MARCOS vs.

MANGLAPUS

G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M.

ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner,
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

RESOLUTION

EN BANC:

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed
the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu,
Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and
order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be
brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following
major arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them
not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of
the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus,
petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the
necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M.
Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines,
and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the
remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for
reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that
"the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the
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label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a
'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization."
[Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the
movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision
of the Court.

2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the
Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a
reconsideration of the Court's decision.

The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed
the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the
destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the
basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that
it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared
that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star,
October 4, 1989.]

3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding
the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers
of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing
new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the
distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.

Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely
accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific
executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the
difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the
conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton
submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore
to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in
the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of
that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's

proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could
exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the
constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened
by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited
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 by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief
Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent
power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only
that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by
internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of
"executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly
limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]

And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual
powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained
analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with
the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6
which provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately
on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he
may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or
letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution
and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First
of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment
No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.

4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath
of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the
return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and
under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear
showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986

RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE,
JR., as Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M.
REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM), respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person
facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to
travel?

Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having

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transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no
officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the former corporation.

Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his
co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise
for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a
Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc,
Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management committee was organized and appointed.

Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission
requested the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for
departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4,
1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division.

When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected
to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one
Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc.
In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and
45400, assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545,
raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total
amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation as surety.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities."1 The prosecution opposed
said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge
Camilon dated March 9, 1982, reads:

Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all embracing
ground that his trip is ... relative to his business transactions and opportunities.

The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is discerned to
warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.

In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or in the
future until these two (2) cases are terminated .2

On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:

6.-Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the Court would allow the
accused to leave the Philippines the surety companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf
might claim that they could no longer be held liable in their undertakings because it was the
Court which allowed the accused to go outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine
Court, should the accused fail or decide not to return.

WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED. 3

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It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting
the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request
was also denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
4 seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.

On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for
lack of merit.

Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6
petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.7 In his
motion, petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with
the obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc."8 He attached the letter dated
August 9, 1984 of the chief executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc.,
Mr. Marsden W. Miller9 requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people
and companies who would be involved in its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested
that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on motion of the
prosecution on the ground that after verification of the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ... (he) was not in any way connected with the Manotoc Securities,
Inc. as of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to him." 10 Criminal Cases
Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained pending as
Judge Camilon, when notified of the dismissal of the other cases against petitioner, instead
of dismissing the cases before him, ordered merely the informations amended so as to
delete the allegation that petitioner was president and to substitute that he was
"controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. On September 20, 1984,
the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go abroad pendente
lite. 12

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts
which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no
jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for
the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court
in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping
him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of
the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. 13

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The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have
held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at
all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from
leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will
be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he
may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the
prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public
officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has
been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become
invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the
principal from leaving the state.14

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has
the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the
person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this
inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation
that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for
permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.

To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in
People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the
following passage:

... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the pleasure of
the Court. ... The law does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable only
when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines and not demandable if
the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit
provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as without the
boundaries of the granting state. This principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any law
or jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial
boundaries of the country.

The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is
misplaced. The rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for
while there is, indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under
bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason
suggested by the appellate court.

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the
accused was able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof
and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she
would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner in this case has not
satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his
comment:

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A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it is
solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where he will, allegedly
attend to some business transactions and search for business opportunities. From the tenor
and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify
the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is
absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the
alleged business transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
Neither is there any hint that petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely
preclude him from taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any
showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause him irreparable
damage or prejudice. 15

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has
agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had
posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without
the assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government
impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the principal that will increase the
risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail
bond or recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the conditions
thereof, which is made without his assent. This result has been reached as to a stipulation or
agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition of other cases, or to permit the
principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982
issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to
petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale behind said
order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his
travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We
find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to
leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no
reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave
the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail
bond.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section
5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court,
or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.

Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence,
the Court finds that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the other issues raised by
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991

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RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that
the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C.
Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the
Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying reconsideration, be set aside.

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised
Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due
time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information,
respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport
of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had
gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements
of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing
the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application
therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country.
This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the
Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has
never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to
show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without
the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.

Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January
1990. Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.

After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due
course and to decide the case.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders,
dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous,
claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending
Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon
lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public
safety or public health."

We perceive no reversible error.

1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is
apparent that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several

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arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-
appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988.
Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is
the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date
(28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were
cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for
accused Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United
States of America;

2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in
person before the Court;

3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had
been issued against him all for the same reason –– failure to appear at scheduled
arraignments.

In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more
than enough consideration. The limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim.
Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).

Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were
not based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all
appearances, the pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for
arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.

2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in

finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on
grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted
had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both
instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having
been issued against him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken
into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when
so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule
114, Secs. 1 and 2).

The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel
(Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A
person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if
abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it
is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court
where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power
of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the
allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security,

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public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one
provision.1âwphi1 Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired.

The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court
or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health (Article
IV, Section 5).

The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them
differently, to wit:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to
travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers
or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health"
and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text
(The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently,
the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which
issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga
vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting
the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect
in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or
judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the
effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available
at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the
right to travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature
and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or
the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of
that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

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Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions
thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have
been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were
to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the
country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing
his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner,
Ricardo C. Silverio.

SO ORDERED.
GENUINO VS. DELIMA

A.M. No. P-11-2927 December 13, 2011

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3532-P]

LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-Office of the CourT

Administrator (OCA), Complainant,
vs.
WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS, Clerk IV Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum
City, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This case stemmed from the leave application for foreign travel1 sent through mail by Wilma
Salvacion P. Heusdens (respondent), Staff Clerk IV of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum
City, Davao del Norte.

Records disclose that on July 10, 2009, the Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative
Services, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), received respondent’s leave application for
foreign travel from September 11, 2009 to October 11, 2009. Respondent left for abroad without
waiting for the result of her application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued in her
favor because she was not cleared of all her accountabilities as evidenced by the Supreme Court
Certificate of Clearance. Respondent reported back to work on October 19, 2009.2

The OCA, in its Memorandum3 dated November 26, 2009, recommended the disapproval of
respondent’s leave application. It further advised that respondent be directed to make a written
explanation of her failure to secure authority to travel abroad in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-
2003. On December 7, 2009, then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno approved the OCA
recommendation.

Accordingly, in a letter4 dated January 6, 2010, OCA Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C.
Vilches informed respondent that her leave application was disapproved and her travel was
considered unauthorized. Respondent was likewise directed to explain within fifteen (15) days
from notice her failure to comply with the OCA circular.

In her Comment5 dated February 2, 2010, respondent admitted having travelled overseas without
the required travel authority. She explained that it was not her intention to violate the rules as
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she, in fact, mailed her leave application which was approved by her superior, Judge Arlene
Lirag-Palabrica, as early as June 26, 2009. She honestly believed that her leave application
would be eventually approved by the Court.

The OCA, in its Report6 dated March 8, 2011, found respondent to have violated OCA Circular
No. 49-2003 for failing to secure the approval of her application for travel authority.

Hence, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that respondent be deemed guilty for violation of OCA Circular No. 49-
2003 and be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future would be dealt with more severely.

OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) specifically requires that:

B. Vacation Leave to be Spent Abroad.

Pursuant to the resolution in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC dated 6 November 2000,7 all foreign travels
of judges and court personnel, regardless of the number of days, must be with prior permission
from the Supreme Court through the Chief Justice and the Chairmen of the Divisions.

1. Judges and court personnel who wish to travel abroad must secure a travel authority from the
Office of the Court Administrator. The judge or court personnel must submit the following:

(a) For Judges

xxx

(b) For Court Personnel:

• application or letter-request addressed to the Court Administrator stating the purpose of

the travel abroad;

• application for leave covering the period of the travel abroad, favorably recommended
by the Presiding Judge or Executive Judge;

• clearance as to money and property accountability;

• clearance as to pending criminal and administrative case filed against him/her, if any;

• for court stenographer, clearance as to pending stenographic notes for transcription

from his/her court and from the Court of Appeals; and

• Supreme Court clearance.

2. Complete requirements should be submitted to and received by the Office of the Court
Administrator at least two weeks before the intended period. No action shall be taken on
requests for travel authority with incomplete requirements. Likewise, applications for travel
abroad received less than two weeks of the intended travel shall not be favorably acted upon.
[Underscoring supplied]

Paragraph 4 of the said circular also provides that "judges and personnel who shall leave the
country without travel authority issued by the Office of the Court Administrator shall be subject to
disciplinary action." In addition, Section 67 of the Civil Service Omnibus Rules on
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Leave8 expressly provides that "any violation of the leave laws, rules or regulations, or any
misrepresentation or deception in connection with an application for leave, shall be a ground for
disciplinary action." In fact, every government employee who files an application for leave of
absence for at least thirty (30) calendar days is instructed to submit a clearance as to money and
property accountabilities.9

In this case, respondent knew that she had to secure the appropriate clearance as to money and
property accountability to support her application for travel authority. She cannot feign ignorance
of this requirement because she had her application for clearance circulated through the various
divisions. She, however, failed to secure clearance from the Supreme Court Savings and Loan
Association (SCSLA) where she had an outstanding loan.

There is no dispute, therefore, that although respondent submitted her leave application for
foreign travel, she failed to comply with the clearance and accountability requirements. As the
OCA Circular specifically cautions that "no action shall be taken on requests for travel authority
with incomplete requirements," it was expected that her leave application would, as a
consequence, be disapproved by the OCA.

Considering that respondent was aware that she was not able to complete the requirements, her
explanation that she honestly believed that her application would be approved is unacceptable.
Thus, her leaving the country, without first awaiting the approval or non-approval of her
application to travel abroad from the OCA, was violative of the rules.

On the Constitutional Right to Travel

It has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) on vacation leave to be spent abroad
unduly restricts a citizen’s right to travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.10 Section 6 reads:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. [Emphases supplied]

Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a citizen’s constitutional right to travel. It is,
however, not the issue in this case. The only issue in this case is the non-compliance with the
Court’s rules and regulations. It should be noted that respondent, in her Comment, did not raise
any constitutional concerns. In fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went
abroad without the required travel authority. Hence, this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out
issues on one’s constitutional right to travel.

Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of one’s right to travel or the freedom to
move from one place to another,11 as assured by the Constitution, is not absolute. There are
constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself
provides that "neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law." Some of these statutory
limitations are the following:

1] The Human Security Act of 2010 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372. The law restricts the
right to travel of an individual charged with the crime of terrorism even though such
person is out on bail.

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 2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to said law, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his authorized consular officer may refuse the issuance of,
restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipino citizen.

3] The "Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" or R.A. No. 9208. Pursuant to the
provisions thereof, the Bureau of Immigration, in order to manage migration and curb
trafficking in persons, issued Memorandum Order Radjr No. 2011-011,12 allowing its
Travel Control and Enforcement Unit to "offload passengers with fraudulent travel
documents, doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victims of human trafficking"
from our ports.

4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as
amended by R.A. No. 10022. In enforcement of said law, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) may refuse to issue deployment permit to a specific
country that effectively prevents our migrant workers to enter such country.

5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A. No. 9262. The law restricts
movement of an individual against whom the protection order is intended.

6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant thereto, the Inter-
Country Adoption Board may issue rules restrictive of an adoptee’s right to travel "to
protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other
practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the
child."

Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that naturally emanate from the source. These
are very basic and are built-in with the power. An example of such inherent limitation is the power
of the trial courts to prohibit persons charged with a crime to leave the country.13 In such a case,
permission of the court is necessary. Another is the inherent power of the legislative department
to conduct a congressional inquiry in aid of legislation. In the exercise of legislative inquiry,
Congress has the power to issue a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any
part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting
Speaker of the House;14 or in the case of the Senate, signed by its Chairman or in his absence
by the Acting Chairman, and approved by the Senate President.15

Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof

With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the "Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof." This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the
effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Recognizing this
mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of the President, dated July 31,
1986,16 considers the Supreme Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules and
regulations on foreign travels. Thus, the Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B).

Where a person joins the Judiciary or the government in general, he or she swears to faithfully
adhere to, and abide with, the law and the corresponding office rules and regulations. These
rules and regulations, to which one submits himself or herself, have been issued to guide the
government officers and employees in the efficient performance of their obligations. When one
becomes a public servant, he or she assumes certain duties with their concomitant
responsibilities and gives up some rights like the absolute right to travel so that public service
would not be prejudiced.

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As earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of the Judiciary, the Court issued
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such
regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel can
go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be a
disruption in the administration of justice. A situation where the employees go on mass leave and
travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are urgently needed, could possibly
arise. For said reason, members and employees of the Judiciary cannot just invoke and demand
their right to travel.

To permit such unrestricted freedom can result in disorder, if not chaos, in the Judiciary and the
society as well. In a situation where there is a delay in the dispensation of justice, litigants can
get disappointed and disheartened. If their expectations are frustrated, they may take the law into
their own hands which results in public disorder undermining public safety. In this limited sense, it
can even be considered that the restriction or regulation of a court personnel’s right to travel is a
concern for public safety, one of the exceptions to the non-impairment of one’s constitutional
right to travel.

Given the exacting standard expected from each individual called upon to serve in the Judiciary,
it is imperative that every court employee comply with the travel notification and authority
requirements as mandated by OCA Circular No. 49-2003. A court employee who plans to travel
abroad must file his leave application prior to his intended date of travel with sufficient time
allotted for his application to be processed and approved first by the Court. He cannot leave the
country without his application being approved, much less assume that his leave application
would be favorably acted upon. In the case at bench, respondent should have exercised
prudence and asked for the status of her leave application before leaving for abroad.

Indeed, under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (EO) No. 292, a
leave application should be acted upon within five (5) working days after its receipt, otherwise the
leave application shall be deemed approved. Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on
Leave reads:

SEC. 49. Period within which to act on leave applications. – Whenever the application for leave
of absence, including terminal leave, is not acted upon by the head of agency or his duly
authorized representative within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the application for
leave of absence shall be deemed approved.

Applying this provision, the Court held in the case of Commission on Appointments v. Paler17 that
an employee could not be considered absent without leave since his application was deemed
approved. In said case, there was no action on his application within five (5) working days from
receipt thereof.18

The ruling in Paler, however, is not squarely applicable in this case. First, the employee in said
case was governed by CSC Rules only. In the case of respondent, like the others who are
serving the Judiciary, she is governed not only by CSC Rules but also by OCA Circular No. 49-
2003 which imposes guidelines on requests for travel abroad for judges and court personnel.
Second, in Paler, the employee submitted his leave application with complete requirements
before his intended travel date. No additional requirement was asked to be filed. In the case of
respondent, she submitted her leave application but did not fully comply with the clearance and
accountability requirements enumerated in OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Third, in Paler, there was
no approval or disapproval of his application within 5 working days from the submission of the
requirements. In this case, there was no submission of the clearance requirements and, hence,
the leave application could not have been favorably acted upon.

SCSLA membership is voluntary

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Regarding the requirement of the OCA that an employee must also seek clearance from the
SCSLA, the Court finds nothing improper in it. OCA is not enforcing the collection of a loan
extended to such employee.19 Although SCSLA is a private entity, it cannot be denied that its
functions and operations are inextricably connected with the Court. First, SCSLA was primarily
established as a savings vehicle for Supreme Court and lower court employees. The
membership, which is voluntary, is open only to Supreme Court justices, officials, and employees
with permanent, coterminous, or casual appointment, as well as to first and second-level court
judges and their personnel.20 An eligible employee who applies for membership with SCSLA
must submit, together with his application, his latest appointment papers issued by the Supreme
Court.21 Second, when an employee-member applies for a SCSLA loan, he or she is asked to
authorize the Supreme Court payroll office to deduct the amount due and remit it to
SCSLA. Third, the employee-borrower likewise undertakes to assign in favor of SCSLA, in case
of non-payment, his capital deposit, including earned dividends, all monies and monetary
benefits due or would be due from his office, Government Service Insurance System or from any
government office or other sources, to answer the remaining balance of his loan.22 Fourth, every
employee-borrower must procure SCSLA members to sign as co-makers for the loan23 and in
case of leave applications that would require the processing of a Supreme Court clearance,
another co-maker’s undertaking would be needed.

The Court stresses that it is not sanctioning respondent for going abroad with an unpaid debt but
for failing to comply with the requirements laid down by the office of which she is an employee.
When respondent joined the Judiciary and volunteered to join the SCSLA, she agreed to follow
the requirements and regulations set forth by both offices. When she applied for a loan, she was
not forced or coerced to accomplish the requirements. Everything was of her own volition.

In this regard, having elected to become a member of the SCSLA, respondent voluntarily and
knowingly committed herself to honor these undertakings. By accomplishing and submitting the
said undertakings, respondent has clearly agreed to the limitations that would probably affect her
constitutional right to travel. By her non-compliance with the requirement, it can be said that she
has waived, if not constricted, her right. An employee cannot be allowed to enjoy the benefits and
privileges of SCSLA membership and at the same time be exempted from her voluntary
obligations and undertakings.

A judiciary employee who leaves for abroad without authority must be prepared to face the
consequences

Lest it be misunderstood, a judge or a member of the Judiciary, who is not being restricted by a
criminal court or any other agency pursuant to any statutory limitation, can leave for
abroad without permission but he or she must be prepared to face the consequences for his or
her violation of the Court’s rules and regulations. Stated otherwise, he or she should expect to be
subjected to a disciplinary action. In the past, the Court was not hesitant to impose the
appropriate sanctions and penalties.

In Office of the Administrative Services (OAS)-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) v.

Calacal,24 a utility worker of the Metropolitan Trial Court was found guilty of violating OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 for going overseas without the required travel authority and was
reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be penalized
more severely. In that case, the Court stressed that unawareness of the circular was not an
excuse from non-compliance therewith.25

In Reyes v. Bautista,26 a court stenographer was found guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-
2003 for traveling abroad without securing the necessary permission for foreign travel. She was
also found guilty of dishonesty when she indicated in her application that her leave would be
spent in the Philippines, when in truth it was spent abroad. Because of the employee’s numerous
infractions, she was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges,
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except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of
the government, including government owned or controlled corporations.

In Concerned Employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan v. Paguio-

Bacani,27 a branch clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, was found
guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her Daily Time Record and leaving the country without the
requisite travel authority. She was suspended from the service for one (1) year without pay, with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
lavvphi1

Following the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the Court considers a
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations as a light offense and punishable with
reprimand on the first offense; suspension for one to thirty days on the second; and dismissal
from the service on the third infraction. Considering that this appears to be respondent’s first
infraction, the OCA recommended that she be penalized with a reprimand and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.

The Court, nonetheless, takes note of the belated action (4 months) of the Leave Division on her
application for leave which she submitted two months before her intended departure date. The
Leave Division should have acted on the application, favorably or unfavorably, before the
intended date with sufficient time to communicate it to the applicant. If an applicant has not
complied with the requirements, the Leave Division should deny the same and inform him or her
of the adverse action. As respondent was not informed of the denial of her application within a
reasonable time, respondent should only be admonished.

WHEREFORE, respondent Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens, Clerk IV Municipal Trial Court in

Cities, Tagum City, is hereby ADMONISHED for traveling abroad without any travel authority in
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense would be dealt with more severely.

The Leave Division, OAS-OCA, is hereby directed to act upon applications for travel abroad at
least five (5) working days before the intended date of departure.

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