Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online)
x
Volume 22 Number 1 2008 pp 1–7
ARTICLES
GENETIC ENHANCEMENT – A THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS?
ELIZABETH FENTON
Keywords
genetic enhancement,
human rights,
human nature,
dignity
I. GLOBALISM, BIOETHICS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
The call has been made for global bioethics. In an age
of pandemics, international drug trials, and genetic
technology, health has gone global, and bioethics
must follow suit. George Annas is one among a
number of thinkers to recommend that bioethics
expand beyond its traditional domain of patient-
physician interactions to encompass a broader range
of health-related matters. Medicine, Annas argues,
must ‘develop a global language and a global strategy
Address for correspondence: Elizabeth Mary Fenton, Philosophy Department, 120 Cocke Hall, PO Box 400780, University of Virginia, Charlottesville,
Virginia 22904. emf7u@virginia.edu
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00564.
ABSTRACT
Genetic enhancement is the modification of the human genome for
the purpose of improving capacities or ‘adding in’ desired character-
istics. Although this technology is still largely futuristic, debate over
the moral issues it raises has been significant. George Annas has
recently leveled a new attack against genetic enhancement, drawing
on human rights as his primary weapon. I argue that Annas’ appeal
to human rights ultimately falls flat, and so provides no good reason
to object to genetic technology. Moreover, this argument is an
example of the broader problem of appealing to human rights as a
panacea for ethical problems. Human rights, it is often claimed, are
‘trumps’: if it can be shown that a proposed technology violates
human rights, then it must be cast aside. But human rights are
neither a panacea for ethical problems nor a trump card. If they are
drafted into the service of an argument, it must be shown that an
actual human rights violation will occur. Annas’ argument against
genetic technology fails to do just this. I shall conclude that his
appeal to human rights adds little to the debate over the ethical
questions raised by genetic technology.
that can help to improve the health of all of the
world’s citizens’.1 Others have identified the need for
a lingua franca to address bioethics concerns that
transcend national and cultural boundaries.2 Bio-
technology, which potentially affects the whole
human species, presents challenges to our moral
1
George Annas. 2005. American Bioethics: Crossing Human Rights and
Health Law Boundaries. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 24.
2
Lori P. Knowles. The Lingua Franca of Human Rights and the Rise
of a Global Bioethic. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2001; 10: 253–263. David
C. Thomasma. Proposing a New Agenda: Bioethics and International
Human Rights. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2001; 10: 299–310.
2 Elizabeth Fenton
thinking ‘so formidable and far-reaching’, argues
Roberto Andorno, that ‘individual countries alone
cannot address them’.3
Individual countries cannot address global health
issues, and neither are culturally specific principles
adequate for addressing global bioethics concerns.
Global issues require global consensus about the
grounds from which deliberations on the issues
should proceed. This consensus in turn requires a
foundation of universally agreed-upon statements
about humankind, which will be transcultural yet
supportive of moral pluralism. The claim has been
made that such a foundation already exists in
human rights, and that human rights should, there-
fore, be the new lingua franca of bioethics.
There are good reasons for advancing this claim.
First, global health issues such as disease pandemics
are public health issues. Since the adequacy of social
conditions is a focus of both public health and
human rights practice, human rights language, it is
argued, is therefore a fitting articulation of public
health ethics. Jonathan Mann has argued for a
strong relationship between public health and
human rights on the ground that violations of
human rights have significant adverse effects on
health and well-being.4 Annas has argued that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights should
serve as the code of ethics for public health, since
both seek to provide ‘the conditions under which
humans can flourish’.5
Second, human rights discourse, as Robert Baker
points out, ‘is already the accepted language of
international ethics’.6 As such, it serves as the ubi-
quitous mode of expressing social criticism, and is
a significant framework for addressing social pro-
blems. If bioethics is to progress and take part in
international debate on social issues, it must take
human rights as its starting point.
3
Roberto Andorno. Biomedicine and international human rights law:
in search of a global consensus. Bull World Health Organ 2002; 80(12):
959–963.
4
Jonathan M. Mann. Medicine and public health, ethics and human
rights. Hastings Cent Rep 1997; 27(3): 6–14.
5
Annas, op. cit. note 1, p. 24.
6
Robert Baker. Bioethics and Human Rights: A Historical Perspective.
Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2001; 10: 241–252. Andorno shares this view,
calling human rights ‘the last expression of a universal ethics’, and ‘a
‘lingua franca’ of international relations’. (Andorno, op. cit. note 3,
p. 960).
Third, as part of a legal regime, human rights
carry significantly more weight than ethical prin-
ciples that may be ignored without consequence.
Bioethics may benefit from yoking itself to a doc-
trine with significant legal clout on the global stage.
Fourth, human rights are the currency of an ever-
increasing body of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). Physicians for Human Rights, Médecins
sans Frontières, Médecins du Monde, and Annas’
own Global Lawyers and Physicians are just some
of the many NGOs that form an important and
energized political movement focused on promoting
human rights. Taking the language of human rights
as its foundation could allow bioethics to advance
its goals on the wheels of this established political
machine.
These four claims indicate the advantages of a
strong relationship between bioethics and human
rights. But there are also good reasons to be circum-
spect regarding the potential of human rights to
serve as the language of global bioethics. Advocates
of a human rights foundation for bioethics, such as
George Annas, are placing unreasonable demands
on the language and conceptual framework of
human rights. A key example of the misplaced use of
human rights in bioethical debate is Annas’ argu-
ment against genetic technology, in which he claims
that reproductive cloning and genetic enhancement
ought to be classified as a new category of ‘crimes
against humanity’, and that scientists who develop
these technologies are properly considered to be
committing terrorist acts.7 In a similar vein, the
European Parliament claims to be convinced that
cloning for any reason is ‘morally repugnant, con-
trary to respect for the person, and a grave violation
of fundamental human rights’.8 These claims rely on
the language of human rights to argue against bio-
technology, but it is unclear whether the human
rights framework is the most useful or appropriate
basis for such an objection. This paper examines the
legitimacy of these claims, both to debunk them as
objections to biotechnology, and to illustrate that
the language and framework of human rights, while
7
Annas, op. cit. note 1, p. 40.
8
The European Parliament. 1998. Resolution on Human Cloning O.J.
(C 34) 164. Available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
cloning2.html [Accessed May 27, 2006].
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
 Genetic Enhancement – A Threat to Human Rights?
it has much to offer bioethics, must be used judi-
ciously, rather than imported wholesale.9
II. HUMAN NATURE AS THE SOURCE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
Annas’ primary argument against genetic enhance-
ment technology proceeds as follows. First, he as-
sumes that human rights and human equality are
grounded in human dignity; and human dignity, in
turn, is grounded in a common human nature.
Second, he assumes that genetic technology offers
possibilities for changing our common human
nature, or ‘fundamental human characteristics’. For
example, it could make some human traits optional
(such as sexual reproduction, through cloning), or it
could lead to the creation of individuals who did not
fit the species definition of Homo sapiens, or who
were incapable of sexually reproducing with a
member of that species. From these two assump-
tions Annas concludes that any such changes to our
common human nature will undermine the very
basis of human rights and human equality:
Because it is the meaning of humanness (our dis-
tinctness from other animals) that has given birth
to our concepts of both human dignity and
human rights, altering our nature threatens to
undermine our concepts of both human dignity
and human rights. With their loss the fundamen-
tal belief in human equality would also be lost.10
This argument implicitly assumes that the kinds of
changes that biotechnology promises – i.e. changes
to genetically based traits or characteristics – are the
9
It is important to note that this paper focuses on one particular view
of human rights – that emerging in recent criticisms of biotechnology
made by George Annas and other ‘techno-conservatives’ such as
Francis Fukuyama and Jürgen Habermas. This view of human rights
rests on an account of human nature, and it is to this account that the
principle criticisms of the paper are addressed. Other views of human
rights reject the human nature account, and so are unlikely to be vul-
nerable to this critique. Rober Baker, for example, argues in favor of
human rights-based global bioethics, but rejects the human nature
account of human rights, on the grounds that on such an account rights
are so profoundly influenced by culture that they are unable to tran-
scend particular cultural contexts and so serve as an adequate basis of
global bioethics. See particularly Robert Baker. A Theory of Interna-
tional Bioethics. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 1998; 8(3): 233–274.
10
Annas, op. cit. note 1, p. 37.
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
3
kinds of changes that threaten human nature. In
other words, Annas assumes that the ‘human nature’
that underpins human rights is essentially biological.
Having concluded that genetic technology threat-
ens human rights and human equality, and making
the tacit assumption that human rights and human
equality ought to be preserved, Annas argues that
human nature, our ‘fundamental human character-
istics’, should be protected from change. Since
human nature is what binds us as a species, his
arguments call for protection and preservation of
the human species, protection from technology
whose use, he believes, constitutes a new category of
‘crimes against humanity’.11 What is really at stake,
then, is our very existence as a species. Again, im-
plicit in this argument is the assumption that pro-
tecting our existence as a species means protecting
the biological traits that currently define the species.
While acknowledging that some genetic enhance-
ments, such as improvements to memory, immunity,
or strength, may not change the nature of the species
or create individuals who no longer fit the definition
of H. sapiens, Annas has serious concerns about the
potential of enhancement technology to lead to the
creation of a new species of humans, the ‘posthu-
mans’. The differences between humans and post-
humans, Annas predicts, will be such as to render
one species inferior in the eyes of the other, lead-
ing to exploitation, enslavement, or even ‘genetic
genocide’.12
In sum: genetic technology endangers our dignity,
equality, and rights as human beings; it threatens
our existence as a species; and it poses the specter of
inter-species warfare.
III. CRITIQUE OF ANNAS’ CORE
ARGUMENT
(a) Annas’ core argument claims that human nature,
described in terms of fixed biological traits that
define membership in the species Homo sapiens,
is the foundation for human rights. This claim im-
plies that fixed biological traits are normatively
significant, that their presence or absence determines
11
Ibid: 40.
12
Annas, op. cit. note 1, p. 51.
4 Elizabeth Fenton
membership not only in a species, but also in a moral
community defined by the notion of human rights.
While remaining agnostic on the question of
whether human rights are based on human nature,
I reject Annas’ assumption that human nature is
reducible to biological traits, and his assumption
that fixed biological traits are normatively con-
nected to moral status or the notion of human
rights. Even if it is the case that human rights are
best thought of as founded on commonalities be-
tween all humans, biological commonalities are
insufficient for this foundation. The moral status of
non-human animals, for example, has long been
considered by many to depend not on the species to
which they belong, but rather on morally relevant
characteristics, such as the capacity to feel pain.
Some morally relevant characteristics track biologi-
cal traits, but this is not necessarily so, and it is
certainly not the case that the human genome as it is
currently constituted, is either necessary or sufficient
for membership in the moral community. As Mary
Anne Warren argues, ‘Genetic humanity . . . is at
best an indicator, not an independently valid crite-
rion, of moral status’.13
The notion that human rights are grounded in the
presence of certain biological traits, such as sexual
reproduction, obscures the primary function of
human rights as equalizing the moral or legal status
of human beings, notwithstanding their manifest dif-
ferences. Moreover, it obscures the notion of the
moral community as formed by individuals possess-
ing morally relevant characteristics, such as the
capacity to suffer, to experience pain, fear or grief.
Biological traits are not in themselves morally re-
levant: whether a being reproduces sexually or by
cloning is irrelevant, just by itself, to the moral status
of that being. Such traits cannot therefore be the sole
determinants of whether a being is entitled to claim
rights or human rights. They may co-exist with or
correspond to other features of the being that are
morally relevant, as would be the case if it turned out
that only sexually reproducing beings are rational,
choosing agents. Biological traits like sexual repro-
duction alone cannot determine moral status or
rights claims. Any changes to these traits through
13
Mary Anne Warren. 1997. Moral Status: obligations to persons and
other living things Oxford: Clarendon Press: 19.
genetic engineering cannot, just by themselves, pose
a threat to human nature, nor to human rights.
(b) In addition to the claim that human nature
is reducible to biology, Annas’ argument makes a
significant assumption about the foundations of
human rights. He claims that human rights have a
single foundation, namely human dignity, which, in
turn, is grounded in biologically defined human
nature. In order to argue successfully that gene-
tic engineering undermines human nature, thereby
threatening the foundation of human rights and so
the rights themselves, Annas owes us an account of
what that foundation is. But further analysis of the
concept of dignity is glaringly absent from the argu-
ment. I suggest that there are two ways in which
Annas’ use of ‘dignity’ can be understood, neither of
which advances his argument.
The first possibility is that Annas views dignity as
a religious or metaphysical foundation for human
rights, perhaps grounded in the claim that human
beings are sacred or intrinsically valuable, created in
the image of God. But this kind of foundational
claim is highly controversial. Since human rights are
supposed to be universal in their application – that
is, valid for all human beings regardless of their race,
religion, gender, and so on – the claim that they are
founded on a singular philosophical or theological
view of human nature will be problematic. There is
widespread religious disagreement among the in-
dividuals to whom these rights apply. Atheists will
reject the notion that human beings are sacred, since
‘sacred’ implies a God whose creations are sacred,
while non-Christians will reject the notion that
humans are sacred in the eyes of a single Christian
God. Humans disagree about what kinds of being
they are and what makes them special, if anything.
To take any single philosophical or religious idea
and claim that it is the foundation of a universal
doctrine will not only vitiate the doctrine’s claim to
universality, but will render it illegitimate in the eyes
of many of those to whom it is supposed to apply.
As Amy Gutmann observes,
If human rights necessarily rest on a moral
or metaphysical foundation that is not in any
meaningful sense universal or publicly defensible
in the international arena . . . then the political
legitimacy of human rights talk, human rights
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
 Genetic Enhancement – A Threat to Human Rights? 5

covenants, and human rights enforcement is that dignity is necessarily threatened by genetic tech-
called into question.14 nology, Annas would be guilty of begging the fun-
damental question. If dignity stands in for the
In short, this first suggested gloss on Annas’s notion
conditions of a fully human or flourishing human
of dignity founders on the problem of pluralism. In
life, then in claiming that it is threatened by genetic
order to be acceptable to a wide range of people,
technology, Annas assumes precisely that which he
human rights cannot claim to have a single moral,
intends to prove, namely that genetic technology
metaphysical or religious foundation. There is,
can only make life worse, not better. Second, on this
however, another interpretation of Annas’ use of
interpretation of dignity, Annas loses the thrust
‘dignity’ that may be more charitable than the single
behind his claim that dignity is threatened by gene-
foundation view. On this gloss, dignity is not a
tic technology. If dignity is equivalent to agency,
unitary philosophical or religious conception, but
then clearly it is not necessarily threatened by
rather shorthand, or a placeholder, for a range of
genetic technology, since most proposed interven-
concepts that define human rights. For example,
tions do not endanger agency, understood as self-
‘dignity’ could stand in for a single feature of human
determination or the capacity to choose goals and
beings, such as agency. James Griffin argues that
the freedom to pursue them.18 Enhanced memory or
dignity is derived from agency; human rights are
intelligence, for example, would improve capacities
grounded in the dignity of persons, but the stress is
that humans already possess. If a student of the
on persons or agents, rather than on dignity.15 Or it
future is better able to recall material she was taught
could stand in for the conditions of a fully human or
years (or even semesters) before, her agency has not
flourishing life. Martha Nussbaum argues that the
been undermined; she is a more efficient agent when
dignity of a human being consists in the freedom to
it comes to memory recall. Someone who lives to the
choose to perform certain functions – i.e. the capa-
age of 150 is no less of an agent than someone of the
bility to perform those functions – functions that are
current era who lives only to 85; the extra 65 years
‘of central importance to a human life’.16 For a
would, in fact, actually bestow more time in which
human being to be free and dignified, she must have
to be an agent.
the capability to perform these functions in some
Annas could concede that longevity or better
way guaranteed, whether or not she actually
memory does not undermine agency, and still main-
chooses to perform them. On this account human
tain that dignity, standing in for the conditions of a
dignity is tethered to humanness per se, since a life
full and flourishing life, is threatened by this tech-
without certain basic capabilities is ‘too lacking, too
nology – i.e. that allowing enhancement will make
impoverished, to be human at all’.17 When Annas
our society a worse place to live. But this is an
claims that human dignity is the foundation of
empirical claim about the future, one on which
human rights, he could mean that these capabilities
Annas could simply be wrong. The conditions of a
or conditions, or human agency, are what give
full and flourishing human life could change as
human rights their meaning and application.
genetic technology proliferates. In listing the capa-
But this interpretation of dignity will not help
bilities necessary for a fully human life, Nussbaum
Annas for two reasons. First, if he wants to claim
explicitly claims that the list is ‘open-ended’ and
14
therefore evolving.19 Moreover, none of these
Amy Gutmann, ed. Michael Ignatieff. 2001. Human Rights as Politics
and Idolatry. Princeton: Princeton University Press: xvii.
capabilities (bodily health, imagination, emotion,
15
James Griffin. Discrepancies between the best philosophical account practical reason, friendship, etc.) are in fact threat-
of human rights and the international law of human rights. The Presi- ened by, for example, enhanced intelligence or ath-
dential Address, Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, October 9, 2000.
16
Martha C. Nussbaum. 2002. Capabilities and Human Rights. In
leticism. Even if Annas insists at this point that the
Global Justice and Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and
18
Political Challenges of Globalization. Pablo de Greiff and Ciaran Griffin, op. cit. note 20, p. 4.
19
Cronin, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press: 127. Martha C. Nussbaum. 1995. Human Capabilities, Female Human
17
Martha C. Nussbaum. Social Justice and Universalism: In Defense of Beings. In Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capa-
an Aristotelian Account of Human Functioning. Mod Philol 1993; 90, bilities. Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathon Glover, eds. Oxford: Clar-
Supplement: S57. endon Press: 74.

© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

6 Elizabeth Fenton
technology could have a negative impact on impor-
tant human institutions or practices, rather than a
direct physical or psychological impact on individu-
als, it is still not necessarily the case that genetic
enhancement technology will undermine the condi-
tions for a flourishing life, particularly if those
conditions are open-ended. The conditions of a
flourishing human life could be met in a society
using genetic enhancement technology. If Annas
intends dignity to be understood as a placeholder
for agency or the conditions of a good life, his objec-
tion to genetic technology simply falls flat. This is
not to say that genetic technology could never truly
threaten human agency or the conditions of a flour-
ishing life, or that there would not be good reasons
to oppose technology that does so. Rather, it is to
say that wholesale opposition to the technology
cannot be supported by the claim that it necessarily
threatens either of these.
Annas’ appeal to dignity as the foundation for
human rights is open to two interpretations, both of
which fail to provide any plausible basis for his claim
that genetic technology threatens human rights. His
attempt to invoke human rights as a means to object
to genetic technology doubly fails. It fails in its
account of human nature, and in its account of
human dignity, and therefore fails to show that either
of these is threatened by genetic technology. I thus
see no good reason to object to genetic technology on
the ground that it threatens human rights.
(c) I turn now to Annas’ concern that human use
of genetic technology will result in inequalities
between individuals, and perhaps even changes so
significant as to produce a species of ‘posthumans’.
Annas is concerned that humans and posthumans
would not be equal in the sense required for the
applicability of equal human rights. But the only
sense in which Annas could surmise that humans
and posthumans would not be equal is in the sense
that the differences between them, in biological
terms, would be significant. Posthumans, for ex-
ample, may not reproduce sexually, but may re-
produce by cloning. As we have already argued, this
view is vitiated by the mistaken assumption that the
equality necessary for human rights is grounded in
shared or common biological traits, but I want here
to emphasize a different problem with this view.
What Annas fails to acknowledge is that humans,
within the species, already vary greatly with respect
to their biological characteristics, such as physical
strength, intelligence, talents, aptitudes and so on.
These differences do not undermine the universality
of human rights; in fact, it is the very purpose of
human rights to render all human individuals equal
regardless of such differences.20 The sorts of differ-
ences that Annas predicts will cause so much trouble
are already with us: humans vary in large degree in
terms of their biological makeup. Such differences
are the raison d’être of human rights, whose very
point is to equalize across differences. The changes
most likely to come sooner rather than later from
genetic technology (boosts to ‘primary goods’ such
as the immune system, memory, or intelligence)21
will merely replicate the exact nature of the differ-
ences that already exist among individuals protected
by human rights. So those rights will continue to
protect individuals who may differ from us in sig-
nificant ways – the differences themselves are
morally irrelevant. This point reinforces the argu-
ment above, that human rights are not grounded in
fixed biological traits, such that individuals who do
not share those traits cannot enjoy human rights.
Fixed biological traits may ground species distinc-
tions and determine species membership, but if a
child born tomorrow lacked, for example, the
capacity to reproduce sexually, or had gills instead
of normal human breathing apparatus, that child
would not be denied human rights, though she may
represent the beginning of ‘posthumanity’.
20
It is important to note that some physical similarity is assumed here.
In his discussion of the ‘circumstances of justice’ Rawls emphasizes the
necessity of rough equality of human beings in their physical character-
istics, in addition to their moral equality (John Rawls. 1971. A Theory
of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press: 127; Chapter 3,
Section 22.). It is for this reason that animals are not considered in the
discussion of the basic principles of justice. But while humans differ
from one another much less than they differ from members of other
species, individual humans can differ from one another significantly,
and the circumstances of justice remain. Enhancement technology will
not produce humans so different from us that the circumstances of
justice will not obtain. I may be more different from an unenhanced and
severely mentally disabled individual than I am from an enhanced indi-
vidual with a better memory, yet since I recognize the severely disabled
person as standing in the relationship of justice to us, then I will also
recognize the enhanced individual as a subject of justice.
21
Some very basic characteristics are described as natural primary
goods, in the Rawlsian sense of being ‘maximally flexible assets’, or
goods regardless of one’s life plan or vision of the good. Alan Buchanan
et al. 2000. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press: 80, 174.
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
 Genetic Enhancement – A Threat to Human Rights?
Moreover, Annas’ attempt to argue for a ban on
genetic technology on the grounds that it introduces
levels of difference between humans that will be be-
yond the equalizing power of human rights simply
overlooks the potential the technology has for good.
At the very beginning of an era of enhancement we
should look ahead with a pragmatic optimism, rather
than presuming the worst and predicting a future of
science fiction horrors.22 Annas may be exaggerating
for rhetorical effect, but exaggeration does not
obscure the basic point: although we should proceed
with caution, we should do so with an eye for the
good outcomes of the technology as well as the bad.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Annas’ core argument against genetic technology,
in particular enhancement and cloning technology,
centers on the claims that human nature is the foun-
dation of human rights, that human nature is
threatened by genetic technology, and therefore that
human rights are threatened by genetic technology.
The appeal to human nature as the foundation of
human rights is deeply problematic philosophically.
It rests on the dubious claim that human nature is
defined by fixed biological traits of the sort that may
be altered through genetic technology, and imbues
these traits with misplaced normative significance,
claiming that the characteristics that determine
species membership are also those that determine
the applicability of human rights. Not only is Annas
mistaken in claiming that human nature can be
reduced to biology, he also fails to provide an
account of human dignity adequate to justify his
claim that it is the foundation of human rights. If he
is claiming that dignity is the single, authoritative
22
Dismal fictional accounts of the human future, such as Aldous Hux-
ley’s Brave New World are often cited in support of arguments against
genetic technology. But not all fictional accounts of a genetically engi-
neered future are pessimistic. Perhaps the most apposite science fiction
treatment of the subject of enhancement is the X-Men comics and films,
which portray the social and political conflicts between humans as
presently constituted and ‘mutants’ endowed with an impressive variety
of special powers (e.g. telepathy, teleporting, etc.), who are said to
represent the next stage of human evolution. Importantly, the non-
humans and X-characters in these futuristic worlds are portrayed, like
the humans, as full agents; and peaceful co-existence among them all is
viewed as possible and desirable in spite of prejudice against the
mutants on the part of the unmodified humans.
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
7
foundation for human rights, his argument founders
on moral pluralism. If instead he is claiming that
dignity can stand in for other features of human
beings, such as agency, then he begs the question
against genetic technology in claiming that it vio-
lates human dignity. In this core argument Annas
gives no reason to accept that genetic technology
threatens either human nature or human rights.
A broader conclusion can also be drawn from this
discussion. Annas invokes human rights to justify a
ban on genetic technology, in part because he views
standard bioethical arguments as ‘too weak a reed’
on which to base such a ban. Bioethics alone is too
weak because the issues at stake concern something
grander than medical and scientific practice – viz.
‘the nature of humanity and the rights of humans’.23
But even if human rights talk is not wholly mis-
placed in the debate over genetic technology, it does
not add to the conversation. The ethical problems
raised by genetic technology need to be carefully
analyzed and thought through, but it is far from
clear that human rights are of any help in doing this,
particularly since this technology need not violate
human rights in any case. Annas’ argument against
genetic technology is an example of human rights
language being deployed as a trump card, an ulti-
mate and unarguable reason to oppose the technol-
ogy. But as this analysis shows, the deployment of
human rights language requires careful thought,
and even in the most significant of ethical debates, it
may be neither appropriate nor helpful.
The call for a global bioethic is not in itself mis-
guided; bioethics must ‘go global’ to meet public
health challenges that transcend national and cul-
tural boundaries. But the call for human rights to
serve as the foundation and lingua franca of the new
bioethics is misguided. Human rights form only a
part of morality, and so should form only a part of
bioethics. The genetic technology debate is a key
example of an instance in which it may be better to
explore other aspects of our ethical thinking, forsak-
ing human rights talk altogether.
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor John D. Arras
in developing this argument and making comments on previous drafts.
I am thankful to the reviewers of Bioethics for their helpful comments.
23
Annas, op. cit. note 1, p. 39.