Submitted by:
Alcanar, Bernalyn D.
Benamir, Daniel A.
Cantillon, Lissy Ann
Esguerra, Grace C.
Nubla, Jessica
Sumbilla, Ian Lucky P.
BACKGROUND
The Rwandan genocide was a directed, pre-meditated entire
systematic campaign attempt by the Hutu ethnic majority aimed at wiping
out each and every member of the minority Tutsi group. The Hutu-
controlled government and allied militias slaughtered between 800,000 and
one million Tutsis before a Tutsi rebel group overthrew them. Over 100,000
Hutus were also killed, including both moderate Hutus killed by Hutu
extremists and those killed by Tutsis in so-called "revenge killings."
The genocide was set into motion by the death of Rwandan President
Juvénal Habyarimana. On April 6th, 1994, Habyarimana's plane was shot
down by a missile of unknown origin. Government-aligned forces used
(Hutu) Habyarimana's death as an excuse to begin a campaign of
slaughter they had been planning for some time, and the genocide began
on April 7th. It went on for about 100 days with over 800,000 Rwandans
murdered.3
COMPOSITION
1
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Preamble. 1994
2
The ICTR in Brief. https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal. Last visited October 19, 2019
3
Beauchamp, Zack. “Rwanda’s Genocide – what happened, why it happened, and how it still matters”. April 10,
2014
The ICTR consists of three major organs: the Chambers, comprising
three Trial Chambers and an Appeal Chamber; the Prosecutor; and a
Registry.
JURISDICTION
The Statute of the ICTR limits the territorial jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda to the territory of Rwanda including its
land surface and airspace as well as to the territory of neighbouring States
in respect of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
by Rwandan citizens and the temporal jurisdiction extends to a period
beginning on January 1, 1994 and ending on December 31, 1994.
4
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 1994
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II.
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons under its territorial and
temporal jurisdiction but ICTR shall have the primacy over the national
courts of all States. At any stage of the procedure, the International
Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts to defer to its
competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
On 9 January 1997, the ICTR held its first trial for The Prosecutor v.
Jean-Paul Akayesu5 which marked the first time in the history of
international law that rape was considered a component of genocide.
5
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T). September 2,
1998.
Subsequently, Akayesu was found guilty of nine counts of genocide, direct
and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity for
extermination, murder, torture, rape and other inhumane acts. The
conviction of Akayesu defined genocide as “the act of committing certain
crimes, including the killing of members of the group or causing serious
physical or mental harm to members of the group with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, racial or religious group, as such”. Likewise,
ICTR also indicated that the crime of rape was “a physical invasion of a
sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are
coercive” and underscored that sexual assault constitutes “genocide in the
same way as any other act as long as [it was] committed with the specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such”.
Akayesu is currently serving life imprisonment in Mali.
FORMAL CLOSURE
After more than 20 years of prosecuting those most responsible for
the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) has issued its final judgment and closed its doors. In its
forty-fifth and final judgment, delivered on December 14, 2015, the Appeals
Chamber decided appeals from six defendants previously convicted by the
Trial Chamber. With this case finalized, the ICTR formally closed at the
end of 2015.
6
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and
Hassan Ngeze (ICTR-99-52-T). December 3, 2003.
7
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et. al. (Butare) (ICTR-98-42). June
24, 2011
The Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT),
established by the UN and headquartered in the Hague, will continue to
operate from an office in Arusha to conclude any unfinished ICTR business
and support domestic prosecutions of criminals involved in the 1994
genocide. The UN plans to transfer the ICTR archives to a smaller facility in
Tanzania; however, the Rwandan government is demanding that the
archive be brought there. The Rwandan government argues that the ICTR
sets precedent for Rwanda and its judiciary is entitled to the records as a
judicial tool. Moreover, the national authorities raised concerns regarding
enforcement of the ICTR’s sentences, which they say could be better
addressed through possession of the archives. 8
8
ICTR reduces Butare Defendants’ Sentences in Last Judgment before Closing (2016).
https://ijrcenter.org/2016/01/19/ictr-reduces-butare-defendants-sentences-in-last-judgment-before-
closing/#more-6550. Last visited Oct. 19, 2019
C. MECHANISM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS
What is MICT?
The United Nations Mechanism for the International
Criminal Tribunals (MICT or Mechanism), is
an international court established by the United
Nations Security Council in 2010 to perform the
remaining functions of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) following the
completion of those tribunals' respective mandates.
History of MICT
Both the ICTY and the ICTR were meant to be
temporary institutions that would conclude after their
mandate to investigate crimes and prosecute
individuals was completed. Although both tribunals
have completed substantially all of their mandates,
there are residual functions that will not be
accomplished for many more years. For example,
future trials may be held once remaining ICTR
fugitives are captured, convicted persons may still petition for early release,
protective orders for witnesses may need to be modified, and the archives
that contain confidential documents need to be safeguarded.
ORGANIZATION
The Mechanism consists of a single set of Principals: a President, a
Prosecutor, and a Registrar. The Principals have responsibility over both
branches of the Mechanism and oversee each of the three organs,
respectively.
PRINCIPALS
The President is appointed by the UN Secretary-General after consultation
with the President of the UN Security Council and the Judges of the
Mechanism. The Prosecutor is appointed by the UN Security Council on
nomination by the UN Secretary-General. The Registrar is also appointed
by the UN Secretary-General.
Serge Brammertz
Chief Prosecutor of the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals since 29 February 2016.
Born: 1962, Eupen, Belgium.
Chambers
Article 4 of the Statute provides that the Chambers shall comprise a Trial
Chamber for each branch of the Mechanism and an Appeals Chamber
common to both branches of the Mechanism.
Chamber Judges
A roster of 25 independent
Judges, including the President,
adjudicate proceedings at both
branches of the Mechanism. In so
far as possible, and so as to
maximize efficiency, Judges work remotely and are only required to be at
either branch as necessary and at the request of the President. The Judges
are supported by Chambers staff at both branches.
Defence Counsel
The two facilities are under the supervision of the Registrar of the
Mechanism, and are operated in accordance with the Rules of Detention of
the Mechanism. The Rules of Detention are inspired by: The overriding
principles of humanity and respect for human dignity; The extensive
experience of the ICTR Detention Facility and the ICTY Detention Unit;
and, International legal instruments pertaining to detention, in particular
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (also known as the “SMR” or the Nelson Mandela Rules).
The Mechanism also consulted with the International Committee of the Red
Cross in the development of the Rules of Detention.
Welfare of Detainees
Healthcare
Further, both the UNDF and the UNDU
benefit from well-equipped medical
facilities, staffed with a Medical Officer
and assistants, who are responsible for
providing detainees with daily healthcare
and emergency services commensurate
with what is available in the local
community. This is especially important
as most detainees are of an advanced
age, requiring medical attention unique to their individual circumstances.
Finally, all detainees are provided with food which meets dietary standards
and is prepared in accordance with modern hygiene requirements, subject
to the supervision of the responsible Medical Officer. Such food takes into
account the age, health, religious, and cultural requirements of detainees,
as much as is practicable.
International Compliance
Both detention facilities are inspected regularly by the International
Committee for the Red Cross, which ensures that the Rules of Detention
are properly applied and that both facilities are operating in accordance
with international standards.
Completion Strategies
The establishment of the Mechanism is a key step in
the Completion Strategies of the two tribunals. The
tracking, arrest and prosecution of the remaining
fugitives indicted by the ICTR is a top priority for the
Mechanism. Of the 90 persons indicted by the ICTR, 8
remain at large. Of these, three have been earmarked
for trial by the Mechanism: Félicien Kabuga, Protais
Mpiranya and Augustin Bizimana. The ICTR
Prosecutor has requested referrals to Rwanda in the
cases of the five other fugitives: Fulgence Kayishema,
Charles Sikubwabo, Aloys Ndimbati, Ryandikayo, and
Phénéas Munyarugarama.
D. Mixed Tribunals and Special Chambers9
‘Mixed criminal tribunals’ (also known as “hybrid” or
“internationalized” criminal tribunals) are criminal courts of law that have
features of both international and domestic criminal jurisdictions. This can
be discerned from 1) the way they were established (e.g. agreement
between the host state and the UN), 2) their subject matter-jurisdiction
(both international crimes and national crimes) and 3) their staff (both local
judges/prosecutors and international staff).
At the same time, they are different from both domestic and
international judicial bodies, too. Unlike fully international criminal
jurisdictions, they include judges and prosecutors from the affected regions
and apply a mix of the criminal laws of the country where they operate, as
amended and corrected to reflect international → human rights and criminal
law standards. Unlike typical domestic courts, they include foreign judges
and prosecutors and apply international laws and standards regardless of
the particular constitutional structure of the country concerned. To ensure
enforcement of decisions, they may rely on international forces, mostly or in
part, and for their financing they rely on various donor States and/or
international organizations.
Tribunals which are often mentioned in this category are the 1)
Special Panels and Serious Crimes Unit in East-Timor; 2) Regulation 64
Panels in the Courts of Kosovo; 3) Special Court for Sierra Leone; 4)
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; 5) Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. The last one that has been linked to this category is the very
recently established 6) Extraordinary African Chambers.
10
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Courts/Hybrid
Shortcomings of International Courts
First, these tribunals are removed from the societies affected by the
crimes they are supposed to prosecute. Proceedings take place hundreds
of miles away from where they were committed. It is more difficult for
international criminal tribunals to play a role in the reconciliation or national
reconstruction process under these circumstances and judgments may be
regarded as alien, and thus rejected by the local population and authorities.
Second, fully international criminal bodies tend to grow considerably
in size employing hundreds if not thousands of personnel with significant
costs even when they can be shared by a large number of wealthy States.
Also, there is a further problem from the perspective of their creators. They
tend to develop their own internal logic, momentum, and agenda, which
can be little influenced by their creators, least of all by individual States.
Third, even in the case of the ICC, they cannot address every
possible situation because of restrictions on jurisdiction: temporal,
geographical, or otherwise.
Finally, bodies like the ICTY and the ICTR are established without
relying on the existing judicial system of the State where the crimes
occurred, but starting from a tabula rasa, a process that is time and
resource intensive.
E. JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
13
See Article 11 of the Rome Statute
14
See Article 6 of the Rome Statute
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
c. War Crimes
War crimes, considered as violation of established protections
of the laws of war, comprise the following acts: (1) grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, such as
compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in
the forces of a hostile Power, and (2) other serious violations of
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict,
within the established framework of international law, such as
employing poison or poisoned weapons, and (3) serious violations
of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 in the case of an armed conflict not of an international
character, such as the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which
are generally recognised as indispensable, and (4) other serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts
not of an international character, within the established framework
of international law, such as intentionally directing attacks against
the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities. 17
15
See Article 7 of the Rome Statute
16
https://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.aspx?id=24586 (Accessed October 2, 2019)
17
Ibid.
d. Crimes of Aggression
Crimes of Aggression means the planning, preparation, initiation
or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of
an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations. It means the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations.18
D. Territorial Jurisdiction
Territorial jurisdiction refers to the territory over which the ICC may
exercise its functions and powers. According to the stipulation of Rome
Statute, the ICC may exercise its functions and powers on: (1) the territory
of any State Party. Because when a state becomes a state to Rome
Statute, it thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC, and (2) on the
territory of any other State that has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by
special agreement.19
18
See Article 8 of the Rome Statute
19
See Article 4 of the Rome Statute
Article 1 of the Rome Statute, introduced the concept of
complementary jurisdiction, which provides:
There is a clear intention to make the ICC a court of last resort, as the
ICC only deals with cases under very limited conditions. To understand the
idea of complementarity, we have to understand the alternative. The
alternative would have been to allow the ICC to have primary jurisdiction,
which would have meant that the ICC would have been able to deal with
cases whether or not the national authorities were trying to deal with them.
States did not like this alternative, as it meant impairing the sovereignty of
the state.
Why is it important?
There are atleast four reasons for the complementary system:
1. It protects the accused if they have been prosecuted before national
courts;
2. It respects national sovereignty in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction;
3. It might promote greater efficiency because the ICC cannot deal with
all cases of serious crimes; and
4. It puts the onus on states to do their duty under international and
national law to investigate and prosecute alleged serious crimes.
States want to control the criminal law system in their own countries,
especially for serious crimes and crimes that have political consequences
or contexts. States, in order to address the inherent inefficiencies in the
operation of ICC (such as distance from victims and crime scenes, witness
protection, victim attendance and participation, and lengths of trials), made
it clear that it would be preferable for trials to take place at the national level
first rather than the international level.
Example:
The state informs the court that it has already investigated the
same case and decided not to prosecute.
If the answer to either one of the questions is NO, the ICC case
is ADMISSIBLE.
Conclusion
At its core, the Rome Statute system and the concept of
complementarity present a means for the international community to
ensure that states make genuine efforts to hold perpetrators of serious
crimes accountable, and to step in when states are either unable or
unwilling to do so.