CAYETANO v.

MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991

PARAS, J.:

FACT:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the said nomination. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
Constitutional qualification requirement.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:

(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
Members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years .
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

It was known to us that Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and having hurdled the bar, worked in his father’s law office. After then, he
worked as operations officer in the World Bank Group for about two years (1963-1970). Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco
Group as a Chief Executive Officer, and subsequently rendered services to various companies either as legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. He also served as former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

ISSUE:

1. WHETHER OR NOT Monsod possess the required qualification for the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.

2. WHETHER OR NOT there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of Commission on Appointments regarding the confirmation of
nomination of Monsod.

RULING:

1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

2. NO. The power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm the nomination of the COMELEC Chairman by the president is mandated by
the Constitution. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion for has been clearly shown.

Dara Louise Adrienne G Lopez 1

 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than
those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning
of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of
“practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:Black defines "practice of law" as:"The
Dara Louise Adrienne G Lopez 2
rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with thelaw." The contention of respondent
that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied
by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer
systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and
non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for
the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and
for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances
but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs
paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by
virtueof the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of
the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

G.R. No. L-6513 December 15, 1911

FAUSTINO LICHAUCO, in his own name and in behalf of his coheirs, Eugenia, Clara, Luisa, Crisanto,
Zacarias, Galo and Timotea Lichauso, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANA ALEJANDRINO and her husband W. WEINMANN, defendant-appellees.

Ramon Salinas, for appellants. No appearance for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

On the 16th of July, 1908, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants, in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, for the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,657.75, with interest at 12 per cent from the said 16th of July,
1908.

To this complaint the defendants demurred, which demurrer was, on the 23d of November, 1908, sustained by the
Hon. Julio Llorente, judge. On the same day (the 23d of November, 1908) the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
against the defendants. The complaint was accompanied by Exhibit A, B, C, and D.
itc@alf 1awphil.net

Dara Louise Adrienne G Lopez 3

Later the defendants presented a demurrer which was overruled. On the 2d of July, 1909, the defendants presented
a general and special answer, in which they prayed to be relieved from all liability under the complaint, with costs
against the plaintiffs.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Hon. Julio Llorente, judge, on the 10th of
February, 1901, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for the sum of P610.22
Philippine currency, with interest at 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908, with the provision that if the defendants
failed to pay the said amount, the plaintiffs were entitled to sell at public auction one-sixth part of the land mortgaged
under and by virtue of a contract between Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco, dated the 30th of July,
1886. (See Exhibit A.) Mariano Alejandrino was the father of the defendant, Ana Alejandrino, and Cornelia Laochangco
as the mother of the plaintiffs. Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco are both dead.

From the judgment of the lower court the plaintiffs appealed.

From an examination of the record, the following facts seem to be true:

First. That on the 30th of July, 1886, the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from the said Cornelia Laochangco the
sum of P6,000 Mex., under certain conditions mentioned in the said contract. (See Exhibit A.)

Second. That on the 15th of August, 1895, the said Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco liquidated the
amount due under the said contract, Exhibit A, and it was found on the date that there was still due under the said
contract the sum of P4,115.75. On the same day (August 15, 1895) the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from
Cornelia Laochangco the additional sum of P234.25, making a total amount due of 4,350 pesos Mex. (Exhibit B.)

Third. That on the 15th of December, 1906, all of the children of the said Mariano Alejandrino, except the defendant
herein, Ana Alejandrino, entered into a contract, by the terms of which they obligated themselves to pay to the plaintiffs
the balance due from their father, Mariano Alejandrino. (See Exhibit D.)

Fifth. That on the 23d of April, 1898, the amount due on the said contract of July 30, 1886, was again liquidated and
it was found that there was remaining due and unpaid on the said contract, the sum of P4,465. (See Exhibit C.)

Under the provisions of Exhibit D (the contract which was entered into by all of the heirs of Mariano Alejandrino, except
the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino), they obligated themselves to pay their proportional amount of the
indebtedness of their father, together with 12 per cent interest. The plaintiffs claim that the amount due on the contract
of July 30, 1886, at the time of the commencement of the present action (the 15th of July, 1908), together with the
interest amounted to the sum of P9,946.50, and that the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, was liable for one-sixth
part of said sum, or the sum of P1,657.75.

The defendant, Ana Alejandrino, was not a party to the contract represented by Exhibit D. she did not agree to pay
12 per cent interest on the amount remaining due on the 23rd of April, 1898, of the debt between her father and the
plaintiffs herein. There is no proof in the record that any demand was ever made upon her for the payment of her
aliquot part of the balance found to be due on the 23rd of April, 1898, either judicially or extrajudicially. She was,
therefore, not liable to pay interest or her aliquot part of the said amount. The lower court correctly held, however, that
she was liable for the payment of one-sixth part of said amount by virtue of her having accepted her proportional part
of the property involved and covered by the original contract between her father and the mother of the plaintiffs,
bearing date of July 30, 1886, or for the sum of 744.16 pesos Mex., which, reduced to conant, amounted to P610.22,
the amount for which the lower court rendered judgment, with 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908.

While we have not discussed the assignments of error in detail, we believe that we have answered each of them in
effect. We have discussed the question upon their merits as they are presented in the record. There is a question of
parties, however, which has not been presented, which we can not overlook.

It will be noted that Faustino Lichauco has brought this action for himself and in representation of his co-heirs. So far
as the record shows, the co-heirs have no knowledge of the pendency of the action. Faustino Lichauco shows no
authority for representing his co-heirs except the mere allegation in the title of his complaint. He speaks of himself as
Dara Louise Adrienne G Lopez 4
the plaintiff. The attorney signs himself as attorney for the plaintiff — not for the plaintiffs. Faustino Lichauco represents
himself and his co-heirs, and the attorney-at-law, who signs the complaint, represents as he alleges "the plaintiff."
There is nothing in the record which shows that the co-heirs are not capable of representing themselves. There is
nothing in the record which shows that they ever gave their consent to the commencement of the present action. It
may be assumed that they did, but this not sufficient. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that in Courts
of First Instance a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and his appearance must be
either personal or by the aid of a duly authorized member of the bar. (Sec. 34, Act No. 190.) In the present case the
co-heirs are neither in court personally nor by the a duly authorized member of the bar. Therefore they are not in court
at all, and any judgment which we might render in the present case, with reference to the heirs, either pro or con,
would in no way be binding upon them. (Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Vicente Guasch, No. 5313). 1

The present case seems to have been tried in the lower court upon the theory that all of the interested parties were
present, and for that reason we have discussed the case upon its merits, believing that the parties would deem further
litigation unnecessary, once being informed of the views of this court upon the facts presented. This assumption,
however, is based upon the ground that even though the co-heirs had been represented in the trial of the cause, in
accordance with law, no other or different evidence would have been adduced.

Therefore, following the decision of this court in the case of Lichauco vs. Limjuco (19 Phil. Rep., 12), the judgment of
the lower court is hereby set aside, unless the coheirs of Faustino Lichauco, within a period of ten days from notification
of this decision, shall appear personally or by attorney in the Court of First Instance of the Province or Pampanga,
either as plaintiffs or defendants, and in writing indicate their full conformance with the proceedings had in the present
cause. In which case, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga is hereby directed to enter a judgment
confirming the judgment heretofore rendered by said court on the 10th day of February, 1910.

Dara Louise Adrienne G Lopez 5