Geluz vs CA

Facts: Nita Villanueva had 3 abortions done by the same doctor, Geluz. Husband Oscar Lazo sued Geluz on
the 3rd abortion (2 mo.), seeking damages. CA sustained claim of Lazo for P3,000.
Issue:Whether or not the husband can claim damages from the abortionist.
Held:No, he cannot. Award for death of a person does not cover unborn fetus because it is still not vested
with legal personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet
possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in utero. The child should be born before the parents
can seek any recovery for damages.
Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There
could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unbord child for the injuries it
received because it lacked juridical personality. Moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife
willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion.

Joaquin vs. Navarro

Facts: This was a summary proceeding to resolve the order of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro Jr and his
Angela. While the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the whole family sought refuge at the German
Club. While staying there, it was set on fire and the Japs were shooting at the fleeing refugees. 3 daughters were
shot dead, Angela refused to leave the place while JN Jr, wife, FL & JN Sr fled. JN jr was shot while coming out.
Moments later, the German Club collapsed. CA said that the mother died before the son on the basis that she
could have died immediately after for a variety of causes.
Issue: Whether the mother died before JN Jr.
Held: In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his
mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by
the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail

Continental Steel
Capacity to Act as persons
Facts: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as
surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that
her husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized by the court as
guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while
in a state of insanity.
Issues: (1)Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the
person does not have capacity to act. (2) Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into contract
at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908.
Held: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The SC held
that there is no evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person suffering from
monomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a contract.
From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had
property of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as the fact that he had never squandered
any large sum of money.
As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of the bond, December
15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified
that they observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but none at the time of the
execution of the said bond on December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally
deprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well that he was insane.

Issue: Whether or not parents can sign contracts on behalf of the unemancipated child.
Held: Yes, parental consent is binding upon both parties. Construing Sec. 50 & 41 of the Civil Rights Law
strictly, the parent’s consent is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are necessary to
effectuate the legislative intent. Neither is a prior court approval of the employment contract for child models is
necessary to validate the contract, since the statute requiring such applies only to child performers.

Moe v. Dinkins
Facts: Plaintiffs seek judgment declaring unconstitutional, and enjoining the enforcement of a statue requiring
parental consent of both parents prior to marriage of unemancipated minors. (males, 16-18; females, 14-18).
They raised the issue of the statute impeding the exercise of their liberty, and they do not want to have their
child stigmatized as illegitimate. Plaintiff Maria got pregnant at 15, and her mother refused to give consent

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because she wished to continue receiving welfare benefits for Maria. Intervenors Cristina Coe and Pedro Doe also
raised the same issues.
Issue: Whether or not the statute is unconstitutional on the basis of substantive issues. (Whether there exists
a rational relation between the mean chosen b the NY legislature and the legitimate state objective)
Held: The statute is upheld. It is the state’s interest to protect the minors from immature decision-making and
preventing unstable marriages. The state, in its exercise of parens patriae, possess the power to protect and
promote the welfare of the children who lack the capacity to act in their own best interests. The requirement of
parental consent ensures that at least 1 mature person will participate in the decision of a minor to marry.
Though petitioners suggest that the courts are in a better position to judge whether a minor is prepared to
marry, the law presumes that the parents possess what the child lacks in maturity, and that parents are more
capable to act in their best interests.
There is no denial of right to marry. The Statue merely delays plaintiff’ access to the institution of marriage until
they comply with the necessary requirements of parental consent, or emancipation. The illegitimacy of the child
would only be a temporary situation. Subsequent marriage of the parents legitimizes the child.

Carillo v. Jaojaco
Facts: Adriana Carillo executed a sale of land 33 hectares to Marcos Jaojaoco for the sum of P4,000. 9 days
later, she was declared mentally incapacitated by the court and later on died. Her sister, as administratrix of
her estate, brought an action for the annulment of the sale of land on the basis of Adriana’s mental incapacity.
Issue: Whether or not Adriana was incapacitated to effect a valid sale of land.
Held: There is no record of evidence to show that Adriana has been incapacitated before the execution of the
deed of sale. Though she was confined in a hospital for cerebral hemorrhage on Nov. 13,1819, there was no
proof of any mental abnormality, as testified by the notary public who attended to her on Dec. 8,1819. The
burden of proof in establishing mental incapacity is upon him who alleges it.
US v. Vaquilar
Facts: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other persons
with a bolo. Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the
crimes. They also testified that the appellant was complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the
killing. The witnesses’ evidence for insanity include:
•
“appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating at the time he was killing his wife.”
•
“he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he wouldn’t have killed his family”
•
at the moment of cutting those people, “he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut
anybody at random”
•
sister said, “…then he pursued me….he must have been crazy because he cut me”
Issue: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore
exempt from criminal liability.
Held: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The appellant’s conduct was consistent with the acts
of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes. The fact
that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane.
The popular meaning of “crazy” is
not synonymous with the legal terms “insane”. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is not
inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has
reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the crime.
The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the
mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt
one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became
demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a
normal state of mind.

C. State of Being Deaf-mute

People v. Sasota
Facts: Defendant was charged with the crime of rape of a deaf and dumb girl. Sasota, found guilty of the
crime because of the victim’s testimony, now posits that the testimony of the deaf and dumb should not have
been accepted by the court at its full value.
Issue: Whether or not a deaf and dumb person is considered a competent witness by the court.
Held: There is no merit in the contention of the defendant that deaf and dumb persons are to be considered
incompetent witnesses. Though formerly, deaf and dump persons were considered incompetent, experience and
observation have shown conclusively that the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not sufficient to justify
the finding that he is incompetent as a witness. When such a witness is produced, the court may ascertain

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whether he has the requisite intelligence, and the judge will allow the witness to adopt such mode of
communicating his ideas, whether by signs or writing as he deems most satisfactory.

Director of Lands v.
Abelardo
Facts: The case revolves around proving the ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were properties subject
in a successional litigation. Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino are contesting the ownership of subject properties in
Manuel Libunao’s possession. They further claim that as deaf-mutes, they should not be barred by prescription in
filing the case.
Issue: Whether or not the prescription period in filing the case should be relaxed due to their being deaf-
mutes.
Held: No, they are not. The SC ruled that the subject lands are still and should still be owned by Manuel
Libuano and family due to the following reasons (1) the preponderance of evidence as to the ownership of the
lands are in favor of Libunao, (2) the action for filing a claim regarding the partition of the estate has already
prescribed.
Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law,
considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons,
in connection with the running of the prescriptive period.

D. Prodigality
Martinez v. Martinez
Facts: Pedro Martinez Ilustre brought an action against his father Francisco for a declaration of prodigality
against him. Pedro alleges that his father has been dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to
his 2nd wife, as well as the administration of his estate. The father denied such allegations, instead he posted
that his son was actually mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate.
Issue: What constitutes prodigality?
Held: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a
morbid state of bind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to
expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. The
testimony of the plaintiff was insufficient to support his allegations against his father. There was no evidence to
show his father has been transferring by sale or mortgage any property, which will reflect in the city record of
public deeds. The court found the defendant is far from being prodigal, and is still in the full exercise of his
faculties and still possess the industry, thrift and ability in managing the estate.

Wassmer v. Velez
Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer are to be wed. 2 days prior the ceremony, Francisco left,
leaving a telegram he will come back but never did. Beatriz filed for damages, and judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages. Defendant now asserts that the judgment
against him is contrary to law, given that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach
of promise to marry.
Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable.
Held:No it is not, but this case is not a mere breach of promise to marry. He must be held answerable for
the damages in accordance with Art. 21.
The SC maintained that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable, the defendant’s act is still punishable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” In
this case, plaintiff already arranged everything for the wedding, like the wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial
bed, etc. The SC held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry - A wedding has been formally set
and all the preparations have been made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days before. This is contrary to good
customs, since defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner.

Tranjanco v. CA
Facts: Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he promised her marriage, she consented to his pleas
for carnal knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her condition, she had to resign from her
work. Because she was unable to support herself and the baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry her, she
instituted an action for damages, compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly
support, plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages.
Issue:Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art. 21.
Held:No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry. It
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained intimate sexual
relations with the defendant, and such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly here there is

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voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces for a year.

De Jesus v. Syquia
Facts: This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the purpose of recovering
from the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from (1) breach of promise to marry, (2) to compel the
defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children and pay maintenance for them. Cesar met Antonia
at the barbership where she works as a cashier. Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a constant visitor at her
home, and wrote a letter to the priest saying that if the child was a boy, it will be christened in his name. On his
trip to China, he was writing letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in good condition so that “junior” will be
strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house where they lived together for 1 year
as a family, with expenses being shouldered by Syquia. She became pregnant again, but soon Syquia left her to
marry another woman.
Issue: (1) Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable. (2) Whether the letters written by the
defendant to the appellant proves paternity.
Held: The SC upheld the decision of the trail court in refusing to give damages to Antonia for breach of
promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. As for the recognition of the
child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by the production of more than 1 document of indubitable
authenticity, containing, all together, the admission of the father recognizing a particular child as of his paternity,
the admission of one writing being supplemented by those of another.

Selanova v. Mendoza
Facts: Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a
document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife. One condition of
the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each
had filed against the other and that they waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of
infidelity either one would commit against the other. Respondent relied on Art 191 of the old Civil Code that
states the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval. The judge ratified the document without judicial approval from CFI Negros where the
couple was residing, making it void assuming arguendo that Art. 191 is still in effect.
Issue: Whether or not the agreement separating the conjugal property and the spouses is void.
Held: It is. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:
1. Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
2. Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains or of the absolute community property between husband and wife.
While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable by the RPC, and a contract
legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable.

Jones v. Hallahan
Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which held that female persons were
not entitled to be issued a marriage license to marry. These 2 women were denied issuance of a marriage license
by the County Court clerk of Jefferson. They now contend that this deprived them of 3 basic constitutional rights:
(1) right to marry; (2) right of association; (3) right to free exercise of religion.
Issue: Whether or not the 2 women can marry each other since the Kentucky law does explicitly mention
marriage to be between a man and a woman.
Held: Looking at dictionaries, the common meaning of marriage is a union between a man and a woman.
Besides, what’s preventing them to marry is not the failure to be issued a marriage license, but rather their own
incapability of entering into a marriage. Even if they did marry through false representation that they’re of the
opposite sex, the marriage will be null and void. In the court’s opinion, there is not constitutional issue involved,
since there is no constitutional sanction which protects the right of marriage between persons of the same sex.