1.

In Re: Garcia

Facts: Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he
is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain
the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto
de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the
law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law
profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise
of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines
without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Issue: Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?

Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and
Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was
intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of
Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to
practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The
privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and
regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to
modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the
reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power
to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
 2. PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava,
in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director
issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for

the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines
Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed
by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified
to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The
respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely
the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical

knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals
who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for
the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been

questioned formally.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent
Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation

and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected

with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts
and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from
any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the

Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
 3. PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA

FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with
crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused
was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in
the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice.

Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor
in this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars
certain attorneys from practicing.

ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of
Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

RULING:The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation,
as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
 4. IN RE: ATTY. MARCIAL EDILLON

August 3, 1978 | Castro, C.J.

Judicial Department > Supreme Court > Administrative Powers > Integration of the Bar

DOCTRINE: The Constitution explicitly and unequivocally granted SC the precise power to promulgate
rules with regard to Bar integration. IBP is a State-organized to which every lawyer must belong.

CASE SUMMARY: Atty. Marcial Edillon refused to pay the IBP membership dues despite the demands
of the IBP. IBP issued a resolution to the SC recommending his disbarment. SC disbarred him!

FACTS:

•Marcial Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

•IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution recommending to the SC the removal of Edillon from the
Roll of Attorneys for the stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues. In his comment, Edillon
reiterated his refusal to pay the membership dues on the following grounds:

1. It impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate)

2. The requirement to pay membership fees is unconstitutional.

3. The penalty imposed on the refusal to pay the fees is a deprivation of property without due process.

4. SC does not have the jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: W/N a member of the IBP may be compelled to pay membership fees and the non-compliance
therewith may result to the member’s disbarment? YES, mems are required to pay!

HELD: IBP is a State-organized to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves in which membership is voluntary. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official nation body of which all lawyers
are required to be members. They are therefore subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance
of the bar, including payment of fees.

•The practice of law is not a vested right, but a privilege clothe with public interest, since lawyers take
part in one of the most important function of the State – the administration of justice.

•The Constitution explicitly and unequivocally granted SC the precise power to promulgate rules with
regard to Bar integration. CONST (1973), art. X, sec. 5(5), now CONST, art. 8, sec. 5(5), provides
“Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged.” This constitutional declaration vests the SC with plenary power in
all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

• Such power was also granted in Section 1, RA 6397 (An Act Providing For The Integration Of
The Philippine Bar).
•SC also answered the grounds raised by the respondent, as follows: (Please refer to the above-
mentioned grounds)

1. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.
He is free to attend or not attend meetings, vote or refuse to not vote, etc. The only compulsion he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues.

2. Nothing in the Constitution prevents SC from requiring members of privileged class to pay a
reasonabl fee.

3. Assuming that the practice of law is a property right, it is still subject to regulation and inquiry. The
penalty imposed is designed to enforce its payments. But, remember, practice of is not a property
right but a mere privilege and must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court.

4. Matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation
and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
 5. Ozaeta, Romulo etc. 92 SCRA 1

Petitioners: Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo; Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes

Facts: Two separate petitions were filed before the Supreme Court by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip (died on May 5, 1975) and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta (died February 14, 1976) seeking
a re-examination of the policy and praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of
their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.

Petitioners argued on the following grounds:

1. Under the law, partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner.

- ART. 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph
that, "The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the
name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the
deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership."

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy & engineering, the legislature has authorized
the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a
deceased partner.

- Use of trade name: No fundamental policy that is offended at least where such firm has acquired the
characteristics of a "trade name"

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner because Canon 33 (adopted by American Bar Asscociation) declares that, "The
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use."

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspaper of general circulation for several days.

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name.

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted

practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.

ISSUE: WON the firms be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners
who had passed away.

HELD:

Petition denied. The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from rulings thus laid down.
Petitioners are advised to drop the names "Sycip" and "Ozaeta" from their respective firm names.
Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their
firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
Dissenting Opinion by J. Aquino

Petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms that
Sycip and Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal
services of the deceased attorneys and to benefit from the good will attached to the names of those
respected and esteemed law practitioner. That is a legitimate motivation. Retention of the names is
not illegal per se. Practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross (Ross, lawrence,
Selph and Carrascoso). No one complained that it was illegal or unethical.

Similar cases:

1953 - law firm in Cebu continued to include in its firm name that of a decease

partner, CD Johnston 1958 - Register of Deeds of Manila vs China Banking Corp., law firm of Perkins
and Ponce Enrile in which Atty. E.A. Perkins is already dead. Both were denied and advised by the
Court to desist and drop the names of the partners who have been long dead.
 6. SALLY D. BONGALONTA vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA

FACTS: Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine
Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a
scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa,
against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action, where she was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in
Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the
Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection of a sum of
money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In
the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel
were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-
parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio
Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by
complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito
Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
number. Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
might obtain in the civil case he filed.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent
Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: The Court agreed with the foregoing findings and recommendations. The practice of law is not
a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other
hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation, for this reason, he is required to swear to
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of
his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
 7. CAYETANO VS MONSOD, 201 SCRA 210

September 1991

The Practice of Law

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.