1. Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v.

Board of Trustees 1978(3) SCC 119

Facts: A port in Cochin had 17 categories of workmen, 15 of which got a weekly off on Sunday.
If those 15 had to be called to work on Sunday, they would get another day of the week as off
and half day wage for working on Sunday. Whereas the rest two categories worked on Sundays
on rotation basis, without any half day wage.
Procedural history: The two aggrieved categories of workmen demanded the same benefits
from Industrial Disputes Tribunal, which were granted. Board of Trustees moved to Supreme
Court via SLP which was dismissed by a non-speaking order (no reasons were given in the order
for dismissal). The Board then filed a writ petition to High court wherein the order of Tribunal
was set aside. Thus, the workmen appealed the decision to the Supreme court with following
issues:
Issue: Whether the principle of Res Judicata barred the writ petition to High court because the
same was dismissed by Supreme court in SLP?
Judgment: Supreme court dismissed workmen’s appeal holding that the effect of non-speaking
order of dismissal without indicating any grounds be taken to have decided only that it was not a
fit case where special leave should be granted. In the absence of any defined reasons, extending
the principal of res judicata to bar trial of the matter in separate proceeding merely on uncertain
assumption that the issues must have been decided is not safe.
2. Modi Entertainment Network v. WSG Cricket (2003) 4 SCC 341
Facts: WSG, incorporated in Singapore, granted license to Doordarshan to telecast an ICC
tournament in India in exchange for certain commission from the profits earned. Under the
contract, London court was chosen as a neutral forum in case of disputes arising between the
parties, but the clause provided that London court will have ‘non-exclusive jurisdiction’. Soon
after commencement of telecast, WSG complained to Doordarshan that the signal of satellite
transmitting the tournament was being received in the Middle-East which amounted to breach of
contract and violation of the license granted to the Middle-East licensee. Therefore, it asked
Doordarshan to rectify the same, else it would withdraw the license. Doordarshan lost huge
advertising revenue due to repeated threats by WSG to discontinue the license and filed a suit in
Bombay High Court claiming damages for the same. Thereafter, WSG filed a suit in the London
court for recovery of commission, while Doordarshan filed for Anti-suit Injunction before the
Bombay High Court praying that WSG be ordered not to proceed with the suit pending in
London on the ground that the UK court is a forum non-conveniens. The matter went on to
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Anti-suit injunction should be granted to Doordarshan against WSG’s suit in
London court?
Judgment: The court opined that in the course of global commercial activities, parties may
agree to submit to exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign court, and it shows they
have foreseen possible breach of agreement by any party and agreed to resolve their disputes
through the forum agreed upon under the agreement. London court cannot be considered a forum
non-conveniens only on the basis of Doordarshan’s argument that continuance of suit in London
court would be oppressive and vexatious. Since no good and sufficient reason to grant anti-suit
injunction is made out, the court will not aid Doordarshan to commit breach of agreement by
restraining WSG from prosecuting in the agreed forum of choice.
3. Mumbai International Airport v. Regency Convention Centre (2010)7 SCC 417
Facts: The Airport Authority of India (AAI) leased Mumbai Airport premises to the plaintiff for
expansion into a world class Airport, barring at certain area which was subject-matter of a
pending suit with Regency Convention Centre (RCC) and any transfer of it was prohibited by
court’s orders. The lease deed stated that the same area will be a part of the leased premises
subject to the court’s verdict.
Procedural History: Plaintiff filed an application to implead itself as a defendant in the ongoing
suit with respect to the said area on the ground that in the view of its object to make the Airport a
world class airport, plaintiff’s interests are likely to be directly affected if any relief was granted
to the RCC. The application was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was not a necessary
party to that suit, and hence, plaintiff preferred appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Mumbai International Airport can be added as a necessary or proper party to the
suit going between RCC and AAI?
Judgment: It was held that the fact that a person is likely to secure interest/right in a suit
property depending upon the decision of the court, will not make that person a necessary or
proper party to the suit. To be impleaded as a party to a suit is not a matter of right but the choice
of the plaintiff to choose its adversary or a judicial discretion which has to be exercised
according to reason and fair play. Here, the plaintiff did not even exist in the picture when the
suit between RCC and AAI was instituted and holds no nexus to the said suit. Presence of
plaintiff is neither necessary for passing a decree nor for complete and effective adjudication of
the matters in issue.
4. Pramod P. Shah v. Ratan N. Tata & Ors. 2017 SCC Online Bom 5269
Facts: Petitioner claiming to be a shareholder in one of the defendant companies, intended to sue
the defendant companies comprising of Tata group (TCS, TGBL, Tata Motors, etc.) in a
representative capacity of all other shareholders on the ground that ousting of Cyrus Mistry has
led to a dip in the shares of all the Tata companies, therefore, it has caused all the non-promotor
shareholders of the group of Tata companies, including the petitioner, a huge loss. Therefore, the
petitioner applied for the leave of court under Order I Rule 8 to sue the Tata group as a
representative of non-promotor shareholders of Tata group of companies claiming damages to
the tune of 41k cr.
Issue: Whether Pramod P. Shah can file a suit in representative capacity against the Tata Group?
Judgment: The question considered by the court was whether there is a ‘commonality of
interest’ between all the non-promotor shareholders. It was held that the Tata companies in the
group are all separate entities having separate Memorandums & Articles of Association, Board
of Directors, etc. If Cyrus Mistry is ousted from Tata Sons, which is a holding company, it has
different number of shares in different Tata companies; thus, resulting in separate causes of
action and no commonality of interest. When the companies in the Tata group are all different
entities, then how could there be a commonality of interest warranting the petitioner to represent
them all in one suit on the basis of common interest? Therefore, different suits have to be
instituted by shareholders of each Tata company to claim a relief. In that case, one person may
represent the shareholders of that particular company. It will be extremely unjust to join all those
non-promotor shareholders who do not want reinstatement of Cyrus Mistry but would be bound
to accept his reinstatement if petitioner succeeds in the representative suit and suffer such
reinstatement as something which was prayed for on their behalf or for their benefit. To avoid
such predicament, they would be forced to join the suit and defend it, when they really had no
intention or obligation to do so. Hence, the application is bound to be dismissed in the absence of
no commonality of interest.
5. Inbasagaran v. S. Natarajan (2015)11 SCC 12
Facts: S. Natarajan (S) was allotted a plot on lease-cum-sale agreement by Housing Board of
TN, the sale deed for which was to be executed once S constructed a building on that plot.
Meanwhile, S entered into an agreement to sell the same plot with Inbasagaran (I) agreeing that
once sale deed is executed in favor of S, it will register the same in the name of I. I had paid the
sale consideration. Later, the parties decided that I shall construct building on the plot at his own
expenses. After I constructed the building and took possession, Housing Board executed the sale
deed in favor of S. I contended that S concealed this fact and attempted to forcibly take
possession of the building constructed by I.
Procedural History: I filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining S from forcibly taking
possession of the building. After a year & during the pendency of that suit, I filed for specific
performance of the agreement to sell which was signed between I and S, to which S contended
that it was barred by Order II Rule 2 and should have been included in the earlier suit. In the
latter suit, court directed S to execute and register the sale document in favor of I, while the
former suit for injunction was dismissed. S appealed to High Court which agreed that second suit
by S was barred by Order II Rule 2. I then moved to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the second suit by I is barred by Order II Rule 2?
Judgment: Court stated that causes of action for the two suits are different and distinct and the
evidence to support the relief in the two suits is also different, therefore, the provisions of Order
II Rule 2 will not apply. The first cause of action arose when S tried to forcibly occupy the
property. The second cause of action arose when S disclosed that property was transferred in his
favor by the Housing Board. Hence, the causes of action are not same and identical.
Foreign Judgment:
6. Satya v. Teja Singh (1975) 1 SCC 120
Facts: Satya and Teja Singh got married in India in 1955. In 1959, Teja Singh went to America
where he completed his Masters in Utah and began to pursue Ph.D in Ohio. In 1964, he went to
Nevada where he stayed for six weeks and filed and obtained a divorce decree against Satya and
flied back to Ohio. The law in Nevada requires the plaintiff to be a bonafide resident for atleast 6
weeks to show the domicile and file for divorce. In 1965, Satya filed for maintenance against
Teja Singh in India to which he replied, by sending the divorce decree from Nevada court, that
he is no longer her husband and therefore, not liable to maintain her.
Issue: Whether the divorce decree obtained from Nevada court by Teja Singh is a conclusive
foreign judgment under Section 13 CPC to divorce Satya and Teja Singh?
Judgment: The facts reveal that prior to the institution of the divorce proceedings, Teja Singh
might have stayed, but never lived in Nevada. He made a false representation to Nevada court
that he was a bonafide resident of Nevada. Having secured the divorce decree, he left Nevada
almost immediately thereafter rendering it false again that he had “the intent to make Nevada his
home for an indefinite period of time”. He went to Nevada as a bird-of-passage, resorted to the
court there solely to found jurisdiction and proceeded a divorce decree on a misrepresentation
that he was domiciled in Nevada. His residence for a particular purpose does not satisfy the
qualitative test for establishing domicile. Thus, decree is obtained by fraud and Nevada court
lacked jurisdiction. It cannot receive recognition in India being violative of Section 13(a) & (e)
of CPC.
7. Narsimha Rao v. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451
Facts: The parties got married in Tirupati in 1975. In 1978, they got separated. Narsimha Rao
files a suit for divorce in Tirupati while he is the resident of New Orleans, which he later on
withdraws. He files second suit for divorce in Missouri where the law for acquiring domicile and
filing a suit required a person to stay for minimum 90 days preceding the filing of suit. From
Missouri, he obtained a divorce decree on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. In
1981, he got remarried to which his wife brought an action for bigamy against him in the
Supreme Court by SLP.
Issue: Whether the divorce decree awarded by Missouri court can be treated as conclusive under
Section 13 CPC?
Judgment: The grounds on which the foreign decree is passed is not in accordance with the Act
under which the parties were married, and hence, is against Section 13(c) and 13(f). Moreover,
the respondent had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court or consented to its passing; thus,
it cannot be enforced in India.