On the Eschatology of

Hegel’s Dialectic Method

Wijcher van Dijk - niv3 - 3637913 - 18-12-2014

WY3V14007: docent Dr. E.O.J Onnasch
woorden: 1573
Introduction
Hegel’s dialectic method has an eschatological character, meaning that the process of
dialectic has an end, after which absolute truth is within our knowledge, and natural
consciousness has returned to it. The crux of the dialectic is the determining of the
negation that enables the continuance of the process. But is this the only element
pertaining to the dialectic that requires determining?
The purpose of this paper is to critique this eschatological character of the
dialectic process, as described in the introduction of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,
by questioning the possibility of consciousness reaching the “​position where
appearance becomes identified with essence​”1, first by arguing the indefinite character
of determining negation, second by placing Hegel’s natural consciousness in the context
of Plessner’s ​self-concealed man​, and third by comparing the Hegelian first moment of
knowledge with a Kantian Noumenon​ ​that is argued to be unmoved by Hegel’s
objections.(​147)

The Dialectic explained

In the Introduction2, Hegel briefly addresses the problem that justifies the development
for his method of ​dialectic​. The problem concerns the criterion of knowledge used to
judge an object under investigation. In the case of knowledge itself, it is difficult to
justify a criterion. One can either give knowledge a meta-status, or axiomate it as
common sense. Hegel does neither, and lets the object provide (or become) its own
criterium: the dialectic method. The dialectic method as explained in the Introduction of
the Phenomenology of Spirit is used by Hegel in many if not all of the subjects he
addresses.

1
G. W. F. Hegel, ​Phenomenology of Spirit,​ §89.
2
The following two paragraphs are influenced by Thomas Bowen’s interpretation of the introduction.
Citing him is problematic, as I could find no data of his work other than the website where it is placed.
Also there is no pages, numbered paragraphs or notation to specify the reference. I am thus forced to cite
with only his name and work’s supposed title. The paragraphs are also based on my note on Hegel’s
dialectic, see appendix ii.
 Arguably the most important step in this dialectic process is the ​sublation​. This
happens when -after the two objects of (or moments within) knowledge (the object as it
exists as ‘known’ and the object as it exists in itself) turn out not to correspond and
consciousness alters the first which, in turn, alters the second, which constitutes a
recognition in consciousness that the second object, as being in itself, is untrue- the
negation of the truth of the initial object in itself becomes explicit and determinate3. The
sublation is then the overcoming of that determined negation, and the continuance of the
dialectic process. ​(203)

The Indeterminate Realm of Untruth and the Returning to Ground

The result and end of the dialectic process, as far as the introduction is concerned and in
the case of consciousness and knowledge, is a knowledge that is scientific and true, as
an appearance that identifies with the essence4. The absolute Truth is this essence and
the ground to which the advance (that is the dialectic process) is a ​retreat5.
Therefore, against an initial objection6 to the finitude of this process that would
sound like ‘how do you know you’re not infinitely going to stumble upon more untruths
to be determined and sublated?’ the reply would be that the growth of consciousness is
necessarily aimed towards this end that is also the beginning, that is truth.
The infinite regress that is implied in the unending of determining untruths is
avoided exactly ​by ​this determining, because the explication of the negation is itself the
growth of consciousness toward its ground of Absolute truth. However, although the
end of the process is implicit in its beginning, that it will actually get there is still
begging the question.​ Even if the dialectic process is essentially finite, there’s no
estimating the length of the process if the domain of whatever is possibly untrue
remains undetermined. ​(202)

3
Hegel, ​Spirit​, §79.
4
Hegel, ​Spirit​, §89.
5
G. W. F. Hegel, ​Science of Logic​, §102.
6
​This is the objection made in my note, see appendix ii.
The Indeterminate Man and Natural Consciousness
If the objections above are withdrawn or overruled, and the dialectic process is accepted
in its form, there remains the presupposition of consciousness that validates the
circularity of the dialectic process7: The beginning that has its end implicitly embedded
in itself as its essence. Hegel asserts that natural consciousness, as this beginning, “​...is
made with pure being in the pure science [of logic]...​,”8 which is “​...neither an arbitrary
and merely provisional assumption, nor is it something which appears to be arbitrarily
and tentatively presupposed, ​[…]​.”​ 9
If, however, we follow Plessner, who says that man is an arbitrary form of life in
the light of other (alien) possibilities life is accepted10, we can reason that the
consequent ​concealment ​of man from himself as a person prevents the process of
history to be progressive11, meaning that it dooms the dialectic process to indefinite
stagnation. This stagnation is analogous in the contingency of human (natural)
consciousness: returning to its ground seems impossible.​ (159)

Kant’s Noumenal World and Hegel’s Inverted World

There is also the question of the conceivability of the thing in itself altogether. ​The
reason Kant postulates the real existence of the Noumenon is to make appearances
objectively grounded therein, and thereby ensure that they are not imaginary, nor
empirically contingent12.
The purport of this postulation of the noumena is that “​[T]hough we cannot
know ​these objects [of experience] as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position
to t​ hink ​them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd
conclusion that there can be appearances without anything that appears (CPuR

7
T. Bowen, ​Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.
8
​Hegel, ​Logic​, §107​.
9
Ibid., §106.
10
​H. ​Plessner, ​De Homine Abscondito,​ 501-2.
11
Plessner, Homine, 503.
12
S. Gardner, ​Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason​, 273.
Bxxvi).”​ 13 So although it is necessary to think the objects of the understanding as the
things in themselves, the Noumenon cannot be conceptualized in any capacity except in
that i​ t cannot be known in any way: “​A thing in itself whose nature is brought within
reach of the categories of understanding is ipso facto unable to ​[...] ​ensure that
appearances are appearances ​of​ something.​”14
The importance of this postulation here is that it embodies the ​Perspectival
character of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism15: “​...cognition is subject to conditions that
cannot themselves be cognised in the same sense in which objects are cognised, and so
that human knowledge can account for itself only by referring outside its sphere.”​
Therefore, when taking into account the aforementioned purport of this condition, it is
clear that elucidating the conditions that make objects possible for us stands in a stark
contrast with identifying the fundamental constituents of reality.16
Conversely, Hegel criticizes adherents to the popular notion of ​Force17, which is
that which lies under the world we experience. The price of this solution to the
one/many problem the common-sense view could not solve was the ​supersensibility o​ f
this (Force) world, and its mystery to the understanding18. Hegel then muses that the
Understanding “​attempts to render this supersensible less mysterious by identifying it
with the laws that govern the natural phenomena,​”19 names the result of this attempt the
kingdom of laws,​ and subsequently has four objections. First, Understanding will
attempt to unify these laws in one theory, but the result will be inapplicable to the
concrete world. Second, these laws cannot justify their own necessity. Third, these laws
describe rather than explain the phenomena. Finally, the two world solution is reduced
to absurdity as an ​inverted world20. These objections herald the transition of this
problematic dualism of the Understanding to Hegel’s self-consciousness.

13
(As cited by) N. Rescher, ​Kant and the Reach of Reason​, 11.
14
​Rescher, ​Reach of Reason,​ 16.
15
Gardner,​Guidebook to Kant,​ 304. Kant’s refutation of idealism is here understood as a refutation of
idealism of certain kinds. In the note on Kant (appendix i) this was not yet clear.
16
Ibid.
17
​R. Stern, ​The Routledge Guide Book to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit,​ 72.
18
Stern, ​Hegel​, 74.
19
Ibid.
20
Stern, ​Hegel​, 76.
 These problems are, however, not applicable to Kant’s ​Perspectival
Transcendental Idealism. Hegel’s objections all pertain to the problems that arise from
an attempt that Kant strictly forbids: trying to somehow conceptualize the Noumenal
World (as a Kingdom of Laws). The (Noumenal) Universal as Law is for Hegel
apparent in its difference with the flux of the world of appearance: it is ​simple21.
But it is not simple. It is not anything: it is exactly ​nothing​. Kant’s Noumenal
World is purely negative: Understanding Noumena limits our Sensibility, as ‘things’
they are literally nothing to us22...
“​Wherever, therefore, perception and its train can reach, according to
empirical laws, there our knowledge also of the existence of things can reach.
But if we do not begin with experience, or do not proceed according to the laws
of the empirical connection of phenomena, we are only making a vague display,
as if we could discover the existence of anything.”​ 23
So, concerning the objections, first, there is ​nothing ​to unify, therefore concrete
applicability cannot become a problem. Second, Necessity is not acquired over other
possible laws, it is inherent in the objectivity and altogether possibility of experience in
the first place. Third, only without acknowledging experience as the undeniable
occasion for postulating the Noumenal World can the Understanding claim to establish
priority of universality over particularity. Kant agrees that would be a ‘vague display’.
Fourth, the Inverted World is an absurd attempt to describe “​what the world is really
like ‘in itself’​[.]”24
Kant, hereby arguably undisputed by Hegel, maintains a Noumenon that cannot
be conceptualized any further that that it necessarily must exist. As such, the initial
phase of the dialectic process may take a Kantian turn: in treating the second object (or
moment) as appearance, in relation to that object the Understanding thinks and
conceives the Noumenon, thereby supposing it determinable, which it isn’t25.

21
Hegel, Spirit, §149.
22
Rescher,​ Reach of Reason,​ 10.
23
​I. Kant (Müller), ​Critique of Pure Reason,​ 184 (A226=B273-4).
24
Stern, ​Hegel​, 76.
25
​I. Kant (Bennett), ​Critique of Pure Reason​, 142 (B307).
 It can now be said that the dialectic process cannot have an eschatological
character because it takes to be determinable that which is indeterminable (a
Noumenon), as a first step towards a knowledge of what is unknowable. The process is
thereby doomed to an infinite regress. ​(758)

Conclusion
Against the eschatological character of Hegel’s dialectic three objections are made. First
it is argued that assuming that the dialectic process will come to an end is at least
begging the question because the indefinite possible untruths that can be explicated.
Second, the presupposition of natural consciousness wherein lies the absolute truth as
its ground is questioned by Plessner’s self-concealed man. Progress turns to stagnation.
Lastly, the possibility of coming to know the absolute truth that is pure being is, by
defending a Kantian Noumenal World, has been rudely refuted. These objections
attempt to thusly relieve the Hegelian dialectic process from its eschatological
character. ​(104)
References
Bowen, T. “Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit” Accessed December 16, 2014,
http://www.oakton.edu/user/2/hgraff/121hegel.htm

Gardner, S. ​Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason​.
Routledge, 1999.

Hegel, G. W. F. ​Phenomenology of Spirit​. Translated by J. B. Baillie. Blackmask

Online, 2001. Accessed December 16, 2014,
http://home.lu.lv/~ruben/Vestures_filozofija/Hegel-The%20Phemenology%20of%20Mi
nd.pdf

Hegel, G. W. F. ​Science of Logic.​ Translated by J. B. Baillie. Blackmask Online, 2001.

Accessed December 16, 2014, ​http://www.hegel.net/en/pdf/Hegel-Scilogic.pdf

Kant, I. ​Critique of Pure Reason​. Edited by J. Bennett. earlymoderntexts.com, 2007.

Accessed December 16, 2014,
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/kant1781part1_4.pdf
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/kant1781part1_5.pdf
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/kant1781part1_6.pdf

Kant, I. ​Critique of Pure Reason​. Translated by F. Max Müller. London: Macmillan,

1881.

Plessner, H. ​De Homine Abscondito.​ Social Research, 36:4 (1969:Winter) pp 497-509.

Rescher, N. ​Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant's Theory of Rational
Systematization.​ Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Stern, R. ​The Routledge Guide Book to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.​ Routledge,

2013
PEER REVIEW - Pieter Broersen (3704769)

Dit paper begon aanvankelijk met het idee om het helemaal over het Plessner gedeelte
te doen, want daar had ik uberhaupt de term eschatologie vandaan gehaald. Pieter
herinnerde me toen, in deze beginfase, aan dat het paper twee notities moet betrekken.
Dit was een uitdaging, maar door overleg werd duidelijk dat de onkenbaarheid van het
Kantiaanse noumenon erg bruikbaar voor het verwerpen van de eindigheid van het
dialectische proces zou kunnen zijn, mits de noumenale wereld Hegels kritiek kan
weerstaan.
Het eerste bezwaar is een resultaat van een nogal verhitte discussie tijdens een lunch
waar we beide op dat moment nogal onze buik vol hadden van de Fenomenologie, die
we argeloos hadden opengeslagen om verheldering te vinden over enkele onduidelijke
begrippen in diens inleiding. Geen Offenbarung voor ons die dag, maar wel een
interessante vraag, die ik door Hegel niet beantwoord krijgen kon.
Pieter, in een dwangneurose, had een meter boeken over Hegel en Kant geleend bij de
universiteitsbibliotheek. Normaliter ben ik wat zuinig met mijn bronnen, maar dit bleek
uiteindelijk ook een uitkomst te zijn, anders was ik niet gekomen op de term
perspectivisme.​
Onze wederzijdse intervisie is een zegen geweest voor ons allebei, niet allerminst
vanwege de frustratie die het trachten te behappen van de teksten soms opleverde.
APPENDIX i: ​Note Kant - Transcendental Deduction
Kant has a concept of the noumenal world that is purely negative: understanding noumena
limits our sensibility, which is to say that it is not noumena that are the results of a limited
sensibility, but vice versa. As things noumena are literally nothing to us. But still we must think
them. We characteristically cannot know them, but they are the “...things the understanding
must think.” (KRV, B307) Being those unknowable things from which our sensations and
representations derive, the whole of noumena in general is a concept (insofar as it can be a
concept, since we can only necessarily postulate their existence, and consequently state that
there is nothing to know about them) vaguely but pertinently similar to the realm of ideas
described by Plato, and also Descartes, who “declares the existence of objects outside us to be
doubtful and indemonstrable”. Though a naive question it may be, for clarification it may be
useful to try and answer it: How, then, is Kant not an idealist? I will state Kant’s response.
Kant distinguishes two conditions under which an object can be known, namely those
laid down by an intuition, through which the object is ​given​ as an appearance, and by a concept,
through which the object corresponding to the intuition is ​thought.(​ KRV, B125) Necessarily the
object in itself must be postulated, in order to assert that the experience of this object is
experience indeed, and not imagination. Ontologically this sounds realistic, but
epistemologically, since the noumenal world is separate from the domain of what is knowable,
but necessarily the ultimate source of any possible knowledge, it sounds idealistic.
Kant sheds this label in his second edition definitively, under the head of ​Refutation of
Idealism​ (B274), where he refutes dogmatic idealism by referring back to his transcendental
aesthetic, and stating that space is not a property of the objects but a pure intuition of ours. He
then turns to problematic (Cartesian) idealism: (i)I am conscious of my existence as determined
in time, which is to say I am aware of being in various states at various instances in time. (ii)It is
the modes of time (persistence, succession, and coexistence) that as rules govern the
establishments of facts, are prior to all experience, and make experience possible (KRV B218).
According to the mode of persistence all knowledge of temporal detail presupposes the
knowledge of something persistent in perception. (iii)This persistent thing, however, is not
something in me (which would be to return to the Cartesian ‘I am’) since “​all the determining
grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations and as such they
themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and
thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be determined​” (KRV Bxxxix).
(iv)Thus perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me.
APPENDIX ii: ​Notitie Hegel - Einleitung Phänomenologie des Geistes
This note will address the eschatological character of Hegel’s dialectic method. Hegel asserts
that the dialectic process will conclude (in the case of knowledge and consciousness) with
consciousness in ​a position where appearance becomes identified with essence​ (PhS §89). The
goal is to criticise this assertion by analyzing the determined negation.
In the Introduction, Hegel briefly addresses the problem that justifies the development
for his method of ​dialectic​. The problem concerns the criterion of knowledge used to judge an
object under investigation. In the case of knowledge itself, it is difficult to justify a criterium.
One can either give knowledge a meta-status, or axiomate it as common sense. Hegel does
neither, and lets the object provide (or become) its own criterium. This is his dialectic method.
The dialectic method as explained in the Introduction of the Phenomenology of Spirit is used by
Hegel in many if not all of the subjects he addresses.
Arguably the most important step in this dialectic process is the ​sublation​. This happens
when -after the two objects of (or moments within) knowledge (the object as it exists as
‘known’ and the object as it exists in itself) turn out not to correspond and consciousness alters
the first which, in turn, alters the second, which constitutes a recognition in consciousness that
the second object as being in itself is untrue- the negation of the truth of the initial object in
itself becomes explicit and determinate. The sublation is then the overcoming of that determined
negation, and the continuance of the dialectic process.
It is true that the negation is determinable, and that thereby consciousness can reverse
itself and make explicit the untruth of the initial object in itself, and thereby continue the
process. Between this notion and the notion that the process will come to an end comes the
following remark: although the negation of an untruth is determinable, e.g. ‘not this,’ the
domain of possible untruths in general is not. There is no finite number of untrue objects of
knowledge. This leads us to the question how can we ever reach the end of this dialectic
process? Is it even possible? Is the process random such that it gives us the minute chance that
we spontaneously come upon a knowledge of an object that is pristinely identifiable with the
knowledge of the essence of this object? Or must we systematically pass through all possible
untruths?