FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred
member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific
case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who
had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon
was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be
reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was
there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of
respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief
Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative
case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through
its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-
Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On
January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required
the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On
March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing
on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend
to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that
the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that
he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a
previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of
the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al.,
Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the
integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine,
has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was
rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting
with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by
persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the
matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the
consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the
appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent
could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other
cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled
with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that
his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of
disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different
attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances
of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He
likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their
confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times
unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it
did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance
on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to
regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid.
Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred
from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said
that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the
dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as
far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership.
What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient
time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the
part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a
privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos,
De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2005 July 14, 2006
[OCA-IPI No. 04-2122-RTJ]
JOSEFINA CRUZ-AREVALO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LYDIA QUERUBIN-LAYOSA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City,
respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative Complaint1 filed by Josefina Cruz-Arevalo charges Judge Lydia Querubin-
Layosa2 with manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case No. Q-
03-50379, entitled Josefina Cruz-Arevalo and Conrado R. Cruz v. Home Development Mutual
Fund and Federico S. Quimbo.
Complainant narrates that Conrado R. Cruz executed an authorization letter3 and a special power
of attorney (SPA)4 in her favor to represent him in Civil Case No. Q-03-50379 while he
undergoes medical treatment in the United States of America (USA). Notwithstanding the
presentation of the authorization letter and SPA during the pre-trial, respondent judge declared
Cruz non-suited due to his absence. She also refused to issue an order to that effect thus
depriving Cruz the right to challenge her order by way of petition for certiorari. Complainant
also assails the order of respondent judge to exclude several paragraphs in the Affidavit which
was adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without giving her counsel a chance to
comment on the objections raised by the defendants. Moreover, she refused to issue a written
order excluding certain paragraphs thus depriving complainant the opportunity to file certiorari
proceedings.
Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or collusion by silence5
with the defendants for not acting on her Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad
Testificandum6 thus providing opportunity for defendant Quimbo to avoid compliance therewith.
Complainant prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality and proper dispensation
of justice.7
On November 14, 2004, respondent judge made the following ruling in Civil Case No. Q-03-
50379:
Considering that plaintiff Josefina Cruz-Arevalo had filed a Complaint against
undersigned Presiding Judge with the Office of the Court Administrator and considering
further that she had also filed with said Office a motion for re-raffle of this case, on
grounds of partiality and bias on the part of said Judge, while such grounds for re-raffle
are unfounded and while there is no legal basis for inhibition, if only to assuage her fears
of not obtaining a fair and impartial trial, and having already entertained serious doubt on
her objectivity in trying and eventually deciding the case, the undersigned Presiding
Judge deems it wise to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case.
Accordingly, undersigned Presiding Judge hereby inhibits herself from trying this case.
Let the entire record be forwarded to the Office of the Executive Judge through the Clerk
of Court of this Court for re-raffle.8
In her Comment9 dated January 12, 2005, respondent judge explains that the letter presented by
complainant allegedly authorizing her to represent Cruz in the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-03-
50379 is defective because it was not duly notarized and authenticated. She likewise found the
SPA defective as it pertains to complainant's authority to receive Cruz's contribution to the PAG-
IBIG Provident Fund and not to represent him in the pre-trial of the civil case. Thus, finding the
absence of Cruz during the pre-trial inexcusable and without any proper representation in his
behalf, respondent judge dismissed the complaint insofar as he is concerned.
As regards the exclusion of several paragraphs in the Affidavit constituting as the direct
testimony of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., respondent judge points out that she gave the other
party the chance to go over the affidavit and make objections thereto like any direct testimonial
evidence. She claims that no written order is necessary as demanded by complainant's counsel
because her rulings were made in open court during the course of trial and are already reflected
in the transcript of the stenographic notes. With regard to complainant's Motions for Writs of
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum, respondent judge avers that they were not given
due course because the legal fees for said motions were unpaid and the person alleged to have
possession or control of the documents sought to be produced is not named or specified
therein.10
In its Report11 dated October 18, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
complainant's accusations unmeritorious and recommended the dismissal of the administrative
case for lack of merit.12
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
The records clearly show that Conrado R. Cruz was absent during the pre-trial of Civil Case No.
Q-03-50379, despite the specific mandate of the Rules of Court for parties and their counsel to
personally appear therein.13 While non-appearance of a party may be excused if a duly
authorized representative shall appear in his behalf,14 however Cruz failed to validly constitute
complainant because his authorization letter and SPA were not respectively authenticated and
specific as to its purpose. Without any authorized representative, the failure of Cruz to appear at
the pre-trial made him non-suited. Respondent judge thus correctly dismissed the complaint in so
far as he is concerned. 15
As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of complainant's witness, the rule
is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party's
offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached
to form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record
the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are
made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the offeror,
he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence. The appellate court
will better understand and appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence involved is included
in the record of the case.16
On the other hand, the ruling on an objection must be given immediately after an objection is
made, as what respondent judge did, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform
itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such
time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situations
presented by the ruling.17 Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking out of portions in
Atty. Arevalo's affidavit which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.18 Objections
based on irrelevancy and immateriality need no specification or explanation. Relevancy or
materiality of evidence is a matter of logic, since it is determined simply by ascertaining its
logical connection to a fact in issue in the case. We agree with OCA's observation that:
There is also nothing irregular when respondent [judge] did not issue an order to reflect
the objections of the defense counsel to each of the allegations in the sworn affidavit
which was adopted as the direct testimony of complainant's counsel as the court's rulings
thereto were made during the trial. As pointed out by respondent [judge], these matters
are already reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes and are not subject to written
order. Orders resolving motions for continuance made in the presence of the adverse
party, or those made in the course of a hearing or trial, may properly be made orally.
(Echaus vs. CA, GR No. 57343, July 23, 1990, [187 SCRA 672]). Moreover, the acts of a
judge in his/her judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
erroneous in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption which complainant failed to
prove in the instant case.
Further, while records show that the person alleged to have possession or control of the
documents sought to be produced is actually named or specified in the Motions for Writs of
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum filed by complainant in Civil Case No. Q-03-
50379, respondent judge was correct not to have entertained the same as the legal fees
corresponding thereto were not paid. Respondent judge is not obliged to remind complainant or
her counsel regarding said fees as the rules of procedure and practice already mandate that fees
prescribed in filing of pleadings or other application which initiates an action or proceeding shall
be paid in full.19 However, this issue has become moot as respondent judge subsequently issued
the subpoena prayed for after the complainant paid the required fees.
Finally, complainant failed to present evidence to show the alleged bias of respondent judge;
mere suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough.20 Bare allegations of partiality will not
suffice in an absence of a clear showing that will overcome the presumption that the judge
dispensed justice without fear or favor. It bears to stress again that a judge's appreciation or
misappreciation of the sufficiency of evidence adduced by the parties, or the correctness of a
judge's orders or rulings on the objections of counsels during the hearing, without proof of
malice on the part of respondent judge, is not sufficient to show bias or partiality.21 The Court
will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench.
At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits
that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Judge Lydia Querubin-Layosa,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.
A.C. No. 4807 March 22, 2000
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE
V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics,
specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C.
Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos.
Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer
College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the
defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge,
compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the
aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims
they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such
an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession
warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents
had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various
Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the
time with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements,
he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were
executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case
involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the
recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter
Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B.
De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz,
were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to
be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member
Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings,
it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the
student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the
erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC
President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th
March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil
case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter
of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-
Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology,
dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon
and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of
apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22
September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997
with the AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael
Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with
the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a
Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law
Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant.
In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against
the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case.
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for
plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this
fact. Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent
attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the
very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was
counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by
design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional
ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the
demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the
Manifestation 1 which, among other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation;
viz:
1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President,
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against
the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 will by filed them.
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP
Board of Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month
suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances
and the explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon
his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an
attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994
CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.
Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.
Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking
the latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a
certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a
deed of assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from
the United States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed
of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid.
Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get,
demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City.
The above documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent
Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the
aforementioned special power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City
post office that she was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence,
Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with damages against complainant.
Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B.
Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on
23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the
Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant
in contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing
her address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated
21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the preliminary injunction to prevent all post
offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw
the pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel
of record but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney
Alexander H. Lim.
On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again
without the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was
stated that complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00.
It was likewise stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would
be paid in monthly installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40% per
annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise agreement was approved by
the trial court on 15 August 1985.
On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment,
based on the following allegations:
7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and
signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them or
at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the
same;
8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement;
(b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c)
respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents
foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything;
9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by respondent;
10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent
complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,
Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other
counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon
the request of complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he
(respondent) made the compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was
informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers.
Complainant stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the
compromise agreement and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by
Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed
grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.
Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4
October 1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect
to any interest to be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on
the promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was
hired by him to collect the loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985,
complainant's debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the
lapse of only ten (10) months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five
percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise agreement provides that the
P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest
of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of mathematical prowess is required
to see that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to
complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise
agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys.
Inting and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from
informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier
quoted in this decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the
compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial
court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel,
respondent saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was
the execution of the compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly
and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.
Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
9. Negotiations with opposite party.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to
the law.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor,
to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty.
Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this
Court. Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they
likewise prevent justice from being attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on
pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May
3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case
No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and
the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case
for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,
does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the
rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC,
in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the
ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that
can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil
aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly
provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a
party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking
the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter
No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No.
00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had
already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the
following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for
the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity
of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS
DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER
COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law
student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in
Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf
of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney
duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board
or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers
to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed
to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the
MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules
of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must
have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to
act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis
for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability
may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no
claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case
do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of
the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave
Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of
the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109149 December 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during
trial, the judgment should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a
new trial. A person who misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for
indirect contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the
offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape 1 of a girl less than
nine (9) years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis,
San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the
prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old
playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant
denied committing the rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the
victim and her playmate, from quarreling.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision 2 finding appellant guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its
accessory penalty. The accused is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the
complainant and another amount for costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of failure to
pay the civil liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 6127, as
amended, and he has agreed in writing to abide by the same rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with the full duration of his preventive
imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal. 3 In his brief, 4 appellant made the
following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING
THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING
TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON
MATERIAL POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS
OWN TO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW
AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first
resolve the issue of proper representation by a member of the bar raised by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto
C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted
the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however,
appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who
discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further
verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact. 5 Appellant therefore
argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding
the fact that appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was
afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the
records reveal that said person "presented the evidence for the defense with the ability
of a seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a professional and
skillful manner." However, the right of the accused to be heard by himself and his
counsel, in our view, goes much deeper than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the
heart of our adversarial system of justice. Where the interplay of basic rights of the
individual may collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need a professional
learned in the law as well as ethically committed to defend the accused by all means fair
and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to
resolve a similar issue in the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals. 6 In Delgado,
petitioner and two others were convicted by the trial court of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public and/or official documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner
Delgado and her remaining co-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of judgment,
petitioner discovered that her lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to set
aside the entry of judgment. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence,
she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court set aside the assailed
judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining that —
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the
bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is
represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf
will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process. 7
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused
was represented by three successive counsels from the Public Attorney's Office, the
Court has ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that accused was given
mere perfunctory representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not
properly and effectively accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en banc case of
People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through Justice
Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers for failing to genuinely protect the interests of
the accused and for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the
court and as members of the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where the accused was not
even duly represented by a certified member of the Philippine Bar, no matter how
zealous his representation might have been.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be
taken lightly. 8 Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. 9 The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the
imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome
prosecutory machinery of the State. 10 Such a right proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is
not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. 11
The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12
and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1
of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the
accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law to the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and
Section 2 thereof clearly provides for the requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar. Jurisprudence has also held that "the right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment,
but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature
of a public
trust." 12 Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v.
Abad, 13 a Bar candidate who has already successfully hurdled the Bar examinations but
has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys, and who was caught in the
unauthorized practice of law was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is
liable for indirect contempt of court for assuming to be an attorney and acting as such
without authority.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby
REMANDED to the trial court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C.
Ompong in connection with this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation
regarding this matter and to report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90)
days from notice of this, order. Let all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar
Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their appropriate action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 139 October 11, 1984
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee, ATTY. PROCOPIO S.
BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association. Inc.,
complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.
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There was likewise received a certification dated May 9, 1984 from the Branch Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig, Branch CLIII,
stating that Elmo Abad y Sanchez is appearing before said court as accused in Criminal
Case No. 50651, *** entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Elmo Abad y Sanchez"
for Qualified Theft (Carnapping).
The actuations of respondent as shown from the foregoing constitute contempt of court
that should be punished more severely considering his temerity in still continuing the
practice of law despite the decision of March 28, 1983.
It is thus respectfully recommended that respondent be:
a. imposed a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10) days from receipt of
this resolution or an imprisonment of twenty (20) days in case of non-
payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary action of
imprisonment in case of any further practice of law after receipt of this
resolution; and
b. debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the
Court finds him fit to become such a member.
It is further recommended that a circular be issued to all courts in the Philippines
through the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent Elmo S. Abad has not
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, and is therefore not authorized to practice law.
Respectfully
submitted:
(SGD.) GLORIA C.
PARAS
Clerk of Court
Respondent fined P2,000.00.
G.R. No. 123698 August 5, 1998
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin
filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting
of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of
said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs.
The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June
25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said
dismissal became final on March 5, 1992. 4
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which
was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is
completely unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and
registered owner of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good
faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion. Another Order was issued on August
18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-
interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in
Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against
5
the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993. 6
On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 109076,
was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7 Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry
of Judgment dated October 21, 1993. 8
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before
the trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's motion was initially granted 9 on
August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private
respondents, the said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.,
who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari 11
with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the
judgment cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the
decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the
property to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality
of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the
assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of religion and worship; and that private
respondents' title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment 12 dismissing the petition for certiorari
on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory.
It ruled, thus:
This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long
become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and possession could have been implemented a
long time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. . . . Petitioner Eternal Gardens
cannot anymore stop the execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this
Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a mere continuation of
petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their
favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment of double costs of this
suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant petition has already become moot
and academic as the property in question was already turned over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs
of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to rest. (Emphasis
ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. 13
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of arguments
espoused in their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties
before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the
controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to
surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties
to the case between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in
Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against
14
the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee.
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21,
1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioner's contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be resolved
before the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or
consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the
property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for
the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in
Civil Case No. C-9297 which will reader the execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to
the pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the
Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include the title to
the subject property. Petitioner argues that the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable
justification why execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property
should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private
respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297.
This is so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was
already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the
said private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse
decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land.
Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
Finally, petitioner's fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution
of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard
to the execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken into
account by the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply
protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.,
stated:
The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy because they can still go after
the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation
pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-
respondents to be placed in possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the same
have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with
the plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or
15
desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots.
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit:
The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are
given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can have access to the property. But as to the
demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with the former owner so that cash payment or
16
cash settlement be made.
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the
following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:
Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many
persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the
interest of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be applied
only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where
the factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves the
17
parcels of land within the said memorial park.
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners
has been properly addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the
questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated
December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriffs Return," 18
dated March 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" 19 indicating therein that private
respondents took possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years
to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution,
interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated,
the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the
real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of
their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes. 20 In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al., 21 we ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which
is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this,
should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the
cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the
courts.
PARAS, J.:p
This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking the
reversal of the decision 1 dated June 27, 1986 and resolution 2 dated May 5, 1987 of the
Deputy Executive Secretary in O.P. Case No. 3023. The decision and resolution set
aside the orders of the Minister of Natural Resources and Director of Mines and Geo-
Sciences dated November 7, 1985 rendered in MNR Case No. 6353 and July 23, 1985
rendered in Mines Sp. Case No. V-183, respectively, that upheld petitioner's action to
cancel/rescind the mining contract dated September 11, 1980 between Zambales
Chromite Mining Co., Inc. and private respondent Philzea Mining and Development
Corporation.
The antecedent facts and the proceedings that spawned the instant case, are as
follows:
Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. (Zambales Chromite, for short) is the exclusive
owner of ten (10) patentable chromite mining claims located in the Municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales. On September 11, 1980, Zambales Chromite, as claim-owner, on one
hand, and Philzea Mining and Development Corporation (Philzea Mining, for short,
herein private respondent) as operator, on the other, entered into a "Contract of
Development, Exploitation and Productive Operation" on the ten (10) patentable mining
claims (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 120). During the lifetime of such contract, Earth Minerals
Exploration, Inc. (Earth Minerals, for short, herein petitioner) submitted a Letter of Intent
on June 30, 1984 to Zambales Chromite whereby the former proposed and the latter
agreed to operate the same mining area subject of the earlier agreement between
Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining (Annex "D", Rollo, p. 111). On August 10, 1984,
Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals concretized their aforementioned Letter of Intent
when they entered into an "Operating Agreement" (Annex "E", Rollo, p. 112) for the
latter to operate the same mining area. Consequently, the same mining property of
Zambales Chromite became the subject of different agreements with two separate and
distinct operators. On November 29, 1984, petitioner Earth Minerals filed with the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS, for short) a petition for cancellation of the
contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining, pursuant t Section 7, P.D.
1281 which provides, inter alia:
Section 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies,
partnerships or persons engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation,
the Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving:
(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder
thereof with several mining operators;
(b) . . . .
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.
In its petition, Earth Minerals alleged, among others, that Philzea Mining committed
grave and serious violations of the latter's contract with Zambales Chromite among
which are: failure to produce the agreed volume of chromite ores; failure to pay ad
valorem taxes; failure to put up assay buildings and offices, all resulting in the non-
productivity and non-development of the mining area.
On December 10, 1984, Philzea Mining filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
Earth Minerals is not the proper party in interest and that the petition lacks cause of
action. The motion to dismiss was, however, denied by the BMGS in an order dated
January 24, 1985 holding that "there appears some color of right" on Earth Minerals to
initiate the petition for cancellation (Annex "G", Rollo, p. 120). A motion for
reconsideration was filed but the same was denied by the BMGS in an order dated
March 4, 1985. Thereafter, Philzea Mining elevated the case to then Ministry (now
Department) of Natural Resources (MNR, for short) which in its order of April 23, 1985
dismissed the appeal for the reason that the order of the BMGS was an interlocutory
order that could not be the proper subject of an appeal.
On May 2, 1985, Philzea Mining appealed to the Office of the President the order of
MNR dated April 23, 1985. During the pendency thereof, Earth Minerals filed with the
MNR a motion for execution of the MNR order of April 23, 1985.
On May 30, 1985, the MNR issued an order directing the BMGS to conduct the
necessary investigation in order to hasten the development of the mining claims in
question (Rollo, p. 93). In compliance therewith, the BMGS on June 7, 1985, ordered
the private respondent Philzea Mining to file its answer to Earth Mineral's petition for
rescission. Philzea Mining moved to reconsider but the motion was denied.
Philzea Mining did not submit its answer. Accordingly, the BMGS resolved the petition
for rescission on the basis of documents submitted ex parte by herein petitioner. Finding
that Philzea Mining grossly violated the terms and conditions of the mining contract
between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite, the BMGS rendered a decision on
July 23,1985, cancelling said mining contract, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of all the foregoing, this Office finds and so holds that the Operating Agreement
dated September 11, 1980 executed by and between Zambales Chromite and Philzea
Mining should be, as is hereby cancelled. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to
immediately vacate the mining area subject of the instant case and turn over the
possession thereof to the claimowner and/or herein petitioner. (Annex "K", Rollo, p. 130).
Aggrieved by the decision of the BMGS, Philzea Mining, aside from filing a notice of
appeal to the MNR on July 29, 1985, also filed a petition for certiorari with the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) on July 30,1985, docketed as AC-
G.R. Sp. No. 06715, to annul or set aside the decision of the BMGS.
On November 4, 1985, the Office of the President promulgated a decision dismissing
the appeal of Philzea Mining from the decision of the MNR dated April 23, 1985, on the
ground that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory in nature and
cannot be the subject of an appeal (Annex "L", Rollo, p. 137).
On November 7, 1985, the MNR on the other hand, issued another order this time
dismissing the appeal of Philzea Mining from the decision of the BMGS dated July 23,
1985.
On November 18, 1985 Philzea Mining appealed the aforementioned November 7, 1985
decision of the MNR to the Office of the President.
Meanwhile, on December 26,1985, the then Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the
petition filed by Philzea Mining in AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715.
Back to the appeal of Philzea Mining to the Office of the President, the disputed
decision dated June 27, 1986 was issued by the then Deputy Executive Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the orders of the Minister of Natural Resources and the Director of Mines and
Geo-Sciences, dated November 7 and July 23, 1985, respectively, are hereby set aside.
(Annex "A", Rollo, p. 92).
A motion for reconsideration dated July 12,1986 (Annex "U", Rollo, p. 190) was filed by
petitioner Earth Minerals which, however, was denied by the then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig in his resolution dated May 5, 1987, which reads in part:
Wherefore, the instant motion for reconsideration by appellee Earth Minerals is hereby
denied for lack of merit and the Decision of this Office dated June 27, 1986 is hereby
reiterated. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 98).
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of the Court dated July 1989, the Court resolved: (a) to give due course
to the petition and (b) to require the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda (Rollo, p. 382).
The principal issues in the case at hand are as follows: (a) whether or not the appeal of
the private respondent Philzea Mining from the decision of the MNR dated November
7,1985 to the Office of the President was made out of time and (b) whether or not the
petitioner Earth Minerals is the proper party to seek cancellation of the operating
agreement between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite.
The petitioner contends that the last day to appeal the decision of the MNR dated
November 7, 1985 fell on November 16, 1985, that is five (5) days from the date of its
receipt by the private respondent on November 11, 1985 and since the notice of appeal
dated November 15,1985 was filed on November 18, 1985, the appeal was taken
beyond the five-day reglementary period.
Public respondent counters that the ground invoked by the petitioner is too technical in
view of the fact that November 16, 1985 was a Saturday and the following day
(November 17, 1985) was a Sunday.
The Court, in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v.
Factoran, Jr. (154 SCRA 49 [1987]) resolved the same issue in this wise:
Saturday was observed as a legal holiday in the Office of the President pursuant to Sec.
29 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended.
The same law provides:
Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday — Where the day or the last day, for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next
succeeding business day.
Apart from the fact that the law is clear and needs no interpretation, this Court in
accordance therewith has invariably held that in case the last day for doing an act is a
legal holiday, the last day for doing the same, the act may be done on the next
succeeding business day (Gonzaga v. De David, 110 Phil. 463 [1960]; Calano v. Cruz, 91
Phil. 247 [1957]; Austria et al. v. Solicitor General, 71 Phil. 288 [1941]).
In the case under consideration, as the next working day after November 16, 1985 was
November 18, 1985 — a Monday, it is evident that the private respondent's appeal was
filed on time.
Be that as it may, the private respondent's appeal within the reglementary period to the
Office of the President does not help them much in the instant case.
The public respondent argues that the petitioner Earth Minerals is not the proper party
to file the petition for cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and
Philzea Mining citing Article 1311 of the Civil Code which provides that a contract takes
effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs.
The contention is untenable.
Indeed, a contract takes effect only between the parties who made it, and also their
assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law
(Article 1311, New Civil Code). Since a contract may be violated only by the parties
thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in interest,
either as plaintiff or as defendant must be parties to said contract. In relation thereto,
Article 1397 of the Civil Code lays the general rule that an action for the annulment of
contracts can only be maintained by those who are bound either principally or
subsidiarily by virtue thereof. The rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in
Teves v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (23 SCRA 1141 [1968]) held that
a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an
action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties, and can show the detriment which could positively result to him from
the contract in which he had no intervention. This exception to the rule has been applied
in Banez v. CA (59 SCRA 15 [1974]; Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 96
SCRA 342 [1980]; Dilson Enterprises Inc. v. IAC, 170 SCRA 676 [1989]).
Petitioner Earth Minerals seeks the cancellation of the contract between Zambales
Chromite and Philzea Mining, not as a party to the contract but because his rights are
prejudiced by the said contract. The prejudice and detriment to the rights and interest of
petitioner stems from the continued existence of the contract between Zambales
Chromite and private respondent Philzea Mining. Unless and until the contract between
Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining is cancelled, petitioner's contract with the
former involving the same mining area cannot be in effect and it cannot perform its own
obligations and derive benefits under its contract. The Director of Mines and Geo-
Sciences in his order denying Philzea Mining's motion to dismiss the petition for
cancellation of the operating agreement between Philzea Mining and Zambales
Chromite stated:
From the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner, i.e., the Letter of Intent and
Operating Agreement between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals, it may be
gleaned that, at least, there appears some color of right on the part of petitioner to
request for cancellation/rescission of the contract dated September 11, 1980 between
Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining.
Moreover, the record amply shows that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed
by the Minister of Natural Resources was supported by substantial evidence. As found
by the Bureau of Mines in its decision dated July 23, 1985, the violations committed by
Philzea Mining were not only violations of its operating agreement with Zambales
Chromite but of mining laws as well.
In affirming the abovementioned decision, the Minister of Natural Resources made the
following statements:
Moreover, the appellant by filing a Manifestation on October 1, 1985 wherein it prayed
that the decision appealed from be reviewed motu propio by this Office, is an implied
admission that it has no justification whether in fact or in law, for its appeal; otherwise, it
could have specified them in the appeal memorandum that it is bound by law to file. (p.
142, Rollo)
In such cases, the Court has uniformly held that, it is sufficient that administrative
findings of fact are supported by evidence (Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]). Still
in later cases, the Court continued that such finding will not be disturbed so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant
(Police Commission v. Lood, 162 SCRA 762 [1984]; Atlas Consolidated v. Factoran, Jr.,
supra).
The decision, therefore, of the Deputy Executive Secretary reversing the decisions of
the Minister of Natural Resources and Director of Mines cannot be sustained. This is in
line with the pronouncement of the Court that the factual findings of the Secretary
should be respected in the absence of any illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition,
none of which was proved by the public and private respondents (Heirs of Santiago
Pastoral v. Secretary of Public Works and Highways, 162 SCRA 619 [1988]).
Regarding the issue of forum shopping, the records show that on July 29, 1985, after
Philzea Mining had filed its notice of appeal to MNR from the July 23, 1985 decision of
the BMGS, it also filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court on
July 30, 1985, docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715 praying for the annulment of the
same July 23, 1985 decision of the BMGS. When the MNR rendered its November 7,
1985 decision affirming the July 23, 1985 decision of the BMGS, private respondent
Philzea Mining, notwithstanding the pendency of its petition for certiorari with the
Intermediate Appellate Court, filed its notice of appeal to the Office of the President from
the said decision of the MNR stating therein that its appeal was "without prejudice to the
pending petition with the Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No.
06715" (Rollo, p. 80).
The foregoing facts show a case of forum shopping.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The
principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection
with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending,
as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable court ruling (Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. Nos.
89095 and 89555, November 6, 1989).
One last point, the motion to dismiss filed by Philzea before this Court on September 5,
1989, on the ground that the petition has become moot and academic in view of the
expiration on August 10, 1989 of the five (5) year term contract between Zambales
Chromite and Earth Minerals executed by August 10, 1984 should be denied.
The contract between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals provides, inter alia:
5. Others.
A. During the existence of this agreement, Earth Minerals is free to look for, and
negotiate with, an interested party who is financially capable of operating the CLAIMS on
a much bigger scale . . . and in connection therewith, may assign this agreement in favor
of said party; . . . .
In view of such provision, Earth Minerals and Zambales Chromite jointly entered into a
"Mining Agreement", dated June 16, 1988, with Acoje Mining Co., Inc., the salient
provisions of which reads:
ZCMC and EMEI jointly desire to protect Acoje from any and all claims (present or future)
against it (Acoje) with respect the title and/or possession of the PROPERTIES and this
protection against all claims of third parties or entities during the life of this Mining
Agreement is one of the main considerations why Acoje agreed to enter into this
Agreement.
Sec. 1. . . . provided, however, that EMEI obligates itself to continue representing its
interest as party in the aforesaid cases pending with the Supreme Court. (Annex "1",
Rollo, p. 397).
The mining agreement between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals, on one hand,
and Acoje Mining, on the other, expressly recognizes the pendency of the case at bar,
so that herein petitioner Earth Minerals has the right to pursue the case to its logical
conclusion, and during the effectivity of such Mining Agreement, both Earth Minerals
and Zambales Chromite are under obligation to assure peaceful possession of the
mining properties from the claims of third parties.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
hereby GRANTED; (b) the decision dated June 27, 1986 and resolution dated May 5,
1987 of the Deputy Executive Secretary are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE; and
(c) the orders of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences dated July 23, 1985 and
Minister of Natural Resources dated November 7, 1985 are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 121413 January 29, 2001
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (formerly INSULAR BANK
OF ASIA AND AMERICA), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FORD PHILIPPINES, INC. and CITIBANK, N.A.,
respondents.
September 1, 1987
MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on
Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M.
Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit:
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Criminal Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She
also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a
writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in
Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was
attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid
criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by
Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their
failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received
against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A
writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by
complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned
cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the
same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7,
21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722
dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was
merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money
judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following
findings and recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents
admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the
Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7,
1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state,
the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg
to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and
in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso
M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid
P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under
IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on
Bar Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who
alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP
official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and
pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her
employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every
lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he
practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4,
Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress
again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the
other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a
falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the
Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133090 January 19, 2001
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of
court.1âwphi1.nêt
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil
Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala
of respondent judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court
issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to
annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on
April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis
pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On
November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996,
filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court.3
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following
incident transpired:
ATTY. For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.
BUGARING:
ATTY. Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.
CORDERO:
ATTY. Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion
BUGARING: for contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of
Deeds is properly notified for today's hearing.
COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.
ATTY. We are ready, your Honor.
BUGARING:
COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which
directed your office to register lis pendens of the complaint in connection with
this case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and
Beatriz Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the
CONCEPCION: subpoena.
ATTY. May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the
BUGARING: Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please,
and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer,
opposition or pleadings or pleadings with respect to this motion.
ATTY. Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the
CONCEPCION: Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our
office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received
this morning the subpoena, your Honor.
ATTY. Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the
BUGARING: respondent that he was not informed.
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is
recorded.
ATTY. Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we
BUGARING: will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your
Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds
that is irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk not to
inform the parties concerned.
COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the
video recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that
such proceedings should be taken.
ATTY. Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just
BUGARING: accompanied me this morning.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the
permission of this Court.
ATTY. Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
BUGARING:
COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that
shots should be done.
ATTY. This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an
BUGARING: occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could
prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your
Honor please. I was just surprised why he took video tape your Honor please,
that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor
please.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary
authority or permission should be secured.
ATTY. In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
BUGARING:
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please,
BUGARING: that is personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being ….
COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.
ATTY. At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary
BUGARING: evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?
ATTY. Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this
CONCEPCION: contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a
BUGARING: criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.
CONCEPCION:
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the
Register of Deeds.
ATTY. Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.
CONCEPCION:
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply
represented.
ATTY. As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing….
CONCEPCION:
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
BARZAGA4:
ATTY. Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just
BUGARING: mark our documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and
thereafter your Honor please….
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by
newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the
privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this
contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the record of
this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. Second call, your Honor.
BARZAGA:
---------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the
BARZAGA: case your Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed on
November 6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the
record of the case shows up to the filing of this motion, the Register as well as
the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court Orders dated
February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty.
Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efren A.
Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed to the Register regarding this
notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250
and this letter request, your Honor for the annotation of the lis pendens clearly
shows that it has been already entered in the book of primary entry. We would
like also to invite the attention of the Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt
of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis
pendens was made by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996,
your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has
already been issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows, 'Wherefore in view
of the above, the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of
lis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248, 51949
(sic) and 51950 (sic).'
ATTY. Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our
BUGARING: documentary evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The
counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us
wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do
to have an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated
BUGARING: your Honor, considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis
pendens has already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just
request that we be given a period of ten days from today your Honor, within
which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.
COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty.
Tutaan in connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the
lis pendens because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty.
Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the record of this case, the
reason for that is because there was a pending subdivision plan, it is so stated. I
think it was dated March, 1996. May 1 have the record please.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor.
BARZAGA:
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.
ATTY. Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this,
BUGARING: your Honor.
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be
guided accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the matter
started from that. After the submission of the …. What are you suppose to
submit?
ATTY. Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in
BUGARING: contempt of Court.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to
the counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the
plaintiff an equal time within which to submit his reply.
ATTY. Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please,
BUGARING: that we will be marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for
hearing for today, your Honor please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet
what are we going to receive as evidence.
ATTY. If your Honor please …
BUGARING:
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the
submission of the comment.
ATTY. I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for
BUGARING: contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado
Concepcion.
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to
do. This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of
record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your
evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by the respondent and
so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.
ATTY. My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time
BUGARING: furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should
have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled
for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this Court, your
Honor
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
ATTY. I am listening, your Honor.
BUGARING:
COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
ATTY. Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers
BUGARING: of the Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our
procedure, your Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first
and then do whatever you want.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the
BUGARING: Court of this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put
on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.
BUGARING:
COURT: Do that right away.
ATTY. We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.
BUGARING:
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.
ATTY. I did not….
BUGARING:
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his
comment.
ATTY. Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on
BUGARING: anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying
this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.
BUGARING:
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
BUGARING:
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this
BUGARING: Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in many
certiorari cases, your Honor.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court.
(Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in
jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
ATTY. I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.
BUGARING:
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of
this Court.
ATTY. I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is
BUGARING: one way I am protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of
this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in
jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)
Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct contempt of
court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1)
operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was
ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of
court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the
appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from
a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the
plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the
cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are
open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not
sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed
the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to
present him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Burgaring
started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite
of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written
pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so many ramifications and the
issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary
evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that
Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to
disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the
Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so.
Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the
uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he has
won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of
Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly
being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the
Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's
sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring
committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and
contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to
three (3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall
commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal
Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.6
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6,
1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.7
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in
direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that
respondent Judge Dolores S. Español had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct
contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes
of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant,
at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and
sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine
of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court,10 and ordered the
excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the
petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING
THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S
SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY,
HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED
DECISION.11
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject
proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and
legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he always
addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95
provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of
or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court
or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if
it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the
trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the
proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the
other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from
attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the
proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to
Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain
towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its importance in the
administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was
making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the
petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December
5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics
which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III,
1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with
fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility
which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your
honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his
subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be
countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.12
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the
extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and
the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative of
justice.13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the
case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing.14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim
that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order
inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an
immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court
during he hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration
of the contempt order on the same day.15
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the
case of his client – by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the
respondent judge's contrary order – he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the
interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v.
Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court,
bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432,
439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice
per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred
in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It
was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly
ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment
meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return
to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.