L;PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

MULLER BALDINO

G.R. No. 137269. October 13, 2000

The complainant Abrelinda Silam was thirteen years old when the incident happened. The accused is her
brother-in-law, being the husband of her elder sister Judith. Abrelinda was staying with another sister
Marcelet Silam-Danglosen at the latter’s house in Irisan, Baguio City. The house of the accused also in
Irisan was 50 to 60 meters away.

On March 4, 1998 Abrelinda left the house of Marcelet and went to the house of accused and Judith nearby.
She was requested by her sister Judith to spend the night thereat to take care of the children of Judith while
the latter is in Buguias, Benguet. At that time Judith and accused had 3 children. While Abrelinda was
sleeping, the accused suddenly grabbed her hands by the wrists and raped her. She felt pain. After he
satisfied his lust, he threatened her not to tell her sister what he did otherwise he will get angry. Then he
moved away and slept.

Immediately Abrelinda left and returned to the house of Marcelet. Crying, she reported to Marcelet and the
husband that the accused raped her or had sexual intercourse with her against her will. She told them she
will sue the accused. It appears that this was the second time accused raped Abrelinda. The first happened
sometime 1997 in their hometown in Buguias. She went home to Buguias, Benguet to report to her father
where she filed her complaint of rape against the accused on March 11, 1998 assisted by her father Teligo
Silam on the first incident. Then she came back to Baguio to file her complaint on the incident that happened
in Baguio.

On March 13, 1998, Abrelinda went to the NBI, Baguio where she was examined by Dr. Ronald Bandonill
who submitted a report. Dr. Bandonill explained that the old-healed hymenal lacerations could have been
inflicted more than three (3) months previous to the examination on the person of Abrelinda on March 13,
1998. He added that once the hymen is lacerated, it will not be lacerated again or there will be no new
lacerations even if there is another sexual contact. This is consistent with the declaration of Abrelinda that
there were two incidents of rape; one in Buguias, sometime 1997 and the second on March 4, 1998 in
Irisan, Baguio as the first incident happened more than 3 months before examination.

The accused denied the charge and claims that the accusation was fabricated. He testified that on the day
in question, he slept together with his wife, who had returned from a visit to her parents in Buguias, Benguet,
the day before.

During the period from February 20 to March 3, 1998, when his wife was in Buguias, he personally took
care of the needs of the two children left with him and brought the children to his place of work at Irisan,
where he was assigned as security guard.

He insisted that neither he nor his wife requested Abrelinda to take care of the children while his wife was
in Buguias and that while Abrelinda went to their house about four times during his wife’s absence, it was
only for the purpose of getting rice and other things after which she immediately left.

Issue:
Whether or not the court below erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape of Abrelinda.
Ruling:

The court found the accused liable as charged for the following reason:

 First, the accused had carnal knowledge of Abrelinda.

 Second, the carnal knowledge was consummated by means of force and against her will. Abrelinda
did not freely and willingly submit to the carnal act. There was force used on her. True, the accused
was not armed at the time. But, his size, weight and strength were enough for him to attain his evil
design. At a tender age of 13, Abrelinda was no match to the size and strength of accused.
‘
 Third, the fact that the Medico-Legal Report shows that there were no extragenital physical injuries
noted on the body of Abrelinda at the time she was examined does not negate her claim of rape.
Neither does it mean lack of resistance on her part.

 Fourth, after the sexual act, Abrelinda returned that same night to the house of her sister Marcelet
crying and disclosed what happened and will would sue him. If the sexual intercourse was with her
consent, Abrelinda would have kept it to herself especially so that the accused is married to her
older sister Judith.

 Fifth, it is unnatural and highly improbable that a simple and innocent 13 year old barrio girl like
Abrelinda would fabricate matters about the cruel acts committed on her person by the accused
knowing fully well the seriousness and consequences of her charges.

 Sixth, she was candid, natural and straightforward in her answers without any intention to evade or
conceive.

 Seventh, the claim of the accused that the charges against him were fabricated was of no merit
because the accused cannot point to any dark or sinister motive that Abrelinda may have in filing
the instant case.

 Ninth. it is hard to believe that accused can baby sit his children Jomar and Janice, ages 5 and 3
respectively while doing his work at the same time. His claim that he brought them to his work
where electric transformers and installations are being guarded by him, a dangerous place
ordinarily is not plausible and credible.

Judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Muller Baldino Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Rep. Act 8353, as charged in the Information,
with the aggravating qualifying circumstance of the victim, Abrelinda Silam, being a 13 year old minor and
the offender Muller Baldino, being her brother-in-law and relative by affinity within the third civil degree.

G.R. No. 132392 January 18, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAR MARCOS Y MON, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
In Province of Pangasinan, the accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully hack
Virgilio Marcos y Mon, (his elder brother) with a bolo at the back inflicting upon him injuries, which caused his death as
a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
RTC finds (accused) Cesar Marcos y Mon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder punishable under
Art. 248 of the PC and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death. Actual damages (51,000) Moral damages
(50,000) indemnified to the heirs
Evidence for the prosecution shows:
Virgilio bent down to put on the ground the tools he was carrying. A witness saw Cesar suddenly hacked the
unsuspecting Virgilio from behind. Virgilio fell to the ground then Cesar hacked him again. When the policemen arrived
Cesar surrendered his bolo and, allowed himself to be hauled into the police car. On a post mortem examination it was
testified that the person could not be hacked in front. Accused-Appellant testified that he agreed to go to the police
station and upon reaching the police station.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death. It is argued that although the aggravating
circumstance of Evident Premeditation was raised in the information, the prosecution failed to prove the same and
hence, accused-appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
RULING
- evident premeditation should not come to fore simply because it was never appreciated by the trial court in its decision
nor was it considered in determining the penalty to be imposed.
- Treachery, to be considered a qualifying circumstance, must be PROVEN as clearly and indubitably as the crime
itself, and cannot be presumed. Witness testified that appellant, suddenly attacked the victim from behind with a bolo
the aggravating circumstance of treachery qualifies the crime to murder.
- Aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, although alleged in the information, was not duly proven by the
prosecution and hence, it was properly not appreciated by the trial court.
- Alternative circumstance of relationship was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
- Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.13
There is here present the aggravating circumstance of relationship but this is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Pursuant to Article 63, the correct penalty to be imposed should only be reclusion perpetua.
Actual damages, P51,000.00 must be reduced to P18,000.00 since it is only the latter amount which is supported by a
receipt. The court can only grant actual damages for such expenses if they are supported by receipts. 15
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Civil Indemnity of P50,000.00 should also be awarded without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime.16
RTC’s decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION Penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua and that appellant is
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P18,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.

G.R. No. 140348 July 18, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GERRYMEL ESTILLORE Y POSTICO, appellant.

FACTS
In the municipality of Rosario, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of
superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and set on fire one Mary Jane Del Carmen with
the use of gas or combustible liquid which caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs
Witness saw appellant carrying his and Mary Jane’s child and jumping out of the about one meter high window of his
"very brightly" lighted house. And in a "soft voice,” asked for help. Mary Jane Del Carmen was found inside the burned
house by the witness who went to help and was then brought to the hospital but subsequently died.
In connection with the death of the victim, her family incurred P28,000.00 for funeral expenses, P10,000.00 of which
had been reimbursed by the Social Security System (SSS), P3,000.00 for the autopsy of her body, and P500.00 for
gasoline and food.
From the post mortem examination by prosecution witness Dr. Renato Bautista
-Cause of death is Burns, severe.
-an accelerant like gasoline, gas and lighter fluid was splashed on the body of the victim. Dr. Bautista ruled out the
possibility of suicide and opined that his findings are consistent with a third party being responsible for the burns suffered
by the victim.
Finding that the killing was attended "by the aggravating circumstance that the accused employed means to weaken
the defense by splashing an accelerant on the victim’s face, which mode of attack was calculated to insure the
commission of the crime without risk to the offender," The trial court convicted Gerrymel Estillore y Postico guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death; and he is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 as indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P21,500.00
as actual damages. (Emphasis supplied).

ISSUE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE
UNCORROBORATED THEORY, CONJECTURES, SUSPICION, SPECULATION AND SURMISES OF THE
MEDICAL OFFICER WHO CONDUCTED THE AUTOPSY ON THE CADAVER OF THE VICTIM.

RULING
Appellant is Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt by the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, which
included the facts testified by the witnesses along with the unrefutted opinion of Dr. Bautista, that the victim received
the splashes of that accelerant and the assailant then lighted her up. This points that the appellant was the who set the
victim on fire which caused her death.
Imposable Penalty:
-The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance that appellant employed means to weaken the defense and
accordingly sentenced him to death.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that every complaint or information should state not only the
qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. In the case at bar, the information did not specifically allege that
appellant employed means to weaken the defense nor show how the act which resulted in the death of the victim was
committed. The said aggravating circumstance cannot thus be appreciated.
The penalty for the crime of Murder for which appellant is liable is reclusion perpetua to death. As there is neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance in the case at bar, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied
conformably with Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
- Moral Damages, while it needs no proof, the award of P 100,000 should be reduced to P 50,000
- Actual damages, may only be awarded if duly supported by receipts. Since only the funeral expenses of P28,000.00,
less the admitted reimbursement by the SSS of P10,000.00, and the autopsy expenses of P3,000.00 are duly supported
by receipts, the award of P21,500.00 must be reduced to P21,000.00. 62

People vs. Dawaton

GR No. 1446247. September 17, 2002.

Facts:

Esmeraldo Cortez was inviting over guests to his house on September 20, 1998. His brother-in-law Edgar Dawaton
and kumpadre Leonides Lavares arrived at 12:00 noon. Domingo Reyes arrived shortly thereafter. The group, all of
which are residents of Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora, started drinking. Came 3:00 pm, they decided to
transfer to the house of Edgar Dawaton's uncle Amado after the group has finished four bottles of gin.

Upon arriving at the elder Dawaton's house, they proceeded at the balcony and continued their drinking spree there.
The elder Dawaton was not home at the time of their session. Leonides, due to his drunkenness, opted to sleep on
the papag or wooden bench on the balcony area, as the three continued drinking until they finished another bottle of
gin.

At around 3:30 pm, Edgar stood up and left for his house. He went back with a stainless knife ranging 2-3 inches in
length and used it to stab the sleeping Leonides near the base of his neck. Awakened by the sudden attack,
Leonides was distraught of his companion's deed against him. Edgar gave him another stab on the upper part of his
neck, spilling blood on the arm of Leonides.

Leonides tried to escape for his life, but the bigger Edgar grabbed him from the collar of his shirt and stabbed him
multiple times. Leonides still managed to move 20 meters away from the elder Dawaton's house, but he dropped in
front of the Cortez residence. From that point, Edgar continuously stabbed him until Leonides expired. After the
incident, he fled to the house of his uncle Carlito Baras, where he was arrested by the authorities, who found him
when people surrounding the body of Leonides pointed them to Edgar's whereabouts.
Domingo and Esmeraldo was shocked by the incident. Both failed to convince Edgar to stop stabbing Leonides, yet
they were not able to help the poor victim.

II. Issues

1.Whether or not the sentence of the trial court charging Dawaton guilty of murder qualified by treachery is valid.

2.Whether or not the account of Dawaton on his provocation by the victim, leading to the commission of the murder,
is valid.

Held:

1. Yes. Treachery is involved in the commission of the crime. There is no question to that, since it is proven by the
prosecution witnesses that at the time of the commission, the victim was drunk and fast asleep, and that Edgar
unexpectedly started to attack the victim in his sleep. Hence the victim lacked the opportunity to defend himself from
the attack.

2. No. There was no evidence to prove that account, as said by Domingo and Esmeraldo themselves.

The presence of a grenade being threatened to be used by the victim, as mentioned in another version of the facts
prepared by Edgar, is not merited. The prosecution witnesses belied it and maintained that the victim was fast asleep
and not in a belligerent manner against the accused. In fact, they claim that the attack was so unexpected, the two
having been in good terms to each other prior to their drunkenness.
People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Bacang

GR Number 116512

July 30, 1996

Facts:

From the judgment of the RTC of Negros Oriental, in Criminal Case No. 397-B, finding them and co-
accused Palacios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay, severally, Php 200,000.00 and Php 25,000.00 as actual damages
and for the funeral expenses, and costs, accused Casido and Alcorin appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a supplemental notice of appeal on December 8, 1993. Appeal was accepted on December 7, 1994.

On January 11, 1996, the court received an undated urgent motion to withdraw appeal from the accused-
appellants which did not state any reason therefor. On March 22, 1996, court received a 1st indorsement
informing the Court that the accused-appellants were released on conditional pardon on January 25,
1996.

On May 20, 1996 the court directed Superintendent Venacio Tesoro to submit the certified true copies of
the Conditional Pardon and the release/discharge order. Tesoso submitted the copies both signed by the
President on January 19, 1996 and certificates of discharge from prison showing they were released on
January 25, 1996. Pardons were granted by virtue of the authority conferred upon the President by the
Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release,
and Pardon.

Issues:

Whether or not conditional pardons can be extended to the accused-appellants during the pendency of
their instant appeal.

Ruling:
No. In an earlier decision, People v Hinlo, the Court declared the practice of processing applications for
pardon or parole despite pending appeals to be in clear violation of law. In People v Salle, the court
declared grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from his conviction by the trial court shall be prohibited. Agencies/instrumentalities must require proof that
he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn appeal. And that the ruling fully bind
pardons extended after January 31, 1995 during the pendency of the grantee’s appeal.

Conditional pardons granted in the case are VOID for having been extended on January 19, 1996
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THEIR INSTANT APPEAL.

PEOPLE V. PONCIANO AGLIPA

G.R. NO. 130941

August 3, 2000

In the early afternoon of April 24, 1995, Severina Macion was at home in Barangay Mindanao,
Malabuyoc, Cebu, when her son, Erick, informed her that their goats had eaten the corn plants of the
Aglipas. Severina told Erick that they would report the matter to the Barangay Captain as soon as his
father would arrive.

Later, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the couple went to the house of the Barangay Captain.
When they arrived there, they found that the Barangay Captain was not at home. They, however, decided
to wait for him for a while. As they waited for the Barangay Captain, appellant Ponciano Aglipa suddenly
appeared and stood on the road in front of the Barangay Captain’s house. He shouted at Solano
challenging him to a ‘buno’ (fight to the death). Solano answered saying he was not afraid of him.
Severina advised her husband not to mind Ponciano so as to avoid trouble. Solano ignored appellant’s
challenge Ponciano then went home.

They decided to stop waiting for the Barangay Captain. While walking home along the road, Solano and
Severina dropped by the sari-sari store. About 20 meters away, appellant shouted from his house
challenging Solano to a fight. Solano advised Severina to go ahead and take their children inside their
house because he would still urinate. As it was already dark, Severina got a kerosene lamp and went
back to her husband. While Solano was urinating, Severina stood behind him holding the kerosene lamp.
Momentarily, Ponciano, who came from nowhere. Without saying a word, appellant hit Solano with an
iron bar at the back of his head. Solano slumped with his face down. Ponciano hit Solano repeatedly with
a crowbar which caused Solano’s instantaneous death. Severina rushed to the aid of her husband but
she too was hit by Ponciano at the back of her head. Severina instinctively turned around to face
appellant and attempted to wrest the crowbar from him but appellant hit her on the hand holding the
kerosene lamp.

However, Ponciano invoked self-defense, He said that when Solano Macion saw him, he pulled out his
gun and fired but the accused evaded by docking and in defense of himself he picked a coco lumber and
without hesitation struck the hand of Solano. Then Severina, picked the gun which was released by
Solano. In anticipation that she would use it against the accused, the latter also struck her hand with the
same lumber. Since he was standing and she was crouching in her attempt to pick-up the gun, the back
of her head was also hit which was injured.

The trial court found the accused guilty of murder and frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court erred in not appreciating the self-defense interposed by the accused.
2. Whether or not the court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder in the killing of
Solano Macion and of frustrated murder in the wounding of Severina Macion.

HELD:

1) No. The burden of proof shifts to the person invoking self-defense, who, with clear and convincing
evidence must establish all the following requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person claiming self-defense. Upon failure to establish these requisites, conviction is
inevitable because the accused, by setting up self-defense, admits being the author of the killing.

2) No. The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the accused deliberately adopts such
means, methods and forms of execution that give the victim no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation.
The essence of treachery is swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim.

Furthermore, Cedeño’s eyewitness account clearly showed that Aglipa had sneaked behind Solano, who
was urinating at the side of the road, and struck him on the head with a crowbar. Not content with doing
that, appellant also hit the victim’s equally defenseless wife on the head, almost killing her. Verily, he
carried out his attack in a swift manner with no risk to himself from any defense which the victims might
put up. Clearly, there was treachery.

Hence, the trial court did not err in finding him guilty of murder for the death of Solano Macion and
frustrated murder for the wounding of Severina Macion.

People vs. Ocfemia

G.R. No. 126135 October 25, 2000

Facts:
On Nov. 22, 1995, one Miriam Reyes, maid of accused-appellant Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot,
complained to accused-appellant’s live-in partner, Margie Ocfemia, that Alberto touched her private
part. Margie confronted Alberto and he admitted touching the private part of Miriam. Night came and
accused-appellant talked with Miriam, asking Miriam not to tell her brother and the brothers of Margie
what he did to her but Miriam refused and told Alberto she has to tell them what he did to her. Later
that evening, Alberto told the members of the household to go to sleep and while Margie, his common-
law wife, was lying, Margie noticed that Alberto was roaming around the house, taking coffee and
smoking. At 11:00 that evening, while Miriam was lying on her side and asleep, Alberto stabbed her
several times. Miriam shouted asking for help and was brought to the hospital by Margie yet the victim
passed away.
Upon arraignment on Nov. 13, 1995, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the offense charged.
On Nov. 17, 1995, the Court issued an order, setting the case for hearing so as to conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea of guilty.
Before the reception of the evidence of the defense, accused-appellant through counsel filed
a motion praying that his plea of guilty be withdrawn as it was improvidently made. Motion was granted
and accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
Accused-appellant thereafter testified in his defense and stated that on Nov. 22, 1995, he
arrived home from work at 11:00 in the evening and was approached by Margie, telling him that their
maid, Miriam, will be leaving the following day. Alberto then asked Miriam why would she leave and
Alberto proceeded to go outside the house. He suddenly noticed he was far from home but cannot
remember how he got there. Upon realizing, he boarded a jeepney and went back home. On his way
home, he passed by his brother Oscar’s house, Oscar asked him what his problem was and Alberto
did not answer. Oscar mentioned to him something like "Wala na patay na" and referred to him as the
one who killed Miriam. Alberto said that at the time, he did not know who killed Miriam. At his brother’s
house he was arrested by the police and brought to his house. He noticed that his house was "magulo,”
and Margie, his wife, was not at home. He said he pleaded guilty because at that time, his mind was
confused.
 After his testimony, accused-appellant through counsel prayed he be subjected to psychiatric
examination. The trial court denied accused-appellant’s motion for reasons that there is no merit found
in the plea of the accused, thru his counsel, that he should be examined by a Psychiatrist to determine
his mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense. The trial court handed down its
judgment, finding the accused-appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery, and aggravated by
evident premeditation and the accused-appellant’s private relations with the victim, who was his maid
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, this automatic review of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not allowing the accused to be examined by the National
Center for Mental Health to establish his mental condition during and after the commission of the crime

Ruling:
No, the trial court’s denial of the request of accused-appellant to be subjected to psychiatric
examination is correct. There is no cogent justification to reverse the finding of the trial court that
accused-appellant was of sound mental condition at the time of his arraignment, and that during the
hearing where the accused-appellant testified in his defense, there was "no slightest insinuation" by
accused-appellant and counsel that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. The
fact that the accused-appellant originally pleaded guilty and thereafter changed his plea to "not guilty"
does not support a claim that there were indications of "mental dysfunction". It is not uncommon for
an accused to change his plea. The invocation of denial and alibi as his defense indicates that he was
in full control of his mental faculties. It has been held that a shift in theory by the defense, from denial
and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after realizing the futility of his earlier defense, is a
clear indication that his defense is a mere concoction. Moreover, the eyewitness account of the
accused-appellant’s common-law wife never mentioned any indication that the accused-appellant
could not have been in his right mind when he committed the crime, and renders the theory of insanity
doubtful. The Court is then convinced that the trial court was right in convicting the accused-appellant
of murder qualified by treachery but does not agree the crime was committed with evident
premeditation and an aggravating circumstance of "private relations of accused-appellant with the
offended party.” Wherefore, the judgment finding Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, is affirmed with the modification that the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.

EFREN MENDOZA Y SALVADOR, Accused-Appellant
GR No. 133382 l 9 March 2000

Facts: Efren Mendoza was charged with the crime of murder for killing Anchito Nano. In
this case Efren alleged that Anchito Nano arrived at their house and upon arrival it started
to destroy the house and that her wife was shouting for help. Efren immediately look for
something to protect his family but found a bolo. He approached Anchito but the latter
tried to hack him but he was able to hack him first on the right side of his neck resulting
to the death of the victim. Thereafter Mendoza went to Municipal Hall of Vinzon and
voluntarily surrendered to the police. He claimed that it was self defense. The autopsy
revealed that location of the wounds found on the body of the victim came from the back
of the victim’s body. The court ruled rejecting appellant’s self defense. This court finds
that the accused was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to
defend himself by means which appeared unreasonable by using a long bolo is
unjustifiable. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating circumstances
of treachery?

Held: The Supreme Court held in the negative. A qualifying circumstance changes
the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other hand,
does not affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition
of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating
circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying
circumstance may not. Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic
aggravating circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it
cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant
the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary surrender.

GR No. 129899
April 27, 2000

People of the Philippines v. Rodulfo Villa y Delgado

Facts:

In the early morning of 22 June 1991 Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass in his yard in New
Cabalan, Olongapo City. Accused Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU and neighbor of Dionito,
suddenly came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle and shot Dionito from behind killing him
instantly. Ronald Fernandez and Sheila Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their fathers rescue after
hearing the gunshot but the accused also fired at them fatally hitting Ronald who was embracing his father,
and mortally wounding Sheila on the thigh and stomach. Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor of the
Fernandezes, attempted to wrestle the rifle from the accused but Samuel too was gunned down.

Villa surrendered to a certain Captain Dolino. He was accordingly charged with multiple murder.
When arraigned on 3 October 1991 he entered a plea of not guilty. His counsel, Atty. Dumpit, manifested
in open court that the accused was desirous of changing his plea to guilty. Thereafter, the accused invoked
self-defense insofar as Fernandez was concerned, as the latter tried to stab him with a bolo. Thus, according
to the accused, he was forced to shoot Dionito with his rifle. The trial court then proceeded to propound
searching questions on the accused to determine whether he understood the nature and consequences of
his change of plea, and upon being satisfied with the answers given by the accused who was assisted by
counsel, the court allowed the change of plea.

The trial court issued an order appointing Atty. Alinea as counsel de oficio for the accused, as his
counsel de parte Atty. Dumpit was unavailable due to his ongoing medical treatment. Before the defense
could present its evidence, Atty. Alinea manifested his inability to confer with the accused but moved that
a psychiatric examination of the accused be made. The motion was granted and the accused was examined
at the Olongapo City General Hospital to ascertain he was suffering from mental illness before, during and
after the commission of the crime.

After more than a month of psychiatric evaluation, the attending physicians submitted to the trial
court a psychiatric evaluation report, which stated in part “Evaluation shows that the patient is suffering from
Insanity or Psychosis classified ashizophrenia. This is a mental illness characterized by deterioration in social and
occupational functioning, auditory hallucination, delusion, thought disturbances and poor judgment. He is at present
incompetent to stand trial”. Six months later, a follow-up report was made, that the patient’s status had
improved enough for him to withstand the rigors of the trial. A petition for release of the accused has been
filed, praying that he be discharged and returned to jail for the speedy disposition of the case. The trial
court granted the petition and the trial resumed with the accused now raising insanity as a defense.

The trial court disregard the defense of insanity and forthwith convicted the accused of the crimes
charged. The court is not convinced that the accused was suffering from insanity of schizophrenic type
before or during the killing. In order that insanity can be considered as an exempting circumstance, it must
be shown to exist just before or during the commission of the offense. Also, in order to exempt the accused
from criminal liability it must be shown beyond cavil of doubt that there was complete deprivation of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime. These the accused
failed to prove.

Issue:

Whether accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crimes as would exempt him
from criminal liability

Ruling:

The court affirm the judgment of conviction. . Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation
of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has
not lost consciousness of his acts.

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature
and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged persons general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and
beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts,
by means of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of a person, and through which we determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.

Examining the evidence on record, we are convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the time
he perpetrated the killings. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete
absence of intelligence on his part: (a) Immediately after he killed the victims he thought of surrendering
to the PC Detachment in Olongapo City; (b) He showed remorse during his confinement at the Mental
Hospital; and, (c) He was able to give a Sworn Statement before the Prosecutors Office in Olongapo City
immediately after the commission of the crimes narrating his version of the incident.14 These are hardly the
acts of a person with a sick mind. In People v. Ambal we held: "The fact that immediately after the incident
(accused) thought of surrendering to the law-enforcement authorities is incontestable proof that he knew
that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it." Similarly, a feeling of
remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his acts, he
acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for them.
GR No. 140344
August 18, 2000

Solomon Rabor v. People of the Philippines

Facts:

On 17 August 1981, at around 9 o’clock in the evening, Hikaru Miyake, a Japanese national,
residing with his Filipina wife and children in Gem Village, Ma-a, Davao City was taking his usual
"Japanese-style" bath in a drum behind his house. As he soaked his body inside the drum filled with
warm water, he heard a sound which made him turn to the direction where it came from. Miyake sensed
that there was something wrong, so he hurriedly got out of the drum. He then saw petitioner about one
and a half meters away rushing towards him with a bolo. Petitioner attacked Miyake who fought and
grappled with the former for the possession of the bolo. The struggle lasted for about two (2) minutes.

Petitioner fled when he lost possession of the bolo. As a result of the attack, Miyake sustained
injuries on the different parts of his body. Miyake’s security guard arrived to give assistance to his
employer. The security guard saw petitioner flee towards the direction of his house. Miyake was
immediately brought to the Brokenshire Hospital where he was confined for ten (10) days.

Petitioner was hired to bring the Miyake children to their school while petitioner’s wife gave
them piano lessons. This cordial relationship between Miyake and petitioner, however, abruptly ended
when their respective wives quarreled with each other over a sum of money which Mrs. Miyake loaned
to petitioner’s wife. Since then, petitioner became hostile towards the Miyakes.

Petitioner threw stones at the house of Miyake. In the afternoon of that same day, Miyake went to
his house, which was just about fifty (50) meters away, to try to patch things up with him. Nonetheless,
on account of the strained relations between them, Miyake terminated the services of petitioner and his
wife. Petitioner, while riding on his motorcycle, would stop in front of the Miyake residence and shout, "I
want to fight and I will kill you." Miyake ignored these threats to avoid any trouble. Then came that
fateful day of 17 August 1981.

After trial, the Court a quo rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the crime of frustrated
murder.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Issue:

A. Whether or not the decision of the court of appeals finding the petitioner guilty of frustrated
murder is contrary to law;

B. Whether or not the medical certificate presented by the prosecution is hearsay.

 C. Whether or not the conclusion of the court of appeals in the application of evident premeditation
in the instant case is a finding grounded on speculation, surmises, conjectures, and is manifestly mistaken.

D. Whether or not the court of appeals in disregarding the alibi of the petitioner has decided
questions of substance not in accord with law and the applicable decision of the honorable court.

E. Whether or not the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence

Ruling:

The petition is partly meritorious.

The first three issues shall be discussed jointly as they are interrelated. They all pertain to
petitioner’s contention that he was wrongly convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. Petitioner
maintains that the wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal; hence, the crime committed was
merely attempted not frustrated. Further, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not
allegedly sufficiently proven in this case. Petitioner thus is of the view that the crime should be homicide
and not murder. Contrary to petitioner’s insistence, some of the wounds inflicted on the victim were fatal.

Given the foregoing testimony that Miyake could have died if not for the timely medical treatment,
the trial court correctly held that the stage of execution of the crime was frustrated. A felony is "frustrated
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator."

In order that evident premeditation may be properly considered in imposing the proper penalty,
the following requisites must be established: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.

None of these requisites can be inferred from the facts of this case. For one, the records do not
show the time when petitioner resolved to commit the crime. The date and, if possible, the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the
third requisite is computed from date and time. Absent this first requisite, evident premeditation was
thus incorrectly appreciated in this case.

Evident premeditation having been wrongly appreciated in this case and there being no other
qualifying circumstance established during the trial, the Court now holds that the crime committed in
this case is frustrated homicide.

The guilt of petitioner for the crime of frustrated homicide had been sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MULLER BALDINO

G.R. No. 137269. October 13, 2000

The complainant Abrelinda Silam was thirteen years old when the incident happened. The accused is her
brother-in-law, being the husband of her elder sister Judith. Abrelinda was staying with another sister
Marcelet Silam-Danglosen at the latter’s house in Irisan, Baguio City. The house of the accused also in
Irisan was 50 to 60 meters away.

On March 4, 1998 Abrelinda left the house of Marcelet and went to the house of accused and Judith nearby.
She was requested by her sister Judith to spend the night thereat to take care of the children of Judith while
the latter is in Buguias, Benguet. At that time Judith and accused had 3 children. While Abrelinda was
sleeping, the accused suddenly grabbed her hands by the wrists and raped her. She felt pain. After he
satisfied his lust, he threatened her not to tell her sister what he did otherwise he will get angry. Then he
moved away and slept.

Immediately Abrelinda left and returned to the house of Marcelet. Crying, she reported to Marcelet and the
husband that the accused raped her or had sexual intercourse with her against her will. She told them she
will sue the accused. It appears that this was the second time accused raped Abrelinda. The first happened
sometime 1997 in their hometown in Buguias. She went home to Buguias, Benguet to report to her father
where she filed her complaint of rape against the accused on March 11, 1998 assisted by her father Teligo
Silam on the first incident. Then she came back to Baguio to file her complaint on the incident that happened
in Baguio.

On March 13, 1998, Abrelinda went to the NBI, Baguio where she was examined by Dr. Ronald Bandonill
who submitted a report. Dr. Bandonill explained that the old-healed hymenal lacerations could have been
inflicted more than three (3) months previous to the examination on the person of Abrelinda on March 13,
1998. He added that once the hymen is lacerated, it will not be lacerated again or there will be no new
lacerations even if there is another sexual contact. This is consistent with the declaration of Abrelinda that
there were two incidents of rape; one in Buguias, sometime 1997 and the second on March 4, 1998 in
Irisan, Baguio as the first incident happened more than 3 months before examination.

The accused denied the charge and claims that the accusation was fabricated. He testified that on the day
in question, he slept together with his wife, who had returned from a visit to her parents in Buguias, Benguet,
the day before.

During the period from February 20 to March 3, 1998, when his wife was in Buguias, he personally took
care of the needs of the two children left with him and brought the children to his place of work at Irisan,
where he was assigned as security guard.

He insisted that neither he nor his wife requested Abrelinda to take care of the children while his wife was
in Buguias and that while Abrelinda went to their house about four times during his wife’s absence, it was
only for the purpose of getting rice and other things after which she immediately left.

Issue:
Whether or not the court below erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape of Abrelinda.
Ruling:

The court found the accused liable as charged for the following reason:

 First, the accused had carnal knowledge of Abrelinda.

 Second, the carnal knowledge was consummated by means of force and against her will. Abrelinda
did not freely and willingly submit to the carnal act. There was force used on her. True, the accused
was not armed at the time. But, his size, weight and strength were enough for him to attain his evil
design. At a tender age of 13, Abrelinda was no match to the size and strength of accused.

‘
 Third, the fact that the Medico-Legal Report shows that there were no extragenital physical injuries
noted on the body of Abrelinda at the time she was examined does not negate her claim of rape.
Neither does it mean lack of resistance on her part.
  Fourth, after the sexual act, Abrelinda returned that same night to the house of her sister Marcelet
crying and disclosed what happened and will would sue him. If the sexual intercourse was with her
consent, Abrelinda would have kept it to herself especially so that the accused is married to her
older sister Judith.

 Fifth, it is unnatural and highly improbable that a simple and innocent 13 year old barrio girl like
Abrelinda would fabricate matters about the cruel acts committed on her person by the accused
knowing fully well the seriousness and consequences of her charges.

 Sixth, she was candid, natural and straightforward in her answers without any intention to evade or
conceive.

 Seventh, the claim of the accused that the charges against him were fabricated was of no merit
because the accused cannot point to any dark or sinister motive that Abrelinda may have in filing
the instant case.

 Ninth. it is hard to believe that accused can baby sit his children Jomar and Janice, ages 5 and 3
respectively while doing his work at the same time. His claim that he brought them to his work
where electric transformers and installations are being guarded by him, a dangerous place
ordinarily is not plausible and credible.

Judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Muller Baldino Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Rep. Act 8353, as charged in the Information,
with the aggravating qualifying circumstance of the victim, Abrelinda Silam, being a 13 year old minor and
the offender Muller Baldino, being her brother-in-law and relative by affinity within the third civil degree.

G.R. No. 132392 January 18, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAR MARCOS Y MON, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
In Province of Pangasinan, the accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully hack
Virgilio Marcos y Mon, (his elder brother) with a bolo at the back inflicting upon him injuries, which caused his death as
a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
RTC finds (accused) Cesar Marcos y Mon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder punishable under
Art. 248 of the PC and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death. Actual damages (51,000) Moral damages
(50,000) indemnified to the heirs
Evidence for the prosecution shows:
Virgilio bent down to put on the ground the tools he was carrying. A witness saw Cesar suddenly hacked the
unsuspecting Virgilio from behind. Virgilio fell to the ground then Cesar hacked him again. When the policemen arrived
Cesar surrendered his bolo and, allowed himself to be hauled into the police car. On a post mortem examination it was
testified that the person could not be hacked in front. Accused-Appellant testified that he agreed to go to the police
station and upon reaching the police station.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death. It is argued that although the aggravating
circumstance of Evident Premeditation was raised in the information, the prosecution failed to prove the same and
hence, accused-appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

RULING
- evident premeditation should not come to fore simply because it was never appreciated by the trial court in its decision
nor was it considered in determining the penalty to be imposed.
- Treachery, to be considered a qualifying circumstance, must be PROVEN as clearly and indubitably as the crime
itself, and cannot be presumed. Witness testified that appellant, suddenly attacked the victim from behind with a bolo
the aggravating circumstance of treachery qualifies the crime to murder.
- Aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, although alleged in the information, was not duly proven by the
prosecution and hence, it was properly not appreciated by the trial court.
- Alternative circumstance of relationship was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
- Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.13
There is here present the aggravating circumstance of relationship but this is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Pursuant to Article 63, the correct penalty to be imposed should only be reclusion perpetua.
Actual damages, P51,000.00 must be reduced to P18,000.00 since it is only the latter amount which is supported by a
receipt. The court can only grant actual damages for such expenses if they are supported by receipts. 15
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Civil Indemnity of P50,000.00 should also be awarded without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime.16
RTC’s decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION Penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua and that appellant is
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P18,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.

G.R. No. 140348 July 18, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GERRYMEL ESTILLORE Y POSTICO, appellant.

FACTS
In the municipality of Rosario, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of
superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and set on fire one Mary Jane Del Carmen with
the use of gas or combustible liquid which caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs
Witness saw appellant carrying his and Mary Jane’s child and jumping out of the about one meter high window of his
"very brightly" lighted house. And in a "soft voice,” asked for help. Mary Jane Del Carmen was found inside the burned
house by the witness who went to help and was then brought to the hospital but subsequently died.
In connection with the death of the victim, her family incurred P28,000.00 for funeral expenses, P10,000.00 of which
had been reimbursed by the Social Security System (SSS), P3,000.00 for the autopsy of her body, and P500.00 for
gasoline and food.
From the post mortem examination by prosecution witness Dr. Renato Bautista
-Cause of death is Burns, severe.
-an accelerant like gasoline, gas and lighter fluid was splashed on the body of the victim. Dr. Bautista ruled out the
possibility of suicide and opined that his findings are consistent with a third party being responsible for the burns suffered
by the victim.
Finding that the killing was attended "by the aggravating circumstance that the accused employed means to weaken
the defense by splashing an accelerant on the victim’s face, which mode of attack was calculated to insure the
commission of the crime without risk to the offender," The trial court convicted Gerrymel Estillore y Postico guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death; and he is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 as indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P21,500.00
as actual damages. (Emphasis supplied).

ISSUE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE
UNCORROBORATED THEORY, CONJECTURES, SUSPICION, SPECULATION AND SURMISES OF THE
MEDICAL OFFICER WHO CONDUCTED THE AUTOPSY ON THE CADAVER OF THE VICTIM.
RULING
Appellant is Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt by the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, which
included the facts testified by the witnesses along with the unrefutted opinion of Dr. Bautista, that the victim received
the splashes of that accelerant and the assailant then lighted her up. This points that the appellant was the who set the
victim on fire which caused her death.
Imposable Penalty:
-The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance that appellant employed means to weaken the defense and
accordingly sentenced him to death.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that every complaint or information should state not only the
qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. In the case at bar, the information did not specifically allege that
appellant employed means to weaken the defense nor show how the act which resulted in the death of the victim was
committed. The said aggravating circumstance cannot thus be appreciated.
The penalty for the crime of Murder for which appellant is liable is reclusion perpetua to death. As there is neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance in the case at bar, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied
conformably with Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
- Moral Damages, while it needs no proof, the award of P 100,000 should be reduced to P 50,000
- Actual damages, may only be awarded if duly supported by receipts. Since only the funeral expenses of P28,000.00,
less the admitted reimbursement by the SSS of P10,000.00, and the autopsy expenses of P3,000.00 are duly supported
by receipts, the award of P21,500.00 must be reduced to P21,000.00. 62
People vs. Dawaton

GR No. 1446247. September 17, 2002.

Facts:

Esmeraldo Cortez was inviting over guests to his house on September 20, 1998. His brother-in-law Edgar Dawaton
and kumpadre Leonides Lavares arrived at 12:00 noon. Domingo Reyes arrived shortly thereafter. The group, all of
which are residents of Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora, started drinking. Came 3:00 pm, they decided to
transfer to the house of Edgar Dawaton's uncle Amado after the group has finished four bottles of gin.

Upon arriving at the elder Dawaton's house, they proceeded at the balcony and continued their drinking spree there.
The elder Dawaton was not home at the time of their session. Leonides, due to his drunkenness, opted to sleep on
the papag or wooden bench on the balcony area, as the three continued drinking until they finished another bottle of
gin.

At around 3:30 pm, Edgar stood up and left for his house. He went back with a stainless knife ranging 2-3 inches in
length and used it to stab the sleeping Leonides near the base of his neck. Awakened by the sudden attack,
Leonides was distraught of his companion's deed against him. Edgar gave him another stab on the upper part of his
neck, spilling blood on the arm of Leonides.

Leonides tried to escape for his life, but the bigger Edgar grabbed him from the collar of his shirt and stabbed him
multiple times. Leonides still managed to move 20 meters away from the elder Dawaton's house, but he dropped in
front of the Cortez residence. From that point, Edgar continuously stabbed him until Leonides expired. After the
incident, he fled to the house of his uncle Carlito Baras, where he was arrested by the authorities, who found him
when people surrounding the body of Leonides pointed them to Edgar's whereabouts.

Domingo and Esmeraldo was shocked by the incident. Both failed to convince Edgar to stop stabbing Leonides, yet
they were not able to help the poor victim.

II. Issues

1.Whether or not the sentence of the trial court charging Dawaton guilty of murder qualified by treachery is valid.
2.Whether or not the account of Dawaton on his provocation by the victim, leading to the commission of the murder,
is valid.

Held:

1. Yes. Treachery is involved in the commission of the crime. There is no question to that, since it is proven by the
prosecution witnesses that at the time of the commission, the victim was drunk and fast asleep, and that Edgar
unexpectedly started to attack the victim in his sleep. Hence the victim lacked the opportunity to defend himself from
the attack.

2. No. There was no evidence to prove that account, as said by Domingo and Esmeraldo themselves.

The presence of a grenade being threatened to be used by the victim, as mentioned in another version of the facts
prepared by Edgar, is not merited. The prosecution witnesses belied it and maintained that the victim was fast asleep
and not in a belligerent manner against the accused. In fact, they claim that the attack was so unexpected, the two
having been in good terms to each other prior to their drunkenness.
People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Bacang

GR Number 116512

July 30, 1996

Facts:

From the judgment of the RTC of Negros Oriental, in Criminal Case No. 397-B, finding them and co-
accused Palacios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay, severally, Php 200,000.00 and Php 25,000.00 as actual damages
and for the funeral expenses, and costs, accused Casido and Alcorin appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a supplemental notice of appeal on December 8, 1993. Appeal was accepted on December 7, 1994.

On January 11, 1996, the court received an undated urgent motion to withdraw appeal from the accused-
appellants which did not state any reason therefor. On March 22, 1996, court received a 1st indorsement
informing the Court that the accused-appellants were released on conditional pardon on January 25,
1996.

On May 20, 1996 the court directed Superintendent Venacio Tesoro to submit the certified true copies of
the Conditional Pardon and the release/discharge order. Tesoso submitted the copies both signed by the
President on January 19, 1996 and certificates of discharge from prison showing they were released on
January 25, 1996. Pardons were granted by virtue of the authority conferred upon the President by the
Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release,
and Pardon.

Issues:

Whether or not conditional pardons can be extended to the accused-appellants during the pendency of
their instant appeal.

Ruling:

No. In an earlier decision, People v Hinlo, the Court declared the practice of processing applications for
pardon or parole despite pending appeals to be in clear violation of law. In People v Salle, the court
declared grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from his conviction by the trial court shall be prohibited. Agencies/instrumentalities must require proof that
he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn appeal. And that the ruling fully bind
pardons extended after January 31, 1995 during the pendency of the grantee’s appeal.
Conditional pardons granted in the case are VOID for having been extended on January 19, 1996
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THEIR INSTANT APPEAL.

PEOPLE V. PONCIANO AGLIPA

G.R. NO. 130941

August 3, 2000

In the early afternoon of April 24, 1995, Severina Macion was at home in Barangay Mindanao,
Malabuyoc, Cebu, when her son, Erick, informed her that their goats had eaten the corn plants of the
Aglipas. Severina told Erick that they would report the matter to the Barangay Captain as soon as his
father would arrive.

Later, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the couple went to the house of the Barangay Captain.
When they arrived there, they found that the Barangay Captain was not at home. They, however, decided
to wait for him for a while. As they waited for the Barangay Captain, appellant Ponciano Aglipa suddenly
appeared and stood on the road in front of the Barangay Captain’s house. He shouted at Solano
challenging him to a ‘buno’ (fight to the death). Solano answered saying he was not afraid of him.
Severina advised her husband not to mind Ponciano so as to avoid trouble. Solano ignored appellant’s
challenge Ponciano then went home.

They decided to stop waiting for the Barangay Captain. While walking home along the road, Solano and
Severina dropped by the sari-sari store. About 20 meters away, appellant shouted from his house
challenging Solano to a fight. Solano advised Severina to go ahead and take their children inside their
house because he would still urinate. As it was already dark, Severina got a kerosene lamp and went
back to her husband. While Solano was urinating, Severina stood behind him holding the kerosene lamp.
Momentarily, Ponciano, who came from nowhere. Without saying a word, appellant hit Solano with an
iron bar at the back of his head. Solano slumped with his face down. Ponciano hit Solano repeatedly with
a crowbar which caused Solano’s instantaneous death. Severina rushed to the aid of her husband but
she too was hit by Ponciano at the back of her head. Severina instinctively turned around to face
appellant and attempted to wrest the crowbar from him but appellant hit her on the hand holding the
kerosene lamp.

However, Ponciano invoked self-defense, He said that when Solano Macion saw the him, he pulled out
his gun and fired but the accused evaded by docking and in defense of himself he picked a coco lumber
and without hesitation struck the hand of Solano. Then Severina, picked the gun which was released by
Solano. In anticipation that she would use it against the accused, the latter also struck her hand with the
same lumber. Since he was standing and she was crouching in her attempt to pick-up the gun, the back
of her head was also hit which was injured.

The trial court found the accused guilty of murder and frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court erred in not appreciating the self-defense interposed by the accused.

2. Whether or not the court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder in the killing of
Solano Macion and of frustrated murder in the wounding of Severina Macion.

HELD:

1) No. The burden of proof shifts to the person invoking self-defense, who, with clear and convincing
evidence must establish all the following requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person claiming self-defense. Upon failure to establish these requisites, conviction is
inevitable because the accused, by setting up self-defense, admits being the author of the killing.

2) No. The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the accused deliberately adopts such
means, methods and forms of execution that give the victim no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation.
The essence of treachery is swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim.

Furthermore, Cedeño’s eyewitness account clearly showed that Aglipa had sneaked behind Solano, who
was urinating at the side of the road, and struck him on the head with a crowbar. Not content with doing
that, appellant also hit the victim’s equally defenseless wife on the head, almost killing her. Verily, he
carried out his attack in a swift manner with no risk to himself from any defense which the victims might
put up. Clearly, there was treachery.

Hence, the trial court did not err in finding him guilty of murder for the death of Solano Macion and
frustrated murder for the wounding of Severina Macion.

People vs. Ocfemia

G.R. No. 126135 October 25, 2000

Facts:
On Nov. 22, 1995, one Miriam Reyes, maid of accused-appellant Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot,
complained to accused-appellant’s live-in partner, Margie Ocfemia, that Alberto touched her private
part. Margie confronted Alberto and he admitted touching the private part of Miriam. Night came and
accused-appellant talked with Miriam, asking Miriam not to tell her brother and the brothers of Margie
what he did to her but Miriam refused and told Alberto she has to tell them what he did to her. Later
that evening, Alberto told the members of the household to go to sleep and while Margie, his common-
law wife, was lying, Margie noticed that Alberto was roaming around the house, taking coffee and
smoking. At 11:00 that evening, while Miriam was lying on her side and asleep, Alberto stabbed her
several times. Miriam shouted asking for help and was brought to the hospital by Margie yet the victim
passed away.
Upon arraignment on Nov. 13, 1995, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the offense charged.
On Nov. 17, 1995, the Court issued an order, setting the case for hearing so as to conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea of guilty.
Before the reception of the evidence of the defense, accused-appellant through counsel filed
a motion praying that his plea of guilty be withdrawn as it was improvidently made. Motion was granted
and accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
Accused-appellant thereafter testified in his defense and stated that on Nov. 22, 1995, he
arrived home from work at 11:00 in the evening and was approached by Margie, telling him that their
maid, Miriam, will be leaving the following day. Alberto then asked Miriam why would she leave and
Alberto proceeded to go outside the house. He suddenly noticed he was far from home but cannot
remember how he got there. Upon realizing, he boarded a jeepney and went back home. On his way
home, he passed by his brother Oscar’s house, Oscar asked him what his problem was and Alberto
did not answer. Oscar mentioned to him something like "Wala na patay na" and referred to him as the
one who killed Miriam. Alberto said that at the time, he did not know who killed Miriam. At his brother’s
house he was arrested by the police and brought to his house. He noticed that his house was "magulo,”
and Margie, his wife, was not at home. He said he pleaded guilty because at that time, his mind was
confused.
After his testimony, accused-appellant through counsel prayed he be subjected to psychiatric
examination. The trial court denied accused-appellant’s motion for reasons that there is no merit found
in the plea of the accused, thru his counsel, that he should be examined by a Psychiatrist to determine
his mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense. The trial court handed down its
judgment, finding the accused-appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery, and aggravated by
evident premeditation and the accused-appellant’s private relations with the victim, who was his maid
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, this automatic review of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not allowing the accused to be examined by the National
Center for Mental Health to establish his mental condition during and after the commission of the crime

Ruling:
No, the trial court’s denial of the request of accused-appellant to be subjected to psychiatric
examination is correct. There is no cogent justification to reverse the finding of the trial court that
accused-appellant was of sound mental condition at the time of his arraignment, and that during the
hearing where the accused-appellant testified in his defense, there was "no slightest insinuation" by
accused-appellant and counsel that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. The
fact that the accused-appellant originally pleaded guilty and thereafter changed his plea to "not guilty"
does not support a claim that there were indications of "mental dysfunction". It is not uncommon for
an accused to change his plea. The invocation of denial and alibi as his defense indicates that he was
in full control of his mental faculties. It has been held that a shift in theory by the defense, from denial
and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after realizing the futility of his earlier defense, is a
clear indication that his defense is a mere concoction. Moreover, the eyewitness account of the
accused-appellant’s common-law wife never mentioned any indication that the accused-appellant
could not have been in his right mind when he committed the crime, and renders the theory of insanity
doubtful. The Court is then convinced that the trial court was right in convicting the accused-appellant
of murder qualified by treachery but does not agree the crime was committed with evident
premeditation and an aggravating circumstance of "private relations of accused-appellant with the
offended party.” Wherefore, the judgment finding Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, is affirmed with the modification that the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.

EFREN MENDOZA Y SALVADOR, Accused-Appellant
GR No. 133382 l 9 March 2000

Facts: Efren Mendoza was charged with the crime of murder for killing Anchito Nano. In
this case Efren alleged that Anchito Nano arrived at their house and upon arrival it started
to destroy the house and that her wife was shouting for help. Efren immediately look for
something to protect his family but found a bolo. He approached Anchito but the latter
tried to hack him but he was able to hack him first on the right side of his neck resulting
to the death of the victim. Thereafter Mendoza went to Municipal Hall of Vinzon and
voluntarily surrendered to the police. He claimed that it was self defense. The autopsy
revealed that location of the wounds found on the body of the victim came from the back
of the victim’s body. The court ruled rejecting appellant’s self defense. This court finds
that the accused was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to
defend himself by means which appeared unreasonable by using a long bolo is
unjustifiable. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating circumstances
of treachery?
Held: The Supreme Court held in the negative. A qualifying circumstance changes
the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other hand,
does not affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition
of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating
circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying
circumstance may not. Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic
aggravating circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it
cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant
the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary surrender.

GR No. 129899
April 27, 2000

People of the Philippines v. Rodulfo Villa y Delgado

Facts:

In the early morning of 22 June 1991 Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass in his yard in New
Cabalan, Olongapo City. Accused Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU and neighbor of Dionito,
suddenly came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle and shot Dionito from behind killing him
instantly. Ronald Fernandez and Sheila Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their fathers rescue after
hearing the gunshot but the accused also fired at them fatally hitting Ronald who was embracing his father,
and mortally wounding Sheila on the thigh and stomach. Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor of the
Fernandezes, attempted to wrestle the rifle from the accused but Samuel too was gunned down.

Villa surrendered to a certain Captain Dolino. He was accordingly charged with multiple murder.
When arraigned on 3 October 1991 he entered a plea of not guilty. His counsel, Atty. Dumpit, manifested
in open court that the accused was desirous of changing his plea to guilty. Thereafter, the accused invoked
self-defense insofar as Fernandez was concerned, as the latter tried to stab him with a bolo. Thus, according
to the accused, he was forced to shoot Dionito with his rifle. The trial court then proceeded to propound
searching questions on the accused to determine whether he understood the nature and consequences of
his change of plea, and upon being satisfied with the answers given by the accused who was assisted by
counsel, the court allowed the change of plea.

The trial court issued an order appointing Atty. Alinea as counsel de oficio for the accused, as his
counsel de parte Atty. Dumpit was unavailable due to his ongoing medical treatment. Before the defense
could present its evidence, Atty. Alinea manifested his inability to confer with the accused but moved that
a psychiatric examination of the accused be made. The motion was granted and the accused was examined
at the Olongapo City General Hospital to ascertain he was suffering from mental illness before, during and
after the commission of the crime.

After more than a month of psychiatric evaluation, the attending physicians submitted to the trial
court a psychiatric evaluation report, which stated in part “Evaluation shows that the patient is suffering from
Insanity or Psychosis classified ashizophrenia. This is a mental illness characterized by deterioration in social and
occupational functioning, auditory hallucination, delusion, thought disturbances and poor judgment. He is at present
incompetent to stand trial”. Six months later, a follow-up report was made, that the patient’s status had
improved enough for him to withstand the rigors of the trial. A petition for release of the accused has been
filed, praying that he be discharged and returned to jail for the speedy disposition of the case. The trial
court granted the petition and the trial resumed with the accused now raising insanity as a defense.

The trial court disregard the defense of insanity and forthwith convicted the accused of the crimes
charged. The court is not convinced that the accused was suffering from insanity of schizophrenic type
before or during the killing. In order that insanity can be considered as an exempting circumstance, it must
be shown to exist just before or during the commission of the offense. Also, in order to exempt the accused
from criminal liability it must be shown beyond cavil of doubt that there was complete deprivation of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime. These the accused
failed to prove.

Issue:

Whether accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crimes as would exempt him
from criminal liability

Ruling:

The court affirm the judgment of conviction. . Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation
of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has
not lost consciousness of his acts.

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature
and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged persons general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and
beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts,
by means of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of a person, and through which we determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.

Examining the evidence on record, we are convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the time
he perpetrated the killings. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete
absence of intelligence on his part: (a) Immediately after he killed the victims he thought of surrendering
to the PC Detachment in Olongapo City; (b) He showed remorse during his confinement at the Mental
Hospital; and, (c) He was able to give a Sworn Statement before the Prosecutors Office in Olongapo City
immediately after the commission of the crimes narrating his version of the incident.14 These are hardly the
acts of a person with a sick mind. In People v. Ambal we held: "The fact that immediately after the incident
(accused) thought of surrendering to the law-enforcement authorities is incontestable proof that he knew
that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it." Similarly, a feeling of
remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his acts, he
acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for them.
GR No. 140344
August 18, 2000

Solomon Rabor v. People of the Philippines

Facts:

On 17 August 1981, at around 9 o’clock in the evening, Hikaru Miyake, a Japanese national,
residing with his Filipina wife and children in Gem Village, Ma-a, Davao City was taking his usual
"Japanese-style" bath in a drum behind his house. As he soaked his body inside the drum filled with
warm water, he heard a sound which made him turn to the direction where it came from. Miyake sensed
that there was something wrong, so he hurriedly got out of the drum. He then saw petitioner about one
and a half meters away rushing towards him with a bolo. Petitioner attacked Miyake who fought and
grappled with the former for the possession of the bolo. The struggle lasted for about two (2) minutes.

Petitioner fled when he lost possession of the bolo. As a result of the attack, Miyake sustained
injuries on the different parts of his body. Miyake’s security guard arrived to give assistance to his
employer. The security guard saw petitioner flee towards the direction of his house. Miyake was
immediately brought to the Brokenshire Hospital where he was confined for ten (10) days.

Petitioner was hired to bring the Miyake children to their school while petitioner’s wife gave
them piano lessons. This cordial relationship between Miyake and petitioner, however, abruptly ended
when their respective wives quarreled with each other over a sum of money which Mrs. Miyake loaned
to petitioner’s wife. Since then, petitioner became hostile towards the Miyakes.

Petitioner threw stones at the house of Miyake. In the afternoon of that same day, Miyake went to
his house, which was just about fifty (50) meters away, to try to patch things up with him. Nonetheless,
on account of the strained relations between them, Miyake terminated the services of petitioner and his
wife. Petitioner, while riding on his motorcycle, would stop in front of the Miyake residence and shout, "I
want to fight and I will kill you." Miyake ignored these threats to avoid any trouble. Then came that
fateful day of 17 August 1981.

After trial, the Court a quo rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the crime of frustrated
murder.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Issue:

A. Whether or not the decision of the court of appeals finding the petitioner guilty of frustrated
murder is contrary to law;

B. Whether or not the medical certificate presented by the prosecution is hearsay.

 C. Whether or not the conclusion of the court of appeals in the application of evident premeditation
in the instant case is a finding grounded on speculation, surmises, conjectures, and is manifestly mistaken.

D. Whether or not the court of appeals in disregarding the alibi of the petitioner has decided
questions of substance not in accord with law and the applicable decision of the honorable court.

E. Whether or not the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence

Ruling:

The petition is partly meritorious.

The first three issues shall be discussed jointly as they are interrelated. They all pertain to
petitioner’s contention that he was wrongly convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. Petitioner
maintains that the wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal; hence, the crime committed was
merely attempted not frustrated. Further, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not
allegedly sufficiently proven in this case. Petitioner thus is of the view that the crime should be homicide
and not murder. Contrary to petitioner’s insistence, some of the wounds inflicted on the victim were fatal.

Given the foregoing testimony that Miyake could have died if not for the timely medical treatment,
the trial court correctly held that the stage of execution of the crime was frustrated. A felony is "frustrated
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator."

In order that evident premeditation may be properly considered in imposing the proper penalty,
the following requisites must be established: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.

None of these requisites can be inferred from the facts of this case. For one, the records do not
show the time when petitioner resolved to commit the crime. The date and, if possible, the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the
third requisite is computed from date and time. Absent this first requisite, evident premeditation was
thus incorrectly appreciated in this case.

Evident premeditation having been wrongly appreciated in this case and there being no other
qualifying circumstance established during the trial, the Court now holds that the crime committed in
this case is frustrated homicide.

The guilt of petitioner for the crime of frustrated homicide had been sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995

WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, et. al., petitioners v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON, et. al.,
respondents

FACTS:

Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time
before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence
would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres
by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.

On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October
10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an
Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the
validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. It was ruled that the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in
violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

RULING:

Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to
order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial
scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on
conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of
the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal
cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains
pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as
illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering
that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach
thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final
sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of
the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if
in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him,
warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a
pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement
as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not
there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the
courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the
exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office.

G.R. No. L-55309, February 22, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. ALBERTO ABREA y ARANCON,

defendant-appellant

FACTS:

Appellant Alberto Abrea, an escapee from the Davao Prison and Penal Farm and under temporary
detention at Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Jail, was charged of murder by inflicting a stab
wound upon the victim, Anatalio Coca, another inmate of said provincial jail, who, according to an
eyewitness, was stabbed from behind while in the act of receiving his food ration from another
detention prisoner, as a result of which he died. During the arraignment, Accused-appellant
entered a plea of guilty, but before the trial court received the evidence for the prosecution, he
was informed of the probability of a verdict of death and was allowed to withdraw such plea if that
be his desire. Appellant Abrea, however, held on to his original plea of guilty, but hastened to ask
the court that he be accorded leniency in the imposition of the penalty. The trial court found
appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to death, the felony having been committed while
appellant was serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment and attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.

ISSUE:

W/N the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty on the accused on the ground that there
is absence of evident premeditation
HOLDING:

The Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the mitigating circumstance of the plea of guilty in
the appellant’s favor and the absence of evident premeditation, the correct penalty is still death,
for the appellant is a quasi- recidivist and being such, Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code
mandates the imposition of "the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony" and according to Article 248 of the same code; murder is punishable by reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death.

Judgment affirmed, but for lack of the required number of votes, the death penalty was reduced
to reclusion perpetua.

P & INSP. ROQUE G. GALANG v. CA and PEOPLE

GR No. 128536, Jan 31, 2000

Facts:

On November 26, 1992, the town of Alcantara in Romblon was in a festive mood since the
provincial meet was being held, in a cultural program hold "Sayawitan" was scheduled that
night.

That day also happened to be the birthday of Carlos Oro, and, ironically, the day of his demise.
As it was his birthday, Carlos celebrated by going on a drinking spree. At around 7:00 o'clock
that evening, Carlos went home, drunk. After a while, he left, never to return again. At around
8:00 o'clock, in front of the house of ex-Governor Solidum, Carlos figured in an altercation with
one Jojo Marcelo. Later on, he similarly had a run-in with one Dennis Lota, who happened to
pass by.

Reports of the altercation reached appellant who, together with policeman Adreo Galin and
CAFGU members, proceeded to the place. Upon seeing Carlos, appellant drew his gun and
pointed it at him, and said: "Carlos, drop your gun, I am Inspector Galang”. Carlos raised his
hands, saying: " Nong Roque, I will not fight back”. Thereafter, appellant grab the right arm of
Carlos and forced him to kneel on the ground with his right hand behind his back still being held
by the appellant. It was in this position when appellant pumped two (2) bullets into Carlos who
slumped to the ground. Appellant ordered his men to get a tricycle to bring Carlos to the
hospital. He was pronounced dead upon arrival.

Police Inspector Roque G. Galang was originally charged with homicide by information filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Romblon, Odiongan, Branch 82. After due trial on plea of not
guilty, on May 17, 1994, the trial court rendered decision finding accused Police Inspector
Roque G. Galang guilty, as charged, rejecting his claim of self defense. Accused appealed to the
CA. On November 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with
modification that of the trial court, as set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision. On
March 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the petitioner of homicide, not appreciating his claim
of self-defense.

Ruling:

No. To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must prove the existence of all the following
concurrent elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (c) the person defending himself
must not have provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression.

Petitioner claims that he fired upon Carlos Oro after the latter pointed a gun at him. The
physical evidence does not support this claim. It was impossible for Carlos to be facing
petitioner because the bullet's trajectory was downward. Carlos Oro was in kneeling position
when petitioner mercilessly shot him from behind as he was begging for his life.

Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was attendant at the initial stage,
the same ceased to exist when Carlos Oro dropped his gun and was forced down on his knees.
The threat to petitioner's life was no longer attendant. He had no justification for shooting
Carlos Oro. When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or
even wound the former aggressor.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in considering in favor of petitioner "the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance of performance of duty as
provided under paragraph 1, Article 13 in relation to paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code. A peace officer is never justified in using necessary force in effecting arrest or in
treating with wanton violence the arrested person or in resorting to dangerous means when
the arrest could be effected otherwise.

The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 16954, promulgated on November 29, 1996. Instead, the
Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Police Inspector Roque G. Galang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, their attendance having been
offset by each other,

BUDLONG v. JUDGE APALISOK

G.R. No.L-60151 June 24, 1983

This case in an ex parte motion to set aside the above entitled case for hearing having been
filed by acting ass. fiscal Budlong, and the court finding said motion was filed out of time
considering that the accused has already made an application for probation, the court hereby
denies said motion and considered the case as closed and terminated.

Facts:

The petitioner filed information before the respondent court charging private respondent
Camilo Galagar with the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. During
the scheduled arraignment, on February 4, 1982, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Immediately after the plea, the respondent Judge rendered judgment and sentence
the accused to suffer 30 days imprisonment and to pay the costs. No civil liability was imposed.
The accused manifested his intention to avail of the provisions P.D.No.968, the probation law.
The respondent court gave the counsel of the accused 5 days within which to file the petition
for probation. Petitioner filed an ex parte motion to prove the civil liability of accused but it was
denied by respondent court.

Then, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was again denied by the court stating:

The court hereby denies said motion on the ground that under Section 4 of P.D.No.1257,
amending P.D. No. 968, the Court after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and
upon his application for probation suspends the execution of said sentence and place the
defendant on probation. The prosecution should have asked leave to prove the civil liability of
the defendant right before its rendered judgment not after for by doing so, would in effect
nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of Probation
Law.

Petitioner contends that: Firstly, respondent Judge gravely erred in holding that the ex parte
motion to set case for hearing was filed out of time considering that the accused has already
filed application for probation. Secondly, respondent Judge again gravely erred in delaying the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that under section1 of Presidential Decree No.
1257,the court after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon his application
for probation suspends the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation.
Lastly, respondent Judge likewise erred and gravely abuse his discretion when in the same
order denying the motion for reconsideration he opined and held that the prosecution should
have asked leave to prove the civil liability of the defendant before it rendered its judgment not
after for by doing so would in effect nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would
defeat the very purpose of probation law.

Issue:

1) Whether or not the respondent Judge has committed grave abuse of discretion on rendering
court orders denying motions to prove the civil liability of the accused.

2) Whether or not the probation law has bearing on civil liability.

Held:

1) Yes, the respondent judge has committed grave abuse of discretion on rendering court
orders denying motions to prove the civil liability of the accused.

2) No, probation law has absolutely no bearing on civil liability.

The extinction and survival of civil liability are governed by Chapter 3, Title 5, Book 1 of the RPC:

Art. 112 Extinction of Civil Liability-civil liability established in articles 100,101,102 and 103 of
this code, shall be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations in accordance with the
provisions of the civil code.

Art 113 Obligation to Satisfy Civil Liability-Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as
provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy civil
liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served
his sentenced consisting of deprivation of liberty of other rights, or has not been acquired to
serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason.

If under Art.113 of RPC, the obligation to satisfy civil liability continues notwithstanding service
of sentence or non service of sentence due to amnesty ,pardon, commutation of sentence or
any other reason, we fail to see what led respondent judge to rule that an application for
probation should have an opposite effect insofar as determination of civil liability is concerned.
It could have not have been delay because the motion was filed on the day after the judgment
of conviction was rendered in open court right after the plea of guilty and the manifestation
that the accused was applying for probation.

The probation law clearly provides only for the suspension of sentence imposed on the accused
by virtue of his application for probation. It has absolutely no bearing on civil liability. There is
no legal basis for the respondent court’s conclusion that a hearing to prove the civil liability of
the accused under the circumstances of the case would in effect nullify the order of the
suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of probation law.

Thus, the instant petition is granted. The respondent court’s orders dated February 11,1982
and February 19,9182 respectively are hereby set aside. The respondent court is hereby
ordered to set hearings on the civil liability of the accused.
G.R. No. 123298 : November 27, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FRANCISCO L. CALPITO alias Francis,
Appellant.

FACTS: That on or about November 21, 1990, appellant Francisco Calpito armed with a deadly
weapon, with intent to gain did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of
violence and intimidation on the person of Florentina Villas rob, take and carry away a shoulder
bag containing cash in the amount of P15,000 and jewelries amounting to P30,000 belonging to
Florentina Villas;that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof and for the purpose
of enabling him to take/rob and carry away the above-mentioned bag, taking advantage of
superior strength with treachery and with intent to kill, said accused did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack and stab with the said weapon Florentina Villas and
Israel Montilla inflicting wounds on Florentina Villas which caused her death and [a] wound on
Israel Montilla which necessitated medical attendance on him for a period of 5-7 days and which
incapacitated him from performing his usual work for the same length of time. Initially,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty and waived pre-trial.But later on, he changed his plea to
one of guilty.
The prosecution presented its sole witness in the person of Israel Montilla, the grandson
of the victim Florentina Villas. In his testimony, he narrated that at around 2:00 a.m. of
November 21, 1990, he was sleeping in the sala of the victim’s residence when he was awakened
by the victim’s shout for help. He then rushed to the victim’s bedroom which was just 2 ½
meters away from the sofa on which he slept. By the doorway, he met appellant who was holding
a fan knife in his right hand and the victim’s shoulder bag in his left. He grappled with appellant,
who suddenly stabbed him on his left upper arm. While Montilla searched for something with
which he could defend himself, appellant rushed out of the house through the kitchen door, the
lock of which the latter had destroyed. Montilla looked inside the bedroom and saw his
grandmother on the bed lying in a pool of blood, with stab wounds all over her body.
Montilla further declared that no other person was inside the bedroom when the incident
happened. He was able to recognize appellant because of the fluorescent light. He testified that
he could not be mistaken regarding the assailant’s identity, since he had long known appellant,
who resided near the victim’s house. He also stated that appellant, in his haste, left a flashlight
and a cap which had the latter’s name written on its inside portion. He added that he had known
appellant to be a drug user, and that at
the time of the incident, the latter appeared to be under the influence of drugs.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Court a quo erred in convicting the accused of the crime of
murder despite the absence of any qualifying circumstance
(2) Whether or not the court a quo erred in not appreciating the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority interposed by the defense

RULING: (1) No. The information alleged the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse
of superior strength. It is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the commission of the crime. In a
recent case, it was held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of the aggressor's superior strength. The
circumstance must apply with more reason in the present case, where the abuse of superior
strength is evident from the notorious disparity between the relative strength of the victim, a 74-
year-old unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with a knife.
With respect to treachery, this Court holds that it cannot be considered in the present case. This
circumstance cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved the events after the
attack happened, but not the manner the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the
victim's death unfolded. It must be noted that in this case, the prosecution's lone witness only
accounted for what transpired after the stabbing, as he did not see the actual attack on the
victim. Given the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the court a
quo therefore correctly convicted appellant for Murder.

(2) Yes. This Court emphasizes that while the submitted birth certificate is not entirely
satisfactory, a careful review of the records reveals other evidence of appellant's minority. In the
December 19, 1994 hearing, upon being asked by the trial court, appellant declared that he was
20 years old, consequently indicating that on November 21, 1990, he must have been only 16
years old. Also, as appearing in appellant's sworn statement executed on November 21, 1991, he
declared that he was 18 years old, hence evincing that he must have been only 17 at the time of
the incident. Notwithstanding the discrepancy, both declarations nonetheless show that he was
below 18 when he committed the crime. This Court has held that the claim of minority by an
appellant will be upheld even without any proof to corroborate his testimony, especially so when
coupled by the fact that the prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence thereto. In this
case, the prosecution only questioned the submitted birth certificate, but did not adduce any
evidence to disprove appellant's claim of minority when he committed the crime. Accordingly,
the mitigating circumstance of minority should, as a matter of fairness, be appreciated in favor
of appellant, especially in light of the compassionate liberality this Court has granted to minors
involved in serious crimes.

G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GEORGE CORTES y
ORTEGA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS: On August 12, 1998, provincial prosecutor Alfredo J. Pondoc of Surigao del Sur filed
with the RTC Surigao del Sur, an Information for murder against accused George Cortes y
Ortega. On or about 11:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, of June 24, 1998, at Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, Philippines, the accused George with treachery and evident premeditation,
armed with a knife and with intent to kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked, assault and stabbed one Edlyn S. Gamboa, a 16 year old girl, thereby inflicting the
latter multiple stab wounds on her body which caused her instantaneous death as certified by
the doctor, to the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs.
Contrary to law: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
On June 24, 1998, at about eleven oclock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a
bench outside her house located at P. Lindo St., Saint Paul
District, Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her
asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibua. Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by accused
George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of the house. When Edlyn complied,
accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to help Edlyn, but
accused overpowered her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away despite being wounded;
however, she collapsed five (5) meters away from where she was stabbed. Junilla shouted for
help. At this juncture, accused scampered away. Edlyn was able to stand up but again collapsed
after walking about five (5) steps. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she
expired.
Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion against
whom he had an altercation earlier. He committed the mistake because at the time of the
incident, accused was very drunk and the place was very dark. He only learned that he had
stabbed the wrong person the following morning through the radio vigilantes program.
On August 28, 1998 the trial court arraigned the accused. He entered a plea of guilty. The
prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances.
The accused on the other hand presented evidence proving the mitigating circumstances that
attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty,
nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were present in the
commission of the crime. The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity and the
alternative mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court after considering the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances attendant found the existence of the aggravating circumstances and appreciated
only the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty that was offset by one of the aggravating
circumstances. The trial court then proceeded to rule on the appropriate penalty to be imposed
on the accused. The trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the
Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Death, to indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P60,000.00, and to
pay damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and cost

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the court erred in finding that the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of superior strength, sex and intoxication
attended the commission of the crime charged; and
(2) Whether or not the court erred imposing the death penalty upon accused instead of
reclusion perpetua.

HOLDING:
(2)Yes. The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that the only aggravating circumstance
present was treachery which qualified the killing to murder and that there were two mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty and intoxication, not habitual.According to the accused, the
prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and other
circumstances attending the commission of the crime. The prosecution failed to establish the
following elements of this aggravating circumstance: (a) the time when the accused determined
to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that
determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act. As to the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty, although the accused stabbed the victim several times, the same could
not be considered as cruelty because there was no showing that it was intended to prolong the
suffering of the victim. For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it must be shown that
the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as
he inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. The crime is aggravated because by
deliberately increasing the suffering of the victim the offender denotes sadism and consequently
a marked degree of malice and perversity. The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds
upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening between the
infliction of one (1) wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong the
suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into
consideration. As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be
considered for the simple reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the
crime. Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by
the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the
crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture. 9 In the case at bar, no
evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime,
or to conceal his identity. The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery,
so that it can not be appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance. 10 Here,
treachery qualified the offense to murder. As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
sex, the same could not be considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately intended to
offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood.11 In
fact, the accused mistook the victim for a man. Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either
aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the
crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to
the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or
intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading in toxication to
mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the
commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same
time, that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic
drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.

(2) Yes. The accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances alleged
in the information and considering that there was one mitigating circumstance attendant, that
of plea of guilty, the penalty imposable is not death but reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor
General agrees with the accused that the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in
accordance with Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6759.

G.R. Nos. 146235-36 May 29, 2002

PEOPLE V. RAFAEL

Facts:

This is an appeal by way of automatic review from the decision,1 dated December 8, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City, convicting accused-appellants, Melchor and Mario
Rafael, of frustrated murder and murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-59453 and Q-94-59454,
respectively. Accused-appellants were accused with their father Maximo Rafael under the following
informations alleging –

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59453 (Frustrated Murder),

That on or about the 28th day of August 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together, and mutually, helping one another with evident premeditation,
treachery, and superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to
kill, attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of ALEJANDRA MACARAEG-
RAFAEL, by then and there hacking her with a bolo and hitting her on the different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which ordinarily would cause the death of said
ALEJANDRA MACARAEG-RAFAEL, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of their will, that is the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said
ALEJANDRA MACARAEG-RAFAEL which prevented her death, to her damage and prejudice.

and in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59454 (Murder),

That on or about the 28th day of August 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation,
treachery and superior strength, by then and there hacking her [GLORIA TUATIS-RAFAEL] with the
use of a bolo and hitting her on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious and
mortal wounds which was the direct and immediate cause of her death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said GLORIA TUATIS-RAFAEL.

Issues:

I. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting accused-appellants of the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder despite the incredible, inconsistent, if not contradictory testimon[ies] of
the prosecution witnesses.

II. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting accused-appellants of the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder despite the fact that accused-appellants' guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
I.

No. With respect to this issue, the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it be
shown that it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. This is because the trial court, having personally heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during trial, is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility.

The Court thus finds no reason to doubt the accuracy of the identification by prosecution witnesses
Alejandra Rafael and Leonilo Hamoy of accused-appellants as the assailants of Gloria Rafael. Indeed,
the same is supported by Rogelio Rafael's account which, curiously, accused-appellants chose not to
assail in this appeal. Against their positive identification of accused-appellants, Mario Rafael's defense
of denial and alibi cannot prevail.

II.

No. The attacks on Gloria and Alejandra Rafael were clearly qualified by treachery inasmuch as they
were made without warning and by armed men against defenseless women. The two conditions for
treachery, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and
(2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed
by him,33 have thus been met in this case. This qualifying circumstance of treachery absorbs the abuse
of superior strength alleged in the informations so the latter need not be appreciated separately.34 The
crime committed as to Alejandra was clearly frustrated murder considering that the number and
severity of her wounds would have caused her death had she not been rushed to the hospital and
received timely medical attention.

G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995

WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, et. al., petitioners v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON, et. al.,
respondents

FACTS:

Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time
before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence
would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres
by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.

On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October
10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an
Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the
validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. It was ruled that the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in
violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

RULING:

Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to
order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial
scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on
conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of
the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.

It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal
cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains
pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as
illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering
that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach
thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final
sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of
the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if
in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him,
warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a
pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement
as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not
there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the
courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the
exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office.