CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C.

Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

VENTURA VS VENTURA 160 SCRA 810 AND VILLAMORE VS CA 162 SCRA 574

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL
VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER
HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.

FACTS:

Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura while
Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and surviving spouse. On the other hand, appellees
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano but the paternity of appellees was denied by the deceased in his will.

Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees.

In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and
appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate.

In due course, said will was admitted to probate. Gregorio Ventura died. The appellant Maria
Ventura, the illegitimate daughter, filed a motion for her appointment as executrix and for the
issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.

Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was issued
in her favor.

Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of Gregorio Ventura.

She filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive. Said account of
administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and by Exequiel
Victorio and Gregoria Ventura.

Both oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the
estate and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses.

But, Maria Ventura filed a motion for the approval of the accounts of administration without
the opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and Exequiel
Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity of Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is
still pending final determination before the Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the
adulterous children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the approval
of the counts of administration.
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However,it was found that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by the
Court of First Instance in Civil Cases No. 1064 and 1476, as the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura,
hence, they have reason to protect their interest.

The court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the
estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the
matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of
the estate, rendered the questioned decision removing her as executrix and in her place Mercedes
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are appointed joint a admintratrices of the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

APPOINTMENT OF ANOTHER ADMINISTRATOR

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous
appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic.

This would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator under the following
provision:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the

will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;"

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona
while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of
kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent's property. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more
preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest
ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

nearest of kin is to be preferred."

CASE AT BAR

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano.

Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura.

Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or
persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the
discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.

OPINION:

This case discussed about the preferential right of a person to be appointed as the executor or
administrator. Such preferential right are present when no one is named or the will is nullified.

G.R. No. L-41508 June 27, 1988

CANDELARIO VILLAMOR, PILAR DE LA SERNA, BARTOLOME VILLAMOR, RAFAELA RETUYA, SOFRONIO

VILLAMOR, PILAR SEMBLANTE, ELEUTERIO VILLAMOR, CARIDAD GORECHO, MARCOS OR and
GUADALUPE CEDEÑO petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DANIELA CENIZA UROT, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of
Fr. Nicanor Cortes, under Sp. Proc. No. 3062-R, respondents.

FACTS:

Spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castañeda had eight (8) children, namely:

 Rufino,

o Rufino Cortes, who died, left two alleged legitimate children,

 Ireneo Cortes Villamor, who died but married one Bersabela Perez and had five
children, namely:

 Candelario, one of the petitioners,

 Bartolome, one of the petitioners,

 Sofronio, one of the petitioners,

 Eleuterio one of the petitioners, and

 Marcos, one of the petitioners,.

CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

 and Paula Cortes Villamor, who died single without issue.

 Barbara,

o Barbara Cortes begot a son by the name of Eustaquio Cortes.

 Eustaquio Cortes married one Sixta Ceniza.

 Born to them were five children, namely:

 Dionisio, predeceased their father

 Bartolome, who was a Catholic priest

 Nicanor, , who died as a monk of the Carthusian Order in Spain and was the last
of the direct descendants of the Barbara Cortes line.

 Agapita predeceased their father and

 Amancia predeceased their father.

 All five remained unmarried and died without will nor forced heirs.

 Florencio,

 Casimira,

 Brigida,

 Braulia,

 Margarita and

 Eugenia, who was last to die.

Of the eight children, six died single and without issue.

The lower court founded an intriguing situation and concurred in by the Court of Appeals that
in both Special Proceedings in question, the administrators appointed were complete strangers to the
decedents.
What is intriguing is the fact that although Fr. Nicanor Cortes had a number of surviving first
cousins, he chose and preferred a stranger, Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-in-fact to take
charge of his and his Nanay's affairs. And even more intriguing is the fact that in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of his mother, he took steps to have the appointment of Escolastico
Ceniza, brother of private respondent, who was appointed as Special Administrator, revoked and in
which he succeeded.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a collusion between the administrators in the case, who are considered
strangers to the decedents.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

APPOINTMENT OF A STRANGER

The Court found and gave credence to the pieces of evidence that no fraud was committed nor
collusion of the administrators.

The Court do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court and concurred in
by the Court of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question, the administrators appointed
were complete strangers to the decedents.

There is nothing repulsive in this nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the
courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors
and administrators.

It provides that in case the persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not
competent or are unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such other person as the court
may appoint.

What is intriguing is the fact that although Fr. Nicanor Cortes had a number of surviving first
cousins, he chose and preferred a stranger, Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-in-fact to take
charge of his and his Nanay's affairs. And even more intriguing is the fact that in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of his mother, he took steps to have the appointment of Escolastico
Ceniza, brother of private respondent, who was appointed as Special Administrator, revoked and in
which he succeeded.

OPINION:

In this case, it is showed that the preferential right is not absolute a stranger may be appointed
as administrator to the settlement of his estate, subject to the discretion of the court, in case the
persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve.

COMPARATIVE:

In the first case, the preferential right under Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is
used. But in the second case, where those who have the preferential right are not competent,
appointment of strangers to the decedent may be allowed.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

CASES

1. CO VS ROSARIO GR 1067 4/30/2008

G.R. No. 160671 April 30, 2008

LUIS L. CO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
66, Makati City, ELIZABETH RACHEL CO, ASTRID MELODY CO-LIM, GENEVIEVE CO-CHUN, CAROL CO,
KEVIN CO, EDWARD CO and the ESTATE OF LIM SEE TE, respondents.

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, appointed petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr., the
deceased’s (Co Bun Chun’s) son as the special administrators of the estate.

However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside Luis’, petitioner’s, appointment
as special co-administrator.

Luis consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co, for appointment as co-administrator of
the estate. RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.

Almost four years later, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs, issued its
order revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin.

The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable as special co-administrator because
his capacity, ability or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded
by the filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had
provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity,
trust and confidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disqualification against Alvin is applicable.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

DISCRETION TO APPOINT OR REMOVE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS

Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove
special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

Even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee
no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid
effect thereto. The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and
control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect
to its smooth administration and earliest settlement.

LIMITATION

As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere
with it.

This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be
based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.

CASE AT BAR

In this case, we find that the trial court’s judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal as special co-
administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle.

The appellate court correctly observed that: In ruling to revoke the appointment of Alvin
Milton Co, the lower court took into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special
administrator which demands a high degree of trust and confidence in the person to be appointed.
The court a quo observed that, burdened with the criminal charges of falsification of commercial
documents leveled against him (sic), and the corresponding profound duty to defend himself in these
proceedings, Alvin Milton Co’s ability and qualification to act as special co-administrator of the estate
of the decedent are beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is only proper under the attendant
circumstances.

OPINION:

The case discussed that the courts has discretion on the appointment or removal of special
administrator. And also, they are not bound by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators.

Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave
abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it.

The judge has no authority to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail
over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason,
equity, justice and legal principles.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

2. TAN VS GEDORIO JR GR 166520 3/14/2008

G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO
NIERRAS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY
ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondents moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need
for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be
resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that
none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not
residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity,
experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting
as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

Atty. Clinton Nuevo, as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her

capacity as de facto administratrix. More than a year later, the RTC, acting on the private respondents’
Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the
directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

Consequently, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order appointing Romualdo as special
administrator of Gerardo’s Estate.

Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming
that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of
kin of the deceased. The Motion was denied by the respondent Judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court was correct in disqualifying Vilma to be executor.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

RULES ON REGULAR ADMINISTRATOR ON PREFERENCE ON NEXT TO KIN NOT APPLY IN SPECIAL

ADMINISTRATOR
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

This Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment
of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming
Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly
considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided
against her appointment for the reason that she fails to comply with the urgent directive by Atty.
Nuevo. This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all
heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does
not satisfy the requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer
the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.

PRINCIPLE:

This case discussed again that the law on regular administrator on the preference in next to kin
does not apple to special administrator. Also, the court was justified in disqualifying Vilma as did not
satisfy the requirement of a special administrator.
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3. PIJUAN VS DE GUZMAN 124 PHIL 157

G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN, special
administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.

FACTS:

In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz — hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea — and Carlos Gurrea
were married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with
their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two
(2) children.

Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos Gurrea
refused to admit her to his residence in said municipality. Hence, she stayed with their son, Teodoro,
in Bacolod City.

Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and
testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and
their son, Teodoro.

Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon
his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond.

Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and one
Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether Marcelo Pijuan, who was named in the will, qualifies as special executor.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

CASE AT BAR

It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea that the lower court erred in denying her petition for
appointment as administratrix, for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the language of this provision, said preference
exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate."
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

PREFERENCE NOT APPLY WHEN THERE IS A WILL

None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar.

The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still
pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names
Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is
more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his
appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties
thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of
the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or
administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies
within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.

OPINION:

This case reminds us that the preference as to the next to kin does not apply when there is a
will. And that presence of such will cannot say that the decedent died intestate.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

4. LUNSOD VS ORTEGA 45 PHIL 664

G.R. No. 14904 September 19, 1921

FRANCISCO D. LUNSOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
SINFOROSO ORTEGA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Rufina Medel inherited by operation of law from her daughter Anacleta Ortega the three
parcels of land in question.

Anacleta Ortega acquired it gratuitously by inheritance from her father Estanislao Ortega.

The said three parcels came from Mariano Ortega, father of the deceased Estanislao Ortega.

Sinforoso and Francisco Ortega (uncle and aunt of the descendant's predecessor in interest
with respect to the property) are relatives within the third degree of the child Anacleta Ortega,
daughter of Estanislao Ortega.

Rufina Medel, widow, in a public document executed and acknowledged on the same day
before Felix Esconde, notary public, sold to Francisco Lunsod with the right to repurchase for two
years.

Petitioner filed in the justice of the peace court a complaint against Sinforoso Ortega and
Candido Cariaga. In said complaint the description of the parcels in question was given and the
plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of the three parcels of land mentioned in the aforementioned
document and that he was illegally, and by means of strategy and stealth, turned out of the
possession thereof by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have been collecting the fruits,
thereby injuring him in the sum of P150.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rufina Medel is obliged to reserve the property.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

OBLIGATION TO RESERVE

According to article 811 of the Civil Code an ascendant who inherits from a descendant any
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law in favor of the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.

NOT ONLY USUFRACUARY, BUT ALSO OWNER

The person obliged to reserve was not only a usufructuary but also the owner in fee simple of
the three parcels of land in question, notwithstanding the fact that they have the character of
reservable property in favor of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, relatives within the third degree of said
Anacleta Ortega and belonging to the line from which such property came, and, in her capacity as
such, she could have, as she did, sold with the right to repurchase on June 3, 1915, said three parcels
to Francisco Lunsod.

SUBJECT TO RESOLUTORY CONDITION

Rufina Medel acquired these parcels subject to a resolutory condition. Her ownership of said
property was subject to said condition, which is the existence of the relatives, included within the
third degree and belonging to the line from which said property came, of Anacleta Ortega from whom
she inherited said property at the time of her death by virtue of which condition said property was
impressed with the reservable character, according to the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code,
and therefore she could not have effected said sale without saving the rights of the persons entitled to
have the property reserved to them, by securing to the latter the value thereof, according to the
provision of article 974 and 975 of the Civil Code in connection with article 109 of the Mortgage Law
and in the manner established in this article, the provisions of the first two articles being applicable by
analogy to reservable property mentioned in article 811 of the Civil Code to which reference has
already been made.

Rufina Medel not having complied with the provisions of said article in effecting the sale of said
parcels in favor of Francisco Lunsod, inasmuch as the document executed for the purpose was not
recorded in the registry of property, and she could not, therefore, have made in the corresponding
record the express reservation of the right of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega over said property, and
said Rufina Medel not having even mentioned in said document the fact that said property was
reservable, said alienation is void and can have no effect as against the persons entitled to have such
property reserved, who are Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega. And Rufina Medel having died on April 10,
1916, leaving as her survivors the persons already mentioned and entitled to have the property
reserved in their favor, and the condition attached to the title to said parcels having thus been
resolved, said parcels became the absolute and exclusive property of the same persons entitled to
have said property reserved as relatives within the third degree of Anacleta Ortega and belonging to
the line from which said property came.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

BEING AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR DOES NOT GIVE THE COURT EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER
THE TITLE OF A SPECIFIC PROPERTY.

It is established doctrine that the mere fact that one of the parties is the executor or
administrator of the estate of the deceased person does not confer upon the probate court, in which
the proceedings for the distribution and settlement of said estate are pending, exclusive jurisdiction to
decide all questions that may arise between said executor or administrator and third persons as to the
title to a specific property.

OPINION:
This case is a case regarding the obligation to reserve of the reservoir. The reservoir not only
acquires the usufractuary but also the owner of the property. But not without limitations, he is an
owner with a resolutory condition.
This case is where the mother inherited 3 lands from her child, who inherited them from her
father. The mother sold the land without stating that the lands were subject to be reserved. The buyer
then filed a case against the relative within third degree to leave the land not knowing of the situation.
This just show how important is it to disclose that the property is subject to reserve.
It also discussed that there that being an executor or administrator does not give the court
exclusive jurisdiction over the title of a specific property.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

5. MARCELINO VS ANTONIO 70 PHIL 388

G.R. No. L-46847 June 29, 1940

Testamentaria de la finada Arcadia Santos (alias Leocadia).

MAXIMINA MARCELINO, solicitante y apelada,
vs.
ROSARIO ANTONIO Y OTROS, solicitantes y apelantes.

FACTS:

After the will of the late Arcadia (Leocadia) Santos was legalized by the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte, his heirs Felisa Antonio and others presented two motions:

One, asking for inventory and rendering of acccounts of all properties which comes to the
possession and knowledge of the executor.

Second, it was requested that the deceased's will be declared void in respect of any legacy or
interest given in said last will to Calixta Peralta, daughter of Casimiro Peralta, one of the
witnesses to the will.

The court, holding the opposition of Maximina Marcelino and Calixta Peralta, dismissed the
motions, on the grounds that they raised questions to be addressed in separate ordinary action.

The movers appealed against that order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to determine the legality of the testamentary disposition

RULING :

YES.

DISCUSSION:

INHERENT POWER TO DETERMINE LAGALITY OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION

As for the other motion, in which the will is declared void in relation to the legacy made in
favor of Calixta Peralta, and as to the memorandum of the movers with respect to the exclusion of
certain properties of the inventory of the testamentary, the Order cannot be upheld either.

After all the debts of a testamentary or intestamentary have been paid, the court has
jurisdiction to proceed with the participation and distribution of the inheritance among the interested
parties. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the court may or may not respect the distribution made in
the will, according to whether or not this distribution is in accordance with the provisions of the law.
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The power, therefore, to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary dispositions, is
inherent to the jurisdiction of the court when proceeding to a fair and legal distribution of the
inheritance.

On the other hand, to declare that an independent and separate action is necessary for that
purpose, is to go against the general tendency of jurisprudence to avoid multiplicity of lawsuits, and is,
moreover, costly, dilatory and impractical.

OPINION:

In this case, it is showed that the court has jurisdiction to determine the legality of the
testamentary disposition. With this it may or may not respect the distribution made in the will.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

6. BABAO VS VILLAVICENCIO 44 PHIL 91

G.R. No. 18140 September 1, 1922

MARIA BABAO, applicant-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIA G. VILLAVICENCIO, administratrix-appellant.

FACTS:

In the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ignacio Trillanes, Maria Babao,
appellee, petitioned the court that an additional inventory be made of certain properties of the
deceased and an allowance be made to her minor children for their support, pending the distribution
of the estate. These minors are children of Jose Trillanes, son of the deceased Ignacio Trillanes. In
other words, they are the grandchildren of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to the provisional support granted by Section 684 of the Code of Civil
Procedure extends to the grandchildren of the deceased.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

RIGHT TO RECEIVE SUPPORT DOES NOT INCLUDE GRANDCHILDREN

The reference made in the aforesaid section to "allowances as are provided by the law in force
in the Philippine Islands on and immediately prior to the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight," does not, in the opinion of the court, have the effect of extending the right to this
provisional support to persons other than the children of the deceased.

Such reference is made only with regard to the extent of the allowances to be made during the
pendency of the proceeding for the settlement of the estate, but cannot have the effect of extending
the allowances to persons who are in entitled to support under the Civil Code come under this section
would justify the inclusion in this phrase "widow and minor children of a deceased" even of the
brothers of the deceased, who are also entitled to support under Article 143 of the Civil Code.

OPINION:

This case discussed that the support does not include grandchildren.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

7. SANTERO VS CFI OF CAVITE ET AL GR 61700 9/14/1987

G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987

PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE SANTERO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA,
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and REYNALDO EVARISTO, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of PABLO SANTERO, respondents.

FACTS:

Acting on the Motion for Allowance filed by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, thru their
guardian, Anselma Diaz, the Opposition thereto filed by the oppositors, the Reply to Opposition filed
by movant Anselma Diaz and the Rejoinder filed by the oppositors, the Court was constrained to
examine the Motion for Allowance filed by the movant wherein the ground cited was for support
which included educational expenses, clothing and medical necessities, which was granted and said
minors were given an allowance prayed for by them.

In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant Anselma Diaz only followed the
precedent of the Court which granted a similar motion last year to be spent for the school expenses of
her wards.

In their opposition the oppositors contend that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no
longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship.

They likewise allege that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said
allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they constitute funds held in
trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from which said
administrator derives the only income of the intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the allowance to the respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel-P2,000.00 each
despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the exception of
Miguel.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE SUPPORT

The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. Special Proceedings (5 to 7 pm Sat)

and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.

While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of
the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.

Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero
are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo
Santero.

Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the
children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right
cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.

Though, take note that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse"
(not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

OPINION:

This case opens our eyes to the reality that our laws should be viewed as one.

True, the Rules of Court do limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children
of the deceased. In the New Civil Code, it gave the surviving spouse and their children without
distinction.

Also, take note that Rules of Court is a procedural law and the New Civil Code is a substantive
law and a mere procedural rule does not prevail over a substantive law.