond his control.


Can a person be held liable for walking out of his own wedding?


YES. Breech of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21
of said Code provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.”

Plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued and their wedding was set. Necessary preparation and publicity were done only for the
defendant to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized. This is contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable
in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. This Court’s opinion, considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15, 000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed
to be a reasonable award.

#25 Constantino VS Mendez 209 SCRA 18
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by the former,
his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.
Amelita Constantino, the petitioner, alleges that sometime in the month of August 1974 she met
Ivan Mendez, the respondent, at Tony’s Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz Manila where she worked
as a waitress. The next day Ivan invited Amelita to have dinner with him at Hotel Enrico where he
was staying; he then proceeded to profess his love for her and courted her. At around 11:00 P.M.
Ivan brought Amelita to his room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her; after which he confessed that he is a married man. Ivan and Amelita
continued to have contact in the months of September and November 1974 whenever Ivan is in
Manila which resulted in Amelita getting pregnant.
The petitioner filed, in the Court of First Instance of Davao, an action for support, acknowledgment,
and damages against respondent on June 5, 1975. In his answer, respondent admitted that he met
Amelita at Tony’s Cocktail lounge but denied to having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her.
He also prayed for dismissal of the complaint for lack of action.
At the time of filing of complaint on June 5, 1975, petitioner was still pregnant with the unborn
child. She gave birth to Michael Constantino on August 3, 1975.

Whether or not Michael Constantino should be acknowledged as an illegitimate child of Ivan
Mendez and if Amelita Constantino and Michael Constantino are entitled to damages and monthly

No because Amelita has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her evidence that Ivan
Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Amelita's testimony on cross-examination
that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974 is
inconsistent with her response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual
intercourse in November. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of
November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she
merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and
November, 1974. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan
is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing
paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 193 & 214 of the Civil Code on the
theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree
with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages
could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At
the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that
she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her
womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have
immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact
sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of
September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates
that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit
herself to Ivan.

#26 St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

Nov. 14, 1984.
133 SCRA 179

Dr. Conrad Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon
Magsayasy Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday
Times where St. Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with that of Mr. Arcadio’s.
On December 15, 1968, St. Louis published an advertisement on the Sunday Times with the heading
“where the heart is”. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the said advertisement, the house
featured was Dr. Aramil’s not Mr. Arcadio’s with whom the company asked permission and the
intended house to be published. Dr. Aramil noticed the mistake and a letter of protest to St. Louis
Realty Corp. The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, officer-in-charge of the advertisement. He
stopped publication of the advertisement. However, no rectification or apology was published.
Dr. Aramil’s counsel demanded actual, moral, and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St.
Louis Realty Corp. published an ad, now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house. Dr. Aramil filed a complaint
for the damages on March 29. On April 15, the notice of rectification was published. Trial court
awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages, and P2,000 as attorney's

With St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered
mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there
was violation of Aramil's right to privacy. CA affirmed that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable
quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code.

Whether or not St. Louis Realty Corp. is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.


Yes. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and
Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it
never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification ". The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.



29. TITLE: Donato vs. Luna

CITATION: GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988


An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with
the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan.
Before the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz
consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous
knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage
license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for
which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home
upon learning that Donato already previously married.

ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended
in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic
relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.


Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means
of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.


#30. Quimiguing vs. Icao

G.R. No. 26795. July 31, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The petitioner, Carmen Quimiguing, who was a student in Dapitan was intimidated and forced by
her neighbor, Felix Icao, a married man, to have a carnal intercourse. As a result, she got pregnant
and had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120 per month, damages and attorney's
fees. Since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born, the lower court dismissed it
for lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that she gave birth to a
baby girl as a result of the intercourse but the court ruled that "no amendment was allowable since
the original complaint averred no cause of action." So the plaintiff appealed directly to this court.

Whether or not the plaintiff has a right to claim support and damages

The orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. The Supreme Court ruled that "a conceived
child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in the Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines". Another
reason for reversing the order is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his
lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation
for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the same Code.

Geluz v. CA,
2 SCRA 801

Nita Villanueva & Antonio Geluz met in 1948 through Nita’s aunt. In 1950, she got pregnant. To
conceal her pregnancy from her parents, she had an abortion. When they got married, she got
pregnant again. Since she was an employee of COMELEC & her pregnancy would be
inconvenient to her, she had abortion in Oct 1953. She again became pregnant after 2 years and
had an abortion for the third and last time. The last abortion constituted the plaintiff’s basis in
filling an action for award of damages. CA and trial court granted the award of damages.

ISSUE: W/N Geluz is entitled for damages

HELD: It is apparent that he consented to the previous abortions making his action questionable
for why he only filed for damages on his wife’s third abortion. Also, SC held that the fetus
wasn’t born yet so it has no juridical personality. The award for the death of a person does not
cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having
rights and obligations.
# 32
De Jesus v Syquia
58 Phil 866


This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the purpose
of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from (1) breach of promise
to marry, (2) to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael as his natural child and pay
maintenance for him. Cesar met Antonia at the barbershop where she works as a cashier.
Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a constant visitor at her home, and wrote a letter to
the priest saying that if the child was a boy, it will be christened in his name. On his trip to
China and Japan, he was writing letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in good condition
so that “junior” will be strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a
house where they lived together for 1 year as a family, with expenses being shouldered by
Syquia. She became pregnant again, but soon Syquia left her to marry another woman.

(1) WON there would be damages for the breach to marry.
(2) WON Syquia is compelled to recognize Ismael loanco as his natural child


The SC upheld the decision of the trial court in refusing to give damages to Antonia for
breach of promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon
the faith of such promise.
As for the recognition of the child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by the
production of more than 1 document of indubitable authenticity.

#34 Dumlao VS Quality Plastics G.R. No. L-27956

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.

Herein petitioner Dionisio Dumlao, acting as the administrator of the testate of Pedro Oria along
with other heirs of Oria's estate, sued Quality Plastic Products Inc. for auctioning the nine and six-
tenths hectares’ land of Oria which was used as security. In a previous case, dated February 28,
1962, the CFI of Pangasinan rendered judgement ordering Oria along with other sureties to pay
solidarity to Quality Plastic Products, Inc., failure of which will result to the foreclosure of the surety
bond. The sale commenced on November 20, 1962.
The petitioners contend that QPPI does not have jurisdiction over the estate of Oria because Oria
died on April 23, 1959, long before June 13, 1960 when the case against them was filed, therefore
Oria did not have juridical capacity on the day the summons was served.

Issue: Whether or not QPPI lacked jurisdiction on the contention that Oria lost his juridical capacity
upon death.


Yes, The CFI of Pangasinan's judgement against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. His juridical capacity, which
is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Article 37 and 42, Civil
Code). Consequently, the execution sale of Oria's land is also void.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration

Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire,
claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with co-plaintiff, a Filipino citizen.
Solicitor General opposes on the ground that the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does
not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship, because record shows that the same
does not possessed all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization (CA 473), even if
she has proven that she does not suffer any disqualification there under.

Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully naturalized.

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who
is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization
as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a
living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural,
stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so
that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter
into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that
the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as
the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship
is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.


#37 Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300
September 18, 1995
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo,
also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification for the petitioner with
COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing
the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the
amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the
COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition
for disqualification meritorious.

Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of
her marriage to the late President Marcos.

For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld
the disqualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy
that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor
follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile by origin is lost only
when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in
the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile
because the term “residence” in Civil law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when
the petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new
domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband
died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
38. Tuason v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116607, 10 April 1996


On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner Emilio Tuazon. Due to the series of physical
abuse against the respondent, the petitioner use of prohibited drugs, cohabitating with three women, leaving the
conjugal home and giving minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of bank debts
without the respondent consent, respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage in 1989 on the ground of
psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further

Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to present his evidence. Counsel for petitioner
moved for a postponement, however, petitioner failed to appear. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
nullity of marriage and awarding the custody of common children to respondent. No appeal was taken.

Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff
of the Conjugal Properties which was opposed by petitioner. Petitioner filed a Petitioner from Relief of Judgment
on the held decision. The trial court denied the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.


Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court should have ordered a prosecuting officer to


A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no
other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a
motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of
this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to
revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in
actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state
because the law looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He
contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one,
petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the
complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the
proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal
clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or
fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion
existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by
any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in
the trial court.

Case No. 39 Estrada Vs. Escritor 492 scra 1

A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006

Facts: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter in the Las Pinas Regional Trial Court since 1999. She has
been living for more than 25 years with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. and had a son with him without the
benefit of marriage prior to her husband’s death who was living with another woman. Quilapio on
the other hand is still legally married to another woman when she joined the judiciary in 1999.
Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested the Judge of RTC, where Escritor is employed, to
investigate respondent. According to the complainant, respondent is committing an immoral act
that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein
for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent asserts that their religion, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Trace
Society, has permitted their union. Such proof of approval from their union is backed with
“Declartion of Faithfulness” which is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Ruling: No. the state could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in
our constitution. According to Jefferson, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to the
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the state has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation or religious exercise as required the free exercise clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interest. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitute an
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.


November 2, 1916
G.R. No. 11263
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.


Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos Rueda, defendant-appellee, were legally
married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915. They established their residence at 115 Calle
San Marcelino, where they lived together for a month before the plaintiff returned to the home
of their parents. Goitia filed a complaint against the defendant for support outside the conjugal
home. The allegations include that the defendant, one month after their marriage, demanded
the plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs on which the latter
rejected the said demands. With continuous rejections of the demands of the defendant by the
plaintiff, the former maltreated the latter by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lips,
face and different body parts. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease from maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and
take refuge in the home of her parents.
Whether or not Goitia can claim support from her husband outside the conjugal domicile.
Yes. Eloisa may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of
the conjugal home. Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the
rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object
of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The
law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to
evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant.

# 41
Balogbog v CA
269 scra 259

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arnival who died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They had an older
brother who died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. Private respondents Ramonito and
Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners,
claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as
such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
Petitioners denied this and alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issues.
Private respondent produced certificates that the records of the marriage of Gavino and
Catalina and the birth of Ramonito must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during
the war.
WON the marriage of Gavino and Catalina is valid even without the marriage
WON Ramonito and Generoso are legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina
Yes. Under the rules of court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be
rebutted when there is a proof to the contrary. Although a marriage contract is considered
primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not prof that no marriage took
place. Other evidences may be shown to prove the marriage.
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the
civil registry does not mean that the private respondents were not legitimate children. The
legitimacy was proven by the testimonies of the witnesses including Catalina.

#42 Cosca VS Palaypayan A.M. No. MTJ 92-721

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.

Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.

Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-
Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992,
herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano
P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer,
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign
their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local
civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the
attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved,
but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the
court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was
filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that
the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to
furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar;
and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative
case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept
by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the
submission by the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to
do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of
the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that
in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil
registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the
date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of
a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment
to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned
up to the present.

Whether or not the marriages enumerated are valid.
Marriages are valid.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages,
and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law."9 This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent

judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern
for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his
undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail,
approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.



A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Firstly, Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, the respondent, officiated the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga on September 27, 1994, despite being
knowledgeable of the fact that the groom is merely separated from his first wife, Ida Peñaranda.
Secondly, he allegedly performed the marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario, outside of his jurisdiction in the Municipality of Sta. Monica – Burgos and
solemnized it at his residence in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. The respondent seeks exculpation from
both acts, stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar confirmin that Tagadan have not seen his first wife in seven years. With regard to the second
charge, he maintains that he did not violate Article 7paragraph 1 of the Family code and that Artcile
8 applies, as there was a written request, by Gemma del Rosario, presented.

Whether or not the respondent is viable of inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
Yes. The law provided that any marriage contacted by any person during the
substinence of a previous marrraige shall be null and void. Furthermore, if the prior spouse have
been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. Albeit, Tagadan not seeing his first wife
in 7 seven years, no summary of proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death was
instituted. Absent of this judicial declaration, Gaspar Tagadan remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. With regard to the second
charge, the responent claims he did not violate Article 7 of the Family Code in regards to Artcile 8,
in which it is provided that the officiate be requested in writing by both parites that the marraige
may be solemnize at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement ot that effect.
Although a written request was presented, it was signed only by Gemma del Rosario. In as much as
respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By
citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

#45 Aranas Vs. Judge Occiano

AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002
Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano of gross ignorance of the law, when the judge
solemnized her marriage with Domionador Orobia where it was outside the judge’s territorial
jurisdiction. There kwas no record of the alleged marriage in the Office of Civil Registrar General,
as the judge only agreed with the promise to solemnized their marriage if the couple can provide
their license on that same day of the ceremony, of which the couple were not able to.
Issue: Whether judge Occiano is guilty of officiating the ceremony without a duly issued license
to marry, and conducting it outside his jurisdiction.
Ruling: The court held that the judge has conducted the marriage outside his jurisdiction, and
not having a duly license to marry for the couple, has held the judge liable, and ordered to pay a
fine of P5,000.00 only.

#46 Laxamana vs. Baltazar

G.R. No. L-5955,
September 19, 1952

In July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended. The vice-mayor Jose T. Salazar,
assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However,
the provincial governor, acting under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), with the
consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who
immediately took the corresponding official oath.
Hence, this quo warranto proceeding based solely on the petitioner’s proposition that the section
first mentioned has been repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised Election Code.


Whether this petition should be granted, and Laxamana declared the lawful mayor of Sexmoan.

No. Because of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code to wit: “Temporary disability of the
mayor. Upon the occasion of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor,
his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who
at the last general election received the highest number of votes.”
In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the Interior and the
office of executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial and municipal
governments have “consistently held that in case of the suspension or other temporary disability of
the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the office of the mayor, and if the
vice-mayor is not available, the said office shall be discharged by the first councilor.”
This quo warranto petition is dismissed with costs. So ordered.

#47 People vs Jansenn

G.R. No. L-31763 December 27, 1929


H. JANSSEN, defendant-appellant.


On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Father H. Jansenn to have
their name inscribed in the marriage registry, which was done. On December 30, 1928, the banns were published
in his parish in San Jose, Antique. As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the
defendant-appellant to marry them before the date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro
issued a dispensation of the marriage with the understanding that no obstacle has been discovered in the
investigation made or to be made of the status and liberty of the contracting parties. On January 4, 1929, the
municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued an authority to solemnize marriage of above contracting parties.
By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose,
Antique, the defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S. del


Whether or not the defendant-appellant violated section 2 of Act No. 3412.

Whether or not the defendant-appellant cannot solemnize marriage without publishing or proclaiming such
marriage 10 days prior to the celebration thereof.


The law does not impose upon priest or ministers of religion to investigate whether the license was issued by an
official duly authorized by law, that is, by the municipal secretary of the municipality where the woman habitually
resides. It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed
from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman
who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or religion whose
rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said proclamation be made during ten
days, unless said rules or practices so require.

The appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved from the information, with costs de oficio.

48. Lim Tanhu vs Ramolete

Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
G.R. No. L-40098. August 29, 1975

Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a
partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial Company and a
Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were
partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens.
Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech
Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong
Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active management of the
partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the
partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with
funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee
Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all
presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was
dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children.

Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore
business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore for
P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co.
sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its
business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and
retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.

Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of
Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.

ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the company
of the latter’s share.

Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, “the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each
other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by
their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a
marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract”. While a marriage may also be
proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily
explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not
admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other
satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the
purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church,
Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to
unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said
certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by
law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify,
the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her
subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised not to
interfere with each other’s affairs since they are incompatible and not in the position to keep living
together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was that of a
common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent court
in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby
annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte proceedings against petitioners and the decision on
December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of
its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu,
Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently
enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs
against private respondent.

#49 Vda de Chua vs IAC

January 5, 1994

G.R. No. 70909

CHUA, petitioners,
HERRERA, respondents.


Sometime in 1950, defendant Herminigilda Herrera executed a Contract of Lease in favor of
Tian On (or Sy Tian On) whereby the former leased to the latter a couple of lots in Cebu City, for
a term of ten (10) years, renewable for another five (5) years. The contract of lease contains a
stipulation giving the lessee an option to buy the leased property and that the lessor
guarantees to leave the possession of said property to the lessee for a period of ten (10) years
or as long as the lessee faithfully fulfils the terms and conditions of their contract. In
accordance with the said contract of lease, the lessee, Tian On, erected a residential house on
the leased premises. Within 4 years from the execution of the said contract of lease, the lessee,
Sy Tian On, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Building in favor of Chua Bok, the predecessor-
in-interest of the plaintiffs herein, whereby the former sold to the latter the aforesaid
residential house for and in consideration of the sum of P8, 000.00. In the deed, it was said that
the sale was made with the knowledge and express consent of the lot-owner and lessor,
Herminigilda Herrera who is represented by her attorney-in-fact, Vicenta R. de Reynes who
hereby also honors the annulment of the lease made by Sy Tian On in favor of Chua Bok, and
promises and binds herself to respect and abide by all the terms and conditions of the lease
contract which is now assigned to the said Chua Bok. After the expiration of the contract of
lease in the plaintiffs herein, who are the successors-in-interest of Chua Bok (who had died),
continued possession of the premises up to April 1978, with adjusted rental rate. On July 26,
1977, defendant Herrera through her attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Luz M. Tormis, who was authorized
with a special power of attorney, sold the lots in question to defendants-spouses, Vicente and
Victoria Go. The defendants-spouses were able to have aforesaid sale registered with the
Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu and the titles to the two parcels of land were transferred
in their names. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed the instant case seeking the annulment of the said
sale between Herminigilda Herrera and spouses Vicente and Victoria Go, alleging that the
conveyance was in violation of the plaintiffs’ right of option to buy the leased premises as
provided in the Contract of Lease and that the defendants-spouses acted in bad faith in
purchasing the said lots knowing full well that the said plaintiffs have the option to buy those

Whether or not the defendants was in bad faith in the purchase of the lots knowing that
plaintiffs had the option to buy said lots.

No. The lease contract, petitioners’ cause of action, involves the lease of real property for a
period of more than one year. The contract was entered into by the agent of the lessor and not
the lessor herself. In such a case, the law requires that the agent be armed with a special power
of attorney to lease the premises. Article 1878 of the New Civil Code, in pertinent part,
provides: "Special Powers of Attorney are necessary in the following cases (8) To lease any real
property to another person for more than one year." It is true that respondent Herrera allowed
petitioners to occupy the leased premises after the expiration of the lease contract and under
Article 1670 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a tacit renewal of the lease is deemed to have
taken place. However, a tacit renewal is limited only to the terms of the contract which are
germane to the lessee’s right of continued enjoyment of the property and does not extend to
alien matters, like the option to buy the leased premises.

# 50
Republic v CA
236 scra 257

Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the
knowledge of Castro’s parents. Since the marriage was unknown to the parents of Castro,
the couple did not cohabit immediately. It was when Castro was already pregnant that the
couple lived together. The cohabitation only lasted for four months. Thereafter they parted
ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The child was brought to US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter
she wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving. She found out that there was
no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage. Thus, respondent filed
a petition for the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
WON the marriage is valid
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license
first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a marriage license would render the marriage void ab initio.


#52 Van Dorn VS Romillo 139 SCRA 139

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985


HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after
the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born
on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Whether or not the divorce filed in Nevada United States should be recognized in our Jurisdiction.
Yes, divorce filed in Nevada United States should be recognized in our jurisdiction.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.


(G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998)
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital
affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie
in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna,
reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert
contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the
decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has
abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to
his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
Yes. The rule 99 of the rules of court provides that it shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed x x x by each of its known living parents who is not insane,
or hopelessly intemperate, or has not abandoned the child x x x. In the instant case, only
the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition or adoption.
Petitioners consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently
alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors the natural father. However, in cases where
the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the
matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination the
issue of abandonment by the natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court
must first confront. Only upon failure of the natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its

#54 Republic Vs. Orbecido

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts: On May 24, 1981 Cipriano Orbecido III was married to Lady Myros Villanueva. But in 1986
the wife left for US, brought one of their children, and became naturalized US citizen and remarried
after obtaining divorce paper in the US. Cipriano on the other hand, filed a petition in the Philippine
court to remarry as well.

Issue: Whether or not Cipriano can remarry.

Ruling: The court ruled that after one of the couple became naturalized foreign citizen and
obtaining a divorce decree in another country, that spouse is to be considered like a foreigner at the
time of marriage, and therefore the Filipino spouse must be allowed to remarry as well.

Case no.55


(G.R. No. 221029)


Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to Japanese national Minoru Yoshino. Manalo filed for divorce
and was granted in Japan on December 6, 2011. Manalo went to court in Dagupan in the Philippines
to have her divorce recognized here. The trial court in Dagupan denied her petition. She then went
to the Court of Appeals (CA), where the CA reversed the decision of the lower court in 2014. The CA
ruled that Manalo should have the right to remarry. It applied the amended Article 26(2) of the Family
Code, which includes:

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

The Philippine government, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), went to the SC to try
to reverse the CA's ruling.


Whether or not a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign spouse is also considered
valid in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse is the one who filed for divorce abroad


The Supreme Court (SC) en banc issued a landmark ruling, recognizing divorce in marriages with

Voting 10-3-1, the SC en banc ruled "that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign
spouse is also considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for
divorce abroad."
With this ruling, the state now recognizes the divorce obtained by the Filipino, and couples of the
same circumstances of mixed-marriage will be considered not married to each other under
Philippine law.