Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014

NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of the nullity of
his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of
bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Case

The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29, 2002, 1 whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for bigamy under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000
in Criminal Case No. 49808 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.

Antecedents

On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo
solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a
marriage license.4 The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose
Church in Iloilo City.6 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that
purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates.8 In 1982,
Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.9

On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony
solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate
reflected the civil status of the accused as single.10

On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against
Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch
39 of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud
in securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological
incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social
humiliation warranting the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he further alleged, among
others, that:

He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was officiated by Hon. Carlos
B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith
attached as Exhibit "A" and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City Registrar. Machine copy
of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Annex "B";

Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in
Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult
and seek treatment by the defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated by the
defendant and the subsequent treatments were performed by the defendant at her residence in
Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment made being on a continuing basis;

xxxx

On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo City. They went to Dainty
Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to
sign the marriage contract, which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a false
affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to Barangay Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which
marked the start of a married life rocked with marital differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without
love, but under the uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should he not follow her;

xxxx

During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the plaintiff, fabricate stories
against him and displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect her marital obligations even committed infidelity,
which psychological incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the petitioner to live separately
from defendant since 1982 up to the present.12

In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo
City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed
on October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz:

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with
Socorro Patingo and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with Josefa
Eslaban.

CONTRARY TO LAW.14

The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo
City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his arraignment, 15 and trial ensued in due course.

In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil Case
No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage
between him and Socorro valid and legal, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint filed by
the plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the
marriage between them is valid and legal.

The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his wife, the defendant in this
case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of ₱3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her
answer with counterclaim on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and every
month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.16

The accused appealed to the CA.17

 Ruling of the RTC

On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in Criminal Case No. 49808,
disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering
him to serve an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.18

Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC
thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage
license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.

The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of
bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in
his favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.19

On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.

SO ORDERED.20

Issues

Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He argues that the RTC and the
CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil
law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one
could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution; 23 that even if
Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; 25 and that his good faith and
lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:

This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of
a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit
of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding
cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.

But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban.
Actually, he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on
bigamy.

Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v.
Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had
been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of
Appeals, supra.

Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v.
Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.

This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect. 28

Decision of the CA

Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in
finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of
cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.

The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of
bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in
his favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage. 19

On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.

SO ORDERED.20

Issues

Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He argues that the RTC and the
CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil
law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one
could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if
Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; 25 and that his good faith and
lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.27

The CA specifically observed:

This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of
a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit
of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding
cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.

But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban.
Actually, he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on
bigamy.

Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v.
Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had
been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of
Appeals, supra.

Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v.
Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.

This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect. 28

Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant.

The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the
Family Code, to wit:

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29

x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is
now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.

In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope
that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note
that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was
only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this
case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage
precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime
of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately
act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the
law is against its simple letter.

Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of bigamy was
1âwphi 1

consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro
being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not
being yet declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction. 30 "What makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan:31

x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid

marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it beheld as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the
records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the
institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second
marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39)
dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already been
filed against him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the
accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was
established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a
recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he
himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting
his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has explained that "[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage."33

The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x Nollora may not impugn his
[subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we
would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As
we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. With neither an
aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the imposable
penalty is the medium period of prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should
be within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense,
which is from six months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of two
years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was proper.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29,
2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-
Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose)
and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall.
The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute
the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and
that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to
Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house.
When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.
When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality
of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose
was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August
1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this
Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly,
the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose]. 9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between
Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank
sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were
at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of
paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on
guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he
will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of
paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged
Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the
person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written
instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N.
taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his
sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud. 10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud,
trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the
earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil
Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of
Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent
to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of
the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a
party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4)
years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only
until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on
July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 16 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between
man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together
as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage,
seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of
the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the
Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of the Civil
Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7 18 of the
Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His
1avv phi1

central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose
cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. 19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license
on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had
lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court
ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be
no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons
are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered
a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended
Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1
August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the
Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to
wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS

MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR

LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She differentiates
the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose
only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative
case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity
of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling
on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and
Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and
formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license
is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’
marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s
notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as
his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District
24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said
barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the
Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. 30 This is in stark contrast
to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void.
The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, 33 (3) ratification
of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have
in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non
thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the
law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law.
For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character.
It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the
requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps
to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The
appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s
review.47 It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt
them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did
Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.

Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to
which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually
entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards
the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a
violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage
license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or
could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was
one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the
place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license
is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required
by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license,
and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application
where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. 55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing
the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31
August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio.
In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that
is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160762 May 3, 2006

Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO, Petitioners,

vs.
LEONARDO YAMANE, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be conjugal in
nature. This presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the
property is paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted
by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the
November 22, 2002 Decision2 and the September 17, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 60939. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated August 12, 1981 and the Final Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale dated August 26, 1982 are declared NULL and VOID."4

The CA denied reconsideration in its September 17, 2003 Resolution.

The Facts

The undisputed factual findings of the CA are as follows:

"Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot located at Res. Sec. 'K', Baguio City,
registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, [respondent] herein, under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12491.

"As a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman in Civil
Case No. 1841, entitled 'Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v.
Cypress Corporation,' which said counsel handled for the plaintiffs therein, hereinafter collectively
referred to as the Pucay sisters, the subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11,
1981.

"Four days prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a Third-Party Claim with the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property
and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters.
However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale despite [respondent's] protest. The subject
property was sold to spouses Josephine [and] Henry Go (or [petitioners]) as highest bidder. No
redemption having been made during the one-year period, a Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was
eventually issued on August 26, 1982 conveying and transferring the said property to [petitioners].

"On September 4, 1984, [respondent] filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 417-R, against [petitioners] and Sheriff Melgar for annulment and
cancellation of auction sale upon the same ground stated in the abovementioned third-party claim.
Citing the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V in LRC Case No. 2288, which
ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 12491 and directed the Register of Deeds to issue new title in the
name of Josephine Go x x x, [petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. In the Order dated November 28, 1984, the motion was denied by the trial court.

"In their Answer filed on December 10, 1984, [petitioners] denied the material allegations of the
complaint and interposed the following special affirmative defenses: that the cause of action was
barred by prior judgment; that [respondent] has not pursued any lawful remedy to annul the execution
proceeding; that there is no flaw or irregularity in the auction sale; and that since the execution sale
was made in accordance with Section 21, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is deemed final and
any irregularity committed in the course thereof will not vitiate its validity.

"On December 28, 1984, Muriel likewise lodged a Complaint for Damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
505-R, against [petitioners] and Atty. Guillermo De Guzman alleging, in gist, fraud, misrepresentation,
manipulation and unlawful acts of the defendants in causing the levy of the subject property with an
estimated commercial value of P200,000 as against a charging lien in the amount of P10,000.

"In its May 27, 1985 Order, the trial court ordered the joint hearing of Civil Cases Nos. 417-R and 505-
R. On August 30, 1985, Muriel was declared non-suited for failure to appear in the hearing despite due
notice. As a consequence, Civil Case No. 505-R was dismissed on October 15, 1985."5

In its Decision6 dated March 25, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 4, held
that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane --
spouse of respondent -- and was not their conjugal property. The appearance of his name on the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was deemed to be merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner, his late wife. Hence, finding that he had no legal standing to question the auction
sale or to pray for its annulment or cancellation, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Upon receipt of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998, respondent filed a Motion, 7 in which he prayed that
he be allowed to file his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision, on or before May 30, 1998. The
trial court granted8 his Motion; received the Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was filed on May 28,
1998; and eventually denied it in its Order dated June 5, 1998.10 He then elevated the matter to the CA
on June 15, 1998.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA reversed the RTC's Decision. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated August 12, 1981, and the
Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated August 26, 1982, were declared null and void.

According to the appellate court, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless
the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose. That the land was
acquired during the spouses' coverture was sufficiently established by the TCT and the Deed of
Absolute Sale, both indicating that Muriel Pucay Yamane was "married to Leonardo Yamane"; and by
the undisputed testimony of the previous owner, Eugene Pucay. Because of petitioners' failure to
establish that the land in question had been acquired by Muriel using her exclusive funds, the CA
concluded that the contested land was conjugal property.

The appellate court further held thus:

"x x x [T]he disputed property being a conjugal property of [respondent] and his wife, and absent any
showing of some advantage or benefit that accrued to their conjugal partnership from the transaction
between the Pucay sisters and Atty. De Guzman, the public auction sale of the subject property in
favor of [petitioners] is null and void."11

Hence, this Petition.12

Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:

"I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the appeal and in not dismissing
the same, despite the fact that the respondent failed to perfect his appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period set by the Rules of Court.

"II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject property as conjugal property,
despite the existence of clear evidence showing that the subject property is the exclusive
paraphernal property of Muriel who, even during her lifetime, always claimed the said property
as her own exclusive paraphernal property and not as property co-owned with her husband, the
respondent herein. 1avvphil.net

"III. The Court of Appeals, assuming, ex grati argumenti, that the subject property is conjugal
property between respondent and Muriel, gravely erred in ruling that the same cannot answer
for the charging lien of Atty. Guillermo de Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841."13

In the main, they posit two issues. They raise, first, the procedural question of whether the CA erred in
giving due course to respondent's lapsed appeal; and, second, the substantive issue of whether the
subject property is conjugal or paraphernal.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Procedural Issue:

Whether Respondent's Appeal Should Be Given Due Course

Petitioners contend that the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal filed by respondent beyond
the 15-day reglementary period.

Concededly, he received a copy of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998. He had, therefore, until April 23,
1998, within which to file an appeal. Prior to the latter date, however, he moved that his new counsel
be allowed to file a motion for reconsideration on May 30, 1998. It was eventually filed on May 28,
1998, but was denied. Respondent subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1998. By this
time, the original period to appeal had expired. It should be clear that the Rules prohibit an extension
to file a motion for reconsideration.14

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional; and the lapse of the appeal period of fifteen
days deprives a court of the jurisdiction to alter a final judgment.15

There have been exceptions, however, in which the Court dispensed with technical infirmities and
gave due course to tardy appeals. In some of those instances, the presence of any justifying
circumstance recognized by law -- such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence --
properly vested the judge with discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. 16 In other
instances, lapsed appeals were allowed in order to serve substantial justice, upon consideration of a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; c)
the merits of the case; d) causes not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party that
would be favored by the suspension of the rules; e) the failure to show that the review being sought
was merely frivolous and dilatory; and f) the fact that the other party would not be unjustly prejudiced. 17

Indeed, in some exceptional cases, the Court has allowed the relaxation of the rules regulating the
reglementary periods of appeal. These exceptions were cited in Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v.
CA,18 from which we quote:
"In Ramos vs. Bagasao, the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice of appeal
because the questioned decision of the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time
when her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could only file the appeal four days
after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed
the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross
miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its
name and had since then been devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, a tardy appeal was accepted considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore
been judicially settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had the
effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee." 19

We believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly warranted in the present controversy. We have
carefully studied the merits of the case and noted that the review being sought has not been shown to
be merely frivolous and dilatory. The Court has come to the conclusion that the Decision of the RTC,
Branch 4 (in Civil Case No. 417-R), must be set aside. It would be far better and more prudent to attain
the ends of justice, rather than to dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice in the
process. Thus, we would rather excuse a technical lapse and afford respondent a review of the case
on appeal.

Substantive Issue:

Paraphernal or Conjugal?

The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988.20 Accordingly, the transaction was aptly covered by the then governing provisions of
the New Civil Code. On the latter basis, therefore, we shall resolve the issue of the nature of the
contested property.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."21 As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal
partnership,22 the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage.23

In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing
of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.24 Moreover, the presumption may be
rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. 25 There must be strict proof of
the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,26 and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting
it.27

The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on February 27,
1967,28 or specifically during the marriage.29 We then follow the rule that proof of the acquisition of the
subject property during a marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. It is clear
enough that the presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership.

Petitioners concede that the property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Muriel to
respondent.30 Nonetheless, they insist that it belonged exclusively to her for the following reasons:

First. Respondent never denied nor opposed her claim in Civil Case No. 505-R, which she had
filed during her lifetime; or in AG-GR Sp. No. 01616 (entitled "Muriel Pucay Yamane v.
Josephine Go"), that the disputed parcel of land was her exclusive paraphernal property. They
allege that his failure to file a denial or opposition in those cases is tantamount to a judicial
admission that militates against his belated claim.
 Second. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is in the sole name of Muriel. Petitioners
posit that, had the spouses jointly purchased this piece of land, the document should have
indicated this fact or carried the name of respondent as buyer.

Third. The failure of respondent to redeem the parcel of land within the redemption period after
the auction sale indicated that he was not its co-owner.

We will discuss the three arguments seriatim.

Unilateral Declaration

Respondent's interest cannot be prejudiced by the claim of Muriel in her Complaint in Civil Case No.
505-R that the subject parcel of land was her paraphernal property. Significantly, the nature of a
property -- whether conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined by law and not by the will of one of the
spouses.31 Thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of a conjugal
property.32

Besides, the issue presented in Civil Case No. 505-R was not the nature of the subject piece of land
being levied upon, but whether Atty. Guillermo de Guzman was entitled to a charging lien. In that case,
Muriel claimed that she had not officially retained him as counsel, and that no lawyer-client relationship
had been established between them.33

Deed and Title in the Name of One Spouse

Further, the mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature.34 Hence, it cannot be contended in the present case that, simply because the title and the Deed
of Sale covering the parcel of land were in the name of Muriel alone, it was therefore her personal and
exclusive property. In concluding that it was paraphernal, the trial court's reliance on Stuart v.
Yatco35 was clearly erroneous.

As stated earlier, to rebut the presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, petitioners must
present clear and convincing evidence. We affirm and quote below, for easy reference, the relevant
dispositions of the CA:

"x x x. We are unable to go along with [petitioners'] contention that the subject property was acquired
by Muriel with her exclusive funds. Mere registration of the contested property in the name of the wife
is not sufficient to establish the paraphernal nature of the property. This reminds Us of the teaching in
the recent case of Diancin v. Court of Appeals, that all the property acquired by the spouses,
regardless of in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. To quote:

"As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose name the same is
registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In the case at bar, the fishpond lease
right is not paraphernal having been acquired during the coverture of the marriage between Matilde
and Tiburcio, which was on April 9, 1940. The fact that the grant was solely in the name of Matilde did
not make the property paraphernal property. What was material was the time the fishpond lease right
was acquired by the grantee, and that was during the lawful existence of Matilde's marriage to
Tiburcio.

"x x x [T]his presumption is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence. The burden
of proving that the property belongs exclusively to the wife rests upon the party asserting it. Mere
assertion of the property's paraphernal nature is not sufficient."

"The record as well as the foregoing established jurisprudence lead us to conclude that the contested
property was indeed acquired during the marriage of herein [respondent] and Muriel. To prove that it is
nonetheless paraphernal property, it is incumbent upon [petitioners] to adduce strong, clear and
convincing evidence that Muriel bought the same with her exclusive funds. [Petitioners] failed to
discharge the burden. Nowhere in the evidence presented by them do We find any indication that the
land in question was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive funds. The presumption not having been
overthrown, the conclusion is that the contested land is conjugal property." 36

Non-Redemption After the Auction Sale

The non-redemption of the property by respondent within the period prescribed by law did not, in any
way, indicate the absence of his right or title to it. Contrary to petitioners' allegation, the fact is that he
filed a Third-Party Claim37 with the sheriff, upon learning of the levy and impending auction sale. This
fact was specifically admitted by petitioners.38 Respondent claimed that the parcel of land was
conjugal, and that he could not answer for the separate obligation of his wife and her
sisters.39 Notwithstanding his claim, the disputed piece of land was sold at a public auction on August
11, 1981. Consequently issued were a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated August 12, 1981, and a Final
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated August 26, 1982.40

Likewise, in his Opposition (Answer) to the Petition in LRC File Adm. Case No. 2288, 41 respondent
raised the issue of the conjugal nature of the property and reserved his right to file an independent
action to annul the auction sale. In its March 30, 1983 Order,42 however, Branch 5 of the RTC of
Baguio City did not rule on either the actual ownership or the nature of the parcel of land. Rather, it
granted the Petition to issue a new certificate of title in favor of Petitioner Josephine Mendoza Go. It
found that, under Section 75 of Presidential Decree 1529, respondent had no legal standing to
question the auction sale, because he was not the registered owner of the property. Instead, his right
to prove his claim in a separate and independent action was upheld. 43 Thus, he instituted the present
case for annulment and cancellation of the auction sale.

The foregoing points clearly explain the failure of respondent to redeem the property. Misplaced is
petitioners' emphasis on his failure to do so within the period required by law, because redemption in
this case would have been inconsistent with his claim that the sale was invalid.44 Redemption would
have served as an implied admission of the regularity of the sale and estopped him from later
impugning its validity on that ground.45

Since petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that the property is paraphernal, the
presumption that it is conjugal therefore stands. The next question before us is, whether the charging
lien of Atty. de Guzman may be properly enforced against the piece of land in question.

Charging Lien Not Chargeable Against Conjugal Property

It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were acquired during the marriage of respondent
and Muriel. The lawyer's legal services were engaged to recover from Cypress Corporation (in Civil
Case No. 1841) the balance of the purchase price of the sale of the exclusive property of Muriel and
her sisters.46 The recovery was done during the marriage.47

The CA elucidated on this matter as follows:

"x x x. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appears to have
been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive
interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for
them. Accordingly, whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters'
private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged
against the contested conjugal property.

"Even on the remote assumption that the conjugal property could be held liable, levy on execution of
the same property should still be denied in accordance with the ruling in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De
Garcia that before a conjugal property could be held liable for the obligation contracted by a spouse,
there must be a showing of some advantage or benefit that accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Concededly, the burden is on the [petitioners] to prove that the services rendered by Atty. De Guzman
in handling Civil Case No. 1841 for the Pucay sisters had, somehow, redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of herein [respondent] and Muriel. This onus, [petitioners], however, failed to
discharge."48

We find no reason to deviate from the CA's findings, which are amply supported by evidence. The
expenses incurred by Muriel for the recovery of the balance of the purchase price of her paraphernal
property are her exclusive responsibility.49 This piece of land may not be used to pay for her
indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown to be one of the charges against the
conjugal partnership.50 Moreover, her rights to the property are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.

Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband's failure to deliver the needed sum;51 when administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts52 or by the husband;53 or when the wife gives moderate donations
for charity.54 Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the present case means that the
conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for Muriel's personal obligation.

The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor alone.55 In this case, therefore, the property -- being conjugal in nature -- cannot
be levied upon.56

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE;
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the
marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v.
Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of
the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon
the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por
amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne
mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there
is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit
of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such
donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH
THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does
not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962.
She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether the ban
on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now
appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he
was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was
married to the donor, sustained the latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character,
this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is
indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation
between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such
a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.

In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute
ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix
Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and
that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and
her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on
November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant
assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned
the property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation
was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was
made during the common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-done and the now
deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix
Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the
only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5

The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation
under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When
the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes
and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when
they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed." 6

We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.

1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han
de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore
invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason
to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover,
as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it would not be just that such donations should
subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains
the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage
should likewise attach to concubinage." 9

2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion
cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be
differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would
be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits.
Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the
principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written,
this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission
may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its
avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar
a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.’’ 10

3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily
result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The
questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property
in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with
the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J, took no part.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA
COPUZ, Respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.

The Case

These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this petition for review of the
Decision 1 dated January 30, 1996 and the Resolution 2 dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758, affirming the Decision of the lower court and denying
reconsideration, respectively.

On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complainant 3 against her
husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint
sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private
respondent and her husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due course, the trial court rendered a Decision 4 dated
September 9, 1992, disposing as follow: 5

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendants,

1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March 1, 1990 (Exh. "A") and the "amicable
settlement" dated March 16, 1990 (Exh. "B") as null void and of no effect;

2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the
remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 which has been the subject of the Deed
of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A");

3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse defendants Luzviminda Guiang the amount of NINE
THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS corresponding to the payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel
Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff in favor of Manuel Callejo, and another sum of
P379.62 representing one-half of the amount of realty taxes paid by defendants Guiangs on Lot 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests thereon computed from the finality of the
decision.

No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual circumstances of the case.

Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Court, in its
challenged Decision, ruled as follow: 6

WHEREFORE, the appealed of the lower court in Civil Case No. 204 is hereby AFFIRMED by this Court.
No costs considering plaintiff-appellee's failure to file her brief despite notice.

Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed Resolution: 7

Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration of Our decision in
this case of January 30, 1996, to be a mere rehash of the same issues which we have already passed
upon in the said decision, and there [being] no cogent reason to disturb the same, this Court
RESOLVED to DENY the instant motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
 The Facts

The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila
seeking employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal peoperty,
consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. The circumstances of this sale are set forth
in the Decision of Respondent Court, which quoted from the Decision of the trial court as follows: 8

1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They were married on
December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge. This is admitted by defendants-spouses Antonio
and Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also admitted by defendant Judie Corpuz when he testified
in court (tsn. p. 3, June 9, 1992), although the latter says that they were married in 1967. The couple
have three children, namely: Junie - 18 years old, Harriet - 17 years of age, and Jodie or Joji, the
youngest, who was 15 years of age in August, 1990 when her mother testified in court.

Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as
vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo who signed
as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration
was payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three
successive installments (Exh. "2", tsn p. 6, February 14, 1990).

2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No.
9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter
have since then occupied the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22,
1992). They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.

3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad,
in [the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was
not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South
Cotabato, . . . on March 11, 1990. Plaintiff's departure for Manila to look for work in the Middle East
was with the consent of her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug. 12, 1990; p. 10 Sept. 6, 1991).

After his wife's departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal
dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel,
restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to school at King's College, Bo. 1,
Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working as household help of, and staying
at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was
going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6, 1991.)

Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-
half portion including their house, of their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her
mother informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however,
did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she
[Guiang] would advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17, Sept. 6, 1991).

4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale
of the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to
defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as "Deed of Transfer of Rights" (Exh. "A") the
remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of
P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuz's children Junie
and Harriet signed the document as witness.

Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5, 1990, obviously to cure whatever defect in defendant
Judie Corpuz's title over the lot transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed another
agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408 (Exh. "3"), this time with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a
widow of the original registered owner from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought
the lot (Exh. "2"), who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz
signed as a witness to the sale (Exh. "3-A"). The new sale (Exh. "3") describes the lot sold as Lot 8,
Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct lot is Lot 8,
Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz.
5. Sometimes on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home. She found her children staying with other
households. Only Junie was staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered
her children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was
informed by her children that their father had a wife already.

6. For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by defendant
Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay
General Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, for trespassing (tsn. p. 34, Aug. 17,
1990). The case was docketed by the barangay authorities as Barangay Case No. 38 for "trespassing".
On March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a document known as "amicable settlement". In full, the
settlement provides for, to wit:

That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave
voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any
charge, on or before April 7, 1990.

FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.

Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff to the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred
however to the Office-In-Charge at the time, a certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in turn told her that he
could not do anything on the matter (tsn. p. 31, Aug. 17, 1990).

This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda
Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs.
Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26, 1990). We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really
approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been
made, plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot.

7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion for the execution of
the amicable settlement, filing the same with the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato.
The proceedings [are] still pending before the said court, with the filing of the instant suit.

8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent P600.00 for the preparation of the Deed of
Transfer of Rights, Exh. "A", P9,000.00 as the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having
assumed the remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo (Exh. "3"); P100.00 for the
preparation of Exhibit "3"; a total of P759.62 basic tax and special education fund on the lot; P127.50
as the total documentary stamp tax on the various documents; P535.72 for the capital gains tax;
P22.50 as transfer tax; a standard fee of P17.00; certification fee of P5.00. These expenses particularly
the taxes and other expenses towards the transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs were incurred for
the whole Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409.

Ruling of Respondent Court

Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial court's ruling that any alienation or
encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal propety without the consent of his wife is null and void as
provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It also rejected petitioners' contention that the
"amicable sttlement" ratified said sale, citing Article 1409 of the Code which expressly bars ratification
of the contracts specified therein, particularly those "prohibited or declared void by law."

Hence, this petition. 9

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the following errors: 10

Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.

II
Whether or not the Cour of Appeals erred in not declairing as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the
Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified thru the execution of the
"amicable settlement" by the contending parties.

III

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the findings of the Court a quo which
recognized as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of private respondent over the remaining
one half (1/2) portion of the properly.

In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was
merely voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into an
amicable sttlement with them.

This Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?

Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed by the parties-
litigants in good faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent
merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible
of ratification.(n)

The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices
of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and
vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private
respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus: 11

Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you still recall where you were?

A I was still in Manila during that time.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. FUENTES:

Q When did you come back to Koronadal, South Cotabato?

A That was on March 11, 1990, Ma'am.

Q Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any problem which arose concerning the ownership
of your residential house at Callejo Subdivision?

A When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a problem which arose regarding my residential house
and lot because it was sold by my husband without my knowledge.

This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code,
which was correctly applied by the teo lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (165a) (Emphasis supplied)

Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the
amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise: 12

The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we
compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166
of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnershit without the wife's consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null
and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or
encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair
her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by
the husband.(n)

This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during [the] marriage to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation
or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were
perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz
alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation
and
coercion. 13 In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between
the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that such
contract was entered into without the wife's consent.

In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent.
To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, 14 the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

Second Issue: Amicable Settlement

Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the
contending parties through the "amicable settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay
Case No. 38.

The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the
private respondent. The trial court correctly held: 15

By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights
(Exh. "A") cannot be ratified, even by an "amicable settlement". The participation by some barangay
authorities in the "amicable settlement" cannot otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot
be denied that the "amicable settlement (Exh. "B") entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendent
spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A"). By
express provision of law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the legal provision, to wit:

Art. 1422. Acontract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).

In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of Rights (Exh. "A") and the "amicable settlement"
(Exh. "3") are null and void.

Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. 16

Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is
clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after
which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a
motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the
property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and
Resolution. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999

ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN
REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of
the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas,
namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu,
Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area and is registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 985. This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and
0354. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in area and is
registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.

The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino. In
February 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution.
As head of the provisional government, the President exercised legislative power "until a legislature is
elected and convened under a new Constitution." 1 In the exercise of this legislative power, the
President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the
program.

On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power
from the President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect
on June 15, 1988.

Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to
sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Hacienda Palico

On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled "Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation
was addressed to "Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda. Palico." 3 Therein, the MARO invited
petitioner to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of
the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was "scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program." 4

On October 25, 1989, the MARO completed three (3) Investigation Reports after investigation and
ocular inspection of the Hacienda. In the first Report, the MARO found that 270 hectares under Tax
Declaration Nos. 465, 466, 468 and 470 were "flat to undulating (0-8% slope)" and actually occupied
and cultivated by 34 tillers of sugarcane. 5 In the second Report, the MARO identified as "flat to
undulating" approximately 339 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0234 which also had several actual
occupants and tillers of sugarcane; 6 while in the third Report, the MARO found approximately 75
hectare under Tax Declaration No. 0354 as "flat to undulating" with 33 actual occupants and tillers also
of sugarcane. 7

On October 27, 1989, a "Summary Investigation Report" was submitted and signed jointly by the
MARO, representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), and by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The Report recommended
that 333.0800 hectares of Hacienda Palico be subject to compulsory acquisition at a value of
P6,807,622.20. 8 The following day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more Summary Investigation Reports
were submitted by the same officers and representatives. They recommended that 270.0876 hectares
and 75.3800 hectares be placed under compulsory acquisition at a compensation of P8,109,739.00
and P2,188,195.47, respectively. 9

On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent
a "Notice of Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows:

Roxas y Cia, Limited

Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes

Manila, Metro Manila. 10

Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to
immediate acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL; that based on the DAR's
valuation criteria, the government was offering compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares;
that whether this offer was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform the Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of petitioner's rejection or failure to reply
within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings with notice to
petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner accepts respondent DAR's
offer, or upon deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the same, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land. 11

Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land
Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled "Request to Open Trust Account." Each
Memoranda requested that a trust account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda
Palico be opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latter's rejection of its offered value. 12

Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas
Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. 13 On
July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the DAR Regional Director reiterating its request for conversion
of the two haciendas. 14

Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the
two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by
respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. 15 On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No.
985 of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No.
6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. 16

Hacienda Banilad
On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a
notice to petitioner addressed as follows:

Mr. Jaime Pimentel

Hacienda Administrator

Hacienda Banilad

Nasugbu, Batangas 17

The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory acquisition
under the CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary
Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent DAR was willing to provide assistance
thereto. 18

On September 18, 1989, the MARO sent an "Invitation to Parties" again to Pimentel inviting the latter
to attend a conference on September 21, 1989 at the MARO Office in Nasugbu to discuss the results
of the MARO's investigation over Hacienda Banilad. 19

On September 21, 1989, the same day the conference was held, the MARO submitted two (2)
Reports. In his first Report, he found that approximately 709 hectares of land under Tax Declaration
Nos. 0237 and 0236 were "flat to undulating (0-8% slope)." On this area were discovered 162 actual
occupants and tillers of sugarcane. 20 In the second Report, it was found that approximately 235
hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390 were "flat to undulating," on which were 92 actual occupants
and tillers of sugarcane. 21

The results of these Reports were discussed at the conference. Present in the conference were
representatives of the prospective farmer beneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel on
behalf of the landowner. 22 After the meeting, on the same day, September 21, 1989, a Summary
Investigation Report was submitted jointly by the MARO, representatives of the BARC, LBP, and the
PARO. They recommended that after ocular inspection of the property, 234.6498 hectares under Tax
Declaration No. 0390 be subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution by CLOA. 23 The following
day, September 22, 1989, a second Summary Investigation was submitted by the same officers. They
recommended that 737.2590 hectares under Tax Declaration Nos. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed
under compulsory acquisition for distribution. 24

On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2)
separate "Notices of Acquisition" over Hacienda Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as
the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the
Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to:

Roxas y Cia. Limited

7th Floor, Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.

Makati, Metro Manila. 25

Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares

and P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498 hectares. 26

On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a
"Request to Open Trust Account" in petitioner's name as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of
Hacienda Banilad. 27 A second "Request to Open Trust Account" was sent on November 18, 1991 over
723.4130 hectares of said Hacienda. 28
On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and P21,234,468.78 in
cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as compensation for petitioner's land in Hacienda Banilad. 29

On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.

Hacienda Caylaway

Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the
effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4)
titles — TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665. On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR,
through the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions accepting
petitioner's voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-
44663. 30 The Resolutions were addressed to:

Roxas & Company, Inc.

7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg.

Aguirre, Legaspi Village

Makati, M. M 31

On September 4, 1990, the DAR Regional Director issued two separate Memoranda to the LBP
Regional Manager requesting for the valuation of the land under TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-44663. 32 On
the same day, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, sent to petitioner a "Notice of
Acquisition" over 241.6777 hectares under TCT No. T-44664 and 533.8180 hectares under TCT No. T-
44663. 33 Like the Resolutions of Acceptance, the Notice of Acquisition was addressed to petitioner at
its office in Makati, Metro Manila.

Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to
the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for
conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other
uses. 34

In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a
reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also
denied petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on
specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18
degrees and that the land is undeveloped. 35

Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its
application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. 36 On July 14, 1993, petitioner,
through its President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda
Caylaway in light of the following:

1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department of

Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1,
1993 stating that the lands subject of referenced titles "are not feasible and economically
sound for further agricultural development.

2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the

Zoning Ordinance reclassifying areas covered by the referenced titles to non-agricultural
which was enacted after extensive consultation with government agencies, including [the
Department of Agrarian Reform], and the requisite public hearings.
 3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8,
1993 approving the Zoning Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu.

4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the Municipal
Planning & Development, Coordinator and Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed to
Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas has no
objection to the conversion of the lands subject of referenced titles to non-agricultural. 37

On August 24, 1993 petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with respondent DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOA's issued by respondent DAR in
the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas
are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production,
and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural.

In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial
question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be
submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination. 38

On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 32484. It questioned
the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of
its landholdings.

Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO on November
8, 1993.

Petitioner's petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on April 28, 1994. 39 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied on January 17, 1997 by respondent court. 40

Hence, this recourse. Petitioner assigns the following errors:

A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS PREMATURE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN VIEW OF THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF THE
RESPONDENTS' ACTS, THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE CAUSED BY SAID ILLEGAL
ACTS, AND THE ABSENCE OF A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW — ALL OF WHICH ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE
SAID DOCTRINE.

B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS ARE SUBJECT TO COVERAGE UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW, IN VIEW OF THE UNDISPUTED
FACT THAT PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO NON-
AGRICULTURAL USES BY PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 1520 WHICH
DECLARED THE MUNICIPALITY NASUGBU, BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND
THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU RE-CLASSIFYING
CERTAIN PORTIONS OF PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS AS NON-
AGRICULTURAL, BOTH OF WHICH PLACE SAID LANDHOLDINGS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF AGRARIAN REFORM, OR AT THE VERY LEAST ENTITLE PETITIONER
TO APPLY FOR CONVERSION AS CONCEDED BY RESPONDENT DAR.

C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO

DECLARE THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE RESPONDENT DAR VOID FOR FAILURE
TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS BLATANTLY
DISREGARDED THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LANDS
UNDER R.A. 6657, MORE PARTICULARLY, IN FAILING TO GIVE DUE NOTICE TO
THE PETITIONER AND TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC AREAS SOUGHT
TO BE ACQUIRED.
 D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONER WAS BRAZENLY AND ILLEGALLY DEPRIVED OF
ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT PAID JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE IT WAS
UNCEREMONIOUSLY STRIPPED OF ITS LANDHOLDINGS THROUGH THE
ISSUANCE OF CLOA'S TO ALLEGED FARMER BENEFICIARIES, IN VIOLATION OF
R.A. 6657. 41

The assigned errors involve three (3) principal issues: (1) whether this Court can take cognizance of
this petition despite petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) whether the acquisition
proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law; and (3) assuming the
haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural, whether this court has the power to
rule on this issue.

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

In its first assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. As a general rule, before a party may be
allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action may be
resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2)
when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when
there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the respondent acted in disregard of due
process; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; (7) when irreparable damage will be
suffered; (8) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (9) when strong public
interest is involved; (10) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and (11) in quo
warranto proceedings. 42

Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its rights and to
require it to exhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.

Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer beneficiaries over
portions of petitioner's land without just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. 43 Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first
be acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. 44 There was no receipt by petitioner of
any compensation for any of the lands acquired by the government.

The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides that the deposit
must be made only in "cash" or "LBP bonds." 45 Respondent DAR's opening of trust account deposits in
petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the Philippines does not constitute payment under the law.
Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash or
LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this
compensation was marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings,
respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due process. Under these
circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial
action on the part of the petitioner.

II. The Validity of the Acquisition Proceedings Over the Haciendas.

Petitioner's allegation of lack of due process goes into the validity of the acquisition proceedings
themselves. Before we rule on this matter, however, there is need to lay down the procedure in the
acquisition of private lands under the provisions of the law.

A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657

Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for two (2)
modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands is set forth in Section 16 of R.A. 6657, viz:

Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of
private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:

a). After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the
owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same
in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the
place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of
the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation
set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.

b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by
personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or
representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the
offer.

c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the
landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and
surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.

d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary

administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land
requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the
matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case
within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.

e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in

case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the
court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the farmer
beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to
the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Within thirty days from
receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a
deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days
from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the
purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the
LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within
fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform
the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall
deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall
immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer
beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final
determination of just compensation.

The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of the land acquisition to hasten the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). 46 Under Section 16 of the
CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this
gap, the DAR issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series or 1989, which set the
operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:

II. OPERATING PROCEDURE

A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, with the assistance of the pertinent Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall:

1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP
in his area of responsibility. The masterlist shall include such information
as required under the attached CARP Masterlist Form which shall include
the name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax
declaration number.

2. Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title

(OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP
except those for which the landowners have already filed applications to
avail of other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the
following duly accomplished forms:

a) CARP CA Form 1 — MARO Investigation Report

b) CARP CA Form 2 — Summary Investigation Report of

Findings and Evaluation

c) CARP CA Form 3 — Applicant's Information Sheet

d) CARP CA Form 4 — Beneficiaries Undertaking

e) CARP CA Form 5 — Transmittal Report to the PARO

The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-
mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the
same are true and correct.

3. Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a

conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case
Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference/meeting shall also be
sent to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC
representative(s), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
representative, and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the
valuation of the property. He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation
report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of the
participants thereon. The landowner shall also be asked to indicate his
retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall be signed by all
participants in the conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF.

4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform

Officer (PARO).

B. The PARO shall:

1. Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his
MAROs.

2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the

land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. 47 The valuation
worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified
correct by the PARO and all the personnel who participated in the
accomplishment of these forms.

3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through
ocular inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection
and verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds =
500,000 per estate.

4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together

with the duly accomplished valuation forms and his recommendations, to
the Central Office. The LBP representative and the MARO concerned
shall be furnished a copy each of his report.

C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition

and Distribution (BLAD), shall:

1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO,
review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property
covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall
be prepared and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel
directly participating in the review and final valuation.

2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized

representative, a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject
property. Serve the Notice to the landowner personally or through
registered mail within three days from its approval. The Notice shall
include, among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the
amount of just compensation offered by DAR.

3. Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of Acquisition.
However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine
just compensation, in accordance with the procedures provided under
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of
the DARAB's decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and
submit to the Secretary for approval the required Order of Acquisition.
 4. Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or
upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or
non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent
Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property is
transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the land
for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries.

Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of
responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition
Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice
of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF.
He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries the representatives of the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested
parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections
or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.

The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall
complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall
be mandatory when the computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of
the valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with his recommendation to the Central
Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD), shall review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property. The
BLAD shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a Notice of
Acquisition for the subject property. 48 From this point, the provisions of Section 16 of R.A. 6657 then
apply. 49

For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage
and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the
BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of
1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.

The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the
conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the
requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the
State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes
retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. 50 But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are
deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. 51 The Bill of Rights provides
that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 52 The CARL
was not intended to take away property without due process of law. 53 The exercise of the power of
eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.

DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first sprung, was amended in
1990 by DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. The Notice
of Coverage and letter of invitation to the conference meeting were expanded and amplified in said
amendments.

DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 entitled "Revised Rules Governing the Acquisition of Agricultural
Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to R.A. 6657," requires
that:

B. MARO
 1. Receives the duly accomplished CARP Form Nos. 1 &
1.1 including supporting documents.

2. Gathers basic ownership documents listed under 1.a or

1.b above and prepares corresponding VOCF/CACF by
landowner/landholding.

3. Notifies/invites the landowner and representatives of the

LBP, DENR, BARC and prospective beneficiaries of the
schedule of ocular inspection of the property at least one
week in advance.

4. MARO/LAND BANK FIELD OFFICE/BARC

a) Identify the land and landowner, and

determine the suitability for agriculture and
productivity of the land and jointly prepare
Field Investigation Report (CARP Form No.
2), including the Land Use Map of the
property.

b) Interview applicants and assist them in the

preparation of the Application For Potential
CARP Beneficiary (CARP Form No. 3).

c) Screen prospective farmer-beneficiaries

and for those found qualified, cause the
signing of the respective Application to
Purchase and Farmer's Undertaking (CARP
Form No. 4).

d) Complete the Field Investigation Report

based on the result of the ocular
inspection/investigation of the property and
documents submitted. See to it that Field
Investigation Report is duly accomplished and
signed by all concerned.

5. MARO

a) Assists the DENR Survey Party in the

conduct of a boundary/ subdivision survey
delineating areas covered by OLT, retention,
subject of VOS, CA (by phases, if possible),
infrastructures, etc., whichever is applicable.

b) Sends Notice of Coverage (CARP Form

No. 5) to landowner concerned or his duly
authorized representative inviting him for a
conference.

c) Sends Invitation Letter (CARP Form No. 6)

for a conference/public hearing to prospective
farmer-beneficiaries, landowner,
representatives of BARC, LBP, DENR, DA,
NGO's, farmers' organizations and other
 interested parties to discuss the following
matters:

Result of Field Investigation

Inputs to valuation

Issues raised

Comments/recommendations
by all parties concerned.

d) Prepares Summary of Minutes of the

conference/public hearing to be guided by
CARP Form No. 7.

e) Forwards the completed VOCF/CACF to

the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO)
using CARP Form No. 8 (Transmittal Memo to
PARO).

xxx xxx xxx

DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules on both Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and
Compulsory Acquisition (CA) transactions involving lands enumerated under Section 7 of the
CARL. 54 In both VOS and CA. transactions, the MARO prepares the Voluntary Offer to Sell Case
Folder (VOCF) and the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF), as the case may be, over a
particular landholding. The MARO notifies the landowner as well as representatives of the LBP, BARC
and prospective beneficiaries of the date of the ocular inspection of the property at least one week
before the scheduled date and invites them to attend the same. The MARO, LBP or BARC conducts
the ocular inspection and investigation by identifying the land and landowner, determining the
suitability of the land for agriculture and productivity, interviewing and screening prospective farmer
beneficiaries. Based on its investigation, the MARO, LBP or BARC prepares the Field Investigation
Report which shall be signed by all parties concerned. In addition to the field investigation, a boundary
or subdivision survey of the land may also be conducted by a Survey Party of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to be assisted by the MARO. 55 This survey shall
delineate the areas covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT), areas retained by the landowner,
areas with infrastructure, and the areas subject to VOS and CA. After the survey and field
investigation, the MARO sends a "Notice of Coverage" to the landowner or his duly authorized
representative inviting him to a conference or public hearing with the farmer beneficiaries,
representatives of the BARC, LBP, DENR, Department of Agriculture (DA), non-government
organizations, farmer's organizations and other interested parties. At the public hearing, the parties
shall discuss the results of the field investigation, issues that may be raised in relation thereto, inputs
to the valuation of the subject landholding, and other comments and recommendations by all parties
concerned. The Minutes of the conference/public hearing shall form part of the VOCF or CACF which
files shall be forwarded by the MARO to the PARO. The PARO reviews, evaluates and validates the
Field Investigation Report and other documents in the VOCF/CACF. He then forwards the records to
the RARO for another review.

DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was amended by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. DAR A.O. No. 1,
Series of 1993 provided, among others, that:

IV. OPERATING PROCEDURES:

Steps Responsible Activity Forms/

Agency/Unit Document
(requirements)

A. Identification and

Documentation

xxx xxx xxx

5 DARMO Issue Notice of Coverage CARP

to LO by personal delivery Form No. 2

with proof of service, or

registered mail with return

card, informing him that his

property is now under CARP

coverage and for LO to select

his retention area, if he desires

to avail of his right of retention;

and at the same time invites him

to join the field investigation to

be conducted on his property

which should be scheduled at

least two weeks in advance of

said notice.

A copy of said Notice shall CARP

be posted for at least one Form No. 17

week on the bulletin board of

the municipal and barangay

halls where the property is

located. LGU office concerned

notifies DAR about compliance

with posting requirements thru

return indorsement on CARP

Form No. 17.

6 DARMO Send notice to the LBP, CARP

BARC, DENR representatives Form No. 3

and prospective ARBs of the schedule of the field investigation

to be conducted on the subject

property.

7 DARMO With the participation of CARP

BARC the LO, representatives of Form No. 4

LBP the LBP, BARC, DENR Land Use

DENR and prospective ARBs, Map

Local Office conducts the investigation on

subject property to identify

the landholding, determines

its suitability and productivity;

and jointly prepares the Field

Investigation Report (FIR)

and Land Use Map. However,

the field investigation shall

proceed even if the LO, the

representatives of the DENR and

prospective ARBs are not available

provided, they were given due

notice of the time and date of

investigation to be conducted.

Similarly, if the LBP representative

is not available or could not come

on the scheduled date, the field

investigation shall also be conducted,

after which the duly accomplished

Part I of CARP Form No. 4 shall

be forwarded to the LBP

representative for validation. If he agrees

to the ocular inspection report of DAR,

he signs the FIR (Part I) and

accomplishes Part II thereof.

In the event that there is a

difference or variance between

the findings of the DAR and the

LBP as to the propriety of

covering the land under CARP,

whether in whole or in part, on

the issue of suitability to agriculture,

degree of development or slope,

and on issues affecting idle lands,

the conflict shall be resolved by

a composite team of DAR, LBP,

DENR and DA which shall jointly

conduct further investigation

thereon. The team shall submit its

report of findings which shall be

binding to both DAR and LBP,

pursuant to Joint Memorandum

Circular of the DAR, LBP, DENR

and DA dated 27 January 1992.

8 DARMO Screen prospective ARBs

BARC and causes the signing of CARP

the Application of Purchase Form No. 5

and Farmer's Undertaking

(APFU).

9 DARMO Furnishes a copy of the CARP

duly accomplished FIR to Form No. 4

the landowner by personal

delivery with proof of

service or registered mail

will return card and posts

a copy thereof for at least

one week on the bulletin

board of the municipal

and barangay halls where

the property is located.

LGU office concerned CARP

notifies DAR about Form No. 17

compliance with posting

requirement thru return

endorsement on CARP

Form No. 17.

B. Land Survey

10 DARMO Conducts perimeter or Perimeter

And/or segregation survey or

DENR delineating areas covered Segregation

Local Office by OLT, "uncarpable Survey Plan

areas such as 18% slope

and above, unproductive/

unsuitable to agriculture,
 retention, infrastructure.

In case of segregation or

subdivision survey, the

plan shall be approved

by DENR-LMS.

C. Review and Completion

of Documents

11. DARMO Forward VOCF/CACF CARP

to DARPO. Form No. 6

xxx xxx xxx.

DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the identification process and increased the number of
government agencies involved in the identification and delineation of the land subject to
acquisition. 56 This time, the Notice of Coverage is sent to the landowner before the conduct of the field
investigation and the sending must comply with specific requirements. Representatives of the DAR
Municipal Office (DARMO) must send the Notice of Coverage to the landowner by "personal delivery
with proof of service, or by registered mail with return card," informing him that his property is under
CARP coverage and that if he desires to avail of his right of retention, he may choose which area he
shall retain. The Notice of Coverage shall also invite the landowner to attend the field investigation to
be scheduled at least two weeks from notice. The field investigation is for the purpose of identifying the
landholding and determining its suitability for agriculture and its productivity. A copy of the Notice of
Coverage shall be posted for at least one week on the bulletin board of the municipal and barangay
halls where the property is located. The date of the field investigation shall also be sent by the DAR
Municipal Office to representatives of the LBP, BARC, DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries.
The field investigation shall be conducted on the date set with the participation of the landowner and
the various representatives. If the landowner and other representatives are absent, the field
investigation shall proceed, provided they were duly notified thereof. Should there be a variance
between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the land be placed under agrarian reform,
the land's suitability to agriculture, the degree or development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be
resolved by a composite team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly conduct further
investigation. The team's findings shall be binding on both DAR and LBP. After the field investigation,
the DAR Municipal Office shall prepare the Field Investigation Report and Land Use Map, a copy of
which shall be furnished the landowner "by personal delivery with proof of service or registered mail
with return card." Another copy of the Report and Map shall likewise be posted for at least one week in
the municipal or barangay halls where the property is located.

Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to the Notice of Acquisition set
forth in Section 16 of the law. They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A.O. No.
12, Series of 1989 and subsequently amended in DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A.O. No.
1, Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner that his property shall
be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it also notifies him,
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990, that a public hearing, shall be conducted where he and
representatives of the concerned sectors of society may attend to discuss the results of the field
investigation, the land valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993,
the Notice of Coverage also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding shall be
conducted where he and the other representatives may be present.

B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad

In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of
invitation entitled "Invitation to Parties" dated September 29, 1989 to petitioner corporation, through
Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico. 57 The invitation was received on the same day it
was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received at the bottom left corner of said invitation.
With regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel, administrator also of
Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attended the
conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner
corporation. 58 The Minutes was also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer
beneficiaries. 59 No letter of invitation was sent or conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda
Caylaway because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent DAR. 60

When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the various
parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was
already in effect more than a month earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No.
12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall be sent to the landowner, the
representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties. The
procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process
especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic
corporation, 61 and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and
employees.

The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the landowner by
"personal delivery or registered mail." Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical person to whose
address the Notice may be sent by personal delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish.
The DAR Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the proceedings before the DAR, the
distinction between natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be found in the Revised
Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB
is governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Notices and pleadings
are served on private domestic corporations or partnerships in the following manner:

Sec. 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation or Partnership. — If the defendant is

a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent,
or any of its directors or partners.

Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14 provides:

Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant is
a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent,
or any of its directors.

Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation before the DARAB
and the regular courts are served on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its
directors. These persons are those through whom the private domestic corporation or partnership is
capable of action. 62

Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of petitioner corporation. Is
he, as administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an agent of the corporation?

The purpose of all rules for service of process on a corporation is to make it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it. 63 Service must be made on a
representative so integrated with the corporation as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize
his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him, 64 and bring
home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. 65 Petitioner's evidence does not show the
official duties of Jaime Pimentel as administrator of petitioner's haciendas. The evidence does not
indicate whether Pimentel's duties is so integrated with the corporation that he would immediately
realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. At the
time the notices were sent and the preliminary conference conducted, petitioner's principal place of
business was listed in respondent DAR's records as "Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes, Manila," 66 and
"7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., 101 Aguirre St., Makati, Metro Manila." 67 Pimentel did not hold office
at the principal place of business of petitioner. Neither did he exercise his functions in Plaza
Cervantes, Manila nor in Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., Makati, Metro Manila. He performed his official
functions and actually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two hundred
kilometers away from Metro Manila.

Curiously, respondent DAR had information of the address of petitioner's principal place of business.
The Notices of Acquisition over Haciendas Palico and Banilad were addressed to petitioner at its
offices in Manila and Makati. These Notices were sent barely three to four months after Pimentel was
notified of the preliminary conference. 68 Why respondent DAR chose to notify Pimentel instead of the
officers of the corporation was not explained by the said respondent.

Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of petitioner corporation, and the notices and
letters of invitation were validly served on petitioner through him, there is no showing that Pimentel
himself was duly authorized to attend the conference meeting with the MARO, BARC and LBP
representatives and farmer beneficiaries for purposes of compulsory acquisition of petitioner's
landholdings. Even respondent DAR's evidence does not indicate this authority. On the contrary,
petitioner claims that it had no knowledge of the letter-invitation, hence, could not have given Pimentel
the authority to bind it to whatever matters were discussed or agreed upon by the parties at the
preliminary conference or public hearing. Notably, one year after Pimentel was informed of the
preliminary conference, DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued and this required that the Notice
of Coverage must be sent "to the landowner concerned or his duly authorized representative." 69

Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its haciendas, the areas
found actually subject to CARP were not properly identified before they were taken over by respondent
DAR. Respondents insist that the lands were identified because they are all registered property and
the technical description in their respective titles specifies their metes and bounds. Respondents admit
at the same time, however, that not all areas in the haciendas were placed under the comprehensive
agrarian reform program invariably by reason of elevation or character or use of the land. 70

The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two haciendas, but only
portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024 hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were
targetted for acquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an area of 1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares
were subject to CARP. The haciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the various tax
declarations over the haciendas describe the landholdings as "sugarland," and "forest, sugarland,
pasture land, horticulture and woodland." 71

Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the Notice of Acquisition specifically requires that the
land subject to land reform be first identified. The two haciendas in the instant case cover vast tracts of
land. Before Notices of Acquisition were sent to petitioner, however, the exact areas of the
landholdings were not properly segregated and delineated. Upon receipt of this
notice, therefore, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to
compulsory acquisition, which portions it could rightfully retain, whether these retained portions were
compact or contiguous, and which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. Even respondent
DAR's evidence does not show that petitioner, through its duly authorized representative, was notified
of any ocular inspection and investigation that was to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is
there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in
those portions to be acquired compulsorily. The right of retention and how this right is exercised, is
guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARL, viz:

Sec. 6. Retention Limits. — . . . .

The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall
pertain to the landowner; Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention
 by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to
remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall
be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In
case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his
right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise
this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his
choice of the area for retention.

Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than five hectares out of the total area of his
agricultural land subject to CARP. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact
or contiguous, pertains to the landowner. If the area chosen for retention is tenanted, the tenant shall
have the option to choose whether to remain on the portion or be a beneficiary in the same or another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features.

C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway

Petitioner was also left in the dark with respect to Hacienda Caylaway, which was the subject of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS). The VOS in the instant case was made on May 6, 1988, 72 before the
effectivity of R.A. 6657 on June 15, 1988. VOS transactions were first governed by DAR Administrative
Order No. 19, series of 1989, 73 and under this order, all VOS filed before June 15, 1988 shall be heard
and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No. 229, thus:

III. All VOS transactions which are now pending before the DAR and for which no
payment has been made shall be subject to the notice and hearing requirements
provided in Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, dated 26 July 1989, Section II,
Subsection A, paragraph 3.

All VOS filed before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL, shall be heard
and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No.
229.

xxx xxx xxx.

Sec. 9 of E.O. 229 provides:

Sec. 9. Voluntary Offer to Sell. — The government shall purchase all agricultural lands it
deems productive and suitable to farmer cultivation voluntarily offered for sale to it at a
valuation determined in accordance with Section 6. Such transaction shall be exempt
from the payment of capital gains tax and other taxes and fees.

Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for the identification of private land as set forth in
DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. 229 merely reiterates the procedure
of acquisition in Section 16, R.A. 6657. In other words, the E.O. is silent as to the procedure for the
identification of the land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary conference with the landowner,
representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. Does this mean that these
requirements may be dispensed with regard to VOS filed before June 15, 1988? The answer is no.

First of all, the same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires that the land, landowner and
beneficiaries of the land subject to agrarian reform be identified before the notice of acquisition should
be issued. 74 Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total
area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles. In two separate Resolutions both dated
January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over
the two of these four
titles. 75 The land covered by two titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only 648.8544 hectares
thereof fell within the coverage of R.A. 6657. 76 Petitioner claims it does not know where these portions
are located.
Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were
conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein, The results
of the survey and the land valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to
attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized
representative. 77 To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure,
much less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the
landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an
essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention
guaranteed under the CARL.

III. The Conversion of the three Haciendas.

It is petitioner's claim that the three haciendas are not subject to agrarian reform because they have
been declared for tourism, not agricultural
purposes. 78 In 1975, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 declaring the municipality
of Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. Lands in Nasugbu, including the subject haciendas, were
allegedly reclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before the effectivity of R. A. No. 6657. 79 In 1993,
the Regional Director for Region IV of the Department of Agriculture certified that the haciendas are
not feasible and sound for agricultural development. 80 On March 20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1520, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas adopted Resolution No. 19 reclassifying
certain areas of Nasugbu as non-agricultural. 81 This Resolution approved Municipal Ordinance No. 19,
Series of 1992, the Revised Zoning Ordinance of Nasugbu 82 which zoning ordinance was based on a
Land Use Plan for Planning Areas for New Development allegedly prepared by the University of the
Philippines. 83 Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8, 1993. 84

Petitioner claims that proclamation No. 1520 was also upheld by respondent DAR in 1991 when it
approved conversion of 1,827 hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area known as the Batulao Resort
Complex, and 13.52 hectares in Barangay Caylaway as within the potential tourist belt. 85 Petitioner
present evidence before us that these areas are adjacent to the haciendas subject of this petition,
hence, the haciendas should likewise be converted. Petitioner urges this Court to take cognizance of
the conversion proceedings and rule accordingly. 6

We do not agree. Respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner's
landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner's application for
conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate
of approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR.

At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the Rules of Procedure governing the
processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was the DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of
1990. Under this A.O., the application for conversion is filed with the MARO where the property is
located. The MARO reviews the application and its supporting documents and conducts field
investigation and ocular inspection of the property. The findings of the MARO are subject to review and
evaluation by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The PARO may conduct further field
investigation and submit a supplemental report together with his recommendation to the Regional
Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO) who shall review the same. For lands less than five hectares, the
RARO shall approve or disapprove applications for conversion. For lands exceeding five hectares, the
RARO shall evaluate the PARO Report and forward the records and his report to the Undersecretary
for Legal Affairs. Applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

The DAR's mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Section 5
(l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular
No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President. The DAR's jurisdiction over applications for
conversion is provided as follows:
 A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or
disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to Section 4 (j) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.

B. Sec. 5 (l) of E.O. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land
uses.

C. Sec. 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize
under certain conditions, the conversion of agricultural lands.

D. Sec. 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of

the President, provides that "action on applications for land use
conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of
the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference, documents on the
comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed
upon and approved by the local government units concerned, together
with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O.
No. 129-A. 87

Applications for conversion were initially governed by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1990 entitled
"Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands and Non-
Agricultural Uses," and DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1990 entitled "Rules of Procedure Governing the
Processing and Approval of Applications for Land Use Conversion." These A.O.'s and other
implementing guidelines, including Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use
conversion have been consolidated in DAR A.O. No. 07, Series of 1997. Under this recent issuance,
the guiding principle in land use conversion is:

to preserve prime agricultural lands for food production while, at the same time,
recognizing the need of the other sectors of society (housing, industry and commerce)
for land, when coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
to promote social justice, industrialization and the optimum use of land as a national
resource for public welfare. 88

"Land Use" refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and
management. "Land Use Conversion" refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a
piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR. 89 The conversion of agricultural
land to uses other than agricultural requires field investigation and conferences with the occupants of
the land. They involve factual findings and highly technical matters within the special training and
expertise of the DAR. DAR A.O. No. 7, Series of 1997 lays down with specificity how the DAR must go
about its task. This time, the field investigation is not conducted by the MARO but by a special task
force, known as the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-DAR Central
Office). The procedure is that once an application for conversion is filed, the CLUPPI prepares the
Notice of Posting. The MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues a certificate to the fact of
posting. The CLUPPI conducts the field investigation and dialogues with the applicants and the farmer
beneficiaries to ascertain the information necessary for the processing of the application. The
Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates on the merits of the investigation report and recommends the
appropriate action. This recommendation is transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the
Undersecretary, or Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more than fifty hectares are
approved or disapproved by the Secretary. The procedure does not end with the Secretary, however.
The Order provides that the decision of the Secretary may be appealed to the Office of the President
or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, viz:
 Appeal from the decision of the Undersecretary shall be made to the Secretary, and from
the Secretary to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals as the case may be.
The mode of appeal/motion for reconsideration, and the appeal fee, from Undersecretary
to the Office of the Secretary shall be the same as that of the Regional Director to the
Office of the Secretary. 90

Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. 91 Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for
conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power
to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt
from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.

Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the
acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the
farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet
to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in
the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries
in 1993. 92 Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. 93 It goes
against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of
their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful
owner of the land.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three
haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process therein. In accordance
with the guidelines set forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is
hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of
petitioner's application for conversion.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Melo, J., please see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Ynares-Santiago, J., concurring and dissenting opinion.

Kapunan, J., I join in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice C. Y. Santiago.

Quisumbing, J., I join the in the concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Santiago.

Pardo, J., I join the concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Santiago.

Separate Opinions

MELO, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;

I concur in the ponencia of Justice Ynares-Santiago, broad and exhaustive as it is in its treatment of
the issues. However, I would like to call attention to two or three points which I believe are deserving of
special emphasis.

The apparent incongruity or shortcoming in the petition is DAR's disregard of a law which settled the
non-agricultural nature of the property as early as 1975. Related to this are the inexplicable
contradictions between DAR's own official issuances and its challenged actuations in this particular
case.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 has the force and effect of law unless repealed. This law declared
Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourist zone.

Considering the new and pioneering stage of the tourist industry in 1975, it can safely be assumed that
Proclamation 1520 was the result of empirical study and careful determination, not political or
extraneous pressures. It cannot be disregarded by DAR or any other department of Government.

In Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (222 SCRA 173, 182 [1993]), we ruled
that local governments need not obtain the approval of DAR to reclassify lands from agricultural to
non-agricultural use. In the present case, more than the exercise of that power, the local governments
were merely putting into effect a law when they enacted the zoning ordinances in question.

Any doubts as to the factual correctness of the zoning reclassifications are answered by the February
2, 1993 certification of the Department of Agriculture that the subject landed estates are not feasible
and economically viable for agriculture, based on the examination of their slope, terrain, depth,
irrigability, fertility, acidity, and erosion considerations.

I agree with the ponencia's rejection of respondent's argument that agriculture is not incompatible and
may be enforced in an area declared by law as a tourist zone. Agriculture may contribute to the scenic
views and variety of countryside profiles but the issue in this case is not the beauty of ricefields,
cornfields, or coconut groves. May land found to be non-agricultural and declared as a tourist zone by
law, be withheld from the owner's efforts to develop it as such? There are also plots of land within
Clark Field and other commercial-industrial zones capable of cultivation but this does not subject them
to compulsory land reform. It is the best use of the land for tourist purposes, free trade zones, export
processing or the function to which it is dedicated that is the determining factor. Any cultivation is
temporary and voluntary.

The other point I wish to emphasize is DAR's failure to follow its own administrative orders and
regulations in this case.

The contradictions between DAR administrative orders and its actions in the present case may be
summarized:

1. DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994, subscribes to Department of Justice Opinion No.
44, Series of 1990 that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988 when the CARP Law
was passed are exempt from its coverage. By what right can DAR now ignore its own Guidelines in
this case of land declared as forming a tourism zone since 1975?

2. DAR Order dated January 22, 1991 granted the conversion of the adjacent and contiguous property
of Group Developers and Financiers, Inc. (GDFI) into the Batulao Tourist Resort. Why should DAR
have a contradictory stance in the adjoining property of Roxas and Co., Inc. found to be similar in
nature and declared as such?

3. DAR Exemption Order, Case No. H-9999-050-97 dated May 17, 1999 only recently exempted 13.5
hectares of petitioner's property also found in Caylaway together, and similarly situated, with the bigger
parcel (Hacienda Caylaway) subject of this petition from CARL coverage. To that extent, it admits that
its earlier blanket objections are unfounded.

4. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996 identifies the land outside of CARP coverage as:

(a) Land found by DAR as no longer suitable for agriculture and which
cannot be given appropriate valuation by the Land Bank;

(b) Land where DAR has already issued a conversion order;

(c) Land determined as exempt under DOJ Opinions Nos. 44 and 181; or
 (d) Land declared for non-agricultural use by Presidential Proclamation.

It is readily apparent that the land in this case falls under all the above categories except the second
one. DAR is acting contrary to its own rules and regulations.

I should add that DAR has affirmed in a Rejoinder (August 20, 1999) the issuance and effectivity of the
above administrative orders.

DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996, Paragraph 2 of Part II, Part III and Part IV outlines the
procedure for reconveyance of land where CLOAs have been improperly issued. The procedure is
administrative, detailed, simple, and speedy. Reconveyance is implemented by DAR which treats the
procedure as "enshrined . . . in Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657" (Respondent's Rejoinder).
Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996 shows there are no impediments to administrative or
judicial cancellations of CLOA's improperly issued over exempt property. Petitioner further submits,
and this respondent does not refute, that 25 CLOAs covering 3,338 hectares of land owned by the
Manila Southcoast Development Corporation also found in Nasugbu, Batangas, have been cancelled
on similar grounds as those in the case at bar.

The CLOAs in the instant case were issued over land declared as non-agricultural by a presidential
proclamation and confirmed as such by actions of the Department of Agriculture and the local
government units concerned. The CLOAs were issued over adjoining lands similarly situated and of
like nature as those declared by DAR as exempt from CARP coverage. The CLOAs were surprisingly
issued over property which were the subject of pending cases still undecided by DAR. There should be
no question over the CLOAs having been improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is
warranted.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;

I concur in the basic premises of the majority opinion. However, I dissent in its final conclusions and
the dispositive portion.

With all due respect, the majority opinion centers on procedure but unfortunately ignores the
substantive merits which this procedure should unavoidably sustain.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals had only one basic reason for its denial of the
petition, i.e., the application of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. This Court's
majority ponencia correctly reverses the Court of Appeals on this issue. The ponencia now states that
the issuance of CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries deprived petitioner Roxas & Co. of its property without
just compensation. It rules that the acts of the Department of Agrarian Reform are patently illegal. It
concludes that petitioner's rights were violated, and thus to require it to exhaust administrative
remedies before DAR was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Correctly, petitioner sought
immediate redress from the Court of Appeals to this Court.

However, I respectfully dissent from the judgment which remands the case to the DAR. If the acts of
DAR are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be
reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the wrongful acts, in this case the illegally issued
CLOAs, must be declared null and void.

Petitioner Roxas & Co. Inc. is the registered owner of three (3) haciendas located in Nasugbu,
Batangas, namely: Hacienda Palico comprising of an area of 1,024 hectares more or less, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 985 (Petition, Annex "G"; Rollo, p. 203); Hacienda Banilad comprising
an area of 1,050 hectares and covered by TCT No. 924 (Petition, Annex "I"; Rollo, p. 205); and
Hacienda Caylaway comprising an area of 867.4571 hectares and covered by TCT Nos. T-44655
(Petition, Annex "O"; Rollo, p. 216), T-44662 (Petition, Annex "P"; Rollo, p. 217), T-44663 (Petition,
Annex "Q"; Rollo, p. 210) and T-44664 (Petition, Annex "R"; Rollo, p. 221).
Sometime in 1992 and 1993, petitioner filed applications for conversion with DAR. Instead of either
denying or approving the applications, DAR ignored and sat on them for seven (7) years. In the
meantime and in acts of deceptive lip-service, DAR excluded some small and scattered lots in Palico
and Caylaway from CARP coverage. The majority of the properties were parceled out to alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, one at a time, even as petitioner's applications were pending and unacted upon.

The majority ponencia cites Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 on the procedure for acquisition of
private lands.

The ponencia cites the detailed procedures found in DAR Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989
for the identification of the land to be acquired. DAR did not follow its own prescribed procedures.
There was no valid issuance of a Notice of Coverage and a Notice of Acquisition.

The procedure on the evaluation and determination of land valuation, the duties of the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) and the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), the
documentation and reports on the step-by-step process, the screening of prospective Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries (ARBs), the land survey and segregation survey plan, and other mandatory procedures
were not followed. The landowner was not properly informed of anything going on.

Equally important, there was no payment of just compensation. I agree with the ponencia that due
process was not observed in the taking of petitioner's properties. Since the DAR did not validly acquire
ownership over the lands, there was no acquired property to validly convey to any beneficiary. The
CLOAs were null and void from the start.

Petitioner states that the notices of acquisition were sent by respondents by ordinary mail only, thereby
disregarding the procedural requirement that notices be served personally or by registered mail. This is
not disputed by respondents, but they allege that petitioner changed its address without notifying the
DAR. Notably, the procedure prescribed speaks of only two modes of service of notices of acquisition
— personal service and service by registered mail. The non-inclusion of other modes of service can
only mean that the legislature intentionally omitted them. In other words, service of a notice of
acquisition other than personally or by registered mail is not valid. Casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est. The reason is obvious. Personal service and service by registered mail are methods
that ensure the receipt by the addressee, whereas service by ordinary mail affords no reliable proof of
receipt.

Since it governs the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the CARL should be
strictly construed. Consequently, faithful compliance with its provisions, especially those which relate
to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands, should be observed. Therefore, the service by
respondent DAR of the notices of acquisition to petitioner by ordinary mail, not being in conformity with
the mandate of R.A. 6657, is invalid and ineffective.

With more reason, the compulsory acquisition of portions of Hacienda Palico, for which no notices of
acquisition were issued by the DAR, should be declared invalid.

The entire ponencia, save for the last six (6) pages, deals with the mandatory procedures promulgated
by law and DAR and how they have not been complied with. There can be no debate over the
procedures and their violation. However, I respectfully dissent in the conclusions reached in the last six
pages. Inspite of all the violations, the deprivation of petitioner's rights, the non-payment of just
compensation, and the consequent nullity of the CLOAs, the Court is remanding the case to the DAR
for it to act on the petitioner's pending applications for conversion which have been unacted upon for
seven (7) years.

Petitioner had applications for conversion pending with DAR. Instead of deciding them one way or the
other, DAR sat on the applications for seven (7) years. At that same time it rendered the applications
inutile by distributing CLOAs to alleged tenants. This action is even worse than a denial of the
applications because DAR had effectively denied the application against the applicant without
rendering a formal decision. This kind of action preempted any other kind of decision except denial.
Formal denial was even unnecessary. In the case of Hacienda Palico, the application was in fact
denied on November 8, 1993.

There are indisputable and established factors which call for a more definite and clearer judgment.

The basic issue in this case is whether or not the disputed property is agricultural in nature and
covered by CARP. That petitioner's lands are non-agricultural in character is clearly shown by the
evidence presented by petitioner, all of which were not disputed by respondents. The disputed
property is definitely not subject to CARP.

The nature of the land as non-agricultural has been resolved by the agencies with primary jurisdiction
and competence to decide the issue, namely — (1) a Presidential Proclamation in 1975; (2)
Certifications from the Department of Agriculture; (3) a Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of
Nasugbu, approved by the Province of Batangas; and (4) by clear inference and admissions,
Administrative Orders and Guidelines promulgated by DAR itself.

The records show that on November 20, 1975 even before the enactment of the CARP law, the
Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas was declared a "tourist zone" in the exercise of lawmaking power
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos under Proclamation No. 1520 (Rollo, pp. 122-123). This
Presidential Proclamation is indubitably part of the law of the land.

On 20 March 1992 the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu promulgated its Resolution No. 19, a
zonification ordinance (Rollo, pp. 124-200), pursuant to its powers under Republic Act No. 7160, i.e.,
the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipal ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Batangas (Rollo, p. 201). Under this enactment, portions of the petitioner's properties
within the municipality were re-zonified as intended and appropriate for non-agricultural uses. These
two issuances, together with Proclamation 1520, should be sufficient to determine the nature of the
land as non-agricultural. But there is more.

The records also contain a certification dated March 1, 1993 from the Director of Region IV of the
Department of Agriculture that the disputed lands are no longer economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes (Rollo, p. 213).

DAR itself impliedly accepted and determined that the municipality of Nasugbu is non-agricultural
when it affirmed the force and effect of Presidential Proclamation 1520. In an Order dated January 22,
1991, DAR granted the conversion of the adjoining and contiguous landholdings owned by Group
Developer and Financiers, Inc. in Nasugbu pursuant to the Presidential Proclamation. The property
alongside the disputed properties is now known as "Batulao Resort Complex". As will be shown later,
the conversion of various other properties in Nasugbu has been ordered by DAR, including a property
disputed in this petition, Hacienda Caylaway.

Inspite of all the above, the Court of Appeals concluded that the lands comprising petitioner's
haciendas are agricultural, citing, among other things, petitioner's acts of voluntarily offering Hacienda
Caylaway for sale and applying for conversion its lands from agricultural to non-agricultural.

Respondents, on the other hand, did not only ignore the administrative and executive decisions. It also
contended that the subject land should be deemed agricultural because it is neither residential,
commercial, industrial or timber. The character of a parcel of land, however, is not determined merely
by a process of elimination. The actual use which the land is capable of should be the primordial
factor.

RA 6657 explicitly limits its coverage thus:

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
 provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of
the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain;

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for a agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon." (RA 6657, Sec. 4; emphasis provided)

In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Natalia Realty,
Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, this Court had occasion to rule that agricultural lands are only
those which are arable and suitable.

It is at once noticeable that the common factor that classifies land use as agricultural, whether it be
public or private land, is its suitability for agriculture. In this connection, RA 6657 defines "agriculture"
as follows:

Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the

soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including
the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed
by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether
natural or juridical. (RA 6657, sec. 3[b])

In the case at bar, petitioner has presented certifications issued by the Department of Agriculture to the
effect that Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are not feasible and economically viable for
agricultural development due to marginal productivity of the soil, based on an examination of their
slope, terrain, depth, irrigability, fertility, acidity, and erosion factors (Petition, Annex "L", Rollo, p. 213;
Annex "U", Rollo, p. 228). This finding should be accorded respect considering that it came from
competent authority, said Department being the agency possessed with the necessary expertise to
determine suitability of lands to agriculture. The DAR Order dated January 22, 1991 issued by
respondent itself stated that the adjacent land now known as the Batulao Resort Complex is hilly,
mountainous, and with long and narrow ridges and deep gorges. No permanent sites are planted.
Cultivation is by kaingin method. This confirms the findings of the Department of Agriculture.

Parenthetically, the foregoing finding of the Department of Agriculture also explains the validity of the
reclassification of petitioner's lands by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas, pursuant to
Section 20 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It shows that the condition imposed by respondent
Secretary of Agrarian Reform on petitioner for withdrawing its voluntary offer to sell Hacienda
Caylaway, i.e., that the soil be unsuitable for agriculture, has been adequately met. In fact, the DAR in
its Order in Case No. A-9999-050-97, involving a piece of land also owned by petitioner and likewise
located in Caylaway, exempted it from the coverage of CARL (Order dated May 17, 1999; Annex "D"
of Petitioner's Manifestation), on these grounds.

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the subject lands are within an area declared in 1975 by
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 to be part of a tourist zone. This determination was made when
the tourism prospects of the area were still for the future. The studies which led to the land
classification were relatively freer from pressures and, therefore, more objective and open-minded.
Respondent, however, contends that agriculture is not incompatible with the lands' being part of a
tourist zone since "agricultural production, by itself, is a natural asset and, if properly set, can
command tremendous aesthetic value in the form of scenic views and variety of countryside profiles."
(Comment, Rollo, 579).

The contention is untenable. Tourist attractions are not limited to scenic landscapes and lush
greeneries. Verily, tourism is enhanced by structures and facilities such as hotels, resorts, rest houses,
sports clubs and golf courses, all of which bind the land and render it unavailable for cultivation. As
aptly described by petitioner:

The development of resorts, golf courses, and commercial centers is inconsistent with
agricultural development. True, there can be limited agricultural production within the
context of tourism development. However, such small scale farming activities will be
dictated by, and subordinate to the needs or tourism development. In fact, agricultural
use of land within Nasugbu may cease entirely if deemed necessary by the Department
of Tourism (Reply, Rollo, p. 400).

The lands subject hereof, therefore, are non-agricultural. Hence, the voluntary offer to sell Hacienda
Caylaway should not be deemed an admission that the land is agricultural. Rather, the offer was made
by petitioner in good faith, believing at the time that the land could still be developed for agricultural
production. Notably, the offer to sell was made as early as May 6, 1988, before the soil thereon was
found by the Department of Agriculture to be unsuitable for agricultural development (the Certifications
were issued on 2 February 1993 and 1 March 1993). Petitioner's withdrawal of its voluntary offer to
sell, therefore, was not borne out of a whimsical or capricious change of heart. Quite simply, the land
turned out to be outside of the coverage of the CARL, which by express provision of RA 6657, Section
4, affects only public and private agricultural lands. As earlier stated, only on May 17, 1999, DAR
Secretary Horacio Morales, Jr. approved the application for a lot in Caylaway, also owned by
petitioner, and confirmed the seven (7) documentary evidences proving the Caylaway area to be non-
agricultural (DAR Order dated 17 May 1999, in Case No. A-9999-050-97, Annex "D" Manifestation).

The DAR itself has issued administrative circulars governing lands which are outside of CARP and
may not be subjected to land reform. Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996 declares in its policy
statement what landholdings are outside the coverage of CARP. The AO is explicit in providing that
such non-covered properties shall be reconveyed to the original transferors or owners.

These non-covered lands are:

a. Land, or portions thereof, found to be no longer suitable for agriculture

and, therefore, could not be given appropriate valuation by the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP);

b. Those were a Conversion Order has already been issued by the DAR
allowing the use of the landholding other than for agricultural purposes in
accordance with Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 and Administrative Order
No. 12, Series of 1994;

c. Property determined to be exempted from CARP coverage pursuant to

Department of Justice Opinion Nos. 44 and 181; or

d. Where a Presidential Proclamation has been issued declaring the

subject property for certain uses other than agricultural. (Annex "F",
Manifestation dated July 23, 1999)

The properties subject of this Petition are covered by the first, third, and fourth categories of the
Administrative Order. The DAR has disregarded its own issuances which implement the law.
To make the picture clearer, I would like to summarize the law, regulations, ordinances, and official
acts which show beyond question that the disputed property is non-agricultural, namely:

(a) The Law. Proclamation 1520 dated November 20, 1975 is part of the law of the land.
It declares the area in and around Nasugbu, Batangas, as a Tourist Zone. It has not
been repealed, and has in fact been used by DAR to justify conversion of other
contiguous and nearby properties of other parties.

(b) Ordinances of Local Governments. Zoning ordinance of the Sangguniang Bayan of

Nasugbu, affirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, expressly defines the
property as tourist, not agricultural. The power to classify its territory is given by law to
the local governments.

(c) Certification of the Department of Agriculture that the property is not suitable and
viable for agriculture. The factual nature of the land, its marginal productivity and non-
economic feasibility for cultivation, are described in detail.

(d) Acts of DAR itself which approved conversion of contiguous or adjacent land into the
Batulao Resorts Complex. DAR described at length the non-agricultural nature of
Batulao and of portion of the disputed property, particularly Hacienda Caylaway.

(e) DAR Circulars and Regulations. DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994
subscribes to the Department of Justice opinion that the lands classified as non-
agricultural before the CARP Law, June 15, 1988, are exempt from CARP. DAR Order
dated January 22, 1991 led to the Batulao Tourist Area. DAR Order in Case No. H-9999-
050-97, May 17, 1999, exempted 13.5 hectares of Caylaway, similarly situated and of
the same nature as Batulao, from coverage. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of
1996, if followed, would clearly exclude subject property from coverage.

As earlier shown, DAR has, in this case, violated its own circulars, rules and regulations.

In addition to the DAR circulars and orders which DAR itself has not observed, the petitioner has
submitted a municipal map of Nasugbu, Batangas (Annex "E", Manifestation dated July 23, 1999). The
geographical location of Palico, Banilad, and Caylaway in relation to the GDFI property, now Batulao
Tourist Resort, shows that the properties subject of this case are equally, if not more so, appropriate
for conversion as the GDFI resort.

Petitioner's application for the conversion of its lands from agricultural to non-agricultural was meant to
stop the DAR from proceeding with the compulsory acquisition of the lands and to seek a clear and
authoritative declaration that said lands are outside of the coverage of the CARL and can not be
subjected to agrarian reform.

Petitioner assails respondent's refusal to convert its lands to non-agricultural use and to recognize
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, stating that respondent DAR has not been consistent in its
treatment of applications of this nature. It points out that in the other case involving adjoining lands in
Nasugbu, Batangas, respondent DAR ordered the conversion of the lands upon application of Group
Developers and Financiers, Inc. Respondent DAR, in that case, issued an Order dated January 22,
1991 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the farmers thereon and finding that:

In fine, on November 27, 1975, or before the movants filed their instant motion for
reconsideration, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520,
declaring the municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in the province of Cavite and
the municipality of Nasugbu in the province of Batangas as tourist zone. Precisely, the
landholdings in question are included in such proclamation. Up to now, this office is not
aware that said issuance has been repealed or amended (Petition, Annex "W"; Rollo, p.
238).
The DAR Orders submitted by petitioner, and admitted by DAR in its Rejoinder (Rejoinder of DAR
dated August 20, 1999), show that DAR has been inconsistent to the extent of being arbitrary.

Apart from the DAR Orders approving the conversion of the adjoining property now called Batulao
Resort Complex and the DAR Order declaring parcels of the Caylaway property as not covered by
CARL, a major Administrative Order of DAR may also be mentioned.

The Department of Justice in DOJ Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990 (Annex "A" of Petitioner's
Manifestation) stated that DAR was given authority to approve land conversions only after June 15,
1988 when RA 6657, the CARP Law, became effective. Following the DOJ Opinion, DAR issued its
AO No. 06, Series of 1994 providing for the Guidelines on Exemption Orders (Annex "B", Id.). The
DAR Guidelines state that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of CARL
are exempt from its coverage. Significantly, the disputed properties in this case were classified as
tourist zone by no less than a Presidential Proclamation as early as 1975, long before 1988.

The above, petitioner maintains, constitute unequal protection of the laws. Indeed, the Constitution
guarantees that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws" (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1).
Respondent DAR, therefore, has no alternative but to abide by the declaration in Presidential
Proclamation 1520, just as it did in the case of Group Developers and Financiers, Inc., and to treat
petitioners' properties in the same way it did the lands of Group Developers, i.e., as part of a tourist
zone not suitable for agriculture.

On the issue of non-payment of just compensation which results in a taking of property in violation of
the Constitution, petitioner argues that the opening of a trust account in its favor did not operate as
payment of the compensation within the meaning of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals (249 SCRA 149, at 157 [1995]), this Court struck down as null and void
DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, which provides for the opening of trust accounts in
lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16 (e) of RA 6657.

It is very explicit therefrom (Section 16 [e]) that the deposit must be made only in "cash"
or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be
made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the
valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying
words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account"
is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term "deposit."

xxx xxx xxx

In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its powers to enact rules
and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in
allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for
his property because, as heretofore discussed, section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific
that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein,
petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent
court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for
being null and void.

There being no valid payment of just compensation, title to petitioner's landholdings cannot be validly
transferred to the Government. A close scrutiny of the procedure laid down in Section 16 of RA 6657
shows the clear legislative intent that there must first be payment of the fair value of the land subject to
agrarian reform, either directly to the affected landowner or by deposit of cash or LBP bonds in the
DAR-designated bank, before the DAR can take possession of the land and request the register of
deeds to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. This is only
proper inasmuch as title to private property can only be acquired by the government after payment of
just compensation In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (175 SCRA 343, 391 [1989]), this Court held:

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.

Necessarily, the issuance of the CLOAs by respondent DAR on October 30, 1993 and their distribution
to farmer-beneficiaries were illegal inasmuch as no valid payment of compensation for the lands was
as yet effected. By law, Certificates of Land Ownership Award are issued only to the beneficiaries after
the DAR takes actual possession of the land (RA 6657, Sec. 24), which in turn should only be after the
receipt by the landowner of payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, after
the deposit of the compensation for the land in cash or in LBP bonds (RA 6657, Sec. 16[e]).

Respondents argue that the Land Bank ruling should not be made to apply to the compulsory
acquisition of petitioner's landholdings in 1993, because it occurred prior to the promulgation of the
said decision (October 6, 1995). This is untenable. Laws may be given retroactive effect on
constitutional considerations, where the prospective application would result in a violation of a
constitutional right. In the case at bar, the expropriation of petitioner's lands was effected without a
valid payment of just compensation, thus violating the Constitutional mandate that "(p)rivate property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 9). Hence, to
deprive petitioner of the benefit of the Land Bank ruling on the mere expedient that it came later than
the actual expropriation would be repugnant to petitioner's fundamental rights.

The controlling last two (2) pages of the ponencia state:

Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due
process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the
CLOA's already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-
circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent
DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries
in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It
goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people,
through no fault of their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold
the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.

I disagree with the view that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued CLOA's but must ask the DAR to
first reverse and correct itself.

Given the established facts, there was no valid transfer of petitioner's title to the Government. This
being so, there was also no valid title to transfer to third persons; no basis for the issuance of CLOAs.

Equally important, CLOAs do not have the nature of Torrens Title. Administrative cancellation of title is
sufficient to invalidate them.

The Court of Appeals said so in its Resolution in this case. It stated:

Contrary to the petitioner's argument that issuance of CLOAs to the beneficiaries prior to
the deposit of the offered price constitutes violation of due process, it must be stressed
that the mere issuance of the CLOAs does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of
the land described therein.

At most the certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as
the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership
 of the land. Thus failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligations
is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of transfer. Moreover, where there is a finding
that the property is indeed not covered by CARP, then reversion to the landowner shall
consequently be made, despite issuance of CLOAs to the beneficiaries. (Resolution
dated January 17, 1997, p. 6)

DAR Administrative Order 03, Series of 1996 (issued on August 8, 1996; Annex "F" of Petitioner's
Manifestation) outlines the procedure for the reconveyance to landowners of properties found to be
outside the coverage of CARP. DAR itself acknowledges that they can administratively cancel CLOAs
if found to be erroneous. From the detailed provisions of the Administrative Order, it is apparent that
there are no impediments to the administrative cancellation of CLOAs improperly issued over exempt
properties. The procedure is followed all over the country. The DAR Order spells out that CLOAs are
not Torrens Titles. More so if they affect land which is not covered by the law under which they were
issued. In its Rejoinder, respondent DAR states:

3.2. And, finally, on the authority of DAR/DARAB to cancel erroneously issued

Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificate of Landownership Awards (CLOAs), same is
enshrined, it is respectfully submitted, in Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657.

In its Supplemental Manifestation, petitioner points out, and this has not been disputed by
respondents, that DAR has also administratively cancelled twenty five (25) CLOAs covering Nasugbu
properties owned by the Manila Southcoast Development Corporation near subject Roxas
landholdings. These lands were found not suitable for agricultural purposes because of soil and
topographical characteristics similar to those of the disputed properties in this case.

The former DAR Secretary, Benjamin T. Leong, issued DAR Order dated January 22, 1991 approving
the development of property adjacent and contiguous to the subject properties of this case into the
Batulao Tourist Resort. Petitioner points out that Secretary Leong, in this Order, has decided that the
land —

1. Is, as contended by the petitioner GDFI "hilly, mountainous, and characterized by

poor soil condition and nomadic method of cultivation, hence not suitable to agriculture."

2. Has as contiguous properties two haciendas of Roxas y Cia and found by Agrarian
Reform Team Leader Benito Viray to be "generally rolling, hilly and mountainous and
strudded (sic) with long and narrow ridges and deep gorges. Ravines are steep grade
ending in low dry creeks."

3. Is found in an. area where "it is quite difficult to provide statistics on rice and corn
yields because there are no permanent sites planted. Cultivation is by Kaingin Method."

4. Is contiguous to Roxas Properties in the same area where "the people entered the
property surreptitiously and were difficult to stop because of the wide area of the two
haciendas and that the principal crop of the area is sugar . . .." (emphasis supplied).

I agree with petitioner that under DAR AO No. 03, Series of 1996, and unlike lands covered by Torrens
Titles, the properties falling under improperly issued CLOAs are cancelled by mere administrative
procedure which the Supreme Court can declare in cases properly and adversarially submitted for its
decision. If CLOAs can under the DAR's own order be cancelled administratively, with more reason
can the courts, especially the Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in issue.

With due respect, there is no factual basis for the allegation in the motion for intervention that farmers
have been cultivating the disputed property.

The property has been officially certified as not fit for agriculture based on slope, terrain, depth,
irrigability, fertility, acidity, and erosion. DAR, in its Order dated January 22, 1991, stated that "it is
quite difficult to provide statistics on rice and corn yields (in the adjacent property) because there are
no permanent sites planted. Cultivation is by kaingin method." Any allegations of cultivation, feasible
and viable, are therefore falsehoods.

The DAR Order on the adjacent and contiguous GDFI property states that "(T)he people entered the
property surreptitiously and were difficult to stop . . .."

The observations of Court of Appeals Justices Verzola and Magtolis in this regard, found in their
dissenting opinion (Rollo, p. 116), are relevant:

2.9 The enhanced value of land in Nasugbu, Batangas, has attracted unscrupulous
individuals who distort the spirit of the Agrarian Reform Program in order to turn out
quick profits. Petitioner has submitted copies of CLOAs that have been issued to
persons other than those who were identified in the Emancipation Patent Survey Profile
as legitimate Agrarian Reform beneficiaries for particular portions of petitioner's lands.
These persons to whom the CLOAs were awarded, according to petitioner, are not and
have never been workers in petitioner's lands. Petitioners say they are not even from
Batangas but come all the way from Tarlac. DAR itself is not unaware of the mischief in
the implementation of the CARL in some areas of the country, including Nasugbu. In
fact, DAR published a "WARNING TO THE PUBLIC" which appeared in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer of April 15, 1994 regarding this malpractice.

2.10 Agrarian Reform does not mean taking the agricultural property of one and giving it
to another and for the latter to unduly benefit therefrom by subsequently "converting" the
same property into non-agricultural purposes.

2.11 The law should not be interpreted to grant power to the State, thru the DAR, to
choose who should benefit from multi-million peso deals involving lands awarded to
supposed agrarian reform beneficiaries who then apply for conversion, and thereafter
sell the lands as non-agricultural land.

Respondents, in trying to make light of this problem, merely emphasize that CLOAs are not titles. They
state that "rampant selling of rights", should this occur, could be remedied by the cancellation or recall
by DAR.

In the recent case of "Hon. Carlos O. Fortich, et. al. vs. Hon. Renato C. Corona, et. al." (G.R. No.
131457, April 24, 1998), this Court found the CLOAs given to the respondent farmers to be improperly
issued and declared them invalid. Herein petitioner Roxas and Co., Inc. has presented a stronger case
than petitioners in the aforementioned case. The procedural problems especially the need for referral
to the Court of Appeals are not present. The instant petition questions the Court of Appeals decision
which acted on the administrative decisions. The disputed properties in the present case have been
declared non-agricultural not so much because of local government action but by Presidential
Proclamation. They were found to be non-agricultural by the Department of Agriculture, and through
unmistakable implication, by DAR itself. The zonification by the municipal government, approved by
the provincial government, is not the only basis.

On a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object the preservation and
maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and underprivileged. They apply with
equal force to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving
of protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the
guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against them. As we
held in Land Bank (supra.):

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the
underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the
landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. As eloquently stated by
Justice Isagani Cruz:
 . . . social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is
true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the
balance in favor of the poor simply because they are poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it
justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to eject the
rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for
poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to grant the petition for certiorari; and to declare
Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, to be non-agricultural
and outside the scope of Republic Act No. 6657. I further vote to declare the Certificates of Land
Ownership Award issued by respondent Department of Agrarian Reform null and void and to enjoin
respondents from proceeding with the compulsory acquisition of the lands within the subject
properties. I finally vote to DENY the motion for intervention.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-32820-21 January 30, 1976

DOROTEA DE OCAMPO VDA. DE DELIZO and her nine (9) children, named REGINO, CRISPINA,
CARMEN, BASILIO, HILARIO, MACARIO, SENDON MARCIANO and HERMOGENES, all
surnamed DELIZO y OCAMPO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
URBANA DELIZO, assisted by her husband, AMBROCIO FLORA, SEVERINO DELIZO and the
Heirs of FRANCISCO DELIZO, namely, RANCIVILLANO SOLTRIFILO, JOSEFINA, EUPROCINA,
AUREA, EDITA and FE all surnamed DELIZO, and ROSENDA GENOVE VDA. DE
DELIZO, respondents-appellees.

Leandro C. Sevilla for petitioners-appellants.

Romeo J. Callejo respondents-appellees.

ANTONIO, J.:

These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages
contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted from April 20, 1891 until
Rows death on December 7, 1909, or a period of eighteen (18) years; and the second, with Dorotea de
Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six (46) years, or from October, 1911 until the death of
Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957 at the age of ninety (90) years. The action for partition was instituted on
April 15, 1957 by a daughter and a son of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and Severino
Delizo, and the heirs of Francisco Delizo, another son, who died in 1943, specifically, Rancivillano
Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe, all surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors
were represented by their mother, Rosenda Genove) all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his
second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely
Regino, Crispina, Carmen, Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano, and Hermogenes, all
surnamed Delizo.

The aforesaid defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the properties described in the complaint
were those of the second marriage. On May 3, 1957, Nicolas Delizo died and was substituted by his
children in the second m as party defendants. In the meantime, Special Proceedings No. 1058
(Intestate Estate of the late Nicolas Delizo) was filed by Dorotea de Ocampo on June 3, 1957.
Thereafter, or on August 23, 1971, Severino De died intestate and is now represented by his children,
namely, Federico, Severina, Angelina, Segundina and Brigida, all surnamed Delizo. Involved are the
properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are sixty-six (66) hectares of agricultural lands in
San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; fifty-eight (58) hectares of riceland in Muñoz of the same province; and a
square meter lot at 1056-M P. Campa, Sampaloc, Manila. The properties are specifically described as
follows:

(1) Lots Nos. 210, 211, 388, 389, 390, and 407 of the San Jose Cadastre situation in Rizal, San Jose
with a combined area of about sixty-six (66) hectares covered by OCT No. 6176-N.E. issued in the
name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. F or 11);

(2) Lot No. 1915 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of about 1,056 square meters and covered by
OCT No. 5783 in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. G or 12);

(3) Lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of about 3,366 square meters and covered by
OCT No. 5622, N.E. issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. H. or
13);
(4) A parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija containing an area of 13.2948 hectares and covered by
TCT No. 2985-N.E. (Exh. I. or 13-A);

(5) An agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares situated in sitio Rangayan, Muñoz and covered by
TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14);

(6) A parcel of land in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares and
covered by TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10);

(7) A cornland in Barrio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square meters and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 5476;

(8) Riceland in Barrio San Andres, Muñoz of about 5,083 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 7083;

(9) Riceland in Barrio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, containing an area of about 17.4755 hectares
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 812;

(10) Lot No. 847-a riceland in Barrio Bayan, Muñoz, with an area of about 13.0902 hectares and
covered by TCT No. 3585 issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo on
April 25,1929 (Exhs. L or 15 & 15-A);

(11) A camarin of strong materials, with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, about eight
(8) meters by twelve

(12) meters; (12) A residential house and lot at Sanchez Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija;

(13) Lot No. 1790 of San Jose Cadastre of about 2,840 square meters and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 8131 in the names of spouses Silvestre Batara and Maria Soriano issued on
November 16, 1927 (Exh. M or 16), superseded by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-29524 issued in
the name of Juan T. Gualberto on May 25,1959 (Exh. N or 17) claimed by the heirs of Nicolas Delizo
and Dorotea de Ocampo pursuant to deed of sale (Exh. N1);

(14) An urban lot and coconut plantation in San Fabian, Pangasinan;

(15) A lot and residential house consisting Of a two-door accessoria at No. 1056-58 (formerly 562) P.
Campa, Sampaloc, Manila;

(16) A sawmill with accessories, bulldozers, etc. in San Jose, Nueva Ecija (bulldozer is now in Gordon,
Isabels in the possession of Regino Delizo and Basilio Delizo); and

(17) Several heads of carabaos. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment on April 27, 1964,
distributing the aforesaid properties as follows: (a) onehalf (½) pro indiviso to the three (3) children of
the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo, Severino Delizo, and the heirs of the deceased Francisco
Delizo, viz.: Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe (b) one-fourth (¼) pro
indiviso to the surviving spouse, Dorotea de Ocampo; and (c) one-fourth (¼) pro in equal shares to the
children of both marriages, nine (9) of whom were begotten during the second marriage, or into
thirteen (13) parts.

From said judgment. petitioners-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 12, 1970, the
Appellate Court rendered judgment, affirming with modifications the trial court's decision. The facts as
found by the Appellate Court are as follows:

As regards the Caanawan lands situated in Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija,
comprising some 66 hectares, defendants capitalize on the undisputed fact that Original
Certificate of Title No. 6176 (Exh. F or 11) issued on August 21, 1924, covering these
lands is in the name of Nicolas Delizo, ma to Dorotea de Ocampo. Defendants further
point out that the testimonies of defendant Dorotea de Ocampo and octogenarian
Moises Patricio prove that these lands were acquired during the second marriage.

However, the fact that the disputed lands situated in Caanawan were registered in the
name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo's no proof that the property is
owned by the second conjugal partnership. The phrase 'married to' is merely descriptive
of the civil status of Nicolas Delizo (Gonzales vs. Miller, 69 Phil. 340; De Jesus vs.
Padilla, CA-G.R. No. 12191-R, April 19, 1955; Muñoz & Tan Go Inc. vs. Santos CA-G.R.
No. "27759-R, October 3, 1963; Pratts vs. Sheriff of Rizal, 53 Phil. 51, 53). Neither is the
testimony of Dorotea de Ocampo that the said lands were acquired by her and her
spouse, altogether clear and persuasive. For while the admitted fact is that she and
Nicolas Delizo were married in 1911, she declared on the witness stand that the
aforesaid properties were given by Pedro Salvador to her and her spouse in 1908 (t.s.n.,
p. 288, March 8, 1963), thereby leading the trial court to infer an admission that these
lands were acquired during the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo. It may likewise be noted
that as per her testimony, she and her father arrived in Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, when Rosa Villasfer was still alive. That would be sometime before 1911. But she
admitted that her father then was not able to acquire lands from Pedro Salvador, their
grantor, because he had no more lands to distribute to settlers. Accordingly, it is
farfetched that after Rosa's death and the subsequent marriage of Nicolas Delizo to
Dorotea de Ocampo, Pedro Salvador would still have those 67 hectares which
defendants claimed were acquired by the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de
Ocampo by grant from Pedro Salvador (t.s.n., pp. 459-46, March 15, 1963).

Moises Patricio tried to confirm the widow, declaring that Nicolas Delizo was married to
defendant Dorotea de Ocampo, when he was given lands in Caanawan by Pedro
Salvador (t.s.n., p. 493, June 7, 1963). However, he placed the acquisition sometime
during the founding of Barrio Sto. Tomas, San Jose, Nueva Ecija (Id., p. 492) which took
place some four years after the Spanish-Filipino revolution of 1896 (t.s.n., pp. 548-549,
June 21, 1963), or approximately 1900. Therefore, it could not be Dorotea de Ocampo,
but Rosa Villasfer, who was admittedly still alive and the wife of Nicolas Delizo at the
time of the acquisition.

Ranged against these unreliable testimonies for the defendants, is the testimony of
Lorenzo Delizo, who being a brother of deceased Nicolas Delizo, stands in equal
relationship to the plaintiffs, who were Nicolas' children by the first marriage, and the
defendants, who were children of Nicolas in his second marriage. His testimony
therefore carries great weight. This witness averred that 16 hectares were acquired as
homestead by his deceased brother, Nicolas Delizo, from Pedro Salvador and Mauricio
Salvador who were then 'cabecillas' distributing lands to homesteaders in 1905 (t.s.n., p.
12, January 20, 1961); that Nicolas acquired by sale the 16-hectare homestead of
Nicolas Dacquel in 1906, another 16- hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin in 1907 and
the 16-hectare homestead of Francisco Pascua in 1908 (id., pp. 14-15). Lorenzo's
declarations are supported by the testimonies of (1) Urbana Delizo, a daughter of
Nicolas by his first marriage and who was already 17 when her mother, Rosa Villasfer,
died in 1909 (id., p. 19); (2) Sabiniano Villanueva, a son of one of Nicolas' tenants on the
controverted Caanawan lands (id., pp. 93-168) and (3) Raymundo Eugenio, a former
clerk in the municipal treasurer's office who u to collect taxes on the land belonging to
Nicolas and later became municipal "president of San Jose, Nueva Ecija (t.s.n., pp. 367-
368, Jan. 31, 1964), although these Caanawan lands cannot be traced back to TD 431,
Exhibit P-9 issued in 1906, cited by appellants (see notations at bottom of reverse side
of alleged succeeding TDs) aside from the fact that the notations on the reverse side
thereof are suspicious (see years when tax commenced and when issued) and the
discrepancy between areas (8 Ha. in Exhibit P-9 and 57 Ha. for lots 210 and 211).

Accordingly, we find with the trial court that the Caanawan lands, comprising lots Nos.
210, 211, 388, 390, 398 and 407.1-under Original Certificate of Title No. 6176 (Exh. F or
 11) were acquired during the existence of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa
Villasfer and there being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to said
Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas
Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. So with the lot and house at 562 P. Campa St., Sampaloc,
Manila, known as Lot 47, Block 83 covered by TCT No. 9616-Manila which was ceded
during the second marriage in payment of, or substitution for, the Caanawan property,
because the Asiatic Petroleum Company to which it had been mortgaged as bond for
Juan Par as agent foreclosed the mortgage, when the agent defaulted in his obligation
to the company, Exhibits 6, 7 & 19 (Art. 153 [formerly, 140], par. 1, new Civil Code).

However, with regard to the other properties in question, like lot No. 498 of the San Jose
Cadastre, under Original certificate of Title No. 5622, likewise issued in the name of
Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo'; a parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva
Ecija under TCT No. 2985 (Exh. I or 13)' and agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares
in Sitio Rangayan, Muñoz Nueva Ecija under TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14); another
parcel of land in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares under
TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a coin land in barrio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, of
about 1,500 square me ' quarters under Tax Declaration No. 5476; a riceland in barrio
San Andres, Muñoz Nueva Ecija, of about 5,083 square meters under Tax Dec. 7083;
another riceland in Rangayan, Muñoz, of about 17.4755 hectares under Tax Dec. No.
812; a riceland, lot No. 847, of about 13.0902 hectares covered by TCT No. 3585 issued
on April 29, 1929 in the name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo'(Exh. L
or 1.5)-, a camarin of strong materials with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, about 8 meters by 12 meters; a residential lot at Sanches Street, San Jose, Nueva
Ecija; lot No. 1790 of the San Jose Cadastre consisting of 2,840 square meters, more or
less, under Original Certificate of Title No. 8131 in another name but claimed by the
heirs under deed of sale, Exhibit N1 a sugar cane mill in San Jose, Nueva Ecija and
several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots Nos. 495 and 496 of the San Jose Cadastre,
possessed by defendants although adjudicated in the name of Marcelo Tomas and
Guillermo Cabiso, respectively; lot No. 494-A, of the San Jose Cadastre, adjudicated in
the name of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo (RA, pp. 96-97),-there is no
controversy that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of
Nicolas Delizo.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

But the trial court held that because there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership
property of the first marriage, upon the death of the first wife, 'the conjugal partnership
was converted into one of co-ownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the
first marriage .... Hence, all the fruits or increase of the properties acquired thereafter
shall belong to such co-ownership.' We cannot agree with this legal conclusion. One-half
of the conjugal properties of the first marriage constituted the separate property of the
husband at the formation of the second conjugal partnership upon his remarriage in
October 1911 (Art. 145, NCC). Moreover, the fruits of the Caanawan property were
acquired through the labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo; and
indeed, two witnesses for the plaintiffs admitted that at the time of the death of Rosa
Villasfer, only about 20 hectares of the Caanawan property had been cleared and
cultivated (pp. 22-23; 113, 117, 383-4, t.s.n.). This property was practically virgin land,
and the rest thereof or about 47 hectares were therefore cleared and cultivated only
during the marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo. This is impliedly admitted in
plaintiffs' complaint that 'from the time of death of the said Rosa Villasfer, the defendants
... have WORKED upon, TILLED and CULTIVATED, or otherwise offered in tenancy the
whole of the agricultural lands described' (par. 2). The Caanawan property left to itself
could not produce any fruits for they did not have any permanent improvements thereon.
What was produced according to the evidence was palay, and the production of palay
requires tilling, cultivation, seedlings, gathering, preservation and marketing. It was thru
the labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo that the Caanawan
property was able to produce fruits. Whatever it produced thru the labor and industry of
the spouses belongs to their conjugal partnership. While it is true that to the owner of the
land belongs the fruits, whether natural, industrial or civil (Art. 441, NCC formerly Art.
354, Spanish Civil Code), this does not mean that all that is produced belongs to the
owner of the land. The owner, according to Art. 443, NCC (formerly Art. 356, Spanish
Civil Code) who receives the fruits, has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a
person in their production, gathering and preservation. When Dorotea Ocampo admitted
that the Muñoz property was purchased partly with the fruits of the Caanawan property,
she was referring to the gross production, not deducting therefrom what could have
pertained to the person who produced the fruits. So it seems "that if we are to determine
with mathematical certainty what portion of the Muñoz property and other properties
acquired during the second marriage should pertain to the first marriage as corn
spending to the value of its share in the fruits of the Caanawan property, and what
should belong to the second marriage as corresponding to the value of the labor and
industry of the spouses Delizo and Ocampo, we have to find how much was produced
during the second marriage and determine what will be the share of the owner of the
land what will correspond to the one who produced the fruits. The burden of proof lies
upon the plaintiffs under the rules of evidence. But, of course, this is an impossibility. For
no records have been kept and it is not in accordance with the Filipino customs for the
surviving spouse-whether he remarries or not-to keep the record of the produce of the
properties left by the deceased spouse. tradition thereto, according to Dorotea Ocampo,
part of the price used in the purchase of Muñoz property was the proceeds of a loan
which, together with the properties purchased with it, belongs to the conjugal partnership
of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo. Under these circumstances, it would be
impossible to determine with mathematical precision what portion of the properties
acquired during the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo should belong to the second
conjugal partnership and what portion should belong to the heirs of the first conjugal
partnership, one half of which pertains to the husband. However, considering that —

1. At the time of the dissolution of the first marriage or about five years after acquisition,
according to plaintiffs' evidence, only about 20 hectares of the Caanawan property had
been cultivated, the remaining 47 hectares were therefore cleared and improved during
the second marriage thru the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and
Dorotea Ocampo for 46 years (1911-1967). These improvements were made in good
faith considering that Nicolas Delizo administered the properties of the first marriage.
The second marriage is entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of these 47
hectares (Art. 516, NCC Even the Muñoz property acquired during the second marriage
had to be improved by the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo.

2. The one-half of the fruits of the Caanawan property which should pertain to the heirs
of Rosa Villasfer refers only to one-half o f the net after deducting the expenses of
clearing the land, cultivating, gathering and preservation. Forty-seven hectares of the
Caanawan property were cleared and cultivated only during the second marriage. Even
under a liberal apportionment of the produce, the heirs of the second marriage could not
be entitled to more than 30% of the produce.

3. Part of the price used in the purchase of the properties acquired during the second
marriage were the proceeds of a loan. This is conjugal property of the "second marriage
(Palanca vs. Smith, Bell and Co., 9 Phil. 131,133; Castillo Jr. vs. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102,
106-7).

4. The improvements on 47 hectares of the Caanawan property and on the Muñoz

property were made at the expense of the second conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo
and Dorotea Ocampo, and thru their labor and industry which lasted for 46 years,
whereas the first conjugal partnership had the Caanawan property for less than 6 years.

Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances and equities of the case, an
adjudication of 20% of all the properties acquired during the second marriage, including
 the Muñoz property, to the children of the first marriage, and 80% to the conjugal
partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo is fair and equitable. So the
properties of the estate should be partitioned thus:

One-half of the Caanawan property and the house and lot at 562 P. Campa Street,
Manila, covered by TCT No. 9616 as the share of Rosa Villasfer in the first conjugal
partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer or 1/6 thereof for each child of the first
marriage; and 20% of all the other properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. To
Nicolas Delizo should be adjudicated one-half of the Caanawan property and the house
and lot on P. Campa, but in view of the death of Nicolas Delizo his share descends to all
the children, both of the first and second marriages and the surviving spouse, Dorotea
Ocampo, and should therefore be divided by the number of children plus one or 1/26
thereof for each heir. tightly per cent of all the properties acquired during the marriage of
Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo constitute the conjugal partnership of Nicolas
Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo; one-half thereof is the share of Nicolas Delizo, to be
divided among his heirs in accordance with the preceding statement, or 2/65 thereof for
each heir; the other half constitutes the share of Dorotea Ocampo in the conjugal
partnership, or 2/5 thereof.

WHEREFORE, paragraph 1 of the judgment appealed from is hereby modified as

follows:

1. Declaring that (a) of the Caanawan property and the house and lot at 562 P. Campa
Street, Manila covered by TCT No. 9616-8139 (1/6 + 1/26) thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the
children of Nicolas Delizo "of the first marriage, namely: Urbana, Severino and the late Francisco Delizo (the last represented by his
children Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita and Fe and 1/26 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the children
of the second marriage and their mother Dorotea Ocampo; (a) of all other properties required during the second marriage-19/195
thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the three children by the first marriage, 2/65 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the
nine children of the second marriage, while 28/65 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to the widow Dorotea Ocampo. The rest of the
judgment particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 are affirmed; without pronouncement as to costs in both instances.

From this adverse judgment, petitioners-appellants interposed the present petition for review. The
thrust of petitioners- appellants' petition is that the Appellate Court acted under a misapprehension of
the facts or decided the legal issues in a way which is not in consonance with law and with the
applicable decisions of this Court, (a) since, the 67-hectare Caanawan properties could not have been
properties of the first marriage because they were then public lands being homesteads, and while the
first conjugal partnership may have had possessory rights over said properties, it was only during the
second marriage that the requirements of the public land law were complied with, resulting in the
confirmation, registration and issuance of the Torrens Title over said properties to Nicolas Delizo and
his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo; (b) apart from the fact that the legal presumption that all
properties of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de
Ocampo were not sufficiently rebutted, these properties were actually. In the adverse possession
under claim of title of petitioners-appellants continuously for a period of 47 years (1911 to 1957), and
consequently, the claim of respondents-appellees for partition should have been considered barred by
acquisitive and extinctive prescription, laches and estoppel; d (c) in any event, there being serious
doubts as to whether. said properties belong to the first marriage, it would have been more equitable if
the said partnership properties were divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the
duration of each and the capital of the spouses,-pursuant to Article 189 of the Civil Code.

From the findings of the Appellate Court that sixty-six (66) hectares of the Caanawan properties w ere
acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads during the period of the first marriage, thus: sixteen (16)
hectares as a homestead from the Government in 1905; and the 16-hectare homestead of Nicolas
Dacquel, the 16-hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin, and the 16-hectare homestead of Francisco
Pascua by purchase in 1%6, .1907 and 1908, respectively, it does not necessarily follow that they
should be considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being homesteads they were
part of the public domain, and it was not shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to
warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with prior to the death in 1909 of
Delizo's first wife, Rosa Villasfer.
Under Act 926, 1 which was then the applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent does
not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. One of the most
important requirements is that the "person filing the application shall prove by two credible witnesses
that he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the
time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been
alienated or encumbered ... (Section 3 of Act 926, italics supplied). Prior to the fulfillment of such
requirement, the- applicant has no complete equitable estate over the homestead which he can sell
and convey, mortgage for lease. 2 Until a homestead right is established and registered under Section
3 of Act 926, there is only an inchoate right to the property and it has not ceased to be a part of the
public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation as such. 3 Conversely, when a
"homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for a
particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an
equitable owner thereof."4 The decisive factor, therefore, in the determination of whether a parcel of
land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not
necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the
requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. 5

As testified to by Lorenzo Delizo, his brother, Nicolas Delizo, and the latter's wife, Rosa Villasfer,
arrived in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, from Barrio Ungag, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, during
the year 1905. It was during that same year that Pedro Salvador and Mauricio Salvador, who were
then the cabecillas were distributing lands to homesteaders in Barrio Caanawan. Nicolas Dacquel,
Mariano Antolin and Francisco Pascua must have received their respective homesteads from the
same officers of the government that same year, considering that their respective homesteads are all
adjacent to the homestead of Nicolas Delizo and according to the evidence, this was the time when the
homesteads in that barrio were parceled out to the new settlers. Indeed, the Homestead Act was then
of recent vintage, having been enacted by the Philippine Commission by authority of the United States
Government, only on October 7, 1903.

Considering that Nicolas Dacquel must have been in possession of his homestead for barely a year
when he transferred his rights in 1906, Mariano Antolin for about two years with respect to his
homestead in 1907, and Francisco Pascua for about three years in 1908 as regards to his homestead,
at the time of their respective conveyances to Nicolas Delizo, it is, therefore, obvious that not one of
them could have complied with the requirements of Act No. 926 to entitle any one of them to the
issuance of a homestead patent before they sold or assigned their rights to Nicolas Delizo. The law
was quite specific, that "No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until the
motion of five year. From the date of the filing of the application and if, at the expiration of such time or
at any time within three years thereafter, the person filing such application shall prove by two credible
witnesses that he has resided upon and cultivate the land for the term of five years immediately
succeeding the time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land
has been I alienated or encumbered, and that he has borne true allegiance to the Government of the
United States and that of the Philippine Islands, then, upon payment of a fee of ten pesos, Philippine
currency to such officer as may be designated by law as local land officer, or in case there be no such
officer then to the Chief of the Bureau of Lands, he shall be entitled to a patent." (Section 3, Act No.
926, italics supplied). Having neither legal nor equitable title thereon, what was transferred by them to
Nicolas Delizo were, therefore, not rights of ownership, but inchoate rights as applicants for
homesteads over portions of the public domain. Similarly, having received the homestead only in 1905,
Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the five-year
occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909. Buttressing the conclusion that Nicolas
Delizo could not have perfected his rights to the four homesteads before 1909 is the specific limitation
imposed by section 3 of Act No. 926 which provides that "No person who is the owner of more than
sixteen hectares of land in said Islands or who has had the benefits of any gratuitous allotment of
sixteen hectares of land since the acquisition of the Islands by the United States, shall be entitled to
the benefits of this chapter."

The foregoing sufficiently show that the Appellate Court erred in, holding that the entire Caanawan
properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering,
however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive during the period
from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to
the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been
complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership.

II

In connection with the other properties, such as Lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre, under Original
Certificate of Title No. 5622; a parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 2985 (Exh. I or 13), and agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares in Sitio Rangayan, Muñoz
Nueva Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14); a parcel of land in Caanawan,
San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11910 (Exh.
K or 10); a cornland in Barrio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square meters under Tax
Declaration No. 5476; a riceland in Rangayan, Muñoz of about 17.4755 hectares, under Tax
Declaration No. 812; a riceland, Lot No. 847, of about 13.0902 hectares covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3585, issued on April 29, 1929 in the name of "Nicolas Delizo, married to
Dorotea de Ocampo" (Exh. L or 15); a camarin of strong materials with galvanized iron roofing in San
Jose, Nueva Ecija; a residential lot at Sanchez Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija; Lot No. 1790 of the San
Jose Cadastre, consisting of about 2,840 square meters, more or less, under Original Certificate of
Title No. 8131 "in another name but claimed by the heirs under deed of sale, Exhibit N1 a sugar mill in
San Jose, Nueva Ecija and several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots Nos. 495 and 496 of the San
Jose Cadastre, possessed by defendants although adjudicated in the name of Marcelo Tomas and
Guillermo Cabiso respectively; and another lot, Lot No. 494A of the San Jose Cadastre adjudicated in
the ' C, name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo, the Appellate Court decision penned
by Justice Arsenio Solidum held that "there is no controversy that these were all acquired during the
existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo"

The same opinion, however, held that since these properties were acquired from the produce of the
Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses
Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during
the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%)
thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. The two concurring Appellate Justices,
although of the view that the legal presumption that those properties acquired during the regime of the
second conjugal partnership belong to said partnership has not been rebutted by respondents-
appellees and, therefore, would hold that such after-acquired properties should belong to the second
conjugal partnership, concurred nevertheless in the result aforesaid, in order to reach a judgment in
the case. It would have been facile to hold that those after-acquired properties belong to the second
conjugal partnership in view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the old Civil
Code (now Article 160, New Civil Code). 6 There are, however, important considerations which
preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact that the produce of the Caanawan lands
contributed considerably to the acquisition of these properties, and We have held that the children of
the first marriage, as a matter of equity, should share in the Caanawan properties. To deny the
respondents-appellees a share in such properties would have exacerbated discord instead of
enhancing family solidarity and understanding.

Considering these circumstances and since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each
spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should
be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
partnership. 7 Under this criterion, the second conjugal partnership should be entitled to 46/64 or 23/32
of the total mass of properties, and the first conjugal partnership. to 18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro
indivision. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net
remainder 8 of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first and second marriages, which would amount
to 32/64 or 1/2 of the whole estate. This should be distributed in equal shares to his children of both
marriages, 9 with the widow having the same share as that of legitimate child. 10 The widow. Dorotea de
Ocampo, is entitled to one-half (½) of the net remainder of the second conjugal partnership and to her
share as heir of her deceased husband which amounts to 23/64 of said properties, plus 1/13 of 32/64
pro indivision. The share of the heirs of Rosa Villasfer would be 9/64 thereof. The foregoing is
recapitulated as follows:
 Share of Rosa Villasfer, lst wife 9/64 of whole estate to be

divided among three (3)

children

Share of Dorotea de Ocampo, 23/64 of whole estate plus her

2nd wife share in Nicolas

Delizo s estate.

Share of Nicolas Delizo, husband 32/64 of whole estate to be

divided into thirteen

(13) equal parts.

Whole Estate 64/64

Computation of Sharing

3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664]

3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] - Share of each child of

3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] lst marriage

1/26 = 64/1664]

1/26 = 64/1664]

1/26 = 64/1664]

1/26 = 64/1664] - Share of each child of

1/26 = 64/1664] 2nd marriage

1/26 = 64/1664]

1/26 = 64/1664]

1/26 = 64/1664]

1/26 = 64/1664]

23/64 + 1/26 = 662/1664 - Share of Dorotea Ocampo.

32/64 + 13/26= 1664/1664 - Whole Estate

In the partition of the properties, the probate court should take into account the fact that the
respondents-appellees are in possession of the Muñoz lands, while the petitioners-appellants have
been in possession of the Caanawan properties as well as the house and lot at 562 P. Campa Street.
Sampaloc, Manila, as directed in the trial court's order of April 23, 1958 record on Appeal, pp. 76-77).
Should it be convenient for the parties, their respective shares should be taken from the properties
presently under their custody.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions. it is unnecessary to resolve the other legal questions raised
in the appeal.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified as herein indicated.
The records of these cases should be, as they are hereby, remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with this judgment. No costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992

WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ and JOSE HERMILO JOVELLANOS, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, for and in her behalf, and in representation of her two minor daughters as natural
guardian, ANA MARIA and MA. JENNETTE, both surnamed JOVELLANOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 promulgated by respondent court on June 26, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No.
27556 affirming with some modifications the earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, which, inter alia, awarded one-half (1/2) of
the property subject of Civil Case No. Q-52058 therein to private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos and one-sixth (1/6) each of the other half of said property
to the three private respondents. all as pro indiviso owners of their aforesaid respective portions.

As found by respondent court, 2 on September 2, 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a
contract denominated as a lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon City Community Development Project, including a
bungalow thereon, located at and known as No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor
Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent
Annette H. Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her herein co-respondents.

On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and, at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of
the premises. On January 8, 1975, with the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the
next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. On September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos
died and his death spawned the present controversy, resulting in the filing by private respondents of Civil Case No. Q-52058 in the court below.

Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their
marriage was still subsisting, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated January 8, 1975 executed by Philamlife in favor of her husband, Daniel Jovellanos.
who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 212286 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
second marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property, specifically the lot and the bungalow erected thereon, as well as the beneficial and
equitable title thereto, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with
Philamlife of September 2, 1955.

On December 28, 1989, the court a quo rendered judgment 3 with the following dispositions:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows

1. Ordering the liquidation of the partnership of the second marriage and directing the reimbursement of the amount advanced by the
partnership of the first marriage as well (as) by the late Daniel Jovellanos and the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia * J. Martinez in
the acquisition of the lot and bungalow described in the Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement (Exhs. D and 1);

2. After such liquidation and reimbursement, declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos as pro-indiviso owner of 1/2 of the property
described in TCT No. 212268 (sic) and the bungalow erected therein;

3. Declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos, as well as the minors Anna Marie and Ma. Jeannette (sic) both surnamed Jovellanos and
the herein defendants, as owners pro indiviso of 1/6 each of the other half of said property;

4. Declaring the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia Martinez as exclusive owners of the two-storey house erected on the property at
the back of the said bungalow, with all the rights vested in them as builders in good faith under Article 448 of the New Civil Code;

5. Ordering the parties to make a partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyances, subject to the confirmation of this
Court, and if they are unable to agree upon the partition, ordering that the partition should be made by not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners who shall make the partition in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court;

6. Ordering the defendant(s) to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs.

SO ORDERED. 4

Respondent Court of Appeals, in its challenged decision, held that the lease and conditional sale agreement executed by and between Daniel Jovellanos and
Philamlife is a lease contract and, in support of its conclusion, reproduced as its own the following findings of the trial court:

It is therefore incumbent upon the vendee to comply with all his obligations, i.e., the payment of the stipulated rentals and adherence to
the limitations set forth in the contract before the legal title over the property is conveyed to the lessee-vendee. This, in effect. is
a pactum reservati dominii which is common in sales on installment plan of real estate whereby ownership is retained by the vendor and
payment of the agreed price being a condition precedent before full ownership could be transferred (Wells vs. Samonte, 38768-R,
March 23, 1973; Perez vs. Erlanger and Galinger Inc., CA 54 OG 6088). The dominion or full ownership of the subject property was only
 transferred to Daniel Jovellanos upon full payment of the stipulated price giving rise to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on
January 8, 1975 (Exh. 2) when the marriage between the plaintiff and Daniel Jovellanos was already in existence.

The contention of the defendants that the jus in re aliena or right in the property of another person (Gabuya vs. Cruz, 38 SCRA 98) or
beneficial use and enjoyment of the property or the equitable title has long been vested in the vendee-lessee Daniel Jovellanos upon
execution of Exh. "1" is true, But the instant case should be differentiated from the cited cases of Pugeda v. Trias, et al., 4 SCRA 849;
and Alvarez vs. Espiritu, G.R. L-18833, August 14, 1965, which cannot be applied herein even by analogy. In Pugeda. the subject
property refers solely to friar lands and is governed by Act 1120 wherein the certificate of sale is considered a conveyance of ownership
subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price has not been paid in full; in the case at bar,
however, payment of the stipulated price is a condition precedent before ownership could be transferred to the vendee. 5

With the modification that private respondents should also reimburse to petitioners their proportionate shares on the proven hospitalization and burial
expenses of the late Daniel Jovellanos, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. applying Article 118 of the Family Code which
provides:

Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds
belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was
vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by
the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.

Petitioners now seek this review, invoking their assignment of errors raised before the respondent court and which may be capsulized into two contentions,
namely, that (1) the lower court erred in holding that the lot and bungalow covered by the lease and conditional sale agreement (Exhibit 1) is conjugal
property of the second marriage of the late Daniel Jovellanos: and (2) the lower court erred in holding that the provisions of the Family Code are applicable in
resolving the rights of the parties herein. 6

It is petitioners' position that the Family Code should not be applied in determining the successional rights of the party litigants to the estate of Daniel
Jovellanos. for to do so would be to impair their vested property rights over the property in litigation which they have acquired long before the Family Code
took effect. 7

To arrive at the applicable law, it would accordingly be best to look into the nature of the contract entered into by the contracting parties. As appositely
observed by respondent court, the so-called lease agreement is, therefore, very much in issue. Preliminarily, we do not lose sight of the basic rule that a
contract which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy has the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith. 8 Its provisions are binding not only upon them but also upon their heirs and assigns. 9

The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" over the
property involved with a lease period of twenty years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the former, as lessee-vendee, had only the right of
possession over the property. 10 In a lease agreement, the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. 11 In fact, Daniel
Jovellanos bound himself therein, among other things, to use the property solely as a residence, take care thereof like a good father of a family, permit
inspection thereof by representatives of Philamlife in regard to the use and preservation of the property. 12

It is specifically provided, however, that "(i)f, at the expiration of the lease period herein agreed upon, the LESSEE-VENDEE shall have fully faithfully
complied with all his obligations herein stipulated, the LESSOR-VENDOR shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to the LESSEE-VENDEE the property
which is the subject matter of this agreement; . . . 13

The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a contract to sell, as contrdistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract
to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. 14 Generally, ownership is
transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this
effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment
plan. 15 Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. 16 the failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring binding force. 17

Hornbook lore from civilists clearly lays down the distinctions between a contract of sale in which the title passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing sold,
and a contract to sell where, by agreement, the ownership is reserved in the seller and is not to pass until full payment of the purchase price: In the former,
non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition; in the latter, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. In the former, the vendor loses and
cannot recover the ownership of the thing sold until and unless the contract of sale is rescinded or set aside; in the latter, the title remains in the vendor if the
vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of making full payment as specified in the contract.

Accordingly, viewed either as a lease contract or a contract to sell, or as a contractual amalgam with facets of both, what was vested by the aforestated
contract in petitioners' predecessor in interest was merely the beneficial title to the property in question. His monthly payments were made in the concept of
rentals, but with the agreement that if he faithfully complied with all the stipulations in the contract the same would in effect be considered as amortization
payments to be applied to the predetermined price of the said property. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the
deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.

The conditions of the aforesaid agreement also bear notice, considering the stipulations therein that Daniel Jovellanos, as lessee-vendee, shall not —

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Sublease said property to a third party;

(c) Engage in business or practice any profession within the property;

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Make any alteration or improvement on the property without the prior written consent of the LESSOR-VENDOR;

(g) Cut down, damage, or remove any tree or shrub, or remove or quarry any stone, rock or earth within the property, without the prior
written consent of the LESSOR-VENDOR;
 (h) Assign to another his right, title and interest under and by virtue of this Agreement, without the prior written consent and approval of
the LESSOR-VENDOR. 18

The above restrictions further bolster the conclusion that Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale
in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and, under
the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership.

We find no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity provided in the Family Code to the effect that —

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired nights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.

The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with Philamlife was merely an inchoate and expectant right which would ripen into a vested
right only upon his acquisition of ownership which, as aforestated, was contingent upon his full payment of the rentals and compliance with all his contractual
obligations thereunder. A vested right as an immediate fixed right of present and future enjoyment. It is to be distinguished from a right that is expectant or
contingent. 20 It is a right which is fixed, unalterable, absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, 21 and which is perfect
in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. 22 Thus, for a property right to be vested, there must be a transition from the potential or contingent to the
actual, and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. 23

The trial court which was upheld by respondent court, correctly ruled that the cases cited by petitioners are inapplicable to the case at bar since said cases
involved friar lands which are governed by a special law, Act 1120, which was specifically enacted for the purpose. In the sale of friar lands, upon execution of
the contract to sell, a certificate of sale is delivered to the vendee and such act is considered as a conveyance of ownership, subject only to the resolutory
condition that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price shall not be paid in full. In the instant case, no certificate of sale was delivered and full payment of
the rentals was a condition precedent before ownership could be transferred to the vendee. 24

We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract between the parties, only after
full payment of the rentals. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was
already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.

As found by the trial court, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial conference in the case below that the rentals/installments under the lease and conditional
sale agreement were paid as follows (a) from September 2, 1955 to January 2, 1959, by conjugal funds of the first marriage; (b) from January 3, 1959 to May
29, 1967, by capital of Daniel Jovellanos; (c) from May 30, 1967 to 1971, by conjugal funds of the second marriage; and (d) from 1972 to January 8, 1975, by
conjugal funds of the spouses Gil and Mercy Jovellanos
Martinez. 25 Both courts, therefore, ordered that reimbursements should be made in line with the pertinent provision of Article 118 of the Family Code that
"any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership."

ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error in the judgment of respondent court, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016

MELECIO DOMINGO, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA AND ELENA B. MOLINA, SUBSTITUTED BY
ESTER MOLINA, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioner Melecio Domingo (Melecio) assailing the
August 9, 2011 decision2 and January 10, 2012 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94160.

THE FACTS

In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a
one-half undivided portion over an 18,164 square meter parcel of land. The sale was annotated on the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering the subject property.

During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses
Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora's death4, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the
spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject
property.5 In 1986, Anastacio died.6

In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's interest was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
2729677 and transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.

Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999.8

Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money
that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without
Flora's consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.

Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina must have falsified the document transferring Anastacio and Flora's one-
half undivided interest over the land. Finally, Melecio asserts that he occupied the subject property from the time
of Anastacio's death up to the time he filed the Complaint.9

Melecio presented the testimonies of the Records Officer of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac, and of Melecio's
nephew, George Domingo (George).10

The Records Officer testified that he could not locate the instrument that documents the transfer of the subject
property ownership from Anastacio to the spouses Molina. The Records Officer also testified that the alleged sale
was annotated at the time when Genaro Molina's brother was the Register of Deeds for Camiling, Tarlac. 11

George, on the other hand, testified that he has been living on the subject property owned by Anastacio since
1986. George testified, however, that aside from himself, there were also four other occupants on the subject
property, namely Jaime Garlitos, Linda Sicangco, Serafio Sicangco and Manuel Ramos.12

The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for his debts
and told the spouses Molina that they already own half of the land. The spouses Molina have been in possession of
the subject property before the title was registered under their names and have religiously paid the property's real
estate taxes.

The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he accompanied Anastacio several
times to borrow money. The last loan was even used to pay for Melecio's wedding. Finally, the spouses Molina
asserted that Melecio built his nipa hut on the subject property only in 1999, without their knowledge and
consent.13

The spouses Molina presented Jaime Garlitos (Jaime) as their sole witness and who is one of the occupants of the
subject lot.

Jaime testified that Elena Molina permitted him to build a house on the subject property in 1993. Jaime, together
with the other tenants, planted fruit bearing trees on the subject property and gave portions of their harvest to
Elena Molina without any complaint from Melecio. Jaime further testified that Melecio never lived on the subject
property and that only George Domingo, as the caretaker of the spouses Molina, has a hut on the property.
Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during the pendency of the case and were substituted by their adopted son,
Cornelio Molina.14

THE RTC RULING

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed15 the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio did
not sell the property to the spouses Molina.

The RTC also held that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property without Flora's consent since the sale was
necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities.

The RTC denied Melecio's motion for reconsideration of the RTC ruling. From this ruling, Melecio proceeded with
his appeal to the CA.

THE CA RULING

In a decision dated August 9, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.

The CA held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant evidence that there was fraud in the conveyance of the
property to the spouses Molina. The CA gave credence to the OCT annotation of the disputed property sale.

The CA also held that Flora's death is immaterial because Anastacio only sold his rights, excluding Flora's interest,
over the lot to the spouses Molina. The CA explained that "[t]here is no prohibition against the sale by the widower
of real property formerly belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains"16.

Finally, the CA held that Melecio's action has prescribed. According to the CA, Melecio failed to file the action
within one year after entry of the decree of registration.

Melecio filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision. The CA denied Melecio's motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.17

THE PETITION

Melecio filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling.

Melecio principally argues that the sale of land belonging to the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent is
invalid.

Melecio also claims that fraud attended the conveyance of the subject property and the absence of any document
evidencing the alleged sale made the transfer null and void. Finally, Melecio claims that the action has not yet
prescribed.

The respondents, on the other hand, submitted and adopted their arguments in their Appeal Brief 18.

First, Melecio's counsel admitted that Anastacio had given the lot title in payment of the debt amounting to
Php30,000.00. The delivery of the title is constructive delivery of the lot itself based on Article 1498, paragraph 2
of the Civil Code.

Second, the constructive delivery of the title coupled with the spouses Molina's exercise of attributes of ownership
over the subject property, perfected the sale and completed the transfer of ownership.

THE ISSUES

The core issues of the petition are as follows: (1) whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina
without Flora's consent is valid and legal; and (2) whether fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to
the spouses Molina.

OUR RULING

We deny the petition.

It is well settled that when the trial court's factual findings have been affirmed by the CA, the findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon the Court and may no longer be reviewed on Rule 45 petitions. 19 While
mere are exceptions20 to this rule, the Court finds no applicable exception with respect to the lower courts' finding
that the subject property was Anastacio and Flora's conjugal property. Records before the Court show that the
parties did not dispute the conjugal nature of the property.

Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void without Flora's consent.
We do not find Melecio's argument meritorious.

Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora's death.

There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code's effectivity on August
3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership.21

Conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the
rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and
Wife) of the Family Code. This is clear from Article 105 of the Family Code which states:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968, pursuant to
Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code22 (now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code).

Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and
prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation, to
quote:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership
property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the
lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. x x x (emphases supplied)
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior
liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall
be "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." 23

An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs governed the conjugal properties pending liquidation and
partition.

In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna,24 we held that the properties of a dissolved conjugal
partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased
spouse until final liquidation and partition. The surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half
undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until
liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora's surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to
Flora's share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns
one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest.

Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399) (emphases supplied)
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without an actual
partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely
sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.

The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.

The OCT annotation of the sale to the spouses Molina reads that "[o]nly the rights, interests and participation
of Anastacio Domingo, married to Flora Dela Cruz, is hereby sold, transferred, and conveyed unto the said
vendees for the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) which pertains to an undivided one-half (1/2)
portion and subject to all other conditions specified in the document x x x"25 (emphases supplied). At the time of
the sale, Anastacio's undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-half of the entire conjugal
properties; and (2) his share as Flora's heir on the conjugal properties.

Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of
his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio's sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners
was not totally void, for Anastacio's rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the
spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest. This result conforms with
the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible
to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).26

The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that
might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition. The observations of Justice Paras cited in the case
of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. V. Servacio27 are instructive:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

x x x [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving
spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal
assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or
mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the
wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these
can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving
spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the
surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except
of course as to that portion of the husband's share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the
property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husband's other heirs,
the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches.
Melecio's recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, is an action for
partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., "it is now
settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the
entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court."28

The sale of the subject property to the spouses Molina was not attended with fraud.

On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed property to the
spouses Molina.

The issue of fraud would require the Court to inquire into the weight of evidentiary matters to determine the
merits of the petition and is essentially factual in nature. It is basic that factual questions cannot be cannot be
entertained in a Rule 45 petition, unless it falls under any of the recognized exceptions29 found in jurisprudence.
The present petition does not show that it falls under any of the exceptions allowing factual review.

The CA and RTC conclusion that there is no fraud in the sale is supported by the evidence on record.

Melecio's argument that no document was executed for the sale is negated by the CA finding that there was a
notarized deed of conveyance executed between Anastacio and the spouses Molina, as annotated on the OCT of
the disputed property.

Furthermore, Melecio's belief that Anastacio could not have sold the property without his knowledge cannot be
considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina's registered title over the subject property. 30

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court.31

Considering these findings, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised by Melecio. chanroble slaw

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August 9, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94160 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawl ibra

 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170004, January 13, 2016

ILONA HAPITAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JIMMY LAGRADILLA AND WARLILY LAGRADILLA AND
ESMERALDA BLACER, Respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA
G.R. CV No. 53301 dated October 14, 2003 and October 7, 2005, respectively. The Decision and Resolution
affirmed the Decision4 dated February 13, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, of Iloilo City
in Civil Case No. 22150 entitled "Sps. Jimmy Lagradilla and War lily Lagradilla v. Spouses Nolan Bienvenido
Hapitan and Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan, et al." for Sum of Money with Preliminary Attachment and Nullification of
Title.

The Facts

Between September to December 1994, respondent Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan (Esmeralda) issued thirty-one (31)
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks in various amounts in the total amount of P510,463.98, payable to
the order of respondent Warlily Lagradilla (Warlily). The checks were dishonored by UCPB for reasons of "account
closed" when presented for payment by Warlily.5 chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

On January 6, 1995, Warlily, with her husband Jimmy Lagradilla (Jimmy), filed a civil case for sum of money
against Nolan (Nolan) and Esmeralda Hapitan, Ilona Hapitan (llona), and Spouses Jessie and Ruth Terosa
(Spouses Terosa), with a prayer that a writ for preliminary attachment be issued against the real property of
Esmeralda and Nolan, consisting of a house and lot, as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that might be
recovered.6chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

In their complaint,7 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that they made several demands on Nolan and Esmeralda for the
latter to settle their outstanding obligations. The latter spouses promised to convey and transfer to Jimmy and
Warlily the title of their house and lot, located at Barangay M. V. Hechanova, Jaro, Iloilo City. 8 The lot was covered
by TCT No. T-103227 in the name of Nolan and Esmeralda.9 Jimmy and Warlily later found out that Nolan and
Esmeralda separately executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating Ilona, Nolan's sister, as their
attorney-in-fact for the sale of the same property.10 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that the property was fraudulently
sold to Spouses Terosa,11 and that Nolan and Esmeralda were about to depart from the Philippines with the intent
to defraud their creditors; thus, the prayer for the issuance of preliminary attachment of the house and lot. 12 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

Esmeralda filed an Answer with Cross-Claim,13 admitting her indebtedness to Warlily. She alleged that due to the
failure of Nolan, who was a seaman at that time, to send her substantial amounts and on account of the losses she
sustained in her jewelry business, she failed to fund the checks she issued.14 Also, although she executed an SPA
in favor of Ilona authorizing the latter to sell the house and lot owned by her and Nolan, she subsequently revoked
the said SPA.15 chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

Nolan and Ilona denied the allegations of Jimmy and Warlily.16 They argued that the debts were incurred solely by
Esmeralda and were not intended to benefit the conjugal partnership.17 They further stated that Esmeralda has
abandoned her only son with Nolan and that Nolan has filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Esmeralda.18 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

On the other hand, the RTC, in its Order19 dated March 31, 1995, declared the Spouses Terosa in default for failure
to file their Answer within the reglementary period.

On February 13, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision20, ruling in favor of Jimmy and Warlily. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants:

1. Declaring the Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering the property in
question. Lot 19-A- covered by TCI No. T-103227 and the house thereon, in the name of the defendants Nolan
Hapitan and Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan null and void; consequently, TCT No. T-107509 in the name of the spouses
Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa is ordered cancelled;

2. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P510,463.98 with interest at the
legal rate from the filing of this complaint until fully paid;
3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

a. P30,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P30,000.00 as attorney's fees;
c. P20,000.()0 as exemplary damages

4. Dismissing the counterclaims.

On the cross-claim, defendants Nolan llapitan, Ilona Hapitan and the spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa
are ordered jointly and severally to pay cross-claimant Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

a. P30,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P30,000.00 as attorney's fees;
c. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.21 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

The RTC ruled that the house and lot is part of Nolan and Esmeralda's conjugal property, having been built from
the amounts sent by Nolan to Esmeralda as well as the income from Esmeralda's business. As regards the sale of
the house and lot to the Spouses Terosa, the RTC noted that the property was sold through an attorney-in-fact,
Ilona. The SPA provided that the proceeds of the sale of Esmeralda's share in the property shall be applied
specifically in payment of her obligations. This limited authority was acknowledged by Nolan in his SPA to
Ilona.22 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

The RTC found that the house and lot was sold at an unreasonably low amount of P450,000.00. The lot's market
value was P290,150.00 and the bill of materials for the construction of the house was P511,341.94. Thus, the
minimum consideration for the property should have been at least P800,000.00. The RTC also found that the SPA
was revoked after Esmeralda knew that the consideration was unconscionably low and that Nolan and his relatives
became antagonistic to her. Further, Ilona turned over the payment to Nolan, but Ilona or Nolan did not pay
Esmeralda's obligations.

On the liability of the Spouses Terosa, the RTC ruled that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove that they
connived and cooperated with their co-defendants Nolan and Ilona to defraud Esmeralda, and also Jimmy and
Warlily. The RTC noted that the Spouses Terosa chose to remain silent because whatever the outcome of the case,
they will not stand to lose anything. In addition, before the sale was consummated, they were informed of the
revocation of the SPA in favor of Ilona.

The parties filed separate Notices of Appeal.23 chanroblesv irtuallawl ib rary

In its Decision24 dated October 14, 2003, the CA agreed with the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed Decision dated February
13, 1996 in Civil Case No. 22150 of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of lloilo City, said Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.25 cralawred

On November 6, 2003, Nolan and Ilona filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Modification 26 based mainly on the
Affidavit of Waiver, Quitclaim and Satisfaction of Claim (Waiver)27 dated October 22, 2003 executed by Warlily,
which reads:

AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER, QUITCLAIM

AND SATISFACTION OF CLAIM

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, WARLILY LAGRADILLA, of legal age, married and resident of Molo, lloilo City, Philippines, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state:

That I am the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 22150 RTC, Branch 37, Iloilo City which was to the Court of Appeals as CA
G.R. No. CV 53301 against Spouses Nolan Bienvenido L. Hapitan and Esmeralda Blacer, Ilona Hapitan and Spouses
Jesse and Ruth Terrosa for Collection of sum of money and damages;

That today I have fully received from Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan for himself and for the rest of the defendants, the
balance of my total claim against them, which is now only in the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
(P125,000.00) PESOS, representing the full and complete satisfaction of my claim in the aforementioned Civil
Case.

WITH this receipt of such amount, I hereby make remission, release and quitclaim all of whatever claims or causes
of action against aforesaid defendants and consider my claims in the aforementioned Civil Case as fully satisfied
including attorney's fees.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands this 22nd day of October, 2003, in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines.
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(signed)
WARLILY LAGRADILLA
Plaintiff/Claimant

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(signed) (signed)
ROSARIO F. FLORES ANELYN P. PERAL

In the same motion, they moved that the CA reconsider its finding that: 1) the sale to the Spouses Terosa was
fraudulent, and 2) Esmeralda is entitled to damages.

On November 20, 2003, Jimmy and Warlily, and Nolan and Ilona filed a Motion for Approval of Amicable
Settlement.28 The terms of the Amicable Settlement stater29 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

AMICABLE SETTLEMENT

COME NOW plaintiffs-appellees Jimmy and Warlily Lagradilla and defendants-appellants Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan
and Ilona Hapitan assisted by their respective counsels and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the
following Amicable Settlement, thus:

1. Plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellants Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan and Ilona Hapitan hereby agree to the
full, final and complete settlement of the liability of the latter and that of defendants-appellants Sps. Jessie P.
Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa to the former under the Decision rendered by the court a quo dated February 13, 1996
and affirmed by this Court in its Decision dated October 14, 2003 with the herein defendants-appellants paying the
former the amount of Four Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P 425.000.00), Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P 300,000.00) in cash receipt of which is acknowledged by the plaintiffs-appellees Lagradilla in this amicable
settlement and the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P 125,000.00) received by plaintiff-
appellee Warlily Lagradilla as mentioned in the Affidavit of Waiver, Quitclaim and Satisfaction of Claim dated 22
October 2003 attached to the Motion for Reconsideration/Modification dated November 6, 2003 and submitted to
this Honorable Court which amount of P 125.000.00 they acknowledge as part payment of the said agreed
settlement of P 425,000.00. It is understood that this payment of defendants - appellants include their share and
that of defendant Esmeralda Blacer and defendants -appellants Terosa.

2. They agree, further, to the modification of the judgment of the court a quo and affirmed by this Court that
instead of its judgment which states -

"Declaring the Deed of Sale in favor of Spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering the property in
question. Lot 19 - A covered by TCT No. T - 103227 and the house thereon, in the name of the defendants Nolan
Hapitan and Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan null and void; consequently, TCT No. T-107509 in the name of the spouses
Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa is ordered cancelled;

"2. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P 520,463.98 with interest at the
legal rate from the filing of this complaint until fully paid;

"3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs:

a.) P 30.000.00 as moral damages;

b.) P 30,000.00 as attorney's fees;
c.) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages

“4. Dismissing the counterclaims.

“On the cross-claim, defendants Nolan Hapitan, Ilona Hapitan and the spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa
are ordered jointly and severally to pay cross-claimant Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan:
“a.) P30,000.00 as moral damages;
“b.) P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
“c.) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.”

the terms of the Amicable Settlement in the first paragraph hereof be considered to have modified the terms of
the foregoing Decision and that the Deed of Sale in favor of Spouse Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering
the property in question, Lot 19 – A covered by TCT No. T- 103227 and the house thereon be declared valid and
the order for the cancellation of TCT No. T – 107509 in the name of Spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa
be recalled.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the herein parties have signed this Amicable Settlement this 19th day of November 2003
at Iloilo City, Philippines.

(signed)
JIMMY LAGRADILLA
Plaintiff –Appelle

(signed)
WARLILY LAGRADILLA
Plaintiff – Appelle

(signed)
NOLAN BEINVENIDO HAPITAN
Defendant – Appellant

(signed)
ILONA HAPITAN
Defendant – Appellant

Assisted by:

(signed)
ATTY. EDGAR PRAILE
Counsel for plaintiffs – appellees

(signed)
ATTY. EDUARDO N. REYES,
Counsel for defendants – appellants

Jimmy and Warlily filed a Manifestation and Motion30 dated December 19, 2003. They alleged that on October 28,
2003, Warlily was approached by Nolan who offered money to settle the case amicably. Considering that she was
not assisted by her counsel, who had died earlier that year, and that she was in difficult financial constraints then,
she accepted the deal of P 125,000.00 for her and her husband to sign a quitclaim or waiver. Further, at that
moment, she was not aware of the fact that the CA had already rendered a decision dated October 14, 2003 as
she only knew of the decision on October 30, 2003. She said that she felt somehow deprived of her rights when
Nolan willfully failed to disclose the fact that the case was already decided by the CA and taking undue advantage
of her counsel's absence, hurriedly closed the deal with her. She further averred that perhaps Nolan was bothered
by his conscience when he gave her P300,000.00 on November 19, 2003.31 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

In response, Nolan and Ilona filed an Answer to the Manifestation and Motion32 dated January 6, 2004. They
argued that Warlily's claim of being deceived rests on dubious grounds as she did not categorically state when she
officially received a copy of the CA Decision. Also, whatever defects there were in the Waiver were cured or
rendered moot and academic by her signing of the Amicable Settlement.

Jimmy and Warlily further refuted Nolan and Ilona's claims in their Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration/Modification and Comment to the Answer to the Manifestation and Motion. 33 Jimmy and Warlily
said that the execution of the Waiver was actually done on October 28, 2003, not on October 22. In noting the
dates of receipts of the CA Decision by the counsel for Nolan and Ilona (October 24, 2003) and by Jimmy and
Warlily (October 30, 2003), it clearly appears that Warlily was deceived when she executed her Waiver. The
execution of the Amicable Settlement later on November 19, 2003 did not change Warlily's situation as she was
never apprised of the import of the CA Decision. She was also of the impression that she had no counsel at that
time as she believed that Atty. Edgar Praile, who assisted Jimmy and Warlily in the Amicable Settlement, was only
a witness that she received P300,000.00 in addition to the P125,000.00 that she already received.

In their Reply to Opposition and Answer to Comment34 dated January 20, 2004, Nolan and Ilona belied Warlily's
claim that she only knew of the CA Decision on October 30, when the office of Atty. William Devilles, Jimmy and
Warlily's counsel, received a copy on October 23. Moreover, while Atty. Praile signed as a witness to her receipt of
P300,000.00, it was likewise true that Atty. Praile signed as counsel for Jimmy and Warlily in the Amicable
Settlement and Motion to Approve Amicable Settlement dated November 19, 2016.
Meanwhile, Esmeralda filed an Opposition to [the] Motion for Reconsideration/Modification35 wherein she stated
that she is not a party to the Waiver and has no knowledge as to its veracity.36 She further argued that it is
incredulous for Nolan to insist that the CA reverse its decision when such decision is even favorable to him. Only
the Spouses Terosa would suffer from the decision ordering their title cancelled. She averred that the act of Nolan
and Ilona merely bolsters the claim that the alleged deed of sale executed by Nolan and Ilona in favor of the
Spouses Terosa is a fictitious and simulated document intended only to deprive Esmeralda and the creditors of
their claims against the conjugal assets.37chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

In its Resolution dated October 7, 2005, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration/Modification filed by Nolan
and Ilona.

Hence, this petition by Ilona.

Ilona argues that by virtue of the Waiver, the CA should have, at the very least, reconsidered or modified its
Decision dated October 14, 2003 as Warlily had received from Nolan and Ilona P125,000.00 representing the full
and complete satisfaction of her claim in the civil case.38 chanrob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

Ilona further argues that in addition to the Waiver, the Amicable Settlement results in the modification of the CA
Decision. This is so because the parties agreed that the P425,000.00 payment received by Jimmy and Warlily is
the full, final and complete settlement of their claims. Thus, Ilona prays to this Court that the terms of the
Amicable Settlement be considered to have modified the terms of the RTC Decision.39 Further, the petitioner prays
that the deed of sale in favor of Spouses Terosa conveying the house and lot be declared valid, and that the order
for the cancellation of TCT No. 107509 in the name of Spouses Terosa be recalled. chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

The Issue

We decide whether the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement can modify the Decision of the CA.

The Courts’ Ruling

The Waiver is invalid

Petitioners anchored their Motion for Reconsideration/Modification on the Affidavit of Waiver, Quitclaim and
Satisfaction of Claim40 executed by Warlily, which they aver to have rendered the issue of the validity of the
transfer of the property moot and academic. We are not persuaded.

The nullity of the Deed of Sale could not be affected by the subsequent waiver of Warlily. The Court has explained
the nature of a waiver:

Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right,
advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed x x x." c hanRoblesv i rtual Lawli bra ry

xxxx

[I]t is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or
privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver
of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy x x x. 41 chan roble slaw

Warlily's Waiver cannot cover the issue of the validity of the sale of the property to the Spouses Terosa since the
property is neither a right nor a benefit she is entitled to. Moreover, the declaration of nullity due to the existence
of fraud was both a finding of fact and of law by the lower courts, and the parties cannot agree amongst
themselves and decide otherwise.

The Amicable Settlement is not valid

The Amicable Settlement, intending to put an end to the controversy between jimmy and Warlily and Nolan and
Ilona, partakes the nature of a compromise agreement. The Amicable Settlement involves two subjects: 1) the
payment of the principal obligation of P510,463.98 to Jimmy and Warlily; and 2) the cancellation of the sale of the
house and lot to the Spouses Terosa.

The Amicable Settlement of the

payment of the debt to Jimmy and
Warlily is not valid

With the payment of P425,000.00, Jimmy and Warlily allegedly released Nolan and Ilona, Esmeralda, and even the
Spouses Terosa from their obligations. Specifically:
1. Plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellants Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan and llona Hapitan hereby agree to the
full, final and complete settlement of the liability of the latter and that of defendants-appellants Sps. Jessie P.
Terosa and Ruth 0. Terosa to the former under the Decision rendered by the court a quo dated February 13, 1996
and affirmed by this Court in its Decision dated October 14, 2003 x x x. It is understood that this payment of
defendants-appellants include their share and that of defendant Esmeralda Blacer and defendants-appellants
Terosa.

2. They agree, further, to the modification of the judgment of the court a quo and affirmed by this Court that
instead of its judgment x x xcha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

xxxx

the terms of the Amicable Settlement in the first paragraph hereof be considered to have modified the terms of
the foregoing Decision and that the Deed of Sale in favor of Spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering
the property in question, Lot 19 - A covered by TCT No. T -103227 and the house thereon be declared valid and
the order for the cancellation of TCT No. T - 107509 in the name of Spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa
be recalled.42 (Emphasis supplied)

A compromise agreement is defined as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to
resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.43 To have the force of law between the parties,
a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites and principles of contracts.44 Thus, it must have the
following elements: 1) the consent of the parties to the compromise; 2) an object certain that is the subject
matter of the compromise; and 3) the cause of the obligation that is established. 45 chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

We note that much has been said by the parties on the validity of the Amicable Settlement, specifically on the
element of consent. Jimmy and Warlily consistently maintained that they were deceived into executing the Waiver
and the Amicable Settlement, and that they were not properly assisted by counsel. They insist that the settlement
was proposed and forged by Nolan and llona in bad faith, having advance knowledge of the decision of the CA.

While compromise agreements are generally favored and encouraged by the courts, it must be proved that they
were voluntarily, freely, and intelligently entered into by the parties, who had full knowledge of the
judgment.46 The allegations of Jimmy and Warlily cast doubt on whether they fully understood the terms of the
Amicable Settlement when they signed it. They further argued that they did not fully comprehend the CA Decision
in their favor. Thus, it may be reasonably inferred that Jimmy and Warlily did not give consent to the Amicable
Settlement with Nolan and Ilona.

Nolan cannot waive his and

Esmeralda s rights over the house
and lot sold to the Spouses Terosa

The Amicable Settlement, which Nolan signed, aims to recall the lower courts1 finding of nullity of the sale of the
house and lot to the Spouses Terosa. In effect, by agreeing to the validity of the sale, Nolan disposed of or waived
his and Esmeralda's rights over the house and lot, which the lower courts found to be part of their conjugal
property.

Such disposal or waiver by Nolan is not allowed by law. Article 124 47 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse; otherwise,
such disposition is void.48 Further, under Article 8949 of the Family Code, no waiver of rights, interests, shares, and
effects of the conjugal partnership of gains50 during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation
of property. Clearly, Esmeralda did not consent to Nolan disposing or waiving their rights over the house and lot
through the Amicable Settlement. In fact, she even objected to the Amicable Settlement, as evidenced by her
pleadings filed before the courts. She further expressed disbelief that Nolan would want the CA to reverse its
decision when its ruling, saving Nolan and Esmeralda's conjugal property, is favorable to him.

The invalidity of the Amicable Settlement notwithstanding, we find that it still is evidence of payment by Nolan and
Ilona of P425,000.00. Even Jimmy and Warlily do not deny that they received the said amount. In fact, in their
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration/ Modification and Comment to the Answer to the Manifestation and
Motion51 filed with the CA, they admitted that they received the amount,52 and even attached a copy of the
receipt53 as annex to the said pleading. The amount of P425,000.00 should therefore be deducted from the total
amount due to Jimmy and Warlily.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 14, 2003 and the Resolution dated October 7,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53301 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount
of P425,000.00 should be deducted from the total amount due to the Spouses Jimmy and Warlily Lagradilla.

SO ORDERED. cra
 SECOND DIVISION

January 13, 2016

G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are
guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated July
18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
Decision4 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella
Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto
with bigamy.7 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity
with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at the time of
the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law.8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the
Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children. 10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another
woman[.]"11 She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M.
Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National
Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in
1987.13 "After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in
1994."14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s
revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were
married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children.17
Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an affair
with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone conversation with
her paramour.18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair.
The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her
paramour.19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint for
bigamy against Norberto.20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage
with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum
imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the penalty
imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the
penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution
dated June 3, 2013.24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment 25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. 27 He presents as evidence a
Certification28 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no
record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with
no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails
to establish the legality of his first marriage.29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime
of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes
bigamy mentions that requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of
the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for his acquittal.32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina
as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that the
first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was
subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage would
have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be convicted
of bigamy.33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has
no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina
proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is
suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license.
Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more
than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious
first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil
registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime
charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on
July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August
3,1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines36 govern the validity of his first
marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning:37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

 (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.38 The marriage license represents the state’s
"involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested."39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties."40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and License
Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of
Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M.
GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. 42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive
piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage. 44This "should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]" 45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage.47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage
license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s]
records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license."49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently
proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting parties." 50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration
of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was
unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On
the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a
circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction
for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its
presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in
relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a
certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no
such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should
be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis
per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned.
Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do
this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In Cariño, the marriage contract
between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.52 In
addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This court declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for
having been solemnized without a marriage license.54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely
and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on
December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy
case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In other words,
petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage,
petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the
defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be
found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.55 There is no
evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued
from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the document in
question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the
procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether there was
unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the proper
judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there
is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the
context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage
license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor does
it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly
executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract
is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage
license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a

deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a
well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases
can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government
employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which
he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an accused.
Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor
of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment based on
evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to
disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license,
petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was
his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. 56 The second element of
the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of
the Family Code:59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of
bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has
to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the
first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first."60 Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is
void."61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En
Banc as petitioner insists.62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently
married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element of bigamy, that the
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy
was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina
having been judicially declared void.64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime
charged. 1âw phi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on
petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then
has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered.65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision
correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years;67 hence,
the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.
As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period, there
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges from
eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed.
The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"68 we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 212483, October 05, 2016

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal properties.

This resolves a dispute between petitioner Philippine National Bank and respondent Venancio C. Reyes, Jr.
(Venancio). Philippine National Bank filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision2 dated August
22, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated May 5, 2014 of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision
affirmed the Decision and Order of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, which annulled the
real estate mortgage and the certificate of sale issued under the extrajudicial foreclosure conducted, and ordered
Lilia Reyes (Lilia) to reimburse to Philippine National Bank the total loan amount she borrowed from the bank.4 c hanro bles law

Venancio is married to Lilia since 1973. During their union, they acquired three (3) parcels of land in Malolos,
Bulacan. Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-52812 and T-52813 were registered under "Felicidad Pascual
and Lilia C. Reyes, married to Venancio Reyes[,]"5 while TCT No. 53994 was registered under "Lilia C. Reyes,
married to Venancio Reyes."6 chan roble slaw

The properties were mortgaged to Philippine National Bank on August 25, 1994 to secure a loan worth
P1,100,000.00,7 which on October 6, 1994 was increased to P3,000,000.00.8 According to Philippine National
Bank, the Reyes Spouses contracted and duly consented to the loan.9 chanrob leslaw

When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations, Philippine National Bank foreclosed the mortgaged real
properties.10 The auction sale was held on September 19, 1997. Philippine National Bank emerged as the highest
bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in its favor.11 chanro bleslaw

On September 22, 1998, Venancio filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint (or Annulment of Certificate of
Sale and Real Estate Mortgage against Philippine National Bank.12 Upon order of the trial court, Venancio amended
his Complaint to include Lilia and the Provincial Sheriff ofBulacan as defendants. 13 chanrob leslaw

In assailing the validity of the real estate mortgage, Venancio claimed that his wife undertook the loan and the
mortgage without his consent and his signature was falsified on the promissory notes and the mortgage.14 chanrob leslaw

Since the three (3) lots involved were conjugal properties, he argued that the mortgage constituted over them
was void.15 chanro bles law

On May 27, 2009, Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan ordered the annulment of the real
estate mortgage and directed Lilia to reimburse Philippine National Bank the loan amount with interest. 16 The
dispositive portion reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Annulling in its entirety the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Amendment thereto, the Certificate of
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Sale issued pursuant to the extra judicial foreclosure and the foreclosure proceedings on the subject properties
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-53994, T-

52812 and T-52813 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan for want of consent on the part of the plaintiff;

2. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent and perpetual conditioned on plaintiffs posting within an
inextendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof of the injunctive bond in the amount Eight Hundred
Thousand (P800,000.00) pesos as contained in the Order dated November 3, 1998;

3. Ordering defendant Lilia C. Reyes to reimburse the defendant Philippine National Bank the total loan account of
P3,324,771.18 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the foreclosure sale until finality of this decision.
After this decision has attained finality interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal and interest (or any
part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment.

SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, Philippine National Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 22, 2013, the Court of Appeals
denied the appeal18 and affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 81 dated May 27, 2009 and August 4, 2009, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED.19 (Emphasis in the original)

Philippine National Bank moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied in the Resolution 20 dated May 5,
2014.

Petitioner Philippine National Bank insists that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court.
It argues that the real estate mortgage is valid, that the conjugal partnership should be held liable for the loan,
and that respondent Venancio C. Reyes, Jr.'s cause of action should be deemed barred by laches.21 chanro bles law

Petitioner claims that respondent and his wife both duly consented to the loan and the mortgage. 22 It points to
respondent's testimony during cross examination where he admitted that he had actual knowledge of the loan as
early as 1996, but only filed the Complaint in 1998.23 Petitioner further claims that it is impossible for respondent
to have no knowledge of the transaction since the ·Reyes Spouses live together in the same house where the
notices and demand letters were sent.24 It contends that the Court of Appeals should not have relied heavily on
the testimony of the handwriting expert since jurisprudence show these experts are not indispensable in
determining a forgery.25 cralawre dchan rob leslaw

Respondent, in his Comment,26 alleges that his wife hid the transaction from him. Even if they lived under the
same roof, he was not aware of everything happening in their home because as a practicing lawyer, he was always
away at work from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m.27 He likewise points out that since both the Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals made a factual finding of forgery, this Court should respect this finding.28 Respondent contends that the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable because a void contract has no legal existence from which an obligation
may stem.29 chanro bleslaw

The issues for resolution are:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the real estate mortgage void;

Second, whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan contracted unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes;
and c ralawlawli bra ry

Lastly, whether respondent is guilty of laches and whether his claim is now barred by estoppel.

The real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the noncontracting spouse did not give consent.

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. The real
estate mortgage over the conjugal properties is void for want of consent from respondent. The Family Code is
clear: the written consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary before any disposition or
encumbrance of a conjugal property can be valid.30 chanroble slaw

It is not disputed that the Reyes Spouses were married in 1973,31 before the Family Code took effect. Under the
Family Code, their property regime is Conjugal Partnership of Gains; thus, Article 124 is the applicable provision
regarding te administration of their conjugal property. It states:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse must be consented to by the other;
otherwise, it is void.32 chanroble slaw

Petitioner points to respondent's signature on the Promissory Notes and Deed of Mortgage to prove that he
consented to the transactions.33 For his part, respondent alleges that his signature was forged and offers
testimony from a handwriting expert to prove that his signature on the bank documents were falsified.34 The
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both agreed that respondent presented clear and convincing
evidence that his signature, as it appeared on the mortgage contract, was forged.

Respondent offered the expert testimony of Efren B. Flores (Flores) of the Questioned Document Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation. Flores, a handwriting expert, compared the signature on the loan documents
with the standard signatures of respondent.35 He concluded that they were not written by the same person
through the following observations:

First, the signatures on the loan documents were executed in a slowly drawn motion of a pen. This can be
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

observed in the hidden portion of the signature because the changes in pen pressure were abrupt.36 chan robles law

Second, respondent's standard signature is written with free and wellcoordinated strokes.37 chanroble slaw

Lastly, there were discrepancies in the structural pattern of letter formation of the two (2) sets of signatures. With
the signatures in the loan documents, both the upper and lower loops were elongated. On the standard signatures,
the upper loop was shorter while the lower loop was bigger.38 chanroble slaw

Flores was convinced that the variations he noted is "due to the operation of a different personality and not merely
an expected and inevitable variation found in genuine handwriting of the same writer."39 chanroble slaw

Likewise telling was petitioner's inability to prove that respondent took part in the transactions. Efren Agustin
(Agustin), Loan and Discount Division Chief of Philippine National Bank, admitted that he merely relied on the
documents presented to him,40 and that he never actually saw respondent sign the documents, follow up, or
inquire about the loan's status or the mortgage. Agustin only testified to seeing Lilia, but not respondent, within
the bank's premises.41 chanro bles law

This Court is not a trier of facts. In Manotok Realty, Inc. v CLT Realty Development Corp.,42 "[w]here ... the
findings of fact of the trial courts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are accorded the highest degree
of respect and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on this
Court."43 chan roble slaw

We see no compelling reason to overturn the lower couris' factual findings that the forgery was proven with clear
and convincing evidence. Having established that his signature was forged, respondent proved that he did not
consent to the real estate mortgage. The mortgage unilaterally made by his wife over their conjugal property is
void and legally inexistent.

II

The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void, but the principal obligation is not affected. It remains
valid.

Petitioner contends that the conjugal partnership should be made liable to the extent that it redounded to the
benefit of the family under Article 122 of the Family Code.

Petitioner's reliance on Article 122 to support the validity of the mortgage is misplaced.

Article 122 provides:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

ARTICLE 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-
mentioned.

Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded to the benefit of the family. It applies
specifically to the loan that respondent's wife Lilia contracted, but not to the mortgage.

To be clear, nowhere in the Decision did the Court of Appeals state that the principal obligation secured by the
mortgage was void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the May 27, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court ordering,
respondent's wife to reimburse the petitioner the total loan amount 44 "of P3,324,771.18 with interest at 6% per
annum from the date of the foreclosure sale until finality of this decision."45 The Regional Trial Court further
imposed interest at 12% per annum on the principal and interest, or any part thereof, after the decision had
attained finality and until full payment.46 chanrob leslaw
Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals47 has explained how Article 121 should be applied:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following conclusions:

(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. " Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
"obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. 48 (Emphasis supplied)

There are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in this case, the wife, contracts a loan to be used
for the family business and the other is when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or
guarantor, evidence that the family benefited from the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership
can be held liable. On the other hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the family business, there is no
need to prove actual benefit. The law presumes the family benefited from the loan and the conjugal partnership is
held liable.

According to petitioner, the Regional Trial Court found49 that the loan was used as additional working capital for
respondent's printing business. As held in Ayala Investment, since the loaned money is used in the husband's
business, there is a presumption that it redounded to the benefit of the family; hence, the conjugal partnership
may be held liable for the loan amount.50 Since there is a legal presumption to this effect, there is no need to
prove actual benefit to the family.

What the lower courts declared void was the real estate mortgage attached to the conjugal property of the Reyes
Spouses. Since the real estate mortgage was an encumbrance attached to a conjugal property without the consent
of the other spouse, it is void and legally inexistent. Although petitioner cannot foreclose the mortgage over the
conjugal property in question, it can still recover the loan amount from the conjugal partnership.

In Philippine National Bank v. Banatao,51 "a mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the
principal contract of loan. The mortgages, while void, can still be considered as instruments evidencing the
indebtedness[.]"52 chanro bleslaw

III

Laches does not apply where the delay is within the period prescribed by law.

Petitioner contends that respondent's action to annul the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is already barred by
latches.53 This is erroneous.

As found by the trial court, records show that upon learning about the mortgage, respondent immediately
informed the bank about his forged signature.54 He filed the Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and
Real Estate Mortgage against petitioner on September 22, 1998, which was still within the prescribed period to
redeem a mortgaged property.55 chanroble slaw

In Torbela v. Rosario:56 chanrobles law

Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. As the Court explained in the preceding paragraphs, the Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case
No. U-4359 five years after Dr. Rosario's repudiation of the express trust, still within the 10-year prescriptive
period for enforcement of such trusts. This does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting one's right. A
delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar relief
Laches apply only in the absence of a statutory prescriptive period.57 (Emphasis supplied)

Since respondent filed the Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage within the
period of redemption prescribed by law, petitioner fails to convince that respondent slept on his right.

The mortgage over the conjugal property is void and cannot be foreclosed. However, petitioner can still hold the
conjugal partnership liable for the principal obligation since the loan is presumed to have redounded to the benefit
of the family. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the liability, the husband is solidarity liable with
the wife for the unpaid balance.58 chan robles law

The last paragraph of Article 121 of the Family Code is instructive:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of
either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by
the provisions of this Code on Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon
the conjugal partnership property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon
the separate property of either spouse;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional,

vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or
completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-
improvement; and

(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to
groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separaie properties. (Emphasis supplied)

The last paragraph points to the "subsidiary but solidary liability of the separate properties" 59 of the spouses for
liabilities enumerated in the Article. This Article, similar to Article 94 of the Family Code governing the Absolute
Community of Property regime, explicitly holds the spouses solidarity liable with each other if the conjugal
properties are not enough to answer for the liabilities. In this case, if the conjugal properties of the Reyes Spouses
are not enough to answer for the loan, petitioner can recover the remaining unpaid balance from the separate
properties of either respondent or his wife Lilia.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for failure to show the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in the
assailed Decision. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 22, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94018
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that Spouses Venancio C. Reyes, Jr. and Lilia Reyes are declared jointly
and solidarity liable with each other with their separate properties if their conjugal partnership is insufficient to
fully pay for the loan.

SO ORDERED
 FIRST DIVISION

April 18, 2016

G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the
same. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the
ground that respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes
on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the first
one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of
the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and
consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On
6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, 4 praying
that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that
petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding
by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null
and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22
January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision 6 declaring
that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court
issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and
executory. 7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced by
petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was
bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent
was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous
marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in its
Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of
the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at
the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on
6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower
court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume
the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration
exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually
had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity
for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were
concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007.
Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.

In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and
upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages
were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not
state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA
Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid
be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared
conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages
was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in
1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil
Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on
voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage,
the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a
voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage,
there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are
considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree. 33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil Code contains no
express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was
contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid
until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third
marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance, hence, nonexistent without
the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.

This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual
antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the
issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage
and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective
with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure
and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the
courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an
open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of
marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.40 (Emphases supplied) 1âwphi 1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the requirement of a
judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the
Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force.
In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering
into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced
into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the
children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family
Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v.
Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.
In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x.
(Citations omitted)

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court
thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her
first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of
the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20
April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

February 10, 2016

G.R. No. 199194

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge a
trial court's declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 ofThe Family Code of the
Philippines1 (Family Code).2

This Petition for Review on Certiorari3assails the October 24, 2011 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of
the Philippines (Republic).

Factual Antecedents

On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition5 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie S.7 Sareñogon (Netchie).8

In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on April 16,
2009. It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the
cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed
the Petition.9 Trial then followed.10

Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991.11 They later became
sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall.12 However,
they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while
Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper.13 For three months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie.14 He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he
tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis
Occidental.16 He returned home after his contract expired.17 He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives
and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. 18 Because of these, he
had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead.19 He filed the Petition before the RTC so he
could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. 20

Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt,
Consuelo Sande.21 These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and
wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations abroad.22 These
two added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s location. 23

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision24 dated January 31, 2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08, the RTC held that Jose had
established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41 of
the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason
enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.26 The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent
presumptively dead for purposes of remarriage of petitioner.

SO ORDERED.27

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On April 19, 2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the
judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari28 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by
instituting a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no
error at all in the RTC’s judgment granting Jose’s Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death
of his wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic’s appeal sought to correct or review
the RTC’s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not translate into excess or lack of
jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion.30 The CA noted that the RTC properly caused the
publication of the Order setting the case for initial hearing. 31 The CA essentially ruled that, "[a] writ
of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.
In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an
appeal."32 The CA then disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.33

Issues

The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS ASSAILED

DECISION BECAUSE:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC’S PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON
THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC
DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR DECISIONS
ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.

II

THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT

SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELLFOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT’S ABSENT WIFE X X
X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35

Petitioner’s Arguments

The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
proper remedy to challenge an RTC’s immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive
death.36

The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not
engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead.37 It maintains that even as
Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the
assistance of the relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police, the National
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. 38 It likewise
points out that Jose did not present any disinterested person to corroborate his allegations that the
latter was indeed missing and could not be found.39 It also contends that Jose did not advert to
circumstances, events, occasions, or situations that would prove that he did in fact make a
comprehensive search for Netchie.40 The Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be vigilant
and wary about the propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the Family Code for
the purpose of terminating their marriage.41

Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie
declared presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of Article
41 of the Family Code.42

Respondent’s Arguments

Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic’s Petition because the latter’s petition is
erected upon the ground that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on record, or
assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or significance; and that such a ground does not avail in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose also contends that the
Republic should have instead filed a motion for reconsideration44 of the RTC’s Decision of January 31,
2011, reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law.
Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting his petition
because it even dutifully complied with the publication requirement. 45 He moreover argues that to
sustain the present petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads into judicial
territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial court’s factual findings are entitled to great weight and respect
as these were arrived after due deliberation.47

This Court’s Ruling

This Court finds the Republic’s petition meritorious.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question the RTC’s Decision
in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death

In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that the RTC’s Decision on a Petition for
declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and
executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such
judgment.49 Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein
pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for review under Rule 45. 50

We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango:51

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in
an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and
three of the same title. It states:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings
filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file
a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. x x x52 (Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied)

"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the Decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."53

In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a
notice of appeal under Rule 42 with the CA to question the RTC’s Decision declaring the presumptive
death of Marina B. Narceda.55

Above all, this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal clear that the OSG properly availed
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the RTC’s Order therein declaring Jerry Cantor as
presumptively dead. 1âw phi 1

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTC’s Decision.

The "well-founded belief" requisite

under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had
indeed been made to ascertain whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead

We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted Jose’s Petition.

Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (83a)

In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that:

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.58

(Underscoring supplied)

With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended
discussion), the holding is that the –

mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the
additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon
a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already
dead.

xxxx

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.
It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).59 (Emphasis omitted; underscoring
supplied)

In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-founded belief" that Netchie was already dead
upon the following grounds:

(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while he was still out of the country, but did not
reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;

(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he was
not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie’s relatives and friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead, was
corroborated by Jose’s older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose) and
Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and that after this, there had been no
information as to Netchie’s whereabouts.

In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that the present spouse (Maria Fe
Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a "passive search" because she simply made unsubstantiated
inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the
degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to
present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent
spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse’s
purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the present spouse’s
evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not
necessarily that the latter was indeed dead.61 The rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous
requirement has been marked out thus:

x x x [T]he Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has
consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent
the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard
required by the Family Code is met. x x x

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family’s
foundation and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. x x x

x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite
the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and
reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this
situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in
cases under Article 41 of the Family Code." (Citations omitted)62

Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding
that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the
"well-founded belief" standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing
Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For,
aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s
whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly
saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove
that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he
show that he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two
years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or
municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to
in the course of his search.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 24, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04158-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent’s Petition in
said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016

GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN, Petitioner, v. ERNESTO SALES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Gloria Zoleta-San
Agustin (petitioner) assails the Decision2 dated May 29, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated August 25, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90302.

Factual Antecedents

On March 14, 1994, brothers Teodoro Sales (Teodoro) (now deceased) and Ernesto Sales (Ernesto) (collectively,
the plaintiffs) filed an action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate children of the late
Louis C. Fernandez (Louis) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case Nu. Q-94-
19781 and raffled to Branch 110.4 Subsequently, an Amended Complaint was filed on March 13, 1996, before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 225, where it was alleged that Ernesto and Teodoro were born in Pasay City on March
20, 1948 and October 22, 1943, respectively. They are the illegitimate children of Louis and his common-law wife
named Epitacia Sales (Epitacia) who was a house helper in the Fernandez household. Louis 5 and his legal wife,
Marie Louise Fernandez (Marie Louise)6 (Spouses Fernandez), a French national, did not have any child. According
to the plaintiffs, Louis formally recognized them as his children by Epitacia in two public documents bearing his
thumb marks, viz: (1) a notarized document dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis and Epitacia
formally recognizing the plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a document solely executed by Louis on December 2,
1980, dominated as Acknowledgement of Children.7 chanrobles law

The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez, directed the action against unknown
defendants. However, on May 30, 1994, the petitioner raised her opposition. She alleged in her Amended Answer
filed on July 26, 1994 that she is the niece of Louis and that the Spouses Fernandez informally adopted her as
their child when she was only 2 years old. She insisted that the father of the plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus),
the former houseboy of the Fernandez household.8 chanrob leslaw

One of the principal allegations in the amended answer of the petitioner is that the documents presented by the
plaintiffs to sustain the complaint were spurious. These documents of recognition were forwarded by the RTC to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. Bayani Palad (Palad), a Fingerprint Examiner of the
NBI, compared the thumbprint of Louis on the documents of recognition with the other documents containing his
thumb marks. Thereafter, Palad concluded that all the thumbprints in the disputed documents belong to Louis.9 chanrob leslaw

On February 17, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion to allow deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) Testing on Louis who
already died on January 1, 1987. The RTC, in its Resolution dated June 4, 2001, denied the petitioner's motion.
Subsequently, the presentation of evidence proceeded.10 chanrob leslaw

On April 15, 2002, the RTC issued an order denying the admission of the photographs presented by the petitioner
seeking to prove that she was treated by the Spouses Fernandez as their own child. The petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the said order of denial, but it was denied by the RTC on July 10, 2002. 11 Thereafter, the
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction against the RTC judge for declaring the photographs irrelevant and immaterial to
the issue of recognition submitted before the RTC. In a Decision12 dated September 29, 2003, the CA denied the
petition for lack of merit. It ruled that even if the photographs were admitted, they remained to be immaterial and
irrelevant to the issue of recognition of the plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Louis. 13 chanro bleslaw

Teodoro died on July 23, 1997 and was substituted by his mother Epitacia who subsequently died on March 19,
2004 leaving Ernesto the lone respondent in the present case.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, the RTC in a Decision14 dated July 12, 2007 ruled in favor of the recognition of the
plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Louis. The dispositive portion reads as follows: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs' prayer for judicial approval of the
recognition made by [Louis] during his lifetime. Accordingly, [Ernesto] and [Teodoro] (deceased) are hereby
declared the illegitimate children of the deceased [Louis] with the appurtenant rights of illegitimate children under
the law.

SO ORDERED.15 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

The petitioner elevated the adverse judgment of the RTC before the CA. The parties filed their respective briefs.
The petitioner filed her Reply Brief (with Application for DNA Testing of Louis).16 Ernesto filed his
Comment17 objecting to the proposed DNA Testing. In a Resolution18 dated February 10, 2009, the CA deferred its
determination of the petitioner's application for DNA Testing.

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision19 dated May 29, 2009, the CA found the appeal devoid of merit. The CA gave due weight to the
deeds of acknowledgment executed by Louis. The self-serving denial of the petitioner did not prevail over the
presumption of regularity accorded to the deeds of recognition in favor of the plaintiffs. Quoted hereunder is the
dispositive portion of the decision of the CA, to wit: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw libra ry

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated 12 July 2007 of the [RTC], Branch 225, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-94-19781, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.20 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

On June 22, 2009, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 contending that the CA failed to act on her
application for DNA Testing despite its previous Resolution on February 10, 2009 that it would treat the same as
one of the assigned errors in the appeal. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution 22 dated
August 25, 2009.

The Issues

Undaunted, the petitioner urges the allowance of her Petition for Review on Certiorari enumerating the following as
errors committed by the CA: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

I.

THE CA GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS AND MANIFESTLY IGNORED THE UNDISPUTED AND
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE
JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

A. The CA gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the two "notarized" documents submitted by Ernesto
despite the petitioner's overwhelming contrary documentary evidence.

B. The CA gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of Ernesto's so-called expert witness.

II.

THE CA ARBITRARILY REFUSED AND/OR FAILED TO RULE ON THE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR DNA TESTING
DESPITE ITS EARLIER PRONOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL RESOLVE THE SAME AS AN ASSIGNED ERROR.

A. The CA's failure to act on the petitioner's Application for DNA Testing is a substantial departure from this
Honorable Court's decisions favoring DNA Testing. Moreover, it is contrary to the CA's very own Resolution dated
February 10, 2009 wherein it undertook to resolve the petitioner's application in the resolution of the main appeal.
The exercise of the Court's power of review and supervision is, thus, proper and necessary under the
circumstances.23
Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the instant petition and upholds the assailed decision and resolution of the CA.

The petitioner calls for the relaxation of the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. It is a well-settled principle that the findings of fact of the CA especially those upholding the
trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The following are the
recognized exceptions to the said rule: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when
the [CA], in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (g) where the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (h) where the findings of fact of
the [CA] are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or
where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the
[CA] are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. x x x.24 (Citation
omitted)
None of these enumerated exceptions exists in the case at bar. Nonetheless, the Court will take up the petitioner's
other assignment of errors to the extent that they touch upon legal issues and in order to support the Court's
ruling that the RTC and CA's factual findings are sufficiently justified by evidence and jurisprudence.

At the center of the present controversy are the documents executed by Louis evidencing his voluntary recognition
of Teodoro and Ernesto as his illegitimate children. The petitioner, in an effort to oppose the judicial approval of
Teodoro and Ernesto's status as illegitimate children, mainly argued that the subject documents are spurious. The
legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.25 cralawred cra lawred

These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children.26 In order to cast doubt as to
the authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by Ernesto, the petitioner purported that the
circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the said documents are highly suspicious thereby
warranting the overturn of the presumption of regularity in favor of these documents. The petitioner claimed that
during the execution and notarization of the documents, Louis could still write, rendering incredible the mere
affixing of his thumbprints to the contested documents.27 However, Ernesto testified before the RTC that Louis was
no longer capable of writing his name as he was already blind and bedridden at the time he affixed his thumb
mark to the document dated November 11, 1980. The witnesses to the document were Margarita Almeda, the
hairdresser of Louis' sister, and Romeo Gadones, Teodoro's acquaintance.28 A thumb mark has been repeatedly
considered as a valid mode of signature. The Court, in the case of Dr. Yason v. Arciaga,29 held that a signature
may be made by a person's cross or mark.30 cha nrob leslaw

There being no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the RTC finding the testimony of Ernesto worthy of
belief, the Court adopts such testimony and considers it against the contention of the petitioner. It is settled in a
catena of cases that the findings of fact of trial courts are given weight on appeal because they are in a better
position to examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and therefore discern whether
they are telling the truth.31 chanrobles law

The other inconsistencies cited by the petitioner are of no importance and insufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity in favor of the notarized documents. A notarized document is a public document and as
such it enjoys the presumption of regularity which can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence. 32 It
serves as a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its
existence and due execution.33 The bare allegations of the petitioner cannot qualify as clear and convincing
evidence to overturn such presumption.

The petitioner maintained that the real father of Teodoro and Ernesto is Corpus. She presented various evidence
like school report card and death certificate wherein Teodoro's surname followed that of Corpus. The use of
Corpus' surname by Teodoro does not in itself negate the illegitimate filiation of Teodoro and Ernesto. As correctly
observed by the CA, Louis' existing marriage to Marie Louise must have prevented him from making any
declaration that would have exposed his relationship with Epitacia. The use of Louis' surname by his children
during the lifetime of Marie Louise would run counter to his intention to cover such relationship. It is no less than
the putative father who voluntary recognized that Teodoro and Ernesto are his illegitimate children. It is
emphatically underscored that it is the law and only the law that determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children for one's legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. 34 chanrobleslaw

All told, the authenticity of the documents of recognition executed by Louis which is the core of the present
controversy, as well as the credibility of the expert witness in the person of Palad, are questions of fact for they
involve the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. There exists a question
of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts while a question of fact
concerns itself with the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.35 To reiterate, a petition for review on certiorari covers
only questions of law.

The petitioner sought the conduct of DNA Testing to resolve the issue of paternity. However, the RTC already
arrived at a definitive conclusion that Teodoro and Ernesto are the illegitimate children of the deceased Louis
rendering the petitioner's request for DNA Testing immaterial.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2009 and the Resolution dated August 25, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90302 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary