Security in Canada's North Looking Beyond Arctic Sovereignty

Report November 2010
Security in Canada’s North

Looking Beyond
Arctic Sovereignty
National Security and Public Safety

Security in Canada’s North: Looking Beyond Arctic Sovereignty
by Bjorn Rutten
About The Conference Preface

Board of Canada This report examines three dimensions of security in the
North—Arctic security, Northern security, and commun-
We are:
ity security—in order to provide a more comprehensive
The foremost independent, not-for-profit, applied
picture of the security challenges in Canada’s North. The
research organization in Canada.
research found that, of these three, community security
Objective and non-partisan. We do not lobby
is the most important for Northerners. The people of the
for specific interests.
North see the community—rather than the individual,
Funded exclusively through the fees we charge
the state, or the nation—as the primary referent object
for services to the private and public sectors.
of living a secure life.
Experts in running conferences but also at con-
ducting, publishing, and disseminating research;
Security in Canada’s Greater North cannot be
helping people network; developing individual
adequately understood through Southern conceptions
leadership skills; and building organizational
of security alone. This report develops the concept of
capacity.
community security primarily based on interviews with
Specialists in economic trends, as well
Northerners (public officials, private sector executives,
as organizational performance and public
and researchers).
policy issues.
Not a government department or agency,
although we are often hired to provide
services for all levels of government.
Independent from, but affiliated with, The
Conference Board, Inc. of New York, which
serves nearly 2,000 companies in 60 nations
and has offices in Brussels and Hong Kong.
©2010 The Conference Board of Canada*

Published in Canada • All rights reserved
Agreement No. 40063028
*Incorporated as AERIC Inc.
Forecasts and research often involve numerous assumptions and data

sources, and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. This information
is not intended as specific investment, accounting, legal, or tax advice.
Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Chapter 1—Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2—Canada’s Security and the Arctic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Sovereignty-Related Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Arctic Geopolitics: Diplomacy and Military Might . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Arctic Governance and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Chapter 3—Northern Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Security Challenges in the Greater North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Climate Change and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Economic Development and Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Governance Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Chapter 4—Community Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Security From a Northerner’s Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Placing Community Security in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Socio-Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Public Safety and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Political Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter 5—Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A—Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Acknowledgements
The National Security and Public Safety staff would like to thank the investors and roundtable members of the
Centre for the North for their commitment, collaboration, and support. This research report would not have been
possible without their investment, and it benefited greatly from members’ comments on an early draft version.
Writing a report like this one is a collective effort. The author would like to thank Barbara van Haute, George
Kolisnek, and Ashley Sisco for their research contributions and insightful comments. Most importantly, the author
owes a debt of gratitude to the following interviewees, who provided invaluable insights into security issues in the
North and the perspectives of Northerners: Nick Arnatsiaq, Clive Archer, Chris Burn, Eric Bussey, Michael Byers,
Julia Christensen, Jennifer Dagg, Bruce Donaldson, Vince Hawkes, Gunhild Hoogensen, Robert Huebert, Tom
Kontra, George Lindsey, Don McRae, Steve McVarnock, Randy Ottenbreit, Donat Pharand, John Sutherland,
and Jo-Ann Toulouse.
In addition, the author would like to thank Derrick Hynes, John Neily, and Gilles Rhéaume for their experienced
guidance and comments along the way.
About The Centre for the North

The Centre for the North is a major, five-year research initiative of The Conference Board of Canada. The Centre brings
together Aboriginal leaders and representatives of businesses, governments, and community organizations to change
the conversation about Canada’s North—and ultimately, to provide insights into how sustainable prosperity can be
achieved in the North.
The Centre for the North is guided by the following founding principles:
The Centre is “North-centric.” It examines all issues from a Northern perspective, seeks to maximize Northern
engagement, and prioritizes Northern interests.
The Centre takes a “holistic” and action-oriented approach. It explores the full range of Northern challenges
and opportunities, and offers strategies that will lead to action.
The Centre considers not just the territorial North, but also the Northern regions of the seven provinces with
boundaries that stretch into the North.
The Centre takes a short- to long-term perspective, identifying immediate and future issues and actions.
CENTRE FOR THE NORTH MEMBERS
The Conference Board of Canada is grateful to the investors and roundtable members of the Centre for the North that,
through their membership, support the Centre’s research program.
Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited MTS Allstream Inc.

Arctic Co-operatives Limited Northwestel
Bell Canada Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing
BHP Billiton Diamonds Inc. Ontario Ministry of Northern Development, Mines
BMO Financial Group and Forestry
Canada Border Services Agency Privy Council Office
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation Province of Manitoba
Canadian Institutes of Health Research Public Health Agency of Canada
Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency RBC
De Beers Canada Inc. RTL Robinson Enterprises Ltd.
Department of National Defence Saskatchewan Ministry of First Nations and Métis Relations
Enbridge Inc. SaskPower
First Air SaskTel
G13 Universities Scotiabank
Galin Foundation Scotia Capital Inc.
Golder Associates Ltd. SNC-Lavalin Inc.
Government of the Northwest Territories TD Bank Financial Group
Health Canada TD Securities Inc.
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada TransCanada PipeLines Limited
Hydro-Québec Transport Canada
IGLOO Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Yukon Economic Development
Ministère des ressources naturelles et de la faune
du Québec
(Note: The findings and conclusions of this report are entirely those of The Conference Board of Canada, not of the
Centre investors and roundtable members.)
Executive Summary
Security in Canada’s North

Looking Beyond
Arctic Sovereignty
important southern areas of the territories and the
At a Glance northern regions of many provinces. This “Southern”
view of security needs to be refreshed. A richer public
To those living in the North, security concerns
conversation is required.
tend to focus on the capacity of communities
to meet the basic needs of their inhabitants
While the security issues noted above are important to
and to become more resilient.
Northerners, they are typically less important than com-
Of the three principal concepts of security in munity-level concerns. Northerners tend to see the issue
Canada’s North, that of community security of security through a different lens than Southerners. To
is the least well understood. those living in the North, security concerns are likely to
focus on the capacity of communities to meet the basic
This report offers the concept of community
needs of their inhabitants and to become more resilient.
security as a catalyst for a broader and more
The introduction of the “community” dimension to this
North-centric conversation about security.
important security discourse demonstrates the need for a
more comprehensive assessment of security in Canada’s
North. Such an assessment should—at the minimum—
T
he current discourse on security in Canada’s include the following key elements:
North, though colourful, is incomplete. The Arctic Security—the legal and geostrategic challenges
media contribute to this phenomenon by focus- that influence Canada’s security posture and policy
ing their attention largely on a limited number of issues, in the Arctic region and its ability to protect Arctic
such as Canadian Arctic sovereignty and militarization,1 territory, people, and environment from remote
Canada’s ability to monitor and control increased offshore threats and undesired influences;
economic activity,2 and dramatic Arctic search-and-rescue Northern Security—the resilience of people, infra-
missions.3 Further, media reports tend to focus exclusively structure, and the environment, and their protection
on issues related to the Arctic region, thereby neglecting from the widest possible range of threats and hazards
across the Greater North; and
1 Akin, “PM Renews ‘Use It or Lose It’ Vow.”
Community Security—the social, economic, political, and
physical capacity of a community to address threats to,
2 Boswell, “Environment, Sovereignty Focus of New Arctic
Marine Rules.” and fulfill opportunities for meeting, the basic needs of
3 Canadian Press, “Teen Hunter Trapped Alone.” its inhabitants and to become more resilient.
Find this report and other Conference Board research at www.e-library.ca

ii | Security in Canada’s North—November 2010
Arctic Security identify and analyze the specific threats faced by

Northerners, critical infrastructure in the North,
Arctic security is a thoroughly researched and generally and the Northern environment; and
well-understood concept. The efforts by various militaries determine the various regions’ ability to address
to increase and demonstrate their Arctic operating capabil- these threats.
ities are predominantly viewed as a symptom of military
due diligence, and the likelihood of armed conflict over
Arctic interests is deemed to be low. There are, however, More work is needed to deepen and broaden our
some important challenges facing Canada, including understanding of the community dimension of security
legal, economic, and geostrategic security concerns in Canada’s North.
and diplomatic challenges. Given the wide international
interest in the Arctic Ocean and the diversity of opinion
on Arctic sovereignty among major economic and military
powers, it is in Canada’s interest to: Community Security
promote the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the definitive Of the three principal concepts of security in Canada’s
mechanism to resolve remaining boundary North, that of community security is the least well
disputes in the Arctic region; understood. It is, however, the most relevant for
seek the support of international entities (such Northerners, who see the community—rather than
as the Arctic Council) for its Arctic policies; the individual, state, or the nation—as the most vital
pursue binding and coordinated Arctic shipping referent object of security. This report does not provide
regulations; a conclusive definition of the concept of community
cooperate with other Arctic countries to improve security or an exhaustive list of its component parts.
enforcement of shipping and environmental Rather, it offers the concept of community security as a
regulations; and catalyst for a broader and more North-centric conversa-
fulfill the promise of greater cooperation made tion about security (and safety). This concept is based on
to indigenous peoples across Canada’s North conversations and interviews with Northerners as part of
and the wider Arctic region. several research projects conducted by the Centre for the
North. “Community security” includes the capacity of a
community to recognize and address threats to, and to
Northern Security fulfill opportunities for meeting, its inhabitants’ basic
needs and developing a basic level of resiliency. This
Northern security is not as well understood. Specifically, report gives only a rudimentary description of the con-
there is a lack of knowledge about the threats and cept. More work is needed to deepen and broaden our
vulnerabilities within the various regions of the North, understanding of the community dimension of security
particularly in light of the increase in economic activity. in Canada’s North. Specifically, the development of a
We need to know more about the threats and vulnerabil- set of clear indicators that assess the security needs,
ities associated with the medium- and long-term conse- capacity, and resilience of a given community would
quences of climate change, industrial accidents and other allow for better understanding of the concept. With
man-made disasters on land and at sea, organized crime, this understanding in place, decision-makers in the
terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, and natural dis- North would be better equipped to address the threats
asters. As a first step, Canada should: to their communities.
undertake dedicated and comprehensive threat
assessments in the various regions of the North;

Chapter 1
Introduction
of Northerners and the local context of their culture,
Chapter Summary socio-economic development, and environment. As
The three basic elements of security in Canada’s a first step toward remedying this perceived gap, the
North are Arctic security, Northern security, and Centre members commissioned a foundational research
community security. project designed to identify:
the main elements of a more comprehensive picture
The debate about security in the North cannot of security, as it relates to Canada’s North;
be complete without adequate consideration of gaps in our understanding of the issues; and
the distinct perspectives of Northerners and the opportunities for increasing our understanding as it
local context of their culture, socio-economic relates to each element.
development, and environment.
This report is based on numerous interviews The report is based on an extensive literature review;
with public and private sector individuals interviews with key public officials, academics, and
from communities across the Greater North. numerous interviews with other public and private
sector executives, both within and outside the North;
and numerous interviews with public and private sector
M
any Canadians have only a limited under- individuals from communities across the Greater North.
standing of the security issues facing The findings are compelling and provide ample cause
Canada’s North. And what understanding and motivation for further research by the Centre for
they do have is formed primarily by media reports that the North and others.
tend to focus on a limited number of issues (such as
potential military disputes over the Arctic and its The three basic elements of security in Canada’s North,
resources). The geographic scope of discussions on as identified in this report, are Arctic security, Northern
the North also tends to be limited to the Arctic. Many security, and community security. On one side we have
issues of significance to the three territories—Yukon, the the sovereignty-related challenges—Arctic security; on
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut—and the Northern the other, the widely held concerns among Northerners
regions of several provinces are excluded. about the sustainability and resiliency of communities—
community security. In between lies Northern security—
The members of The Conference Board of Canada’s the need to improve the resilience of people and
Centre for the North firmly believe that the debate protect them—as well as critical infrastructure and
about security in the North cannot be complete without the environment—from the widest possible range of
adequate consideration of the distinct perspectives threats and hazards across the Greater North.

Chapter 2
Canada’s Security and the Arctic

The disagreements over the extent of sovereignty rights
Chapter Summary in the Arctic are fuelled to a large degree by concerns
over economic security. Arctic and non-Arctic states are
The international governance structure for
asserting their interest in securing free access to northern
the Arctic region is only in its infancy.
navigation routes that connect the Atlantic and Pacific
The Northwest Passage could eventually oceans and in claiming rights to the natural resources of
provide a shorter route for international the Arctic Ocean.
shipping than currently exists, but the risks
and costs could outweigh the benefits over
the foreseeable future. The international governance structure for the Arctic
region is only in its infancy.
Canada’s economic security could be affected
by the outcome of legal disputes concerning
sovereign rights over natural resources above
The legal mechanism established under the United Nations
and below the seabed of the Arctic Ocean.
Convention on the Law of the Sea1 for claims relative
Climate change is one of the most pervasive to the Arctic Ocean is expected to eventually resolve most
threats in the North—one that will stretch of the boundary issues that exist today.2 The results may
the capacity of individual organizations and not, in all cases, come out in Canada’s favour.3
jurisdictions to respond to the security and
safety-related consequences. Furthermore, the international governance structure for
the Arctic region is only in its infancy. The existing
Arctic shipping guidelines of the International Maritime
T
he geostrategic importance of the Arctic has Organization are non-binding, as are the statements of
increased in recent years as the region has
become more accessible and as vast natural
resources have been discovered beneath the Arctic
Ocean seabed. Geostrategic concerns now range from 1 United Nations “Convention on the Law of the Sea” [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
climate change and energy security to environmental
2 For more information, see International Boundaries Research Unit,
protection and the potential of foreign militaries—or Durham University, “Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries.”
even international terrorists and criminal groups—to 3 Kraska, “International Law and International Security in the
operate freely across the Arctic region. Northwest Passage.”

The Conference Board of Canada | 3
the Arctic Council. The five nations that share the Arctic
shelf (Russia, Denmark, Norway, the United States, and Exhibit 1
Canada) have shown little interest in broadening the Northern Routes Shorten Shipping Distances
mandate of the Council to include military and security
matters, or to expand its membership; and they oppose
the creation of any alternative or additional multilateral
rule-making bodies.
It remains to be seen whether current approaches and

institutions can provide effective solutions to traditional,
economic, and environmental security challenges based on
a meaningful representation of legitimate interests of the
international community and Arctic indigenous peoples.
Source: Hugo Alenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal.
Sovereignty-Related Considerations
Sovereignty and its component parts (e.g., jurisdiction)
can be defined as the (legal) competence of states in
The Northwest Passage, a term used to describe a set of
respect of a particular territory (i.e., land area, airspace,
navigation routes linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans
and territorial sea).5 It is the prerequisite for the provision
via the Canadian archipelago, could eventually shorten
of basic security, as it establishes the international recog-
the maritime routes between major commercial centres.
nition of a state’s authority over a given territory and the
But the risks of navigating the Arctic seas and the high
associated respect for its terrestrial borders and maritime
cost of ice-capable ships could outweigh the benefits
boundaries. Once established, state sovereignty comes
over the foreseeable future.4 (See Exhibit 1.)
with a duty to provide security for the people who
occupy the land.6
Once established, state sovereignty comes with a duty to

Sovereignty Over Arctic Islands
provide security for the people who occupy the land.
Canada bases its sovereignty over its Arctic islands (the
Canadian Arctic archipelago) on arguments of historic
title and possession, including:
The Arctic Ocean and land mass represent a huge ter-
the acquisition of “Rupert’s Land and the North
ritory with an abundance of coveted natural resources
Western Territory” from the Hudson’s Bay Company
(including oil, gas, metals, minerals, timber, and fish)
in 1870;
that are becoming increasingly accessible due to the
the transfer of “all British possessions on the American
warming effects of climate change and advances
continent not hitherto annexed to any colony” by the
in exploration and exploitation technology. Rising
United Kingdom in 1880; and
prices for metals, minerals, and hydrocarbons provide
the “presence of Inuit and other indigenous peoples
an additional incentive for Arctic and non-Arctic states
since time immemorial” and their self-determined
to direct their attention to this region, and for Arctic
will to be governed by Canada.7
coastal states to determine, seek formal recognition
of, and assert their sovereign rights in the Arctic.
5 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 107–08.
6 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility to Protect, para. 2.15.
7 Côté and Dufresne, The Arctic: Canada’s Legal Claims; Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on Canada’s
4 Ebinger and Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt.” Arctic Foreign Policy.

4 | Security in Canada’s North—November 2010
Currently, there are no direct threats to Canada’s sover- The “straight baseline” method that determines the extent
eignty and jurisdiction related to the land areas of the of internal waters is defined in Article 7 of the United
Canadian Arctic archipelago, with the exception of Hans Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
Island. Although this dispute with Denmark appears to be which also determines that states can exercise the same
headed toward a cooperative agreement,8 neither country sovereignty rights (i.e., unqualified sovereignty) over
has so far abandoned its claim to the island. their so defined internal waters as they exercise over
their land territory. This interpretation would allow
Sovereignty Over Arctic Waters Canada to decide which vessels would be allowed to
An issue that requires closer examination is that of the navigate through the Passage (see Exhibit 2) and give
extent of Canada’s sovereign rights over marine territory— Canada the power to bar unwanted aircraft from entering
above and below the seabed. “This includes the waters the airspace above the Passage. It would also give Canada
off the Canadian Arctic coasts—especially the Northwest the sovereign right to adopt and enforce laws and regula-
Passage, a set of waterways through the Canadian Arctic tions as it deems appropriate, such as those enshrined in
Archipelago—as well as the submerged parts that form the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) and
the continental shelf, and particularly the continental shelf the regulations that formally established the Northern
beyond 200 nautical miles,” says Kristin Bartenstein, a Canada Vessel Traffic Services (NORDREG) Zone10
professor of international law in the Faculty of Law at under the Canada Shipping Act. The latter requires all
the University of Laval.9 foreign vessels that travel through the Passage and the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago to register with and provide
In particular, there are countries that take legal positions information to the Canadian Coast Guard.11
that, if validated, would prevent Canada from:
interdicting navigation by unwanted vessels through
its Arctic waters or the overflight of unwanted aircraft What is under dispute is to what degree Canada’s
through its Arctic airspace; sovereignty is limited by international law and the
freely enacting and enforcing laws that address rights of others.
the risks of increased commercial and military
navigation and other activity in parts of the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago; and Some states, most notably those of the European
exploring and exploiting natural resources in a Union,12 hold the legal opinion that the “Northwest
promising section of the Beaufort Sea and on Passage” through the Canadian archipelago is simply
the seabed of parts of the Lomonosov Ridge. part of Canada’s territorial sea and does not qualify as
internal waters. According to this interpretation, Canada
Northwest Passage would have to respect the right of “innocent passage” of
In principle, Canada’s sovereignty over the waters that foreign vessels and the extent of its authority to regulate
make up the Northwest Passage in the Canadian Arctic activity in this area would be prescribed by Article 21
Archipelago is undisputed. What is under dispute, (“Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to
however, is to what degree Canada’s sovereignty is innocent passage”) of UNCLOS.13
limited by international law and the rights of others.
Canada deems the waters between its Arctic islands to

be “internal waters,” based on a theoretical line drawn
10 Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations.
around the outer limits of the Canadian archipelago.
11 Boswell, “Environment, Sovereignty Focus of New Arctic
Marine Rules.”
8 Donat Pharand. In-person interview with The Conference Board 12 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From
of Canada. April 12, 2010. the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.
9 Bartenstein, “Use It or Lose It.” 13 UNCLOS, part II, s. 3, “Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea.”

Exhibit 2
Shipping Routes Through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago
RUSSIA
ARCTIC OCEAN
Chukchi Sea
Bering Sea ICELAND

GREENLAND
Beaufort Sea
ALASKA Baffin Bay

(USA)
Gulf of
Alaska
CANADA
Labrador Sea
Legend
Arctic Circle Hudson Bay
Shipping routes
Source: geology.com.
The United States, which has not yet ratified UNCLOS, (“Laws and regulations of States bordering straits relating
also contests the legality of the baselines drawn by to transit passage”) of UNCLOS. Most legal experts agree
Canada, and it further claims that the territorial sea of the that customary international law would require that the
Canadian archipelago includes an “international strait.” Northwest Passage be used as an international shipping
UNCLOS defines an international strait as a connection route before it can be deemed an international strait. Very
between two parts of the high seas (or exclusive economic few ships have made the transit, so that requirement has
zones). Classifying the Northwest Passage as an inter- probably not been fulfilled. However, the warming effects
national strait would give any country the right of transit of climate change may in time change that situation. In
passage14—including free navigation and overflight any case, the U.S. disagrees with most experts on this
for their militaries—thereby constraining even further point and interprets customary law in such a way that
Canada’s rights to regulate activity and increasing the the Northwest Passage requires only the “potential” to
freedom of use for other countries. Canada would only be used as an international shipping route in order to be
have the prescriptive jurisdiction defined in Article 42 deemed an international strait.
14 UNCLOS, part III, s. 2, “Transit Passage.”

Another difference among legal experts concerns the Canada’s claimed exclusive economic zone is stated in
Northwest Passage and the applicability and scope of section 13 of the country’s Oceans Act. The rights con-
Article 234 (“Ice-covered areas”) of the Law of the Sea ferred upon Canada in the EEZ, based on its continental
Convention. This provision was inspired by Canada’s shelf, include:
AWPPA15 and gives coastal states the right to:
. . . sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
. . . adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and exploiting, conserving and managing the nat-
and regulations for the prevention, reduction, and ural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
control of marine pollution from vessels in ice- waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed
covered areas within the limits of the exclusive and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities
economic zone, where particularly severe climatic for the economic exploitation and exploration of
conditions and the presence of ice covering such the zone, such as the production of energy from
areas for most of the year create obstructions or the water, currents, and winds.18
exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution
of the marine environment could cause major The economic impacts arising from such sovereign rights
harm to or irreversible disturbance of the eco- over resources in the EEZ cannot be underestimated. One
logical balance. has only to look at the petroleum development off the
coast of Newfoundland19 to appreciate the historical,
The applicability of AWPPA in the Canadian archipelago current, and potential future economic importance of
is therefore supported by Article 234 (“Ice-covered areas”) such rights.
of UNCLOS, but the warming effects of climate change
may make the provision relatively unreliable in the future,
as it applies only to areas that are covered by ice “for Both the U.S. and Canada claim the same territory north
most of the year.” The United States argues that of the Alaska–Yukon border as their territorial seas and
Article 234 does not apply to international straits, exclusive economic zones.
and it therefore asserts the right of unfettered transit
passage and rejects Canada’s right to enact regulations
under Article 234 for the set of waterways that make up There is an ongoing disagreement between Canada and
the Northwest Passage.16 the U.S. over their common maritime boundary in the
Beaufort Sea. Canada argues that the boundary follows
the 141st meridian of longitude, which is an extension
The Delimitation of Maritime of the Alaska–Yukon border. The U.S., however, says the
Boundaries boundary is farther east along a line drawn equidistant
between two headlands jutting northward into the Beaufort
Exclusive Economic Zone Sea. (See Exhibit 3.) Both countries claim the territory
Canada’s sovereign rights to the natural resources of between these two lines as part of their territorial seas and
the Arctic Ocean and its seabed derive mainly from the exclusive economic zones—mainly because initial studies
recognition in UNCLOS of the right of coastal states to suggest that the seabed in the disputed region is rich with
enforce an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) based on their oil and gas reserves. Both sides have issued exploration
continental shelf but which can extend no further than licences for the area.20
200 nautical miles from a defined coastal baseline.17
15 European Commission—Maritime Affairs and Fisheries,

Legal Aspects of Arctic Shipping. 18 UNCLOS, part V, art. 66, para. 1.
16 See earlier section, “Northwest Passage.” 19 Newfoundland and Labrador, Petroleum Development.
17 UNCLOS, part V. 20 Boswell, “Canada Non-Committal Over U.S. Position.”

Extended Continental Shelf

Arctic coastal states (Canada, United States, Russia, Exhibit 3
Denmark, and Norway) are carrying out research to Disputed Waters in the Beaufort Sea
determine if they can gain additional sovereign rights in
RUSSIA ARCTIC OCEAN
the Arctic Ocean beyond 200 nautical miles. Under the
UNCLOS legal regime, it is possible to claim such rights Chukchi
Sea
based on extended continental shelves up to a maximum
range of 350 miles. Countries must submit evidence sup-
Bering Sea Disputed
porting their claims to the dedicated Commission on the waters
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).21 Their claims,
if validated, will allow them to explore and exploit the
Beaufort
resources of the seabed and subsoil of their extended ALASKA Sea
(USA)
continental shelf but not, however, the marine life above
the seabed. Canada’s continental shelf (beyond the EEZ)
is estimated by Natural Resources Canada to represent
YUKON
“an area of about 1.5 million square kilometres on the CANADA
Atlantic and Arctic coasts.”22 Gulf of
Alaska NUNAVUT
NORTHWEST
Legend TERRITORIES
International boundaries
Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2003 and therefore has until 200-nautical mile
limit (370 km)
2013 to submit scientific, technical, and legal details
substantiating claims to an extended continental shelf.
Source: Ottawa Citizen.
Russia, Denmark, and Canada all have a keen interest in

the Lomonosov Ridge which is an undersea mountain been engaged in extensive geological research. Canada
chain stretching across the North Pole from Ellesmere and Denmark collaborated on their geological research
Island to central Siberia. This ridge is believed to contain in 2007, and Canada and the United States did so in
vast reserves of hydrocarbons that could be developed 2008 and 2009.23 Their claims, however, are likely to
in the future. All three countries have signed UNCLOS, conflict—with each other’s and with the Russian claim.
and now they have to stake claims to their portions of the
ridge based on their continental shelves. Countries have Geostrategic Considerations
10 years from the coming into force of UNCLOS to sub- Geostrategic considerations play a key role in determining
mit their claims. Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2003 and Canada’s challenges with respect to security in the Arctic,
therefore has until 2013 to submit scientific, technical, and they also help to explain some of the opposition to
and legal details substantiating its claims. Denmark must Canada’s legal and policy positions. For example, foreign
submit in 2014, while Russia has until 2011 to resubmit submarines could travel freely and submerged through the
its claims. Russia was quick to submit a claim in 2001, but Northwest Passage if certain legal positions on Canada’s
the CLCS was not satisfied with the scientific evidence sovereign rights in the Arctic Ocean are not validated and
and asked Russia to resubmit. Since then, Russia has enforcement capabilities are not put in place. While this
kind of unfettered foreign military access to the waters
of the Northwest Passage (and its airspace) may not have
21 UNCLOS, part VI, art. 76, para. 8. Submissions made so far can
be accessed on the Commission’s website at www.un.org/depts/
los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.
23 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Canada’s Submission to
22 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Canada’s Ocean Estate.” the Commission.”

a direct effect on the security of the Arctic population In addition, Donat Pharand—Professor Emeritus of
in particular, it could affect the strategic position of International Law at the University of Ottawa and
Canada’s military and its allies. In recognition of the a founding member of the Canadian Council on
growing need for a military presence and effective International Law—emphasizes that “Canada’s exclusive
monitoring in the North, Norway has already moved control of all the waters of its archipelago could constitute
its military operations centre from a southern location an important contribution to the fight against international
near Stavenger to Reitan in the north of the country.24 terrorism.”26 He believes that “unrestricted freedom of
This confirms the region’s strategic importance not navigation [in the Northwest Passage] could well bring
only to Norway, but also to NATO. dangerous visitors and catastrophic consequences . . . .”27
Canada’s economic security is another factor in geo-

strategic considerations that could be affected by the In 2008, a Russian expedition team made headlines in
outcome of the legal disputes concerning sovereign rights Canada and around the world by placing a Russian flag
over natural resources above and below the seabed of the on the seabed at the North Pole.
Arctic Ocean. For the private sector, however, “the key
factors are costs of development and the price cycle of
oil and gas,” as most of the reserves lie in existing and Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark (via
recognized exclusive economic zones.25 At this point, Greenland), and Norway (via the Spitsbergen, or
the motivation in the oil and gas community to develop Svalbard, Archipelago) all have Arctic lands bordering
known Arctic reserves (on land and at sea) is low given on the Arctic Ocean. These Arctic coastal states are often
the existence of more cost-effective alternatives, both in referred to as the “Arctic Five.” (See Exhibit 4.) They
North America and abroad. While licence applications are the only countries that can lay claim to extended
may be filed and certain exploration projects undertaken, continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean, and all are now
significant development activity does not seem to be on engaged in determining their rights and territorial bound-
the horizon just yet. aries in the Arctic Ocean. All five have developed dedi-
cated Arctic policies and have begun to strengthen their
military capabilities in the North to varying degrees.28
Licence applications may be filed and certain exploration
projects undertaken, but significant oil and gas development Russia has significant economic and national security
activity does not seem to be on the horizon just yet. interests in the Arctic. In 2008, a Russian expedition
team made headlines in Canada and around the world
by placing a Russian flag on the seabed at the North
Canada also hopes to benefit from potential commercial Pole; and Russia regularly conducts long-range bomber
shipping in the area, but the size of the benefit will depend exercises near Canadian airspace in the Arctic. Both
on the extent of its sovereign rights over the territory and Russia and the United States occasionally move to
the cost-risk-benefit assessment of shipping companies demonstrate their operational capabilities in the High
that could lead to decisions against using the hazardous Arctic by conducting exercises involving planes, ships,
and largely uncharted northern navigation routes. and submarines. The Arctic waters are important to
26 Pharand, “Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty,” 5.

24 Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 121–22. 27 Ibid.
25 Yalowitz and others, The Arctic Climate Change and Security 28 For an assessment and overview of recent developments
Policy Conference, 13; Potts and Schofield, “Current Legal among the Arctic Five, see Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic
Developments.” Quoted in Ebinger and Zambetakis, “The Interests in the Arctic. See also Emmerson, The Future History
Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” 1221. of the Arctic, 122–24.

Russia’s nuclear deterrent, which relies heavily on its

nuclear submarines and has grown increasingly significant Exhibit 4
as the country’s conventional capabilities have diminished. Five Countries Border Arctic Ocean
Furthermore, Russia views the Arctic as its most important
strategic (economic) resource base29; it asserts exclusive
jurisdiction over the Northeast Passage, and it lays claim
to the entire Lomonosov Ridge.
Freedom of navigation and overflight is the point on which

the U.S. and Canadian positions most significantly diverge.
Canada and the United States share a strategic interest

in the Arctic, which is illustrated by their successful and
recently broadened30 partnership in NORAD, the joint
North American Aerospace and Defence Command. The
United States recognizes the significance of the Arctic for
its energy security and the need for balancing its economic
and environmental interests.31 But it also has a number
of “hard” security interests in the Arctic, including
“missile defence and early warning, deployment of sea
and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence,
maritime presence, and maritime security operations;
Source: Hugo Alenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal.
and ensuring the freedom of navigation and oversight.”32
It is the last point—freedom of navigation and overflight—
on which the U.S. and Canadian positions most signifi- the Northwest Passage is an international strait runs
cantly diverge, with Canada insisting that the waters counter to efforts to ensure the security of North America,
of the Northwest Passage are internal and subject to as it prevents the United States’ neighbour and trusted
Canadian sovereign control. ally, Canada, from effectively controlling access to the
North American continent. Paskal says the U.S. position
Cleo Paskal, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House is based on commercial interests.35 Others argue that it is
in London,33 and a recent Canadian Senate Committee mainly military interests that determine the United States’
report34 both argue that the current U.S. position that position. They say Washington’s efforts to have the
Northwest Passage deemed an international strait
bolsters U.S. claims to the right to freely use straits
29 The “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Until and channels around the world for navigation and
2020 (NSS)” was announced on May 13, 2009. It is cited in overflight by its military.36
Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic.
30 In 2006, a maritime warning element was added to NORAD’s
surveillance capability. Non-Arctic states have also intensified their efforts to
define their concerns and assert their interests in the
31 Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic.
Arctic region, which range from climate change and
32 The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 66
and Homeland Security Directive 25.
33 Paskal, Global Warring, 123. 35 Paskal, Global Warring, 124.
34 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling 36 Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, “The Question of
Canada’s Arctic Waters. Sovereignty.”

environmental pollution to international trade and security. Linda Jakobson, an international expert on security in the
Most non-Arctic states share the position that no country Asia-Pacific region, expects export-dependent China to
or group of countries (i.e., the Arctic Five) should have intensify its engagement in political discussions about the
sovereignty over the Arctic Ocean and that any newly Arctic and to assert its claims to the right of free passage
opened routes through the Arctic Ocean should be free and resource extraction in the Arctic Ocean in the near
for all countries to use.37 One of the legal arguments future.43 Other trading nations, such as Taiwan and
brought forward is that much of the seabed of the Arctic India, stand to benefit from Arctic shipping routes, as
Ocean should be considered international and designated does South Korea where many ice-capable vessels are
a “common heritage of mankind” under the Declaration of built.44 In addition to its interest in new trade routes,
Principles Governing the Seabed38 and UNCLOS.39 This Japan is looking to secure international fishing rights
would mean that no state could exercise sovereignty over for its fisheries’ industry, which depends to a significant
this area and that any exploitation of resources would have degree on fishing in waters far from home and therefore
to be carried out “for the benefit of mankind as a whole.”40 the right of access to international waters.
One of the legal arguments is that much of the seabed of Arctic Geopolitics: Diplomacy
the Arctic Ocean should be considered international and and Military Might
designated a “common heritage of mankind.”
Canada has made the enhancement of the strategic
and operational capabilities of its three militaries in the
The European Union’s High Representative for Arctic a priority, as evidenced by a number of funding
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the announcements.45 In August 2010, Canada held a military
Commission have clearly stated the EU’s economic and exercise—“Operation Nanook”—in the Arctic. According
security interests in the Arctic: “There is an increasing to Defence Minister Peter MacKay, the main objective
need to address the growing debate over territorial claims was to assert Canada’s sovereignty in the North.46
and access to new trade routes by different countries [that]
challenge Europe’s ability to effectively secure its trade Rob Huebert, an Associate Professor of Political Science
and resource interests in the region and may put pressure at the University of Calgary and Arctic security expert,
on its relations with key partners.”41 The Commission says he is concerned about the increasingly serious tone
concludes that, “On the whole, Arctic challenges and heard from defence and foreign affairs organizations in
opportunities will have significant repercussions on the Arctic countries. He notes that these countries are con-
life of European citizens for generations to come.”42 ducting more Arctic military exercises and enhancing
their Arctic military capabilities.47 Michael Byers, a
professor of law at the University of British Columbia,
interprets this military buildup as a response “to the
37 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 2; constabulary responsibilities that come with a newly
Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic. opened coastline” rather than “a military buildup that’s
38 United Nations General Assembly, 2749 (XXV).
39 UNCLOS, part XI, art. 136. (The United Nations Convention on
43 Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic.
the Law of the Sea was opened for signing on December 10, 1982.
UNCLOS would take effect when at least 60 countries had ratified 44 Ebinger and Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt.”
the agreement. That occurred on November 16, 1994, when
45 Government of Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy—Our North,
Guyana became the 60th state to sign on to UNCLOS.)
Our Heritage, Our Future, 10; Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime
40 UNCLOS, part XI, art. 140. Minister Announces Expansion.”
41 European Council, “Climate Change and International Security.” 46 CBC News, “Operation Nanook Continues in Pond Inlet.”
42 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From 47 Robert Huebert. In-person interview with The Conference Board
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 2. of Canada. April 8, 2010.

directed at state threats in the Arctic.” Nevertheless, the five Arctic coastal states issued the Ilulissat
he cautions that if “. . . you talk about [the risk of] conflict, Declaration. The document expressed their commitment
it can become self-fulfilling.”48 On the other hand, Huebert to the legal framework that governs the Arctic Ocean,
argues that “if you refuse to react to what your neighbours promised cooperation on Arctic issues with each other
are doing in terms of a buildup, you risk leaving yourself and other states, and committed themselves to the “orderly
vulnerable in future disagreements and conflicts.”49 settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”53
Despite some occasional rhetoric suggesting otherwise,

Canada’s military is not particularly concerned about Significant divergence of interests exists between Arctic
Russia’s efforts to increase its Arctic military capacity.50 and non-Arctic states.
In general, the Russian efforts are viewed as part of mil-
itary due diligence among the Arctic Five to be prepared
to operate in the Arctic environment and to maintain a In August 2010, Canada released a statement on Arctic
balance of military power between East and West. In fact, foreign policy in which it identified the engaging of
in August 2010, Canadian and U.S. Air Force personnel— neighbours to seek to resolve boundary issues as a
under NORAD—conducted their first-ever joint exercise focus area for its international efforts.54 The United
with the Russian Federation Air Force designed to deal States government has expressed its commitment to
with international air-terrorism. “strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight
Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden)” and
It is not the military attack that planners are most “to continue to cooperate with other countries on Arctic
worried about but the loss of control over strategic issues.”55 In September 2010, Russia and Norway con-
navigation routes, infrastructures, and energy reserves. cluded an agreement on the maritime boundary in the
Barents Sea, ending a dispute that had lasted 40 years.56
The militaries of the Arctic Five continue to train with While the member states of the Arctic Council seem
the goal of improving their ability to respond to Arctic to be moving toward greater cooperation, significant
security threats. But the scenarios chosen for these divergence of interests exists between Arctic and non-
training exercises tend not to be based on any military Arctic states over the accessibility of the Arctic Ocean
confrontation; instead, they are based on the potential and its seabed, regulation of navigation and economic
need for armed forces to respond to terrorist attacks, activity, and the question of how the Arctic region
sabotage, disasters, or various types of non-military should be governed. Some observers predict that this
sovereignty challenges.51 It is not the military attack could lead to serious diplomatic confrontations once the
that planners are most worried about—it is the loss of climatic, technological, economic, and legal conditions
control over strategic navigation routes, infrastructure, are right for allowing countries to fully capitalize on the
and energy reserves.52 opportunities in the Arctic.57
Past state behaviour suggests that the likelihood of Arctic

coastal states resorting to armed confrontation over
boundary disputes in the Arctic region is low. In 2008,
53 Arctic Ocean Conference, “The Ilulissat Declaration.”
54 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on
48 Canadian Press, “Arctic Sees Military Buildup.”
Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.
49 Huebert, in-person interview.
55 The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 66 and
50 Canadian Press, “Russia’s Arctic Policy No Cause for Alarm.” Homeland Security Directive 25.
51 Rice, “Four Selected Intrusion Scenarios,” 65–78. 56 Harding, “Russia and Norway Resolve Arctic Border Dispute.”
52 Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 124. 57 Ebinger and Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt.”

Arctic Governance and Cooperation members have tended to oppose any changes to the
Council’s mandate,60 and they have been reluctant to
Existing governance arrangements (such as those pro- negotiate a dedicated international regime for the Arctic
vided through the Arctic Council and the International as has been proposed by some non-Arctic countries.
Maritime Organization) are deficient in that they lack the The Ilulissat Declaration in particular underlines the
capacity to produce binding rules that can be enforced. fact that the Arctic Five see no need for a new inter-
national regime.61
The Arctic Council is the only intergovernmental forum
that brings together the eight “Arctic” member states
(Norway [Svalbard Islands/Spitsbergen], Denmark Most Arctic Council members have tended to oppose any
[Greenland], Iceland, Sweden, Canada, Russia, the changes to the Council’s mandate.
United States, and Finland) specifically to examine and
discuss Arctic issues. The Council is also the only forum
where Arctic indigenous associations and representatives The Arctic Council’s 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping
can participate in such high-level discussions. Assessment62 includes recommendations for harmon-
ized regulations and technology transfer between Arctic
However, the ability of the Arctic Council to deal effect- states and across the Arctic region. However, in many
ively with current and future disputes in the region is areas, binding agreements and resource commitments
questionable—mainly because its consensus-based reso- are still missing. The guidelines for ships operating in
lutions are non-binding and the mandate of the Council Arctic ice-covered waters, prepared by the International
does not allow members to address security issues. The Maritime Organization,63 are less stringent than the
Council has also been criticized for excluding “nations rules that Canada envisages for the waterways of the
with legitimate interests.”58 China recently asked to be Northwest Passage, are recommendatory in nature, and
granted permanent observer status59 but was turned down have been criticized for a number of shortcomings.64
(as were the European Union, South Korea, and Italy). Donald McRae, law professor at the University of Ottawa
The current permanent observers are France, Germany, and an expert on the Arctic, calls on Arctic nations to
Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and agree on a consistent set of stringent and enforceable
a number of international and non-governmental organiz- rules and regulations to manage the security, public
ations. China, Italy, and South Korea continue to hold the safety, and environmental risks of economic activity—
status of ad hoc observers and must ask for permission to such as shipping, fishing, and oil exploration—in the
attend meetings that they are interested in. Arctic Ocean.65 The lack of consistent environmental
60 For Canada’s position, see Foreign Affairs and International Trade

The ability of the Arctic Council to deal effectively with
Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 23–25.
current and future disputes in the region is questionable. For the U.S. position, see The White House, National Security
Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Directive 25.
61 Arctic Ocean Conference, “The Ilulissat Declaration.”
While the Arctic Council members realize that many of 62 Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report.
the transnational issues in the Arctic require cooperation 63 International Maritime Organization, Guidelines for Ships Operating
with other Arctic and non-Arctic countries, most Council in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters.
64 VanderZwaag and others, Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping,
19.
58 Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic, 14.
65 Don McRae. In-person interview with The Conference Board of
59 Schiller, “China Warming Up to Be an Arctic Player.“ Canada. April 14, 2010.

protection standards has already raised concerns about worded Arctic foreign policy statement that favours
the expected increase in offshore drilling and the potential “agreements” and “coordination” among the Arctic
for oil spills to travel across international boundaries.66 Five and relegates cooperation with other countries
and forums to the domain of non-committal “dialogue”
Canada would benefit from taking a regional and and “research.” The policy takes a three-pronged
cooperative approach to providing safety and environ- approach to Arctic governance, which includes:
mental protection in the Arctic Ocean—common rules bilateral negotiations (particularly with the
would ensure a consistent level of protection across all U.S.) on issues of common interest;
areas of the Arctic Ocean67 and enable the more effect- agreement and policy coordination among the
ive and efficient use of expensive resources, such as Arctic Five; and
ice-breakers, surveillance aircraft, and satellite-based policy dialogue, development of guidelines on
observation systems. A promising step in this direction select topics, and research through the Arctic
has been the negotiations among Arctic Council member Council and other multilateral institutions.70
states on a regional search-and-rescue agreement, which
Russia said it expected to be signed in the spring of Cooperation with indigenous peoples who have
2011.68 Canadian Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson says, been living in the Arctic for generations is becoming
“There are national interests to be protected, but many of increasingly important—both for governments and
the challenges can only be fully addressed by all affected private enterprises that intend to seek out economic
parties working together to meet common goals, set com- opportunities in the Arctic. Respect for their cultures,
mon standards, and achieve a shared vision of security.”69 recognition of their traditional ways of life (including
subsistence hunting), and respect for self-government
rights are required to operationalize public policies and
Cooperation with indigenous peoples who have business strategies. Indeed, the right of indigenous peoples
been living in the Arctic for generations is becoming to consultation on matters that can affect their culture and
increasingly important. traditional way of life is increasingly being recognized
by the courts. In the summer of 2010, for example, the
Nunavut Court of Justice granted an injunction against a
In the context of wide international interest in the seismic testing project that could have affected the trad-
Arctic Ocean and the diversity of opinion between itional hunting grounds of five indigenous communities.
major economic and military powers around the world, The court based its decision not only on the potential
it is in Canada’s interest to promote the United Nations loss of marine mammals as a traditional food source,
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the but also on the potential “loss of culture.”71 The Inuit
definitive mechanism to resolve remaining boundary in Greenland, Northern Canada, Alaska, and Chukotka
disputes in the Arctic region; seek support for its (Russia)—through the Circumpolar Council—made a
Arctic policies in international entities, such as the declaration on Arctic sovereignty in April 2009 that
Arctic Council; pursue binding and coordinated Arctic asserted their rights under the United Nations
shipping regulations; and cooperate with other Arctic Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
countries to improve enforcement of environmental (UNDRIP)72 to “freely determine [their] political
regulations. In August 2010, Canada released a carefully status, freely pursue [their] economic, social, cultural,
70 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on

66 CBC News, “Oil Spill Raises Arctic Offshore Drilling Concerns.”
Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.
67 Granatstein, “Does the Northwest Passage Still Matter?”
71 Qikiqtani Inuit Association v. Canada (Minister of Natural
68 BarentsObserver.com, “Arctic Countries to Sign Joint Agreement.” Resources).
69 Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson. Phone interview with The 72 United Nations, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Conference Board of Canada. April 12, 2010. Indigenous Peoples.”

and linguistic development, and freely dispose of [their] In 2007, Russia and Norway signed the Treaty Between
natural wealth and resources.”73 The Circumpolar the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation
Council represents all Inuit peoples across the Arctic at Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation
the Arctic Council, where it holds the status of permanent in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean.76 And in
participant. The Declaration on the Establishment of the September 2010, the foreign ministers of the two
Arctic Council (The Ottawa Declaration, 1997) provides nations outlined the lessons and experiences provided
that “the category of Permanent Participation is created by the treaty. In an opinion piece in a Canadian national
to provide for active participation and full consultation newspaper, they offered advice on how best to resolve
with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the maritime disputes, and they called for increased cooper-
Arctic Council.”74 While the Circumpolar Council ation.77 The ministers highlighted the Arctic Council
acknowledges that it has “a direct and meaningful seat” as an arena “where eight Arctic states meet at the pol-
at discussion and negotiating tables of the Arctic Council, itical and expert levels”—but they did not mention the
it says problems remain, including the following: indigenous peoples of the Arctic nor identify them as a
The rights of indigenous peoples receive insufficient necessary party to include in the “creative discussions
mention in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration made by that are required to reach solutions.” There is an oppor-
the five Arctic coastal states. tunity for Canada to foster greater cooperation with
The discussions of Arctic sovereignty at the Arctic Arctic indigenous peoples and to open up the possibility
Council lack references “to existing international of using their unique traditional knowledge and expertise
instruments that promote and protect the rights of to create and implement more effective international
indigenous peoples.” norms and agreements.78
The Arctic Five have “neglected to include Inuit in
Arctic sovereignty discussions in a manner compar-
able to Arctic Council deliberations.”75
73 Inuit Circumpolar Council, A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on

Sovereignty in the Arctic. 76 Government of Norway, Treaty Between the Kingdom of Norway
and the Russian Federation.
74 Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic
Council.” 77 Lavrov and Støre, “Canada, Take Note.”
75 Inuit Circumpolar Council, A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on 78 In A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic,
Sovereignty in the Arctic. the Inuit expressed their readiness to partner with Arctic states.

Chapter 3
Northern Security
takes regional differences in the Greater North into
Chapter Summary account, examines all hazards, and considers the
linkages between economic development and security.
Northern security extends well beyond issues
related to Canada’s sovereignty. It includes the
protection of people, infrastructure, and the
Northern communities differ significantly in the maturity
environment against all hazards in Canada’s
of their socio-economic development.
Greater North.
Northerners are concerned that the security

implications of the effects of climate change Northern security extends well beyond issues related to
and the resulting broad range of economic Canada’s sovereignty. It includes the protection of people,
development activity have not been assessed infrastructure, and the environment against all hazards
in a comprehensive way. in Canada’s Greater North. It is also about mitigation,
emergency response, and recovery when major natural
Megaprojects and other types of economic
or human-caused incidences occur. While there are
development in the Greater North have
some threats—such as forest fires and floods—that are
brought valuable goods and money to the
well known, there are other threats—such as pandemics,
region—but have also resulted in a variety
industrial accidents, organized crime, illegal trafficking in
of illegal activities.
drugs and people, and (eco-)terrorism—whose particular
significance and consequences in the North are less well
known. Furthermore, there is a lack of understanding of
Security Challenges in the the vulnerabilities associated with these threats to critical
Greater North infrastructure (particularly energy-related infrastructure),
Northern communities, and the environment.
W
hile the existing and potential future
challenges to Canada’s sovereignty in Threats and Vulnerabilities
the Arctic have received a fair amount The Greater North is highly diverse in terms of geography
of attention and are relatively clear, other security and climate, and Northern communities differ significantly
challenges in the Greater North are not as well defined in the maturity of their socio-economic development and,
or understood. Canada would benefit greatly from a therefore, the nature of the threats that they face. Cities
comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment that that have benefited from resource development, such

as Fort McMurray, face different security threats than registered to a Russian company collided while attempting
smaller and more isolated communities, such as those to navigate the Northeast passage between Murmansk and
that lie at the northern edge of the Canadian Arctic. Chukotka in Russia’s Far East. They were under escort of
two Russian nuclear powered ice-breakers. While it was
Interviews with some 30 subject-matter experts and reported that there was no leakage of their loads of diesel
Northern leaders have shown that a comprehensive fuel, Russian officials conceded that the collision occurred
assessment of the security risks that could affect the in difficult ice conditions exacerbated by poor visibility.2
people, critical infrastructure, and the environment of Navigation in the Arctic is particularly challenging
the North continues to be lacking. This rings particularly because the region is not very well mapped and condi-
true with respect to the long-term consequences of climate tions keep changing, partly due to the fluctuation of
change and the potential effects of increasing economic extreme temperatures. Another example of the chal-
development activities on the security of Northerners lenges of navigating Arctic waters came in August
and their environment. 2010 when a cruise ship ran aground after hitting an
unmapped rock approximately 55 nautical miles west
of Kugluktuk, Nunavut.3
Climate Change and Security
Climate change has begun to reduce the environmental The increase in transit traffic is hard to predict, but shipping
impediments to operations in the North and sparked companies that already supply Northern communities can
private sector interest in exploring opportunities for be expected to pick up more business.
shipping, oil and gas, and mining. Northerners are
concerned that the security implications of the effects
of climate change and the resulting broad range of eco- The opening of the Northwest Passage due to melting sea
nomic development activity have not been assessed in a ice has some observers speculating that it might eventu-
comprehensive way. While the current (and some future ally become a viable navigation route for commercial
potential) effects are known and the implications relatively shipping, mainly because it is significantly shorter than
clear, others are less certain. currently used routes between major commercial centres.
However, a recent survey by Frédéric Lasserre of Laval
University suggests that international shipping companies
Navigation in the Arctic is particularly challenging—it is may not be as interested in using the Northwest Passage
not very well mapped and conditions keep changing. as these observers believe.4 Others have raised similar
doubts.5 The concrete increase in transit traffic is hard
to predict, but shipping companies that already supply
The warming effects of climate change on permafrost Northern communities can be expected to pick up more
soil have started to endanger the stability of pipelines business as economic activity on land increases.
and other essential infrastructure, such as roads that
connect Northern communities to the outside world The number of military naval vessels traversing the Arctic
or provide access to remote commercial facilities in Ocean is believed to be on the rise, given the strategic
the Greater North.1 importance of the region. The number of scientific mis-
sions and expeditions into the Arctic Ocean has already
Increased shipping in and through the Arctic would
inevitably lead to a greater probability of accidents, 2 BarentsObserver.com, “Arctic Oil Tankers Collided.”
pollution, and negative effects on marine life in the
3 Canadian Press, “Cruise Ship Exploring Northwest Passage
Arctic Ocean. On July 16, 2010, two ice-rated tankers Runs Aground.”
4 Weber, “Cold Shoulder: Little Shipping Interest in Ice-Free
Northwest Passage.”
1 Alfred Wegener Institute, “Will the Permafrost Soils in Alaska and
Siberia Thaw?” 5 Ebinger and Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt.”

started to increase. Cruise ships are increasingly sailing to provide security for their facilities, there is rarely any
to Arctic waters during summer months. Marine traffic adjustment to the policing reference level for the com-
to an increasing number of offshore infrastructures used munities in the vicinity of those facilities—no additional
for the exploration of oil and gas fields can be expected to funding is provided to address the increase in criminal
increase as well. Oil companies are considering invest- activity that comes with the new-found wealth.8
ments in the exploration of the Arctic seabed and have
applied for drilling licences in the Beaufort Sea and the Current and future economic development activities and
eastern Arctic waterway of the Davis Strait. Extracting opportunities include natural resource extraction, con-
oil and gas in the Arctic Ocean has particular challenges struction of various forms of infrastructure, and electricity
that have raised concern about an elevated potential for generation and transmission. Many of the projects that
accidents and oil spills that could be difficult to respond are currently under way or planned can be characterized
to and clean up.6 as “megaprojects” due to their size, the effort required to
bring them to operation, and the prospective high rate of
return on investment.
Rarely is additional funding provided to address
the increase in criminal activity that comes with
new-found wealth. The drug trade has become a significant problem in
Northern communities.
One of the greatest challenges of dealing with the con-

sequences of climate change and the implications of Megaprojects and other types of economic development
aggressive economic development in the North may prove in the Greater North have brought valuable goods and
to be the already limited capability of local and federal cash to the region but have also resulted in a variety
governments to respond to the threats they will increas- of illegal activities. Organized crime has arrived in
ingly face, and a lack of resources to properly respond to Northern communities, mainly in the form of street or
those threats. The expected increase in human activity in youth gangs based on those in the South. This criminal
the North, combined with the evolving effects of climate activity has gained from economic development, and
change, will make the public safety and emergency man- organized crime is focusing its recruitment efforts on the
agement resource gap an increasingly pressing concern.7 local youth and on residents of correctional facilities who
eventually will return to Northern communities. The drug
trade (involving, for example, the use of small planes for
Economic Development and Crime drop-in operations) has become a significant problem in
Northern communities.9
Across the Greater North, planned “megaprojects” and
other economic activities mean growth potential for the Smugglers and organized crime groups, such as human
participating companies and the promise of opportunity traffickers and drug dealers, may increasingly see access
for local communities. But these projects also increase to North America through the North as a business
the likelihood of criminal activity when Northern opportunity. The relative isolation of the many small
employees return home to their communities with sig- communities will be a deterrent in the near term, but as
nificant amounts of money in their pockets. While the time passes and increased numbers of people arrive in
corporations that are developing the sites are expected
8 Sgt. Steven McVarnock. Phone interview with The Conference

6 CBC News, “Oil Spill Raises Arctic Offshore Drilling Concerns.” Board of Canada. April 26, 2010.
7 Regan Watts. In-person interview with The Conference Board of 9 Vince Hawkes. Phone interview with The Conference Board of
Canada. May 31, 2010. Canada. April 23, 2010.

the Arctic as a result of economic growth and resource police services on major crimes, and it does so without
exploitation, these types of activities are likely to the funding required to pay for the additional specialized
increase if no action is taken.10 policing services that the OPP provides. Two interviewees
stated that some communities in Northern Ontario lack
Terrorist groups may also view the newly opened north- the ability to maintain infrastructure and equipment
ern access to North America as viable routes for moving that were purchased through capital funding. The assets
people and weapons, as the northern border will be harder deteriorate quickly due to the lack of operations and
to control than borders further south. Meeting this chal- maintenance funding.14
lenge would require a high degree of cooperation and
trust among the five Arctic nations and other countries
dealing with the threat of terrorism.11 The Canadian Forces have an ever-increasing role in the
partnerships required to provide security in the North.
Governance Challenges
Emergency management personnel tend to be based in
Canadian efforts to provide comprehensive security and major cities in the South, and they must monitor security
public safety in all regions of the Greater North have been risks and vulnerabilities not only in the North but in the
encumbered by a shortage of locally available resources Southern regions of their overall jurisdictions as well.
and shortcomings in governance. Capacity to deal with security challenges in much of the
Greater North is limited, and public safety resources, such
as search and rescue equipment and personnel, are gen-
Most regions in the Greater North do not have the resources erally located far away.
needed to deal effectively with a range of current and future
security challenges. The Canadian Forces have an ever-increasing role in
the partnerships required to provide security in the
North.15 Most federal agencies—with the exception
What has become evident is that most regions in the of the RCMP—lack a broad and distributed presence
Greater North do not have the resources needed to deal in the Arctic and frequently depend on the Canadian
effectively with a range of current and future security Forces for transportation to and from Arctic locations.
challenges, including organized crime, drug abuse, and While this would change somewhat if the Canadian
street gangs controlled from the South.12 There are government decided to equip other departments to be
insufficient police services to respond to emergencies, able to operate more independently in the Arctic, the
and the ones that are in place have an overwhelming armed forces will continue to play a central role. Other
workload.13 For example, in addition to their regular countries already train their armed forces to respond
duties in most communities policed by the RCMP in to particular security challenges that require military
Nunavut, Mounties frequently act as social services rep- skill sets and equipment. Energy security, for example,
resentatives and parole officers. The Ontario Provincial has become a major concern for Arctic countries, as
Police (OPP) is regularly called to assist First Nations disruptions to the continuous functioning of the related
infrastructures could have serious consequences for their
10 Michael Byers. In-person interview with The Conference Board of national economies. As a consequence, Norway has
Canada. February 12, 2010; Robert Huebert. In-person interview
with The Conference Board of Canada. April 8, 2010.
11 Huebert, in-person interview.
14 Tom Kontra. Phone interview with The Conference Board of
12 Hawkes, phone interview. Canada. April 23, 2010; Hawkes, phone interview.
13 McVarnock, phone interview. 15 McVarnock, phone interview.

recently begun to train its Special Forces teams in the Climate change is judged by many to be one of the most
skills and tactics required to recapture offshore oil-drilling pervasive threats—one that will stretch the capacity of
platforms should they be hijacked by eco-terrorists or individual organizations and jurisdictions to respond to
other criminal elements. the security and safety-related consequences. We know
that the warming effect of climate change is most pro-
But while the Canadian Forces may for the moment be nounced in the Arctic and that the consequences could
the best equipped to operate in the Arctic, there are alter the entire region in a fundamental and unpreced-
several security and control tasks related to border ented way.17 In recent years, the interrelationships
control, environment, search and rescue, and infrastruc- between climate change and security have become the
ture that require the involvement of other responsible theme of many discussions, publications, and confer-
government departments and agencies. The Standing ences in security circles18 that highlight the need for a
Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans recently holistic policy response that integrates different levels of
recommended that the Canadian Coast Guard be better government and divergent priorities between departments
equipped to address Northern security challenges, and it and agencies.
said that would involve the Coast Guard having a year-
round Northern operation that is actually administered in In Canada, too, there is a strong need to improve policy
the North. The committee also recognized the role of the integration, cooperation, and information sharing among
territorial governments and the federal departments of the various territorial, provincial, federal, and local gov-
Indian and Northern Affairs, Fisheries and Oceans, ernments, and to raise the degree of coordination among
Environment Canada, Natural Resources, Foreign different departments and agencies on Arctic policy.19
Affairs and International Trade, and Transport
Canada.16 (Public Safety Canada was curiously
missing from the list despite its broad responsibility
for the coordination of national security, emergency 17 Lemmen and others, From Impact to Adaptation.
management, intelligence, and corrections.) 18 See Bjorn Rutten, The Threat of a Changing Climate; also Yalowitz
and others, The Arctic Climate Change and Security Policy
Conference, 13.
16 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling 19 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling
Canada’s Arctic Waters. Canada’s Arctic Waters, iii.

Chapter 4
Community Security
threats). The largely artificial distinction between public
Chapter Summary safety and security has no practical value to them. Given
that capacity building in Northern communities is fre-
Northerners are more concerned with the
quently led, funded, and facilitated from the outside,
direct, local, and immediate threats to their
the threat of a lack of capacity can be considered by
community’s sustainability and resiliency
Northerners to be external (and therefore largely out-
than they are with threats whose effects are
side of their control). It is not surprising that Northern
primarily indirect, remote, and in the future.
communities view this problem through a “community
Communities will not be able to thrive unless a security” lens.
basic capacity to meet security needs and build
resiliency is provided at the community level.
Northerners’ focus is on the capacity of local communities
Northerners are concerned about the growing
to provide residents with the basic necessities of life and
potential for environmental accidents caused or
a basic level of resiliency.
aggravated by economic development activity
and the inability to respond to such disasters
in a timely fashion.
Security From a Northerner’s

Perspective
W
hile most casual observers tend to associate
security in the North with Arctic geopol- In our interviews with researchers, Northern community
itics, defence, and economic development, representatives, and corporate entities regarding their
Northerners themselves have made clear that their con- interpretations of “security” in Canada’s North, it
ception of security is quite different. Interviews with a became apparent that the traditional interpretations
diverse group of Northerners show that their focus is on of security promoted by academics and policy-makers
the capacity of local communities to provide residents have little relevance to the experience of a Northerner.
with the basic necessities of life (e.g., water, food, shelter) Although each interviewee stressed different challenges
and to enable them to develop a basic level of resiliency— to, and opportunities for, security, each focused on com-
regardless of whether the identified dangers to the community-specific threats and opportunities, rather than on
munity are external (security threats) or internal (safety those that might be considered personal or national in

scope. Interviewees confirmed what researchers of the catastrophic consequences of security incidents depends
International Polar Year GAPS (Gas, Arctic Peoples, on the capacity of their communities to provide or attract
and Security) initiative1 and others have noted—namely the infrastructure, expertise, and funding required for:
that Northerners (and Canada’s Northern indigenous delivering health, education, public safety, and
people in particular) see their “community,” rather than environmental protection services;
the individual or the state, as being the primary referent promoting socio-economic development; and
object of living a secure life. building effective community governance.
This may be explained in part by the fact that, for gener- This report does not claim to provide a definitive definition
ations, people in the North—particularly in the Canadian of the concept of “community security” or an exhaustive
Arctic and in other remote Northern regions—have had list of its component parts. Rather it offers the concept of
to rely on their communities or bands for survival in a community security as a catalyst for a broader and more
hostile environment. Harsh climatic conditions and great “North-centric” conversation about security (and safety)
distances between areas of human activity have required in the North based on conversations and interviews with
Northerners to focus on their immediate environment and Northerners in the context of several research projects
made questions of national scope less relevant. Today, conducted by the Centre for the North. One of these
Northerners have greater access to goods and services projects is looking at the conditions of and determinants
from the South, but many issues have not changed. for “thriving communities.” The conclusions that can be
Northerners still face the challenges of low population drawn from this research include the one that communities
density, great distances between communities, and harsh will not be able to thrive unless a basic capacity to meet
climatic conditions. security needs and build resiliency is provided at the
community level.
Northerners now have greater access to goods and services

from the South, but many issues have not changed, such Placing Community Security
as great distances and harsh climatic conditions. in Perspective
The concept of “community security” proposed in this

Northerners are more concerned with the direct, local, report draws on relevant aspects of both human secur-
and immediate threats to their community’s sustain- ity and societal security, but better captures the specific
ability and resiliency than they are with threats whose security concerns of Northern communities2 in order to
effects are primarily indirect, remote, and in the future. address this distinctly Northern perspective.3
Northerners believe that their ability to prevent security
incidents from within (e.g., criminalization and radical- The concept of human security, with its focus on people
ization of youths) and to recover from the potentially (as opposed to territories) and their basic needs (as
opposed to armaments), more closely aligns with these
Northern perspectives on security. However, it still falls
1 “GAPS” (Gas, Arctic Peoples, and Security) is a fully endorsed
International Polar Year (IPY) project and is funded through the short because the referent object remains the nation rather
Canadian and Norwegian IPY programs. GAPS is a multinational, than the community—the indicators developed in the 1994
multidisciplinary initiative that aims to examine the scope and
range of human security in the Arctic. GAPS specifically focuses
on the impacts of oil and gas activity on climate change and on
Arctic peoples, in order to identify and document threats and
coping strategies from multiple security perspectives (in Arctic 2 For the purpose of this project, a Northern community is defined
communities and among Arctic researchers). GAPS aims to as a settled group of 100 residents or more congregated in
deliver this knowledge, in cooperation with Arctic communities, Canada’s North.
to other Arctic communities and to the human security policy 3 Duhaime, “Sustainable Development: Questioning the Concept,”
and academic communities. 11–45; Zellen, On Thin Ice.

United Nations Human Development Report are designed However, societal security also ultimately focuses on the
to “provide an early warning of whether a country [. . .] is nation (i.e., society as a whole) rather than on individual
heading toward social disintegration and possible national communities. The concept also:
breakdown.”4 Moreover, this definition was originally presupposes homogeneous socio-economic develop-
designed for developing nations in crisis, especially those ment across society, as well as a relatively mature
that have suffered violent conflict (such as Afghanistan, national crisis- and risk-management organization
Angola, Haiti, Iraq, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sudan, and and infrastructure;
Zaire) as opposed to developing regions of a developed provides advice that is narrowly directed at the
nation, such as Canada’s North.5 Consequently, while challenges of cooperation and coordination of
some indicators of human security (e.g., food security, local and national resources; and
job and income security) might be relevant to Northern focuses on threats to “critical societal functions”
communities, other indicators (e.g., human rights viola- (similar to Canada’s critical infrastructure sectors)
tions, ethnic or religious conflicts) are less relevant.6 but provides no tools to identify specific threats to
diverse and geographically dispersed communities.
More research is needed to confirm the suggested elements Suggested Elements of Community Security
of community security and determine their impact on the It is proposed that “community security” includes the
security and resilience of Northern communities. capacity of a community to recognize and address
threats to, and fulfill opportunities for, meeting its
inhabitants’ basic needs and developing a basic level
The concept of societal security originated in Scandinavia. of resiliency, including the capacity to:
“A civil and civilian concept that potentially covers all promote socio-economic development;
non-military risks and threats to society,” it was part protect the environment;
of the updating and reorganizing of the “total defence” provide health services;
concept used during the Cold War and is designed for provide public safety and security; and
domestic policy-making by developed states.7 The defin- establish effective governance.
ition put forth by Esther Brimmer, Director of Research
at the Center for Transatlantic Relations (Paul H. Nitze Further research is required to confirm these elements
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins and determine their impact on the security and resilience
University), does reflect some of the specific security of Northern communities. There may be a requirement
interests of Northerners, including those related to for other capacities that have not yet been identified. It
cohesion (democracy, rule of law and civil liberties, is important to keep in mind that these capacities have
education, welfare, and pluralism) and physical protec- been determined largely based on information from
tion (infrastructure, public health, natural disaster relief, interviews with Northerners and Northern researchers.
environmental quality, and anti-terrorism measures).8 What follows is a discussion of the identified capacities.
The discussion is not intended to be exhaustive; rather,
it is intended to broaden and deepen the conversation
4 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 1994, 38. about capacity for security and resiliency at the com-
5 Ibid., 42–43. munity level in Canada’s North.
6 Ibid., 38.
7 Bonin and others, Focal Report 2.
8 Brimmer, “From Territorial Security to Societal Security,” 31.

Socio-Economic Development two cultures and facing unique challenges.”11 One of the
most devastating manifestations of issues related to culture
Socio-economic security emerged as the key (and perhaps loss is “the unprecedented number of suicides and suicide
the broadest) component of community security, encom- attempts in recent decades, largely among youth.” 12
passing adequate social infrastructure (e.g., schools and
skills training, housing, counselling services, social
assistance) and a healthy economy. Risks to Northern Environment
communities include:
a lack of economic diversity (and thus, job and Environmental security concerns in Northern commun-
skill shortages); ities are related primarily to harsh weather conditions
housing affordability, shortages, crowding, and and remoteness of location, climate change, and the
poor conditions; harm inflicted on the environment by natural and man-
limited access to education, health, and social services; made disasters. Compared with the South, the North is
lack of critical (water, energy, transportation, vast, comprising 80 per cent of Canada’s land mass but
communication) infrastructure; only 7 per cent of its population.13 The relative remote-
loss of culture and traditional way of life, due to rad- ness of some communities, combined with the colder
ical socio-economic and demographic changes; and temperatures, wilderness conditions, and the challenges
higher rates of drug-related and violent crimes, which that are increasingly emerging from climate change
represent risks to the socio-economic development of represent major environmental threats to Northerners.
many Northern communities.9 For example, harsh weather conditions and “[t]hin ice
[are] claiming the lives of . . . hunters every year.”14
In some Northern communities affected by megaprojects, Northerners feel some of these deaths could be prevented
too great a focus is placed on economic development if Northern communities had better access to search and
rather than community development. Consequently, rescue services. However, the SAR teams are stationed
infrastructure that supports the community lags behind far from most of Canada’s remote or hard-to-reach areas.
that which facilitates commercial projects. Many remote And while they may be trained in Arctic rescue, they
communities, particularly in the Far North, lack adequate aren’t located there. As Exhibit 5 shows, the majority
banking as well as credit and investment facilities. For of SAR technicians are stationed in Canada’s southern
example, residents of Baker Lake in Nunavut must rely regions. Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Trenton, for
on ATMs and the local grocery store to obtain cash example, which commands search and rescue in the
because there is no local bank.10 vast majority of Canada’s North, is closer to Quito,
Ecuador, than it is to the Canadian military base at
Alert, Nunavut.
Northerners feel some deaths could be prevented if
Northern communities had better access to search Northerners who were interviewed for this project
and rescue services. expressed concern about the growing potential for
environmental accidents caused or aggravated by
economic development activity and the inability to
Findings from an integrated Working Group for a Nunavut
Suicide Prevention Strategy, published in 2010, determined 11 Bobet, Towards the Development of a Nunavut Suicide
that “people’s living situations [in Nunavut] have changed Prevention Strategy.
rapidly and radically; that as a result, the traditional ways 12 Ibid.
are breaking down; and that Inuit today are straddling 13 Based on data from Statistics Canada, “Profile for Canada,
Provinces, Territories, Census Divisions, and Census Subdivisions,
2006 Census.”
9 Sisco and Stonebridge, Toward Thriving Northern Communities.
14 Sisco and Stonebridge, Toward Thriving Northern Communities;
10 CBC News, “No Bank in Baker Lake Despite Mining Boom.” The Great Warming, “Interview With Sheila Watt-Cloutier.”

Exhibit 5
Search and Rescue Technicians in Canada
Legend: Search and rescue regions (SRR) and

search and rescue technicians
Victoria SRR Trenton SRR Halifax SRR
43 Number of SAR techs North–South boundary
Victoria
SRR
Trenton
SRR
Halifax
SRR 4
Goose Bay, NL
12
Gander, NL
4
43 Comox, BC Cold Lake, AB
4
17 Bagotville, QC 27
Greenwood, NS
Winnipeg, MB
29
Trenton, ON
Source: The Centre for the North (The Conference Board of Canada).
respond to such disasters in a timely fashion, given the Generally, research participants viewed this as an out-
limited access to emergency services in some Northern come of poor policy planning and coordination at and
communities. (They also expressed similar concerns between all levels of government. The “[l]ack of local
regarding natural disasters.) hospitals and shortage of health professionals, and food
and water security issues are all contributing factors
to poor health outcomes in Northern communities.”15
Health Community representatives did not make reference to
local concerns regarding contaminants in traditional or
According to some interviewees, economic development “country” food sources, but researchers in the natural
is frequently initiated in Northern communities without
provision of the necessary essential health services. 15 Sisco and Stonebridge, Toward Thriving Northern Communities.

sciences have noted that they are finding increased levels of police units and the long distances between specialized
of various carcinogens and other contaminants, such as police and other emergency responders. Interviewees in
methyl mercury, in Northern marine and wildlife.16 the Northern communities all shared a concern about pub-
Indeed, a forthcoming Conference Board of Canada lic safety, particularly with regards to high rates of crime.
report notes that “country food is often contaminated According to statistics from the 2006 census, Northern
with toxins that global atmospheric and oceanic currents regions have much higher crime rates than seen in the
bring to the Arctic, including persistent organic contamin- South.19 Further, these higher crime rates in the North
ants (e.g., PCBs, DDT, chlordale, and toxaphene), heavy have been linked to “rapid, large-scale population growth
metals (e.g., arsenic, cadmium, lead, nickel, mercury), in some, largely resource-based, communities, as well as
sulphur and nitrogen compounds, radioactive contamina- low education and employment.”20
tion, and oil pollution. These toxins then enter the food
chain and threaten the wildlife as well as the people who
depend on hunting, fishing, and gathering for their major Political Governance
food sources.”17 Further, food security is an especially
prevalent concern among Northern communities without Community representatives and Northern researchers
outbound road access because food staples arrive only by have all noted that local governance is often adequate in
air—and air transport is dependent on favourable weather terms of its commitment to the security of the community.
conditions. Moreover, the cost of flying in goods inflates However, intergovernmental relations and jurisdictional
the cost of food staples, making them less affordable.18 barriers often inhibited the capacity of local governments
and community members to address common security
concerns. A lack of intergovernmental communications
Public Safety and Security and consultations has, in some instances, led to juris-
dictional overlap and conflict that can slow approval
Community representatives noted that access to reliable processes and inhibit the overall effectiveness of policy
and immediate emergency and police services in Northern development and implementation.21
communities is often challenged by both the limited size
16 Alaska Native Science Commission, “Transboundary Arctic 19 Ibid.; Human Resources and Skills Development Canada,
Contamination.” “Security—Crime Rates.”
17 Sisco and Stonebridge, Toward Thriving Northern Communities. 20 Sisco and Stonebridge, Toward Thriving Northern Communities.
18 Ibid. 21 Ibid.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
for Northerners. They see the community—rather than
Chapter Summary the individual, the state, or the nation—as the primary
referent object of living a secure life. Community secur-
This report examines three dimensions of
ity includes the capacity of a community to recognize
security in the North in order to provide a
and address threats to, and fulfill opportunities for,
more comprehensive picture of the security
meeting its inhabitants’ basic needs and developing
challenges facing Canada’s North.
a basic level of resiliency.
Security in Canada’s Greater North cannot
be adequately understood through Southern
conceptions of security alone. The third dimension—community security—is the most
important for Northerners.
More work is needed to deepen and broaden
our understanding of the community dimension
of security in Canada’s North.
Security in Canada’s Greater North cannot be adequately
understood through Southern conceptions of security
alone. We need to build a lens that takes the local and
T
his report examined three dimensions of security regional particularities in the North into account and
in the North—Arctic security, Northern security, allows us to factor in the cultural and socio-economic
and community security—in order to provide a development context in all its diversity across the
more comprehensive picture of the security challenges Greater North. This report develops the concept of
in Canada’s North. Arctic security refers to the protection community security, based primarily on interviews with
of Canada’s sovereignty and of its Arctic territory, people, Northerners (public officials, private sector executives,
and environment from remote threats and undesired and researchers). More work is needed to deepen and
influences. Northern security includes the protection broaden our understanding of the community dimension
and resilience of people, critical infrastructure, and the of security in Canada’s North. Specifically, this concept
environment against all threats and hazards. The third could be better understood via a comprehensive and
dimension—community security—is the most important region-specific threat assessment in the North and the

development of a set of clear indicators that identify and As the level of community security within the hundreds
measure the security needs and the capacity to provide of communities in Canada’s North is better understood,
security and build resilience of a given community in this knowledge will better guide the development of pub-
these regions. This broadened understanding and future lic policies, strategies, and programs that can address the
defined set of indicators could be used to enhance our greatest threats to the security and resilience of Canada’s
understanding of the essential elements that determine Northern communities.
the resilience of that community.

Appendix A
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Report November 2010

Security in Canada’s North

National Security and Public Safety

About The Conference Preface

©2010 The Conference Board of Canada*

Forecasts and research often involve numerous assumptions and data

Chapter 2—Canada’s Security and the Arctic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Chapter 3—Northern Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapter 4—Community Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

About The Centre for the North

Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited MTS Allstream Inc.

Security in Canada’s North

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Arctic Security  identify and analyze the specific threats faced by

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Canada’s Security and the Arctic

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It remains to be seen whether current approaches and

Once established, state sovereignty comes with a duty to

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Canada deems the waters between its Arctic islands to

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Bering Sea ICELAND

ALASKA Baffin Bay

14 UNCLOS, part III, s. 2, “Transit Passage.”

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15 European Commission—Maritime Affairs and Fisheries,

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Extended Continental Shelf

Russia, Denmark, and Canada all have a keen interest in

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Canada’s economic security is another factor in geo-

26 Pharand, “Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty,” 5.

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Russia’s nuclear deterrent, which relies heavily on its

Freedom of navigation and overflight is the point on which

Canada and the United States share a strategic interest

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Despite some occasional rhetoric suggesting otherwise,

Past state behaviour suggests that the likelihood of Arctic

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60 For Canada’s position, see Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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70 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on

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73 Inuit Circumpolar Council, A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on

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 Northerners are concerned that the security

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One of the greatest challenges of dealing with the con-

8 Sgt. Steven McVarnock. Phone interview with The Conference

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Security From a Northerner’s

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Northerners now have greater access to goods and services

The concept of “community security” proposed in this

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Arctic Security identify and analyze the specific threats faced by

Northerners are concerned that the security