1. VICTORIA P. CABRAL, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELIGIO P. PACIS, REGIONAL

DIRECTOR, REGION III, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, FLORENCIO
ADOLFO, GREGORIO LAZARO, GREGORIA ADOLFO and ELIAS POLICARPIO,
respondents.

G.R. No. 101974, July 12, 2001

A petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA with an urgent subsequent
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) due to conveyance of property
in issue by private respondent to a third party.

Facts:

As early as July 1973, Victoria Cabral sought DAR’s reclassification of property into
residential, commercial or industrial purposes. However, in April 25, 1988, Emancipation
Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title (EP and TCT) were issued in favor of private-
respondents, Florencio Adolfo, etc. Thus, petitioner sought for cancellation of the EP
and TCT before the BARC on 16 January 1990 citing four reasons:

1) petitioner had a pending application for conversion and reclassification;

2) the lots covered by the emancipation patents included areas not actually tilled by
private respondents;

3) private respondents had illegally transferred their rights over the parcels of land
covered by the emancipation patents;

4) private respondents are deemed to have abandoned their rights over the properties;

5) the subject property was taken without just compensation

On 19 January 1990, petitioner also petitioned DAR for cancellation of the EP and TCT
but DAR denied the same on trial and on motion for reconsideration, and by CA on
certiorari and motion for reconsideration. Thus, this petition for certiorari. A TRO was
granted on subsequent motion of petitioner due to conveyance of private-respondent to
a third party that has commenced conversion of the property on issue for commercial
and industrial use.

Issue(s):

(1) Whether it is the DAR Regional Office (RO) or DARAB that has jurisdiction over
agrarian reform issues?
(2) Whether petitioner was denied due process being not given the opportunity to be
heard on appeal.?

Ruling:

(1) DARAB has jurisdiction, and not DAR RO.

The function of DAR RO is the implementation (purely executive) of agrarian reform

laws whereas that of DARAB/RARAD/PARAD (in this hierarchical order) is for
adjudication (judicial in nature) of agrarian reform cases. These were the laws at the
time.

Although the CA cited that DARAB can delegate its powers and functions (judicial) to
the regional office, adjudication has been delegated to the Regional Office, the same is
however subject to the rules promulgated by DARAB. The same rules have been
revised, so that the same has now been delegated to RARAD and PARAD which are
deemed part of the Regional Office where it is located. This comingling of powers
(executive and judicial) must not be confused, for duplication of functions would seem:
1) impractical; 2) confusion as to what each agency serves; 3) divides agency’s
resources. The intention of law is to avoid such confusion, and thus, the theory that
DAR RO has jurisdiction is without merit.

The petition is granted, CA Resolution is reversed and set aside. TRO made permanent. 


(2) The Court did not resolve the issue on denial of due process by DAR since DAR has
no jurisdiction in the first place.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is given DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 

2. REMIGIO ISIDRO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(SEVENTH DIVISION) and NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 105586. December 15, 1993.

Facts:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject
parcel of land in Nueva Ecija, 4.5 hectares. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister
of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner
Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land (1 hectare). The
occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that
petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the
land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In
1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner
the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return
possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested
capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial court
dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an agrarian dispute, hence
not cognizable by civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC
which affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the
decision of the trial court was reversed.

Issue:
Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not
cognizable by civil courts?

Held:
No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically
make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has
jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto
make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law provides for
conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being
agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute
must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands
devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement
may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is
also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when
the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. The
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1) parties are the LO & tenant;

2) Subject matter is agricultural land

3) There is consent

4) Purpose is agricultural production;

5) There is a personal cultivation by the tenant;

6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties

Absence of one DOES NOT MAKE OCCUPANT A DE JURE TENANT.


3. Laguna Estates Dev’t Corp. vs. CA

FACTS:
DAR placed 234.76 hectares of agricultural land in Brgy. Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna belonging to Sta. Rose Realty Development Corporation, under
the compulsory acquisition scheme of the CARP. It issued CLOA to the
farmer-beneficiaries, including private respondents. The said agricultural
lands are isolated and/or separated from the rest of municipality of
Cabuyao, and the only passage way or access road leading to private
respondents’ agricultural lands is the privately owned road network
situated within the premises of the Laguna Estates Development
Corporation. The subject road network is open to public, but after said
award to the beneficiaries, Laguna Estates prohibited and denied the
agrarian reform beneficiaries from using said road network, preventing
ingress and egress from Brgy. Casile where farmlands are located. On
petition by the beneificaries, DAR ordered Laguna Estates to give a right of
way to the subject road network it owns.

ISSUE:
Whether the DARAB has jurisdiction to grant the beneficiaries of the
agrarian reform program a right of way over Laguna Estates’s private roads
intended for their exclusive use?

RULING:
DARAB HAS NO JURISDICTION. For it to have jurisdiction over a case,
there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. An issue of
right of way or easement over private property without tenancy relations is
outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is NOT an agrarian issue.
Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.

4. CREBA vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said
AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural
lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. March
1999, Sec DAR issued “Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses,” it covers the following:

(1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and

other non-agricultural purposes;

(2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock,

poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage;

(3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously

authorized; and

(4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-

agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15
June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other
pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.

The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for
conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural
use. The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate
development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No.
88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval
of all land use conversion applications.

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of

housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage,
unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not
only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT
HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL,
OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES?

RULING:
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have
been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the
aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules
and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the
authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion.
Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the
subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to
agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for under
Republic Act No. 6657.

More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which
Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been
given the authority to approve land conversion.38 Concomitant to such
authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of agricultural
lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use conversion.

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and

conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the process of
conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which they are intended.

Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion

authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on
15 June 1988.45 The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR
conversion clearance or authority.46 Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural
lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority.

Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other
purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified
agricultural lands. It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural
lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural
lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes.

5. Heirs of Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines

FACTS:

• Spouses Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin – owners of a parcel of

agricultural land in Tambo, Iligan City; they were childless and only had
Virgilio Nanaman (son of Gregorio by another woman)

• Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the Iligan property
and subsequently sold this to Dr. Jose Deleste

• Hilaria died in 1954, Gregorio’s brother – Noel was appointed as regular

administrator of the estate, he then filed an action for reversion of the title
of the property, this case went up to the SC where it was ruled that the
property was the conjugal property of Nanaman spouses and so Hilaria
can only sell ½ of the land

• Deleste and the intestate estate of Gregorio were then held to be co-
owners of the property

• PD 21 was issued in 1972 - DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF

TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO
THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE
INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR – property was placed
under the Operation Land Transfer program, however only the heirs of
Gregorio were identified by Department of Agrarian Reform as landowners

• In 1975, the City of Iligan passed an ordinance -- “Zoning Regulation of

Iligan City” which reclassified the land into commercial/residential

• In 1984, the DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer in favor of private

respondents who were the tenants and actual cultivators of the land

• In 2001, Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title were

issued to the private respondents

• City of Iligan expropriated a part of the property – as the issue of

ownership was pending, the just compensation was deposited with the
Development Bank of the Philippines held in trust for the RTC of Iligan City

• Petitioners Heirs of Deleste filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify the EP’s issued to
the private respondents

• Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) declared the EP’s null and
void, in view of the pending issues of ownership, the subsequent
reclassification of the property into a residential/commercial land and the
violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process of law

• Private respondents filed a Notice of Appeal, while the petitioners filed a

Motion for Writ of Execution

• DARAB reversed the ruling of PARAD and held the EP’s were valid and
that the petitioners Heirs of Deleste should have been the one informed by
DAR at the time the property was placed under the OLT program

 • Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA which was denied for
failure to attach the writ of execution, a subsequent motion for
reconsideration was filed and denied

• Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for review which was denied as no
reversible error was shown, they then filed an MR which the SC granted
and gave due course – hence this proceeding.

ISSUES:

1. Is the property covered by the agrarian reform program?

2. Is the property covered by PD 27?

RULING:

1. NO. It is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the
enactment of the local zoning ordinance. In light of the enactment of the
local zoning ordinance reclassifying the property from agricultural into
commercial/residential, the property became exempt from the coverage of
the agrarian reform program. The local government has the power to
reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural land

2. NO. Even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of

October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon
these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land. They need to
comply with certain requirements first.

It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed

owners as of October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically
vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land they
were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as
payment of just compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the
tenant-farmers.

Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have,

at most, an inchoate right over the land they were tilling

In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984 therefore, for all intents and
purposes, it was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-
beneficiaries, were recognized to have an inchoate right over the subject
property prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Considering
that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently
approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested
rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private
respondents were issued the CLTs and were deemed owners.

 6. ANGELITA, REYNALDO, NARCISO, CECILIA, FEDERIO and
LEONIDA all surnamed LEVARDO vs. YATCO, G.R. No. 165494, March
20, 2009

FACTS:
DCN 3361:
Asuncion Belizario was the owner of a 4.3 hectare parcel of land which she
donated to Tomas Yatco as evidence by a Deed of Donation inter vivos. Said
land was tenanted by Aguido Levardo who subsequently executed
a Pinanumpaang Salaysay signed by him and his children, waiving his rights as
tenant. Aguido Levardo received 2M as disturbance compensation. Tomas Yatco
sold the landholding to Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. The Levardos filed a complaint
for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation, Deed of Sale and the waiver
of rights.
DCN 3362:
Leoncio Yatco was the owner of a 4.2 hectare parcel of land which was tenanted
by Francisco and his son Hernando Levardo. Levardo likewise executed a
similar Pinanumpaang Salaysay waiving his rights as tenant. F. Levardo received
2.4M as disturbance compensation. Yatco thereafter sold the landholding to
Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. The Levardos filed a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of the Deed of Donation, Deed of Sale and the waiver of rights.
In both cases, the plaintiffs grounded their causes of action on the claim that the
land in dispute was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27). They contend that they were already
deemed the owners of the land on the basis of an alleged Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) in the name of their father Aguido, which was never issued by the
DAR, but on the basis of an alleged certified xerox copy of a Masterlist of tenants
wherein his name appeared.
1. PD 27 — COVERAGE
P.D. No. 27 should be read in conjunction with Letter of Instruction No. 474
(LOI No. 474) and the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on
Retention by Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 (DAR Memorandum).
The pertinent portion of LOI No. 474 is as follows:
 1. You shall undertake to place the Land Transfer Program of the
government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn
lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who
own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate
areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves
and their families. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pertinent portion of the DAR Memorandum is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be
covered by Operation Land Transfer. The relation of the land owner and
tenant-farmers in these areas shall be leasehold . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the lands in dispute do not fall under
the coverage of P.D. No. 27. The DAR Memorandum is categorical that
lands with seven hectares or less shall not be covered by OLT.
2. TERMINATION OF LEASEHOLD BY PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION
Based on the evidence on record, respondents paid Aguido P2,000,000.00
and Hernando P2,417,142.00 as disturbance compensation. A reading of
the Pinanumpaang Salaysay executed by petitioners show that they gave
up their leasehold rights"dahil sa aming kagustuhang umiba ng hanap
buhay ng higit ang pagkikitaan kaysa panakahan." The money given by
respondents as disturbance compensation was indeed advantageous to the
families of petitioners, as it would have allowed them to pursue other
sources of livelihood.
3. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER — EFFECT
Citing Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA
252:
Moreover, assuming arguendo that CLTs were actually issued to
petitioners, a CLT does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the
land described therein. At most, the CLT merely evidences the
government's recognition of the grantee as partly qualified to await the
statutory mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled
by him as provided in P.D. No. 27. Neither is this recognition
permanent or irrevocable.

7. Petronito Maylem vs. Ellano G.R. No. 162721, July 13, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner files a motion for recovery of possession of a piece of agricultural
land. Bonifacio Abad was awarded a parcel of land that was under a
leasehold agreement he entered with the petitioner’s husband by virtue of
PD No, 27 under Emancipation Patent. The land transfer was covered by a
transfer certificate of title registered with the Register of Deeds. Petitioner
persuaded Abad to allow her to a one year possession of the land which he
allowed. After the lapse of the agreed period petitioner refused to return the
land to Abad who subsequently filed complaint for recovery of possession
of said property before the provincial adjudicator of DAR after learning that
it was mortgaged by the petitioner to a third party. Meantime, the petitioner
filed exclusion of her property from the coverage of the Agrarian Reform
Law. The Provincial adjudicator rendered favor of Abad ruling that
ownership of Abad of the property by virtue of emancipation patent is
absolute. Petitioner contends that pending the appeal for retention Abad’s
ownership of the land is not yet absolute and that the action brought by
Abad already prescribed. CA ruled in favor of Abad rendering him absolute
owner of the property by virtue of emancipation patent.

ISSUES:

Whether or not acquisition of property by emancipation patent is absolute
and may prescribe?

RULING:
It was held that acquisition of property by emancipation patent vests
absolute ownership to the person whose name is registered in the title.
Land transfer under P.D. No. 27 is effected in two stages: (1) the issuance
of a certificate of land transfer to a farmer- beneficiary as soon as the DAR
transfers the landholding to him in recognition of his being deemed an
owner; and (2) the issuance of an emancipation patent as proof of full
ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations
or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary.
The issuance of title gives the grantee absolute ownership and he ceases
to be a mere tenant or lessee.

As to the contention of the petitioner that Abad abandoned his right to the
property by allowing her to take possession of the land the court ruled that
Abandonment or neglect, as a ground for the cancellation of an
emancipation patent or certificate of land award requires a clear and
absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or to abandon a right or
property coupled with an external act by which that intention is expressed
or carried into effect. It consists in any one of these conditions: (a) failure to
cultivate the lot due to reasons other than the non-suitability of the land to
agricultural purposes, for at least two (2) calendar years, and to pay the
amortizations for the same period; (b) permanent transfer of residence by
the beneficiary and his family, which has rendered him incapable of
cultivating the lot; or (c) relinquishment of possession of the lot for at least
two (2) calendar years and failure to pay the amortization for the same
period. None of the instances cited above obtains in this case.

Furthermore, ownership by emancipation patent is non-transferrable except

by hereditary succession or in favor to the government. Even if Abad
waived his right to the property it is deemed void. Also prescriptive period
under the Agrarian Reform Law do not apply to emancipated patent.

Petition is denied.