Anda di halaman 1dari 15

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1996. Vol. 71, No. 2. 230-244 0022-3514/96/S3.00

Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct


and Stereotype Activation on Action
John A. Bargh, Mark Chen, and Lara Burrows
New York University

Previous research has shown that trait concepts and stereotypes become active automatically in the
presence of relevant behavior or stereotyped-group features. Through the use of the same priming
procedures as in previous impression formation research, Experiment 1 showed that participants
whose concept of rudeness was primed interrupted the experimenter more quickly and frequently
than did participants primed with polite-related stimuli. In Experiment 2, participants for whom an
elderly stereotype was primed walked more slowly down the hallway when leaving the experiment
than did control participants, consistent with the content of that stereotype. In Experiment 3, par-
ticipants for whom the African American stereotype was primed subliminally reacted with more
hostility to a vexatious request of the experimenter. Implications of this automatic behavior priming
effect for self-fulfilling prophecies are discussed, as is whether social behavior is necessarily mediated
by conscious choice processes.

For many years, social psychologists have studied the effects Automaticity in Attitudes and Social Cognition
of priming on the individual's subsequent impressions of oth-
ers. Priming refers to the incidental activation of knowledge The extent to which one's own thought and behavior are or
structures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the current are not under one's own intentional control is a fundamental
situational context. Many studies have shown that the recent existential question (see Posner & Snyder, 1975; Uleman &
use of a trait construct or stereotype, even in an earlier or unre- Bargh, 1989). Indeed, over the past two decades, researchers in
lated situation, carries over for a time to exert an unintended, the area of attitudes and social cognition have documented that
passive influence on the interpretation of behavior (see Bargh, many of the phenomena they study are unintentional or auto-
1994;Higgins, 1989; Wyer&Srull, 1989, for reviews). matic in nature (for reviews, see Bargh, 1994; Smith, 1994, in
We argue here that such passive, automatic effects of priming press; Wegner & Bargh, in press). Attitudes are discovered to
need not be limited to social perception. Recent research has become activated automatically on the mere presence of the at-
shown that attitudes and other affective reactions can be trig- titude object, without conscious intention or awareness (i.e.,
gered automatically by the mere presence of relevant objects preconsciously; see Bargh, 1989), to then exert their influence
and events, so that evaluation and emotion join perception in on thought and behavior (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto,
the realm of direct, unmediated psychological effects of the en- 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Fazio, San-
vironment (see Bargh, 1994, in press, for reviews). But assum- bonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). The self-concept (Bargh,
ing that behavioral responses to situations are also represented 1982; Bargh & Tota, 1988; Higgins, 1987; Strauman & Higgins,
mentally, as are stereotypes and attitudes, they should also be 1987) is shown to become active automatically on the presence
capable of becoming automatically activated, by the same prin- of self-relevant stimuli to affect self-perception and emotions.
ciples that govern the development of automaticity of other Stereotypes become active automatically on the mere presence
representations. of physical features associated with the stereotyped group
(Brewer, 1988;Devine, 1989; Perdue &Gurtman, 1990; Pratto
& Bargh, 1991), and categorizing behavior in terms of person-
ality traits (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Winter & Ule-
John A. Bargh, Mark Chen, and Lara Burrows, Department of Psy-
chology, New York University.
man, 1984) and then making dispositional attributions about
This research was supported in part by Grant SBR-9409448 from the
the actor's personality (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Gilbert, Pelham, &
National Science Foundation to John A. Bargh and by a Max Planck Krull, 1988) have both been shown to occur automatically to
Society (Germany) Research Prize to John A. Bargh and Peter Goll- some extent.
witzer. The contributions of Elliott Rosenthal, Gayatri Taneja, and This growing evidence of automaticity in social psychological
Jayme Yocum to this research in their capacity as experimenters is phenomena notwithstanding, it remains widely assumed that
gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Peter Gollwitzer, John Skow-
behavioral responses to the social environment are under con-
ronski, Dan Wegner, and especially Leonard Berkowitz and Dan Gilbert
for their comments and suggestions concerning an earlier version of this
scious control (see review in Bargh, 1989). These responses
article. might well be consciously chosen on the basis of automatically
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to John produced perceptions and feelings (especially when the individ-
A. Bargh, Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washing- ual was not aware of the potential for any such nonconscious
ton Place, Seventh Floor, New York, New York 10003. Electronic mail influence; see Herr, 1986, and Neuberg, 1988), but the ultimate
may be sent via the Internet to bargh@psych.nyu.edu. behavioral decisions themselves are believed to be made con-
230
AUTOMATIC SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 231

sciously. Devine (1989), for example, argued for a two-stage Several theorists have argued that behavioral responses are
model of prejudice in which the perceptual phase is automatic activated immediately by the situational context. Lewin's
(i.e., activation of stereotypes by the target person's features), (1943) notion of the psychological situation considered it to
whereas the second phase of prejudiced behavior is a matter of consist of the totality of the individual's immediate reactions to
conscious choice, driven by one's relevant values. Fiske (1989) the objective, external situation. Mischel (1973) further devel-
argued that a person could "make the hard choice" and over- oped this concept as part of his social-cognitive model of per-
come stereotypic influences on behavior if sufficiently moti- sonality. He noted that an individual can have all sorts of im-
vated to do so. mediate reactions to a person or event, not limited to cognitive
Indeed, the traditional rationale for the study of attitudes and or perceptual ones but including (a) expectancies for what was
social cognition is the belief (even faith) that choices of social going to happen next in the situation; (b) subjective evaluations
behavior are based on the outcome of these processes—thus, it of what was happening; (c) emotional reactions one has had in
is social behavior that is the long-term focus of this research that situation in the past; and, most important to the present
(i.e., "thinking is for doing"; Fiske, 1992). The historic purpose thesis, (d) the behavioral response patterns one has available
of attitude research has been that attitudes predicted behavior, within the situation based on one's past experience (see also
and evidence to the contrary (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969) Higgins, 1987).
was cause for alarm, similar to the purpose of personality re- There is no theoretical or conceptual reason why the effects
search (e.g., Mischel, 1968). of preconscious, automatic activation should be limited to per-
The impetus behind automaticity research is no different. ception and evaluation. Preconscious activation of mental rep-
Research into the automaticity of attitudes was first conducted resentations develops from their frequent and consistent activa-
because it was hypothesized that attitudes that became active tion in the presence of a given stimulus event in the environ-
automatically (preconsciously) in the presence of the attitude ment (Bargh, 1989; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). This is the
object would be more likely to influence behavior toward the mechanism behind the automaticity of trait construct activa-
object than those that depended on intentional conscious re- tion given the mere observation of trait-relevant behavior, of at-
trieval of the attitude (Fazio et al, 1986). The presumption be- titudes in the mere presence of the attitude object, and of ste-
hind studies of automatic influences in social perception, such reotypes on the mere presence of a stereotyped group member.
as via primed or chronically accessible trait constructs (e.g., To the extent that an individual repeatedly has the same reac-
Bargh & Pietromonaeo, 1982; Bargh & Thein, 1985), was that tion to a social stimulus event, the representation of that re-
such preconscious influences would play a stronger than usual sponse should come eventually to be activated automatically on
role in subsequent behavior toward the target person, as the per- the mere occurrence of that event. Thus, if an individual con-
ceiver would not be aware of the interpretive bias and so could sistently behaves the same way in response to a situation, that
not correct for it (Bargh, 1989). In a similar fashion, research behavioral response should become automatically associated
into the automaticity of stereotyping has been motivated by a with those situational features. In harmony with this hypothe-
larger concern with the controllability of prejudicial behavior sis, Mischel and Shoda (1995; Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1994)
(Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1989). have provided several demonstrations of a high degree of con-
Focusing the research spotlight on attitudes and perceptions sistency over time in an individual's behavioral responses to the
as mediators of behavior, in the present view, has obscured the same situations, when situations are denned in terms of specific,
possibility that behavior need not always be so mediated. Al- concrete sets of features.
though it is quite reasonable to assume that attitudes and social
perceptual processes exist in the service ofguiding behavior, this The Principle of Ideomotor Action
does not require the assumption that behavioral responses al-
ways require such services. William James held that the mere act of thinking about a
behavior increased the tendency to engage in that behavior; he
The Case for Automatic Social Behavior called this the principle of ideomotor action: "We may lay it
down for certain that every representation of a movement awak-
We propose that social behavior is often triggered automati- ens in some degree the actual movement which is its object"
cally on the mere presence of relevant situational features; this (1890, p. 526). James's notion of awakening here is similar to
behavior is unmediated by conscious perceptual or judgmental modern notions of accessibility, in that the internal (through
processes. We turn next to a discussion of several lines of sup- ideation) activation of a representation (i.e., through imagining
port, both theoretical and empirical, for this hypothesis. the behavior) increases its accessibility of likelihood of activa-
tion. Modern research on construct accessibility has shown that
Behavioral Responses Can Be Associated With mental representations can become activated from many
sources, including one's goals, external environmental events,
Situational Features long-term use, and recent thought. Moreover, all of these possi-
Social-behavioral responses are represented mentally just as ble sources increase the accessibility or ease of use of that rep-
are trait concepts and attitudes. Thus, they should be capable resentation in an interchangeable, additive fashion (Bargh,
of becoming activated automatically on the mere presence of Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Higgins & King, 1981). For
relevant features in the environment by the same principles that James, imagining or thinking about a behavioral response had
produce automatic trait categorization and automatic attitude the same kind of priming effect on the likelihood of engaging in
activation. that response.
232 BARGH, CHEN, AND BURROWS

However, Lashley (1951), in a famous discourse on the se- pendulum from moving; participants are of course not aware of
quential organization of behavior, was the first to use the term the automatic effect that the thoughts about the to-be-avoided
priming to describe the preparatory function of thought. movement have on their behavior and so cannot control it.
Thinking has the function of preparing the body for action, and
Lashley's given example of this was the production of fluent The Perception-Behavior Link
speech. To be able to speak words in an understandable, serial
fashion, just as to act in a sequential manner, requires a prior Just as the accessibility or likelihood of use of a concept in-
organization of the representations that are to be used, in the creases no matter what the particular the source of that accessi-
intended sequence. The function of this preparation allows for bility, the likelihood of a behavioral response may increase from
the fluidity of spoken thoughts and ideas and the enactment of thinking about that behavior, regardless of the source of that
organized movements in the proper order. Thus, like James, thought. Specifically, cognitions about a type of behavior can
Lashley argued for the necessity of a direct connection between come not only from internal sources, as in the above examples,
thought and behavioral representations (N.B., not limited to but also from external sources, such as perceiving that type of
those used in speech). behavior enacted by others.
The automaticity of the ideomotor-action effect—that merely There is a strong historical precedent for postulating an auto-
thinking about a behavior makes it more likely to occur, even if matic link between the representations used to perceive behav-
it is unintended—has been demonstrated recently in a series of ior and those used to engage in that behavior oneself. Imitation,
studies by Wegner and his colleagues (see Wegner, 1994, for a for example, consists of performing an action that corresponds
review). Wegner's ironic process model contends that acts of in its structure to the perceived action of another person. The
intentional control over our thought and behavior involve an capacity to imitate is present in early childhood (Piaget, 1946)
automatic monitoring of the presence of the unwanted state. and even in newborns (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983). Such
When this automatic vigilance notices the to-be-controlled scholars of imitative behavior as Koffka (1935), Piaget (1946),
thought or response tendency, conscious processing can inhibit and Bandura (1977) all have proposed that imitation is made
it from occurring. In this way, experimental participants can possible by a common or shared representational system for
distract themselves from thinking about white bears (for perceptual and action codes (see Prinz, 1990, for a review).
example) by consciously thinking about something else. But Schank and Abelson's (1977) script theory argues that the same
this control over unwanted thoughts can occur only when there mental structures used to understand and anticipate the se-
is sufficient attentional capacity available for the act of control. quence of behavior in social situations also is used to generate
If the person is distracted, or is under attentional load, an ironic appropriate responses to them. Theories of speech production
effect is likely to occur: The very thought or behavior one did have increasingly emphasized the mediational role played by
not want to happen, does happen. the representations involved in speech perception (see Dell,
The irony of this effect is that the likelihood of this occur- 1986; Meyer & Gordon, 1984; Prinz, 1990). Also, Zajonc, Pie-
rence (under attentional load) is actually greater than if the per- tromonaco, and Bargh (1982) showed that people implicitly
son had not tried to stop that response. Thus, in one experi- mimic the facial expressions of others, such that when this sub-
ment, participants under attentional load who are trying not to tle imitation is prevented (i.e., by having them chew gum while
make sexist completions to word fragments actually make more the faces are presented), memory for the faces is impaired.
than participants not instructed to try to avoid sexism. Accord- In 1984, Berkowitz reformulated his theory of how violence
ing to the ironic process model, this occurs because the repre- portrayed in the mass media increased the probability of ag-
sentation of the unwanted response is more accessible than gression in the viewer by invoking James's principle of ideomo-
usual because the person is watching out for its occurrence and tor action. Activation was said to spread in memory from rep-
has to keep it in mind to do so. For present purposes, the im- resentations of the violent acts perceived in the media to other
portance of thesefindingsis that the mere act of thinking about aggressive ideas of the viewer, and this spreading activation oc-
a response, even when the thought involved is meant to help curred "automatically and without much thinking" (p. 410).
prevent that response, has the automatic effect of increasing the Similar to Mischel's (1973) analysis, Berkowitz (1984) argued
likelihood of that response. The principle of ideomotor action, that behavioral responses as well as thoughts and emotions
to put it another way, operates in the absence of the person's could all be activated automatically by aggressive stimuli: "The
intention to engage in that behavior and even when the person present conception does not stop with the individual's thoughts
is trying to avoid that behavior. and memories. . .It holds that externally presented ideas can
Ansfield and Wegner (1996) applied the ironic process model activate particular feelings and even specific action tendencies
to understanding the classic literature on automatisms, or be- as well" (p. 410).
haviors that do not appear to be consciously produced, like the An experiment by Carver, Ganellen, Froming, and Chambers
spinning table in seances, a divining rod, or the movement of (1983) provided evidence in line with Berkowitz's (1984) ideo-
the pendulum in Chevreuil's illusion. In the latter case, the pen- motor action model of the effect of aggressive cues on aggres-
dulum held dangling above a table moves—apparently of its sion. In afirstexperiment, some participants' concept of hostil-
own accord—when the person is told to hold it completely still. ity was primed subliminally, following the procedure of Bargh
In fact, the pendulum tends to move along the very axis along and Pietromonaco (1982). Then, in what they believed to be an
which the person is trying to prevent it from moving. Ansfield unrelated second experiment, participants were instructed to
and Wegner showed in several experiments that this effect is give shocks to another "learner" participant (actually a
produced by the very attempt to prevent the seance table or the confederate) whenever he or she gave an incorrect answer. Com-
AUTOMATIC SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 233

pared to participants who were exposed to neutral priming ironic process research has indeed shown automatic behavior in
stimuli, those presented subliminally with hostility-related that it is unintended by the individual and even uncontrollable
primes gave longer shocks. Carver et al. (1983) accounted for when attention is in short supply. These effects are goal depen-
their results in terms of a behavioral schema for hostility and its dent in that they are produced by an act of conscious intention
close semantic associative ties to the "interpretive schema" used (see Wegner, 1994, for a similar but more elaborate analysis)
to perceive hostility. Because of the degree of semantic feature and would not occur without that intention in place.
overlap between the two representations, the authors argued, Moreover, in all of the studies reviewed by Berkowitz (1984)
activation will spread automatically from the interpretive to the that were in favor of the perception-behavior link, including
behavioral schema, so that perceiving another person's hostilty Carver et al.'s (1983) experiments, participants were given the
increases the likelihood that one will behave in a hostile manner explicit, conscious goal to engage in the behavior that was
oneself. shown to be affected by the priming manipulation. In Berkowitz
The behavioral schema notion, which is a variant of the ideo- and LePage's (1967) and Carver et al.'s (1983) studies, for ex-
motor action hypothesis, has the desirable ability to account ample, participants were instructed to take the role of teacher
for how the same priming manipulation can produce effects on and give shocks to a learner. These studies showed that the in-
impression formation in one study (Bargh & Pietromonaco, tentional behavior could be affected in intensity or duration by
1982) and behavior in another (Carver et al., 1983, Experiment the aggression priming manipulation (the presence of guns or
2). Because the only difference between the two studies was the prior exposure to synonyms of aggression), but they did not
particular dependent measure collected following the priming show the behavior to be produced automatically, in the absence
manipulation, the inescapable conclusion is that the activation of that explicitly given intention.
of the concept of hostility had the simultaneous effects of mak- Thus, although all of these lines of evidence are suggestive
ing the participant both more likely to perceive hostility in an- and supportive of the hypothesis of automatic social behavior,
other person and to behave in a hostile manner him- or herself. they have not demonstrated it. The three experiments we report
To us, Carver et al.'s (1983) results are an intriguing clue that in this article were designed to provide a definitive test of this
the influence of perception on behavioral tendencies is auto- hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants were primed on the
matic, in that it is passive, unintentional, and nonconscious. traits of either rudeness or politeness (or neither) with Srull and
Therefore, recent evidence of automatic influences in- social Wyer's (1979) scrambled-sentence test. In Experiment 2, we
perception, such as the automatic activation of stereotypes and again used the scrambled-sentence priming manipulation but
priming effects on impression formation (see Bargh, 1994, for used it to activate the participants' stereotype of elderly people.
a review), when related to the foregoing discussion, implies that In neither experiment were participants given any explicit con-
there may be behavioral consequences of automatic social per- scious instructions to act in line with any of the trait dimensions
ception for the perceiver. For it is precisely when the individual being primed or measured. In fact, in both experiments the key
is not aware of a perceptual process that conscious control over dependent behavioral measures were taken at times when par-
it is not possible (Bargh, 1989; Strack & Hannover, 1996), max- ticipants believed they were not currently engaged in an experi-
imizing the possibility of the passive perception-behavior effect. mental task at all (i.e., in the hallway between parts of the ex-
periment, or after they thought the experiment was over). In
Experiment 3, a different priming manipulation—photographs
The Present Experiments of male African American faces—was used, and it was pre-
From the various streams of evidence reviewed above, several sented subliminally. This change was intended to extend the
principles can be derived concerning the conditions under generality of the presentfindingsto more realistic environmen-
which automatic social behavior will be produced. First, behav- tal stimuli and to effectively rule out any possible demand inter-
ioral representations exist and can become activated. They can pretations of thefirsttwo experiments.
become active and accessible when one thinks about that kind
of behavior, either actively or passively. The tendency to behave
in line with the representation is increased when it is activated, Experiment 1: Behavioral Consequences of Trait
whether the reason for that activation is (a) an intention to pre- Construct Priming
pare to engage in that behavior (e.g., Lashley), (b) an intention
not to engage in that behavior (e.g., Wegner), (c) merely think- Method
ing about that behavior without an intention to engage in it or Participants. A total of 34 students at New York University who
not (e.g., James), or (d) merely perceiving that kind of behavior were enrolled in the Introductory Psychology course participated in the
in another person (e.g., Berkowitz). experiment in partial fulfillment of a course research requirement. On
The present hypothesis is that social behavior should be ca- their arrival at the laboratory waiting room they were randomly as-
pable of automatic activation by the mere presence of features signed to one of the three priming conditions.
of the current environment just as are social perceptions and Materials. The priming manipulation took the form of a "Scram-
bled Sentence Test" (Srull & Wyer, 1979), presented to participants as
attitudes. By the mere presence of environmental features, we
a test of language ability. For each of 30 items, participants are to use
mean that the activation of the behavioral tendency and re- the five words listed to construct a grammatically correct four-word sen-
sponse must be shown to be preconscious; that is, not dependent tence as quickly as possible. The five words presented in a given test item
on the person's current conscious intentions (see Bargh, 1989, are in scrambled order, such as "he it hides finds instantly."
in press). By these criteria, none of the research reviewed above Three versions of the scrambled-sentence test were constructed: One
has demonstrated direct, automatic behavioral effects. The was intended to prime the construct rude, another the construct polite,
234 BAROH, CHEN, AND BURROWS

and a third was intended to prime neither trait (the neutral priming or her. Our hypothesis was that participants in the rude prime condition
condition). For both the rude and the polite priming versions, 15 of the would interrupt more quickly than neutral prime condition partici-
30 items contained an adjective or verb semantically related to the trait pants, and those in the polite prime condition would wait longer to in-
in question. For the rude priming version, the critical priming stimuli terrupt than would neutral condition participants.
were aggressively, bold, rude, bother, disturb, intrude, annoyingly, in- When the participant began to say anything to the experimenter, such
terrupt, audaciously, brazen, impolitely, infringe, obnoxious, aggravat- as "Excuse me," or "Sorry, but. . ." the confederate stopped the stop-
ing, and bluntly (e.g., "they her bother see usually"). For the polite watch and recorded the elapsed time. We placed a 10-min limit on how
priming version, the 15 critical stimuli were respect, honor, considerate, long the participant would have to wait if he or she did not interrupt at
appreciate, patiently, cordially, yield, polite, cautiously, courteous, gra-all, reasoning that by that time he or she was not going to. When the
ciously, sensitively, discreetly, behaved, and unobtrusively (e.g., "they her
participant interrupted, or at the end of the 10-min maximum waiting
respect see usually"). In the neutral priming version, these 15 words time, the experimenter showed him or her into a room adjacent to the
were replaced by exercising,flawlessly,occasionally, rapidly, gleefully, one in which the confederate was seated and gave the participant a brief
practiced, optimistically, successfully, normally, send, watches, encour- anagram puzzle task that took no more than 2 min to complete. After
ages, gives, clears, and prepares (e.g., "they her send see usually"). the participant had completed this task, he or she was partially debriefed
Procedure. Participants took part in the experiment one at a time. and questioned concerning how they thought the first, scrambled-sen-
When they arrived at the central waiting area, they were greeted by the tence test might have influenced them in the rest of the experiment.
experimenter, who showed them into thefirstexperimental room. They No participant showed any awareness or suspicion as to the scrambled-
were told that the experiment was actually composed of two short stud- sentence test's possible influence on their interruption behavior; nearly
ies having to do generally with language ability. After obtaining their all participants reported either no effect of thefirsttask or that both it
consent to participate, thefirststudy, ostensibly to do with construction and the anagram task were related to language ability, which was the
of grammatical English sentences, was explained to them. The experi- cover story.
menter handed the participant an envelope that contained one of the At this point the experimenter thanked the participant for helping
three forms of the scrambled-sentence test. Which of the three versions with the study, and the participant headed toward the elevator to leave
(rude, polite, or neutral priming) the participant received had been ran- the building. Waiting there was a second confederate, who posed as a
domly determined by another experimenter who did not have any con- department representative inquiring as to the participant's experience
tact with the participant, with the constraint that approximately equal in psychology experiments. The confederate asked if the participant
numbers of participants received each of the forms. Neither the experi- would mind completing a "Survey of Experimental Participants," and
menter nor the confederate (see below) knew the priming condition to all but 3 participants agreed to do so. On the survey were six questions
which a particular participant had been assigned until after the experi- concerning whether the experiment was interesting and whether it was
mental session was over. considered a valid educational experience. The last three items con-
cerned the experimenter, whether he or she was on time, whether he or
The participant was given the general instructions for the scrambled-
she explained the study and answered questions, and the critical item:
sentence test. The experimenter told the participant that when the test
"Was the experimenter courteous and polite to you?" This the partici-
had been completed (most participants took about 5 min to complete
pant responded to on a - 3 to +3 scale that ranged from —3 (not at all)
the 30-item test), he or she should come out into the hallway tofindthe
to +3 (very much so). This item served as our check for a potential
experimenter, who would be at a different room around the corner. The
alternative interpretation of our results, to be discussed below.
experimenter said that at that time he would give the participant the
next short experimental task to complete. When the participant had completed the survey, he or she was fully
debriefed as to the purpose and hypothesis of the experiment and was
The experimenter then waited for the participant in the doorway of
thanked again by the second confederate.
another laboratory room, located on the same hallway but around a
corner from the first room. A confederate of the experimenter was
seated in this second room, in sight of the experimenter but not of any- Results
one coming from the direction of the first room, as she was seated be- Our primary dependent variable was the number of seconds
hind a half-opened door. The confederate posed as another participant
who was apparently having difficulty understanding how to complete a
the participants waited before interrupting the experimenter.
task. The experimenter and confederate engaged in a conversation, with A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of these data, with
the experimenter standing so that his body was open to the direction priming condition as the single factor, revealed a significant
from which the participant would be coining down the hall, at about a main effect, F(2, 33) = 5.76, p = .008. Participants in the rude
45° angle, while still facing the confederate in the room. priming condition interrupted significantly faster (M = 326 s)
When the participant turned the hallway corner and became visible than did participants in the neutral (Af=519s)or polite (M =
to the experimenter, without looking at the participant or acknowledg- 558 s) priming conditions. Within the significant main effect,
ing his or her presence the experimenter made a subtle prearranged sign simple t tests revealed that the rude prime condition mean was
to the confederate (i.e., touching his right pant leg). At this the confed- significantly shorter than each of the other two means (both ps
erate started a stopwatch. The experimenter and confederate continued < .04), which were not reliably different from one another
their conversation as the participant approached and while he or she (f<l).
stood near the experimenter, waiting for the experimenter to acknowl- Although this result supports our hypothesis that social in-
edge his or her presence and give him or her the next experimental task
to complete.
teraction behavior can be primed, the time-to-interruption dis-
tribution varied considerably from normality. Fully 21 of the 34
Our dependent measure was the amount of time the participant
would wait until interrupting the conversation between experimenter participants did not interrupt at all in the 10 min available to
and confederate and ask to be given the next experimental task. Until them, so that the time variable suffered from a severe ceiling
he or she did so, the conversation continued, with the confederate asking effect. Thus, we reanalyzed the data in terms of the percentage
questions and requesting clarification and just not getting it, and the of participants in each priming condition who interrupted at all
experimenter repeating the instructions and clarifying if possible and during the 10-min period. These percentages are shown in Fig-
also not turning to look at the participant or make eye contact with him ure 1.
AUTOMATIC SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 235

menter (i.e., whether they interrupted him) might have been


based on these differential perceptions (as has been demon-
strated in studies by Neuberg, 1988, and Herr, 1986) instead of
as a direct effect of the priming manipulation.
It is important to note, however, that we did not design or
intend the experimenter's behavior to be ambiguous in this way,
because our intention was to demonstrate an effect of priming
on behavior that was not mediated by differential inter-
pretations of the experimenter's behavior. In previous category
accessibility research, some studies have sought to examine fea-
tures of accessibility other than its effect on interpretation.
Bargh and Thein (1985), for instance, studied the ability of ac-
cessible constructs to pick up relevant behavioral information
under attentional overload. In this study, the construct-relevant
behaviors were unambiguous and clearly diagnostic of the trait
in question, and accessibility of the trait concept did not influ-
ence impressions of the target (though it did affect ability to
process the information). The top-down effects of accessibility
should influence impressions only when the informational in-
put is sufficiently ambiguous (i.e., a relatively weak bottom-up
Polite Neutral Rude effect; see Higgins, 1989).
Priming Condition To assess whether the priming manipulations had resulted in
differential perceptions of the experimenter's politeness, we ex-
Figure 1. Percentage of participants who interrupted the experi- amined the ratings participants made on the "Experimental
menter within the 10-min period, by trait priming condition Participation Survey." On the critical item having to do with
(Experiment 1). the experimenter's politeness, which ranged from - 3 (not at all
polite) to +3 (verypolite), there was no reliable difference in
the ratings made in the three priming conditions, F(2, 28) < 1
Because we made a specific directional prediction regarding (polite prime condition M: = 0.6, rude prime condition: M =
the ordering of the three percentages, rather than an omnibus 0.4, neutral prime condition: M = 0.8). Apparently, the fact
prediction of any difference among the three, we applied the test that the experimenter essentially ignored participants (focusing
for a linear trend in proportions (Snedecor & Cochran, 1980, his attention on the confederate and her questions) while they
pp. 206-208). The specific hypothesis tested was that the pro- waited in the hall led all of them to perceive him as equivalently
portion of participants who interrupted the experimenter nonpolite (but not impolite either).
would increase as a function of the trait concept primed, from The fact that the behavioral measure showed quite strong
politeness through no priming to rudeness. In support of the effects of the priming manipulation, whereas the effect on the
hypothesis, the test revealed a reliable linear trend (Z = 2.32, p judgment measure was nonexistent, argues against the alterna-
= .02, two-tailed). Participants whose concept of rudeness had tive interpretation of our findings. It was not the case that the
been surreptitiously activated in the scrambled-sentence test priming manipulation affected consciously made judgments
subsequently were more likely to interrupt the conversation be- about the experimenter, which then determined behavioral re-
tween the experimenter and confederate than were the other sponses to him. The results instead point to a direct effect on
participants, and those whose concept of politeness had been behavior that is not mediated by conscious perceptual or judg-
activated were the least likely to interrupt. mental processes. In fact, the present priming effect on behavior
Whereas our interpretation of this result is that the priming is much more substantial than the typical priming effect in im-
manipulation produced a direct, preconscious effect on the par- pression formation research (cf. Bargh et al., 1986; Srull &
ticipants' subsequent behavior in a social interaction, an al- Wyer, 1979). The powerful effects of priming on behavioral rel-
ternative explanation in terms of the social perceptual effects of ative to perceptual dependent variables is a topic to which we
priming must be considered. This alternative centers on how the return in the General Discussion.
participant may have interpreted or perceived the experiment-
er's behavior during his conversation with the confederate. If Discussion
the experimenter's behavior was ambiguous enough to permit
different impressions of him, depending on the relative accessi- In thisfirstexperimental test of whether trait construct prim-
bility of the participant's relevant trait constructs (e.g., Higgins ing would produce differences in behavior as it has been shown
& King, 1981), it is possible that rude-primed participants were to do for perceptual interpretation, participants primed with
more likely to perceive the experimenter as rude because he was rudeness-related stimuli in an ostensibly unrelated first experi-
ignoring them and attending to the confederate, whereas polite- ment interrupted a conversation reliably faster and, as a group,
primed participants were more likely to perceive the experi- more frequently than did other participants. Those whose con-
menter as polite because he so patiently dealt with the confed- cept of politeness was surreptitiously activated interrupted the
erate's questions. The participants' own behavior to the experi- least often. Behavior in social interaction, like social perception
236 BARGH, CHEN, AND BURROWS

and evaluation, apparently can be driven directly by environ- relevant to the elderly stereotype in the elderly priming condition, but
mental stimuli—that is, preconsciously and automatically. all references to slowness, which is a quality stereotypically associated
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the passive, auto- with elderly people, were excluded. The neutral priming condition
scrambled-sentence task contained age-non-specific words in the place
matic activation of a trait concept results in traitlike behavior
of elderly stereotyped words.
by the individual, but there are two ways in which trait concepts
After completing the task, each participant was partially debriefed
can be activated directly by the environment. One is a direct
and thanked for his or her participation. A second experimenter then
activation by the presence in the environment of trait-relevant surreptitiously recorded the amount of time the participant took to
behavior; several lines of research show that behavior relevant walk down the corridor after exiting the laboratory room. Subsequently,
to a trait automatically activates that trait concept (Newman & participants were debriefed once again with a complete explanation of
Uleman, 1989; Srull & Wyer, 1979). Another way in which a the purpose of the experiment. The main hypothesis was that partici-
given trait concept can be activated automatically, however, is pants who had been primed with the elderly stereotype would walk
by its membership in a larger schema, such as a stereotype. Ste- more slowly compared to participants who had not been primed with
reotypes of social groups consist, in part, of constellations of the stereotype-relevant stimuli.
interrelated trait concepts (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989; Participants. Thirty male and female New York University under-
Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) that become active in an all-or-none graduates who were enrolled in Introductory Psychology participated
fashion (see Hayes-Roth, 1977) in the presence of the features in Experiment 2a, and a different sample of 30 participated in Experi-
of a group member. ment 2b, to partially fulfill a course requirement. In both experiments,
participants were randomly assigned to either an elderly prime condi-
Devine's (1989) Experiment 2 demonstrated the all-or-none tion or a neutral prime condition. The experimenter kept himself blind
activation feature quite clearly. She primed the stereotype of to condition by prepackaging the various scrambled-sentence tasks and
African Americans (as held by White Americans) subliminally picking packets randomly when the participant arrived at the laboratory
using a set of stereotype-related stimuli (e.g., musical, athletic) waiting area.
that did not include any item related to hostility, though hostil- Materials. As in Experiment 1, the priming manipulation took the
ity had been shown by pretesting (and much prior research) to form of a scrambled-sentence task presented to participants as a test of
participate in the stereotype. However, Devine (1989) showed language proficiency. We constructed two versions of the scrambled-
that the concept of hostility had indeed become activated by the sentence task: one elderly prime version, which contained words related
priming manipulation, because primed participants subse- to the elderly stereotype, and another, neutral version. For the elderly
quently rated a target person's ambiguously relevant behavior prime version, the critical stimuli were worried, Florida, old, lonely,
as more hostile than did a control group (just as had partici- grey, selfishly, careful, sentimental, wise, stubborn, courteous, bingo,
withdraw, forgetful, retired, wrinkle, rigid, traditional, bitter, obedient,
pants in Bargh & Pietromonaco's [1982] study who were
conservative, knits, dependent, ancient, helpless, gullible, cautious, and
primed directly with hostile-related stimuli). The only way this alone. These prime words were obtained from previous research that
result could have been obtained was if the concept of hostility examined the components of the elderly stereotype (Brewer, Dull, &
had become active (and thus temporarily more accessible for Lui, 1981; Harris & Associates, 1975; McTavish, 1971; Perdue &Gurt-
use in interpreting the target's behavior) by its participation in man, 1990). In the neutral version, the elderly prime words were re-
the activated stereotype. placed with the words unrelated to the elderly stereotype (e.g., thirsty,
Thus, research has shown that the priming or automatic ac- clean, private).
tivation of both single trait concepts (e.g., Bargh & Pietromo- Procedure. Participants took part in the experiment one at a time.
naco, 1982; Srull & Wyer, 1979) and stereotypes (Devine, The participant was informed that the purpose of the study was to in-
1989) influences social perception without the individual being vestigate language proficiency and that he or she was to complete a
aware of or intending this influence. The present Experiment 1 scrambled-sentence task. The task consisted of 30 sets offiveword com-
binations. The participant was instructed to write down a grammati-
has shown that priming a single trait concept influences subse-
cally correct sentence using only four of the five words given. Partici-
quent social behavior as well. The deduction that follows natu- pants were also informed that the task was self-paced. After giving the
rally from these two sets offindingsis that the priming or auto- instructions, the experimenter left the room so that the participant
matic activation of stereotypes should make the perceiver him- could complete the task in privacy.
or herself more likely to act in accordance with the trait con- After the participant completed the task and notified the experi-
cepts that participate in that stereotype. We designed Experi- menter, the experimenter re-entered the lab room and partially de-
ments 2 and 3 to test this hypothesis in the context of two dis- briefed the participant. He or she was informed that the experiment
tinct stereotypes: one for elderly people and one for African was concerned with how individuals use words in various, flexible ways.
Americans. Waiting until the participant had gathered all of his or her belongings,
the experimenter told the participant that the elevator was down the hall
and thanked him or her for participating.
Experiments 2a and 2b: Behavioral Effects of Activating Using a hidden stopwatch, a confederate of the experimenter, who
the Elderly Stereotype was sitting in a chair apparently waiting to talk to a professor in a nearby
office, recorded the amount of time in seconds that the participant spent
Method walking a length of the corridor starting from the doorway of the exper-
Overview: The method and procedure for Experiments 2a and 2b imental room and ending at a broad strip of silver carpet tape on the
are identical and so are described together. Experiment 2b is a replica- floor 9.75 maway.
tion of 2a. The present experiments were designed to study the effect of Afterward, the experimenter caught up with the participant near the
activation of the elderly stereotype on behavior. Participants were in- elevator and gave the complete debriefing, explaining the experimental
structed to work on a scrambled-sentence task as part of a language hypotheses verbally as well as giving the participant an accompanying
proficiency experiment. The scrambled-sentence task contained words written version. Participants were also informally asked (prior to this
AUTOMATIC SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 237
10
Priming Condition Awareness Check Study
• Neutral n Elderly
The crucial factor in concluding that these results show auto-
matic effects on behavior derives from the perceiver's lack of
awareness of the influence of the words. Previous research (see
review in Bargh, 1992) has indicated that it is not whether the
primes are presented supraliminally or subliminally, but
whether the individual is aware of the potential influence of the
prime that is critical; diametrically opposite effects on judg-
ments are obtained if the participant is aware versus not aware
of a possible influence by the priming stimuli (see Lombardi,
I 1111111111 Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Strack & Hannover, 1996). We con-
ducted a subsequent study to explicitly test whether the partici-
pants were aware of the potential influence of the scrambled-
sentence task. Our conclusions in terms of automatic social be-
havior depend on the participants' not being aware of this
influence.
Method. Nineteen male and female undergraduate students at New
Experiment 2a Experiment 2b York University participated in the experiment to partially fulfill course
credit. On arrival at the laboratory waiting room, participants were ran-
Figure 2. Mean time (in seconds) to walk down the hallway after the domly assigned to either the elderly stereotype priming condition or the
conclusion of the experiment, by stereotype priming condition, sepa- neutral priming condition.
rately for participants in Experiment 2a and 2b. Participants took part in the experiment one at a time. They were
informed that the purpose of the study was to investigate language pro-
ficiency and that they would complete a scrambled-sentence task. Par-
ticipants were randomly administered either the version of the task con-
final debriefing) whether they thought the scrambled-sentence task taining words relevant to the elderly stereotype or the neutral version
might have affected them in any way, and if they had known that the containing no stereotype-relevant words. Immediately after completion
task contained words relevant to the elderly stereotype. No participant of the task, participants were asked to complete a version of the contin-
expressed any knowledge of the relevance of the words in the scrambled- gency awareness funnel debriefing, modeled after Page (1969). This
sentence task to the elderly stereotype. Furthermore, no participant be- contingency awareness debriefing contained items concerning the pur-
lieved that the words had an impact on his or her behavior. pose of the study, whether the participant had suspected that the pur-
pose ofthe experiment was different from what the experimenter had
explained, whether the words had any relation to each other, what pos-
Results sible ways the words could have influenced their behavior, whether the
participants could predict the direction of an influence if the experi-
Experiment 2a. A t test was computed to ascertain the effect menter had intended one, what the words in the scrambled-sentence
task could have related to (if anything), and if the participant had sus-
of the priming manipulation on walking speed. Participants in
pected or had noticed any relation between the scrambled-sentence task
the elderly priming condition (M = 8.28 s) had a slower walking and the concept of age. Afterward, the experimenter explained the
speed compared to participants in the neutral priming condi- hypotheses to the participants and thanked them for their help.
tion (M= 7.30 s), t(2S) = 2.86,p< .01, as predicted.
Results and discussion. Inspection of the responses revealed
Experiment 2b. In the replication, analyses revealed that that only 1 of the 19 participants showed any awareness of a
participants in the elderly priming condition (M = 8.20 s) again relationship between the stimulus words and the elderly stereo-
had a slower walking speed compared to participants in the neu- type. However, even this participant could not predict in what
tral priming condition (M = 7.23 s), t(28) = 2.16, p < .05. form or direction their behavior might have been influenced
Thus, across both studies, passively activating the elderly stereo- had such an influence occurred. Thus, it appears safe to con-
type resulted in a slower walking speed (see Figure 2). clude that the effect of the elderly priming manipulation on
walking speed occurred nonconsciously.
Discussion
Does Mood Mediate the Effect ofPriming
The results of the present experiments suggest that exposing
individuals to a series of words linked to a particular stereotype
on Walking Speed?
influences behavior nonconsciously. How the activated stereo- One alternative explanation that can be offered for the effect
type influences behavior depends on the content of the activated of the elderly-stereotype-related stimuli on walking speed is
stereotype itself, not the stimulus words actually presented. Be- that, in general, the words relating to the elderly stereotype are
cause there were no allusions to time or speed in the stimulus more likely than control words to induce in participants a sad
materials, the results of the study suggest that the elderly prim- mood, which might then be the reason they walked more slowly.
ing stimuli activated the elderly stereotype in memory, and par- Method. A total of 33 undergraduate men and women from New
ticipants subsequently acted in ways consistent with that acti- York University participated in the experiment in order to partially ful-
vated stereotype. fill course credit. On arrival at the experimental waiting area, partici-
238 BARGH, CHEN, AND BURROWS

pants were randomly assigned to either the elderly or the neutral prim- Caucasian male face. On the 130th trial, the computer alerted the par-
ing conditions. ticipant of an ostensible data-saving failure and also informed the par-
Each participant completed the version of the scrambled-sentence ticipant that he or she would have to do the entire computer task again.
task corresponding to their assigned priming condition: either the prime A hidden video camera was placed in the lab room to capture partici-
version containing elderly-stereotype-relevant words, or a neutral ver- pants' facial reactions to the ostensible computer error and news that
sion without the elderly-stereotype-relevant words. Immediately after the task would have to be redone. Also, the experimenter rated the hos-
they completed the task, a modified version of the Affect-Arousal Scale tility of the participant's reaction. The hypothesis was that participants
(Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989) was administered to each participant. presented subliminally with African American faces would react with
This questionnaire contained eight bipolar items differentiating feelings greater hostility to the computer error, compared to participants primed
of emotion and arousal on scales ranging from - 8 to +8. The emotion with Caucasian faces.
dimensions were bad-good, disappointed-satisfied, sad-happy, and Participants. Participants were 41 non-African-American under-
displeased-pleased. The arousal dimensions were calm-excited, tired- graduate students from New York University who participated in the
energetic, down-elated, and sedate-aroused. Participants responded to experiment to partially fulfill course credit.
each dimension in terms of how they felt at that moment. After comple- Apparatus. A Gateway 486 computer with a VGA color monitor
tion of the scales, participants were debriefed and thanked for their was used to administer the priming manipulation. A Visual Basic pro-
cooperation. gram was created that allowed the experimenter to be blind to priming
Results. We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance conditions, gave participants directions about an odd-even task, and
(MANOVA) using priming condition as the independent vari- administered the experimental trials. When the experimenter entered
able and the average of the four emotion scales and the average the participant's ID number into the computer, the computer randomly
of the four arousal scales as the dependent measures. Analyses assigned the participant to a condition, keeping the participant's condi-
revealed that the main effect of priming condition was not sig- tion from the experimenter's knowledge. During the experimental
nificant across the two dependent measures, F{ 1, 31) < 1. Fur- phase, each participant was subliminally exposed to black-and-white
thermore, there was no interaction between priming condition photographs of African American or Caucasian faces. On a given trial,
and the two dependent measures of emotion and arousal, F( 1, the face photograph was followed by two different pattern masks in
31) < 1. If anything, participants in the elderly priming condi- rapid succession. Thefirstpattern mask was composed of a black-and-
white pattern of diagonal cross-hatches. The second mask, presented
tion were in a more positive mood (M =1.7) than control par-
immediately after thefirst,was conceptually similar but not identical to
ticipants (M - 0.3) and were more aroused or energetic as well
the target picture, which was composed of from 4 to 20 colored circles
(Ms = —0.5 and —1.2, respectively). Thus, participants who on a gray background. Pretesting had shown that the masking proce-
were exposed to the elderly stereotype stimuli were not more dure was effective in that individuals were not aware of the presence of
likely to be sad or less aroused compared to participants who the face photographs.
were not exposed to the stereotype-related stimuli. The alterna- The presentation speed of each subliminal picture (faces and masks)
tive explanation for our findings in terms of a mediating effect was bounded by the computer hardware. Specifically, the 76 Hz monitor
of mood caused by the elderly stereotype primes appears screen refresh rate resulted in a minimum presentation time of 13 ms
untenable. and a maximum of 26 ms. Each target picture was then presented for 3
s before it disappeared and the participant was asked to make the odd
or even response.
Experiment 3: Behavioral Effects ofthe African Participants were videotaped throughout the odd-even task by means
American Stereotype of a hidden video camera. The video camera allowed a clear view of
facial expressions while the participant completed the computer task
The results of Experiment 2 showed that the automatic acti- and was exposed to the ostensible computer error.
vation of the elderly stereotype has direct and nonconscious Procedure. Each participant completed the experiment individu-
effects on behavior in line with the content of the stereotype. ally. When brought into the experimental room, he or she was informed
Experiment 3 was intended to assess the generality of these re- that the experimenter was interested in how individuals use different
sults to an entirely different stereotype—that for African aspects of a picture to make quick judgments. Pictures of 4-25 different
Americans. As discussed above, Devine (1989) already showed colored circles would appear inside a small box drawn on the screen for
that this stereotype becomes active automatically to influence a few seconds at a time. For each picture, the participant was to make a
perceptions of a target's hostility. Therefore, according to the decision as to whether the picture contained an odd or an even number
present model, this automatic activation should also produce a or circles. Although each target picture was on for only 2 or 3 s, the
tendency toward hostile behavior in the perceiver. participant was asked to make the most accurate judgment possible.
The experimenter left the room after the participant completed the
Another important change in procedure from Experiment 2 practice trials and when the experimenter was sure the participant un-
was that the priming stimuli were presented subliminally, com- derstood the directions.
pletely ruling out experimenter demand or other explanations At the end of the 130th trial, the computer program beeped and dis-
of our results in terms of conscious, strategic processes. played an error message stating "Fl 1 error: failure saving data." After
the experimenter clicked on the screen response button "OK" the com-
Method puter displayed another message: "You must start the program over
again." The participant was then instructed to get the experimenter. The
Overview. The present experiment was designed to study the effect experimenter came back into the room andfiddledwith the computer,
of activation of an African American stereotype on social behavior. Par- finally announcing "I'm sorry, but you'll have to do the experiment over
ticipants were instructed to work on a computerized visual task that again." After morefiddling,the experimenter concluded "Actually, it
pretesting had shown was considered to be very boring and tedious. looks like the computer did save your data. You don't have to do it over
Immediately before each trial, the computer flashed a subliminal pic- again." The critical dependent measures were the participant's video-
ture of a young African American male face or a picture of a young taped reactions to the news that he or she might have to do the task
AUTOMATIC SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 239
over again and the experimenter's rating of the participant's degree of
hostility. Prime Type
Subsequently, participants were asked to fill out two questionnaires: • Caucasian •African-American
the Racial Ambivalence Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988) and the Modern
Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). Participants were informed that the
scales were just part of a pilot pretest in preparation for some future
experiments and were not linked to the previous experiment. When the
experimenter left the room to allow the participant tofillout the surveys
in private, the experimenter recorded her own ratings of the partici-
pant's irritability, hostility, anger, and uncooperativeness on 10-point
unipolar scales based on her interaction with the participant. V, 2
Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and then debriefed.
Participants were asked if they had seen anything unusual in the com-
puter pictures, if they thought the presence of any pictures could have
changed their behavior in any way, and to describe how. Only 2 of the
participants actually reported seeing faces in the computer task. How-
ever, those participants could not identify whether the faces were Cau-
casian or African American, and the participants could not guess that
the study was about race in any way. Furthermore, no participants were
suspicious that completing the two race scales had anything to do with
the present experiment. Participants were informed that they had been Experimenter Blind coders
videotaped to obtain facial reactions to the computer error.
Rater Type
Two coders who were blind to experimental conditions and hypothe-
ses rated all the videotaped facial expressions from the 41 participants
on a 5-point unipolar scale of hostility ranging from 0 (not at all hostile) Figure 3. Mean hostility ratings of the participants' reactions to the
to 10 (extremely hostile). The correlation between the two raters was computer error, by stereotype priming condition, separately for the ex-
.64, and discrepancies between the two sets of ratings were resolved by perimenters' and the blind coders' ratings (Experiment 3).
averaging the two sets into an overall hostility index.

son, Dunton, and Williams (1995) also found no moderation


Results by Modern Racism scores of their obtained effect of racial atti-
tudes on behavior (but see Lepore & Brown, 1996).
We conducted a MANOVA using an average of the experi-
menter's hostility ratings across the four trait scales and an av-
General Discussion
erage of the two videotape coders' hostility ratings as dependent
measures, and priming condition as the independent measure. Across three experiments, the activation of a trait construct
The MANOVA revealed a significant effect of priming condi- or a stereotype in one context resulted in behavior consistent
tion across both indexes of hostility, F( 1, 39) = 6.95, p < .05, with it in a subsequent unrelated context. The participants were
such that participants primed with photographs of African not aware of the influence or potential influence of the priming
American faces behaved in a more hostile fashion (M = 2.79) events on their behavior. The same priming techniques that
compared to participants primed with Caucasian faces (M = have been shown in prior research to influence impression for-
2.13; see Figure 3). Furthermore, codings of hostility did not mation produce similar effects when the dependent measure is
significantly differ by source of rating (experimenter vs. blind switched to social behavior.
coders), F( 1, 39) < 1, and there were no interactions between One explanation for the present results is in terms of situa-
rating source and priming condition, F{ 1, 39) < 1. tionally linked behavior; that is, that a person has behavioral
To examine the possibility that our effects could have been responses (e.g., assertiveness, anger, patience) that are associa-
moderated by attitudes toward African Americans, we calcu- tively linked to particular situations (e.g., being made to wait by
lated correlations between the averaged hostility measure across another person, losing one's work because of another's
rater type and the participant's level of racism as measured by mistake). That people have automatic behavioral as well as per-
the Racial Ambivalence Scale and the Modern Racism Scale ceptual responses to the social environment is congruent with
for each priming condition separately. None of the correlations the proposal by Lewin (1943), Mischel (1973), Berkowitz
between hostility and racism as measured by either scale were (1984), Higgins (1987), and others that immediate psycholog-
significant for either priming condition (all rs < .25, ps > .35). ical reactions to the environment are not only cognitive or
Thus, participants who were low in racist attitudes toward Afri- affective in nature but also include motivational and behavioral
can Americans were just as likely to behave in a hostile manner responses. The present results show that these behavioral re-
as participants who were high in racist attitudes, regardless of sponses become automatically linked to representations of so-
priming condition. cial situations just as previous research has found perceptual
This finding corresponds to that of Devine (1989, Experi- trait constructs, stereotypes, and attitudes to become automati-
ment 2), who found that the automatic effect of the African cally activated.
American stereotype on social perception did not vary as a Although the present results are consistent with the hypothe-
function of level of consciously expressed prejudice, as mea- sis that behavioral representations are linked directly to the rep-
sured by the Modern Racism Scale. More recently, Fazio, Jack- resentations of social situations, another theoretical perspective
240 BARGH, CHEN, AND BURROWS

consistent with the presentfindingsis that of an automatic per- of the primed stereotype was one of the appropriate responses
ception-behavior link (e.g., Berkowitz, 1984; Carver et al., to the computer error and seeming loss of the last 10 minutes'
1983). Because our studies used the same kind of trait and ste- work. In short, the primed behavior was relevant and appropri-
reotype priming manipulations that have been shown by prior ate for the experimental situation into which we placed the par-
research to affect impression formation (e.g., Devine, 1989; ticipant. In accessibility logic, the representation of that behav-
Srull & Wyer, 1979), we now know the identical priming ma- ior was applicable to the situational information (Higgins, in
nipulations result simultaneously in automatic perceptual and press).
behavioral effects. Not so with the movie situation. One is there to watch the
Thus, our results are in harmony with those of Carver et al. movie, and getting up and leaving one's seat conflicts with that.
(1983), who advanced a "behavioral schema" model as an ex- It also conflicts with another goal inherent in the theater situa-
planation for modeling effects. According to the behavioral tion, that of not disturbing the others in the audience also trying
schema model, the perceptual and actional representations of to watch thefilm.The subliminal message would affect behavior
the same type of behavior share many features in common and only for those in the audience for whom getting up to buy a
thus develop strong connections. As a result, if one has just per- soda or popcorn is a behavior they have associated with that
ceived another person acting in a generous or an aggressive way, situation, that is, a behavioral representation linked to the situ-
for example, one's behavioral schema for generosity or aggres- ational features. For those of us who buy concessions only on
sion is activated and accessible, and so one is more likely to be- the way in to our seats, and not after the movie starts, there is
have that way oneself in subsequent situations for which gener- nothing there to prime. Automatic activation can occur only if
osity or aggression is a relevant response. the individual has that behavioral representation available in
thefirstplace.
Under What Conditions Will Behavior Be Automatic? Thus, automatic social behavior may occur only if the behav-
ioral representation that is activated is already associated with
To many, we presume, the presentfindingsconjure up images that situation by the individual. In the present experiments, it is
of the old subliminal advertising debate. In the stock example, likely that all primed behaviors were in the participants' reper-
frames of Pepsi bottles or boxes of popcorn were flashed in the toire for those situations. Lewin's(e.g., 1943)fieldtheory holds
middle of a movie and were supposed to create a mad rush to that although you might be able to affect a person's behavior by
the concession counter. That kind of ploy did not and does not making some motivations more salient than others, you cannot
work (see Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, & Tataryn, 1992; Moore, give the person a motivation that he or she does not already have
1982). Why, then, were we able to prime behavior noncon- and make him or her do something for which he or she has no
sciously in the present studies?
motive base (Cartwright, 1959). It is doubtful, for example,
For one thing, our priming stimuli directly activated trait that the participants in Experiment 2 left our building to go buy
concepts, either directly as in Experiment 1 or by virtue of their condos in Florida.
inclusion in all-or-none stereotypic representations, as in Ex-
periments 2 and 3. As described above, these representations
contain the knowledge of what it means to act in the traitlike
manner, as well as the mechanisms for producing that kind of Relative Strength of Priming Effects on
behavior (see Carver et al., 1983; Prinz, 1990). We have gone Behaviors Versus Impressions
directly to the behavior representation, in other words; but a
picture of a bottle of Pepsi would directly activate only the The limited range of behavioral options that participants had
"Pepsi" representation, or the "soft drink" or "cola" represen- in our experimental situations may also account for the strength
tation. Unlike the present priming manipulations, it takes an of the findings, especially in Experiment 1 in which partici-
additional step for "Pepsi" activation to spread to a behavioral pants' responses appeared polarized toward either the rude or
representation such as "to drink" or "to buy." the polite option. But in general, across the three experiments,
For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that because obtaining priming differences on these behavioral measures was
drinking it is what one usually does with a bottle of Pepsi, there considerably easier than in our laboratory's previous research
exists an automatic link between the Pepsi representation and on social judgment measures (e.g., Bargh et al., 1986; Bargh,
the "drink" behavior representation, so that the picture of a Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982).
bottle of Pepsi does activate the "drink" behavior representa- This may be surprising news to those who might assume that
tion. Why, then, do people not act on that automatic behavior because judgments and perceptions mediate behavior, if any-
activation? Consideration of this question highlights another thing the impression effects should be stronger.
difference between the present experimental situations and the Although ultimately one cannot really compare the strength
movie theater: the ease or relevance of the automatic behavior of priming effects on behavioral versus judgmental measures,
to the person's current situational goals. because there are too many differences between the experimen-
We constructed the "interruption" situation so that both of tal situations to allow for a meaningful comparison, we can
the primed behaviors—rudeness/assertiveness or politeness/ point to some differences that are likely to produce greater or
patience—were relevant responses to it. Similar to walking lesser priming effects. The major difference, we believe, is that
down the hall after the session in Experiment 2 was ostensibly public behavior such as we measured here is more constrained
over, one can walk to the elevator as quickly as one wishes. In than are subjective judgments along personality scales; there is
Experiment 3, the hostility that we assume was activated as part less variability, and so effects are easier to detect.
AUTOMATIC SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 241

Does Social Perception Always Mediate Social Behavior? and regularity. Add to this those situations commonly enough
experienced so that we have behavioral responses strongly asso-
However, the greater variability and freedom that people have ciated with them, and the probability of automatically triggered
in perceiving others' behavior also suggests that social percep- behavior becomes even greater.
tion will be less of a mediating influence on behavior than many The question is not, therefore, how often such automatic be-
might assume. Perceptions may play a role, but they are one of havioral effects occur, but whether and how often they are con-
several influences, and it is clear from the present results that trolled or overridden by some conscious intention and purpose.
behaviors can be triggered directly without being mediated by Control over automatic influences requires three things: (a)
impressions or judgments of the person with whom one is in- awareness of the influence or at least the possibility of the in-
teracting. In Experiment 1, impressions of the experimenter fluence, (b) motivation to exert the control, and (c) enough at-
were not affected by the priming manipulation, whereas behav- tentional capacity (or lack of distractions) at the time to engage
ior strongly was. in the control process (see Bargh, 1989; Wegner, 1994). Aware-
One might argue that our impression measure lacked enough ness of the automatic effect is necessary for the motivation to be
sensitivity to detect the presence of the mediation. In response engaged, and for the motivation to operate to control the auto-
to that we would first point out that the means on the impres- matic impulse it must be supported by sufficient processing ca-
sion measure were in a different direction than the behavior pacity. Given that control requires all three of these features to
measure. But more important, to those who hold to the media- be in place, it is not difficult to see that there are many real-
tional model, it must be noted that the evidence for such con- world circumstances in which not all three are present. Even
scious mediation of behavior by attributions or judgments is with the best of underlying intentions, one cannot control an
historically weak, that when behaviors and mediators are mea- influence if one is not aware of its operation, or at least its po-
sured in the same study it is the behavioral measure that shows tential for operating (viz. Devine, 1989, Experiment 2). More-
the clear, predicted difference and the mediator that shows weak over, even if one is aware of the influence it is possible to slip up
or nonexistent differences, just as in the present Experiment 1 if one is not paying enough attention, as in ironic failures of
(see Bargh, in press; Bern, 1972, pp. 50-51). As Bern (1972) control (Wegner, 1994) and action slips (e.g., Norman, 1981).
put it, although it seems intuitively plausible that changes in One notable feature of the present demonstrations is that
perceptions will be reflected in changes in behavior: many of the behaviors automatically triggered—rudeness, slow-
ness, and hostility—are negative and so run counter to norms
There seems to be only one snag. It appears not to be true. It is not
for socially appropriate behavior. That these effects occurred
that the behavioral effects sometimes fail to occur as predicted; that
kind of negative evidence rarely embarrasses anyone. It is that they despite the general situational norms against them underscores
occur more easily, more strongly, more reliably, and more persua- the strength of the automatic behavior effect. At the same time,
sively than the attribution changes that are, theoretically, supposed one can imagine situations in which consequences for negative
to be mediating them. (p. 50) behavior are sizable enough that motivations would be strong
enough to overcome them—as when the person making you
Bern supported this statement by reviewing several classic cool your heels in the hallway is your boss or supervisor. None-
studies in which measures were taken both of the behavior and theless, we believe the individual's lack of awareness of the
the presumed mediator (e.g., Valins & Ray, 1967; Zimbardo, source of the automatic behavior impulses usually translates
Cohen, Weisenberg, Dworkin, & Firestone, 1969); in all of into a lack of monitoring or attempt to control them—as well
them, well-designed and conducted as they were, the behavioral as a tendency to misattribute them to possible (and justifiable)
measure showed clear predicted effects, and the evidence of the causes of which the individual is aware (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson,
"mediator" was nonexistent. In others (e.g., Darley & Latane^ 1977)—which will also increase the likelihood that the activa-
1968), the assumed mediator (e.g., diffusion of responsibility) tion of automatic behavior responses will find expression.
was not measured at all but was inferred from the behavioral
measure (e.g., likelihood of helping).
Implications for Stereotype Confirmation
By no means are we arguing here that social perceptions and and Empathic Reactions
judgments do not mediate behavior. Our point is merely that
they need not and, moreover, we should hold the assumption of One important message to be taken from the results of Ex-
mediation to the same standards of proof and evidence to which periments 2 and 3 is that there may be an automatic, noncon-
we hold the hypothesis of direct, nonmediated behavior instead scious basis for self-fulfilling prophecy effects (e.g., Snyder,
of assuming mediation by default. Reviews of the evidence of Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). If the automatic activation of a ste-
such mediation, in fact, find it in short supply (Bargh, in press). reotype by the physical features (including speech accent, skin
color, gender, and age-related features) of another person causes
Can Automatic Behavior Be Controlled? the perceiver him- or herself to behave in line with the stereo-
typefirst,the perceiver's own initial behavior to the target could
If, as the ideomotor principle has it, the mere thought of be- well produce similar behavior in the stereotyped individual. In
having in a certain way increases the tendency to so behave, the case of the African American stereotype, for example, the
and if, as the perception-behavior link notion has it, merely nonconscious influence of the activated stereotype could cause
perceiving the behavior of others (in the media as well as real the perceiver to behave in a hostile manner to African Ameri-
life) activates tendencies to behave in the same way, then auto- cans he or she encounters and produce behavioral confirmation
matic behavioral impulses are occurring with great frequency of the stereotype (i.e., a hostile response in reaction). It is im-
242 BARGH, CHEN, AND BURROWS

portant to note that the perceiver would be unaware of the role one may attribute it to the stereotyped group member (and,
his or her own initial hostility had played in this sequence, be- hence, the group).
cause the effect of the stereotype on behavior was noncon- As afirstdemonstration of automatic social behavior, the lim-
scious—the perceiver would have no conscious experience of its and parameters of these effects remain to be established.
choosing that mode of behavior. Thus, the perceiver's subjec- However, an important theoretical point can already be made:
tive, phenomenal experience, and hence memory of the event, Social behavior is like any other psychological reaction to a so-
would be of the stereotyped group member's unprovoked initial cial situation, capable of occurring in the absence of any con-
hostility. scious involvement or intervention. The implications for many
Another important implication is the automatic creation of social psychological phenomena—among them conformity,
empathic reactions. When in the normal course of interacting emotional and behavioral contagion, empathy, imitation and
with another person, one perceives his or her friendliness or modeling, and the behavioral confirmation of stereotypes—
honesty or anger, and the same kind of behavior in response is would appear to be considerable.
made more likely merely by the ideomotor function, noncon-
sciously producing empathic behavioral and emotional reac- References
tions (see Hodges & Wegner, in press). The perception-behav-
Ansfield, M., & Wegner, D. M. (1996). The feeling of doing. In P. M.
ior link may be an important ingredient in the "glue" that binds Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action (pp. 482-
two (or more) interaction partners, keeps them on the same 506). New York: Guilford Press.
wavelength, and helps to bring each partner a sense of validation Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren-
by others of their experience. tice Hall.
This is not to say that an automatic effect of perception on Bargh, J. A. (1982). Attention and automaticity in the processing of
behavior is necessarily entirely beneficial for social interaction. self-relevant information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
Dodge and Crick's (1990) research on the social cognition of ogy 49, 1040-1053.
aggressive children shows that they are both more likely to per- Bargh, J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic
influence in social perception and cognition. In J. S. Uleman & J. A.
ceive another child's action as aggressive in nature and to re-
Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 3-51). New York: Guilford
spond themselves with aggression. Although Dodge's account Press.
of these and relatedfindingsis in terms of a conscious deliberate Bargh, J. A. (1992). Does subliminality matter to social psychology?
choice of aggression based on a perceived aggressive provoca- Being aware of the stimulus versus aware of its influence. In R. F.
tion by the other, it also is possible, on the basis of the present Bornstein & T. Pittman (Eds.), Perception without awareness (pp.
results, that conscious choice may play less of a role in produc- 236-255). New York: Guilford Press.
ing the aggression. It may be that the mere accessibility of the Bargh, J. A. (1994). The Four Horsemen of automaticity. In R. S. Wyer
mental category of aggression increases the likelihood of aggres- & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (pp. 1-40). Hills-
sive behavior, via the passive perception-behavior link. More- dale, NJ: Erlbaum.
over, the automatic effect of priming on behavior that we have Bargh, J. A. (in press). The automaticity of everyday life. In R. S. Wyer
documented is further reason to believe that aggression in the (Ed.), Advances in socialcognilion(Vol. 10). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bargh, J. A., Bond, R. N., Lombardi, W. J., & Tota, M. E. (1986). The
mass media does produce aggressive tendencies in the viewer
additive nature of chronic and temporary sources of construct acces-
(e.g., Berkowitz, 1984)—perhaps even more insidiously and sibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 869-878.
pervasively than previously believed. Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The gener-
ality of the automatic attitude activation effect. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 62, 893-912.
Conclusions Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Raymond, P., & Hymes, C. (1996). The auto-
matic evaluation effect: Unconditionally automatic attitude activa-
Our central message is that social behavior can be triggered tion with a pronunciation task. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology, 32, 104-128.
automatically by features of the environment. In Experiment 1,
Bargh, J. A., Lombardi, W., & Higgins, E. T. (1988). Automaticity in
the same trait-priming manipulations that have exerted a non- Person X Situation effects on person perception: It's just a matter of
conscious influence over social perceptual processes in previous time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 599-605.
research were shown to produce traitlike behavior as well. Ex- Bargh, J. A., & Pietromonaco, P. (1982). Automatic information pro-
periments 2 and 3 showed that traitlike behavior is also pro- cessing and social perception: The influence of trait information pre-
duced via automatic stereotype activation if that trait partici- sented outside of conscious awareness on impression formation.
pates in the stereotype. The major implications of the findings Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 437-449.
are, first, the apparent degree to which social behavior occurs Bargh, J. A., & Thein, R. D. (1985). Individual construct accessibility,
unintentionally and without conscious involvement in the pro- person memory, and the recall-judgment link: The case of informa-
duction of that behavior. Second, thefindingspoint to the pos- tion overload. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49,
sibility that the automatic activation of one's stereotypes of so- 1129-1146.
Bargh, J. A., & Tota, M. E. (1988). Context-dependent automatic pro-
cial groups, by the mere presence of group features (e.g., Afri-
cessing in depression: Accessibility of negative constructs with regard
can American faces in Experiment 3), can cause one to behave to self but not others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
in line with that stereotype without realizing it (e.g., with hos- 54, 925-939.
tility of facial expression or tone of voice). By this first strike, Bern, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Ad-
therefore, one may elicit that very type of behavior in response. vances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 1-62). New
But because one is not aware of one's own role in provoking it, York: Academic Press.
AUTOMATIC SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 243

Berkowitz, L. (1984). Some effects of thoughts on anti- and prosocial Higgins, E. T. (1989). Knowledge accessibility and activation: Subjec-
influences of media events: A cognitive-neoassociation analysis. Psy- tivity and suffering from unconscious sources. In J. S. Uleman & J. A.
chological Bulletin, 95, 410-427. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 75-123). New York: Guilford
Berkowitz, L., & LePage, A. (1967). Weapons as aggression-eliciting Press.
stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 202-207. Higgins, E. T. (in press). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applica-
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. bility, and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social
In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer, Jr. (Eds.), Advances in social cognition psychology: Handbook of basic principles. New \brk: Guilford Press.
(Vol. 1, pp. 1-36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Higgins, E. X, & King, G. A. (1981). Accessibility of social constructs:
Brewer, M. B., Dull, V., & Lui, L. (1981). Perceptions of the elderly: Information-processing consequences of individual and contextual
Stereotypes as prototypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- variability. In N. Cantor & J. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Personality, cogni-
ogy, 41, 656-670. tion, and social interaction (pp. 69-122). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Carlston, D. E., & Skowronski, J. J. (1994). Savings in the relearning of Hodges, S., & Wegner, D. M. (in press). Automaticity and control of
trait information as evidence for spontaneous inference generation. empathy. In W. J. Ickes (Ed.), Empathic accuracy. New "Vbrk: Guil-
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 840-856. ford Press.
Cartwright, D. (1959). A field theoretical conception of power. In D. James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Holt.
Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in social power (pp. 183-220). Ann Arbor, Katz, I., & Hass, R. G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value
MI: Institute for Social Research. conflict: Correlational and priming studies of dual cognitive struc-
Carver, C. S., Ganellen, R. J., Framing, W. J., & Chambers, W. (1983). tures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 893-905.
Modeling: An analysis in terms of category accessibility. Journal of Kihlstrom, J. F., Barnhardt, T. M., & Tataryn, D. J. (1992). Implicit
Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 403-421. perception. In R. F. Bornstein & T. S. Pittman (Eds.), Perception
Darley, J. M., & Latanel B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergen- without awareness (pp. 17-54). New \brk: Guilford Press.
cies: Diffusion of responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Koffka, K. (1935). Principles of Gestalt psychology. New York: Har-
Psychology, 8, 377-383. court, Brace.
Dell, G. S. (1986). A spreading activation theory of retrieval in sentence LaPiere, R. T. (1934). Attitudes vs. actions. Social Forces, 13,230-237.
production. Psychological Review, 93, 283-321. Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A.
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and Jeffress (Ed.), Cerebral mechanisms in behavior: The Hixon sympo-
controlled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- sium (pp. 112-136). New York: Wiley.
ogy, 56, 5-18. Lepore, L., & Brown, R. (1996). Category and stereotype activation: Is
Dodge, K. A., & Crick, N. R. (1990). Social information-processing prejudice inevitable?Manuscript submitted for publication.
bases of aggressive behavior in children. Personality and Social Psy- Lewin, K. (1943). Defining the "field at a given time." Psychological
chology Bulletin, 16, 8-22. Review, 50,292-310.
Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C , & Williams, C. J. (1995). Lombardi, W. J., Higgins, E. X, & Bargh, J. A. (1987). The role of
Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of ra- consciousness in priming effects on categorization. Personality and
cial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? Journal of Personality and Social Social Psychology Bulletin, 13, 411-429.
Psychology, 69, 1013-1027. McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the mod-
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C , & Kardes, F. R. ern racism scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice,
(1986). On the automatic activation of attitudes. Journal of Person- discrimination, and racism (pp. 91-125). Orlando, FL: Academic
ality and Social Psychology, 50, 229-238. Press.
Fiske, S. T. (1989). Examining the role of intent: Toward understanding McTavish, D.G. (1971). Perceptions of old people: A review of research
its role in stereotyping and prejudice. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh methodologies and findings. The Gerontologist, 11, 90-102.
(Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 253-283). New York: Guilford Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1977). Imitation of facial and manual
Press. gestures by human neonates. Science, 198, 75-78.
Fiske, S. T. (1992). Thinking is for doing: Portraits of social cognition Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1983). Newborn infants imitate adult
from daguerrotype to laserphoto. Journal of Personality and Social facial gestures. Child Development, 54, 702-709.
Psychology, 63, 877-889. Meyer, D. E., & Gordon, P. C. (1984). Dependencies between rapid
Fiske, S. T, & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression for- speech perception and production: Evidence for a shared sensorimo-
mation, from category-based to individuating processes: Influences tor voicing mechanism. In H. Bouma & D. G. Bouwhuis (Eds.), At-
of information and motivation on attention and interpretation. In tention and performance X (pp. 365-377). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley.
23, pp. 1-74). New York: Academic Press. Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptual-
Gilbert, D. T. (1989). Thinking lightly about others. In J. S. Uleman & ization of personality. Psychological Review, 80, 252-283.
J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 189-211). New York: Mischel, W, & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory
Guilford Press. of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics,
Gilbert, D. T, Pelham, B. W, & Krull, D. S. (1988). On cognitive busy- and invariance in personality structure. Psychological Review, 102,
ness: When person perceivers meet persons perceived. Journal ofPer- 246-268.
sonality and Social Psychology, 54, 733-739. Moore, T. E. (1982). Subliminal advertising: What you see is what you
Harris, L., & Associates. (1975). The myth and reality of aging in get. Journal of Marketing, 46, 38-47.
America. Washington, DC: National Council on Aging. Neuberg, S. L. (1988). Behavioral implications of information pre-
Hayes-Roth, B. (1977). Evolution of cognitive structure and processes. sented outside of conscious awareness: The effect of subliminal pre-
Psychological Review, 84, 260-278. sentation of trait information on behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Herr, P. M. (1986). Consequences of priming: Judgment and behavior. Game. Social Cognition, 6, 207-230.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1106-1115. Newman, L. S., & Uleman, J. S. (1989). Spontaneous trait inference.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. In J.S. Uleman & J . A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 155-
Psychological Review, 94, 319-340. 188). New York: Guilford Press.
244 BARGH, CHEN, AND BURROWS

Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: interpersonal behavior: On the self-fulfilling nature of social stereo-
Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 2 3 1 - types. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 656-666.
259. Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S., Jr. (1979). The role of category accessibility
Norman, D. A. (1981). Categorization of action slips. Psychological in the interpretation of information about persons: Some determi-
Review, 88, 1-15. nants and implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
Page, M. M. (1969). Social psychology of a classical conditioning of 37, 1660-1672.
attitudes experiment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Strack, F., & Hannover, B. (1996). Awareness of influence as a precon-
11, 177-186. dition for implementing correctional goals. In P. M. Gollwitzer &
Perdue, C. W, & Gurtman, M. B. (1990). Evidence for the automatic- J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action (pp. 579-596). New
ity of ageism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 199— York: Guilford Press.
216. Strauman, T. J., & Higgins, E. T. (1987). Automatic activation of self-
Piaget, J. (1946). La formation du symbole chez I'enfant [Symbol-for- discrepancies and emotional syndromes: When cognitive structures
mation of the child]. Paris: Delachaux & Niestle! influence affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53,
Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention and cognitive con- 1004-1014.
trol. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Information processing and cognition: The Uleman, J. S., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.). (1989). Unintended thought. New
Loyola symposium (pp. 55-85). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. York: Guilford Press.
Pratto, F., & Bargh, J. A. (1991). Stereotyping based on apparently Valins, S., & Ray, A. A. (1967). Effects of cognitive desensitization on
individuating information: Trait and global components of sex ste- avoidance behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7,
reotypes under attention overload. Journal of Experimental Social 345-350.
Psychology, 27, 26-47. Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychologi-
Prinz, W. (1990). A common coding approach to perception and ac- cal Review, 101, 34-52.
tion. In O. Neumann & W. Prinz (Eds.), Relationships between per- Wegner, D. M., & Bargh, J. A. (in press). Control and automaticity in
ception and action (pp. 167-201). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. social life. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Hand-
Salovey, P., & Birnbaum, D. (1989). Influence of mood on health-rele- book ofsocial psychology (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
vant cognitions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, Wicker, A. W. (1969). Attitude versus actions: The relationship of ver-
539-551. bal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects. Journal of So-
Schank, R. C , & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals and un- cial Issues, 25, 41-78.
derstanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Winter, L., & Uleman, J. S. (1984). When are social judgments made?
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic hu- Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences. Journal of Per-
man information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic at- sonality and Social Psychology, 47, 237-252.
tending, and a general theory. Psychological Review, 84, 127-190. Wyer, R. S., Jr., & Srull, T. K. (1989). Memory and cognition in its
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Wright, J. C. (1994). Intra-individual stabil- social context. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
ity in the organization and patterning of behavior: Incorporating psy- Zajonc, R. B., Pietromonaco, P., & Bargh, J. A. (1982). Independence
chological situations into the idiographic analysis of personality. and interaction of affect and cognition. In M. S. Clark & S. T. Fiske
JournalofPersonality and Social Psychology, 67, 674-687. (Eds.), Affect and cognition: The seventeenth annual Carnegie Sym-
Smith, E. R. (1994). Procedural knowledge and processing strategies posium on Cognition (pp. 211-228). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of Zimbardo, P. G., Cohen, A., Weisenberg, M., Dworkin, L., & Firestone,
social cognition (2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 99-152). Hillsdale, NJ: 1. (1969). The control of experimental pain. In P. G. Zimbardo
Erlbaum. (Ed.), The cognitive control of motivation (pp. 100-125). Glenview,
Smith, E. R. (in press). Mental representation and memory. In D. T. IL: Scott, Foresman.
Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psy-
chology (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Snedecor, G. W., & Cochran, W. G. (1980). Statistical methods (7th Received August 2, 1995
ed.). Ames: Iowa State University Press. Revision received February 14, 1996
Snyder, M., Tanke, E. D., & Berscheid, E. (1977). Social perception and Accepted March 3, 1996 •

Anda mungkin juga menyukai