Feudal Europe, 800-1300 Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices

Cambridge University Press
International Organization Foundation
Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices

Author(s): Markus Fischer
Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 427-466
Published by: The MIT Press
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Feudal Europe,800-1300: communal
discourseand conflictualpractices
MarkusFischer
The disciplineof internationalrelationsfaces a new debate of fundamental

significance.After the realist challenge to the pervasive idealism of the
interwaryears and the social scientificargumentagainstrealismin the late
1950s, it is now the turn of critical theoriststo dispute the established
paradigms of internationalpolitics,having been remarkablysuccessfulin
severalotherfieldsof social inquiry.In essence,criticaltheoristsclaimthatall
social realityis subject to historicalchange, that a normativediscourse of
understandingsand values entails correspondingpractices,and that social
theorymust include interpretation and dialectical critique.In international
relations,this approach particularlycritiquesthe ahistorical,scientific,and
materialistconceptionsofferedbyneorealists.Traditionalrealists,bycontrast,
finda littlemore sympathy in the eyes of criticaltheoristsbecause theyjoin
themin theirrejectionof social science and structuraltheory.'Withregardto
liberal institutionalism, critical theoristsare naturallysympatheticto its
communitariancomponent while castigatingits utilitarianstrand as the
accompliceof neorealism.2Overall,the adventofcriticaltheorywillthusfocus
I thankStephenKrasner,David Laitin,JohnMearsheimer,Duncan Snidal,AshleyTellis,Daniel

Verdier,StephenWalt,and theanonymousreviewersofInternational Organizationfortheirhelpful
critiquesand comments.I am especiallygratefulto Robert Bartlettfor his carefulhistorical
perusal.
1. See RichardK. Ashley,"The Povertyof Neorealism,"International Organization38 (Spring
1984),pp. 225-81.
2. Indeed, criticaltheoristshave alreadybegun to appropriatethe institutionalcomponentof
liberalism.See FriedrichKratochwil,"Regimes, Interpretationand the 'Science' of Politics:A
Reappraisal,"Millennium17 (Summer1988),pp. 263-84; AlexanderWendtand RaymondDuvall,
"Institutionsand InternationalOrder," in Ernst-OttoCzempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds.,
Global Changesand TheoreticalChallenges:Approachesto WorldPoliticsforthe1990s (Lexington,
Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1989),pp. 51-73; and JamesF. Keely,"Toward a FoucauldianAnalysisof
InternationalRegimes,"International Organization44 (Winter1990), pp. 83-105. Withregardto
critiquingliberalutilitarianismas partand parcelofneorealism,see thefollowingworksofRichard
K. Ashley:"The Three Modes ofEconomism,"International StudiesQuarterly
27 (December 1983),
especiallypp. 481-82; and "Untyingthe SovereignState: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique,"Millennium17 (Summer1988),especiallyp. 236.
International 46, 2, Spring1992

Organization
? 1992 bytheWorldPeace Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
428 InternationalOrganization
thefieldof international relationson its"interparadigm debate" withneoreal-

ism.3
This article seeks to make an empiricalcontributionto this important
controversy betweenneorealismand criticaltheory.As suggestedby critical
theorists,the Middle Ages constitutethe mostimportantcase to supporttheir
argumentthat world politicsundergoesfundamentalchange. Followingthe
criticaltheorists'lead, this article investigatesboth the discourse and the
practicesof feudalEurope in orderto determinewhetherthemedievalsystem
differedfundamentally fromthemodernone. It findsthatfeudaldiscoursewas
indeed distinct,prescribing unity,functionalcooperation,sharing,and lawful-
ness. However,it also findsthatwhilefeudal actorsobservedthese normsfor
the mostparton thelevel ofform,theyin essence behavedlikemodernstates.
Outwardlyprofessingadherence to such legal institutionsas vassalage, fief,
feud, and peer court, they really strove for exclusive territorialcontrol,
protected themselvesby militarymeans, subjugated each other, balanced
againstpower,formedalliances and spheresof influence,and resolvedtheir
conflictsby the use and threatof force.This evidence underminesthe twin
argumentsofcriticaltheoriststhatinternational politicsis markedbyhistorical
change and that discourse shapes practice. Conversely,it supports the
neorealistviewthatconflictand powerpoliticsare a structural conditionofthe
internationalrealm-present even amongindividualsin a statelesscondition.
The debatebetweenneorealismand criticaltheory
On the mostfundamentallevel,neorealismand criticaltheoryclash over the

age-oldquestionofwhetherhumanaffairsare definedbycontinuity or change.4
relationsapplies across
Neorealistsclaimthattheirdescriptionofinternational
time. According to Kenneth Waltz, the "textureof internationalpolitics
remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves
endlessly."5Neorealistsexplainthisconstancyin termsof anarchicstructure,
3. See M. Banks, "The Inter-ParadigmDebate," in M. Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds.,

InternationalRelations:A Handbookof CurrentTheory(London: Frances Pinter,1985), pp. 7-26;
MarkHoffman,"CriticalTheoryand the Inter-Paradigm Debate," Millennium16 (Summer1987),
pp. 231-49; and Robert0. Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions: Two Approaches,"International
StudiesQuarterly32 (December 1988),pp. 379-96.
4. See R. B. J. Walker, "Historyand Structurein the Theory of InternationalRelations,"
Millennium18 (Summer1989),pp. 163-83.
5. KennethN. Waltz, TheoryofInternational Politics(New York: Random House, 1979), p. 66.
Neorealismhas been largelyshaped bytheworksofWaltz,includinghisearlierbookMan, theState
and War(New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). See also KennethN. Waltz,"Reflections
on Theoryof International Politics:A Response to My Critics,"in Robert 0. Keohane, ed.,
Neorealismand Its Critics(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1968), pp. 322-45. Recently,
StephenM. Walt has elaboratedthe neorealistmechanicsof balancingand bandwagoningin his
The OriginsofAlliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1987). Closely associated with
neorealismis theworkof RobertR. Gilpin;see his Warand Changein WorldPolitics(Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press,1981).
Feudal Europe 429
which constrainsall states to act in similarways despite their historical

differences. This structuralview can be said to reflecta generalbeliefamong
politicalrealiststhatviolentconflictrepresentsthenaturalconditionofpolitics
outside the domestic sphere. In contrast,criticaltheoristsassume that all
human phenomena come into being and pass away, assertingwith Max
Horkheimerthat"the term'humannature'. . . does not referto an originalor
an eternalor a uniformessence ... [since]new individualand social qualities
arise in the historicalprocess."6As discussedfurtherbelow,criticaltheorists
faultneorealistsmainlyforfailingto understandthehistoricaltransformations
whichthe internationalsystemhas undergonein the past and whichit could
experienceagain in the future.In short,the quarrelbetweenneorealismand
criticaltheorycan be expressedbytheantagonistic categoriesofcontinuity and
change,natureand history, structureand process.
In conjunctionwithits naturalistview of humanaffairs,neorealismapplies
the scientificmethodto the studyof internationalpolitics.Thus, it seeks to
determinethe objectivelaws of international relationswhileexcludingsubjec-
tive and intersubjective phenomena such as behavior motivatedby norms,
values,or consent.Drawingon thehistoricalimportanceofcity-states, empires,
and nation-states, neorealismtakes the state as its unitof analysis.It defines
thestateas themonopolyoflegitimateforceovera giventerritory and assumes
thatit seeks mostlyself-preservation but at timesengagesin violentdrivesfor
hegemony.Given the factthatstatesare not subjectto one centralauthority,
neorealismproposes thattheirself-seeking charactergivesrise to a structure
that regulates state behavior. States are constrainedby this structureof
anarchyto performall survival-enhancing tasksthemselves, makingthemact as
independentand like unitsratherthanas functionally specializedcooperators.
Thus, the structureof anarchyconstrainsstates to control natural and
humanresourcesin orderto procuremilitary forcessufficient
to deterpotential
aggressors.It constrainsstatesto armand to formalliancesin accordancewith
the distributionof capabilitieswith the aim of balancingeach other'swar-
makingpotential.When balancingis not available,weakerstatesare forcedto
submitto strongerones, therebyforming spheresof influenceunderthe aegis
of the latter.When a threatenedstate refusesto submitto an aggressorand
war breaksout. Unable to trusteach other'spresent
failsto deterit militarily,
and futureintentions, statesgenerallyfailto cooperate,since the exchangeof
goods and services could entail a relative loss to their power. In short,
neorealism conceives internationalrelations in terms of states that are
6. Max Horkheimer,CriticalTheory:SelectedEssays,trans.MatthewJ. O'Connell et al. (1936;

reprint,New York: Herder& Herder,1972),p. 66. For a generalintroduction
to criticaltheory,
see
ZygmuntBauman, Towardsa CriticalSociology(London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1976); David
Held, Introductionto CriticalTheory:Horkheimer to Habermas(Berkeley:Universityof California
Press,1980); and RaymondGeuss, TheIdea ofa CriticalTheory: Habermasand theFrankfurt School
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1981).
430 International
Organization
constrained bythestructure of anarchy to engagein conflictual practicesof

self-helpinaccordance withthedistribution ofpower.
Criticaltheoryassailsthe positivist practiceof treating humanbeingsas
objectsbecauseitholdsthatourspecieshastranscended naturebya linguistic
reorganization ofsocialrelations. In itsprevailing Habermasian form, critical
theoryassumesthe humanspecies as a whole to have threecognitive
interests-namely, to produce,to communicate, and to reflect uponitself-
whichtogether giverisetoa historical process.In thisprocess,thecommunica-
tiveandreflective interestsengender successive forms ofsocialorganization by
shapingournormsand understandings; thesenormsand understandings, in
turn,driveand integrate the materialforcesengendered by theproductive
interest,whichmanifests itselfinthedomination ofnaturebytechnology and
thedomination ofpeoplebypower.Giventhisproductive, communicative, and
reflectiveconstitution of society,social eventshave to be understood by a
criticalanalysiswhichinterprets thediscourseof normsand understandings
thatmotivate peopleto act,whichexplainsthematerialrelations ofproduc-
tion,andwhichundertakes a dialectical studyofsocialcontradictions inorder
to emancipatepeople fora lifeof freedomand reason.In essence,critical
theory holdsthatsocialreality is constituted byintersubjective consciousness
basedon languageand thathumanbeingsare therefore freeto changetheir
worldbya collective actofwill.
Since 1980,a growing numberof scholarshave appliedcriticaltheory to
international politics.7
Thesethinkers understand theinternational realmas a
community structured bya historically contingent discourseofsharedunder-
standings, values,and normsabouttheprinciples of politicalauthority and
economicproduction. Theseintersubjective conceptsmotivate and guidethe
practicesof international actors,whichin turnreproduceor transform their
discourse overtime.In terms ofacademicdisciplines, critical
theory thusoffers
a historical
sociology ofinternational behavior.
According to mostcriticalaccounts, moderninternational politicshasbeen
constituted by the discursive principleof sovereignty, whichlegitimates the
divisionofhumanity intoterritorially exclusiveunitsofauthority andproduc-
tion,the modernnation-states. Takingexclusiveness to entailselfishness,
criticaltheoriststhus attribute international conflictand violenceto the
7. Representativearticlesbeyondthe ones alreadycitedincludethe following:RobertW. Cox,

"Social Forces,States,and WorldOrders:BeyondInternationalRelationsTheory,"Millennium10
(Summer1981), pp. 126-55; RobertW. Cox, "Gramsci,Hegemonyand InternationalRelations:
An Essay in Method,"Millennium12 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-75; AndrewLinklater,"Realism,
Marxism,and CriticalInternationalTheory,"ReviewofInternational Studies12 (October 1986),pp.
301-12; Richard K. Ashley,"The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a CriticalSocial
Theoryof InternationalPolitics,"Altematives12 (October 1987), pp. 403-34; AlexanderWendt,
"The Agent-Structure Problemin InternationalRelationsTheory,"IntemationalOrganization 41
(Summer1987), pp. 335-70; and Fred Halliday,"State and Societyin InternationalRelations:A
Second Agenda," Millennium16 (Summer 1987), pp. 215-29. For an importantextradisciplinary
source,see AnthonyGiddens,TheNation-Stateand Violence,vol. 2 ofA Contemporary Critiqueof
HistoricalMaterialism(Berkeley:University
ofCaliforniaPress,1987).
Feudal Europe 431
"discourseof sovereignty," whichtheylocate amongpolicymakers, capitalists,

and, indeed,realiststudentsof politics.ArguingwithRichardAshleythatthis
"discourseof realistpowerpoliticsand itsrituals... can be readilyassociated
withWesternrationalistdiscourse,"8criticaltheoristsultimately claimthatthe
mentalhabitof separatingoneselfas the subjectfromone's environment seen
as a set of objectsto be controlledlies at the rootof the separationof people
into sovereignstates that see each other as objects of domination.In short,
criticaltheoriststie internationalconflictin the modernera to the historical
emergence of the sovereignstate, capitalist relations of production,and
instrumental rationality.
From this vantage of historicalbecoming, critical theoristsreprimand
neorealistsfortakingthe state as an objectivelygivenunitratherthan as an
intersubjective historicalconstructionin need of explanation.They redefine
the neorealistconceptof poweras "empowerment"because theyunderstand
power as transientrecognitionby others ratherthan as a set of material
capabilities.Likewise,theyreconceptualizetheneorealiststructure ofanarchy
into "anarchic practices,"such as watchingwith suspicionthe growthof a
neighboring stateand engagingin balance-of-power politics,because theytake
this behavior to result fromwillfuldiscourse rather than fromstructural
necessity.By illuminating the volitionaloriginof these state practicesin the
modern discourse of sovereignty, criticaltheoristsseek to emancipate the
repressed"postmodern"discoursesof proletariat, women,and less developed
countries,therebyempoweringthe so-called antisystemforcesand counter-
hegemonies,whichtheyhope will overthrowthe Westernstatesin favorof a
"peace system"constituted bynormsoftrustand sharing.
By ascribinginterstateviolence to the distinctlymodern discourse of
instrumental reason and sovereignty, criticaltheoristsare led to argue that
matterswere different in the precedingperiod of the Middle Ages and that
internationalpoliticsunderwenta fundamentalchangein both discourseand
practice during the medieval to modern transition.Employinga critical
perspective,JohnRuggie thusarguedthatneorealism"providesno means by
whichto accountfor,or evento describe,themostimportant contextualchange
in internationalpoliticsin thismillennium:the shiftfromthe medievalto the
moderninternationalsystem,"which,as he also indicates,"unleashed both
interstatepoliticalrelationsand capitalistproductionrelations."9Accordingto
Ruggie'sbriefdescription,the medievalsystemwas a "heteronomousinstitu-
tional framework"as opposed to the modernsystembased on sovereignty.10
Thus, medieval actors viewed themselvesas the local embodimentsof a
8. Ashley,"The Geopoliticsof GeopoliticalSpace," p. 406.

9. JohnG. Ruggie,"Continuityand Transformation in the WorldPolity:Toward a Neorealist
Synthesis,"WorldPolitics35 (January1983),p. 273.
10. Heteronomy,a termformedfromthe Greek hetero(other) and nomos (law), means being
under someone else's law. By contrast,sovereigntydenotes a conditionof givingthe law unto
oneself.
432 International
Organization
universalcommunity,whichwas legitimated bya commondiscourseof law,

religion,and custom.This discoursewas centeredon the principleof
heteronomy, theidea thatauthorityoverpeopleand controloverresources
shouldbe shared,leadingto a criss-crossing
web of mutualobligations
and
As Ruggiedescribes
interdependencies. it,
Thefeudalstate,iftheconceptmakesanysenseat all,consisted ofchains
oflord-vassal Itsbasiswasthefief,
relationships. whichwasan amalgamof
conditionalpropertyandprivate authority.
Property wasconditional
inthat
itcarriedwithitexplicit
socialobligations....Moreover,theprevailing
conceptofusufructure meantthatmultiple titlestothesamelandedprop-
ertywerethenorm.As a result, themedievalsystem ofrulereflected
"a
patchwork ofoverlapping andincomplete rightsofgovernment,"which
were"inextricablysuperimposed andtangled,"andinwhich"differentju-
ridicalinstances
weregeographically interwovenandstratified,
andplural
allegiances,
asymmetrical andanomalousenclaves
suzerainties
abounded."'"
Sincesuchrights ofgovernment "are notsimplydescriptive
categories[but]
components of generative structures[that]shape,condition,and constrain
socialbehavior,"'12
Ruggie'sdescription ofthemedievaldiscourseofheteron-
omyclearlyimpliesthatmedieval practiceshadtobe farmoreharmonious than
the modernpracticesentailedby the "deleteriouseffects"of sovereignty.
Obligatedto respecteach other'srightsand dependenton each other's
medievalactorswereconstrained
resources, bytheirfeudal"regime"to show
restraint
andtocooperateforthecommon good.
Honoring Ruggie'scontribution,RobertCoxunderscored thecrucialroleof
medievalpoliticsin lendingempirical supportto thecriticaltheorists'
claim
thatinternational
politicsissubjecttofundamentalchange:
Thedetermination ofbreaking pointsbetweensuccessive structures-those
pointsatwhichtransformations takeplace-becomesa majorproblem of
method.
[critical] JohnRuggieraisedthisissueinpointing tothestructural
disjuncturebetweenthemedievalandmodern worldsystem, andtothein-
ofWaltz'sstructural
ability realismeventoconsider letaloneexplainthis
transformation.Thecase is extremely important,sinceitcontrasts
two
worldsconstituted byquitedistinct The entities
intersubjectivities. as well
as themodesofrelations amongthemareofdifferent orders.
Thiscase oftransformation canbe contrastedtothefrequent invocations
ofThucydides inneorealistliteratureinsupportofthecontention thata
balance-of-power systemis theuniversal Whattheseinvocations
condition.
do establish
is thattherehavebeenotherperiodsinhistory wherestruc-
11. Ruggie, "Continuityand Transformation in the World Polity,"p. 274. In this passage,
Ruggie is citingfromJ. R. Strayerand D. C. Munro, The Middle Ages, 4th ed. (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts,1959), p. 115; and PerryAnderson,Lineages of theAbsolutistState
(London: New LeftBooks, 1974),pp. 37-38.
12. Ruggie,"Continuityand Transformation in theWorldPolity,"p. 280.
Feudal Europe 433
turesanalogousto thebalance ofpowerof the modernstatessystemhave

appeared. Theydo notconsiderthattherehave likewisebeen otherwise-
ofwhichthe medievalorderof European
constitutedhistoricalstructures
Christendom was one.13
Since the debate betweenneorealismand criticaltheoryhingeson the issue

ofwhetherinternational politicsis markedbystructural or historical
continuity
change,itis indeedcrucialto examinewhethermedievalpoliticswas fundamen-
tallydifferentfromthepowerpoliticsofantiquityand modernity. If thepolitics
of the threemajorperiodsof Westernhistorywere foundto be essentiallythe
same, thiswould make it muchmore difficult forcriticaltheoriststo demon-
stratehistoricalchange and mucheasier forneorealiststo showthatanarchic
powerpoliticsconstitutestheuniversalcondition.
To advance the interparadigm debate,thisarticleinvestigatesthe historical
recordand comparesthediscourseand practicesofmodernpoliticswiththose
of medievalpolitics.It focuseson the feudal age, the centralmedievalperiod
fromA.D. 800 to 1300,because thefeudalsystemcontainedwhatis distinctively
medievalin its purestform.It reconstructs feudal discourseon the basis of
medievalpoliticalthought,gleaned primarily fromtheworksof Otto Brunner,
AronGurevich,and Walter Ullmann and theessays in TheCambridge Historyof
Medieval PoliticalThought,edited byJ. H. Burns."4It analyzesfeudal practices
withthe help of two kindsof sources: first,the general accountsofferedby
leading scholarsof medievalhistory,includingthose of Marc Bloch, Robert
Boutruche,John Mundy,Jean-PierrePoly and Eric Bournazel, and Susan
Reynolds;and, second,the in-depthstudiesundertakenbyGeorgesDuby and
focusingon the Maconnais in southeasternFrance, seminal works that
benefitedfroman exceptionalnumberofsurviving local documents.15
13. RobertW. Cox, "Postscript1985,"in Keohane,Neorealismand Its Critics, pp. 244-45.

14. See Otto Brunner,Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen derterritorialenVerfassungsgeschichte
OsterreichsimMittelalter(Land and rule: Fundamentalissues in the historyof Austria'sterritorial
constitution)(Darmstadt:Wissenschaftliche 1973); AronJ.Gurevich,Categories
Buchgesellschaft,
of Medieval Culture,trans.G. L. Campbell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985); Walter
Ullmann,PrinciplesofGovernment and Politicsin theMiddleAges(London: Methuen,1961); and J.
H. Burns,ed., The CambridgeHistoryof MedievalPoliticalThought,c. 350-c. 1450 (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press,1988).
15. Marc Bloch, Feudal Society,2 vols., trans.L. A. Manyon (Chicago: Universityof Chicago
Press,1960); RobertBoutruche,Seigneurie etfeodalite(Lordshipand feudalsociety),vol. 1, 2d ed.
(Paris: Aubier,1968); RobertBoutruche,Seigneurie vol. 2 (Paris: Aubier,1970); John
etfeodalite,
H. Mundy,Europein theHighMiddleAges,1150-1309(New York: Basic Books, 1973); Jean-Pierre
Poly and Eric Bournazel, La mutationfeodale, Xe-XIIe siecles (The feudal transformation,
10th-12thcenturies)(Paris: Presses Universitairesde France, 1980); and Susan Reynolds,King-
domsand Communities Europe,900-1300 (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984). See also the
in Western
followingseminal works of Georges Duby: La societe aux XIe et XIIe siecles dans la region
maconnaise(The societyof the 12thand 13thcenturiesin the Maconnais region) (Paris: Ecole
Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1971); and The ChivalrousSociety,trans.CynthiaPostan (Berkeley:
Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1980), pp. 15-80. Except fordirectquotations,the analysisof the
Maconnaiswillbe based on thesetwoworksofDuby withoutfurther citation.
The investigation of the historicalrecordsdemonstratesthatfromtheninth

to the end of the thirteenth century,mostpeople in the Latin West (today's
Britain,France, Germany,and Italy) believed in the idea of a universal
Christianempire,in thenormsof heteronomousinstitutions such as vassalage
and fief,in the affective
community ofvillageand town,and in the ruleof law.
In contrastto modern politics,which is legitimatedby the discourse of
sovereignty, feudal politics was thus legitimatedby what could be called
communaldiscourse.
Since thedistinctiveness offeudaldiscourseis readilyconfirmed, thegeneral
questionof whetherfeudalpoliticsand modernpoliticsare different leads to
themorespecificquestionofwhetherfeudalactorsbehavedin accordancewith
their particularcommunal norms. If the critical theorists'argumentthat
discourseshapes practiceor is interactivelyconfiguredwithpracticeis correct,
itwouldfollowthatbehaviorarisingfromcommunaldiscoursewouldvaryfrom
thatarisingfromtheopposingdiscourseofsovereignty. As criticaltheoristsand
neorealistsagree, the modernsystemconsistsof territorially exclusivestates
thatposses legal supremacy,regularlyraise and maintainarmed forces,fear
each other'sintentionsand watchwithsuspicionthe acquisitionof capabilities
by others,conquer weaker states and incorporatetheminto theirspheresof
influence,balance and formalliances againstperceivedpower,and arbitrarily
use and threatenforceto achieve theirself-interests. If feudal actors were
foundto abide by theircommunaland cooperativeprinciples,theirbehavior
would have differedmarkedlyfromthatof modernstates,and criticaltheory
would be impressivelycorroborated.If, however,feudal actors ultimately
disregardedtheircommunaldiscourseand engaged in power politicsin the
manner of modern states, the neorealist assertionof structuralcontinuity
wouldbe strengthened considerably.
In exploringthe questionof whetherfeudal actorsbehaved in accordance
withtheircommunalnorms,the studypresentedhere focuseson foursalient
topicsof feudal discourse-unity,functionalcooperation,heteronomousand
communalrelations,andjustconflictresolution-a selectionthatis reflectedin
the fourempiricalsectionsof the article.To allow forgreatersensitivity to
historicalnuances,the studymoreoverdistinguishes feudalpracticesby their
formaland essentialaspects.Thus,it is mindfulthatformsof behaviorsuch as
the swearingof solemn oaths may have been observed in accordance with
discoursewhile at the same timeservingulteriorand more essentialmotives
thatwere different.
The idea ofunityand politicalfragmentation
The discourse of the feudal age derived fromtwo principal sources, the
customsof Germanictribesand the legal traditionof the Roman Empire,
Feudal Europe 435
whichhad become Christianduringthe fourthcentury.16 Germaniccustoms

had stronglypopulist and communal elements, such as the assemblyof
freemen,whose membersmade and applied customarylaw and elected a king
as theircharismaticleader in timesof war. By contrast,the Christian-Roman
traditionwas theocratic,combiningthe conceptsof divinewill and imperial
rule intoa unifiedlegal framework. When Christianity spread duringthe fifth
to the eighthcenturiesamong the Germanic peoples, many of whom had
settledon formerly Roman soil, divinewill came to be seen as the source of
their communal norms, fusing Germanic populism and Christian-Roman
theocracyintothediscourseof feudalEurope.
The mostgeneralconceptoffeudaldiscoursewas theworldas a harmonious
whole under God, a "great chain of being," wherein people perceived
themselvesand all thingsas copies of the whole, essentiallycontiguousand
inseparable from each other and governed justly by a central principle
emanatingfromdivinewill.'7Accordingly, people perceivedno clear boundary
betweenthespiritualand materialorderofevents,betweenthemselvesand the
worldof objects,and betweenpast,present,and future.Withthe exceptionof
clerical scholars, people made no substantivedistinctionbetween divine
revelation,natural law, positivedecrees, and popular custom,fusingthese
moderncategoriesintoa single,all-embracing law thatexpressedtheorderof
thecosmos.Since thiscosmoswas believedto be createdbyan absolutelygood
supreme being, medieval minds also believed that the resultantlaw which
governedhuman affairsand thereforethe variousmanifestations of thislaw,
includingpopular custom,the actionsof legitimaterulers,and the findingsof
peer courts,wereimmanently just.
Given the normativeunityof the Christianworld,trulylegitimateauthority
rested,accordingto Geoffrey Barraclough,with"the Christianidea of empire
. .. [which]was a powerfulforce ... influentialin the mindsand actions of
many kings and emperors.""8The actual separation of Christendominto
16. On thefusionofthe Germanicand Roman-Christian traditions,see ReinhardBendix,Kings

or People: Powerand theMandate to Rule (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1978), pp.
23-26; Gurevich,Categoriesof MedievalCulture,p. 18; R. A. Markus,"The Latin Fathers," in
Burns,The CambridgeHistoryof MedievalPoliticalThought,p. 93; P. D. King, "The Barbarian
Kingdoms,"in Burns,ibid.,pp. 123-24; and Ullmann,Principlesof Govemment and Politicsin the
MiddleAges,pp. 22 and 145.
17. On thewholenessof medievalthought,see AntonyBlack, "The Individualand Society,"in
Burns,TheCambridge History ofMedievalPoliticalThought,
p. 592; JeanDunbabin,"Government,"
in Burns,ibid.,pp. 484-88; Brunner,Land undHerrschaft, pp. 48 and 133-36; Gurevich,Categories
ofMedievalCulture,pp. 44-45, 56-57, 84-86,98-113, 154, 165-67,175,273-74, and 288; Arthur0.
Lovejoy,The GreatChain ofBeing:A Studyof theHistoryof an Idea (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1936), pp. 67-98; and Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in WestemEurope,
p. 19.
18. GeoffreyBarraclough,TheMediaevalEmpire:Ideal and Reality(London: G. Philip,1950),p.
26. On theidea ofuniversalempireand absence ofsovereignty, see Brunner,Land undHerrschaft,
pp. 141-46,231-37,and 387-93; Gurevich,Categories ofMedievalCulture, pp. 167-70and 192; D. E.
Luscombe, "Introduction:The Formationof Political Thought in the West," in Burns, The
Cambridge HistoryofMedievalPoliticalThought, pp. 163-64;JanetNelson,"Kingshipand Empire,"
kingdomsand duchieswas consideredillegitimate bymostand epiphenomenal

even by the temporalrulerswho benefitedfromit. The rulersderivedtheir
legitimacynot onlyfromGod's grace bestowedby the sacramentof unction,
whichsubordinatedthemto theadjudicationofdivinelaw bythepope, butalso
frompopularcustom,whichwas consideredyetanothermanifestation ofGod's
law, a legal dualitythathas been expressedby Ullmannas the "descending"
and "ascending" themes of medieval government."9 Rather than sovereign
states,theirdominionswere consideredpopular communitiesthatcame into
beingat coronationwhen rulerand ruledsworeto one anotherto uphold the
law of the land and where continued legitimacydepended on consent
expressiveof the just order.This absence of sovereignty concurredwiththe
prohibition ofarbitrary war.Accordingto thejustwardoctrine,warscould only
be legitimately foughtto defendand expandChristendomagainsttheheathens
or to remedygraveinjustice.
Overall,feudaldiscourseenjoinedpeople to constitutea universalChristian
empireas theideal formofpoliticalauthority and subjectedall temporalrulers
to universallaw,depriving themand theirdominionsofanysovereignty. On the
level of practice,however,as discussedbelow, politicalauthoritywas highly
fragmented amonglocal strongmen who ruledoverautonomousunitsofpower
and constantly engagedin arbitrary
violence.
The real feudal systemarose from the breakup of the administrative
structure oftheFrankishempire.Its mostcharacteristic features,vassalageand
fief,go back to theyear732,whentheFrankishrulerCharlesMartellorganized
cavalryon a largescale bygivingland to hiswarriorson theconditionofservice
in mounted shock combat-a practice of remunerationsoon extended to
administrative Expanded greatlybyCharlemagne,who reignedfrom
officials.20
768 to 814, the Frankishkingdomunited practicallyall of ChristianEurope
under a common administrationthat relied on royal officialsas the local
authority, fiefsas formsof property,publicleviesforthe defenseof the realm,
peer courtsto administerjustice, taxes, tolls,and coinage to sustainpublic
works,and bishopricsand monasteriesto provideforspiritualand educational
needs.2' Recognizingthese achievementsas the renovationof the Roman
Empire, whose unityand peace were still yearned for,the pope crowned
Charlemagneon Christmasdayin 800 as thenew Roman emperor.Withall of
Christendomunderthejoint authority of emperorand pope, theidea of unity,
whichhad been homeless since the collapse of Rome at the end of the fifth
in Burns,ibid.,p. 227; Markus,"The Latin Fathers,"in Burns,ibid.,pp. 115-16; Marcel Pacaut,

politiquesde l'Occidentmedieval(The political structuresof the medieval West)
Les structures
(Paris: ArmandColin, 1969),pp. 165-75; and Ullmann,Principles of Govemment and Politicsin the
MiddleAges,pp. 19-26.
19. Ullmann,Principles ofGovemment and Politicsin theMiddleAges,pp. 20-21.
20. See Francois Louis Ganshof, Feudalism, trans. Philip Grierson (New York: Harper
Torchbooks,1964), p. 16; and LynnWhite,Jr.,MedievalTechnology and Social Change(Oxford:
OxfordUniversity Press,1962),pp. 27-31.
21. Francois Louis Ganshof,FrankishInstitutions UnderCharlemagne,trans.BryceLyon and
MaryLyon(Providence,R.I.: BrownUniversity Press,1968).
Feudal Europe 437
century,had found another concrete expressionin the realm of political

authority.
This meetingof discourseand practiceby virtueof Frankisharmswas of
shortduration,however.Once Charlemagne'stoweringpersonality was gone,
the Frankishempirebegan itssteadydeclineas a unitaryorganization.During
the ninthcentury,the grandsonsof Charlemagneseverallycarved up the
empireinto such kingdomsas Burgundy,France, Germany,and Italy.While
the universal Christian empire continued to be an aspiration of many,
especiallythe German kings,it never again achieved any degree of reality.
Besides the personalambitionsof the great,the Frankishadministration had
alwayscarriedthe seeds of its own fragmentation. While successfulas long as
new lands were conqueredbythe king,the practiceof remunerating staffwith
land ratherthan moneypromotedthe fragmentation of authorityin the long
run,since it endowedits recipientswitha self-renewing sourceof incomethat
enabled themto buildindependentpowerbases fromwhichto defythecentral
ruler-except in cases in whichtheyneeded himas an alliance leader against
externalthreatsthatcould notbe metlocally.22 The raidsof maraudingbands
of Vikings,Saracens, and Magyarsduringthe eighththroughtenthcenturies,
however,largelyposed such local threatsthatcould be best defendedagainst
by groupsof mountedwarriorsbased in initiallypublic fortresses,giventhe
impossibility of preclusiveborderdefensealong the perimeterof the Frankish
kingdoms.23 Built originallyagainstthreatsfromthe outside,these fortresses
could then also defy the numericallystillsuperiorforcesof the kingbecause
theirreductionusuallytook longerthan the fortydays that the vassals and
freemenwere obligatedto servein the royallevy.24 In short,the dominanceof
local defense,the absence of a money-basedeconomy,and theeventualend of
territorialexpansion all added up to a structuralconstraintfor political
fragmentation.
While the Frenchand Germankingdomsforthe mostpartfellfarshortof
effectiveunitygiventhesecentrifugal tendencies,thenormativeclaimsoftheir
kingsto overallauthority mayhave providedthemwitha modestmeasureof
influencebeyondthereachoftheirarms.25 For instance,whilemilitarilylimited
22. See NorbertElias, Powerand Civility, trans.EdmundJephcott(New York: PantheonBooks,

1982), pp. 16-18; HeinrichMitteis,The State in theMiddleAges: A ComparativeConstitutional
Historyof Feudal Europe, vol. 1, trans.H. F. Orton (Amsterdam:North-Holland& American
Elsevier, 1975), pp. 91-92; and Max Weber, Economyand Society:An Outlineof Interpretive
Sociology,vol. 1, ed. GuentherRoth and Claus Wittich(Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,
1968),p. 257.
23. See WilliamH. McNeill,TheShape ofEuropeanHistory (New York: OxfordUniversity Press,
1974),pp. 86-88; JosephR. Strayer,WestemEuropein theMiddleAges:AShortHistory(New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), pp. 59-60; and Joseph R. Strayer,"Feudalism in Western
Europe," in Fredric L. Cheyette,ed., Lordshipand Community in Medieval Europe: Selected
Readings(New York: Holt, Rinehart& Winston,1968),p. 18.
24. SidneyPainter,MedievalSociety(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press,1951),p. 26.
25. On the ideologicalsupportof kings,see Strayer,WestemEuropein theMiddleAges,pp. 64
and 119-26; Elias, Powerand Civility,p. 23; and Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in Westem
Europe,pp. 259-61 and 278-97.
438 International
Organization
totheirduchyaroundParis,theCapetiansremained generallyacceptedas the

nominalkingsof Franceand used this"empowerment" to legitimizetheir
militaryinterventionsoutsidetheIle de Franceand to maintain fora while
theirhold overoutlying courtsof justice,bishoprics, and monasteries. In
Germany, whilemostpowercameto restaroundtheyear900withthetribal
duchies,thegroupofdukeskeptup a semblance ofunity byregularlyelecting
oneoftheirmembers tobe theirking,whowouldbe responsible forleadingthe
royallevyagainstthe pagansof the East and the citiesof Italyand for
assembling incourtthepeersoftherealm.
Claiming thelegacyofRomeandcommanding recognitionbyall Christians,
thechurchhas been describedbyJohnMundyas the"onlyreallyuniversal
institutionin Europe," by Michael Mann as an "extensivenetworkof
ideologicalpower"thatcreateda minimal normative orderin theabsenceof
centralpoliticalauthority,and by JosephStrayeras a kindof "ecumenical
government" exercisedfromRome.26Reachinginto everybody's life,the
churchindeedprovideda unifiedspiritual framework thatalso servedmany
functions of civiladministration,includingthe registration of births,the
performance ofmarriageceremonies, andtheprovision ofschools.
On thelevelofpoliticalauthority, however, theeffective roleofthechurch
appearsmuchdiminished. As describedbelowin greaterdetail,thefamous
attempt bythepopesto wrestcontrolovertheclergy fromtemporalrulers,
knownas theInvestiture Contest(1075-1122),endedinfailure. Kings,counts,
andcastlelordsregularlyappointed bishopsandpriests according totheirown
interests,
andtheboundaries oftheparishesweregenerally adjustedto those
ofthecastellanies.?
Thebestcasefora political roleofthechurch restswiththeCrusades, which
wereinitiated byPope UrbanII in 1095.Undoubtedly, manyofthecrusaders
wereinspired bya genuinereligious motivenexttotheirmundaneconcernfor
a sharein the spoils.However,the idea of Christian unityfailedagainto
achievepoliticalreality.The crusadersnot onlycarvedup the newlywon
in theEast intopettyprincipalities
territories butalso continued to struggle
againsteach otherin Europe.And theyultimately failedto hold the East
preciselybecause theycould not squaretheirparticular interestswiththe
universalideathathadinspired them.
Withempire,kingdoms, and papacyunableto maintaineffective unity,
feudalEuropefragmented during theninth, tenth, andeleventh centuries
into
an ever-growingmosaicofsmaller politicalunits,suchas duchies, margravates,
counties,and castellanies,
as localmilitarycommanders usurpedcontrolover
26. See Mundy,Europein theHighMiddleAges,pp. 25-27; Michael Mann, TheSourcesofSocial

Power,vol. 1 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1986), pp. 379-90; and Strayer,Westem
Europein theMiddleAges,pp. 100-106.
27. See Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 348-50; Boutruche,Seigneurie
etfeodalite,vol. 1, p. 202; and
Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in WestemEurope,p. 128.
Feudal Europe 439
theiradministrative Given the dominanceof local defenseand the

districts.28
opportunitiesit offeredfor enterprisingstrongmen,everyknightsoughtto
fortifyhishouse,leadingto a proliferationofcastles,each mannedbya band of
knights, fromthe ninthcenturyonward.The castlelords,defyingtheirkingor
countwithimpunity while at the same time subjugatingthe countrysideand
discipliningtheirfollowers,became over timethe mostpowerfulactors,as is
evidentin thefactthattheysuffered muchless frommultiplevassalagethandid
the higher-ranking lords,who oftenhad to share the uncertainallegiance of
vassalswithone other.Accordingly, thecastellanyor seigniorybecame in many
places the basic unit of political authority,constitutingin effecta small,
autonomous unit based on the lord's capacity to command and judge its
inhabitants.
The castellanieswere separated at timesby clearlyunderstoodboundaries
but moreoftenbyfrontier zones, usuallycalled marches,wherethe controlof
the two powersinterpenetrated.29 Despite theireffortsto achieve contiguous
territorialcontrol,the lords oftenhad to accept exclaves withintheirown
territoryheldbyanotherruler.To gain access to themand to maintaincontrol,
they regularlymounted militaryexpeditionsacross often hostile territory.
Moreover,theirhold over theirown vassals was oftentenuous,since these
knightswho disposed of independentsurplusobservedtheirswornfealtyonly
to the extentthat it coincidedwiththeirinterest,essentiallyrecognizingno
powerabove them.30 Thus, anarchyand powerpoliticsoftenreachedthe level
of the individualwarrior,who acted like an autonomousunit.As a result,the
apparent interpenetration of territorydoes not indicate mutual sharingof
authoritybut, rather,a fluid conditionof power politics among atomistic
individuals.
While professingallegiance to the communityof all Christians,the many
actorsof the feudal age ruthlessly engaged in the power politicsof conquest
and alliance formation.As NorbertElias argued,"The relationshipbetween
one estate ownerand anotherin thatsocietywas analogous to thatbetween
statestoday... usuallya verylabile systemof powerbalances in whichrulers
were alwayspotentialallies and potentialenemies... each beingconstantly on
28. On feudal fragmentation and its causes, see Bloch, Feudal Society,pp. 238, 376-79, and
394-401; Boutruche, Seigneurieet feodalite,vol. 2, pp. 31-39; Guy Fourquin, Lordshipand
Feudalismin theMiddleAges,trans.Iris Sells and A. L. LyttonSells (New York: Pica Press,1976),
pp. 93-94; Mitteis,The Statein theMiddleAges,p. 92; Mundy,Europein theHighMiddleAges,pp.
politiquesde lOccidentmedieval,pp. 116-32; Painter,
56, 226-27, and 421; Pacaut, Les structures
MedievalSociety,pp. 19-20 and 26; Poly and Bournazel,La mutation feodale,pp. 81-87 and 129;
Strayer,WestemEuropein theMiddleAges,pp. 57-66; and R. Van Caenegem,"Government,Law
and Society,"in Burns,TheCambridge History ofMedievalPoliticalThought, pp. 175-85.
29. Fourquin,Lordshipand Feudalismin theMiddleAges,p. 93; and FrancoisLouis Ganshof,
Le moyenage (Historyof internationalrelations:The middle
Histoiredes relationsintemationales:
ages) (Paris: Hachette,1953),pp. 139-40.
30. See JanDhondt,"Medieval 'Solidarities':FlemishSocietyin Transition,1127-1128,"trans.
FredricL. Cheyette,in Cheyette,Lordshipand Community in MedievalEurope,pp. 274-75; and
Van Caenegem,"Government, Law and Society,"pp. 179-80.
guard againstexpansionby others,and constantlyseekingto enlargehis own

possessions.... For in a societywithsuch competitivepressures,he who does
notgain 'more' automatically becomes 'less.' ..31And as WalterSchlesingerput
it,feudallordsbattled"notonlythoseabove .. ., notonlythosebelow .. ., but
also on all sides,againstthosewhoweredoingthe same thing."32
During the twelfthand thirteenthcenturies,the prevailingtrend in this
warlike play of forces began to shifttoward consolidation as the more
successfullordsgraduallystrengthened theircontrolovermen and territory in
a naturalselectionprocessthatElias describedas a "monopolymechanism."33
Exemplifiedin the slow reconquestof France by the Capetian kings,34 this
mechanismof accumulationof moreand moreresourcesin the handsoffewer
and fewerprincestookplace bymeansofwar and led straight to theformation
of absolutistmonarchiesand nationalstates.While the deeper causes of this
trendtowarda renewedconcentration of authority need notconcernus here,it
neverthelessimpliesthat developmentsassociated with sovereignty and the
modernstate alreadytook a firstand somewhatprecociousformtowardthe
end of the feudal period. In fact,it was the success of centralizingmonarchs
whichbroughtabout theend offeudalfragmentation.
Turningnow to Duby's regionalstudyof the Maconnais,we findthatthe
fragmentation of political authorityand the concomitantpolitics of power
reached the level of extremelysmall territorialunitstowardthe end of the
tenthcentury.Situatedin southeasternFrance at the borderwithBurgundy,
the Maconnais had once been a Frankishcounty,called thepagus matisconen-
sis, administeredforthe kingbythe countsof Macon, who had led the county
levy,enforcedpublicpeace, collectedtaxes,and presidedoverthe courts.The
counts delegated their public authorityto the castellans in charge of the
the smallestunitsof government
districti, centeredon the publicfortressesof
Beaujeu, Berze, Brancion,La Bussiere,Tournus,and Uxelles,whichhad been
builtaccordingto an overallplan along the strategically importantriversand
Roman roads. When the influenceof the Frankishkings,whichhad been on
thewane since about 850,ceased completelyaround950, the countsof Macon
were at firstable to preservetheirauthority. From980 to about 1030,however,
thecastellansincreasingly ceased to obeythecounts'commandsand to appear
at theircourts,and theyusurpedmilitarycommandand highjustice in their
districts.Withoutenoughindependentmilitary forceto reducetheirfortresses,
the countshad to acquiesce to theirsecession,whichthustook place without
much violence. This disintegration of firstroyal and then comital authority
made the Maconnais into an anarchicsystemof autonomousterritorial units
that centeredon the major castles and are thereforecalled castellanies.As
pp. 43 and 98-99; see also p. 64.

31. Elias, Powerand Civility,
32. Walter Schlesinger,"Lord and Follower in GermanicInstitutionalHistory,"in Cheyette,
Lordshipand Community inMedievalEurope,p. 91.
pp. 99-131.
33. Elias, Powerand Civility,
34. See ElizabethM. Hallam, CapetianFrance,987-1328 (London: Longman,1980).
Feudal Europe 441
Duby notes, "In the Maconnais of the 11thcentury,thereparticularly is no

vassal pyramid,thereis no [unifying]feudalsystem.The count,the castellans,
and the ecclesiasticpowers are as much 'heads' (capita), independentfrom
each otherdespitetheirfeudalbonds,as theyeach are centersof a clienteleof
knights.... Afterthe decline of comital authority,the aristocracy... finds
itselffreedof anyreal constraint."35
The process of fragmentation slowed between 1100 and 1150, leading to a
fairlystablebalance of poweramongthe castellaniesof Bage, Beaujeu, Berze,
Chalon, Cluny,La Bussiere, Macon, Tournus, and Uxelles (see Figure 1).
Havinghad to retreatfromthe greaterpartof thepagus matisconensis around
theyear1000,thecountsof Macon held on to mostof thefertilestretchin the
valleyof the Saone and an outlyingarea in the southwest;theyremainedthe
leadingpowerin controlof the largestfortressin the area, buildingadditional
strongholdsat Dun, Chateauneuf,La Salle, Montbellet,and Vinzelles after
1050.Rivalingand at timessurpassingthe countsofMacon werethecastellans
of Beaujeu, who had expanded south into the Lyonnais.The castellans of
Uxelles expanded theirterritory by annexingBrancion around 1100 and by
subordinatingthe castellans of Sennecey and L'Eperviere, whose territory
straddledthe Saone River; duringthe twelfthcentury,theybuiltthe strong-
holds of Nanton and Boutavant("forwardtip") to secure theirnorthernand
southernapproaches.Stillequal in landholdingsto theirrivalsaroundtheyear
1000,thecastellansofBerze and thoseofLa Bussierewererelegatedto second
rankduringthe powerstruggleof the eleventhcentury, reducingeach of them
forceofabouttenvassalfamiliesand revenuesfromeightparishes.
to a military
Based on the fortressLourdon,itsburghermilitia,and revenuefroma dozen
parishes,the monasteryof Clunycontrolledthe hillsalong the upper Grosne
River, togetherwith several enclaves on the territory of the castellanyof
Uxelles; to secure their southern approach against the castellanyof La
Bussiere, the monks built two additional towers, Mazille and Clermain.
Similarlyrelianton fortressand militia,the monasteryof Tournuscontrolled
onlyitsimmediatesurroundings. ofthecountsofChalon
Finally,theterritories
and the castellansof Bage, initiallyoutside thepagus matisconensis,became
partof the Maconnais duringthe ninthcenturywhen the old boundarieslost
theirsignificance.The countsof Chalon directlyheld the fortressesMont-St-
Vincentand Charolles and controlledthe castles of Chaumontand Sigy.The
castellans of Bage controlledthe east bank of the Saone fromtheirlarge
holdingsin theneighboring regionofBresse.
The territorialcontrolexercisedbythecastellanswas based on personalties
between them and theirvassals who held outlyingmanors and who rallied
behind themin the case of war. Given the independentmanorialincome of
theirvassals,thesecastellaniesare moreaptlydescribedas spheresofinfluence
ratherthanas small-scalestates.Indeed, as Duby indicates,"Lords [had] little
hold over their men, these freeholderswho [had] other resources,other
35. Duby,La societeau XIe etXIIe sieclesdans la regionmdconnaise,pp. 164-65.

Organization
442 International
Scale
10 miles
'Eperviere
~ Snncey,&
Mont-St-VincentA elf A
A Nanton
Uxeles Brancion
a
/ &4 Tourflus@
+ c#/ ,Jour S/
Chaumont A A o
But"ant,l
\\, 5 \41 / Montbellet ,'
A urdon(
Charolles 0 Cluny 1 La lle
,---MazllleA Berz'eN
Clermain
/ / ~ LatuX
~~
Isi6re
~ A~ ~ X~~~~~Bag6
"
/
Macon A
c:,>_l
/4bc / / St-Cl6ment
/ V ~~~~~ VinzellesA \
Dun A j |
Chateauneuf / "
Beaujeu
/ ~~~~~~~~~Belleville
A Formerlypublicfortress Boundaryofcastellany
A Castle River
0 Town
FIGURE 1. ThecastellaniesoftheMaconnaisaroundtheyear1150
Source.GeorgesDuby,La societeauxXIe etXIIe sieclesdans la regionmacdnnaise(Paris: Ecole
Pratiquedes Hautes Etudes, 1971),pp. 518-19; modifiedand reproducedwithpermissionof
Editionsde l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.
Feudal Europe 443
patronsand thereforeotherrefuge."36 For instance,the Chaumontsand the

Senneceys,primarily vassals of the castellanof Brancion,at timeswentoffto
servethe countof Macon or the countof Chalon,whose vassals theywere as
well. In otherwords,fragmentation in the Maconnais ultimatelyreached the
levelofindividualknightsand theirretainers,who engagedinvariouspractices
of power,configuring castellaniesbyalliances and the formationof spheresof
influence.
To sum up this section of the article,the historicalrecord shows a clear
divergencebetween feudal discourse,which portrayedChristendomas a
harmonious unity without internal violence, and feudal practice, which
consistedof violent power politics among separate units. The idea of the
Christianempireremainedin the hearts and mindsof manypeople, but in
realitythese selfsame people foughtbitterlyfor the exclusive control of
ever-smaller tractsof territory.
Althoughkingdomsmayhave retaineda small
measure of existencefrompopular recognitionof the royaloffice,the seat of
effectivepoliticalauthorityshiftedto the levelof countyand castellany,where
individualknightsfoughtforthe possessionof the strongholdsand manpower
that controlledthe countryside.The politicsof the Crusades,while showing
thatreligiousideas can have some politicaleffect,remainedalliancescircum-
scribedbythe exigenciesofpower.
On balance, the evidencethussuggestsratherclearlythatcommunalnorms
failed to engendera correspondingpractice.Despite ideas of unity,political
authoritywas fragmentedamong feudal actors down to the level of the
individual,behavingin wayssimilarto the power practicesof modernstates.
While criticaltheoristsare thereforecorrectin pointingout thatthe normsof
feudal discoursewere distinctly communal,theyare largelymistakenin the
beliefthatthese normswere associatedwithcommunalbehavior.Conversely,
since feudal actorsbehaved ratherlike modernstates,the generalneorealist
claimthatinternational politicsis subjectto structural has gained a
continuity
firstmeasureofcredibility.
Functionalcooperationand theneed fordefense

Viewing the world as a harmoniouswhole under God, feudal discourse
imaginedsocietyas an organiccommunity in whichChristianscooperatedfor
the commongood byperforming theirassignedfunctions.37
This organicorder
36. Ibid.,p. 165.

37. On the organicChristiancommunity, see Black,"The Individualand Society,"pp. 592 and
596-97; Brunner,Land und Herrschaft, pp. 399-404; Dunbabin, "Government,"p. 480; Georges
Duby, The ThreeOrders:Feudal SocietyImagined,trans.ArthurGoldhammer(Chicago: University
ofChicagoPress,1980); Gurevich,Categories ofMedievalCulture,pp. 61 and 197-209;and Polyand
Bournazel,La mutation feodale,pp. 222-34. See also thefollowingessaysin Burns,The Cambridge
Historyof MedievalPoliticalThought:D. E. Luscombe and G. R. Evans, "The Twelfth-Century
Renaissance,"pp. 307-14; JeannineQuillet,"Community, Counsel,and Representation,"p. 543;
and I. S. Robinson,"Churchand Papacy,"pp. 261-66.
was imaginedbothas a bodypoliticwiththeruleras thehead and the ruledas

the limbsand as an expressionof the differentiated but harmoniousunion of
Father,Son, and Holy Spirit.The functionsof thissocietywere thoughtto be
distributedbyordo,a legal and moralcategoryof men whichdeterminedthe
rights,social roles,and inneridentitiesoftheirmembers.At firstdistinguishing
onlyclericsfromlaypersons,feudal discourseprincipallydividedsocietyinto
threeorders:the oratores,or clergy,who were to providethe community with
divinegrace; the bellatores,or knights,who were to protectit againstexternal
and internalfoes; and the laboratores,or peasants,who were to procureits
economicsustenance.Baptismwas thoughtto transform ordinaryself-seekers
intomembersofthecorpusChristi(body Christ),whichmystically
of expressed
the whole of Christianity and the Christiancommunity. to
According Christ's
commandthat "thou shalt love thyneighbouras theyselfe,"38all Christians
were obligedto striveforcaritas(altruisticlove) and legitimatepoliticalorder,
whichwouldextendGod's love on earth.
This normof functionalcooperationimpliedthateach orderwas obligedto
performits specializedfunction-allottedby thewhole community-andthat
legitimatesocial relationsshould be governedby mutualityand reciprocity.39
Toward the end of the twelfth century,thissimpleidea of ordersadvancedto
the more differentiated theoryof corporations,which allowed for greater
functional varietyand laid downinternalprinciplessuchas canonicalelections.
Witheverybody obligedto offermutualaid and affection, the unarmedorders
ofclergy,peasants,and townsmenshouldhavebeen safefrompossibleviolence
on thepartofthewarriorclass.Amongthewarriors, thefeudalcode ofchivalry
replaced the Germanicethos of arbitrary violencewiththe obligationto use
forcesolelyto protectthe unarmedpartsof society:at theirdubbing,knights
sworeto have contemptforfatigue,pain, and death in thepursuitof "praise,"
whichcouldbe acquiredbyfaithful serviceto theirlordand bytheprotectionof
unarmedand helplesspeople suchas clerics,peasants,widows,and orphans.
Accordingto thisprincipleof functionalcooperation,feudal ordersshould
havebeen freeto specializein particulartasksto theneglectofotherfunctions,
since these were providedby the otherestates of the realm. Thus, if feudal
discourseentaileda corresponding social practice,the churches,monasteries,
villages,and townsshould not have needed to providefortheirown defense,
since therewere the knightsto providepublicpeace. In reality,however,the
knightssubjugatedand pillagedratherthanprotectedtheothergroups,forcing
themto providetheirownsecuritybyself-help.
38. Mark 12:29-34.

39. On functionalcooperation,see Black,"The Individualand Society,"pp. 593 and 596; Bloch,
Feudal Society,pp. 312-19; and Gurevich,CategoriesofMedievalCulture,pp. 61, 132, 163-64, 176,
and 186. On corporationtheory,see J. P. Canning,"Law, Sovereignty and CorporationTheory,
1300-1450,"in Burns,TheCambridge HistoryofMedievalPoliticalThought,pp. 443-49.
Feudal Europe 445
On the level of practice,the fragmentationof Frankishrule allowed counts,

castellans,and knightsto subjectmany-thoughby no means all-bishoprics
and abbeysto theirrule,to seize part of theirland and revenues,to mistreat
clerics,and to investthemselveswith churchoffices.40 Often,the formsof
feudaldiscourseweremaintainedbyvestingtheknightly usurperwiththeoffice
ofadvocatusor the managementcontractof comenda.By the end of the tenth
century, the clericssoughtto hold thewarriorsto theirfunctionalresponsibili-
ties bymakingthemswearthe peace or truceof God, whereintheypromised
underpain of excommunication to respectchurchproperty,notto harmclergy
and parishioners,and not to fighton certaindays of the week, particularly
Sundays.As Bloch tellsus, these "spiritualpenaltieswere onlyintermittently
effective,"however.41Indeed, thefrequentviolationsoftheseoathsbecame the
object of a whole corpus of cynicaland moralizingliteraturethroughoutthe
Middle Ages. The numerousexceptionsin theoath formulations alone,suchas
allowingknightsto fighton certaindaysor to takegrainwhenon forays,already
show that the entireweightof excommunicationcould hardlymake them
renouncetheirviolenthabits.
Despoiled ratherthanprotectedbythewarriors,the ecclesiasticalestablish-
mentswere constrainedto providetheirown securitywhen royal authority
began to wane duringthe ninthcentury.42 As the high clergywas regularly
endowedwithfiefsand commandedthe servicesofmilitary vassals,it could at
timesdefenditselfsuccessfully. The bishops,who usuallyruledovertowns,had
rampartsbuiltand burghermilitiasestablished.The heads ofmonasteriesalso
builtfortifications and armedtheirmen,leadingto the formationof monastic
castellanies.At the heightof disorderduringthe eleventhcentury,even local
churchesand cemeterieswerefortified.
40. On thesubjugationand abuse oftheclergy,see MarshallW. Baldwin,TheMediaevalChurch

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1953), p. 28; Bloch, Feudal Society,pp. 405-7 and 414;
Boutruche,Seigneurie etfeodalite,
etfeodalite,vol. 1, pp. 135-36 and 202-5; Boutruche,Seigneurie
vol. 2, pp. 88-91; Duby, The ChivalrousSociety,pp. 125-28; Elias, Power and Civility, p. 181;
Fourquin,Lordshipand Feudalismin theMiddleAges, pp. 33-34 and 134-35; Hallam, Capetian
France,p. 18; Denis Hay, The MedievalCenturies(New York: Harper Torchbooks,1964), p. 84;
Jean-FrancoisLemarignier,"Politicaland MonasticStructuresin France at the End of theTenth
and theBeginningofthe EleventhCentury,"trans.FredricL. Cheyette,in Cheyette,Lordshipand
Community in MedievalEurope, pp. 111-12; Mann, The Sourcesof Social Power,vol. 1, p. 382;
Pacaut, Les structures politiquesde l'Occidentmedieval,pp. 148-49; and Poly and Bournazel,La
mutation feodale,pp. 97-98 and 234-50.
41. Bloch,Feudal Society,p. 415. See also Baldwin,TheMediaevalChurch,p. 33; Brunner,Land
undHerrschaft, p. 33; and Hay, TheMedievalCenturies, p. 91.
42. On clericalefforts at armeddefense,see Bloch,Feudal Society,p. 346; Brunner,Land und
Herrschaft,p. 268; Duby,The ThreeOrders,pp. 156 and 178-79;GabrielFournier,"Rural Churches
and Rural Communitiesin Early Medieval Auvergne,"trans.FredricL. Cheyette,in Cheyette,
Lordshipand Communityin Medieval Europe, pp. 326 and 331-32; Fourquin, Lordshipand
Feudalismin the MiddleAges, p. 88; Hay, The Medieval Centuries,pp. 48 and 66; Pacaut, Les
politiquesde l'Occidentmedieval,p. 150; and Henri Pirenne,MedievalCities:TheirOrigins
structures
and theRevivalofTrade,trans.FrankD. Halsey (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1952),
pp. 66-70.
Likewise,a significantproportionof the ruralpopulationmoved into new

walled settlements.43 The peasants who lived withinthe reach of a lord's
warriorsoftensuffered outrightsubjugation,endingup as serfsto be exploited
at will.Land robbedfrompeasantswas simplyincorporatedintothedomainof
thelord,who forcedthe formerownersto workit forhim,extracting rentsand
services.The weaker freeholderswere also despoiled throughabuse of the
justice system,which the lords had come to dominate. In particular,the
peasantswere subjectedto ordeals in whichtheycould "prove" theirproperty
rights,forinstance,by demonstrating thattheirarmscould remainunharmed
afterbeing submergedin boilingwater.As a resultof these practices,large
partsofWesternEurope werelargelywithoutfreepeasantsbytheearlytwelfth
century.
The medievaltownsarose fromthe tradingof long-distancemerchantswho
protected themselvesinitiallyby formingarmed travel companies (from
whence arose theirpracticeof organizinginto guilds).4 During the eleventh
and twelfthcenturies,these merchantsbegan to settlenextto the castle of a
lord who could offerthemprotectionand access to lines of communication,
erectingdefensivewalls aroundtheirsuburbium. Augmentedbyrunawayserfs
turnedcraftsmen, the merchantsoftenstood up in armsagainsttheirlordsin
order to obtain self-government. Once independent,the burghershad to
providefortheirown defensebymaintaining byraisinga militia
fortifications,
stiffened withmercenaries,and byformingallianceswithothertowns,such as
the German Hansa and Lombard League. Thus, withmilitaryservicein the
guilds being mandatoryand defense expendituresbeing high (for example,
representing82 percentof Cologne's budget in 1379), the use of forcewas
hardlyless importantto burghersthan it was to knights.Indeed, as Henri
Pirenneargued,"In theneed ofsecurity whichthemerchantsfelt,therelies ...
the explanationof the fundamentalcharacteristic of the townsof the Middle
Ages. Theywere strongholds."45
Accordingto Duby, mostspiritualestablishments in the Maconnais had to
ofa castellanwhencomitalauthority
surrenderall oftheirland to theauthority
declined around the year 1000. The onlyexceptionswere the monasteriesof
Cluny and Tournus,whichwere able to maintainindependentcontrolover
because oftheirfortresses
theircore territories and burghermilitias.Neverthe-
43. On the subjugationof the peasantry,see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 171 and 241-74; Duby,
The ThreeOrders,pp. 152-53;Otto Hintze,"The NatureofFeudalism,"trans.FredricL. Cheyette,
in Cheyette,Lordshipand Community in MedievalEurope,p. 27; Poly and Bournazel,La mutation
feodale,p. 92; Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in Westem Europe,p. 105; and Van Caenegem,
"Government,Law and Society,"p. 196.
44. On the belligerentoriginsof towns,see NorbertElias, The Historyof Manners,trans.
Edmund Jephcott(New York: PantheonBooks, 1982), p. 198; Hay, The MedievalCenturies, pp.
110-11; Mundy,Europe in theHighMiddleAges,p. 154; Painter,MedievalSociety,pp. 72-74 and
78-79; Pirenne,MedievalCities,pp. 118-21, 134-35, 148-51, and 170-83; and Fritz Rorig, The
MedievalTown(Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,1967),pp. 19-20,41, 155, 159,and 164.
45. Pirenne,MedievalCities,p. 150.
Feudal Europe 447
less,theystilllosttheiroutlyingfringesand enclavesto neighboring castellans,

whooftendisguisedtheirusurpationas custodialagreements.For instance,the
burghersof Cluny, strengthenedby mercenaries,waged war against La
Bussiere in 1145, 1173, 1180, and 1207, against Chalon in 1166, against
Brancionand Nantonfrom1203to 1215,and againstBerze in 1205.The clerics
of the Maconnais also soughtto employfaithfortheirdefense.In 1095,Pope
Urban II issued a papal bull, threateningexcommunication to anybodywho
murdered,mutilated,or used forcein the innermostterritory of Clunyand
aroundthe bishopricof St-Vincent-de-Macon. And in 1120,Pope CalixtusII
issued a similarbull concerningthemonastery ofTournus.Moreover,thelocal
clericsrepeatedlytriedto make the knightsswearby the peace of God not to
attackcertainplaces and personsand to keep truceduringcertainperiods,all
based on theconstraintof excommunication. Althoughoftenignored,thetexts
nevertheless,accordingto Duby, "suggestthat some limitationon violence
operated at the end of the eleventhcentury"thanksto these oaths,which,
however,led mainlyto indemnifying bequestsbyknightson thedeathbed.46
In conclusion,the historicalrecord suggeststhat the norms of feudal
discourse-prescribingthe membersof societyto performtheirspecialized
functionsforthe good of the community-weregravelybreached in practice.
The Christian warriors,although somewhat constrained by the fear of
excommunication, used forceagainstpeasants,clergy,and burghersto satisfy
theirself-seekingdesires. Disguisingsubjugationand robberyas protection
agreements,theymerelyprofessedto accord formsof behaviorwith their
norms while violatingtheir essential meaning. The burghersand clergy,
constrainedto providesecurityby self-help,builtwalls aroundthe townsand
monasteriesand raised troopsin orderto maintaintheirindependenceon the
basis of militarypower. In accordance with neorealistpropositions,feudal
actorsdownto the level of the individualthusstroveforfunctionallikenessin
the mannerof modernstateswiththe aim of remainingindependentin the
absence of centralauthority, failingto specialize theirfunctionsin order to
cooperateforthe commongood. While criticaltheoryis correctin pointingto
the cooperativecharacterof feudal discourseas opposed to the individualist
beliefsof modernity, its concomitantclaimsthatthe actual behaviorof feudal
actorsoughtto have correspondedto theirprofessedideas and thathistoryis
thereforemarkedbyfundamentalchangehavebeen weakened.
Heteronomy, and powerpolitics

community,
In discussingfeudaldiscourseon legitimaterelationsbetweenindividuals,it is
usefulto distinguishtwo types:(1) relationsof heteronomoussubordination,
46. Duby, The ChivalrousSociety,p. 49. See also Duby,La societeaux XIe etXIIe sieclesdans la
regionmdconnaise,p. 168.
conceptualizedhere as unionsbetweenindividualsof unequal rankunderthe

law,manifestin the legal institutionsofvassalage,dependency,servitude,and
fief,whichwere purportedto be based on encompassingfeelingsof affection
and loyalty;and (2) relationsofcommunalequality.
Vassalage organized heteronomoussubordinationamong warriors.Often
and mistakenlyinterpretedas an exchangecontract,vassalage was reallya
lifelongcommunity underthe law, a unionto whichlord and vassal submitted
jointlybythe oath of fealtyand fromwhichonlybreachbyone side-the most
heinous felony-could release the other from its obligation.47 Above all,
vassalage obligedbothlord and vassal notto harmeach otherbut to help each
otheraffectionately. More concretely,a lord had to providehis vassals with
materialmaintenanceand protectionboth on the fieldof arms and in court,
whilethevassals had to obeythe lordin all things,renderhimmilitary service,
fillhis administrative posts, and togethercomprisethe membershipof the
lord'scourt.Followingthemaximquod omnestangitab omnibusapprobaridebet
(what touches all mustbe approvedby all), the courtof vassals considered
actions in light of customarylaw and by approvingthem legitimizedthe
authority and activitiesofthelord.
Dependency and servitudewere formsof heteronomoussubordination
betweena warriorand an unarmedcommoner.48 In analogyto the obligation
incurredby vassalage, the commonerowed encompassingfidelityand obedi-
ence as well as economicand militaryservice,dues, and help to the noble,in
exchangeforpatronage,protection,representation in feud and court,the use
of the land, and general help. The differencebetween dependency and
servitudelaywithnuancesin thedegreeoffreedomretainedbythecommoner,
rangingfroma status approachingthat of a vassal down to the unhappy
conditionof a bondman.
The fiefwas typicallygrantedbythenoble to hisvassal or dependentforthe
latter'smaterialmaintenance.49 In the grant,one person ceded to anothera
numberof politicaland economicrightsto an asset,consistingmainlyof land
and its inhabitantsbut also involvingofficessuch as castellanor advocate and
revenuessuch as mintingand marketdues. The ceded rightsusuallyinvolved
bannum,implyingpolice authority, the rightto commandthe public levy,a
share in tolls and taxes,and presidiumover the lowercourtsof freemenand
47. On thelegal featuresofvassalage,see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 145-47 and 218-30; JohnS.

Critchley,Feudalism(London: Allen & Unwin,1978), pp. 30-31; Ganshof,Feudalism,pp. 83-96;
Gurevich,Categories ofMedievalCulture,pp. 169-70and 186; Luscombe,"Introduction," p. 160; K.
Pennington, "Law, LegislativeAuthority and Theoriesof Government, 1150-1300,"in Burns,The
CambridgeHistoryof MedievalPoliticalThought,pp. 440 and 449; Quillet,"Community, Counsel,
and Representation,"pp. 545-54; Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in WestemEurope,p. 339;
and Van Caenegem,"Government, Law and Society,"p. 210.
48. On the legal aspects of dependencyand servitude,see Brunner,Land und Herrschaft, pp.
258-72; and Gurevich,Categories ofMedievalCulture,pp. 186-87.
49. On the legal characteristicsof the fief,see Brunner,Land und Herrschaft, pp. 252-53;
Critchley,Feudalism,pp. 17-18; and Ganshof,Feudalism,pp. 113-17 and 132-67.
FeudalEurope 449
judgment overserfs,and dominium, involvingtheenjoyment of revenue, the

righttotakeindependent legalactionwithregardtotheasset,tosub-enfeoff it
toa thirdparty, andtoleaveittoone'sheirs.The grantor usuallykepttheright
ofadministering highjusticeincasesofbloodcrimesandreserved theright to
takebackthefiefifthefief-holder diedwithout heirs;moreover, thefief-holder
couldnotdiminish theasset,sellit,orpledgemorethanhalfofitfordebt.
At the levelof discourse, thelegal institutions of vassalage,dependency,
servitude, andfieforganized feudalsociety intoa highly heteronomous network
ofmutualobligations andsharedrights. The sharedobligations andconstraints
alreadyinherent insimplelord-vassal tiesweregreatly multiplied bytheright
of vassalsto createtheirown rear-vassals, by the legitimacy of multiple
vassalagewherein onemanhadseverallords,andbytheconfusing possibility
of
circular vassalagein whicha vassalbecamethelordof hislord'slord.50 The
additionof thefieffinally made thisalreadyjumbledstructure of personal
subordination intoa mostirregular network of rights, sinceeveryfreeman
couldreceivea fieffromeveryotherone, including hisownvassal.Overall,
feudaldiscoursethuspostulatedheteronomous normsamongwarriors and
betweenwarriors andcommoners whichconstrained thembysharedrights of
authority andproperty toactinmutualaffection andsupport.
In practice, however, vassalageandfiefagreements essentiallyfunctioned as
normative figleaves,barelyconcealing butnonetheless legitimating relation-
ships more realistically describedas alliances,nonaggression pacts,and
spheresofinfluence. As R. Van Caenegemphrasedit,"Feudalrelationships
were... a meretechnique forconcluding formal alliancesandfinding patron-
ageorknights intheever-changing anduncontrolled powergame."'"Thanksto
numerous regional andlocalstudies, accordingtoElizabethHallam,"itisnow
clearthatalthough inNorthern Francevassalageandfiefappearedquiteoften
theywerenotoftenthebasisonwhichsocietiesfunctioned. In manyareasthe
tieofvassalagewasusedas littlemorethana treaty brokenatwill."52 Indeed,as
Jean-Francois Lemarignier noted,"territoriallordspassedfromtheallegiance
ofone to thatofanother, following thestronger side,seekingan allyor as the
resultofa warortreaty ofpeace."53 The power-political essenceoflord-vassal
tiesis especiallyindicatedbythepracticeofmultiple vassalage,whichreduced
thehierarchical bondbetweenlordand vassalto a temporary tie becauseit
expressed thevassal'sautonomy to choosesidesiftwoofhislordscameinto
conflict.Unlessdevoidofanyreality, vassalagehadtoleadtoa power-
multiple
50. See Bloch, Feudal Society,pp. 211-12; Ganshof,Feudalism,pp. 49-50 and 102-3; and
Luscombe,"Introduction,"pp. 160-62.
51. Van Caenegem,"Government,Law and Society,"p. 201. See also Bloch,Feudal Society,p.
235; Boutruche,Seigneurieetfodali, vol. 1, p. 222; and Polyand Bournazel,La mutation
feodale,
pp. 137-42.
52. Hallam, CapetianFrance,p. 27.
53. Lemarignier,"Politicaland MonasticStructuresin France at the End of theTenthand the
Beginningof the EleventhCentury,"p. 110.
politicalalignmentof sorts,since as Guy Fourquin says,"to be the vassal of

severallordswas reallyto be thevassal ofnone."54
The fact that manyvassalage agreementswere essentiallynonaggression
pacts is clear fromtheir legal formulations.55 In 1020, Bishop Fulbert of
Chartresset thenormativestandardforvassalage as follows:
He who swearsfidelity to hislord shouldalwayskeep thesesixtermsin
mind:safe and sound,secure,honest,useful,easy,possible.Safe and
sound,thatis, notto cause hislord anyharmas to his body.Secure,thatis,
notto endangerhimbybetraying his secretsor thefortresses
whichmake it
possibleforhimto be secure.Honest,thatis, notto do anything thatwould
detractfromhislord'srightsofjusticeor the otherprerogatives whichhave
to do withhis honour[office].Useful,notto cause himanyloss as regards
his possessions.Easy and possible,notto make it difficult
forhislordto do
somethingthatwouldbe ofvalue to him.... The lord,in turn,shouldbe
faithfulto hisvassal in thesematters.56
A combinationofvassalage and fieffunctionedas an alliance,particularly in
cases involvingthe formsof frontierand peace homage and moneyfief.In
frontierhomage, a vassal recognizeda lord nominally-thuspreservingthe
form-but maintainedhis equal standingas an alliance partnerby doing
homage at their common frontierrather than in the lord's residence.57
peace homagewas conductedamongnoblesofequal rankas a purely
Similarly,
formalact,withouteven nominalsubordinationor involvement of a fief.The
moneyfiefwas a mostusefulinstrument of alliancepoliticsbecause it involved
a merelyeconomicratherthan territorial transfer.Finally,vassalage and fief
servedto legitimizethe subjugationof one warriorby another,wherebythe
strongercreated a sphereof influenceconsistingof vassals around his castle.
While this functionis clearly inherentin these institutionsonce they are
disrobedof theiraffectivedisguise,theirpurpose of legitimizing usurpation
appears most clearlyin the fiefde reprise,by which a warriorwho had just
robbed a plot of land grantedit back to its previousowneras a fiefafterthe
owneragreedto become thewarrior'svassal.
Dependency and especially servitudelegitimizedthe subjugationof the
freeholdersbythewarriorsafterthecentralauthority oftheFrankishkingshad
begunto disintegratein the ninthcentury.The knightssubornedthe peasants
eitherby directcoercionor by offering themextortionary protectionagainst
54. Fourquin,Lordshipand Feudalismin theMiddleAges,p. 128. See also Bloch,Feudal Society,

p. 214.
55. See Boutruche,Seigneurie vol. 2, p. 172; Fourquin,Lordshipand Feudalismin the
etfeodalite,
MiddleAges,p. 121; and Polyand Bournazel,La mutation feodale,p. 145.
56. FulbertofChartres,TheLettersand PoemsofFulbertofChartres, trans.F. Behrends(Oxford:
OxfordUniversity Press,1976),pp. 90-91.
57. On the alignmentcharacterofvassalage,see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 171-73; Boutruche,
Seigneurie etfeodalite,vol. 2, pp. 160-61; Fourquin,Lordshipand Feudalismin theMiddleAges,pp.
118-20 and 135-37; Ganshof,Feudalism,pp. 121-24; Painter,MedievalSociety,p. 16; and Polyand
Bournazel,La mutation feodale,p. 145.
Feudal Europe 451
even more oppressivewarriors."8 Fearing such subjection,freeholdersoften

submittedthemselvesto churchesand monasteriesin the hope of obtaininga
morebenevolentstatusas the dependentor serfof an ecclesiasticallord,who
often turned out to be no less exacting. In the year 1016, Thietmar of
Merseburg,a German prelate criticizingthe state of affairsin Burgundy,
suggestedthatinsecurity in the absence of centralauthoritywas the real cause
ofthemanyactsofsubmission, whichweresealed byplacingone's joined hands
between those of the lord: "The king has nothingsave his title and his
crown.... He is not capable of defendingeitherhis bishopsor the restof his
subjectsagainstthe dangersthat threatenthem.Thereforewe see them all
betakingthemselveswithjoined hands to serve the great. In this way they
secure peace."59And writingin the thirteenth centuryabout servitude,which
had become ubiquitousby thistime,the legal theoristBeaumanoirexplained
itshistoricaloriginsin termsofrelativepower-namely,in termsofthepoverty
and incapacityor unwillingness of men to bear arms,whichforcedthem to
submitto thestrong.60
Overall,therelationsamongwarriorsand therelationsbetweenwarriorsand
commonerswere quite clearlydrivenby the self-interested use of power,
despitethe discourseof heteronomoussubordinationmanifestin thenormsof
vassalage,fief,dependency,and servitude.Let us now turnto the discourseof
communalequalityamongpeasants and burghersin orderto compareit with
theactualpracticesofthesegroups.
Feudal discourse postulated affectiveand voluntarycooperation among
peasantsand burghersforthegood oftheircommunity of equals in villageand
town.61With medieval Latin not even havinga word for the self-sufficient
individual,people thoughtof themselvesas partial manifestationsof the
community, identified theirowngood withthecommongood, and perceivedas
truthwhat the collectivebelieved. In the countryside, feudal values obliged
people to participatein the overlappingcommunitiesof the parishwithits
spiritualfocus and the villagewithits more secular concernsof sharingand
distributingthe means of production.In the town,the principleof community
manifesteditselfin fraternities and guilds,whichoriginatedas social clubsand
latertookon religious,charitable,and professionalpurposes.These values led
58. On the enserfmentof the peasantry,see Bloch, Feudal Society,pp. 255-74; Boutruche,
Seigneurieetfeodalite,vol. 2, pp. 53-82; Hintze, "The Nature of Feudalism,"pp. 27-28; Mundy,
Europein theHighMiddleAges,p. 224; Polyand Bournazel,La mutation feodale,pp. 193-219; and
59. Thietmarof Merseburg,citedbyBloch inFeudal Society,p. 160.
60. Philip of Remi, lord of Beaumanoir,cited by Mundyin Europe in theHigh MiddleAges,
p. 224.
61. On communitarian beliefsand theirpracticalmanifestations,see Black,"The Individualand
Society,"pp. 588-97; Gurevich,Categories ofMedievalCulture,pp. 81-82, 163-64,178-79,185-90,
and 273; AronJ.Gurevich,MedievalPopularCulture:ProblemsofBeliefand Perception, trans.Janos
M. Bak and Paul A. Hollingsworth(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988), pp. 55-56;
Quillet, "Community,Counsel, and Representation,"pp. 520-26; and Reynolds,Kingdomsand
Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 1-11,67-78, 90-100, 148-54,and 168-214.
to some extentto corresponding practices.Rural parishionerscollectively

built
and repairedthe church,gatheredthe tithe,and sometimeselected theirown
clergy.As villagers,the same people cooperatedin clearingthe land,working
the fields,and maintainingthe nonarable land as a common propertyfor
grazinganimals,hunting,and gatheringwood. Havingformeda communeby
oath, townsmenlikewise acted collectivelyon all mattersof government
throughopen assemblies,guilds,and towncouncils.Thus, thereundoubtedly
was genuinecooperationforthe commongood amongpeasants and burghers.
Much of the collectiveactionin villageand town,however,was governedby
powerand threatratherthancommunalnorms.62 To beginwith,peasants and
townspeopleoftencooperatedbecause theyfearedthe powerof a lord more
than theyfearedpotentialrebellionsand conspiracieswithinthe community.
Thus, even Susan Reynolds,one of the foremostproponentsof medieval
communalpractices,can onlyclaimthatpeasant communities"althoughquite
oftenin conflictwiththeirlords,did not owe theirsolidaritymerelyto that
conflict"and has to admitthat"whattownspeoplewantedwhen theyformed
communes ... was ... better protectionfor themselves,individuallyand
collectively,against oppression."63When peasants and burghersfailed to
challengea lord,theyoftenacted collectively because theysubmittedto hiswill
or because, at a minimum,he solved their collective action problem by
providing leadershipmixedwiththreat.As Reynoldsputsit,"The development
of lordshipand government unitedlocal communitiesnot onlybyoppressing
them into unitybut by providingthe framework withinwhich theyfulfilled
normalpublicduties."64
Thus,thecollectivization oftheruraleconomyduringtheeleventhcentury-
whichwas evidentin populationshiftsfromhamletto village,in the spread of
collectivefieldrotation,and in collectiveland clearing-correlatesbyand large
withthe enserfment of the peasantry.The peasant assembliesthatregulated
villageaffairswere in factcourtspresidedoverby the lord,who had the first
voice followedbythemostsubstantialand seniorofthevillagers.As fortowns,
lordsnot onlymade possiblethe initialdevelopmentof townsbyprovidingthe
securityof theircastle,as we saw above, but theyalso foundedtownsactively
duringthe twelfth centuryand supervisedtheirtrades.Finally,withrespectto
the commonersthemselves,theirbehaviorwould oftenbe governedby the
distribution of capabilitiesamong them:peasants and burgherswould reach
collectivedecisions,as Reynoldssays,"by the usual amorphousconsensusin
whichwe mayguess thatthe richerand moreseniorof themtookthe leading
62. On the poweraspectsof community and cooperation,see GeorgesDuby,L'economierurale

et la vie dans les campagnes(The ruraleconomyand the lifein the countryside)(Paris: Aubier,
1962), pp. 97-107, 118, and 122; Pirenne,MedievalCities,pp. 171-72; Reynolds,Kingdomsand
Communities in Westem Europe,pp. 109-13,125-30,139-40,144,146,148,167,173-76,and 192-93;
and Rorig,TheMedievalTown,pp. 18-28, 122-23,149,and 154.
63. Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 140 and 182.
64. Ibid.,p. 140.
Feudal Europe 453
part,"so that"the moresubstantialamongthelandowners[were]likelyto have

dominatedlocal groups."65 Especiallythetownswereregularly led bythericher
merchantswho dominatedthe towncounciland ruledoverthe craftsmen and
daylaborerswithmuchoppressionand conflict.
In the Maconnais, protectiverelationships,alignments,and spheres of
influenceproliferatedafterthe centralauthorityof the count had vanished
around the year 1000. Before, people had lived independently,findingit
unnecessaryto seek the protectionof a lord, and vassalage had remained
limitedto public militaryservice.With the onset of the eleventhcentury,
however,accordingto Duby,ifa personwas "no longercapable offighting," he
fell "immediatelyunder the dominationof a powerfulman."66The lower
peasant stratumwas rapidlycoercedintosubmissionbycastellansor manorial
knights.The better-off freeholdersoftenplaced themselvesand theirproperty
under the protectionof the nearestcastellanor monasteryin orderto avoid
conflictwiththewarriors.The manorialknightsin theimmediatesurroundings
of a fortress
or a monastery became itsvassals.The knightswhosemanorlayin
the frontierareas of castellanies often retained independence, balancing
againstthe more powerfulcastellanby allyingwiththe lesser one. In Duby's
words,"Free to carryhis fealtyto whom he liked,the small noble obviously
chose the patronwho would have less leverageoverhim."67 As all knightshad
withoutdoubt more than one lord by the end of the eleventhcentury,their
multiplevassalage allowed them to choose their alignmentaccording to
momentary interest.Amongthe castellans,vassalage was thusnothingmore
than a treatyof nonaggression, friendship,or alliance. "At thatlevel," Duby
argues,"vassalage and the fief[were]onlymeansto improveand to softenthe
oftentense relationsbetweencompetingand thoroughly foreignpowers....
Vassalage [was] a treatyofpeace."68
Let us look at the knownalignmentsof two castellaniesof the Maconnais,
thatofthecountsofMacon and thatofthemonastery ofCluny.Overtheyears,
thevariouscountsof Macon maintainedas military vassalsthechevaliersofthe
manorsof Bois-Ste-Marie,Bresse-sur-Grosne, Cenves,Creches,Matour,and
Montmelard.To securetheirfriendship, theygave the propertyof Reneins to
the castellanof Montmerlein 1040,the abbeyof St-Laurent-les-Macon to the
castellanofUxelles in 1074,theAjoux mountainto the castellan of La Bussiere
in 1171, and certain tenures,among them the domain of Cenves, to the
castellansof Beaujeu in 1172. The castellanof Uxelles, nominallya vassal of
thecountof Macon at thetime,receivedfiefsfromthecountofChalon in 1115
and 1147. The head of the cathedralof St-Vincent-de-Macon, part of the
castellanyof the of
count Macon, repeatedlygave fiefsto the castellans ofBage
and enfeoffedthe castellan of Uxelles withthe propertyof St-Gengoux-de-
65. Ibid.,pp.lOO0andl113.
66. dans la regionmaconnaise,p. 199.
Duby,La societeauxXle etXIIe sh?cles
67. Ibid.,p. 163.
68. Ibid.,p. 160,fn.51.
Scisse. When a powerfulvassal refusedto behave like a friendly power,little

could be done: at the beginningof the eleventhcenturythe castellanof Bage
refused to swear the fealtyhe owed to his nominal lord, the bishop of
St-Vincent-de-Macon, who thenhad to buyitfora considerablesumofmoney.
The castellanof Bage, in turn,had grantedfiefsto the castellanof Berze in
1030 and 1080,the latterbeingin turnallied to the monasteryof Cluny.The
monasteryof Clunycountedamongitsmilitary vassals the chevaliersof Biere,
Mailly,Merze, Meulin, Sologny,and St-Nizier.The chevaliersof Biere and
St-Nizierwere also thevassals ofthe castellanofBerze. Finally,themonastery
of Clunygave land around St-Pointto the castellan of La Bussiere for his
friendship in 1030,and itsclergyconcludeda "securitypact" withthecastellan
ofBerze in 1050,howeverwithoutgrantinga fief.
To sumup thissection,thehistoricalrecordindicatesthatfeudalactorspaid
heed to theirdiscourseof heteronomousobligationsand communalvalues in
termsof the forms of theirbehavior but that the essence of most of their
practicesconsistedin self-interested powermovesreadilyunderstoodin such
neorealisttermsas conquest,subjugation,nonaggressionpacts,alliances,and
spheresof influence.Outwardlyobservingthe language of vassalage, depen-
dency,and fief,feudalactorspracticedconquestand subjugationin thewarsof
thelords,the enserfment of thepeasantry,and the usurpationofthepeasants'
land. Feudal warriorsof all ranksengagedin nonaggression pacts and alliances
and formedspheres of influencearound castles by loosely controllingless
powerfulknights.While a certain amount of voluntarycooperation for a
genuinecommongood undoubtedlytook place in village and town,muchof
this communalpracticecan be alternatively describedin termsof alliances
againstthe externalthreatposed by a lord, acts of subordinationto a lord's
orderinghand, or functionsof the internaldominanceof the powerfulfew
amongvillagersand burghers.Overall,the twinargumentsimpliedbycritical
theory-thatthe heteronomousand communalcharacterof feudal discourse
entailed correspondingpractices and that the feudal systemwas therefore
essentiallydifferent frommoderninstitutions-havebeen weakened on yet
anothercount.Furthermore, it shouldbe notedthatthepowerpracticesofthe
feudal age oftentook place at the level of individualactors,be theyknights,
retainers,villagers,or townsmen, sincecentralauthority was completelyabsent
in manyplaces.
Immanentjustice and theadvantageofthestronger
Since feudalsocietywas thoughtto be governedbycosmiclaw,feudaldiscourse

prescribedthat conflictshould be resolvedon the basis of a corresponding
notion of immanentjustice. In accordance withthe populist and theocratic
strandsof feudal norms,two formsof legitimateconflictresolutioncan be
distinguished:customaryjustice and papal justice. Let us turn firstto the
of customaryjustice-namely, blood vengeance,feud, and peer
institutions
Feudal Europe 455
courts-in orderto comparetheirnormativeclaimswiththeactualpracticesof

feudalconflictresolution.
On thelevelof discourse,blood vengeanceand feudwereretributive actions
of self-helpby individualsand groupswhose sense of customaryjustice had
been infringed.69 bloodvengeanceand feudhad to be directed
To be legitimate,
againsta priorviolationof customarylaw thatwas assessed and enforcedby
those who felt the injury.These retaliatoryactions were considered just
because the harmonyof cosmiclaw (deriveddirectlyfromthe PlatonicIdea of
the Good) was thoughtto manifestitselfin the customsof thepeople and thus
could be graspedbythesouls ofvirtuousmen.Giventhisholisticconceptionof
justice, a criminalact put the entire communityinto a state of hostility,
breakingthe "peace of the land" and turningthe perpetratorinto an outlaw
whose punishmentwas everybody'smoral rightand duty.Any free person
could administerimmanentjusticeon his own byexactingblood vengeancein
cases involvinghomicide,bodilyinjury,and "deathly"insult.In contrast,feuds
could onlybe pursuedbyknightsbut could be undertakenin responseto any
kindof injury.Since the rulerwas equallysubjectto the law, freemenhad the
rightto feud againsthimwhen theybelieved thathe had violatedcustomary
law.
In the peer court, a jury composed of equals of the accused person
adjudicated customarylaw and conducted arbitration.The litigantswould
argue theircase by bringingwitnesses,swearingoaths on the Bible, uttering
ritualspeech,undergoingordeals,and fighting each otherin whatwas called
trial by battle. These solemn ceremoniesof oaths, formulae,ordeals, and
judicial combatwere thoughtto revealimmanentjusticein thebeliefthatGod
would interveneon the side of the righteous.Attunedto the idea of essential
unity,medieval minds made no juridical distinctionbetween lawsuits and
arbitrations.Thus,peerscourtalso acted as forumsof arbitrationwhichsought
the settlementthat reconciled the competingclaims in keeping with the
predestinedbutoftenhiddenharmonyof society.
Theoretically, theseprinciplesof customaryjusticemayhave made sense in
termsof a discourse that reflectedfaith in the essential harmonyof the
universe.In the absence of such faith,it is ratherobvious that the actual
use and
practicesof feudal conflictresolutionconsistedof the self-interested
threat of force. To paraphrase Thrasymachus,customaryjustice was the
advantageofthestronger.
On the level of practice,since success in feud and blood vengeance was
obviouslydependenton superiorforce,theseinstitutions were enactedmostly
by those who expected to prevailin combat by virtueof theirarms.70If the
69. On the legal aspectsof feud,vengeance,and peer court,see Brunner,Land undHerrschaft,

pp. 19-41 and 237-38; Gurevich,CategoriesofMedievalCulture,p. 175; and Reynolds,Kingdoms
and Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 26-27 and 45.
70. On the power-drivenrealityof feud and vengeance, see Bloch, Feudal Society,p. 230;
Brunner,Land undHerrschaft, pp. 37-38 and 62;
pp. 42-43 and 46-47; Hay, TheMedievalCenturies,
injuredside was willingto forgotheblood oftheoffender, theissue was settled

bycoercivebargainingoveran indemnity. Since thejudgmentaboutwhethera
violationof customarylaw justifieda retaliatoryactionlay withthe enforcer,
thevictorwould regularly declare thevanquishedas the illegitimateaggressor.
Thus,diffidatio,or thelegitimatewithdrawaloffaithbetweenlordand vassal in
responseto priorinfringement, was in realityan arbitrarydeclarationofwar,as
can be seen fromthe innumerablecomplaintsthat it had been performed
withouta just cause.
While the arbitrariness of feud and blood vengeance is ratherobvious to
mindsunaccustomedto medievalfaithin the immanenceof justice,the peer
courtshave been hailed bytraditionalhistorianssuch as Strayeras the "keyto
good government, peace, and security"in the feudal age.71These courtsmay
have had some mitigating influenceon the worstexcesses by employingthe
moral forceof public opinion and by concerningthemselvesmore withthe
injuriesof thevictimand reconciliationof the partiesthanwithretribution. In
overwhelming practice,however, they resolved conflictin ways that rewarded
powerand aggressionbytransferring arbitrary self-helpintothecourtroom.In
the absence of a public prosecutor,trialin a feudal court depended on the
appearance of an accuserwho not onlyofferedto prove the chargebut also
accepted the negativeconsequences in the case of failureto do so. Then
judgmentwas renderedby a jurythatconsistedof local landowners,leading
townsmen,or simplyall thosepresent,allowingthe powerfulfewto dominate
the deliberations.While oral testimony was sometimesdeemed sufficient fora
verdict,thecourtusuallysoughtto uncoverimmanent justicebytheprocedures
of oath, ordeal, and trialby battle.Since the oathworthiness of an individual
reflectedthe individual'ssocial status,relianceon oaths favoredthe powerful.
When oaths seemed insufficient, feudal courtsresortedto ordeal or judicial
combatin orderto forcea visibleintervention byGod. The ordealwas in reality
an instrumentof dominationby the upper stratumbecause it biased the
outcomeagainstaccused individuals,whose innocencewouldbe provenifthey
came to no harmafterholdinga hot iron or havingtheirarms submergedin
boilingwateror iftheysankto thebottomafterbeingshackledand throwninto
a lake. Trial bybattle,whichwas the preferredproofat peer courtscomposed
of knights,not onlyfavoredthe physically strongbut also the richbecause the
practiceof allowingwomenand clericsto offera proxywas soon extendedto
Painter,MedievalSociety,p. 27; and Carl Stephenson,MediaevalFeudalism(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

UniversityPress,1942),p. 34.
71. Strayer,WestemEurope in the MiddleAges, p. 94. On the painfulrealityof peer court
procedures,see Robert Bartlett,TrialbyFire and Water:The MedievalJudicialOrdeal (Oxford:
ClarendonPress,1986),especiallypp. 3-37 and 103-26; Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 128-29 and 373;
Boutruche,Seigneurie etfeodalite,vol. 2, pp. 133-36; Hay, The MedievalCenturies,
p. 62; Painter,
MedievalSociety,p. 21; Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 23-38; and
Stephenson,MediaevalFeudalism,p. 34.
Feudal Europe 457
any man who could affordto pay a warriorto fightin his stead, spawninga
regularprofessionofjudicial championsforhire.
Damages were assessed intuitupersonae-that is, in considerationof the
social statusof the injuredparty-ratherthan on the basis of the amountof
damage suffered.72 Social rank, however,was a direct functionof combat
strengthand wealth,the wordnobilisbeing used forthe strongmenwho had
come to dominate locally and the principal social distinctionbeing made
betweenpotens (powerful) and pauper (weak). As a result,feudal courts
accorded damages in proportionto the powerof the litigant,forinstance,by
countingthenumberofhismilitary vassals.The procedureofarbitration meant
inpracticethatinfringement was rewardedbecause it accordedtheperpetrator
a shareofthe disputedobject,abandoningtheidea ofobjectiverightor law. In
southernand westernFrance,the arbitersusuallytriedto dividetheobjectsin
litigationso thatno one leftempty-handed, since it was customarythatboth
partiesshould be satisfied.While thissharingmayindeed reflecta heterono-
mous view of justice,it clearlyencouragedunjustclaimsbecause it promised
theplaintiffto reap at least some rewardfromhistransgression. Moreover,the
arbiterswereusuallypeople withvestedinterests, suchas friends,relatives,and
associates,who exertedvariouspressureson thelitigants.
Unwrittenand applied ad hoc, the customarylaw thatpeer courtsapplied
favoredthe strongerbecause it reflectedthe structureof power.73 Believingto
live underthe same "good old law," whichin realitychangedrapidly,feudal
people quicklyaccorded traditionalstatusto recentdeviationsfromcustom.
Accordingto Bloch, "Every act, especiallyif it was repeated three or four
times,was likelyto be transformedinto a precedent-even if in the first
instanceithad been exceptionalor evenfrankly unlawful";thus,"the principle
ofcustomary law ... in thelongrunresultedin thelegalizationofalmostevery
usurpation."74 Such usurpationwas oftenlegitimizedby the conceptof seisin,
wherebya personcouldprovea property rightbysheerpossessionregardlessof
theoriginaltitle.Likewise,thelordlyexactionsimposedon thepeasantrywere
called consuetudines, or customs,since nobodycould remembertheirillegiti-
mateorigins.
72. On intuitu
personaeand arbitration, see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 129-30,288, and 332-35;
Karl Bosl, "Ruler and Ruled in theGermanEmpirefromtheTenthto theTwelfthCentury,"trans.
MiriamSambursky, in Cheyette,Lordshipand Community in MedievalEurope,p. 361; FredricL.
Cheyette,"Suum Cuique Tribuere," French HistoricalStudies 6 (Spring 1970), pp. 287-99;
Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 26-27; StephenD. White,"Pactum
... Legem Vincit et Amor Judicium:The Settlementof Disputes by Compromisein Eleventh-
CenturyWesternFrance,"AmericanJoumalofLegal History22 (October 1978), pp. 281-308; and
73. On the legitimizingnatureof customarylaw, see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 113-16; Duby,
TheChivalrousSociety,p. 4; Elias,Powerand Civility, p. 62; Gurevich,Categories
ofMedievalCulture,
pp. 181-85; Poly and Bournazel, La mutationfeodale, pp. 93-95; Reynolds,Kingdomsand
Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 12-14; and Van Caenegem,"Government,Law and Society,"
p. 182.
74. Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 114 and 411. See also Brunner,Land undHerrschaft, pp. 138-39.
Finally,peer courtshad to leave the enforcement of theirjudgmentto the

victoriouspartyforthe simplereason thatcentralauthority was absent.Thus,
whateverobjectivity was leftafterall these power-basedmeans ofjustice had
been applied surelyvanishedin thefaceofgreatercombatpoweron thepartof
theguilty.Givenall theseshortcomings, mostpeople did not even botherwith
the courtsbut used forcerightaway withthe resultthat,as Schlesingersays
frankly, "worldlymightmade institutional right."75
Turningnow to papal justice,we findthaton the level of feudal discourse,
the authority of the churchto administerdivinelaw was directlyderivedfrom
Christ'scommissionto Peter,grantinghim and his successorsauthorityover
the salvationof all people: "I willgiveuntothee the keyesof the kingdomeof
heaven: and whatsoeverthou shaltbind on earth,shall be bound in heaven:
whatsoeverthou shaltloose on earth,shall be loosed in heaven."76Although
contested by emperors and kings, the principle of rule by God's grace
theoreticallysubordinatedeven them to the pope's authorityto judge the
dischargeof theirdivineoffice.On thelevel of practice,therecan be no doubt
thatthe churchhad an importantlegislativeand judicial role in manyfieldsof
layactivity,includingmarriage,commerce,and inheritance.Convictedbytheir
priests,people regularlydid penitenceand triedto abstainfromfurther sinful
deeds, as definedby the church.The more relevantclaim forour purpose-
namely,thatthe pope was, accordingto Mann, the "main arbiterof interstate
politics,preservinga balance ofpower,restraining overweening monarchs"77_is
muchmoredoubtful,however.Indeed, a briefinquiryintotwoimportant cases
in which a pope excommunicateda king will show that papal authority
ultimately depended on the distribution of capabilitiesratherthanon recogni-
tionbythefaithful.78
In 1075,Pope GregoryVII issued a decree thatprohibitedall layinvestiture
of churchofficials, settingoffthe famousstrugglewiththe Germanemperors
knownas the InvestitureContest.The Germanking,HenryIV, respondedby
summoninga council of German bishops, who denounced the pope as a
usurperof the papal office,accusing him of perjury,immorality, and gross
abuse of authority. In the followingyear,Gregory declared the German king
deposed and excommunicated him,denying salvation not only to Henry but
also to those who continuedto obey him. Faced witha coalitionof German
75. Schlesinger,"Lord and Follower in Germanic InstitutionalHistory,"p. 84. See also

Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in WestemEurope,p. 38.
76. Matt. 16:18-19. On the social role of the church,see Bloch, Feudal Society,pp. 360-61;
Boutruche,Seigneurie etfeodalite,vol. 2, pp. 136-37; Mann, TheSourcesofSocial Power,vol. 1, pp.
379-83; Mundy,Europein theHighMiddleAges,pp. 25-27; and Ullmann,Principles of Govemment
and Politicsin theMiddleAges,pp. 32-114 and 138-49.
77. Mann, TheSourcesofSocial Power,vol. 1, p. 383.
78. The accounts of the cases presented here are drawn fromthe followingworks: Brian
Tierney,The Crisisof Churchand State,1050-1300 (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1964),
pp. 53-55, 85-86, and 128; and J. A. Watt, "Spiritual and Temporal Powers," in Burns, The
Cambridge HistoryofMedievalPoliticalThought, pp. 384-85 and 394.
Feudal Europe 459
princesforwhomHenryhad growntoo powerfuland some bishopswho felt

morallyobligedto the pope, Henrysaw himselfconstrainedto do penance at
Canossa in 1077,which,in turn,induced the pope to granthim absolution.
WithHenrythusreinstated,theopposingprincesconsideredthepope a traitor
and revoltedbyelectingRudolphofSwabia as theirking.Seekingto resolvethe
conflictbetweenHenryand Rudolph, Gregoryagain excommunicatedHenry
in 1080, at a timewhen he had alreadyregainedthe upper hand afterthree
yearsof savage fighting.This timethe papal verdicthad littlemoraleffect,as
the pope was widelyblamed forthe civilwar thathad befallenGermany.The
victoriousHenry,instead of doing anotherpenance, summonedcouncils of
Germanand Lombardbishops,who again declared Gregorya usurperof the
pontificateand elected an antipope. Henry then invaded Italy with armed
might,took Rome afterthreeyearsof siege,and enthronedhis pope. In 1111,
Henry'sson and successorto the Germanthrone,HenryV, likewiseinvaded
Italyand reducedRome, eventakingPope Paschal II prisoner.The investiture
issuewas finallysettledin 1122witha compromisein favoroftheking:German
bishopswereto be canonicallyelectedratherthaninvestedbytheking,butthe
king maintainedan effectiveveto as the newlyelected bishops had to do
homageto theirrulerto receivethefiefsconnectedwiththeiroffices.
In 1204,whenPope InnocentIII soughtto intervenein a territorialdispute
between King John "Lackland" of England and King Philip Augustus of
France, he took sides against the French. In response,the French bishops
protestedthatthepope had no rightto intercedein a conflictwhichwas purely
concernedwith mattersof vassalage and fiefand which,in addition,had
alreadybeen triedat theirking'scourt.AfterJohnhad formedan alliancewith
Otto IV, the German kingwho was threateningRome, the pope practiced
balance-of-powerpoliticsand turnedagainstJohn,excommunicating him in
1209 and placingEnglandunderan interdictthatdeprivedthepeople of most
sacramentsin orderto put popular pressureon the king.AfterJohnheld out
forfouryears,fear of a French invasionand unrestamong his officialsand
baronsforcedhimto make a compromisein 1213. He recognizedthe pope as
hislordin orderto receiveEnglandand Irelandback as fiefsand agreedto the
canonical electionof bishops.In exchange,the pope condemnedthe French,
excommunicatedthe leaders of the baronial rebellion,and condemnedthe
Magna Carta, which the barons had wrested from John in 1215. While
impressiveon paper, papal suzeraintywas neveractualized,however,and the
Englishkingkeptan effective vetoin episcopal elections.
Clearly,whetherthe attemptsby popes to exercisetheirtheoreticaljudicial
authority in conflictsamongtemporalrulerswere successfuldepended largely
on thebalance of military powerbetweena rulerand his internaland external
adversaries.If the kingwas in a relativelyweak position,he yielded to the
spiritualauthorityofthepope, butifhe was strong,he woulddefythepope and
make even his bishopsturnagainstthe head of theirchurch.In the twocases
discussed above, the popes achieved only meager compromisesthat left
460 International
Organization
effective overinvestiture
control totherulers.The sinofservingan excommu-
nicatedkingmayhavemattered toineffable
publicopinionamongthemasses,
butithardly theking'swarriors.
affected Otherwise, howcouldan excommuni-
cated Germankinghave musteredenoughmilitary vassalsto invadeItaly,
conquerRome,and evendethrone thepope? Overall,according to Mundy,
ofthe . . . allianceofthe Church
"papal politicalpowerwas largelya reflection
withEurope'saristocracies againsttheprinces," withtheendresultthat"the
effortsoftheChurchtowindirectdominion resulted eitherinmerely nominal
rewards orclearfailure."79
As longas theMaiconnais hadbeenundertheeffective authorityofthecount
of Macon,conflicts had been resolvedby publiccourtsinsteadof private
self-help,
making peopleindependent and theirproperty secure.Aroundthe
year1000,however, thecastellans ceasedtoappearatthecount'scourt, neither
submittingtoitssentences norserving asjurorsanylongerbutinsteadusurping
thedistrictcourtsneartheirfortresses. In Chalon,as inMacon,thejurisdiction
ofthecomitalcourtwasreducedtothesphereofa count'spersonalinfluence.
In eachcase,jurisdiction followed theconstraint ofthecastle,ifonlyoverthe
peasants,whiletheknights largelyfreedthemselves ofanyjudicialconstraint
during theeleventh century. As a result,
thenoblesresolvedconflict aboveall
byviolenceandcoercivebargaining. According toDuby,"In the11thcentury,
ifa chevalier suffered an injury,hisfirst
move[was]toseekvengeance against
the aggressor; ... often,however, thevictim, eitherwithouthope to obtain
satisfactionwithhisforcesor unwilling to engagein longand costlyaction,
[preferred] a settlement."80 Settlement was eithersoughtprivately orbyjoint
submission to thearbitration ofa castellan-ifthelatterlethimself be drawn
in.For instance, abouttheyear1100,all sessionsofthecourtofthecountof
Maconendedwithpeace treatiesand compensation agreements. Unableto
enforcedecisionsand composedof the litigants'kin,the courtsof the
Maconnaisreliedon oral testimony by local people withvestedinterests,
allowedbribesto arbiters andwitnesses, andpartitioned thecontested object
ratherthanfullycompensated thevictim.In short, justicein theMaconnais
favored thepowerful.
As theabovediscussion demonstrates, thefeudalnormprescribing conflict
resolutionaccording to immanent justiceeitherbycustomary or papal action
largelyfailedto engender a corresponding practice.Payingheedmerely to its
formsby callingfeudor diffidatio whatwas reallyarbitrary most
self-help,
peopleresorted directlytoforceandcoercive bargaining inordertosafeguard
theirindividual interests,favoring thestrong overtheweak.Evenwhenfeudal
actorsdidbringcomplaints tocourt,thestrong stillhadtheadvantage because
feudalcourtprocedureswere based on forceand on the applicationof
79. Mundy,Europein theHighMiddleAges,pp. 330 and 325. See also JanetNelson, "Kingship
and Empire,"p. 248.
80. Duby,La soci&tg
auxXIe etXIIe sieclesdans la regionmaconnaise,p. 169.
Feudal Europe 461
customarylaw, which inherentlyreproducedrelationsof power. While the

judicial role of the churchin the dailylivesof the people mustbe recognized,
the authority of the pope over secularpotentateswas epiphenomenalat best.
Accordingly, therewas perhapsa formalbut not an essentialchangebetween
the feudal and modern systemswith regard to conflictresolution:in the
absence of centralauthority, feudal conflictswere resolvedby the use and
threatof force,a summary thatunderminescriticaltheorywhilestrengthening
neorealism.
Conclusion
The politicalhistoryof feudalEurope revealsa persistentpattern:a distinctly

heteronomousand communaldiscourseentaileda fairdegreeof adherencein
theformsof behaviorbut littlecorrespondencein theirunderlying rationales.
In theiressence,thepracticesoffeudalactorswerequitesimilarto thepractices
of modernstates.This essentialdivergencebetweencommunaldiscourseand
conflictualpracticescan be seen in all fourfieldsoftheprecedinginquiry.
First,believingtheworldto be a harmoniousChristianwhole,the people of
thefeudalage endorsedthelegitimacy ofuniversalempireand papal authority
while denyinglegitimacyto separate parts-in contrast to the ideal of
sovereigntyamong modern states. To a small degree, this idea of unity
engenderedsome supportforthe authority of the churchand legitimatekings.
On balance, however,politicalauthorityfragmentedinto manyseparate and
autonomousentitiesundertheruleoflocal strongmen, who stroveviolentlyfor
exclusivecontrolof people and land. The factthatthiscontroloftensuffered
fromenclavesand unclearfrontiers indicatesitsinitialweaknessratherthana
different organizingprincipleof politicalspace. Thus, while the actorswere
different,the feudalsystemwas organizedbythe same fundamentalprinciple
as the modernsystem:the rationalpropensityto striveforexclusivecontrol
overmanpowerand thusterritory in orderto maximizethechancesforsurvival
in a conditionwherecentralprotectionis absent.
Second, feudal discourseobligatedpeople to specialize in functionaltasks,
suchas praying, and laboring,and to cooperateforthegreatergood of
fighting,
the community-incontrastto the ideal of autarkyamongmodernstates.To a
verylimiteddegree,the warriors,whose abidance by the normof functional
cooperationis crucialbecause theircapacityforviolenttransgression was byfar
the greatest,mayhave been constrainedby the fearof damnationto protect
thosewho prayedand worked.In essence,however,theychose to satisfytheir
self-interestratherthanthe commongood by robbingand subjugatingclergy,
peasants, and burghers,often under the legitimizingappearance of a
"protection"agreement.To surviveas independentunits,townsand monaster-
ies were forcedto providefortheirown securityby raisingfortifications and
troopsratherthanremainingspecialized economicand spiritualactors.Thus,
the absence of central authorityconstrainedfeudal actors to strive for

functionalautarkyin a manneressentiallyidenticalwiththatofmodernstates.
Third,feudalnormsrequiredwarriorsand commonersto help one another
and fulfillmutualobligationsin the formof heteronomoussubordinationand
urged the lower strata to formcommunitiesof equals-in contrastto the
legitimacyof the unconstrainedpursuitof self-interest amongmodernstates.
In reality,however,vassalage, fief,dependency,and servitudefunctioned
mostlyas formalappearancesthatlegitimizedpracticesofself-regarding power
politics,such as subjugation,nonaggressionpacts, alliances, and spheres of
influence.To some extent,communalvalues did inducepeasantsand burghers
to cooperateforthecommongood ofvillageand town.Much oftheircollective
action,however,restedon alliance behavioragainstthe commonthreatposed
bya lord,internalconstraintbythe powerfulfew,and externalconstraintby a
lord.Thus,exceptforsome genuinecommunity amongtheface-to-face groups
ofvillageand town,therelationsamongfeudalactorswerelargelygovernedby
the same principleas those of modernstates: the pursuitof self-interest by
dominationand alliancein accordancewiththedistribution ofcapabilities.
Fourth,feudal discourserequiredpeople to resolve theirconflictson the
basis of customaryand divinelaw-in contrastto the legitimacyof arbitrary
violence among modernstates. While maintaininga correspondingformof
behavior,theabsenceofcentralenforcement and thereproduction ofpowerby
courtproceduresand customary law turnedthepeer courtsintoinstruments of
mightratherthan justice. As a result,most people resolved theirconflicts
privately byforceand coercivebargaining,legitimizedbythebehavioralforms
offeudand blood vengeance.Whileintervening in thedailylivesof
successfully
people, the churchgenerallyfailed to adjudicate the power strugglesamong
secular rulers,givenits dependence on supportbythe nobility.Thus, conflict
resolutionamongfeudalactorswas essentiallybased on the same principleas
thatamongmodernstates:the arbitrary use and threatofforce.
In sum,the twocentralquestionsof thisstudy,whetherfeudalpoliticswere
fundamentally different frommodernpoliticsand whetherfeudal practices
accordedwithfeudaldiscourse,have been answeredbythehistoricalrecordin
thenegative:a good deal of corresponding formsand some genuineadherence
notwithstanding, thereis overwhelming evidencethatfeudal actorsdeparted
regularly fromtheirdiscourseof unity,heteronomy, community, and justicein
orderto engagein a struggleforexclusiveresourcecontrol,functionalautarky,
power-political advantage,and forcefulconflictresolution.Accordingly, feudal
politics were not fundamentallydifferentfrom modern politics, and the
communaldiscourseoffeudalEurope did notentailcorresponding practices.
If anything,the feudal systemwas more violentand conflictualthan the
modernone because therewere no large statesto constrainconflictat least
insidetheirterritories. Thus, mostindividualswere constantlyexposed to the
violent consequences of anarchy,livingin a conditionperilouslyclose to
Hobbes's famousdescriptionofthestateofnature.Bloch expressedthisfeudal
realityof the "war of all" in a concludingpassage,whichis also noteworthy for
Feudal Europe 463
the medieval period mainlyin

its warningagainstthe errorof interpreting
normativeterms:
A pictureoffeudalsociety... would inevitably givebut an inaccurateidea
ofthe realityifitwere concernedexclusively withlegal institutions and al-
lowed one to forgetthatmenin thosetimeslivedin constantand painful
insecurity.It was not,as it is today,the agonyof the terrible,but intermit-
tentand collective,dangersinherentin a worldof nationsin arms.Nor was
it-or at least notmainly-thefearof the economicforceswhichcrushthe
poor or unfortunate. The ever-present threatwas one whichlayheavyon
each individual.It affectedone's possessionsand,indeed,one's verylife.
War,murder,the abuse of power-these have cast theirshadowoveral-
mosteverypage ofour analysis.81
Severalsignificant forthe debate betweenneoreal-
theoreticalramifications
ism and criticaltheoryfollowfromthe precedingempiricalinquiry.To begin
withneorealism,thelikenessbetweenthebehavioroffeudalactorsand thatof
modernstatescorroboratesthe generalneorealistpropositionsthat interna-
tionalpoliticsis markedbystructural continuityand thatself-interested
power
politicsrepresentsits enduringbehavioralpattern.In otherwords,the feudal
case strengthens theprincipalbeliefofpoliticalrealiststhatlawlessconflictand
arbitrary violence constitutethe naturalconditionof individualsdeprivedof
theblessingsofcentralauthority.
The feudalcase also impressively confirmsthe neorealistassertionthatthe
structureof anarchycompels actorsto behave alike, despite historicaldiffer-
ences in theirattributes. Feudal actorsarmed,formedalliancesand spheresof
influence,resolved conflictby the use and threat of force, and failed to
cooperatefunctionally. Thus,theyfollowedthe same logicofpowerpoliticsas
sovereignstates,despite the factthat theyrecognizednormsof heteronomy
rather than sovereigntyand even though they were organized as loose
aggregatesof individualsthatregularlylacked the territorial exclusivenessof
states. Thus, we can conclude that feudal actors engaged in power politics
regardlessof their attributesbecause the self-regarding pursuitof power
promised them the best chances for survivalin the absence of central
protection.In methodologicalterms,neorealism'sclaimthatitsstructural logic
of action under anarchyhas the characterof an objectivelaw has received
empiricalsupportfromthebehavioroffeudalEuropeans.
The factthatneorealismemploysthestateas itsunitthereforedoes notlimit
itsanalysisin principleto thestate-centered politicsofthemodernand ancient
periods. Since it is not the particularcharacterof the statewhichengenders
powerpoliticsbuttheabsenceofcentralauthority, the"anarchicactors"ofany
historicalperiod-that is,the mostencompassingpoliticalunitsofeach epoch,
be theyindividuals,castellanies,city-states, or nations-can be expected to
behave in accordance with neorealist logic. However, to explain stateless
politicsin a moreconsistentmanner,neorealismmightwantto reformulate its
81. Bloch,Feudal Society,p. 410.

unitof analysisin a waythatrepresentsthe historicalrealityof anarchicactors

at levels of organizationbelow that of the state. As the feudal example
demonstrates,such a definitionof the anarchicactorwould have to include
individualswho livein theabsence ofcentralprotection.
Withregardto criticaltheory,the factthatpoliticalspace duringall three
major periods of Western history-ancient,medieval, and modern-was
dividedintoaggregatesofindividualsthatstroveviolentlyforexclusivecontrol
seriouslyweakens the general criticalclaim thatworld politicsis subject to
fundamentalchange. By implication,the continuity of power politicsacross
time suggeststhat such behavior is not peculiar to the modern systemof
nation-states. Thus,thisresultshouldmilitateagainstthevarioustendenciesto
seek the originof internationalconflictin the characterof the modernstate,
tendenciesevident,forinstance,in the generalviewthatrivalryspringsfrom
nationalsovereignty and in the Marxistthesisthatimperialist war derivesfrom
the state's functionas the executivecommitteeof a bourgeoisiefaced with
fallingratesofprofit.
Criticaltheoristshave chosen the medievalcase to demonstratethevalidity
of theirparadigmbecause no otherhistoricalperiodhas been so distinctin its
normsand understandings. As we saw above, the criticaltheoristRobert Cox
consideredthe Middle Ages to be an "extremelyimportant"case forshowing
the realityof fundamentalchange in the internationalsystem.Consequently,
the evidencethatconflictualpowerpoliticsreignedsupremein the feudalage
(the central medieval period, in which heteronomousdiscourse was most
deeply rooted) defeatsthe argumentabout change on the verygroundthat
criticaltheoristshave chosenforitsempiricaldemonstration.
The mistakemade by criticaltheoristsin selectingthe medievalperiod for
empiricalsupportstemsfromtheirnormativeworldview,expressedby their
centraltenetthat discourseentails a correspondingpractice.If we followed
Ruggie'sadvicethatthemedievalto modernshiftis "bestobservedthroughthe
lens of legitimations,""we would assess the medievalperiodthroughitsset of
norms,whichwere indeed markedby the idea of heteronomy.In so doing,
however,we would committhe verymistakeBloch warnedus against,thatof
seeingthe Middle Ages in termsof itslegal institutionsratherthantheviolent
realityof everydaylife. Criticaltheoristswho adopt the medievalperiod for
empiricalsupportcommitpreciselythiserror.They findthatmedievalrights
wereheteronomous, and assuminga priorithatdiscourseentailsa correspond-
ingpractice,theythenfailto inquirefurther whethertheserightswere actually
followedin medievalpractice.As a result,theyfail to see thatthe essential
practicesof feudal actorswere thoroughly selfish,exclusive,conflictual,and
violent.To adduce a modernanalogy,criticaltheoristsargue as ifcontempo-
raryworldpoliticscould be adequatelydescribedthroughthedocumentsofthe
international courtat The Hague or perhapsthecharteroftheUnitedNations.
in theWorldPolity,"p. 275.
and Transformation
82. Ruggie,"Continuity
FeudalEurope 465
Thischasmbetweenthecommunal normsand theconflictual behaviorof

feudalEuropeansundermines, of course,the generalargument of interna-
tionalcritical theory thatdiscourse is associatedwithcorresponding practices.
Byimplication, italsoweakensthecritical theorists'suggestion thatconflictin
themodernperiodstemsfromthediscourse ofsovereignty amongpolicymak-
ers, capitalists,and politicalrealists-let alone fromtheirinstrumental
rationality.Thus,thereis no need to rejectthe current"discourse"in the
disciplineofinternational relationsas thedeleterious mentalhabitsofmoderns
infected withthe idea of sovereignty, and thereis no reasonto acceptthe
criticaltheorists'attemptsto subvertpower by reconceptualizing it as
"empowerment," torelativizerealpolitikbycallingitan"anarchic practice,"or
todiscount thelawsoflogicas "identity thinking."
Mostimportant, thedivergence betweendiscourse andpractice inthefeudal
ageindicates thatsharedunderstandings, norms, andideaswhichdiverge from
power-political practicescannotinducepeople who live in the absenceof
centralprotection to behavein morecommunal ways,exceptperhapson the
ineffectuallevelofformal appearances. The subjectofinternational relations,
however, is definedprecisely as politicsin the absenceof centralauthority.
Accordingly, thefeudalcase suggests thatdiscourse is essentially
irrelevantto
thefieldofinternational relations,
sinceactorswhofearviolentdeathcannot
riskfollowing normsand principles thatdivergefromthenecessary logicof
self-help. a
As consequence, critical
theory as a wholewouldappearinherently
unsuited forthestudy ofinternational relations, sinceitsmethodisprecisely to
understand social realitythrough the discourseof its actors.Whilenorms,
ideas, and understandings maybe a fruitful sourceforsocial thoughton
domesticsocietywhere fear of violentdeath is largelysuspended,the
hermeneutic potentialofcriticaltheory is essentiallyannulledin theforeign
realmbythe self-help constraint,whichnecessarily arisesfromthe lackof
centralprotection.
In thefinalanalysis, thefeudalcase suggests thatthereis an unchanging
essenceofhumannaturethatprevents us fromreplacing thenaturalworldof
selfish
powerpolitics witha socialconstruct basedonchangedunderstandings,
new norms,or freshideas. This conclusiondirectly challengesthe critical
theorists'viewthathumannaturedissolvesfullyintoa processof historical
becoming whichhas allowedourspeciestoovercome naturalnecessity byacts
of collectiveconsciousness based on language.To explorethisissuefurther
wouldobviously lead us farbeyondthescopeofthecurrent however.
inquiry,
Sufficeit,therefore, tospeculatethatthisunalterable essenceofhumannature
hasprobably muchto do withtheHobbesiannotionsofself-preservation and
fearofviolentdeath.At anyrate,thepoliticalobjective ofcritical
theory,that
of bringing abouta justworldof peace byemancipating oppressed(and,of
course,morejustandpeaceful)discourses, is unlikelyto succeedtotheextent
thattheself-help character oftheinternational system stemsfromsomefixed
dispositionin humannature.In otherwords,international relationswillremain

in whatoughtto be called thereal stateofnature.
To defendtheirpositionagainstthese conclusions,criticaltheoristscould
attempta numberof empiricaland interpretive moves.First,theycould claim
that the heteronomousnormsprofessedby feudal actors did not constitute
theirtrue discourse,whichwas reallymuch more in accordance withtheir
conflictualpractices.While alreadydiscountingitselfas a nonfalsifiable ad hoc
assumption,such a movewould admitthatcriticaltheory'sinitialstresson the
medievalperiod as a highlydistinctintersubjectivity was mistaken.Unlikelyto
succeed in mountingenough evidence, such an admission would deprive
criticaltheoristsof theironlymajorcase in Westernhistoryand forcethemto
searchfora nonsovereign intersubjectivityin otherpartsoftheworld.
Second, criticaltheoristscould claim thatfeudalpracticeswere muchmore
heteronomousthan this studyallows. While methodologically sound, such a
defensewould have to accomplishno less thana wholesalerevisionof modern
scholarshipon medievalhistory in orderto producemorethanjust epiphenom-
enal or anecdotalevidencein itsfavor.Moreover,thisstudyhas alreadygiven
due weightto counterevidence and drawnitsconclusionsaccordingly.
Third,criticaltheorists could perhapssuggestthatcommunaldiscoursehad
already affectedfeudal practice on the level of formand would soon have
alteredits essence as well, had it not been forthe late medievalshiftto the
self-regardingdiscourseofsovereignty whichwas associatedwiththeriseofthe
firststates and whichforestalledfurtherprogresstowardcommunity. While
alreadydisqualifying itselfas an especiallyegregiousexampleof a nonfalsifi-
able ad hoc assumption,thisinterpretation wouldfurthermore leave intactthe
highlysignificantfact that practice did fail to correspondto discourse for
severalcenturies.
Fourth,criticaltheoristscould turnaroundand interpret theriseoftheearly
statesas thelong-awaitedactualizationofcommunaldiscourseratherthanthe
firstmanifestationof sovereignty.While methodologicallyacceptable, this
interpretation would again leave intactthe countervailing factof centuriesof
divergencebetweendiscourseand practice.Moreover,itwould contradictthe
establishedargumentof criticaltheorythatassociatesthe rise of these states
withthe emergenceof anticommunalsovereignty discourse,and it would be
negatedbythecorresponding factthattheseaggregations werelargelyeffected
bymilitary force.

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Cambridge University Press

International Organization Foundation

Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices

The disciplineof internationalrelationsfaces a new debate of fundamental

I thankStephenKrasner,David Laitin,JohnMearsheimer,Duncan Snidal,AshleyTellis,Daniel

International 46, 2, Spring1992

thefieldof international relationson its"interparadigm debate" withneoreal-

The debatebetweenneorealismand criticaltheory

On the mostfundamentallevel,neorealismand criticaltheoryclash over the

3. See M. Banks, "The Inter-ParadigmDebate," in M. Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds.,

which constrainsall states to act in similarways despite their historical

6. Max Horkheimer,CriticalTheory:SelectedEssays,trans.MatthewJ. O'Connell et al. (1936;

constrained bythestructure of anarchy to engagein conflictual practicesof

7. Representativearticlesbeyondthe ones alreadycitedincludethe following:RobertW. Cox,

"discourseof sovereignty," whichtheylocate amongpolicymakers, capitalists,

8. Ashley,"The Geopoliticsof GeopoliticalSpace," p. 406.

universalcommunity,whichwas legitimated bya commondiscourseof law,

turesanalogousto thebalance ofpowerof the modernstatessystemhave

Since the debate betweenneorealismand criticaltheoryhingeson the issue

13. RobertW. Cox, "Postscript1985,"in Keohane,Neorealismand Its Critics, pp. 244-45.

The investigation of the historicalrecordsdemonstratesthatfromtheninth

The idea ofunityand politicalfragmentation

whichhad become Christianduringthe fourthcentury.16 Germaniccustoms

16. On thefusionofthe Germanicand Roman-Christian traditions,see ReinhardBendix,Kings

kingdomsand duchieswas consideredillegitimate bymostand epiphenomenal

in Burns,ibid.,p. 227; Markus,"The Latin Fathers,"in Burns,ibid.,pp. 115-16; Marcel Pacaut,

century,had found another concrete expressionin the realm of political

22. See NorbertElias, Powerand Civility, trans.EdmundJephcott(New York: PantheonBooks,

totheirduchyaroundParis,theCapetiansremained generallyacceptedas the

26. See Mundy,Europein theHighMiddleAges,pp. 25-27; Michael Mann, TheSourcesofSocial

theiradministrative Given the dominanceof local defenseand the

guard againstexpansionby others,and constantlyseekingto enlargehis own

pp. 43 and 98-99; see also p. 64.

Duby notes, "In the Maconnais of the 11thcentury,thereparticularly is no

35. Duby,La societeau XIe etXIIe sieclesdans la regionmdconnaise,pp. 164-65.

patronsand thereforeotherrefuge."36 For instance,the Chaumontsand the

Functionalcooperationand theneed fordefense

36. Ibid.,p. 165.

was imaginedbothas a bodypoliticwiththeruleras thehead and the ruledas

38. Mark 12:29-34.

On the level of practice,the fragmentationof Frankishrule allowed counts,

40. On thesubjugationand abuse oftheclergy,see MarshallW. Baldwin,TheMediaevalChurch

Likewise,a significantproportionof the ruralpopulationmoved into new

less,theystilllosttheiroutlyingfringesand enclavesto neighboring castellans,

Heteronomy, and powerpolitics

conceptualizedhere as unionsbetweenindividualsof unequal rankunderthe

47. On thelegal featuresofvassalage,see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 145-47 and 218-30; JohnS.

judgment overserfs,and dominium, involvingtheenjoyment of revenue, the

politicalalignmentof sorts,since as Guy Fourquin says,"to be the vassal of

54. Fourquin,Lordshipand Feudalismin theMiddleAges,p. 128. See also Bloch,Feudal Society,

even more oppressivewarriors."8 Fearing such subjection,freeholdersoften

to some extentto corresponding practices.Rural parishionerscollectively

62. On the poweraspectsof community and cooperation,see GeorgesDuby,L'economierurale

part,"so that"the moresubstantialamongthelandowners[were]likelyto have

Scisse. When a powerfulvassal refusedto behave like a friendly power,little

Immanentjustice and theadvantageofthestronger

Since feudalsocietywas thoughtto be governedbycosmiclaw,feudaldiscourse

courts-in orderto comparetheirnormativeclaimswiththeactualpracticesof

69. On the legal aspectsof feud,vengeance,and peer court,see Brunner,Land undHerrschaft,

injuredside was willingto forgotheblood oftheoffender, theissue was settled

Painter,MedievalSociety,p. 27; and Carl Stephenson,MediaevalFeudalism(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

Finally,peer courtshad to leave the enforcement of theirjudgmentto the

75. Schlesinger,"Lord and Follower in Germanic InstitutionalHistory,"p. 84. See also

princesforwhomHenryhad growntoo powerfuland some bishopswho felt