G.R. No.

117401 October 1, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., Accused-Appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 4, dated March 2, 1994,
finding accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. guilty of the crime of parricide.

On January 17, 1989, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial
Court of Davao. The information reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR. of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about September 17, 1988, in the Municipality of Kaputian, Province of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping with Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, who are charged for (sic) Murder in a separate
information, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, with the use of a bolo and an iron bar,
assault, hack and stab his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon him wounds which caused his death, and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damage to the
heirs of the victim.

Contrary to law. 1

Accused-appellant's case was tried jointly with the murder case filed against his co-accused Reynaldo Malita
and Eddie Malita who, however, withdrew their "not guilty" plea during the trial and were accordingly
sentenced. Thus, only accused-appellant's case was tried on the merits.

The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its witnesses accused-appellant's brother Leo
Quidato, appellant's wife Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara. Likewise, the prosecution offered
in evidence affidavits containing the extra-judicial confessions of Eddie Malita and Reynaldo Malita. The two
brothers were, however, not presented by the prosecution on the witness stand. Instead, it presented Atty.
Jonathan Jocom to prove that the two were assisted by counsel when they made their confessions. Similarly,
the prosecution presented MTC Judge George Omelio who attested to the due and voluntary execution of the
sworn statements by the Malita brothers.

Based on the foregoing pieces of evidence, the prosecution's version of the facts is as follows:

Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a
widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned sixteen
hectares of coconut land in the area.

On September 16, 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, herein accused-appellant, and two hired hands,
Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra,
Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left. Bernardo and accused-appellant went
back to Sitio Libod that same day. 2

According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day, September 17, 1988, accused-appellant and the
Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-law's
house to get money from the latter. She had no idea, however, as to what later transpired because she had
fallen asleep before 10:00 p.m. 3 Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on the ground that
the same was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. 4 The judge, acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said testimony only against
accused-appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.
As adverted to earlier, the Malita brothers confessed to their participation in the crime, executing affidavits
detailing how Bernardo was killed. Their version shows that Eddie had been living with accused-appellant for
the past four years. At around 6:00 p.m. of September 17, 1988, accused-appellant asked Reynaldo to come to
the former's house to discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldo's arrival at accused-appellant's house, he
saw that his brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. The Malita brothers alleged that it
was at this juncture that accused-appellant proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's
house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the house,
accused-appellant knocked on the door, asking his father to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door,
Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck.
Accused-appellant and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking for money but they found none; so, the
three of them left.

The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by accused-appellant's son, who had gone there to call
his Lolo for breakfast. The cause of death, as stated in Bernardo's death certificate was "hypovolemic shock
secondary to fatal hacking wound on the posterior neck area." 5

On September 27, 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo
and Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were promptly arrested by the
police. Aside from arresting the latter two, however, the police also arrested accused-appellant.

On September 29, 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian
Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they
signified their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given
in the absence of counsel, Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to
sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with
their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. 6

Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their
constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita
brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie
affix their signatures on the affidavits. 7

In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the Malita brothers. He claimed that the Malita
brothers were not at his house on the evening of September 17, 1988. They, however, passed by his house at
around 10:00 p.m. and asked him to come with them to his father's house, threatening him with harm if he
refused. Out of fear, he led the way to Bernardo's house and even knocked on the latter's door until Bernardo
opened the same. In the ensuing commotion, he scampered away, but in his confusion, reached his house only
at around 11:00 p.m., although the same was only about one hundred fifty meters away from Bernardo's
house. He did not call for help. Eddie arrived a while later. Accused-appellant claimed not to have seen the
actual killing, having run away earlier. He, however, admitted finding a bolo, encrusted with blood, at his
house. He turned the same over to his brother, who, in turn, surrendered the same to the police. Accused-
appellant did not feel uneasy having Eddie around even if he knew of the latter's participation in the crime. 8

After due trial, the court a quo rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused, Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the offense of Parricide which falls under Article 246 (of the
Revised Penal Code), for the death of his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, is hereby sentenced by
this court to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties provided by law and
to indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the amount of P50,000.00, in accordance with current
case doctrines of the Supreme Court, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 9

From the aforesaid judgment of conviction, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning the following
errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF REYNALDO MALITA
(EXH. C) AND EDDIE MALITA (EXH. D) IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING (THE) EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE RAISED BY THE ACCUSED AND DISREGARDING
(ANY) ILL-MOTIVE OF REYNALDO AND EDDIE MALITA IN KILLING THE VICTIM.

Accused-appellant must be acquitted.

In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie.
The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial
confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook
doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits,
the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. 10 The voluntary
admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the
latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him. 11

The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn statements of the Malita brothers, cites
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or declaration of a conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration." The inapplicability of this provision is
clearly apparent. The confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of
the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or declarations made during
the conspiracy's existence.

Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in
evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible
in evidence. 12 It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the
absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day. As ruled in People
vs. Compil: 13

[T]he belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect (of lack of counsel) for the investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements from accused-appellant . . . Thus, in People vs. De Jesus (213 SCRA 345
[1992]) we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.

With regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant having timely
objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a quo, the
disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves
other parties or accused. 14 Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie,
which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against
accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case
without violating the marital disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" is
a rule familiar even to law students.

Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's
extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to accused-
appellant. Admittedly, accused-appellant's defense, to put it mildly, is dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the
demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his father's house on the strength of the
latter's verbal threats, his incredulous escape from the clutches of the two, his inexplicable failure to return
home immediately, his failure to seek assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him
immediately after the incident, and the nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita
brothers as the culprits, all suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion, no
matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on
the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every
circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused. 15 This the prosecution has failed to demonstrate.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in
Criminal Case No. 89-9 dated March 2, 1994, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Bernardo
Quidato, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, let the accused be
immediately released from his place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him further for any other
legal or valid cause. With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES, respondents.

NOCON, J.:

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Court's decision
promulgated on November 22, 1990, 1 which affirmed with modification the agrarian court's decision
promulgated January 10, 1990,2 which ordered them and the other defendants therein to, among others,
restore possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said
respondent court's decision is now final and executory as to Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the
other petitioners in the respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.

Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of the respondent Court, the same shall be quoted
verbatim and are as follows:

It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza,
is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay
Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 square meters,
respectively. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian
dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.

In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona
fide tenant of the subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in
conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises;
and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the
lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of
possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or appointed
barangay officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy
relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of
the latter's farm lots. Claiming that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and
impartiality in the discharge of their official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case
and claimed moral damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P165,000.00 (Answer
with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).

For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots
without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes
due the government, as his defenses. He also demanded actual and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney's fees (Answer, pp. 77-78).
 During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza of the case in the lower court,
Mendoza was in possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the same. Upon motion of
plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise the harvesting of the palay crops, to
cause the threshing thereof and to deposit the net harvest (after deducting from the expenses
incurred), in a bonded warehouse of the locality subject to the disposition of the court. 3

The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's decision with the
modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.

The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified, states as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and against defendants:

On the Mandatory Injunction:

1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding subject of the action to the
plaintiff and enjoining said defendants and any person claiming under them to desist from
molesting them or interfering with the possession and cultivation of the landholding descriptive
in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay
Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square meters, more or
less, owned by a certain Juan Mendoza, and devoted principally to the
production of palay, as evidenced by a Certification from the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform issued on July 30, 1984.

2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the two landholding in question and to
respect the tenancy rights of plaintiff with respect to the same;

b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto plaintiff 220 cavans of palay or its
equivalent in cash of P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of 1984, and every harvest time
until defendants finally vacate and surrender possession and cultivation of the landholding in
question to plaintiff.

c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been sufficiently proved, the same is denied.

d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.

The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the deposits of the harvests ordered
by the Court from which the planting and harvesting expenses have been paid to defendant
Olympio Mendoza; and if said net deposits with the Court or the warehouses as ordered by the
Court are insufficient, then the balance should be paid by defendants, jointly and severally. 4

Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, present for the
consideration of the Court:

[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and severally, with the other
defendants, for the harvests of the litigated property, Lot No. 46, or the money equivalent
thereof starting from the principal crop years of 1984 and every harvest time thereafter until
the possession and cultivation of the aforestated landholding are finally surrendered to the
private respondent. 5

It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza and
Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the bahay Pare
Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the estate, which lot was purchased by
petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he later donated to the barangay
Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High School. 6 As to their
supposed participation in the dispossession of private respondent from the disputed landholding, petitioners
present the September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by
Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, 7 wherein private respondent's complaint against
petitioners and the other defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D. 583 8 was dismissed, to show
that private respondent's "point is already settled and considered closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that they
were included in the present controversy so that their political career would be destroyed. 10

Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it was petitioners who conspired with
Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot No. 46 but also from Lot No.
106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where they were ejected and dispossessed, so much so
that even if Farmlot No. 106 was removed by the Court of Appeals from the judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was
harvesting palay worth at least P33,000.00 per year since 1989, private respondents, who are entitled to the
possession and peaceful enjoyment of the farmlot as provided for in Section 23 of the Agrarian Reform Law,
should be compensated for the lost income by the petitioners who are solidarily liable with Olympio Mendoza
and Severino Aguinaldo. 11

We find for the private respondents.

It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented and evaluated by the
trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in arriving
at the trial court and appellate court's findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but
instead put finis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 12 absent the exceptions which do not
obtain in the instant case. 13

We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination, which We adopt, on why it has to dismiss the appeal.
Said the Court:

In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106
Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area
of 23,969 square meters, more or less . . ." (Complaint, Record, vol. 1, p.1). However, during
Violeta's testimony, she clarified that actually only Lot No. 106, which contains an area of
P19,000 square meters, is not included in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p. 5; May 8,
1989, p. 12). This statement was corroborated by plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Arturo Rivera, who
informed the court that the 19,000 square meter lot is subject of a pending case before the
MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15). The inconsistency between the averment of the
complaint and the testimony of the witness should not only because there was no showing that
she intended to mislead defendants and even the trial court on the subject matter of the suit. It
would in the complaint since together with Lot 106 had been include in the complaint since
together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olympio's father.

We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other appellants in the
dispossession of appellee. They not only knew Olympio personally, some of them were even
asked by Olympio to help him cultivate the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that
defendant Olympio, together with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from
entering the land through "strong arm methods". (Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of
Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the affiants were not presented and
subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court
shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision
states that "In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy,
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial
evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took
effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:

Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is

required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant
 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion
and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on
record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own
judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the
weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.14

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 22, 1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137757 August 14, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG", accused-appellant.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No.
2349-272, Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan,
under the following Information:

That on or about the 8th day of July, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Km. 6,
Begang Barangay, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused, by the
use of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab the
undersigned complainant by her neck, cover her mouth and forcibly make her lie down, after which the said
accused mounted on top of her and removed her short pant and panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the
use of force, threat and intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the undersigned complainant and
finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge of her, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(p. 6, Rollo.)

At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
ensued.

The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of its witnesses - Alejandra
Tabada, mother of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police officer who investigated the case; Orlando
Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the victim; Escelea Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos
Timorata, the medical record clerk who used to be the medical officer under Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang, the
physician who physically examined the victim after the incident - is abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in this
wise:

Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang, Isabela, Basilan, their houses
being only about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.; August 19, 1996). Escelea was then staying with
her father, Alejandro and her deaf grandmother, Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years and six (6)
months old at the time of incident, having been born on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).

The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven o'clock (7:00 p.m.) in the evening,
Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was accompanied by a certain Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her
neighbor, Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to join her grandmother who was already
sleeping in the room. About to enter the said room, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice
and when she asked who was it, the party introduced himself as the appellant, viz:

Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you say if any?

A. I answered: "Who is that?"

Q. Did the person calling your name answer you?

A. I heard, sir, "me Totong".

Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong" you are referring to whom?

A. Rodegelio, sir.

(p. 15, id; Underscoring supplied)

She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for four (4) years and appellant is her
second cousin (p. 34, id). Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea forthwith opened the
door. Appellant Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea's face. Appellant, aside from covering the victim's
mouth, even placed his right hand on the latter's neck.

Appellant bid Eseelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about twelve (12)
meters away from the victim's house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the
victim and took off her shortpants and panty (pp. 17-19, id). Escelea tried to resist by moving her body but to
no avail. Appellant succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea's private
part. The victim felt terrible pain (p. 20, id). Still dissatisfied, after consummating the act, appellant kissed and
held the victim's breast. Thereafter, appellant threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to
anybody, thus:

"He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you.

(p. 21, id; Underscoring supplied)

Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went home. Escelea, on the other hand, upon
reaching home, discovered that her shortpants and panty were filled with blood (p. 23, id). For almost ten (10)
days, she just kept to herself the harrowing experience until July 18, 1995 when she was able to muster
enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, about the said incident. Orlando in turn
informed Alejandro, the victim's father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and
immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination (p. 27, id).

Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the Provincial Hospital. She was examined by Dr.
Rimberto Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they went to Isabela Municipal Station and
filed Escelea's complaint against appellant (pp. 30-33, id).

(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)

The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her granddaughter Corazon Macapili,
and accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. The defense that the victim and him
were sweethearts was also advanced. Leonora Cabase mentioned this in her direct testimony.

In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:

While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase was trying to project that the
complainant Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are sweethearts. In the case of People vs.
Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the Supreme Court agrees with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere
concoction of appellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability. The claim of voluntary love affair is
an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair needed proof. Nowhere in the record of the case that the
same was substantiated, though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora Cabase. The accused and/or his witnesses must
present any token of the alleged relationship like love notes, mementos or pictures and the like. Such bare
allegation of the defense, not to mention its utter lack of proof, is incredulous. It is hard to understand how
such a relationship could exculpate a person from the rape of a terrified young child barely a little over the age
of twelve (12) years old. Indeed, a love relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out force (People vs.
Sergio Betonio, G.R. No. 119165, September 26, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 36, No. 3,
September 1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).

There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs. Victor Abrecinoz, G.R. No. 122474, October 17,
1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1, October 2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and they are:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the credibility of the complainant is a
paramount importance, and if her testimony proves credible, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.

It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are second degree cousin or they are sixth civil
degree relatives. The mother of the accused is a first degree cousin of the father of the complainant. In the
culture of the Filipino family on extended family, the relationship between the complainant and the accused
being only second degree cousin, it becomes the duty of an older relative (the accused) to protect and care for
a younger relative (the complainant). It is very hard to understand or comprehend why a cousin files a case of
rape against her cousin, unless it is true. There is no showing that there was compelling motive why the case
be filed against the accused, except that the rape really happened.

xxx

xxx

xxx

It is noted that there was no underlying reason why the complainant and/or her father would bring an action
against the accused, except that the accused had raped Escelea Tabada on July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening. If it were not true that she was raped by the accused, why would she expose herself to an
embarrassment and traumatic experience connected with the litigation of this rape case. We are aware of the
Filipino culture especially on virginity. We likened it as a mirror, once dropped and broken, it can no longer be
pieced together ... not ever. This is true among the Filipino folks that the complainant belonged, poor and
helpless and everything is entrusted to God. The complainant is a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old
and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the
cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television
show ... and expose herself to the danger of the dark night. All said, it is very difficult to be poor. Going to the
court is a shout for help ... let us try to hear it.

xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds the accused "GUILTY" of rape and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the complainant the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

xxx

xxx

xxx
(pp. 33-37, Rollo.)

In accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged errors:

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE
BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA AND HER WITNESS.

II

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION, BASED
ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO
PROVED [sic] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE
AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.

III

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE
PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE COMPLAINANT THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00 REPRESENTING MORAL DAMAGES BASED ON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.

(p. 101, Rollo.)

He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt considering that
other than the written statement of the complainant before the Police Station of Isabela and before the Clerk
of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, and her testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was
presented to conclusively prove that there was ever rape at all; that she only presumed that it was accused-
appellant who attacked her since she admitted that immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator
hastily covered her face with a towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly and convincingly shows that she
was able to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator; that complainant implicated accused-appellant only
because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the
complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-
legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

We agree with the trial court.

As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
although innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590 [1998]; People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687
[1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75 [1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).

Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of
complainant's testimony.

The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate,
having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television
set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and exposes
herself to the danger of the dark night." But verily, age, youth, and poverty are not guarantees of credibility.
Hence, thorough scrutiny must be made by the Court.

Complainant narrated the incident in this wise:

Q While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your grandmother, did you hear anything?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was that?

A I heard a call, sir.

Q How was the call made?

A It is just by saying: "Lea".

Q After you heard your name was mentioned, what did you say if any?

A I answered: "Who is that?"

Q Did the person calling your name answer you?

A I heard, sir, "me Totong".

Q When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong", you are referring to whom?

A Rodegelio, sir.

Q When you say "Rodegelio", you are referring to Rodegelio Turco, Jr., the accused in this case?

A Yes, sir.

Q After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as "Totong", what did you do?

A I opened the door, sir.

Q And when you opened the door, what happened next?

A Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir.

Q Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he do?

A He covered my mouth, sir.

Q Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do?

A He placed his right hand on my neck, sir.

Q Aside from placing his right hand ... when he placed his right hand on your neck, where was he? Was he
infront or behind?

A He was at my back, sir.

Q After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did "Totong" do next with that position?

A He covered my mouth, sir.

Q After covering your mouth and face, what did he do next?

A He told me to walk, sir.

Q Where did he bring you?

A I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir.

Q But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place?
A I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir.

Q Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have a copra kiln?

ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:

The witness already answered that she does not know where she was brought, leading, Your Honor.

COURT: (Questioning the witness)

Q According to you, from your house you were brought by the accused to a place which you do not know?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What place?

A Pig pen, Your Honor.

Q Do you know the owner, of that pig pen?

A Our pig pen, Your Honor.

Q Who owned that pig pen?

A My father, Your Honor.

Q How far is that pig pen to your house?

A (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).

COURT:

It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.

PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing)

Q You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court that you were brought to the pig pen or the
place where you were sexually abused, were you place inside or outside?

ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:

Leading, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:

I will withdraw.

Q Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of the pig pen that you were brought by the
accused?

A Inside the grasses, sir.

Q When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen, what did the accused do to you?

A He put me down, sir.

Q When you were already down on the ground, what did the accused do next?

A He mounted on me, sir.

Q And when the accused was already on top of you, what did he do next?

A He molested me, sir.

Q Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your body?

A Yes, sir.

Q What?

A My shortpants and panty, sir.

Q You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your pants and panty, did he totally remove it from
your body?

A Yes, sir.

Q After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the accused do?

A He abused me, sir.

Q You said that he abused you, how did he abuse your?

A He put his private part inside my private part, sir.

Q When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused you, what did you do?

A I tried to move my body, sir.

Q While you were trying to move your body and while the accused was on top of you, what did the accused
do?

A He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir.

Q And was he able to insert his private part?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you feel when his private part was already inside your private part?

A I felt pain, sir.

Q Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of the accused was already inside your private
part?

A I felt pain when he already finished, sir.

Q By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped? Will you please tell us whether you have already
experienced or you have already your menstruation at that time?

A No, sir.

Q Now you stated to the Honorable Court ... after the accused had sexually abused you and you said you felt
pains after he consumated the sexual act, after that what did he do next after consumating the act?

A After consumating his desire, he raised my panty and shortpants then he kissed me and hold my nipple, sir.
Q After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty, embraced you, kissed you and hold your breast, did
he tell you anything?

A He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you."

Q In what dialect? In Chavacano, sir.

A After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your nipple and threatened you in Chavacano dialect,
what happened next after that?

No more, sir.

(tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)

On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the defense counsel asked her
about the events that transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The query prompted her to narrate the
incident prior to said date when she also watched television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that when
she arrived home, accused-appellant came and called her "Lea" and when she asked who was it, he answered
"so Totong". When she asked what he wanted, he said he wanted to borrow a guitar. She said that she could
not lend him the guitar since her father was not yet around. He insisted but to no avail, and hence he just went
home. She went to sleep afterwards. On re-direct examination, she clarified that when accused-appellant
came to borrow the guitar on July 8, 1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Lastly, she said that the
incident of the borrowing of the guitar and the incident that transpired at 7 o'clock in the evening on July 8,
1995 were separate incidents.

Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's youth, her apparent confusion concerning the
events that transpired, and her fear of both accused-appellant and her father.

At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the
offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they
testified were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we take cognizance of the trial
court's observation on the segment of the Filipino society to which the victim belongs - almost illiterate, having
attended school up to the third grade only, and so poor that she had to go to a neighbor's house to watch
television, yet one who values her virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped and broken ... can no longer be
pieced together ... not ever," this being "true among the Filipino folks [to which] complainant belonged, poor
and helpless everything is entrusted to God" (p. 35, Rollo).

The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony, having intermingled two
incidents. Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record that the defense counsel may have
contributed to this confusion when he asked the victim what transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19,
1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an
experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]).Rape, as
a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not something which
enhances one's life experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes deep
psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or
subconscious mind would prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These lapses do not
detract from the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the
malefactor (People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered
and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein (People vs.
Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).

The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Her testimony
deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]).
Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was
not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA
251 [1998]).

Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and the victim. At this juncture,
we reiterate the trial court's observation thereon - the mother of accused-appellant being a first degree cousin
of the victim's father, that makes the victim and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree
relatives. Filipino culture, particularly in the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and
recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and take care of a younger one. On the contrary, in the
instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the charge were not true, it is indeed difficult
to understand why the victim would charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she having no compelling
motive to file said case against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape really happened is logically
reinforced.

As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state that the delay and
initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo,
supra). In the case at bar, the victim's fear of her father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She
testified that she did not disclose the incident to her father because of fear both of her father as well as of
accused-appellant (tsn, August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is typical of a twelve-year-old girl and only
strengthens her credibility.

The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points presented by the defense that
must be passed upon:

1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between accused-appellant and the
victim? The theory initially advanced by the defense in the proceedings before the court a quo is the
"sweetheart theory". In this regard, .we agree with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere
concoction of accused-appellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability. In People vs.
Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-
serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with
the victim. Hence, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and
the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. It
is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this theory that accused-appellant has not
insisted on this defense in his brief, seemingly abandoning this line.

We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was between accused-
appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood relationship. Hence, it
is noticeable that on the day of the incident, when accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter
asked who he was, the victim knew right away that her caller was accused-appellant when the latter replied "Si
Totong".

Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the victim Escelea Tabada and
touched on the apparent friendship between them, as follows:

Q You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do you know the complainant Escelea Tabada?

A I only know her when I was already in jail, sir.

Q You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before you were arrested?

A I do not know her, sir.

COURT: (Questioning the witness)

Q Why, are you not related to the Tabadas?

A No, Your Honor.

ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: (Continuing)

Q Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang?

A The complainant is at Begang, sir.

Q And you mentioned that you were not related with the complainant, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir, we are only close.

Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant Escelea Tabada were already friends?

A Yes, sir.

(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.)

However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled:

Q Now, you stated in your direct examination that you are not related to the Tabadas in San Antonio Begang,
Isabela, Basilan, is that right?

A Yes, sir, we are only close.

Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin of the father of Escelea Tabada?

A They are cousins, sir.

Q So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you were not telling the truth?

A Yes, sir.

(ibid, p. 51.)

2. Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually happened since the
medico-legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was not presented in court to explain the same.

In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by the
examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate could be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is
presented in court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of
evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of
evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law.
On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation
within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence
may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it
has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said
that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture,
secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foul-smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen
secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which,
standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601
[1997]). It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape (People vs.
Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable,
supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of
rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is
proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to
convict.

As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in favor of Escelea Tabada as
indemnification (P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is incomplete based on established jurisprudence
and must be modified. In People vs. Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the award of P50,000.00 to
the victim as indemnity for rape not committed or qualified by any of the circumstances under the Death
Penalty Law, needs no proof other than the conviction of the accused for the raped proved. This is different
from the P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages which also needs no pleading or proof as basis
thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]).

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Rodegelio Turco, Jr. aka "Totong" is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial court as
moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152807 August 12, 2003

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN
and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA.
BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS
SAEZ JR., petitioners,
vs.
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,1 REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO
A. LARIEGO,1a BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a piece of
evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August 7, 2001
Decision and the February 27, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 3 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60645. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Decision dated 22 June 2000
rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Su[r]." 4

The assailed Resolution5 denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:

"A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents]
before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

"The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land
275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all
his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
 "In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The
termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
[Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the
husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration,
Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was
carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such
transfer was witnessed by several people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco
Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos Saez' property without paying any rental.

"Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the respondents
who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through petitioners' tolerance.

"On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the
latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual
and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,]
Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding
Certificate to File Action was issued by the said barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was filed
by petitioners against respondents.

"Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and alleged that they
entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors
and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just
and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that
the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in
question when it ruled that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore,
entitled to the issuance of a title.

"The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the
Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. x x x" 6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors.
The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional executive director of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless
declared null and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENR's community environment and
natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still
alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.

According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous
and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The appellate court deemed as self-serving, and therefore
incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Court's consideration:

"I

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional executive director?

"II
 Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial Court's
ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal?

"III

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land subject matter of
this case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?

"IV

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, 'neither is there error on
the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by Gloria Leano
Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving?'" 8

To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall be discussed in reverse sequence.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998

Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order issued by the regional director of the
DENR was erroneous. The reason was that the Order, which had upheld the claim of respondents, was
supposedly not yet final and executory. Another Order dated August 23, 1999, 9 issued later by the DENR
regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the effectivity of the earlier one.

Under the Public Land Act,10 the management and the disposition of public land is under the primary control of
the director of lands11 (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB), 12 subject to review by the
DENR secretary.13 As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the
powers of the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not, however, divest
regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their
respective possessions and occupations.14 The power to determine who has actual physical possession or
occupation of public land and who has the better right of possession over it remains with the courts. 15 But
once the DENR has decided, particularly through the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a
certificate of title, its decision on these points will normally prevail. 16

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land remains pending
with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property is a matter that may be
addressed to the courts.

Second Issue:
CENR Officer's Certification

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the signature
of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr.17 and argue
that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.

We are not persuaded.

In Garvida, the Court held:

"A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade
or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x" 18
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not
admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic. 19

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer
Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one
mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means
but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. 20

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:

"x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a 'CERTIFICATION' dated 22 July 1997, certified among others,
that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was not allocated to any
person x x x."21

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as
reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the
appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and supervision.

Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the
pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as
evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. 22 The Certification was not formally offered, however,
because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure23 nor jurisprudence24 would sanction the admission of evidence that has not
been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases
covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held. 25

Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners' Witnesses

Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on
Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their
position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.26 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence.27

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of
the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still
bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief. 28

Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription

Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding the defense of prescription proffered by respondents.
It is the former's contention that since the latter's possession of the land was merely being tolerated, there
was no basis for the claim of prescription. We disagree.

For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the possession of
respondents was by mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by the former to support their
claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in accordance with the survey dated May 22,
1936.29 Both of these were discredited by the CENR Certification, which indicated that the contested lot had
not yet been allocated to any person when the survey was conducted.30 The testimony of petitioners'
witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents' continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot
for a considerable length of time.
Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45. 31

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 145006 August 30, 2006

DAVID TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAROLYN ZARAGOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused David Tan (petitioner) assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 11, 2000, and the Resolution dated September 4, 2000.

The antecedent facts as accurately narrated by the MTC in its Decision are as follows:

David Tan, the accused herein, stands charged with the crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (6
counts) in six (6) separate informations which read as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

Records show that the accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not Guilty, upon being arraigned.
Thereafter, these cases were set for trial on the merits, which cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

Carolyn Zaragoza, of legal age, the private complainant, testified among others that: She met the accused
through their common friend, Paul Dy while they were having some business negotiations (Witness identified
the accused through his pictures which were attached to his bail bond, as said accused failed to appear in court
despite notice, said pictures were marked as Exhs. "J", "J-1" and J-2"); that during her first meeting with the
accused, they had a loan transaction which was followed by another loan transaction on June 27, 1994 in the
amount of P1 Million, and for which she gave the accused a Metrobank Check No. 001430 in the amount
of P950,000.00 (Exhs. "K" & "K-1"), having deduced the 5% interest from said loan. Thereafter, the accused
issued several PCIBANK Checks, among which are numbered as follows: x x x When all these checks were
deposited at her account with the City Trust Bank, Sucat (Parañaque) Branch, they all bounced for reason
"Account Closed." She thereafter tried to contact the accused but he (accused) refused to talk to her. The
accused was sent by her lawyer a formal demand through registered mail, for him to pay in cash the
aforementioned bounced/dishonored checks but to no avail. In filing this case she engaged the services of a
lawyer for P50,000.00 acceptance fee and P1,000.00 per appearance in court; that said accused should pay the
corresponding interest of P50,000.00 which had become due since November 1994 other than the principal
obligation.

Despite ample opportunity given to the accused to present its evidence, it still failed to do so; hence, the court
in its Order dated March 18, 1997, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

On May 27, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment, to wit:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused David Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in six (6) counts, and hereby sentences said accused to an
imprisonment of six (6) months for each case, and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of P600,000.00 representing the total amount of the subject checks, plus interest thereon in the amount
of P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the MTC wherein he denied receipt of the demand
letter3 dated October 30, 1995 marked as Exhibit "R" and alleged that said evidence was not included in the
formal offer of evidence. Said motion for reconsideration was denied. He then appealed the case to the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258 (RTC), with the following assignment of errors:

1. The trial court gravely erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
B.P. 22 on six (6) courts (sic);

2. The trial court gravely erred in ordering appellant to indemnify the private complainant the value of the six
(6) checks in question, plus the sum of P50,000.00 interest and P20,000.00 attorney’s fees.4

On April 16, 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court a quo is MODIFIED to read, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused David Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in six (6) counts, and hereby sentences said accused to an
imprisonment of six (6) months for each case, and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of P600,000.00 representing the total amount of the subject checks, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from the filing of the Information until fully paid and to pay the costs.

In view of the foregoing the court a quo is directed to issue a Warrant of Arrest against the accused which need
not be returned until he has been arrested.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but per Order dated July 5, 1999, the RTC
denied the same.

A Petition for Review was then filed by petitioner with the CA, alleging as follows:

With due respect to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 258, Parañaque City, it committed reversible
error, thus:

1. In affirming the trial court’s verdict of conviction despite the prosecution’s failure to prove the guilt of herein
petitioner/accused beyond reasonable doubt.

2. In affirming the trial court’s verdict awarding damages to private respondent.

3. In ordering the trial court to issue warrant of arrest against petitioner despite the fact that its verdict
affirming the trial court’s decision is not yet final and executory. 6

The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, ruling that petitioner’s guilt had indeed been
proven beyond reasonable doubt since the existence of the element that he had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time he issued the checks is established by the
demand letter dated October 30, 1995 notifying him of the dishonor of the checks he issued. The CA further
pointed out that the RTC had already deleted the MTC’s award for interest in the amount of P50,000.00 and
attorney’s fees, hence, on said issue, there is no error that needs to be corrected. As to the order for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the CA held that "[i]t is a constitutional mandate that once accused is convicted
in the Regional Trial Court, bail becomes a matter of discretion upon the court and no longer a matter of
right."7

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration where he argued that no evidentiary weight should be given to
the demand letter dated October 30, 1995 because, although included in the formal offer of evidence by the
prosecution, it was not presented during trial for proper identification, hence, it should not have been
admitted into evidence even if the defense failed to object to the formal offer thereof. Petitioner insisted
that the prosecution did not have proof of notice of dishonor, thus, petitioner’s guilt had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA denied said motion for reconsideration in its Resolution 8 dated September 4, 2000 holding that since
said issue was never raised before the trial court nor before the RTC, the same can no longer be considered by
the reviewing court.

Hence, this petition where it is alleged that:

I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE LOWER COURT’S VERDICT OF CONVICTION
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF PETITIONER/ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT MUCH MORE SO CONSIDERING THAT THE PROOF OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR HAS NOT BEEN
SATISFACTORILY PROVEN OR IS BASED ON EVIDENCE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AND OFFERED.

xxxxxxxxx

II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S VERDICT AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

xxxxxxxxx

III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH ORDERED AN INFERIOR
COURT TO ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST AGAINST PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS VERDICT
AFFIRMING THE INFERIOR COURT’S DECISION IS NOT YET FINAL AND EXECUTORY.9

The petition is imbued with merit.

With regard to the first assignment of error, petitioner reiterates his argument that no evidentiary weight
should be given to the demand letter dated October 30, 1995 because, although included in the formal offer
of evidence by the prosecution, it was not presented during trial for proper identification and should not
have been admitted into evidence even if the defense failed to object to the formal offer thereof.

It is quite true that this Court has ruled that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not made at the time
such evidence is offered, shall be deemed waived.10 However, in all cases where said rule had been applied,
the assailed testimonial or object evidence had been duly presented during the course of the trial.

In the present case, a judicious examination of the entire record shows that, indeed, the demand letter dated
October 30, 1995 was never presented during the course of the trial.

The transcript of stenographic notes11 for the hearing held on September 26, 1996 shows that the presentation
of the testimony of the bank representative testifying for the prosecution was dispensed with since the
opposing parties stipulated that the testimony of a bank representative would prove the following:

x x x the witness will be testifying on the points that at the time the six checks were presented for payment,
the first two checks were dishonored for being "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" while the third up to the
sixth checks were dishonored for reason of "account closed" and per records of the bank, the account of the
accused was not sufficient to cover the amount of the checks issued by the accused as well as the domestic
current account of the accused and we have here the documents, the ledger of the accused which would
prove that the accounts of the accused, both savings and current were not sufficient to cover the checks issued
by the accused to the complainant?12

The only other prosecution witness is private complainant Carolyn Zaragosa (Zaragosa), whose testimony is to
the effect that after the checks bounced, she tried to call up petitioner but the latter refused to talk to her,
thus, she was constrained to obtain the services of a lawyer. Nowhere in the transcript of stenographic
notes[13] for the hearing held on December 17, 1996, did Zaragosa ever mention the existence of a demand
letter dated October 30, 1995. After the direct testimony of Zaragosa where the exhibits marked were only up
to Exhibits "Q" and "Q-1," all the subsequent hearings did not push through. Zaragosa was never cross-
examined. The defense, despite numerous resetting of hearing dates set for presentation of its evidence, failed
to appear during those hearings, prompting the MTC to deem the case submitted for decision without
evidence for the defense.
Since there were no other hearings held, it was impossible for the prosecution to have presented and marked
as exhibit, the demand letter dated October 30, 1995.

The very first time said demand letter was ever mentioned or appeared in the record was in the formal offer of
evidence, supposedly marked as Exhibit "R." How said demand letter came to be marked as Exhibit "R" and
inserted into the record truly mystifies this Court. Such circumstance, to say the least, is tainted with
irregularity because, as previously mentioned, such document was never presented or identified in any of
the hearings. As held in Pigao v. Rabanillo,14 for documentary evidence to be considered by the court, it must
have been presented during trial and formally offered.

Although petitioner admits that they failed to submit any opposition to the formal offer of evidence, he
nevertheless raised the issue of the non-presentation of the demand letter in his motion for reconsideration
filed with the MTC. Evidently, the CA made a mistake in stating that petitioner only raised for the first time on
appeal, the issue on the admission of the demand letter into evidence.

Thus, in view of the foregoing significant circumstances, it would be unreasonable to apply to the present case
the general rule that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not made at the time such evidence is
offered, shall be deemed waived. As the demand letter was never presented during the course of the trial,
petitioner was never alerted to its possible inclusion in the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence. Verily,
therefore, petitioner’s failure to timely object to this piece of evidence (the demand letter) is excusable. The
prosecution should not benefit from the anomalous inclusion of the demand letter in the records. Said
evidence should be deemed inadmissible and should not have been considered by the MTC in arriving at its
judgment.

With the exclusion of the demand letter from the body of evidence presented by the prosecution, the next
question is, would the remaining evidence still be sufficient to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt? The answer must be in the negative.

The elements of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of
any check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.15

In Ongson v. People,16 the Court expounded on the kind of evidence necessary to prove the second element, to
wit:

As to the second element, we have held that knowledge involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish,
thus the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of
his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the check's presentment for payment if
he fails to pay the amount of the check within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor.

Sec. 2 of B.P. 22 provides:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the check is presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the
check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought
into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five
days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of
nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such
notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
Furthermore, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal notice is not enough.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Since the prosecution failed to present evidence during trial that a written demand had been sent to and
received by petitioner, the second element, that the accused had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, had
not been established. As stated in Dico v. Court of Appeals,18 "[a] notice of dishonor received by the maker or
drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. x x x. The lack of a written notice is
fatal for the prosecution." Hence, petitioner’s conviction for the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 must be set
aside.

However, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s award of the legal rate of interest on the principal amount
of P600,000.00. It should be borne in mind that Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action x x x." Section 1, Rule 133 of the same Rules provides that
"[i]n civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence."
Here, private complainant successfully proved, by preponderance of evidence, that despite all her efforts to
collect from petitioner, he failed to pay his indebtedness. Thus, the trial court correctly ordered petitioner to
pay private complainant civil indemnity.

Petitioner’s argument that private complainant should not have been awarded civil indemnity because she
failed to exhaust non-judicial means before resorting to the filing of the criminal case should not be given any
consideration as the evidence shows that private complainant indeed tried to demand payment from
petitioner out of court but all to no avail.

The RTC was correct in awarding interest on the principal amount at the legal rate which should be 12% per
annum from the filing of the Information until fully paid, as this is in keeping with the Court’s ruling in Trade &
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corporation,19 where
the Court reiterated that:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on 'Damages' of the
Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the
rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

x x x x x x x x x (Underscoring Ours)

Petitioner also keeps harping on the issue of the MTC’s error of awarding attorney’s fees, but as correctly
pointed out by the CA, the RTC had already deleted such award for attorney’s fees. There is, therefore, no
longer any need to discuss such aspect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of Violation of B.P. Blg.
22. However, petitioner is ORDERED to PAY private complainant Carolyn Zaragosa the amount of P600,000.00
representing the total amount of the subject checks, plus 12% interest thereon from the filing of the
Information until fully paid and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN
CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman, City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and
Assistant City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and Rufino Navarro for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired
together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its
evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its
witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a
certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness,
counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different
ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji
and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a
number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following
remarks were made:

FISCAL LUSTRE:

May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as
against the accused Consunji himself?

COURT:

That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a
confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances as required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9

The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion
was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for
the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of
the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial
when the ruling was made.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an
accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as
to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as
against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37;
People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123,
providing that:

The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this
case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs.
Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused,
nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings)
had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying
the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to
adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally
offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in
question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was
no prior proof of conspiracy.

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the
objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court
issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the
other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling
on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of
indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so
doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the
ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no
power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial
confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the
identity of the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even
been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed
such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same
conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the
relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration
of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what,
under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:

In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least
favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical
objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for
a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty
whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the
Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement
of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in
the heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in
judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a
mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds
itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for
a new trial, — a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of
proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful,
 can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law;
and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the
irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court
upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of
evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is
annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and
this opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.