CLARENCE TIU Consti 2 Notes Last Edit Jan2018 PDF

CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW II
CODAL
NOTES ON FR. BERNAS’ PRIMER ON THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
NOTES ON PROF. NACHURA’S POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
JURISPRUDENCE BASED ON DEAN CANDELARIA’S SYLLABUS
JURISPRUDENCE BASED ON PROF. JACK JIMENEZ’S SYLLABUS
IT BEGINS WITH FAITH & CONVICTION, PERSEVERES WITH HARD WORK & DISCIPLINE, AND
ENDS WITH AN IMPASSIONED TRIUMPH WITHIN, WHEN WE REALIZE THAT WE CAN DO ANYTHING
[SEE EPH. 3:20]
#EMBRACETHEGRIND
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTICLE 3 — BILL OF RIGHTS 3
BILL OF RIGHTS IN GENERAL 3
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 5
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION 13
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 16
RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE 35
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF THE PRESS AND THE RIGHT TO PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY AND PETITION 36
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION 51
LIBERTY OF ABODE; RIGHT TO TRAVEL 57
RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN 57
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 60
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 62
RIGHT AGAINST NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS 70
RIGHT OF FREE ACCESS TO COURTS, QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE 71
RIGHTS OF PERSONS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS 71
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES 74
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES 84
OVERVIEW OF THE SPECIAL WRITS 85
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 86
WRIT OF AMPARO 88
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA 91
WRIT OF KALIKASAN 93
RIGHTS AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 94
LIMITATIONS ON THE ENACTMENT OF PENAL LAWS 94
ARTICLE 4 — CITIZENSHIP 97
WHO ARE PHILIPPINE CITIZENS 97
NATURAL-BORN PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP 99
NATURALIZATION 100
LOSS AND RE-ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP 104
DUAL ALLEGIANCE AND DUAL CITIZENSHIP 107
ARTICLE 5 — SUFFRAGE 109

THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE 109
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES ON CONGRESS REGARDING SUFFRAGE 111
ARTICLE 13 — SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113
LABOR 113
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM 114
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING 118
HEALTH 120
WOMEN 120
ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS 120
HUMAN RIGHTS 120
ARTICLE 14 — EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS 123
EDUCATION 123
LANGUAGE 129
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 129
ARTS AND CULTURE 130
SPORTS 130
ARTICLE 15 — THE FAMILY 131
CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

ATENEO LAW 4B 2017 2 OF 131 POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
ARTICLE 3 — BILL OF RIGHTS
BILL OF RIGHTS IN GENERAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS

‣ What is the “Bill of Rights”? What is its importance?
‣ BERNAS — Government is powerful. When unlimited, it becomes tyrannical. The Bill of Rights is a guarantee that
there are certain areas of a person's life, liberty, and property which governmental power may not touch. The Bill of
Rights limits all the powers of government.
‣ It is the set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing
limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. The Bill of Rights is
designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security “against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of
the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles. (PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills)
‣ NACHURA — Generally, any governmental action in violation of the Bill of Rights is void. These provisions are also
generally self-executing.
‣ What rights are protected by the Bill of Rights?
1. Civil Rights — Those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights to
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.. They are rights appertaining to a person by
virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
2. Political Rights — They refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right to petition and, in general the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government
‣ In very general terms, the bill of rights protect the right to life, liberty and property. All other rights derogate from these
general rights.
‣ What if the Bill of Rights is suspended (such as during the People Power Revolution when the Constitution was
suspended) what will protect our civil and political rights?
‣ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCP) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
which the State must observe even during the ineffectively of the Constitution.
‣ SEE — Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
‣ In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative from the
actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the EDSA revolution until the
adoption, on March 24, 1986, of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution. During this period, the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law, because no constitution limited the extent and
scope of such directives and orders. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under the Bill of Rights, because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights at the time. However, the
protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.
THREE INHERENT POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

‣ The totality of governmental power is contained in three great and inherent powers of the State —
1. Police power
2. Power of eminent domain
3. Power of taxation
‣ They are inherent because they belong to the very essence of government and without them no government can exist.
‣ The constitution can only define and delimit them and allocate their exercise among various government agencies, it does
not grant them.

‣ NOTE — It is important to distinguish what kind of governmental power is being exercised by the State as different
limitations and rules are imposed on each of them.
‣ Who wields and exercises these power?
‣ The national government, through the legislative department, exercises these powers, but they are also delegated,
within limits, to local governments.
‣ What are the common characteristics of these three inherent powers?
1. Inherent in the State, exercised even without need of express constitutional grant.
2. Necessary and indispensable; State cannot be effective without them.
3. Methods by which State interferes with private property.
4. Exercised primarily by the Legislature.
‣ What are some distinctions between these three inherent powers?
‣ Police power regulates both liberty and property; eminent domain and taxation affect only property rights.
‣ Police power and taxation are exercised only by government; eminent domain may be exercised by private entities.
‣ Property taken in police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose and may thus be destroyed; while
in eminent domain and taxation, the property is wholesome and devoted to public use or purpose.
‣ Compensation in police power is the intangible, altruistic feeling that the individual has contributed to the public good;
in eminent domain, it is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken; while in taxation, it is the protection given
and/or public improvements instituted by government for the taxes paid.
POLICE POWER
‣ What is Police Power?
‣ Police power has been characterized as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it
does to all the great public needs." Negatively, it has been defined as "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safely, and welfare of society." (Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association Inc. v. Mayor of Manila 1967)
‣ It is essentially government regulation of private activities for the public good.
‣ It is the limitation and restriction of public rights for the general welfare.
‣ It is power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with
or injurious to the rights of the public. Under the Police Power of the State, all persons and property may be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. (US
vs Toribio)
‣ Under this power, the State may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general
welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception
and fraud. (People vs Ventura)
‣ The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of
society. It can also regulate property rights. (Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation)
‣ What is the scope of Police Power?
‣ It pertains to any measure intended to promote, the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or
to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is a legitimate
exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of
an individual, the same must be upheld. (People vs Cayat)
‣ Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public to self-protection. For this
reason, its scope expands and contracts with changing needs. (Churchill v. Rafferty 1915)
‣ Examples of the valid exercise of Police Power —

‣ A law prohibiting and penalising gambling (Magtajas v. Price Properties 1994)
‣ A law ordering the closure of commercial blood banks (Beltran v. Secretary of Health 2005)

‣ Regulation of legislative franchises. Franchises are subject to police power and the mandatory rule is not a form of
taking but a form of police power regulation. (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. PMSI 2009)
‣ A law limiting deployment of overseas workers to skilled workers. (Executive Secretary v. CA 2004)
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
ARTICLE 2 — DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

1. RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY
‣ The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of one's
limb against physical harm. The right to life is the right to a good life.
‣ The emphasis on the quality of living is found in Article 2 where it commands the State to promote a life of "dignity"
and guarantees "a rising standard of living”, and “improved quality of life” for all.
‣ “Life” — includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to
the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable.
‣ “Liberty” — includes “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude, it includes
the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro)
‣ “Life and liberty” Includes the following rights —
a. Right to health
b. Right to privacy
c. Right to Security
‣ While the right to life under Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution guarantees essentially the right to be alive, upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned, the right to security of a person is a guarantee of the
secure quality of this life. The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler, rather it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The right to
security covers — (1) Freedom from Fear (2) Guarantee of Bodily and Psychological Integrity or Security (3)
Guarantee of Protection of one’s right by the Government. (Sec. of National Defense vs Manalo 2008)
d. Right to dignity
e. Freedom of expression and speech
f. Freedom of assembly
2. RIGHT TO PROPERTY
‣ Property — is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more
than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and dispose of them.
‣ NOTE — Under the Civil Code, anything which may be subject of appropriation is considered property.
‣ Protected property includes —

a. All kinds of property rights
‣ This includes Real and Personal Property, whether tangible and intangible, and other property rights as defined
under the Civil Code
‣ Includes rights arising from contracts. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Art. 3, Sec. 10 is really a
reiteration of substantive due process and is subject to the same scrutiny.
b. Vested rights
‣ Such as a perfected mining claim, or a perfected homestead, or a final judgment
c. Right to Employment (the right to work and the right to earn a living)
‣ An order of preventive suspension without opportunity for hearing at all violates property right. (Crespo v.
Provincial Board 1988)
d. Right to exercise a Profession
‣ Pilotage, as a profession, has taken on the nature of a property right. Only duly licensed individuals may
practice pilotage, just like other professions. Their license is granted in the form of an appointment that allows
them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. (Corona v. United Harbor
Pilots Association of the Phils)
‣ Protected property does NOT include mere privileges granted by the State, such as —
‣ A license to operate a cockpit is not considered protected properly. It is deemed merely a privilege withdrawable
when public interest require its withdrawal.
‣ A certificate of public convenience granted to public utilities confers no property right
‣ A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being a mere
privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the
non- impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest. (Republic v.
Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation 2004)
‣ The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A
permit to carry a firearm outside one’s residence may be revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it
cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power. (Chavez v. Romulo)
‣ BUT — Exceptionally, a mere privilege, however, may evolve into some form of property right protected by due
process, as for instance when a privilege, in this case an export quota, has been enjoyed for so long, has been the
subject of substantial investment and has become the source of employment for thousands. (American Inter-
Fashion Corporation v. Office of the President 1991)
‣ Is the right to a “Public Office” property?
‣ NO. Public office is not property; but one unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action to recover the same,
flowing from the de jure officer’s right to office. (Nunez v. Averia) While public office is not property to which one
may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right (Bince v. Comelec)
HIERARCHY OF PROTECTED RIGHTS

‣ RULE — THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
‣ SEE — Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs PBMC, 50 SCRA 189,202-3 (1973)
‣ The right to life and property do not enjoy identical protection from the Constitution. The primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions.
‣ The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
‣ RULE — NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
‣ This simply means that the government, in the exercise of its police powers, must observe and satisfy the
requirements of due process.
‣ The exercise of police power and government regulation results in the restriction and limitation of the right to life,
liberty and property. The Due Process Clause guarantees that any such restriction and limitation must NOT be
arbitrary and not procedural unfair.
‣ RATIONALE — The purpose of the guaranty of due process is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of persons, to secure them from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power, to protect property
from confiscation without trial and conviction, and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and benefit of
the general law. (City of Manila vs Laguio)
‣ Aspects of Due Process —
1. Procedural Due Process — a guarantee of procedural fairness, depending on the forum.
2. Substantive Due Process — prohibits the imposition of arbitrary laws. The government regulation must be
justified in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, having in mind, the public welfare sought to be
promoted and the degree of intrusion to the rights which will be restricted.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

‣ RULE — PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IS A GUARANTEE OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND FAIR PLAY. IT ESSENTIALLY REQUIRES
PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE ANY JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR DECISION AFFECTING A PERSON MAY BE RENDERED
‣ It requires a mode of procedure which government agencies must follow in the enforcement and application of laws.
‣ Its essence was expressed by Daniel Webster as a “law which hears before it condemns.”
‣ Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of “fair play”. (Lai vs People 2015)
‣ As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. (Corona vs UHPA)
‣ The importance of due process cannot be underestimated. Too basic is the rule that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to reasonable prior notice and hearing embraces not only
the right to present evidence but also the opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The
right to submit arguments implies that opportunity otherwise the right may as well be considered impotent. And those
who are brought into contest with government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are
entitled to be fairy advised of what the government proposes and to be heard upon its proposal before it issues its
final command. (CIR vs CA 1996)
‣ NACHURA — This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of government.
‣ BUT — A PERSON’S RIGHT TO PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING MAY BE DEPRIVED PURSUANT TO A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER, SUCH AS IN —
1. Bank closures
2. Laws allowing the issuance of ex parte provisional orders in cases involving public interest
ASPECTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN THE PROMULGATION OF LAWS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT ISSUANCES
‣ REQUIREMENTS — Failure to comply with the following requirements results in the ineffectivity of laws —
a. Laws and other government issuances must be published
‣ Publication is an indispensable requisite, the absence of which will render the law ineffective
‣ This is governed by Art. 2 of the Civil Code which provides that laws shall have effect only after the proper
period of its publication either in the (1) Official Gazette, or (2) a Newspaper of general circulation

‣ The rule that requires publication for the effectivity of laws applies not only to statutes but also to presidential
decrees, and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Republic u. Filipinos Shell 2008)
b. Laws and other government issuances must NOT be vague (Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine)
‣ The “Void-for-Vagueness” doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction. (Estrada vs Sandiganbayan)
‣ TEST — whether a law lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily
guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.
‣ It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects —
1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle
‣ BUT NOTE — A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each
and every word in an enactment. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 2001)
2. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING CIVIL CASES
‣ REQUIREMENTS —
a. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it
b. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject
of the proceedings
c. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
d. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing (Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca 1918)
‣ NOTE — The specific standard of procedural due process in civil cases is governed by the Rules on Civil Procedure
under the Rules of Court
3. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING CRIMINAL CASES

‣ The requirements of procedural due process in criminal cases is more stringent. It is discussed in detail in Art. 3, Sec.
14 which provides for the rights of the accused in a criminal case.
‣ NOTE — The specific standard of procedural due process in criminal cases is governed by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure under the Rules of Court
4. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN GENERAL

‣ RULE — Judicial actions must be judged by a person with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge
‣ SEE — Castillo vs Juan, 62 SCRA 124
‣ In this case, the Judge, on two separate occasions, in the secrecy of his chambers met with the petitioners of
the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed upon
them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to have such
accused indemnify them. These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting
its evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet.
‣ Court held that the Judge must be disqualified otherwise it would violate of due process.
‣ In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial
to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give
the appearance of catering to the at times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from
reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters.

‣ A judge should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to his integrity.”
‣ SEE — Webb vs People, 276 SCRA 243
‣ A party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case. This right must be weighed with the duty of a
judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and
prejudice the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. This is a heavy burden and
petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof.
‣ To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and
result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on
the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the
part of the judge.
‣ As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently
expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.
‣ Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable
error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as
to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be
insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross
and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.
‣ A series of adverse rulings of the respondent judge, even if they were palpable errors, is not enough.
‣ SEE — Lai vs People, G.R. No. 175999, July 1, 2015
‣ This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
‣ The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the judge's
degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge. He must be reminded that the same compulsory
disqualification that applied to him could similarly be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense
lawyer, if either of them should be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The purpose of this stricture is
to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect the life, liberty and property of the petitioner as the
accused should be conducted and determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent.
5. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS

‣ SEE — Government of Hongkong v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
‣ In this case, the Supreme Court modified its earlier ruling (in Government of the U.S. v. Purganan) that the
constitutional right to bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. The Court said that it cannot ignore the
modern trend in public international law which places primacy on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which proclaims the right to life, liberty
and all the other fundamental rights of every person) is not a treaty, the principles contained therein are now
recognized as customarily binding on all members of the international community. If bail can be granted in
deportation cases, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there
is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
‣ However, the standard to be used in granting bail in extradition cases should be “clear and convincing evidence”,
which is lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. It is imperative
that the potential extradite must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that —
a. He is NOT a flight risk; and

b. He will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court
6. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

‣ Although deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature, the consequences can be as serious as those of a
criminal prosecution. The provisions in the Rules of Court for criminal cases are applicable, as well as the right to bail.
(Lao Gi, Jr. v. CA 1989)
7. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

‣ REQUIREMENTS —
a. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal
rights
b. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
one's favor, and to defend one's rights
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained the records or made known to the parties affected. (Ang Tibay v. CIR 1940)
‣ If the Quasi-Judicial or Administrative Agency exercises Quasi-Legislative Powers, is notice and hearing to
individual parties necessary?
‣ NO. While notice and hearing are always required in administrative proceedings, if the Agency is in the
performance of executive or quasi- legislative functions, such as issuing internal rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. Only publication is required.
8. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

‣ Minimum standards in school disciplinary proceedings which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process —
a. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them
b. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired
c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them
d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
e. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. (Guzman v. National University 1986)
‣ NOTE — Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be
summary; and cross- examination is not an essential part thereof. (Guzman v. National University 1986)
‣ How does due process for students affect the academic freedom of schools?
‣ While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education and to due process, the schools
are also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this
freedom is not jeopardized. (Licup vs USC 1989)
9. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN BANK CLOSURE PROCEEDINGS

‣ RULE — For banks, the law allows the Bangko Sentral through Monetary Board to close and order banks to cease
from further business even without notice and hearing, without prejudice to subsequent judicial review. This is the
“close now, hear later” doctrine.
‣ SEE — Rural Bank of Buhi vs Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 288
‣ Rural Bank was placed under receivership by the Banko Sentral and it alleged that due process was not observed.
Said Rural Bank claimed that it was not given the chance to deny and disprove such claim of insolvency and/or
any other ground that the Monetary Board used in justification of its action. Court held that from the banking law,
that there is no requirement whether express or implied, that a hearing be first conducted before a banking
institution may be placed under receivership. On the contrary, the law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to
the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and to appoint a
receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities.

‣ It has long been established and recognized in this jurisdiction that the closure and liquidation of a bank may be
considered as an exercise of police power. Such exercise may, however, be subject to judicial inquiry and could be
set aside.
‣ The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the Monetary Board, without notice and hearing, may make the
appointment of a receiver but its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure the protection of the banking
institution. Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity
to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing:
bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped
out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
10. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS

‣ RULE — The parties must be given the chance to be heard before the Commissioners in the determination of just
compensation
‣ SEE — NAPOCOR vs. Dela Cruz, 514 SCRA 56
‣ In this case, the Court invalidated the ruling of the Trial Court in awarding just compensation as the
Commissions failed to conduct a hearing and give NAPOCOR the chance to adduce evidence in determining
just compensation.
‣ The fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to present their own
evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners’ findings. The absence of such
trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court because the parties’ (in particular,
petitioner’s) right to due process was violated.
‣ While it is true that there is jurisprudence supporting the rule that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
negates allegations of denial of due process, it is equally true that there are very specific rules for expropriation
cases that require the strict observance of procedural and substantive due process, because expropriation
cases involve the admittedly painful deprivation of private property for public purposes and the disbursement
of public funds as just compensation for the private property taken. Therefore, it is insufficient to hold that a
Motion for Reconsideration in an expropriation case cures the defect in due process.
11. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS WITH REGARD TO EX PARTE PROVISIONAL ORDERS

‣ Laws allowing the issuance of Ex Parte Cease and Desist Orders are constitutional provided that the interests of the
public outweigh the right of the defendants to prior notice and hearing
‣ SEE — Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA, 195 SCRA 112
‣ P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a) allowing the Pollution Adjudication Board to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards was
questioned in this case. Court held that such provision is valid, yielding to a valid exercise of police power.
‣ Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and
other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such
as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.
‣ The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of
the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power.
‣ It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

‣ RULE — TO JUSTIFY THE STATE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER OR GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE OR REGULATION, THE
FOLLOWING REQUISITES MUST BE SATISFIED —
1. LEGAL SUBJECT OR PURPOSE — THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC GENERALLY, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THOSE OF
A PARTICULAR CLASS, REQUIRE SUCH INTERFERENCE
‣ It must appear that the interests of the general public (and not merely of a particular class) requires an interference
with private rights

‣ The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business
or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. (US vs Toribio 1910)
‣ Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life,
liberty or property. US case law tells us whether there is such a justification depends on the level of scrutiny used.
(City of Manila vs Laguio)
2. LEGAL MEANS OR METHODS — THAT THE MEANS ARE REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE
PURPOSE, AND NOT UNDULY OPPRESSIVE UPON INDIVIDUALS
‣ The means adopted must be reasonably connected and necessary with the purpose of the law
‣ It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights
can work.
‣ A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interests, personal and property rights will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
‣ NOTE — The case of White Light vs City of Manila 2009 seems to add another requisite with respect to the means
— “that no other alternative for its accomplishment less intrusive of private rights can work”.
‣ If these two requisites are lacking, the police measure will be struck down.
‣ BERNAS — The heart of substantive due process is the requirement of "reasonableness," or absence of exercise of
arbitrary power. These are necessarily relative concepts which depend on the circumstances of every case.
TESTS TO DETERMINE IF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE SATISFIES SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

‣ IN GENERAL — The test depends on the level of scrutiny to be used which depends on the rights invaded. If a law is in
an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental
rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose. (City of Manila vs Laguio)
1. Strict Scrutiny Test — the focus is on the presence of compelling state interest, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
‣ These are for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process. It is used today to test the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion
from its earlier applications to equal protection.(White Light vs City of Manila 2009)
2. Intermediate or Heightened Scrutiny Test — governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.
3. Rational Basis Test —laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
‣ This is used for economic legislation and property rights. (White Light vs City of Manila 2009)
JURISPRUDENCE WHICH INVALIDATED LAWS OR REGULATIONS FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
‣ City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12,2005
‣ In an effort to curb immorality, the city of Manila passed an ordinance which disallows the operation of sauna parlors,
massage, parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance
halls, motels and inns in the Ermita- Malate area. Court held that such ordinance is invalid as it was an arbitrary
blanket prohibition. The enumerated establishments may be lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral
welfare.
‣ The means employed for the accomplishment were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. The worthy aim of fostering
public morals can be achieved through less restrictive means of private rights. It can be attained by reasonable
restriction rather than absolute prohibition. The closing down, transferring or conversion of the businesses under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. The prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare, not will it eradicate the social ills of
prostitution, adultery and fornication, nor will it arrest the spread of STD in Manila.
‣ The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the
community. That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further illegal
prostitution is of no moment. Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places.

There are no “pure” places where there are impure men. The problem is not the establishment but the deplorable
human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it
cannot for that reason alone be punished.
‣ There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend
or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are
other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
‣ White Light Corp v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
‣ A Manila ordinance prohibits motels, etc. from offering short- time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates
for such abbreviated stays. The ordinance was invalidated as violative of the right to property of motel operators and
of liberty of potential clients as not all who avail of “short time” were in pursuit of immoral activities.
‣ We cannot discount other legitimate activities that the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate
uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the
time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up
and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or
groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
‣ Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
‣ An Executive Order issued by President Marcos read: "Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that hence-
forth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture.” The original Executive Order was for prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos,
except under certain conditions, for the purpose of preserving them for the benefit of small farmers. The amendment
was invalidated by the Supreme Court which held that outright confiscation is not reasonably related to the purpose.
The prohibition of interprovincial transport of carabaos (means) could NOT possibly prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter (purpose) considering that they can be killed anywhere. Retaining carabaos in one province will not prevent
there slaughter there, any more that moving them to another province. Moreover, it is unduly oppressive. The owner of
the property is denied the opportunity to be heard and the property is immediately confiscated and distributed.
‣ Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)
‣ The rule of the Professional Regulatory Commission which restricts reviewees from attending review classes, briefing
conferences or the like, and receiving any hand out, review material, etc. was unreasonable and arbitrary and violative
of the academic freedom of schools
‣ Balacuit v. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182 (1988)
‣ The City of Butuan issued an ordinance prescribing that children between the ages of 7 and 12 should be charged
only half the admission price in movie houses. It was held as an invalid exercise of police power, for the benefit of
parents then the cost is passed on to cinema owners. Court held that there is no discernible relation between the
ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; NATURE AND CONCEPT

‣ RULE — IN THE STATE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER OR GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE OR REGULATION, NO PERSON SHALL BE
DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
‣ The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the Equality of the Person.
‣ Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.

‣ The equality it guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under it,
each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who
he is or what he is or what he possesses.
‣ The goddess of justice is portrayed with a blindfold, not because she must be hindered in seeing where the right lies,
but that she may not discriminate against suitors before her, dispensing instead an even handed justice to all.
‣ A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (People vs Vera)
‣ One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause. (Biraogo vs PTC)
‣ According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
(Biraogo vs PTC)
‣ The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union)
‣ Courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though
the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution. (Central Bank Employees vs BSP 2004)
SCOPE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

‣ The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. (Biraogo vs PTC)
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION
‣ RULE — THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE DOES NOT PROHIBIT REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION. IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION IF ITS ABSENCE WOULD RESULT IN INEQUALITY
‣ It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection” clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. (Central Bank Employees vs BSP 2004)
‣ There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is

within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect
in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (Central Bank
Employees vs BSP 2004)
‣ The equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or
persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by
legal means to that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both
in privilege conferred and liabilities imposed. (Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation)
‣ BERNAS — The Equal Protection Clause does not merely prohibit the State from passing discriminatory laws. It also
commands the State to pass laws which positively promote equality or reduce existing inequalities.
REQUISITES OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION

1. IT MUST REST ON SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS
‣ Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. (Villegas vs. Hu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho)
‣ The classification must rest on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. (People vs Carat
1939)
2. IT MUST BE GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW

3. IT MUST NOT BE LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY
‣ The law must not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It should be intended to
apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. (People vs Carat 1939)
4. IT MUST APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SAME CLASS

‣ Those similarly situated must be treated alike, with regard to rights granted and obligations imposed. Also, those who
are not similarly situated should not be treated alike.
TESTS FOR VALID CLASSIFICATION

1. STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
‣ Requires the government to show that the challenged classification serves a compelling state interest and that the
classification is necessary to serve that interest
‣ A classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.
‣ Applied traditionally to suspect classifications like gender or illegitimacy.
2. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TEST

‣ Requires the government to show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest.
‣ Often used in cases involving classification based on race, national origin, religion, alienage, denial of the right to vote,
interstate migration, access to courts and other rights recognized as fundamental.
3. DEFERENTIAL OR RATIONAL BASIS TEST

‣ The challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest.
‣ The most liberal test and the most used test in Philippine jurisprudence
‣ Constant view of the Supreme Court is that when the classification is rational, it is allowable and does not violate the
equal protection clause
‣ With this test, there is a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution

JURISPRUDENCE WHICH INVALIDATED LEGISLATION FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
‣ Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Service, G.R. No. 167614, March 24,2009
‣ A law provides that "In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined
by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." Other employees, however, are given full coverage for the
unexpired term. The Court held that it violate the equal protection clause for being discriminatory against overseas
workers in a matter involving fundamental right.
‣ Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
‣ Executive Order No. 1 created the Truth Commission with power to investigate graft and corruption committed during
the Arroyo administration. It violates equal protection for focusing only of what happened during the arroyo
administration and does not comprehend previous administrations.
EQUAL PROTECTION CANNOT BE INVOKED BY ACCUSED AGAINST INEFFICIENT PROSECUTION RESULTING IN INEQUALITY
‣ SEE — People vs Alvarez (2012)
‣ While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they
are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty
of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such
instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society
‣ Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person
has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime. Likewise, if the failure of prosecutors to
enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the
result would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many
persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown.
DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY

‣ RULE — A PROVISION OF LAW WHICH IS INITIALLY VALID, MAY BECOME SUBSEQUENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ON THE GROUND
THAT ITS CONTINUED OPERATION WOULD VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
‣ SEE — Central Bank Employees v. Bangko Sentral. G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004
‣ Statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. The
constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of
facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because
of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity,
even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
conditions.
‣ In this case, with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental
financial institutions (GFIs) removing limitations on employees, the continued operation of the limitation on Central
Bank employees under Section 15(c), Article II of the Central Bank law constitutes indirect invidious discrimination
on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). This is a case of relative
unconstitutionality.
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3.
(1) XXXXXXXX

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
‣ RULE — THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE
‣ BERNAS — The purpose of the provision is to protect —
1. The privacy and sanctity of the person
2. The inviolability of his house and other possessions against arbitrary intrusions by State officers
‣ The provision does NOT prohibit all searches and seizures. What it prohibits are merely those “unreasonable”
searches and seizures.
‣ Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. (Valmonte v.
General de Villa 1989)
‣ Also, it must first be established that there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. (Pollo vs Constantino-David
2011)
‣ When are searches and seizures unreasonable?
‣ Searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant
of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by the search and seizure clause is that between person and
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search
warrants or warrants of arrest.
‣ Who are protected by Sec. 2?
‣ All persons, including aliens (Qua Chee Gan vs Deportation Board 1963)
‣ Juridical persons are also protected (Bache and Co. vs Ruiz 1971)
‣ Does the Sec. 2 protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals?
‣ NO. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with enforcement of the law. Recourse against private individuals
is an action for damages under the Civil Code. (People v. Marti 1991)
‣ Who can invoke the right against unreasonable searches and seizures?
‣ The right is personal. It may only be invoked by the person whose right is invaded. (Stonehill vs Diokno)
‣ Can the right against unreasonable searches and seizures be waived?
‣ YES. This right may be waived expressly or impliedly.
‣ Any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby was
deemed waived when no objection was raised by appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or
impliedly. (People vs Nunez 2009)
‣ What is the rationale and purpose behind the right against unreasonable searches and seizures?
‣ SEE — 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs Court of Appeals (1988)
‣ It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. What is
sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life.
‣ Authorities characterize the constitutional right as the embodiment of a `spiritual concept: the belief that to value
the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is

no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social
need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.
REQUISITES FOR THE VALIDITY OF ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

‣ RULE — FOR AN ARREST, SEARCH OR SEIZURE TO BE REASONABLE AND VALID IT MUST BE CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO A
VALIDLY ISSUED SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST
‣ What is a Search Warrant?
‣ A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a
judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. (Rule 126, Sec. 1, Rules of Criminal Procedure)
‣ A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property —
1. Subject of the offense
2. Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense
3. Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (Rule 126, Sec. 3, Rules of Criminal
Procedure)
‣ What is an Arrest?
‣ Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. (Luz vs People 2012)
‣ Who can issue Warrants of Arrest?
‣ Only courts
‣ NOTE — Since the Commissioner on Immigration is not a judge, he may not issue warrants of arrest in aid merely
of his investigatory power. However, he may order the arrest of an alien for the purpose of carrying out a
deportation order that has already become final. (Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board 1963)
‣ What are Administrative Arrests?
‣ EXCEPTION — IN THE FOLLOWING CASES, A WARRANT IS NOT NECESSARY —

1. Valid Warrantless Arrests —
a. Arrests in Flagrante Delicto — When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or attempting to commit an offense
b. Hot Pursuit Arrest — When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it
c. Arrest of Escaped Prisoners — When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
‣ RATIONALE — For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands
of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged
violation of law and to prose cute and secure the punishment therefor. An arrest is therefore in the nature of an
administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities. (Umil vs Ramos 1991)
2. Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures —
a. Express or Implied Waiver or Consented Warrantless Search
b. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
c. Search and seizure of evidence in "plain view"
d. Search of a moving vehicle
e. Customs search in the enforcement of customs laws

f. Stop and Frisk
g. Search during Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
h. Visual search at checkpoints
i. Inspection of buildings, and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary, and building regulations
j. Searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of fishery, immigration and customs laws
ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST; DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE

‣ RULE — NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED
PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES
HE MAY PRODUCE
‣ The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty is regulated by Art. 3, Sec. 2. This provision deals
with the requirement of probable cause both for issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants.
‣ These constitutional guaranties should be given strict construction against the government, and liberal in favor of the
individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon the rights secured by them. (Alvarez vs CFI)
‣ What does probable cause mean?
‣ In general it means such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief
that his actions, and means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper.
‣ The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects the right of the people to be secure in
their persons against unreasonable searches and seizure. An arrest without probable cause is a violation the privacy
of persons. (Webb vs De Leon)
‣ As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, hot absolute or even moral
certainty. The prosecution need hot present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man, hot the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. (Microsoft
Corporation v. Maxicorp 2004)
‣ It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies
on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. (People vs Tuan)
REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT

1. There must be an application under oath (affidavit) which must refer to the truth of the facts that are within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses.
2. In the determination of probable cause, the judge must personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
3. Existence of probable cause as determined personally by the judge
4. The warrant must be issued in relation to one specific offense
5. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized
‣ NOTE —
‣ Search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it
was issued. Otherwise, it is void. (People vs Veloso)
‣ The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going into the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify
under it. (People vs Veloso)
REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT (BROKEN DOWN)

1. PROBABLE CAUSE
a. Substance
i. Based on personal knowledge — Must be from the personal knowledge of specific facts of the complainant or
the witnesses he may produce

ii. Offense was probable — Must arise from facts or circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to conclude that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched
iii. Specificity — Must be in connection with 1 specific offense
b. Procedure
i. Under oath or affirmation — Must be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce
ii. Personal examination by searching questions and answers — Judge must personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers
2. PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION
a. Place to be searched
b. Things to be seized
REQUISITES OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT (EXPOUNDED)

‣ NOTE — See Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the norms in the issuance of Search Warrants
1. THERE MUST BE AN APPLICATION UNDER OATH (AFFIDAVIT) WHICH MUST REFER TO THE TRUTH OF THE FACTS THAT ARE
WITHIN THE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PETITIONER OR HIS WITNESSES.
‣ TEST — The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a warrant is whether it was drawn in such a way
that perjury could be charged thereon. (Alvarez vs People 1937)
‣ The applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them. When the law speaks of facts, the
reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent
the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in
legal contemplation, arbitrary. (Sony Music Entertainment vs Judge Espanol 2005)
‣ It will be noted that both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search
warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies
that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward
pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (Alvarez vs People
1937)
2. IN THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE, THE JUDGE MUST PERSONALLY EXAMINE IN THE FORM OF SEARCHING
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE
‣ The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (Rule 126, Sec. 5, Rules of Criminal
Procedure)
‣ SEE — Bache & Co. vs Ruiz (1971)
‣ In this case, there was no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant and
his witness. While it is true that the complainant's application for search warrant and the witness' printed-form
deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause
against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that
notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken.
‣ The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant was thus
limited to listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission
of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal
examination.
‣ If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy
Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was

precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the
issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would
be consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of
the proceedings quoted above.
‣ SEE — Silva vs Presiding Judge of RTC of Negros Oriental (1991)
‣ In this case, Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.
‣ Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in
a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. The deposition did not
only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in
fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all that the witnesses
had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.
‣ In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he
must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
‣ BUT SEE — Soliven vs Makasiar (1988)
‣ What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
‣ Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall — (1) Personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
‣ Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts.
‣ NOTE — To harmonize, the conclusion is that the judge is required to “personally” examine the complainant and his
witnesses by “searching questions and answer” only in cases for the issuance of a search warrant. This is in accord
with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Arrest cases, this procedure need not be followed, it is enough that the judge
follows the procedure in the Soliven Case.
3. EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE

‣ Probable cause in the issuance of search warrants — Such facts and circumstances as would reasonably make a
prudent man believe that a crime has been committed and that the documents or things sought to be searched and
seized are in the place to be searched. (Burgos vs Chief of Staff 1984)
‣ Such must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person
‣ The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial functions. A
finding of probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search warrant, needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. (Sy Tan vs
Sy Tiong Gue 2010)
‣ Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact
seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched. (People vs Tuan)
‣ Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The
judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a
fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The existence depends to
a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. (Del Castillo vs People 2012)
4. THE WARRANT MUST BE ISSUED IN RELATION TO ONE SPECIFIC OFFENSE

‣ This is required by the Rules. See Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
‣ “Scatter-shot warrant” — warrants issued for more than one offense. (Vallejo vs CA 2004)
5. THE WARRANT MUST PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED

a. IT MUST PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED
‣ TEST — A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. (Del Castillo
vs People 2012)
‣ The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community.
Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. (Uy and Unifish Packing
Corporation vs BIR 2000)
‣ Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of
a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not
invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly
inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is
otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched. (Uy
and Unifish Packing Corporation vs BIR 2000)
‣ RATIONALE — The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the
exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion. The controlling subject of search warrants is the place indicated in
the warrant itself and not the place identified by the police. (People vs Francisco 2002)
‣ What if the address indicated in the search warrant was erroneous (example — address indicated is #10
Grace St. but the actual place to be searched was really #11 Grace St.) Is this defect fatal?
‣ YES. Unless, aside from the address, the search warrant also has a particular description of the place to be
searched.
‣ SEE — Yao vs People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007
‣ The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement. Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued
the warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit.
b. THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED MUST BE DESCRIBED WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY

‣ TEST — A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when —
1. The description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow
2. When the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure
3. When the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant
is being issued. (Bache & Co. v. Ruiz 1971)
‣ RATIONALE — The purpose is to prevent abuse by the officer enforcing the warrant by leaving to him no discretion
as to who or what to search or seize. One of the evils sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision is to
outlaw the so-called “general warrants”. (Stonehill vs Diokno)
‣ The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is
only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched
for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Any description of the place or thing to
be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is
sufficient. However, the requirement that search warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.
As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Thus, the specific
property to be searched for should be so particularly described as to preclude any possibility of seizing any other
property. (Vallejo vs Court of Appeals 2004)

‣ The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description
of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general
description in a warrant. (Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation vs BIR 2000)
‣ EXCEPT — when, by nature of the goods, their description can only be done generally.
‣ It is not required that technical precision of description be required , particularly where, by the nature of the
goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description
would mean that no warrant could issue. (People v. Tee 2003)
‣ While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no
other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow." Where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue. As a corollary, however, we could not logically conclude that where the description of those goods to be
seized have been expressed technically, all others of a similar nature but not bearing the exact technical
descriptions could not be lawfully subject to seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable purpose of the warrant issued
would be defeated by mere technicalities. (Yousef Al-Ghoul vs Court of Appeals 2001)
‣ Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as
to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look
for. (Vallejo vs Court of Appeals 2004)
‣ Does a "John Doe" warrant satisfy the requirement of particularity of description?
‣ YES. provided that it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.
(People v. Veloso 1925)
‣ Can a search warrant be partially valid?
‣ YES. The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and
unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable, and
those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. (Uy and Unifish
Packing Corporation vs BIR 2000)
‣ No provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to
be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective
warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable, the
items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. (Microsoft Corporation vs
Maxicorp 2004)
‣ Can the place to be searched be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police?
‣ NO. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own
personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the
warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede
to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be delineated in the warrant. It
would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant
that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description
of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be
left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. (People vs Francisco 2002)
‣ Does the mingling of the seized items with others invalidate the search?
‣ NO. Mingling of the seized items with other items, is extraneous to the determination of the validity of the
issuance of the search warrant. (Sony Music Entertainment vs Judge Espanol 2005)
‣ What if the name of the person to be searched is wrong in the search warrant, does this invalidate it?
‣ NO. The discrepancy regarding the name of accused-appellant and that stated in the search warrant cannot
mitigate against his positive identification by the poseur-buyer. It has been consistently held that greater weight
is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than accused's denial
concerning the commission of the crime. (People vs. Martinez 1994)

ADMISSIBILITY OF ITEMS SEIZED PURSUANT TO A INVALID SEARCH WARRANT; EXCLUSIONARY RULE
‣ What is the consequence of a search or seizure without a warrant or by authority of an invalid warrant?
‣ RULE — Any evidence obtained in such illegal search or seizure are inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
‣ Article III, Section 3 (2). The Constitution explicitly follows the exclusionary rule. This is the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” doctrine
‣ BUT — This rule only applies when the illegal search and seizure is conducted by public officers and NOT private
individuals. (People vs Marti)
‣ The reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is
the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed. (Stonehill vs
Diokno)
‣ The exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary
rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom
from all brutish means of coercing evidence. (People vs Francisco 2002)
REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT OF ARREST

1. There must be an information filed by the prosecutor recommending the trial of the accused
3. Particular Description of the Person sought to be arrested
REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT OF ARREST (EXPOUNDED)

1. THERE MUST BE AN INFORMATION FILED BY THE PROSECUTOR IN COURT RECOMMENDING THE TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED
‣ Who determines the existence of probable cause?
‣ The prosecutor first, and then the judge. Thus, there are two stages of determination —
a. Executive determination of probable cause — The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for
a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes
upon. (Ho vs People 1997)
b. Judicial determination of probable cause — The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether. there is a necessity for placing him under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on
one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives. (Ho vs
People 1997)
‣ NOTE — Since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the
prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and
hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other
than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic
law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation
process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but
also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate
judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest. (Ho vs People 1997)
‣ How does the prosecutor determine the existence of probable cause in arrest cases?
‣ Through preliminary investigation or inquest proceedings as provided under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
‣ Should a classificatory hearing so that the defense can confront the witness against him be held by the
prosecutors?

‣ NO. See — Webb vs De Leon, 247 SCRA 632
‣ Considering also the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, the
DOJ Panel did not gravel abuse its discretion when it did not call the witnesses for clarificatory questions. The
decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator
alone. If the evidence yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his
rights such as the right to confront and cross- examine the witnesses against him.
2. EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE

‣ What is Probable Cause within the context of arrest cases?
‣ Probable cause in arrest cases consists of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the persons sought to be arrested. Other
jurisdictions use the term, “man of reasonable caution” or “ordinarily prudent and cautious man” but these all
mean the same which is an average man on the street and not someone trained in the law like a judge or
prosecutor. Bear in mind that an average man weighs the facts and circumstances using common sense. (Webb vs
De Leon)
‣ The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects the right of the people to be secure
in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizure. An arrest without probable cause is a violation the
privacy of persons. (Webb vs De Leon)
‣ Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for
the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. (Pilalpil vs Sandiganbayan 2011)
‣ Does the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor bind the judge?
‣ NO. SEE — Lim vs Felix, 194 SCRA 292
‣ The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge, not for the fiscal or prosecutor. Only the judge
alone makes the determination. The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge, it
merely assists him to make a determination of probable cause. In itself, the certification of the prosecutor is
actually ineffectual. It is the report, affidavits, TSNs and other supporting docs that are material to assist judge
in his determination.
‣ Judges and Prosecutors should distinguish between preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge.
‣ The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, riggers and
embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.
‣ The Constitution requires personal determination by the judge. If he relies solely on the certification of the
Prosecutor, as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not
personally determined probable cause. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge
commits a grave abuse of discretion.
‣ A judge may rely on the fiscal’s certification of existence of probable cause, but this does not bind the judge to
issue a warrant of arrest. The issuance of the warrant is not a mere ministerial function, but calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion. This is also stated in the Rules of Court, under which, the judge must satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant.
‣ How should the judge determine the existence of probable cause?
‣ A judge should —
1. Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal and on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest

2. If on such basis he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses. (Soliven vs Makasiar)
‣ There is no measure of time for this. That fact that the judges took a few hours to review and affirm the probable
cause determination of the panel does not mean that no personal evaluation of the evidence was made. (Webb vs
De Leon)
‣ In issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely personally determine the probability, not the certainty of the guilt of an
accused. Judges just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor to find probable cause and if its
supported by substantial evidence. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the accused. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
stand trial and is not a pronouncement of guilt. (Webb vs De Leon)
‣ It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted
to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the
complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is
required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make
his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation,
as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the
certification or the report of the investigating officer. (Ho vs People 1997)
‣ Must the judge “personally” examine the complainant and his witnesses?
‣ NO. It was is proper to interpret Art. 3, Sec. 2 to mean that the judge must personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause. It only means that it is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. What he is required to do is
to personally evaluate the report and documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant. If he finds no probable cause because on the fiscal’s report, he may
disregard it and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him. In so doing, he is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Sound policy dictates this procedure so as not
to unduly burden judges with preliminary examinations and investigations, so they could concentrate on deciding
cases. (Soliven vs Makasiar)
3. PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON SOUGHT TO BE ARRESTED
‣ Are John Doe Arrest Warrants prohibited?
‣ NO. On John Doe warrants, this rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a
party whose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be
given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his
occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances by which
he can be identified. (People vs Veloso 1925)
DIFFERENCES IN THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS AND WARRANTS OF ARRESTS
ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST
1. There must be an application under oath (affidavit) which must refer to the truth of the 1. There must be an information filed by the
facts that are within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses.
prosecutor recommending the trial of the
accused
2. In the determination of probable cause, the judge must personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the 2. Existence of probable cause as
witnesses he may produce
determined personally by the judge

3. Particular Description of the Person
sought to be arrested
4. The warrant must be issued in relation to one specific offense
5. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized

‣ Is the standard of determining probable cause the same in both Search Warrants and Warrants of Arrests?
‣ NO. SEE — Webb vs De Leon, 247 SCRA 632
‣ The quantum of evidence for probable cause to exist in search and arrest cases are quite different.
1. In search cases — it must be established that the items sough are seizable because they are connected to a
criminal activity and that these items will be found in the place to be searched.
2. In arrest cases — there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested committed it regardless if evidence of the commission of the crime will be found in that person’s control.
‣ NOTE — that under our Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest may be issued upon filing of information whereas
the procedure for issuing search warrants is more defined.
‣ What are the differences in the manner of Judges should examine the complainant and his witness?
‣ Search Warrant — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, “personally examine” in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses. (Rule 126, Sec. 5, Rules of
Criminal Procedure; Bache vs Ruiz 1971)
‣ Warrant of Arrest — A judge is NOT required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses or to await
the submission of counter affidavits from an accused. Following established doctrine and procedure, the judge shall
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence
of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause. (Soliven vs Makasiar; Borlongan, Jr. v. Pefia 2007)
‣ Must proof of probable cause for a warrant point to a specific offender?
‣ For a search warrant for things — NO
‣ For warrants of arrest — YES (Webb v. de Leon)
‣ What are the differences in the manner of issuance of a Search Warrant and Warrant of Arrest?
‣ The manner of its issuance is different —
1. Search Warrant — based upon application supported by oath, which must refer to the truth of the facts that
are within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses. (Alvarez vs CFI)
‣ No need for an information
2. Warrant of Arrest — Presupposes the filing of an information by the fiscal.
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE; CARDINAL NORMS TO OBSERVE

‣ THE FOLLOWING ARE RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE REQUIRING A SEARCH WARRANT —
1. Express or implied waiver or Consented warrantless search
2. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
3. Search and seizure of evidence in "plain view"
4. Search of a moving vehicle
5. Customs search in the enforcement of customs laws
6. Stop and Frisk
7. Search during Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
8. Visual search at checkpoints
9. Inspection of buildings, and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary, and building regulations
10. Searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of fishery, immigration and customs laws
‣ THE EXCEPTIONS ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES

‣ The right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a
most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant
of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically

provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so
basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated. (People vs Aruta 1988)
‣ THE GENERAL REQUISITE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IS STILL REQUIRED NOTWITHSTANDING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE EXCEPTIONS,
THIS IS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF “REASONABLENESS”
‣ SEE — People vs Aruta (1988)
‣ The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample
upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and
seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.
‣ In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any
probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested.
Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or actual belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
‣ THE FACT THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAVE HAD THE AMPLE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROCURE A SEARCH WARRANT IS A
DEFENSE
‣ People vs Amminudin (1988) (Gangplank case) — The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon. His name was known. The vehicle
was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing.
No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who
was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search warrant was not necessary.”
‣ People vs Racho (2010) — Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do
away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their
office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the
appellant's physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same
day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant
‣ Spouses Veroy vs Layague (1992) — Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample
time to procure a search warrant but did not. In a number of cases decided by the SC, warrantless searches were
declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to obtain a search warrant.
‣ MHP Garments vs CA — The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of
private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial
warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents.
In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly
illegal.
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE (EXPOUNDED)

1. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WAIVER OR CONSENTED WARRANTLESS SEARCH
‣ Right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived by consenting to an illegal search
‣ REQUISITES —
a. It must appear first that the right exists
b. That the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right
c. That said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
‣ RATIONALE — When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. (People vs Malasugui)
‣ SEE — Luz vs People (2012)
‣ Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary
in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion

‣ Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent
and the environment in which consent is given —
1. The age of the defendant
2. Whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location
3. Whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on
4. The education and intelligence of the defendant
5. The presence of coercive police procedures
6. The defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found
7. The nature of the police questioning
8. The environment in which the questioning took place
9. The possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
‣ It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.
‣ A waiver against illegal search cannot be made under undue influence
‣ What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the
supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were
conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the
petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case, the manifestation merely of
our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime,
there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist. (Roan vs Gonzales 1986)
‣ Presumption is against waiver
‣ The rule is that courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and
that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. (People vs Aruta 1998)
‣ The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his
warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object. (People vs Barros)
2. WARRANTLESS SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST
‣ When a person is validly arrested, he may be searched for weapons or for anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense. This must be done on his person or in the immediate place of arrest.
‣ This is recognized under the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence.
‣ SEE — Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure — Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The arrest must take place before the search and seizure
b. Arrest must be valid, either with a warrant or without but falls under the exceptions
‣ RATIONALE —
1. The need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody
2. The need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. (Luz vs People 2012)
‣ The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.
(People vs De Los Reyes 2011)
‣ The search can only be made at the place where the person was arrested and covers weapons or anything that can
be used as proof against him.
‣ The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided in Rule 126, sec. 12 and that is to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and
incident to his or her arrest and to "dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of
arrest. (Nolasco vs Pano 1987)

3. SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN "PLAIN VIEW”
‣ Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has the right to be in position to have that view are subject to seizure
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area.
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent (not deliberate)
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
‣ In summary, the law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which
he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. (People
vs Fajardo 2011)
4. SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE

‣ Search, without a warrant, can be made in a moving vehicle.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The vehicle must be “moving”
b. The existence of probable cause justifying the search
‣ RATIONALE —
‣ The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may
readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. (Papa vs Mago 1968)
‣ Rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the
object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that
can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a
moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” (People vs Lo Ho Wing 1991)
‣ Search of a moving vehicle is highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. (People vs Aruta 1998)
5. CUSTOMS SEARCH IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTOMS LAWS

‣ An individual deputised by the Commissioner of Customs for the purpose of enforcing customs and tariff laws may
validly search containers without a warrant if there is reasonable cause to suspect the presence of dubitable articles.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. Must be made under the authority of the Commissioner of Customs pursuant to authority from Customs Laws
b. The search must NOT be made in dwellings
c. Probable cause of existence of dutiable or prohibited articles
‣ SEE — People vs CFI of Rizal (1980)
‣ Considering now the critical area of the dispute, under the law, the authority of persons duly commissioned to
enforce tariff and customs laws is quite exceptional when it pertains to the domain of searches and seizures of
goods suspected to have been introduced in the country in violation of the customs laws.
‣ This Court had occasion to recognize this power granted to persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Code, who in order to discharge their official duties more effectively —
‣ ". . . may at anytime enter, pass through, or search any land or inclosure of any warehouse, store or other
building not being a dwelling house.” (Sec. 2208)

‣ (to) open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he has reasonable
cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable or prohibited article or articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid." (Section 2211)
‣ Thus, in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
‣ SEE — Papa vs Mago (1968)
‣ The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other
movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and
tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when
he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid.
‣ The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said a search warrant. The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant
issued by a judge or justice of the peace."
‣ It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement
of customs laws.
6. STOP AND FRISK

‣ When there is a genuine reason for the police officer to believe that a certain person has illegal firearms or is carrying
illegal drugs in his possession.
‣ While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. (People vs
Malacat 1997)
‣ SEE — Esquillo vs People (2010)
‣ The act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.
The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer's
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.
‣ What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him.
‣ RATIONALE —
1. The general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause
2. The more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. (Esquillo vs People 2010)

‣ SEE — Terry vs Ohio
‣ Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment
‣ SEE — Posadas vs CA (1990)
‣ The Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the
Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously.
They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live
ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade.
‣ In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only
after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly
in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to
simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
‣ NOTE —Philippine Jurisprudence has already expanded this scope of the Stop and Frisk Doctrine by including not
just weapons but also the seizure of illegal drugs in the event of a stop and frisk. (SEE Manalili vs CA 1997)
7. SEARCH DURING EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

‣ When the exigent and emergency circumstances justify a search without a warrant
‣ SEE — People vs De Gracia (1994)
‣ There was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
‣ Under the foregoing circumstances, it is out considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
‣ Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a
search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.
8. VISUAL SEARCH AT CHECKPOINTS

‣ Are Police Checkpoints prohibited, do they violate the right against unreasonable searches?
‣ NO. Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized
government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be
allowed and installed by the government. Routine inspection and a few questions do not constitute unreasonable
searches. If the inspection becomes more thorough to the extent of becoming a search, this can be done when
there is deemed to be probable cause. In the latter situation, it is justifiable as a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle. (Valmonte v. General de Villa 1989)
‣ Warrantless searches by checkpoints is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a
visual search. (Aniag vs Comelec)
‣ Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those that are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as
long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
(People vs Escano 2000)

‣ Should police checkpoints be announced?
‣ NO. There is no need for checkpoints to be announced. Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn
those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their
fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated. (People v. Escano 2000)
9. INSPECTION OF BUILDINGS, AND OTHER PREMISES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF FIRE, SANITARY, AND BUILDING REGULATIONS
10. SEARCHES OF VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT FOR VIOLATION OF FISHERY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS LAWS
VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST

1. ARRESTS IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he —
i. Has just committed
ii. Is actually committing
iii. Is attempting to commit an offense
b. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
‣ NOTE — A person committing a continuing crime (such as rebellion) may be arrested without a warrant because he is
actually committing a crime
‣ SEE — Umil vs Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991
‣ Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as
it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
‣ The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other
crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude.
‣ The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-
violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense.
‣ The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or
any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and
duly constituted authorities.
2. HOT PURSUIT ARREST

‣ REQUISITES —
a. Offense has in fact just been committed
‣ A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an
essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. (People vs Burgos)
‣ The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a
necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds
exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein. (Umil vs Ramos 1991)

b. That the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense
‣ SEE — Umil vs Ramos 1991
‣ It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
‣ "Personal knowledge of facts” can either be based on—
i. Actual belief
ii. Reasonable grounds of suspicion
‣ The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on
actual facts supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested and coupled with good faith.
‣ Therefore the requisites of reasonable grounds of suspicion are —
(1) Actual facts and circumstances constitutive of probable cause
(2) Good faith on the part of the arresting officer
‣ What is the length of time allowed between the commission of the crime and the subsequent warrantless hot
pursuit arrest?
‣ It depends on the circumstances, but it cannot be an appreciable amount of time.
‣ Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made
only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under a valid hot pursuit arrest, since it was only on 28
December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the
killing of Bunye II and the a rest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and
despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight. (Umil vs Ramos 1991)
3. ARREST OF ESCAPED PRISONERS

‣ When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS TO OBSERVE IN EXECUTING WARRANTLESS ARRESTS

‣ RELIABLE INFORMATION ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A WARRANTLESS ARREST
‣ The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from
this well-established doctrine. (People vs Racho 2010)
‣ As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of
a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. (People vs De Los Reyes 2011)
‣ THE GENERAL STANDARD TO EXECUTE A WARRANTLESS ARREST IS THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
‣ In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section
5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for
which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace
officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. The
courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and
acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting
officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or
for other administrative sanctions. (Umil vs Ramos 1991)
‣ The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause Probable cause means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is

based on actual facts, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith. (People vs De Los Reyes 2011)
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES VALID WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
1. Arrests in Flagrante Delicto — When, in his presence, the 1. Express or Implied Waiver or Consented Warrantless Search
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
2.
or attempting to commit an offense
3. Search and seizure of evidence in "plain view"
2. Hot Pursuit Arrest — When an offense has in fact been

committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating 4. Search of a moving vehicle
that the person to be arrested has committed it

5. Customs search
3. Arrest of Escaped Prisoners — When the person to be Stop and Frisk
6.
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or

temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has 8. Visual search at checkpoints
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to 9. Inspection of buildings, and other premises for the enforcement
another. of fire, sanitary, and building regulations
10. Searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of fishery,

immigration and customs laws
RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
Section 3.
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
‣ BERNAS — This provisions extends the scope of the right of privacy as expressed in Sec. 2. When the 1935 Constitution
was being formulated, the controlling doctrine was that the search and seizure clause did not prohibit non-trespassory
wiretaps. This was the doctrine established in 1928 in Olmstead v. United States. The argument in Olmstead was that
where there is no physical trespass there is no search, and where the object is not tangible it cannot be seized. The
"tangibles only" rule was anchored on the text of the Fourth Amendment which enumerates tangibles: house, person,
papers, effects. The Olmstead doctrine has been overruled and the rule is now to place wiretapping, with or without
physical trespass, under the ban of the search and seizure clause.
SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

‣ What forms of correspondence and communication are covered by this provision?
‣ BERNAS — It covers letters, messages, telephone calls, telegrams, and the like.
‣ When is intrusion into the privacy of communication and correspondence allowed?

‣ It is allowed only in the following exceptional cases —
1. Upon lawful order of the court
2. When public safety or order requires it as prescribed by law
‣ Upon what grounds may a court allow intrusion?

‣ BERNAS — The text does not give any ground. It is submitted that the requirement of “probable cause” in the
preceding section should be followed.
‣ Should the order also particularly describe the communication or correspondence sought to be seized?
‣ BERNAS — When the correspondence sought is written correspondence, it would seem that there should be no
inconvenience in requiring particularity of description. But if the intrusion is to be done through wiretaps, how is the

description to be made? Evidently, it would be impossible to describe the contents of a communication that has not
yet been made. Hence, it would be unreasonable to require a description of the contents of the communication. But
the identity of the person or persons whose communication is to be intercepted, and the identity of offense or
offenses sought to be prevented, and the period of the authorization given can be specified. In fact, an attempt in this
direction is made by Section 3 of R.A. 4200, the Anti- Wiretapping Law
‣ What is the law implementing permissible wiretaps when public safety or order requires it?
‣ R.A. 4200 known as the Anti-Wiretapping Law
‣ Such law provides penalties for specific violations of private communication. Section 3 of the Act allows court-
authorized taps, under specific conditions, for the crimes of "treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case
of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping.”
‣ What is the consequence of evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 3 (and Sec. 2)?
‣ It is inadmissible. Sec. 3 expressly provides that any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF THE PRESS AND THE RIGHT TO PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY
AND PETITION
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
PURPOSE OF THE PROTECTION OF SEC. 4

‣ Freedom of expression is essential for the search of truth. This is they marketplace idea which posits that the power of
thought can be tested by its acceptability in the competition of the market
‣ Another reason is that free expression is needed for democracy to work properly
‣ Promotes individual self-realisation and self-determination
‣ Serves as a check on government power
‣ In the absence opt governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective
restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry
SCOPE OF SEC. 4
‣ RULE — NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED ABRIDGING THE FOLLOWING FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS —
1. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS
‣ SCOPE — Speech, expression, and press include every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc
recorded.
‣ It also includes movies as well as what is referred to as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an armband as
a symbol of protest.
‣ Peaceful picketing has also been included within the meaning of speech.
‣ Conduct which amounts to speech
‣ Not all kinds of speech and expression are treated with the same degree of protection
a. Preferred Speech
‣ The doctrine on freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the protection of "core" speech” or
speech which communicates political, social or religious ideas. These enjoy the same degree of protection.
b. Less-Preferred Speech
‣ Such as — Commercial speech, which does not enjoy the same level of protection as political, social or
religious expressions.

c. Unprotected Speech
‣ Such as — libel and obscenity
‣ What is symbolic speech?
‣ This is when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct. In this case, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on free speech. (U.S. v. O’Brien 1968)
2. RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
‣ What is “public assembly”?
‣ It means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action
held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general
public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or
social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances. (Sec. 3, BP 880)
‣ Does Sec. 4 only cover “laws”?
‣ NO. It covers all forms of government action which restricts and limits the freedoms and rights enshrined therein.
ASPECTS FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS

1. Freedom from Prior Restraint or Censorship
2. Freedom from Subsequent Punishment
FREEDOM FROM PRIOR RESTRAINT OR CENSORSHIP

‣ What is Prior Restraint?
‣ Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination.
‣ The term prior restraint is used "to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur. (Alexander vs US)
‣ It is basically censorship.
‣ Such as —
a. A system of licensing administered by an executive officer.
b. Movie censorship
c. Judicial prior restraint which takes the form of an injunction against publication.
d. License taxes measured by gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in the business of advertising in any
newspaper or flat license fees for the privilege of selling religious books.
e. Content-based laws amount to a prior restraint (Newsounds vs Dy 2009)

‣ What is the Freedom from Prior Restraint?
‣ Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of
censorship, and regardless of whether it is wield by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of government.
(Chavez vs Gonzales 2008)
‣ SEE — Near vs Minnesota (1931)
‣ In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it
is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The general principle that the
constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press gives immunity from previous restraints has been approved in
many decisions under the provisions of state constitutions. The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason
for its existence, does not depend, as this Court has said, on proof of truth.
‣ Examples of Invalid Prior Restraint —
‣ A warning on media against airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other
personalities constitute unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
(Chavez v. Gonzales 2008)

‣ Are all kinds of Prior Restraint prohibited?
‣ NO. Although any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality,
there are exceptions to the rule. Freedom of expression is NOT absolute since it always subject to the police power of
the State. This is premised on the need to protect society from the injurious exercise of said freedom and the need to
promote or protect public welfare, public safety, public morals and national security.
‣ EXCEPTIONS — Cases where prior restraint is permitted —
a. Pornography
b. False or misleading commercial statement
c. Advocacy of imminent lawless action
d. Danger to national security (Chavez vs Gonzales 2008)
e. Press statements made by persons, for and on behalf of the government, uttered while in the exercise of their
official functions
f. Movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the youth
who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. (Soriano vs Laguardia 2009)
g. It is not unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify
TV programs and enforce its decision subject to revue why our courts. IIglesia ni Kristo vs CA 1996)
h. Live TV coverage may be prohibited since the right of the accused must prevail over the right of the public to
information and freedom of the press. (In re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of Trial of Former Pres. Estrada 2001)
i. Comelec's power, under IX, C, 4, to regulate time in broadcast media and space in the papers is an exception to
freedom-of-speech-and-press clause on account of considerations more paramount for the general welfare and
public interest, which exceptions after all would operate only during limited periods, that is, during the duration of
the election campaign filed in the charter itself and/or by law. The provision on freedom of expression must be
read in conjunction with the power given to the Commission on Elections to supervise and regulate media during
elections as well as with the various provisions in the Constitution which place a high premium on equalization of
opportunities. (National Press Club v Comelec 1992)
‣ What is the “Heckler’s Veto”?
‣ This involves situations in which the government attempts to ban protected speech because it might provoke a violent
response. In such situations, the mere possibility of a violent reaction to protected speech is simply not a
constitutional basis on which to restrict the right to speak. (Roe vs Crawford 2008)
‣ The government cannot grant power to a private actor, the heckler, to unilaterally silence a speaker because of a
concern for the violent reaction by the heckler. (Hill vs Colorado)
‣ NOTE — This may be in the guise of a permit requirement in the holding of rallies conditioned on the payment of a fee
computed on the basis of the cost needed to keep order in view of the expected opposition by persons holding
contrary views.
PRESUMPTION OF INVALIDITY OF THE IMPOSITION OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS

‣ Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity. (New York Times Co vs US 1971)
‣ As prior restraint, the rule is presumed to be invalid. (SWS v. Comelec, G.R. 147571, May 5, 2001)
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION OF PRIOR RESTRAINT OR CENSORSHIP; TESTS OF VALID PRIOR RESTRAINTS
‣ NOTE — Although prior restraints on speech are generally invalid, there are those which may be permitted under the
Constitution if the restraint to be imposed meets the burden of proof necessary to uphold its validity. This burden of proof
depends on whether the restraint is in the form of content-based regulations or content neutral regulations. Content-
based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with
discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to
speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.

CONTENT-BASED REGULATION CONTENT NEUTRAL REGULATION
Defintion Restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. It Restraint is merely concerned with the incidents of the
is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well defined standards without any
restraint on the content of the expression
Test to Strict Scrutiny Test Intermediate approach or the O’Brien Test

Determine
NOTE — The heightened or strict scrutiny test is appropriate in A Government regulation is sufficiently justified —
Validity
assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well
1. If it is within the constitutional power of the
as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the
Government
political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,

gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as 2. If it furthers an important or substantial governmental
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The interest
immediate implication of the application of the "strict scrutiny"

3. If the governmental interest is unrelated to the
test is that the burden falls upon the government to prove that
suppression of free expression
their actions do not infringe upon constitutional rights.

(Newsounds vs Dy 2009) 4. If the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms (of speech, expression and press) is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Basis for Existence of a Clear and Present Danger of a substantive evil Only a Substantial Governmental Interest
Justification the Congress has a right to prevent
‣ May content-neutral regulations of speech be considered content-based regulation?
‣ YES. If the circumstances and underlying facts show that the intent of the regulation was really aimed at at the
subject-matter message or idea of the expression, then an ostensibly content-neutral regulation can be considered as
content-based.
‣ SEE — Newsounds Broadcasting v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009.
‣ Newsounds had been operating a radio station in Cauayan, Isabela. When renewal of the permit was sought to
continue operation in the same place, he was denied on the basis of a zoning ordinance.
‣ The Court said that such ordinance was a content-based regulation. Ostensibly, the ordinance was a content
neutral zoning ordinance. However, under the circumstances of the case, the real purpose of the ordinance was to
silence the station which had been a strong critic of the local administration. The ordinance therefore must be
viewed as a content-based regulation
JURISPRUDENCE INVALIDATING PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON SPEECH

‣ Adiong v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
‣ Relying on Section 11 of Republic Act 6646, the Comelec prohibited the posting of decals and stickers of candidates
on "mobile" places, public or private.
‣ The Supreme Court declared Sec. 11 and such prohibition unconstitutional for infringing freedom of speech and for
being an undue delegation of rule making authority. The prohibited acts were found to present no substantial danger
to government interest. The prohibition therefore did not satisfy the requirements of the clear and present danger rule.
Moreover, the prohibition was found to suffer from over "breadth." It encompassed the use of privately owned
property such as a vehicle. It therefore was an unreasonable restriction on the use of property. Finally, the
constitutional objective to give rich and poor candidates equal opportunity was not seen as served by the prohibition
of decals.
‣ ABS-CBN v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000
‣ In the exercise of its authority to regulate the holders of media franchises during the election period the Comelec
banned "exit polls." It contends that"an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of
selecting interviewees, which further makes the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit
poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec is ever present
‣ Supreme Court declared such regulation unconstitutional. It said that exit polls (random polling of voters as the come
out of the booths, and the dissemination of their results through mass media) constitute an essential part of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean,

honest, orderly and credible elections. The ban does not satisfy the clear and present danger tale because the evils
envisioned are merely speculative.
‣ SWS v. Comelec, G.R. 147571, May 5, 2001
‣ Section 1 of R.A. 9006, the Fair Election Act, says: "Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before
an election." The provision as well as the implementing resolution of the Comelec is challenged as violative of freedom
of expression. The Comelec, however, justifies the rule as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of
electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before election.
‣ The Supreme Court declared such provision unconstitutional. As prior restraint, the rule is presumed to be invalid. The
power of the Comelec over media franchises is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space and the right to
reply" as well as to reasonable rates of charges for the use of media facilities for "public information and forums
among candidates." Here the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute and substantial. Nor does the rule pass the
O’Brien test because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials, etc. and
(2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the interest can be protected
by narrower restriction such as subsequent punishment.
STATE REGULATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEDIA

‣ All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. However, the
freedom of expression of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and print media because of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must,
necessarily, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for government
allocation and regulation of the print media. (Divinagracia vs Consolidated Broadcasting 2009)
FREEDOM FROM SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT

‣ What is Subsequent Punishment?
‣ These are sanctions of penalties imposed by the government on conduct amounting to speech or expression after
publication or dissemination.
‣ What is the Freedom from Subsequent Punishment?
‣ It is a limitation on the power of the State to impose a punishment after publication or dissemination.
‣ It is a prohibition on systems of subsequent punishment which have the effect of unduly curtailing expression.
‣ RATIONALE — For, indeed, if prior restraint were all that the constitutional guarantee prohibited and government could
impose subsequent punishment without restraint, freedom of expression would be a mockery and a delusion.
‣ The mere prohibition of government interference before words are spoken or published would be an inadequate
protection of the freedom of expression if the government could punish without restraint after publication.
Unrestrained threat of subsequent punishment itself would operate as a very effective prior restraint
‣ Are all kinds of Subsequent Punishment prohibited?
‣ NO. Similar to the rules on prior restraint, the freedom of speech and expression is not absolute. It is subject to the
police power of the State.
‣ What are the standards for allowable subsequent punishment of expression?
‣ BERNAS — Jurisprudence has evolved three tests —
a. Dangerous Tendency Test
b. Clear and Present Danger Test
c. Balancing of Interests Test
TESTS AND STANDARDS OF VALID SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT (EXPOUNDED)

1. DANGEROUS TENDENCY TEST
‣ What is the “Dangerous Tendency Test”?

‣ Speech may be curtailed or punished when it creates a dangerous tendency which the State has the right to
prevent. All it requires, for speech to be punishable, is that there be a rational connection between the speech
and the evil apprehended.
‣ If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used
be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent. (Gonzales vs Comelec 1969)
‣ When is the “Dangerous Tendency Test” used?
‣ When the objective of the government prohibition or regulation is aimed at the preventing of certain evils, such as
—
a. Seditious Speech
b. Contempt cases in Supreme Court
‣ SEE — People v. Perez, 45 Phil. 599 (1923)
‣ In a political discussion held at a town municipio, citizen Perez made this remark: "And the Filipinos, like myself,
must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines." Prosecuted
for seditious speech, Perez was convicted.
‣ The Supreme Court said that “criticism” is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government.
Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty
of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the
laws, and the existence of the State.
‣ There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. In the
words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up
the people against the lawful authorities
‣ SEE — Roxas vs De Zuzuarregui
‣ The Supreme Court does not prohibit a lawyer to be critical of courts and judges as long as they are made in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
‣ Dangerous Tendency Test applied in speeches against the Supreme Court — Tending to degrade the dignity of
the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded it
‣ The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is
an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for
the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect
therefor and confidence therein.
‣ Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade
and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
2. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST

‣ What is the “Clear and Present Danger Test”?
‣ The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
‣ In each case the court must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability, justified such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
‣ It means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. (Gonzales vs Comelec 1969)

‣ The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of
establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what
words may be publicly established. (Gonzales vs Comelec 1969)
‣ When is the “Clear and Present Danger Test” used?
‣ It is basically a milder and less stricter version of the dangerous tendency test. But the use is also similar, which is
when the government prohibition or regulation is aimed at the preventing of certain evils, such as —
a. Contempt cases in lower courts
b. Rebellious speech or expression
‣ BERNAS — It should be noted that between the dangerous tendency rule and the clear and present danger rule,
the difference is chiefly one of degree. Hence, it is difficult to speak of preferences independently of the factual
context. This much, however, may be said, that in early speech cases involving incitement to sedition, an analysis
of Supreme Court decisions yields a language that favors the more restrictive dangerous tendency rule. BUT with
the restoration of democracy, the clear and present danger test is again coming into favor.
‣ SEE — Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,509 (1951)
‣ Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If the Government is aware that a group aiming at its
overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when
the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required.
‣ The argument that there is no need for Government to concern itself, for Government is strong, it possesses ample
powers to put down a rebellion, it may defeat the revolution with ease, needs no answer. For that is not the
question. Certainly an attempt to overthrow the government by force, even though doomed from the outset
because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent.
‣ The damage which such attempts create both physically and politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure
the validity in terms of the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt. We must therefore
reject the contention that success or probability of success Is the criterion.
‣ Conviction relying on speech as evidence of violation may only be sustained when the speech creates a clear and
present danger of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime – in this case, overthrowing the government
Overthrow of a government is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech
3. BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST

‣ What is the “Balancing of Interests Test”?
‣ This test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in
given situation or type of situation. (Ayer Productions vs Capulong)
‣ It is basically a weighing of the different interests involved in the controversy and coming up with a conclusion of
which of them is more important or significant as to justify the interference to the others.
‣ RATIONALE — It rests on the theory that it is the Court’s function in the case before it when it finds public interests
served by legislation on the other hand and other rights under the Bill of Rights affected by it on the other, to
balance the one against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. It rests on
the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the Bill of Rights, and that they
may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests
‣ When is the “Balancing of Interests Test” used?
‣ When there are two or more competing interests and there is really no evil or danger involved. Such as —
a. Commercial speech
b. COMELEC regulations on elections
c. Privacy of person
d. Right vs Right
‣ BERNAS — The dangerous tendency rule and the clear and present danger rule were evolved in the context of
prosecution for seditious speech. They are thus couched in terms of degree of evil and proximity of the evil. But
not all evils easily lend themselves, like sedition, to measurement of proximity and degree. For legislation therefore
whose object is not the prevention of evil measurable in terms of proximity and degree, another test had to be
evolved. The balancing of interests test serves the purpose.

‣ SEE — Gonzales v. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835,899 (1969)
‣ The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly pragmatic approach to the problem of First Amendment
freedom, indeed, to the whole problem of constitutional interpretation. It rests on the theory that it is the Court's
function in the case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation on the one hand and First
Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance the one against the other and to arrive at a judgment
where the greater weight shall be placed.
‣ If on balance it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such a character that it
outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid.
‣ In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even
those stated in the First Amendment, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and
important interests.
‣ NOTE — Of these, the second and third are most often used, as the case may be.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
‣ What is the Commercial Speech?
‣ It is communication which "no more than proposes a commercial transaction."
‣ It concerns only commercial or economic activity
‣ Such as — Advertisement of goods or of services

‣ Does every form of speech enjoy the same degree of protection?
‣ NO. The doctrine on freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the protection of "core" speech” or speech which
communicates political, social or religious ideas. These enjoy the same degree of protection. Commercial speech,
however, does not.
‣ The advertising and promotion of breast milk substitutes falls within the ambit of the term commercial speech, a
separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. An absolute ban on advertising is unduly
restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of infants
and young children. (Pharmaceutical v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007)
‣ The government's right to regulate commercial speech is greater than its right to regulate non-commercial speech.
The government may regulate commercial speech if it is false or misleading or if the restriction directly and narrowly
advances a substantial state interest. (Cincinnati vs Discovery Network)
‣ In order for government to curtail commercial speech what must be shown?
‣ TEST — To enjoy protection, commercial speech must NOT —
1. Be false or misleading, and
2. Propose an illegal transaction. (Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission 1973)
‣ BUT — Even truthful and lawful commercial speech may be regulated if —
1. Government has a substantial interest to protect
2. The regulation directly advances that interest
3. It is not more extensive than is necessary to protect that interest (Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of NY 1980)
‣ NOTE — These are known as the “Central Hudson Standards or Test”
FACIAL CHALLENGE OF LAWS REGULATING FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

‣ RULE — A FACIAL CHALLENGE IS ALLOWED TO BE MADE AGAINST VAGUE OR OVERBOARD LAWS UNDULY ABRIDGING FREEDOM
OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
‣ SEE — Southern Hemispheres Engagement Network vs Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5,
2010 citing the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
‣ RATIONALE — This is because of the possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that when
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for

rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionality
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the track demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
‣ On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.
‣ What is a “Facial Challenge”?
‣ It is a challenge to a statue in which the plaintiff alleges that the legislation is always unconstitutional, and therefore
void. If a facial challenge is successful, a court will declare the statute in question facially invalid, which has the effect
of striking it down entirely.
‣ Is a “facial challenge” the same as the “as-applied challenge”?
‣ NO. They are different.
FACIAL CHALLENGE AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE
Seeks to invalidate it in its entirety because every application Seeks to invalidate a particular application of a statute
is unconstitutional
May be brought soon after a statute's passage in a legislature. Can only be brought once it has been enforced. It is
Thus, it is prospective, or forward looking, because it seeks to retrospective, or backward looking, because it seeks to
prevent a law from being enforced and thus violating redress a constitutional violation that has already occurred
someone's constitutional rights
It is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and It considers only extant facts affecting real litigants
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court
‣ Grounds for a Facial Challenge —

1. VAGUENESS
‣ A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
‣ It is repugnant to the Constitution because —
a. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid
b. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle
2. OVERBREADTH
‣ A governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
‣ As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.
‣ Overbreadth is only applicable in Facial Challenges and not in As-Applied Challenges
‣ SEE — David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
‣ By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot
areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be

properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.
‣ The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates
the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.
‣ The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
‣ Overbreadth only applicable in Free Speech Cases

‣ SEE — Southern Hemispheres Engagement Network vs Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552 (2010)
‣ In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, observed that
the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment, and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or
speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression
‣ Does the facial challenge rule apply to criminal laws?
‣ NO. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds.
‣ Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
(Southern Hemispheres Engagement Network vs Anti-Terrorism Council, 2010)
‣ The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of
penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing
and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal
statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are
not before it. (Romualdez vs Comelec 2008)
‣ Does a facial challenge only apply to free speech cases?
‣ NO. It seems to apply also to other fundamental rights, but they are disfavored.
‣ The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights
may be facially challenged, but under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
(Romualdez vs Comelec 2008)
UNPROTECTED SPEECH
‣ What are Unprotected Speech?
‣ There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any constitutional problems. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interests in order and morality. (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
1942)
‣ These consist of —

1. Libel
2. Obscenity
‣ NOTE — There is no call for the application of the clear and present danger rule or the dangerous tendency rule or the
balancing of interests test because these are essentially methods of weighing competing values. The problem lies at how
to determine which speech is libellous or obscene
LIBEL
‣ NOTE — Libel is punished under the Revised Penal Code. See Arts. 353 to 362 for more details
‣ What is Libel?
‣ Libel is defined by the RPC as a public and malicious imputation of any —
1. Crime
2. Real or imaginary vice or a defect
3. Any other act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which—
a. Tends to cause the dishonour, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person
b. Blackens the memory of one who is dead (Art. 353, RPC)
‣ Elements of Libel —
1. Allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another
2. Publication of the charge
3. Identity of the person defamed
4. Existence of malice or evil intent
‣ What is “publication” for purposes of libel?
‣ Publication means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person
to whom it has been written. The reason for such rule is that a communication of the defamatory matter to the person
defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man’s reputation is not the good opinion
he has of himself, but the estimation in which the others hold him. (Ledesma vs CA 1997)
‣ When is there malice for purposes of libel?
‣ There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by ill-will or spite not in response to duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. (Alonzo vs CA 1995)
‣ How is malice proved?
‣ RULE — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown. (known as “malice in law”)
‣ EXCEPT — In the following cases, malice is NOT presumed and “actual malice” must be proved as a fact. (known
as “malice in fact”)
1. Privilege communications
a. Absolutely Privilege Communications (Art. 6, Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)
b. Qualifiedly Privileged Communications Art. 354[1], RPC)
2. Fair and true commentaries on governmental conduct (Art. 354[2], RPC)

3. Fair commentaries on matters of Public Interest (Borjal vs CA 1999)
4. Commentaries on Public Officials and Public Figures (New York Times Co. vs Sullivan 1964)
5. Testimony in Judicial Proceedings which are relevant to the case (Armovit, et al. v. Judge Purisima 1982)
‣ What is “Actual Malice”
‣ Actual malice means with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not
CASES WHERE ACTUAL MALICE MUST BE PROVED AND IS NOT PRESUMED

1. PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATIONS

a. Absolutely Privilege Communications
‣ This pertains to parliamentary privilege under Art. 6, Sec. 11 of the Constitution. — “No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.”
‣ NOTE — In this case, the legislator is absolutely exempt from criminal or civil liability, even if actual malice is
proved, but he may be subject to disciplinary action by the proper house of Congress.
b. Qualifiedly Privileged Communications — these are private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty
‣ These are communications made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest,
or concerning which he has a duty, is prevailed if made to a person having a corresponding interest, although it
contains incriminatory matter which without the privilege, would be libellous and actionable. (Ledesma vs CA 1997)
‣ REQUISITES —
i. The person who made the communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make the communication, or at
lease had an interest to protect, which may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made.
ii. The communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought
iii. Statements are made in good faith and without malice
2. FAIR AND TRUE COMMENTARIES ON GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT

‣ These are fair and true reports made in good faith without any comments or remarks, of —
a. Any juridical, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature
b. Any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions (Art. 354[2], RPC)
‣ Newspapers may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings, which are not of a
confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being
official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But to enjoy immunity, a publication containing
derogatory information must be not only true but also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without comments
or remarks. (Lopez vs CA 1970)
‣ What is the Sub-judice Rule?
‣ The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub judice rule may
render one liable for indirect contempt under the Rules of Court. (Romero vs Estrada 2009)
‣ RATIONALE — It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies. (Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez 1987)
3. FAIR COMMENTARIES ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST

‣ The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. Fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. (Flor vs People 2005)
‣ Comment must be true, or which, if false, expresses the real opinion of the author, such opinion having been formed
with a reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds.
‣ But such comments must not be used as a cloak for malicious assaults on the private life and character of the person
criticised.
4. COMMENTARIES ON PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC FIGURES

‣ Public Officials
‣ The constitutional guarantee requires a rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual
malice. (New York Times Co. vs Sullivan 1964)
‣ The people have the right to scrutinize, comment, or condemn the conduct of their chosen representatives in the
government. As long as their comments are made in good faith and with justifiable ends, they are insulated from
prosecution or damage suits for defamation even if such views are found to be inaccurate and erroneous. A public
officer may not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. (US vs Bustos 1918)

‣ To avail relief, they may prove that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice. Public figures are not
left unprotected. if the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer’s performance of his duties or
irrelevant to matter of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.
‣ Public Figures
‣ The rule on actual malice was extended to cover defamation of private sector public figures. This is known as the
“Public Figure Doctrine” (SEE — Rddenblatt v. Boer 1966 ; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 1974; Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell 1988)
‣ Public figures are not unprotected. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer's
performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise
to criminal and civil liability. While personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and
intrigue writers and commentators, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignify by
indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments. (Fermin v. People 2008)
5. TESTIMONY IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO THE CASE

‣ The prevailing rule is that parties, counsel, and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words
otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are relevant to the
case. (Armovit, et al. v. Judge Purisima 1982)
OBSCENITY
‣ What is Obscenity?
‣ Obscenity means something offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy.
‣ “Obscene” and “indecent” are already descriptive words. Words that are in common use and every person of average
intelligence understands their meaning
‣ Obscenity as unprotected speech
‣ Obscenity is not covered by the protection of the First Amendment. Therefore, it can be punished. Benefits from
exposing ideas through obscenity are clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. (Roth vs US)
‣ The States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of
dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to
juveniles. (Miller v. California 1973)
TESTS FOR OBSCENITY

‣ How do you determine whether a particular work is obscene and indecent?
1. MILLER TEST (APPEAL TO PRURIENT INTEREST TEST)
‣ SEE — Miller v. California 1973; Kingsley Pictures vs N.Y. Regents 1959
a. Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest
b. Appeal to prurient interest must be measured by the effect of the work not on susceptible persons but on the average
person
c. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
contemporary community standards
d. The material must exceed the limits of tolerance imposed by contemporary standards of the community with respect
to freedom of expression in matters concerning sex
e. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value
f. The material must be judged by its dominant themes as a whole and not by isolated passages
g. Mere advocacy of a behaviour which is immoral by contemporary community standards is also constitutionally
protected, provided such advocacy is not itself obscene and does not amount to incitement to immediate action.
‣ SEE — Gonzales vs Kalaw-Katigbak 137 SCRA 717 (July 22, 1985)
‣ TEST — Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest

‣ Hicklin Test – early leading standard of obscenity where material is to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated
excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Later on rejected by subsequent decisions.
‣ NOTE — This is basically a simplified version of the Miller Test
2. CORRUPTING TENDENCY TEST

‣ SEE — Pita vs CA, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989, People vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352 (1923)
a. Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.
b. Whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency
c. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that ultimately, the
question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it
RIGHT TO PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

‣ What is the right of assembly and petition?
‣ Historically, it is the primary right, the right peaceable to assemble a subordinate and instrumental right, as if the
provision read: “The right of the people peaceably to assemble” in order to petition the government”
‣ It is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental
‣ Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters
of public concern.
‣ When can the right of assembly and petition be impaired?
‣ TEST — Only when there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
‣ It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state
has a right to prevent. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of
a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest. (J.B.L. Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing 1983)
‣ NOTE — Because it is a right equally fundamental as freedom of expression, the standards for allowable impairment
of speech and press are also used for assembly and petition.
‣ Can the right of assembly and petition be regulated?
‣ YES. It is subject to reasonable regulations of the State. The State (though the proper LGU) may regulate the time,
place, and manner, of the assembly. A prior permit is normally required.
‣ BP 880 or “The Public Assembly Act of 1985” is a restriction which regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. It is a content-neutral regulation. (Bayan vs Ermita 2006)
‣ SEE — J.B.L. Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, October 25, 1983
1. The applicant for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place.
‣ BUT — In the following cases, a permit is NOT required —
a. Private place — only the consent of the owner or of the one entitled to its legal possession is required
b. Campus of a government-owned or operated educational institution
c. Freedom park (BP 880)
2. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but to another public place.
‣ NOTE — It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached. The presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice
on the side of liberty. If public authority is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.

3. The decision of public authority, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest
opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority
‣ What is the Maximum Tolerance Rule?
‣ It the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (Sec. 3, BP 880)
‣ NOTE — What was called by the government as "calibrated preemptive response" to demonstration and rallies has no
place in the constitutional system. The proper response is "maximum tolerance" prescribed in BP 880. (Bayan v.
Ermita 2006)
‣ Procedure for the Issuance of a Permit under BP 880 —
1. An application for the permit to assemble shall be filed before the Office of the Mayor within 5 working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
2. Upon receipt, the application must be immediately be posted as a conspicuous place in the city or municipality
3. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
4. The mayor must issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
5. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
6. The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within 24 hours.
7. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
‣ Can demonstrations be held in the vicinity of courts?
‣ Not in the immediate vicinity. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are enjoined from holding
any activity on the sidewalks and streets adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of 200 meters from, the outer
boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any hall of justice, and any other building that house at least 1 court sala. (In
re Petition to Annul En Banc Res. AM 98-7-02, 1998)
‣ Can demonstrations be held by students in school premises?
‣ YES. Subject to school regulation
‣ SEE — Malabanan vs Ramento, G.R. No. L-62270, May 21, 1984
‣ The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger
to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded
the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law.
‣ If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid
of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as
to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic
personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to
the offense.
‣ Disciplinary action may be taken against students for conduct which "materially disrupts class work or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” However, considering the importance of the right of
assembly and petition, the penalty imposed cannot be too severe.

RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
ARTICLE 6 — THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 29.XXXXX (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
 
ARTICLE 9(C) — THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: XXXXXXX
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. XXXXXX
IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

‣ SEE — Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72, September 12,1974
‣ The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must,
therefore, yield to the former.
‣ Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in
the hierarchy of values
‣ It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid
the danger.
ASPECTS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

1. Principle of Separation of Church and State — The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
2. Non-Establishment Clause — No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion
3. Free Exercise Clause — No law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
4. Prohibition on Religious Test — No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights
5. Other Constitutional Prohibitions —

a. No public money or property may be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such (Art. 6, Sec. 29[2])
‣ EXCEPT — when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
b. Religious denominations and sects cannot be registered as political parties or organizations (Art. 9[C], Sec. 2[5])
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

‣ RULE — THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE
‣ The prohibition expressed in Sec. 5 is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the
necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history,
not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for

occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of
their respective ends and aims. (Aglipay vs Ruiz 1937)
‣ All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the
Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its
inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. A creator is recognized by the Philippines as a people, as inferred from
the preamble of the Constitution. (Aglipay vs Ruiz 1937)
‣ Neither the State nor the Federal Gov’t may constitutionally force a person to profess belief or disbelief in any religion,
nor can it pass laws that aid all religions as against nonbelievers. (School District vs Schempp)
‣ Twin Aspect of Religious Freedom —
1. Non-establishment of religion (Non-establishment clause) — State cannot promote or establish any religion
2. Free exercise of religion (Free exercise clause) — State cannot interfere with the exercise of religion
‣ Nature and Relationship of the the Twin Aspects
‣ The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it
forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organisation of form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
‣ Nature of the relational concept must be constantly re-examined because the term of the relation are not immobile
concepts. These terms, are, on one end, the human experience expressed by the word “religion” and, on the other,
the proper actions within the domain of the State.
‣ Means, that the two concepts come into conflict more often
‣ How do you distinguish if a case involves a free exercise case or a non-establishment case?
‣ BERNAS — Every violation of the free exercise clause involves compulsion whereas a violation of the non-
establishment clause need not involve compulsion.
‣ EXCEPT — CERTAIN GENERAL CONCESSIONS ARE INDISCRIMINATELY ACCORDED TO RELIGIOUS SECTS AND DENOMINATIONS —
1. Exemption from Real Property Taxes — Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries and al lands and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Art. 6, Sec. 28[3])
2. Religious Ministers may be assigned in certain public offices — Priest, preacher, minister,, or dignitary may be
assigned to the Armed Forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium and public funds
may be appropriated for such purpose. (Art. 6, Sec. 29[2])
3. Optional Religious Instruction may be taught in Public Schools — At the option expressed in writing by the
parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high
school within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion
to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the government. (Art. 14, Sec. 3[3])
4. Religious Holidays — Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made
legal holidays in the Revised Administrative Code because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to
beneficial moral results. (Aligpay vs Ruiz 1937)
5. Certain crimes against Religious Worship are penalized— The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and
bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state.
(Aligpay vs Ruiz 1937)
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
‣ RULE — NO LAW SHALL BE MADE RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
‣ It basically prohibits the establishment of any religion by the State
‣ Its essence is that the State cannot set up a church neither can it pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can it open or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious groups and
vice versa. The clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
Church and State.” (Board of Education v. Everson 1936)

‣ BERNAS — While there is no unanimity in the interpretation of non-establishment as a political principle, there is
substantial agreement on the values non-establishment seeks to protect. These are two —
1. Voluntarism — as a value is both personal and social. As a personal value, it is nothing more than the inviolability
of the human conscience which is also protected by the free exercise clause. As a social value, protected by the
non-establishment clause, it means that the growth of a religious sect as a social force must come from the
voluntary support of its members because of the belief that both spiritual and secular society will benefit if
religions are allowed to compete on their own intrinsic merit without benefit of official patronage. Such
voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from religion and unless religion is
insulated from politics. Non-establishment assures such insulation and thereby prevents interfaith dissention.
2. Insulation of the political process from interfaith dissension — voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the
political process is insulated from religion and unless religion is insulated from politics. Non-establishment assures
such insulation and thereby prevents interfaith dissention.
TESTS APPLIED TO DETERMINE VIOLATIONS OF THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

‣ Are all kinds of government aid which redound to the benefit of religion or religious sects or churches, prohibited?
‣ NO. As long as the such benefit is merely incidental to a secular purpose. The government should not be precluded
from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect.
(Aglipay vs Ruiz 1937)
‣ The Non-Establishment Clause does not prevent the State from extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens
without regard for their religion. (Board of Education vs Allen)
‣ Requisites for the validity of government aid redounding to the benefit of religious sects or churches —
1. It must have a secular purpose
2. It must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion
3. It must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions. (Lemon vs Kurtzman 1971)
‣ Tests applied to determine violations of the Non-Establishment Clause —
1. Strict Neutrality/Separation
‣ It examines only whether the government action is for a secular purpose and does not consider inadvertent burden
of religious exercise. A rigid reading of the principle of separation between church and state. (Estrada vs Escritor
2003)
2. Benevolent Neutrality/Accomodation
‣ An approach that looks further than the secular purposes of government and examines the effect of these actions
on religious exercise. The court will strive to accommodate religious beliefs and practices when it can within
flexible constitutional limits. The Philippines adheres to this. (Estrada vs Escritor 2003)
‣ Basically, this approach gives room for accommodation of religious exercises, provided that it does not offend
compelling state interest.
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

‣ Cases where government aid violates the Non-Establishment Clause —
a. State sponsored Bible readings and prayers in public schools — no secular purpose (School District v. Schempp
1963)
b. Salary payments and reimbursements for secular textbooks and other instructional materials under a system
involving close government supervision — there is excessive entanglement between the government and the
recipient institutions (Lemon vs Kurtzman 1971)
‣ Cases where government aid does NOT violate the Non-Establishment Clause —
a. Postage stamps depicting the Philippines as the site of a religious event (Aglipay vs Ruiz 1937)
b. Government sponsorship of town fiestas — A fiesta is socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in
rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses. (Garces vs Estenzo
1981)
c. Book lending program for students in parochial schools (Board of Education vs Allen)

d. Display of creche in secular setting (Lynch vs Donnelly)
e. Financial support for secular academic facilities (Tilton vs Richardson)
f. Exemption form zoning requirements to accommodate architectural features of religious buildings (Martin vs
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop)
g. Celebration of Religious Holidays (Garces vs Estenzo 1981)
h. The expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of Iglesia ni Kristo, for the purpose of preserving it as a
historical landmark, was upheld as for "public use" under the broadened definition of public use. Moreover, the non-
establishment objection was answered by the argument that whatever benefits the adherents of Iglesia would reap
would only be incidental to the public historical purpose. (Manosca v CA 1996)
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE (FREEDOM OF WORSHIP AND BELIEF)

‣ RULE — THE FREE EXERCISE AND ENJOYMENT OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION OR
PREFERENCE, SHALL FOREVER BE ALLOWED
‣ The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two
concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot
be. (Cantwell v. Connecticut 1940)
‣ Is the government absolutely prohibited from interfering with the exercise of a religion?
‣ NO. The government may exceptionally interfere with religious acts and exercises if there is a clear and present
danger or there are compelling state interests involved.
‣ It does not follow that because no mode of worship can be established or religious tenets enforced in this country,
therefore any tenet, however destructive of society, may be held and advocated if asserted to be part of the religious
doctrine of those advocating and practicing them. While legislation for the establishment of religion is forbidden, and
its free exercise is permitted, it does not follow that everything which may be so called can be tolerated Crime is not
the less odious, because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion. Whether an act is immoral
within the meaning of statute is not to be determined by the accused’s concept of morality. Congress has provided
the standard. The offense is complete if the accused intended to perform, and did in fact perform, the act which the
statute condemns. (Davis vs Beason 1890)
‣ Two aspects of the Free Exercise of Religion —
1. Freedom to believe
‣ It is absolute as long as it is confined in the realm of thought
‣ This carries with it the corollary expectation that the government, while it may look into the good faith of a person,
cannot inquire into a person’s religious pretensions.
‣ The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own
theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion;
acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of
his soul – in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be
to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may
not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter
of faith. “Men may believe what they cannot prove.” Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called
to account because he cannot prove what he believes. (In Re: Request of Muslim Employees 2005)
2. Freedom to act on one’s belief
‣ It is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The moment
belief follows into action, it becomes subject to government regulation. (INC vs CA 1996)
‣ Where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so
becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think
that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the
general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And

this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of
evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law. (In Re: Request of Muslim Employees 2005)
TESTS APPLIED TO DETERMINE VIOLATIONS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

1. Clear and Present Danger Test
‣ Whether government interference is justified by the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has the right to prevent. (Schenck vs US 1919)
2. Compelling State Interest Test
‣ REQUISITES — In order to interfere with religious exercise —
a. The court should look into sincerity of religious belief, without inquiring into the truth of the belief
b. State has to establish that its purposes are legitimate and compelling enough to override such religious belief and
practice
c. State must use the least intrusive and restrictive means (Estrada vs Escritor 2003)
‣ NOTE — Government interference which are content-neutral and is of general applicability are treated differently with
those which is specifically made to apply against a particular religion.
‣ SEE — Church of Lukumi vs City of Hialeah (1993)
‣ A law that burdens religious practices need NOT be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is
neutral and of general applicability. (In this case, the clear and danger tests suffices)
‣ BUT — where such a law is not neutral and does not apply generally (such as in this Lukumi case), it must
undergo the most rigorous scrutiny. That is it must be —
1. Justified by a compelling governmental interest
2. Narrowly tailored to advance that interest

‣ Religious freedom must be exercised in good faith and should not be abused to the prejudice of others
‣ SEE — German vs Barangan (1985)
‣ The facts cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond debate that every
citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental
rights for that matter, must be done in good faith.
‣ As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties observe honesty and good faith.”
‣ One may believe in most anything however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others,
even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief
and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief
clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the
latter. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.”
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

‣ Cases where government interference violates the Free Exercise Clause —
a. To compel students to take part in a flag ceremony when it is against their religious beliefs will violate their religious
freedom. (Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent of Schools 1993)
b. To deprive muslim group of the power to certify food as halal (that is, suitable for consumption by Muslims according
to their religious belief) and giving such task to a government agency. (Islamic Da'wah Council v. Executive Secretary
2003)
c. To interfere with the issue of expulsion or excommunication of a member from a church. (Taruc, et al. v. Bishop 2005)
d. The State requiring a license for the dissemination of religious literature — The constitutional guarantee of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious, profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Unless the dissemination is done as a business operation for profit, no license may be required. Any
restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a

clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. (American Bible Society vs
City of Manila 1957)
e. The state compelling amish teenagers to go to highschool where the Amish belief has a system of informal education
which ensures the physical and mental welfare of the child and prepares him to discharge the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship violates free exercise of religion. The Amish may decline to send their children to public
or private high school on the contention that high school attendance is contrary to their religion and way of life and
will endanger the salvation of the children. The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a
balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing
of their children. (Wisconsin vs Yoder 1972)
‣ Cases where government interference does NOT violate the Free Exercise Clause —
a. The sale of religious literature, books, etc is subject to VAT and the religious institution may be compelled to register
as a VAT taxpayer and to pay the costs of such registration. — The Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not
prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious
organization. The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of
tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an
output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not
imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 1994)
b. The solicitation of contributions in general, which may include contributions for religious purposes, may be regulated
by general law for the protection of the public — even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight
inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its
citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit
funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.
The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety,
peace; convert or convenience. (Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos 1994)
PROHIBITION ON RELIGIOUS TESTS

‣ RULE — NO RELIGIOUS TEST SHALL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS
‣ RATIONALE — Purpose on the prohibition on religious test is but a corollary of the freedom and non-establishment
clause, is to render the government powerless to restore the historically and constitutional discredited policy of
probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps kind of religious
concept. To allow religious tests would have the effect of formal or practical establishment of particular religious faiths
with consequent burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of non-favored believers. (Torcaso v. Watkins
1961)
‣ Cases where the prohibition on religious tests was violated —
a. An association of gays and lesbians was excluded from participation in the party-list system on the ground, among
others, that the group holds principles contrary to accepted norms of morality that have seeped into Philippine
culture after 500 years of Muslim and Christian teaching. Reliance by the Comelec on religious justification violates
the constitutional teaching on religious neutrality. (Ang Ladlad v. Comelec 2010)
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TEST

‣ This test is applied in the US to avail of an exemption from military service based on a law which provides that persons
who are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of religious training and belied may be
exempted from combatant training and service in the armed forces. (Welsh vs United States 1970)
‣ REQUISITES —
1. There must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the believer’s life
2. The religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief (it cannot be purely subjective)
3. A demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not inquire into the truth or reasonableness of the
belief
4. There must be some associational ties although there is also a view that religious beliefs held by a single person
rather than being part of the teachings of any kind of group or sect are entitled to the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause (Estrada vs Escritor 2003)

LIBERTY OF ABODE; RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER SEC. 6

1. LIBERTY OF ABODE
‣ RULE — The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
‣ EXCEPT — It may be impaired upon lawful order of the court
‣ Such as —
‣
2. RIGHT TO TRAVEL
‣ RULE — The right to travel both at home and going out of the country shall not be impaired
‣ SCOPE — This right only covers —
a. The right to travel from the Philippines to another country
b. The right to travel within the Philippines
‣ It does NOT cover the right to return to the Philippines. (Marcos vs Manglapus 1989)
‣ Every sovereign nation has the power to forget the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them
only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit. (Nishimura Ekiu vs US 1892)
‣ EXCEPT — It may be impaired in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law
‣ Such as —
a. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. (Manotoc vs CA 1986)
b. In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the
prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or
where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety. (Sec. 26, RA 9372, Human
Security Act)
c. Supreme Court may regulate travel of their employees and judges. (OAS vs Macarine)
RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
 
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
‣ RULE — THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN SHALL BE RECOGNIZED AND
AFFORDED TO THE CITIZEN, SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW

‣ SCOPE — The right to information includes the right of access to —
a. Official records
b. Documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions
c. Government research data used as basis for policy development
d. Any other information on matters which is of public concern
‣ RATIONALE —
‣ Access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public
concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s
problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has
been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and
its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.” (Province of North Cotobato vs
GRP Panel)
‣ The objective is to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as
provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. They are also essential
to hold public officials "at all times accountable to the people," for unless citizens have the proper information,
they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. (Initiatives vs PSALM 2012)
‣ Who can invoke this right?
‣ Any citizen has standing to invoke this right.
‣ When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is
a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission 1985)
‣ What is the meaning of “matters of public concern”?
‣ In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
the public. (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission 1985)
‣ Is this right self-executory?
‣ YES. Right to information on matters of public concern are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of
which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access
to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon
the ratification of the constitution without need for any auxillary act of the Legislature. (Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission 1985)
‣ What is the procedural remedy to invoke this right?
‣ The aggrieved citizen may file an action for mandamus
‣ NOTE — The burden of proof that it is NOT matters of public concern or it falls under one of the exemptions is on
the government agency concerned. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of
showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has
been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of
access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.(Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission 1985)
‣ May the right to information be regulated?
‣ YES. Obviously the government agency may administratively regulate access and the manner of the exercise of
the right to preserve the information sought. However, once the right is deemed available, only regulation is
allowed not prohibition.

‣ Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern.
This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. Regulations which the
Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end
that —
1. Damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided
2. Undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may
be prevented
3. The right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission
1985)
‣ BUT — While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission 1985)
‣ Can government agencies inquire as to the purpose of why a citizen is interested in a certain information?
‣ NO. They cannot concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the
records. Except, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity. It is not
their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that
scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the
officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission
1985)
‣ EXCEPT — WHEN THE LAW PROVIDES OTHERWISE

‣ What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded
which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest. (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission 1985)
‣ What is the test for validity of a law which curtails the right to information?
‣ BERNAS — The standards that have been developed for the regulation of speech and press and of assembly and
petition and of association are applicable to the right of access to information.
‣ This refers to the “Clear and Present Danger” Test.
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

‣ Information which is required to be disclosed as it is covered under the right —
1. The refusal of the Comelec to reveal the names of the nominees for party-list seats violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. (Ba-Ra 7941 v. Comelec 2007)
2. It is incumbent upon the PCGG, and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders
of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common '
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage." Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government 1998)
3. Information, for instance, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.
From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary
information leading to such definite proposition. (Chavez v. PEA 2002)
4. Decisions and opinions of a court are matters of public concern or interest. Access to court records may be permitted
at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or
purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. (Hilado, et al. v.
Judge 2006)
5. Civil service eligibilities of members of the civil service (Legaspi vs CSC)

6. National board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general,
and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these
exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters
pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further
improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting. We do realize that there may be valid reasons
to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience
of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, administration, and checking of
these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration.
(Antolin vs Domonodon 2010)
‣ Information NOT covered under the right and disclosure may not be compelled —
1. National security matters
2. Criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters — such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution
and the detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution.
Otherwise, efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized.
3. Pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case — need not be matters of public concern or interest. They
are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting
their rights and interests. (Hilado, et al. v. Judge 2006)
4. Diplomatic correspondence
5. Closed door Cabinet meetings
6. Executive sessions of either house of Congress
7. Internal deliberations of the Supreme Court
8. Trade secrets
9. Banking deposits and transactions
10. Informer’s privilege
11. Presidential communications privilege
12. Deliberative process privilege
13. Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.
From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary
information leading to such definite proposition. (Initiatives vs PSALM 2012)
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
‣ RULE — THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, INCLUDING THOSE EMPLOYED IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, TO FORM UNIONS,
ASSOCIATIONS, OR SOCIETIES SHALL NOT BE ABRIDGED
‣ BERNAS — All this means is that the right to form associations shall not be impaired except through a valid exercise
of police power. It is therefore an aspect of the general right of liberty. More specifically, it is an aspect of freedom of
contract; and in so far as associations may have for their object the advancement of beliefs and ideas, freedom of
association is an aspect of freedom of expression and of belief.
‣ SCOPE —
1. Persons (both in the public and private sectors) may form —
a. Unions
b. Associations

c. Societies
2. Persons may NOT be compelled to join unions, associations, societies
‣ The guarantee also covers the right not to join an association.
‣ NOTE — Government employees have the right to form unions. This is covered under Sec. 8. (Trade Union of the
Philippines v. NHC 1989)
‣ BUT — The right to strike may be limited by law. The Supreme Court has definitively ruled that employees of the
Social Security System and public school teachers, do not have a constitutional right to strike. But the current ban
on them against strikes is statutory and may be lifted by statute. (SSS v. the CA 1989, Manila Public School
Teachers Association v. Secretary of Education).
‣ EXCEPT — WHEN THE LAW PROVIDES OTHERWISE

‣ What is the test for validity of a law which curtails the right to information?
‣ It depends on the purpose of the association. If the purpose is a manifestation of the freedom of speech, then the
standards of such right apply.
‣ Do all societies and associations enjoy the same constitutional protection?
‣ NO. The Constitution recognizes a hierarchy of values. (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees v. Philippine
Blooming Mills 1973) The degree of protection an association enjoys depends on the position which the
association's objective or activity occupies in the constitutional hierarchy of values. Thus, for instance, where the
object of an association is the advancement of a common political belief such as racial equality, any law that either
has the effect of limiting membership in such association or blunting its effectivity must satisfy the more stringent
standards for allowable limitation of expression and belief. (NAACP v. Button 1963)
‣ Such as —
‣ Illegal associations and assemblies under the RPC
‣ Managerial and confidential employees cannot form unions. (United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union vs Laguesma
1998)
‣ Supervisory employees may form unions but not with the rank-and-file employees.
‣ Lawyers are compelled to join the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as a pre-requisite to the practice of law
‣ Subversive organizations
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

‣ Bel air Village Association v. Dionisio (1989)
‣ A land buyer buys a lot with an annotated lien that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the homeowner's
association. Such annotation does NOT violate the right freely to join or not to join associations. The fact that the
obligation is annotated in the title does not make it a government act forcing one to join an association. Rather, the
buyer freely buys the lot knowing that the purchase will entail an obligation.
‣ United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union vs Laguesma (1998)
‣ The first sentence of Article 245 of the Labor Code provides that: "Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist
or form any labor organization. Such provision is valid because the right under Art. 3, Sec. 8 is subject to the condition
that its exercise should be for purposes 'not contrary to law. The rationale is because if these managerial employees
would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in the Union membership.
‣ Occefia v. COMELEC (1984)
‣ Batas Big. 222 prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of May 17, 1982 from representing or allowing himself
to be represented as a candidate of any political party and prohibits a political party, political group, political
committee from giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against a barangay
candidate's campaign for election. This is valid. The right is not absolute and the prohibition found in the law is
couched in very narrow terms. The law is intended to meet a clear and imminent danger of the debilitation of the
electoral process and also the danger of disenabling barangay officials from adequately performing their function as
agents of a neutral community.

LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
ARTICLE 12 — NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon
payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
Government.
ARTICLE 13 — SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS — AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
ARTICLE 18 — TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Section 22. At the earliest possible time, the Government shall expropriate idle or abandoned agricultural lands as may be
defined by law, for distribution to the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit
with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
RA 8974 — AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY, SITE OR LOCATION FOR NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 2. National Government Projects. - The term "national government projects" shall refer to all national government infrastructure,
engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and controlled corporations,all projects
covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and
other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation,
construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair, and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
Section 3. Modes of Accounting Real Property. - The government may acquire real property needed as right-of-way, site or location for
any national government infrastructure project through donation, negotiated sale, expropriation or any other mode of acquisition as
provided by law.
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way or location
for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the
expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of
the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current
relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7 hereof;
(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of
sixty (60) days from the date of the expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation for said area; and
(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation
of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into
consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take
possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.

Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds
from the proper official concerned.
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency’s proffered value, the court shall determine the just
compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court
becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just
compensation as determined by the court.
Section 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. - In order to
facilitate the determination of just compensation, the court may consider, among other well-established factors, the following relevant
standards:
(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvement on the land and for the value of
improvements thereon;
(f) This size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and
(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of
approximate areas as those required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
Section 6. Guidelines for Negotiated Sale. - Should the implementing agency and the owner of the property agree on a negotiated sale
for the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project, the standards prescribed under
Section 5 hereof shall be used to determine the fair market value of the property, subject to review and approval by the head of the
agency or department concerned.
Section 7. Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures. - The Department of Public Works and Highways and other implementing
agencies concerned, in coordination with the local government units concerned in the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any
national government infrastructure project, are hereby mandated to adopt within sixty (60) days upon approval of this Act, the necessary
implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land to be expropriated.
Section 8. Ecological and Environmental Concerns. - In cases involving the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national
government infrastructure project, the implementing agency shall take into account the ecological and environmental impact of the
project. Before any national government project could be undertaken, the agency shall consider environmental laws, land use ordinances
and all pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 9. Squatter Relocation. - The government through the National Housing Authority, in coordination with the local government
units and implementing agencies concerned, shall establish and develop squatter relocation sites, including the provision of adequate
utilities and services, in anticipation of squatters that have to be removed from the right-of-way or site of future infrastructure projects.
Whenever applicable, the concerned local government units shall provide and administer the relocation sites.
In case the expropriated land is occupied by squatters, the court shall issue the necessary " Writ of Demolition" for the purpose of
dismantling any and all structures found within the subject property. The implementing agency shall take into account and observe
diligently the procedure provided for in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992.
Funds for the relocation sites shall come from appropriations for the purpose under the General Appropriations Act, as well as from
appropriate infrastructure projects funds of the implementing agency concerned.
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

‣ What is the “Power of Eminent Domain”?
‣ It is the power of the state to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation.
‣ Where does the power of eminent domain reside?
‣ Similar to police power and the power of taxation, it is one of the three inherent powers possessed by the State and is
exercised by the national government through Congress.
‣ Why is it important to know whether a government action an exercise of the power of eminent domain (as
opposed to police power or power of taxation)?
‣ The nature of the power being exercised by the State is important because different constitutional standards and
restrictions apply to each specific power being exercised.

‣ Thus, if the “taking” of private property is a result of police power, the standards for eminent domain (public purpose
and just compensation) need NOT be complied with, the requisites for the valid exercise of police power are the
proper tests.
‣ What is the difference of “police power” with the “power of eminent domain”?
1. Police power — regulates or may even destroy private property but there is no transfer of ownership nor
compensation
2. Power of eminent domain — transfers ownership and must be compensated.
‣ NOTE — Imposition of restrictions to protect the public health, safety, or morals from dangers threatened is not a
taking. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform)
‣ What is the scope of the power of eminent domain?
‣ SCOPE — The state can expropriate ANY private property (real or personal) subject to Constitutional limitations. The
power is plenary, similar to the power of Congress itself. (Barlin v. Ramirez 1906).
‣ EXCEPT — The following properties may NOT be expropriated —
1. Money — it would be a futile act because the payment of just compensation is usually also in money
2. Choses in action — this is a proprietary right in personam. It is the right to bring an action to recover a debt,
money, or thing. Such as debt owned by another person, a share in a joint-stock company, or a claim for
damages in tort.
‣ Is expropriation proper as a substitute for the enforcement of a valid contract?
‣ NO. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any
agreement as to price. Where there is a valid and subsisting contract, between the owners of the property and the
expropriating authority, there is no reason for the expropriation. (Noble v. City of Manila 1938)
‣ Can LGUs exercise the Power of Eminent Domain?
‣ YES. But only if there is a law delegating such power. Thus, the LGUs power of eminent domain is merely “delegated”
and should strictly conform to the requisites and standarfcds provided by the delegating statute.
‣ The Local Government Code delegates this power to the LGUs.
PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

1. Art. 3, Sec. 9 — Sets down the limits on the exercise of such inherent power
2. Art. 12, Sec. 18 — Allows the State, upon payment of just compensation and in the interest of national welfare or
defense, to transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.
3. Art. 13, Sec. 4 — Mandates an Agrarian Land Reform Program for the just distribution of all agricultural lands
4. Art. 18, Sec. 22 — Mandates the expropriation of idle or abandoned agricultural lands for distribution to the beneficiaries
of the agrarian reform program.
EXPROPRIATION; WHEN IS THERE “TAKING”?

‣ What is “Expropriation”?
‣ It is the “exercise” of the power of eminent domain.
‣ It is the “taking” of private property by the State.
‣ NOTE — Only private property may be expropriated.
‣ How is Expropriation instituted by the government?
‣ Through a special civil action filed under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Under such rules, Expropriation is a two-
pronged proceeding which involves —
1. The determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts which terminates in an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's
lawful right to take the property for the public use or purpose described in the complaint
2. The determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated
‣ When is there a “taking” of private property?

‣ REQUISITES — For “taking” to occur, the following must be present —
1. The expropriator must enter upon the private property
2. Entry must not be for a momentary period only (it must be permanent or at least indefinite)
3. Entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority
4. Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected
5. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
of the property. (Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi 1974)
‣ Examples of an impairment of private property which constitutes “taking” —
1. Actual taking
a. When the owner is actually deprived or disposed of his property
b. Where the entry into private property is not just a simple right-of-way. (Didipio Earth Savers v. Secretary 2006)
2. Constructive taking
a. There is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of the property
b. The owner is deprived of the ordinary use of his property. (Republic vs Sarabia 2005)
c. Where the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines results in the imposition of limitation
against the use of the land for an indefinite period. (NPC v. San Pedro 2006)
‣ NOTE — There is “constructive taking” when there is destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of
ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or
destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material
whether the property is removed firm the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. (NAPOCOR vs
Heirs of Sangkay 2011)
‣ Is Expropriation limited only to the acquisition of title over the property expropriated?
‣ NO. It is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-
way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by the transmission lines
of the National Power Corporation also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” (NPC vs Santa Loro)
REQUISITES FOR THE VALIDITY OF EXPROPRIATION

1. The taking must be for purposes of public use
2. There must be payment of just compensation
REQUISITES FOR THE VALIDITY OF EXPROPRIATION (EXPOUNDED)

1. THE TAKING MUST BE FOR PURPOSES OF PUBLIC USE
‣ What does “public use” mean?
‣ This refers to any use directly available to the general public as a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or
accommodation.
‣ This is normally a political question, as long as the property will be devoted for any kind of public use, then it is
allowed.
‣ Such as — construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems,
hydroelectric power plants, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, irrigation systems.
‣ Should “public use” be construed to mean that the property should “actually” be used by the public?
‣ NO. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has been discarded. As long
as the public has right to use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a “public advantage” or
“public benefit” accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. (Manosca vs CA 1996)
‣ Public use has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage,
or what is productive of general benefit of the public.” (Vda. De Ouano vs Republic 2011)
‣ Such as — Socialized housing. (Sumulong vs Guerrero; City of Manila vs Tan Te 2011)

‣ Can the government devote the property to a different public purpose than which the action for expropriation
was based (the intended use was abandoned for another public use)?
‣ NO. The government has NO unrestricted title to the land expropriated.

‣ SEE — Via. de Ouano vs Republic, G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011
‣ A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the
condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot
plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment
of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play,
‣ The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership
over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. Expropriated lands should be differentiated
from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and
sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell.
In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the fee simple
concept if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always
conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is
terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject
of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received.
‣ SEE — Republic vs Heirs of Borbon, G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015
‣ It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for
expropriation. More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file
another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the
power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate
the property owner's right to justice, fairness and equity.
‣ What if the public purpose disappears, can the former owner re-acquire the property (the intended use was
abandoned)?
‣ YES. The former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of
the just compensation received. (Vda. De Ouano vs Republic 2011)
‣ The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned for public purpose, the party who
originally condemned the property recovers control of the land if the condemning party continues to use the
property for public purpose; however, if the condemning authority ceases to use the property for a public purpose,
property reverts to the owner in fee simple. (Moreno v. Mactan- Cebu International Airport 2005)
‣ SEE — Mactan Cebu International Airport vs Lozada, G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010
‣ The requirement of public use means that the expropriator must use the property for the purpose specified in
the petition. If this is not done, the expropriator must return the property, even if there was no agreement for
reversal. But the owner must return to the expropriator the compensation it had received with legal interest and
must pay the expropriator for benefits the lot may have obtained.
‣ The taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is
always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. In effect, there is a constructive trust that results where the government, upon failing to comply with its
obligation to devote the property to public use has an obligation to reconvey the property upon the proper
payment. (MCIAA vs Lozada 2010) But, the owners must pay the following —
a. The amount received as just compensation for the expropriation
b. Legal interest to be computed from default, which is computed from the time the Government complies
with its obligation to reconvey
c. Necessary expenses that the Government may have incurred in maintaining the property
d. The monetary value of Government services in managing the property to the extent that the former owners
were benefitted thereby

‣ Is “necessity” (for the public use) a pre-requisite to expropriation?
‣ NO. As long as the property is devoted to public use and there is payment of just compensation, then
expropriation is allowed.
‣ EXCEPT — In expropriation by LGUs, there must be “genuine necessity” for the property expropriated.
‣ Such necessity must be of public character, also, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. (City of Manila vs Chinese Community 1919)
‣ Basically, if expropriation is done by the national government, necessity is NOT required. It is required only
when exercised by the LGU.
‣ As a rule, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise of eminent domain is a
justiciable question. However, when the power is exercised by Congress, the question of necessity is
essentially a political question. (Manapat v. CA 2007)
‣ SEE — Masikip vs City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
‣ In the case of LGUS, the right to take private property for public purposes a) necessarily originates from the
necessity and b) the taking must be limited to the said necessity. In other words, the very foundation of the
right to exercise eminent domain is a “genuine necessity”, which must be of a public character, provided
that the ascertainment of the necessity must precede the taking of the property and not following it. Further,
“necessity” does not mean an absolute, but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would
combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning
party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.
‣ The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is so fundamental that
it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the requisite of
genuine necessity for the expropriation of ones property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the
courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. Important as the power of eminent
domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual
requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for
the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.
2. THERE MUST BE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION

‣ What is “Just Compensation?
‣ Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The valuation of a property in the tax declaration
cannot be an absolute substitute to just compensation. (Republic vs Rural Bank vs Kabacan 2012)
‣ The constitutional limitation of “just compensation is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usually and ordinary course of legal
action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell
it. (Republic vs Asian Pacific Integrated Seal Corp. 2014)
‣ Basically, it means payment that matches "market value.”
‣ Factors to take into consideration in determining the market value of the property —
a. Nature and character of the land is principally considered (Tinio vs NPC)
b. The capabilities of the property
c. The uses to which the property may be applied
d. The uses to which the property is adapted
e. The condition it is in at the time of the “taking”
f. The surroundings of the property
g. The improvements made on the property (EPZA vs Dulay)
h. Zonal valuation, tax declarations, and current selling price supported by documentary evidence. (Republic vs
Asian Pacific Integrated Seal Corp. 2014)
‣ NOTE — Just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different
factors. (Republic vs Asian Pacific Integrated Seal Corp. 2014)

‣ Who determines the amount of “just compensation”?
‣ The Courts (through the help of commissioners) as provided by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
‣ Determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. (NPC v. Purefoods)
‣ What is the point of reference, in terms of the time, for valuating the property expropriated?
‣ RULE — The time of the filing of the compliant for expropriation or the time of the “taking”, whichever is earlier.
‣ The general rule is that the value must be that as of the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. The
filing of the case generally coincides with the taking. When, however, the filing of the case comes later than the
time of taking and meanwhile the value of the property has increased because of the use to which the
expropriator has put it, the value is that of the time of the earlier taking. Otherwise the owner would gain
undeserved profit. (National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals 1996)
‣ Where the government occupied a piece of private land for the airport runway but without expropriating it and
after lapse of many years the owner seeks compensation and rental, for purposes of compensation the value of
the land should be based on what it was worth at the time of entry and not its value after many years. Beyond
the payment for the value of the land the owner is entitled to legal interest, not rental. (MIAA v. Rodriguez 2006)
‣ NOTE — If the compensation is not paid when the property is taken, but is postponed to a later date, the
interest awarded is actually part of just compensation which takes into account such delay. (Benguet
Consolidated vs Republic)
‣ EXCEPT — In the case of expropriation by LGUs, the Local Government Code expressly provides that it should be
at the time of “taking” of the property
‣ When should payment of just compensation be made?
‣ Within a reasonable amount of time. Just compensation includes not only the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to owner of the land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable period of time from its taking.
(Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals 1988)
‣ Within 5 years from finality of judgment. (Republic vs Lim 2005)
‣ If payment of just compensation is NOT made (within 5 years from finality of judgment) can the owner demand
the return of the property expropriated?
‣ YES. SEE — Republic vs Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005 as affirmed by Yujuico vs Atienza, G.R. No.
164282, October 12, 2005
‣ While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to
pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,
the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with
the principle that "the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment."
‣ To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually.
This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.

REQUISITES OF EXPROPRIATION BY REQUISITES OF EXPROPRIATION BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. The taking must be for purposes of 1. The taking must be for purposes of public use
public use
There must be payment of just compensation
2.
2. There must be payment of just 3. A genuine necessity for the expropriation must exist
compensation
A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
4.
3. The procedure for expropriation under offer was not accepted
Rule 67 of the Rules on Civil Procedure 5. There must be an ordinance (not merely a resolution) authorizing the Local
must be complied with Chief Executive to exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless
6. The procedure for expropriation under Rule 67 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
must be complied with
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

‣ In case the national government is expropriating for purposes of “national government infrastructure projects” RA 8974
primarily governs and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court merely govern suppletorily.
‣ What are “national government infrastructure projects”?

‣ The term "national government projects" shall refer to all national government infrastructure, engineering works
and service contracts, including —
1. Projects undertaken by government-owned and controlled corporations
2. Projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and
3. Other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and
materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair, and
rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
PAYMENT OF INITIAL DEPOSIT

‣ RULE — In cases of expropriation, the State (or the LGU) may already take or enter upon the possession of the
property sought to be expropriated upon the filing of the expropriation cases (a special civil action under Rule 67,
Rules of Court) upon the payment of an “initial deposit”.
‣ The “initial deposit” operates as an advance of the just compensation which is still to be determined. It is merely a
provisional value which is usually lower than the value of the property. In the meantime, the State (or the LGU) can
already get a writ of possession from the Court and take the property.
‣ What is the amount of the “initial deposit”?
1. Expropriation by national government — amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes
of taxation
2. Expropriation by LGU — at least 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated.
3. Expropriation for purposes of national infrastructure projects — then government must make a direct
payment of the FULL value of the property (not just a deposit under Rule 67) of the proffered value of the property
before it can enter and exercise proprietary rights. (See RA 8974)
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXPROPRIATION BASED ON GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

‣ RULE — Expropriation (on the choice of what property is to be expropriated which is normally a political question)
may be challenged in courts if it was arbitrary, capricious and whimsical amounting to violation of due process
‣ SEE — De Knecht vs Bautista, G.R. No. L-51078, October 30, 1980
‣ The SC held that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken.
Jurisprudence has recognized that the failure to meet the exacting standard of due process would constitute a
valid objection to the exercise of the power of eminent domain

‣ A landowner is covered by the mantle of protection that due process affords, which is a mandate of reason and
frowns upon arbitrariness, whim, or caprice – the standard that must be met by governmental agencies in the
exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it
RIGHT AGAINST NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
‣ RULE — NO LAW IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS SHALL BE PASSED

‣ When is there an impairment of a contract?
‣ REQUISITES — A law impairs a contract when —
1. It changes the contract between parties by either —

a. Changing the terms of a legal contract between the parties, either in time or mode of performance
b. Imposing new conditions or dispenses with those expressed
c. Authorizing for its satisfaction something different form that provided in its terms
d. Changing the intention of the parties
2. The impairment must involve substantial rights and not mere procedural remedies
‣ Mere change in procedural remedies which does NOT diminish substantive rights or increase subs native
obligations does NOT violate the guarantee This is because the parties have NO vested right in particular
remedies or modes of procedure. Legislature may change existing remedies or modes of procedure without
impairing the obligations of contracts provided an efficacious remedy remains for enforcement.
‣ It is competent for the States to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see
fit, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. Every case must be
determined upon its own circumstances.The general doctrine of this court on this subject may be thus
stated: in modes of proceeding and forms to enforce the contract, the legislature has the control, and may
enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided it does not deny a remedy or so embarrass it with conditions or
restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right. (Home Loan Association vs Blaisdell 1933)
‣ BUT — While the procedural remedies to enforce contractual obligations may be altered, it cannot be
changed in such a way as to amount to a deprivation of substantial rights
‣ The State may postpone the enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy
futile. The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies in the determination of
the period of suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable,
otherwise it would be violative of the constitution. (Rutter vs Esteban 1953)
3. The law must changes the relationship between the parties to the contract and not between parties and
non-parties
‣ Imposing additional taxes does not change the relationship of the parties with each other but rather it
changes the relationship with the government. A rehabilitaiton plan approved by statute which merely
suspends the actions for claims does not violate the contract clause (GSIS vs Kapisanan)
‣ EXCEPT — A LAW MAY IMPAIR A CONTRACT IF IT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

‣ A valid exercise of police power is superior to the obligation of contracts.
‣ SEE — Home Loan Association vs Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, (1934)
‣ Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.
‣ It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not
prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common wealth, or are
necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of

the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the
people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.
‣ The argument is pressed that, in the cases we have cited, the obligation of contracts was affected only
incidentally. This argument proceeds upon a misconception. The question is not whether the legislative action
affects contracts incidentally, or directly, or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end
‣ What is the test of validity of a law which impairs a contract?
‣ Since the rights of parties arising out of a contract are considered property, then the tests for substantive due
process applies (there must be legal purpose and means based on a rational basis)
FRANCHISES AND LICENSES GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT CONTRACTS

‣ Are franchises and licenses granted by the Government protected by the non-impairment of contracts clause?
‣ NO. They are not considered contracts.
‣ SEE — Gonzalo Sy v. Central Bank, L-41480, April 30,1976.
‣ It is one of the first principles in the field of administrative law that a license or a permit is not a contract between
the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in any constitutional sense, as to which the
constitutional prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend.
‣ A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, or a permission or authority to do what is within its terms. It is
not in any way vested, permanent, or absolute. A license granted by the State is always revocable. As a necessary
consequence of its main power to grant license or permit, the State or its instrumentalities have the correlative
power to revoke or recall the same. And this power to revoke can only be restrained by an explicit contract upon
good consideration to that effect.
‣ The absence of an expiry date in a license does not make it perpetual. Notwithstanding that absence, the license
cannot last beyond the life of the basic authority under which it was issued
RIGHT OF FREE ACCESS TO COURTS, QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
‣ This constitutional provision is the basis for the provision in the Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis. Those
protected include low paid employees, domestic servants and laborers. (Cabangis v. Almeda Lopez 1940) They need not
be persons so poor that they must be supported at public expense. "It suffices that plaintiff is indigent... And the
difference between 'paupers' and 'indigent' persons is that the latter are 'persons who have no property or sources of
income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor though self-supporting when able to work and in
employment. (Acar v. Rosal 1967)
‣ BERNAS — The new Constitution has expanded the right so that in addition to giving free access to courts it now
guarantees free access also to "quasi judicial bodies" and to "adequate legal assistance" as well.
RIGHTS OF PERSONS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS
Section 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
(2) XXXXXXX
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

(4) XXXXXXX
RA 7438 (1992) —AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. –
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any
person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the
investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such
report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be
read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer
in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be
null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge,
district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under
custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the
waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any
member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member
of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of
the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child,
brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of law.
‣ What is “custodial investigation”?
‣ It is any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way. (Miranda vs Arizona 1966)
‣ Under RA 7438, it also includes practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation
of law.
‣ Is a mere general inquiry in relating to a criminal investigation already a custodial investigation?
‣ NO. The main distinction is that in a mere general inquiry, there is no definite suspect yet. In custodial investigation,
the inquiry has evolved to focus on particular suspects.
‣ It is only after the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule begins to operate. (Escobedo v. Illinois 1964)
‣ What are the rights of a person subject of a custodial investigation?
1. The right to remain silent
2. The right to competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice
‣ Further, if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.

3. The right to be informed of such rights.
‣ RATIONALE — It is but a recognition of the fact that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial
investigations, in the absence of proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. (Miranda v. Arizona 1966)
‣ NOTE — See RA 7438 for more details
‣ When are these rights available?
‣ Only when the person is subject to a custodial investigation, not a mere general inquiry.
‣ When are these rights NOT available?
1. Mere general inquiries or police investigations which have yet to focus on a particular suspect
2. Before persons who are NOT law enforcement officers
‣ Such as — private individuals, media, public officers who are not law enforcement officers, or law enforcement
officers acting in their private capacities.
‣ Thus, the protection is not available to a person undergoing audit because an audit examiner is not a law
enforcement officer. (Navallo v. Sandiganbayan 1994)
3. Spontaneous statement and confessions
‣ Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements, not elicited through
questioning by authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed
the crime. Hence, such confession is admissible in evidence against him, even when he did so without the
assistance of counsel (People v. Cabiles)
4. Police-line ups
‣ Provided that no questions are asked and the person not already under custodial investigation
5. Investigations by administrative bodies
‣ Such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
(Sebastian, Jr. v. Garchitorena 2000)
‣ What is the legal effect of the violation of the rights in custodial investigations?
‣ Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 (provision against self-incrimination) hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
‣ Can the accused waive his rights in cases of custodial investigation?
‣ YES. Provided it must be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver
shall be null and void and of no effect.
‣ An extrajudicial confession also partakes the nature of a waiver of the right to be silent. For an extrajudicial confession
to be valid it must be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise,
such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
‣ What is the presumption in the matter of waiver of a constitutional right?
‣ Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is
always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the
satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession.
(People vs Jara 1986)
‣ When does the protection of Section 12(1) or the rights of a person subject of a custodial investigation end?
‣ BERNAS — The criminal process includes the investigation prior to the filing of charges, the preliminary examination
and investigation after charges are filed, and the period of trial. The Miranda rights or the Section 12(1) rights were
conceived for the first of these three phases, that is, when the enquiry is under the control of police officers. It is in this
situation that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the absence of proper
safeguards, is inherently coercive.Outside of this situation, Section 12(1) no longer applies. But Sections 14 and 17
come into play. Conceivably, however, even after charges are filed, the police might still attempt to extract confessions

or admissions from the accused outside of judicial supervision. In such situation, Section 12(1) should still apply. But
outside of such situation, the applicable provisions are Section 14 and Section 17.
‣ NOTE — It is for this reason that an extrajudicial confession sworn to before a judge even without assistance of
counsel enjoys the mark of voluntariness. (People v. Pamon 1993)
RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

1. THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
‣ This is particularly the right against coercion into making extra-judicial confessions and admissions
‣ NOTE — These are generally verbal or oral. But confessions or admissions covered by the provision need not be
explicit; they can be merely implicit in any evidence that is communicative in nature. Thus, the signature of an
accused on a receipt for seized property (People v.de Guzman 1991) or marijuana cigarettes where the accused
wrote his name is not admissible if not assisted by counsel. (People v. Enriquez 1991)
2. THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE
‣ Further, if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
‣ The counsel must be "competent and independent” and “preferably of his own choice”. This specification is a product
of experience under the Marcos regime when the military authorities used to make available to detainees only counsel
of the military's choice, and presumably working also for the interest of the military.
‣ When is a lawyer provided by the investigators deemed engaged by the accused?
‣ When the accused never raised any objection against the lawyer's appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
(People vs Jerez 1998)
‣ What does the phrase "preferably of his own choice" mean?
‣ It does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by ja person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of
the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest. Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford
the services of counsel — or where the preferred lawyer is not available — is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another
one. (People v. Mojello 2004)
‣ Who are not deemed independent counsel?
1. Special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
adverse to that of the accused. (People v. Fabro 1997)
2. A mayor. (People v. Taliman 2000)
3. A barangay captain. (People v. Tomaquin 2004)
4. Any other whose interest may be adverse to that of the accused.
3. THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF SUCH RIGHTS

‣ When the Constitution requires a person under investigation 'to be informed' of his right to remain silent and to
counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be
sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is
not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in
practical terms. (People vs Ramos)
‣ The right of a person under investigation to be informed' implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed.
Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights.
(People vs Pinlac 1988)
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES

NOTE — This is really taken up under Criminal Procedure, so reference to the Rules of Criminal Procedure is inevitable.

Section 12.
(1) XXXXXXX
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) XXXXXXX
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Section 14.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

1. Right against torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will (Sec. 12)
2. Right against secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention (Sec. 12)
3. Right to bail (Sec. 13)
4. Right to due process of law (Sec. 14[1])
5. Right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (Sec. 14[2])
6. Right to be heard (Sec. 14[2])
7. Right to assistance of counsel (Sec. 14[2])
8. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (Sec. 14[2])
9. Right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial (Sec. 14[2])
10. Right to meet the witnesses face to face (Sec. 14[2])

11. Right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf
(Sec. 14[2])
12. Right against self-incrimination (Sec. 17)

13. Right against double jeopardy (Sec. 21)
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (EXPOUNDED)

1. RIGHT AGAINST TORTURE, FORCE, VIOLENCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION, OR ANY OTHER MEANS WHICH VITIATE THE FREE WILL
‣ BERNAS — This provision has been deliberately separated from the self-incrimination clause in Section 17 in order to
emphasize the need to protect the sacredness of the person. Protection of the sacredness of the person is also the

purpose of the prohibition of secret detention places, etc. and of the command to provide for penal and civil
sanctions. Moreover, reference to families has in mind psychological damage done to minor children of detainees.
‣ NOTE — Relate this with the writ of amparo
2. RIGHT AGAINST SECRET DETENTION PLACES, SOLITARY, INCOMMUNICADO, OR OTHER SIMILAR FORMS OF DETENTION
‣ NOTE — Relate this with the writ of amparo
3. RIGHT TO BAIL
‣ What is “Bail”?
‣ Bail is a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused
at his trial. It usually takes the form of a deposit of money or its equivalent of such attendance and which deposit
is forfeited upon failure to appear. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused. It has
neither punitive nor revenue raising purpose.
‣ Why is bail awarded to the accused?
‣ (1) To honor the presumption of innocence until the guilt of the accused is proven beyond reasonable doubt and (2)
To enable the accused to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction. (Cortes v.
Catral 1997)
‣ What are the rules governing applications for bail
‣ See Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Court

‣ What are the forms of bail?
1. Corporate surety — Bond issued by a surety company, accredited by the SC
2. Property bond — an undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the
bail.
3. Cash bond — paid in cash
4. Recognizance — Simply, it is a promise to appear. It is an obligation of record entered into before a court
guaranteeing the appearance of the accused for trial. It is in the nature of a contract between the surety and the
state.
‣ What is the duration of the bail?
‣ It remains in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of judgment by the RTC irrespective of whether the
case was originally filed in or appealed to it. (Rule 114, Sec. 2, Rules of Criminal Procedure)
‣ When is bail available to the accused?
‣ When he is actually detained or under custody. One is under the custody of the law either when he has been
arrested or has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court, as in the case where through counsel petitioner
for bail who was confined in a hospital communicated his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. (Paderanga v.
CA 1995)
‣ NOTE — Bail is only allowed when the accused in in custody pursuant to a criminal case. BUT jurisprudence has
extended it to (1) extradition cases; and (2) deportation cases (Gov't of Hongkong v. Olalia 2007)
‣ When is bail available to the accused (1) as a matter of right (2) as a matter of discretion (3) not allowed?
‣ NOTE — You need to look at Rule 114, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for this
1. Bail as a matter of right —
a. Before conviction by the RTC and the accused is NOT charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
b. Before or after conviction by the MTC
‣ NOTE — In these cases, Judge cannot deny bail, he only has discretion as to the amount
2. Bail as a matter of discretion (of the court)
a. Before conviction by the trial court AND the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
‣ NOTE — In this case, it is discretionary on the part of the court in the sense that it is no longer a matter of
right yet dependent on whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. In this way, there is a judicial

determination whether or not the accused should be granted bail. The court will hold a bail hearing and give
the prosecution the chance to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. The prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the
court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
b. When there is conviction by the RTC (but judgment not yet final) AND the offense has a penalty of
imprisonment NOT exceeding 6 years
c. When there is conviction by the RTC (but judgment not yet final) AND the offense has a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years BUT is NOT a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment and acused is NOT any of the following —
(a) Repeat offender — Recidivism, Quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquent, reiteracion
(b) Previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, violated the conditions of his bail without
justification
(c) Committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon
(d) Flight risk — Circumstances of the case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail
(e) There is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal (See Leviste
Case)
3. Bail NOT allowed —
a. When the accused has already been convicted by final judgment or when the accused has commenced to
serve sentence
‣ EXCEPT — If prior to conviction, the accused applies for probation, he can continue on original bail if one
has been given, if not he can apply for bail, if he cannot avail because of his financial incapacity, he can be
released on recognizance. (Rule 114, Sec. 24, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Court)
b. When there is conviction by the trial court (but judgment not yet final) AND the offense is a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
‣ This is because evidence of guilty is strong as there was already a conviction by the trial court.
c. When there is conviction by the trial court (but judgment not yet final) AND the offense has a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years BUT is NOT a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment) and ANY following circumstances are present —
i. Accused is a repeat offender — Recidivism, Quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquent, reiteracion
ii. Accused has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, violated the conditions of his
bail without justification
iii. Committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon
iv. Accused is a flight risk — Circumstances of the case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail
v. There is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal
‣ What are other important constitutional norms to observe in relation to Bail?
1. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
2. Excessive bail shall not be required
‣ BERNAS — Obviously, the requirement of excessive bail can amount to a denial of bail.
‣ Does a person admitted to bail necessarily have the right to leave the Philippines?
‣ NO. A court, as a necessary consequence of the nature of a bail bond, may prevent a person admitted to bail from
leaving the country. A bail bond is intended to make a person available any time he is needed by the court.
(Manotoc, Jr. vs CA 1986)
6. RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW

‣ What does due process in criminal proceedings mean?
‣ In general, the requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without "due process of
law" simply that the rules prescribed by Section 14 and all other provisions related to criminal prosecution are
followed, particularly the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

‣ Further, the following rules are observed as a an incident of due process in criminal proceedings —
1. Prohibition on ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder
2. Judicial actions must be judged by a person with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge
‣ May a judge who replaces another judge validly render a decision although he has only partly heard the
testimony of witnesses?
‣ This rule is rooted in practical considerations. Sometimes it is an impossibility for the judge who tried the case to
be the same judicial officer to decide it. The judge who tried the case may die, resign or retire from the bench,
before he could render judgment thereon. (People u. Narqjos 1987)
7. RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY
‣ What is the principal effect of the guarantee of presumption of innocence?
‣ BERNAS — Its principal effect is that no person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has proved him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
‣ Does preventive suspension pendente lite violate the right to be presumed innocent?
‣ NO. Because preventive suspension is not a penalty. (Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan 1991)

‣ Does presumption of innocence preclude the State from shifting the burden of proof to the accused?
‣ NO. The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a right
to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of
guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention. (U.S. v. Luting 1916)
‣ Such as — Art. 217 of the RPC provides that the failure of an accountable officer to produce money in his charge
upon demand shall be prima facie evidence of malversation, that he has appropriated the money to his personal
use. This does not violate the presumption of innocence Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from
the fact proved failure to produce, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to
present evidence to rebut it. (Albores vs CA 1984)
‣ Does the presumption of innocence end upon conviction by the trial court?
‣ NO. It ends upon the finality of the judgment of conviction. Where the conviction by a lower court is still on appeal,
it has not yet reached finality and the accused still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence.
8. RIGHT TO BE HEARD
‣ This includes the right of the accused to be present in trial. BUT it covers only the period from arraignment to
promulgation of sentence. (U.S. v. Beecham 1972)
‣ Can trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused (Trial in Absentia)?
‣ YES. The trial must proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided —
1. He has been arraigned
2. He has been duly notified; and
3. His failure to appear is unjustifiable
‣ NOTE —
‣ Trial in absentia is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has been arraigned, notified of dates of
hearing and his absence is unjustified.
‣ Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court.
It need not wait for the time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to
present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this
purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. (People vs Mapalao 1991)
‣ Can the accused waive his right to be present in trial?
‣ YES. The accused may choose not to be present during the course of the trial, provided that after arraignment he
may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he
unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case
on trial. The reason for requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all
the stages of the proceeding without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may

in his defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled
to acquittal. (People v. Presiding Judge 1983)
‣ What are the instances when the presence of the accused in the criminal proceedings is mandatory?
1. During arraignment and plea (Rule 116, Sec. 1, Rules of Criminal Procedure)
2. During trial, for identification purposes, unless the accused has already stipulated on his identity during pre-trial
and that he is the one who will be identified by the witnesses as the accused in the criminal case. (People v.
Presiding Judge 1983)
3. During promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense. (Rule 120, Sec. 6, Rules of Criminal Procedure)
9. RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
‣ This is a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional skill to
protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
represented by an experienced and learned counsel.
‣ What duty is imposed on the judge by the guarantee of the right to counsel?
‣ If the defendant appears without counsel he must be informed by the court that he has a right to have counsel
before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and is unable to employ
counsel, the, court must assign counsel to defend him. This is a right which the defendant should not be deprived
of, and the failure of the court to assign counsel or, after counsel has been assigned, require him to perform this
duty by appearing and defending the accused would be sufficient cause for the reversal of the case. (U.S. v.
Gimeno 1905)
‣ What are the pre-arraignment duties of the trial judge?
1. To inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned
2. After giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel
3. If he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and
4. If he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend
him.
‣ BUT — After arraignment, the duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel
of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty
exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. At the
most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary with the
trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse. (Libuit v. People 2005)
‣ After conviction, accused discovers that the "lawyer" who defended her was not a member of the bar. May she
be granted new trial?
‣ YES. She has a right to qualified counsel.

10. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
‣ What is the purpose and scope of the right to be informed?
‣ The object of the written accusation is —
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.
‣ In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made
up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place,
names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of
every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (U.S. v. Karelsen 1904)
‣ What must a criminal information contain in order to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him?
1. The name of the accused
2. The designation given to the offense by the statute

3. A statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense
4. The name of the offended party
5. The approximate time and fate of the commission of the offense
6. The place where the offense had been committed. (Sec. 6, 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court)
11. RIGHT TO HAVE A SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
‣ NOTE — the delay contemplated by the Constitution is unreasonable delay which cannot be attributed to the accused
‣ What is the remedy for violation of the right to speedy trial?
‣ The accused is entitled to dismissal of the case, and, if he is under detention, to release by habeas corpus.
Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
‣ When is a trial “public?"
‣ It is public when attendance is open to all irrespective of relationship to defendants. However, when the evidence
to be presented may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals," the proceeding may be limited
to Mends, relatives, and counsel. (Garcia v. Domingo 1973)
‣ What is the purpose of the guarantee of a public trial?
‣ The purpose of this guarantee is to serve as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments
of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject o contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. (Garcia v. Domingo 1973)
12. RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE
‣ Otherwise, it would constitute hearsay evidence which is generally not allowed.
‣ RATIONALE — The right has a two-fold purpose —
1. Primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination
2. Secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportation of the witness.
‣ The following are NOT allowed as it would violate the right of confrontation —
1. May extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating another cannot be used against the latter if not repeated in
open court (People v. de la Cruz 1983)
2. An affidavit executed by a witness be admitted in evidence if the witness is not produced in court. (People v.
Ramos 1983)
‣ BUT — When a witness in a criminal prosecution testified at the preliminary investigation and was extensively
cross-examined by the defense. When trial came, the witness could not be found in spite of the combined efforts
of national and local law enforcement agencies.The transcripts of the witness' testimony at the preliminary
investigation be admitted in evidence since admission will be for the same criminal case and extensive opportunity
for cross-examination was already given, and the witness is not merely refusing to testify but is actually missing.
(People v. Villaluz 1983)
13. RIGHT TO HAVE COMPULSORY PROCESS TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES AND THE PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN
HIS BEHALF
14. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

‣ RATIONALE — This right was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity: Of policy, because, if the
party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit perjury; and of
humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confession by duress. (U.S. v. Navarro 1904)
‣ When is a question incriminating?
‣ Usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements and that a question would have a tendency to
incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only one of said elements. The right thus, includes a right to refuse to testify to
a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness.
(Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg 1953)
‣ What kind of compulsion is covered by the right against self-incrimination?
1. Testimonial compulsion

‣ What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Thus,
substance emitting from the body of the defendant was received as evidence in a prosecution for acts of
lasciviousness. (U.S. v. Tan Teng 1912)
‣ Similarly, the taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self- incrimination. (People v. Gallardo 2000)
‣ The right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial compulsion. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. (People v. Malimit
1996)
2. Compulsion to perform acts requiring intelligence

‣ SEE — Beltran vs Samson 50 Phil. 570 (1929)
‣ Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of the intelligence and attention. For the purpose of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself. Here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of
writing, evidence which does not exist.
3. Compulsion to produce private books and papers of the owner (Boyd v. United States 1886)
‣ These are limited to “private documents” and not records required by law to be kept in order that there may be
suitable information of transaction which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the
enforcement of restrictions validly established. (Shapiro v. United States 1948)
‣ What "persons" are protected by the self-incrimination clause?
‣ Only natural persons. Thus, a corporation may be compelled to submit to the visitorial powers of the State even if
this will result in disclosure of criminal acts of the corporation. (Hale v. Henkel 1906)
‣ May a corporate officer prevent the production of corporate papers on the ground that they may incriminate
him personally?
‣ NO. That would not be self-incrimination but incrimination by the corporation. (Hale v. Henkel 1906)
‣ Can government registration requirements violate the self-incrimination clause?
‣ BERNAS — In more recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has struck down certain registration
requirements that presented real and appreciable risks of self-incrimination. These involved statutes directed at
inherently suspect groups in areas permeated by criminal statutes, a circumstance which laid the subjects open to
real risk of self-incrimination.
‣ In what proceedings may the right against self-incrimination be asserted?
‣ In any judicial or administrative proceeding or in any official government enquiry.
‣ What are the norms to observe when invoking the right against self-incrimination?
1. Criminal Proceedings
a. Accused — may assert the right from the moment he is asked to testify. He may refuse to take the stand as he
has an absolute right to be silent
b. Witness — may assert the right only when the incriminating question is asked.
‣ The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself' signifies that
he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one
of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He
cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. In other
words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena,
having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be
sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall
not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. (People vs Ayson)
2. Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings which are penal in nature

‣ Same as those in criminal proceedings. Thus the defendant can also altogether refuse to take the stand and
testify.
‣ When the nature of the penalty that may be imposed by the administrative body, the hearing partakes of the
nature of a criminal proceeding. Such as — forfeiture of property under Anti-Graft Law (Cabal v. Kapunan
1962); and revocation of license to practice medicine (Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners 1969)
3. Civil, Administrative, and Other Proceedings
‣ Defendant/Witness — may assert the right only when the incriminating question is asked. He must wait until
the incriminating question is asked. (Bagadiong v. Gonzales 1979)
‣ May the right against self-incrimination be waived?
‣ YES. The right can be waived either directly or by failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is certain and
unequivocal and intelligently, understandingly and willingly made.
‣ BUT — If the accused wants to testify, then he may be subjected to cross-examination and compelled to answer
questions in relation to matters taken up on direct examination. Under the Rules of Court, the witness may be
cross-examined and asked incriminating questions on any matter he testified to on direct examination. (Rule 132,
Sec. 3. Rules on Evidence)
‣ SEE — People vs Ayson, G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
‣ If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify,
then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters
stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith. He may not on cross-examination refuse to
answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would
have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.
‣ It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of
which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against
self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should
testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he
might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question which
might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa.
‣ In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in
court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1. BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation),
but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way,
and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2. AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —
a. To refuse to be a witness;
b. Not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c. To testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d. While testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some
crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
‣ What are the immunity statutes in relation to the right against self-incrimination?
1. Transactional immunity statute — The testimony of any person or whose possession of documents or other
evidence necessary or convenience to determine the trust in any investigation conducted is immune from criminal
prosecution for an offense to which such compelled testimony relates. (Galman vs Pamaran 1985)
2. Use and fruit immunity statute — This statute prohibits the use of the witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits
in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. (Galman vs Pamaran 1985)
15. RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
‣ Requisites of successfully invoking the right against double jeopardy —

1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
‣ It attaches when all the following are present —
a. There is a valid complaint of information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction
b. Such information is before a a court of competent jurisdiction
c. Accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge
2. The first jeopardy must have terminated
‣ It terminates when there is either —
a. Conviction
b. Acquittal
c. Dismissal without the express consent of the accused
d. Dismissal based on the merits (even with consent of the accused) due to either—
i. Violation of Speedy Trial
ii. Violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases
iii. Demurrer to Evidence
iv. Discharge as a state witness
‣ BUT — The discharge of an accused in order to make him a state witness is equivalent to an
acquittal and is a bar to reinstatement of the case against him. However, if the accused so
discharged fails or refuses to testify against his co-defendant, the defense of double jeopardy is
withdrawn from him and becomes unavailable to him. (Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. v. Son 1992)
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first
‣ When is the second offense charged the same as the first offense?
‣ BERNAS — The test now is whether one offense is identical with the other or whether it is an attempt or
frustration of the other or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other.
What this test shows is that identity of offenses does not require one-to-one correspondence between the
facts and law involved in the two charges. It is necessary, however, that one offense is completely included
in the other. Thus, while physical injury is not identical with attempted homicide, for purposes of double
jeopardy physical injury is "the same" as attempted homicide (which alleges inflicted injury) because
physical injury is necessarily included in such attempted homicide.
‣ This third element is present when either —
a. The second jeopardy is for the same offense
b. The second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information
c. The second offense is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration of the first offense
‣ BUT — If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
‣ In this case the offenses need not be the same, provided, however, that they flow from the same act. (Yap v.
Lutero 1959)
‣ What if a person commits two or more crimes with one act (one act resulting in multiple offenses)?
‣ BERNAS — The situation is different when one act violates two different statutes or two different provisions
of a statute. The rule in such a case is that if the one act results in two distinct offenses, prosecution under
one is NOT a bar to prosecution under the other. The test is not whether the defendant has already been
tried for the same act, but whether the defendant has already been put in jeopardy for the same offense.
(People v. Cabrera 1922)
‣ Convicted of physical injuries through reckless imprudence, accused was subsequently charged with
damage to property through the same act of reckless imprudence, both under Article 365, R.P.C. Double
jeopardy?
‣ YES. The essence of criminal negligence under Article 365 is the imprudent or negligent act. Hence, the
second jeopardy is for the same offense. (People vs Buan 1968)

‣ SEE — Ivler v. Judge San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010.
‣ The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. The reason
for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause
to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because of the accused's prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: "Reason and
precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
‣ What are the exceptions to the right against double jeopardy?
‣ Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in the following cases, double jeopardy will NOT set in —
a. Supervening event — The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge
b. Late discovery of facts — The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information
c. Plea to lesser offense without consent of prosecutor and private offended party (who appears during
arraignment for plea bargaining)
‣ When an accused appeals a conviction, may the reviewing court impose on him a penalty higher than that
imposed in the decision appealed by him?
‣ YES. when an accused appeals his conviction he waives his right to the plea of double jeopardy. (Trono v. US
1905)
‣ NOTE — In Trono, the accused had been prosecuted for a higher offense but was convicted for a lower
offense. Hence, equivalently, he had been acquitted of the higher offense. Was his appeal a waiver of this
acquittal? The Court answered in the affirmative and ruled that a penalty higher than that of the original
conviction could be imposed on him.
‣ SEE — Bu Lin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57170, November 19,1982.
‣ In this case, the accused was prosecuted for estafa and was convicted under Article 315, 2(d), R.P.C. (by
issuance of bouncing checks). On appeal the Court of Appeals penalized the accused instead under Article
315, 2(a) (through false pretenses or similar deceits). Accused now contends that since the trial court had said
that Article 315, 2(a) could not be applied to him, he equivalently was acquitted of that offense and the
appellate court could no longer convict him under such provision. He claimed double jeopardy.
‣ The SC said that the accused’s contention was erroneous. When the petitioners appealed from the sentence of
the Trial Court, they waived the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case
open to the review of the Appellate Court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as the law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to them, and whether they are made the subjects of
assignment of error or not
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

‣ The concept of "speedy disposition of cases," like "speedy trial," is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. In the determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and
balanced are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the
delay. (Caballero v. Alfonso 1987)
‣ What is the difference between the “right to speedy trial” and the “right to speedy disposition of cases”?
1. Speedy trial in section 14 — covers only the trial phase of criminal cases,
2. Speedy disposition of cases in section 16 — covers all phases of any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
proceedings.
‣ What remedy does a person have if there has been unreasonable delay in the resolution of a case?
‣ Dismissal through mandamus. (Roque v. Ombudsman 1999)
OVERVIEW OF THE SPECIAL WRITS
SPECIAL WRITS
‣ There are four special writs which the courts may issue:
1. Writ of Habeas Corpus
2. Writ of Amparo
3. Writ of Habeas Data
4. Writ of Kalikasan
‣ There writs essentially involve the violation or threatened violation of certain constitutional rights.
‣ Accordingly, the Supreme Court promulgated these rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights —
1. Habeas Corpus (Rule 102, Rules of Court)
2. Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12 SC)
3. Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16 SC)
4. Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Title 3: Special Civil Actions, Rule 7: Writ of Kalikasan (A.M. No. 09-6-8
SC)
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WRIT OF AMPARO WRIT OF HABEAS DATA WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Rights Involves the right to liberty. It Involves the right to life, Involves the right to Involves the right to a
Involved extends to all cases of illegal liberty and security. It privacy in life, liberty, and balanced and healthy
confinement or detention by involves extrajudicial security ecology, involving
which any person is deprived killings, enforced environmental damage of
of his liberty, or by which the disappearances, and such magnitude as to
rightful custody of any person threats thereof. prejudice the right, health or
is withheld from the person property of inhabitants of two
entitled thereto or more cities or provinces
Etymology “You have the body” “To protect” “You have the data” —
Purpose Seeks to inquire into all It is intended to address It is a remedy to protect a It is a remedy based on the
and manner of involuntary restraint violations of or threats to person’s right to control right to a balanced and
Objective and to relieve a person the right to life, liberty, information regarding healthy ecology, against
therefrom if such restraint is and security as an one’s self, particular in environmental damage of
illegal. Basically, it seeks to extraordinary and instances where such such magnitude as to
determine whether or not a independent remedy, information is being prejudice the right, health or
particular person is legally particularly extralegal collected through unlawful property of inhabitants of two
held, and if not, the court will killings and enforced means in order to achieve or more cities or provinces
order the release of the person disappearances unlawful ends.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it.
ARTICLE 7 — EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment ofjurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
‣ What is the Writ of Habeas Corpus?
‣ It is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner
at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive
whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. (Hence, an essential requisite for the
availability of the writ is actual deprivation of personal liberty).
‣ It seeks to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. In
general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. It is
essentially a writ of inquiry, and is granted to test the right under which a person is detained
‣ A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
‣ The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relive persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
‣ Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient
‣ It is not available when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment, or in other
words, his restraint is legal.
‣ Specifically, the writ is availed to —
1. Obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement
2. Liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause
3. Deliver them from unlawful custody
‣ What is the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?"

‣ It is the right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.
‣ What is the governing authority on the Writ of Habeas Corpus?
‣ Rule 102 of the Rules of Court

‣ When is the Writ of Habeas Corpus available?
‣ When there is an unlawful deprivation of liberty, which actually or effectively restricts the freedom of action.
‣ NOTE — An assertion that a person is illegally confined or detained, in general, may involve any of the following —
1. A violation of the accused’s constitutional rights resulting in the restraint of a person
2. The court trying the case had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence
3. The penalty imposed is excessive or beyond what the court could legally impose, thus voiding the sentence as to
the excess. (Harden vs Director of Prisons 1948)
‣ Can the deprivation of liberty only involve actual, physical restraint or detention?
‣ Generally yes, but the SC has recognized under forms of restriction of the right to liberty as basis also (See the
following cases)
‣ SEE — Moncupa vs Enrile 1986
‣ In this case, the reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the
petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement
of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. In
this case the SC granted it on the basis of the following restraints: (1) petitioner must get permission of
respondents if he wants to travel outside Metro Manila. (Restriction on Freedom to Travel) (2) Permission
needed also if he wants to change place of residence. (Restriction to Liberty of Abode) (3) That he should not
"participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press
release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security." (Restriction on Freedom of Speech)
‣ SEE — Villavicencio vs Lukban 1919
‣ In this case the prostitutes in Manila were deported to Davao, the respondent said that the women parties in
were under no restraint anymore as they were free in Davao. Court said that at first blush, this is a tenable
position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of
the writ of habeas corpus. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila
by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region,
deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.
Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty
of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
‣ When is the Writ of Habeas Corpus NOT available?
1. When there is no deprivation of liberty or restraint
2. When the deprivation of liberty or restrain is legal
3. To correct alleged erroneous orders of the court
‣ A writ of habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial court. In the absence of
exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of the trial should be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before the writ may be invoked.
4. When person deprived of liberty through involuntary restraint/detention has already been released
‣ EXCEPT —
a. If the release was conditional such that the conditions still about to effective restrictions of constitutional rights
(See Moncupa vs Enrile 1986; Villavicencio vs Lukban 1919)
b. If then release was not adequately proven by the respondent and grave doubts are raised (Dizon vs Eduardo
1988)
5. When the illegal detention becomes legal by virtue of court processes

6. When the privilege of availing of the writ is suspended by the President.
‣ The Constitution allows the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it. (See Art. 3, Sec. 15 and Art. 17, Sec. 18)
‣ What may be suspended, the writ or the privilege of the writ?
‣ The writ is never suspended. It always issues as a matter of course. What is suspended is the privilege of the
writ, i.e., once the officer making the return shows to the court that the person detained is being detained for
an offense covered by the suspension, the court may not enquire any further.
‣ Does the suspension of the privilege also suspend the right to bail?
‣ NO. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
(Art. 3, Sec. 13)
‣ What reliefs does a Writ of Habeas Corpus provide to the aggrieved party?
1. The person is discharged from confinement (Sec. 15, Rule 102, Rules of Court)
2. The person cannot be imprisoned for the same offense (Sec. 17, Rule 102, Rules of Court)
‣ EXCEPT — When the court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense orders his recommitment
WRIT OF AMPARO
‣ What is the Writ of Amparo?
‣ The remedy of the writ of amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty and security, as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
‣ The writ of amaparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disapperances.
‣ It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, it is curative in
that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances (Sec. of National Defense vs Manalo 2008)
‣ The writ’s curative role is an acknowledgement that the violation of the right to life, liberty and security may be
caused not only by a public official’s act, but also his omission. Accountability in the context of amparo
proceedings who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective (Rodriguez vs Arroyo 2013)
‣ The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner.
‣ It is not an action to determine the criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require
full and exhaustive proceedings. (Sec. of National Defense vs Manalo 2008)
‣ There is no determination of civil, criminal or administrative liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings,
courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or
extrajudicial killing. Thus, presidential immunity against it cannot be invoked. (Rodriguez vs Arroyo 2011)
‣ What is the governing authority on the Writ of Amparo?
‣ The SC Rules on the Writ of Amparo (A.m. 07-9-12-SC). It took effect on October 24, 2007
‣ The rule on the writ of amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the right
to life, liberty, and security as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
rules, or as a supplemental remedy to these rules (Castillo vs Cruz 2009)
‣ The Supreme Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances. It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
people’s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino

experience of the martial law regime. As the amparo rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. (Sec. of National Defense vs Manalo 2008)
‣ When is the Writ of Amparo available?
‣ REQUISITES — The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person —
1. Whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission;
and
2. Such unlawful act or omission is made either by —
a. A public official or employee, or
b. A private individual or entity
‣ Particularly it is a remedy against —
1. Extralegal killings — Killings committed without due process of law, without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings (Sec. of National Defense vs Manalo 2008)
‣ Elements —
a. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty
b. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization
c. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
d. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. (Naiva vs Pardico 2012)
2. Enforced disappearances — Attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a

person by a government official or organised groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law. (Sec. of National Defense vs Manalo 2008)
‣ What does the “right to security” mean? (in the context of the writ of amparo)
‣ Right to Security is an important feature of Amparo, thus, even a person who has been set free from captivity may
apply for it, if his security is threatened
‣ While the right to life under Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution guarantees essentially the right to be alive, upon which
the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned, the right to security of a person is a guarantee of the secure quality
of this life.
‣ In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Art. 3,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution and the right to security of persons (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Art. 3, Sec. 2, as well as the policy of the State of guaranteeing full respect for human
rights under Art. 2, Sec. 11 of the Constitution. The right to security of a person is a guarantee of secure quality of the
right to life. The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler, rather it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established
and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The immunity of one’s person, including
extensions of his person, houses, papers and effects against government intrusion and does not only limit the state’s
power over his property, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself (Sec. of National
Defense vs Manalo 2008)
‣ The right of security includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of its duty to
investigate. (Rodriguez vs Arroyo 2011)
‣ The right to security covers —
a. Freedom from Fear — it is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action.
b. Guarantee of Bodily and Psychological Integrity or Security — Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body.
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free

will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion
of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will.
c. Guarantee of Protection of one’s right by the Government — The right to security of person in this third
sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section
11 of the 1987 Constitution. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right
to security of person to be invoked.
‣ For the Writ of Amparo to be available, is government involvement indispensable?
‣ YES. For the writ of amparo to issue allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough.
It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was —
1. Carried out by, or with authorisation, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
2. Followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons
3. With the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. (Navia vs
Parodic 2012)
‣ Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence has the
indispensable element of government participation. This hallmark of State participation by some government
involvement differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person. In this case,
the indispensible State participation is not present here. Virginia’s petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s
disappearance. No government agent or employee was even impleaded in this case. Hence, the Court cannot hold
any government or its agents responsible or accountable for the disappearance of Ben. While the court recognizes
that the writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance is indispensible. This requisite spells the difference between an enforced disappearance case from
that of an ordinary case of missing persons. (Navia vs Parodic 2012)
‣ Does the doctrine of command responsibility apply in Amparo cases?
‣ YES. Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found
application in civil cases for human rights abuses. In amparo proceedings, the doctrine may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of the persons involved in order
for the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights (Rodriguez vs Arroyo 2011)
‣ Elements of Applicability of Command Responsibility —
1. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the
crime as his subordinate
2. The superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed, and
3. The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts to punish the
perpetrators thereof (Rodriguez vs Arroyo 2011)
‣ NOTE — Knowledge includes constructive knowledge. Knowledge is presumed when —
1. The acts are widespread within the government officials area of jurisdiction,
2. The acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility, or
3. Members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved (Rodriguez vs Arroyo 2011)
‣ When is the Writ of Amparo NOT available?
1. Purely property or commercial rights. (Castillo vs Cruz 2009)
2. Amorphous and uncertain grounds (Tapuz vs Del Rosario 2009)
3. Restriction of a person’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of a criminal case filed against him. (Reyes
vs CA 2009)
4. It is not a remedy available to obtain custody over a minor child involving issues of parental authority. (Caram vs
Segui 2014)
‣ Is hearsay evidence admissible in the Amparo proceedings?
‣ YES. The SC has relaxed the application of the strict rules of evidence in amparo proceedings, it has applied the
“Doctrine of Totality of Evidence”

‣ SEE — Razon vs Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009
‣ In these cases, the realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or
indirect evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to
disappear. The fair and proper rule, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the
relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
‣ In the Amparo proceedings, can the respondents invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions?
‣ NO. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed to evade responsibility or liability. The respondents must prove that the standard of diligence, as required
by applicable laws, rules and regulations, was observed in the performance of duty.
1. Respondent is a private individual or entity — Must prove that ordinary diligence
2. Respondent is a public official or employee — Must prove that extraordinary diligence

‣ What reliefs does a Writ of Amparo provide to the aggrieved party?
‣ Any such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. (Sec. 17, Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
‣ The privilege of the writ of amparo once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since
the writ was granted, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. It is already
subsumed under the privilege of the writ. (Rodriguez vs Arroyo 2011)
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
‣ What is the Writ of Habeas Data?
‣ The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control information regarding one’s
self, particular in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
‣ As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy, especially the right to informational privacy,
the issuance of the writ does not entail any finding of criminal, civil, or administrative culpability.
‣ It is designed to protect the image, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy
‣ The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
‣ It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
‣ What is the governing authority on the Writ of Habeas Data?
‣ The Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) which became effective
on February 2, 2008 as the principal rules governing habeas data proceedings.
‣ When is the Writ of Habeas Data available?
‣ REQUISITES — The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose —
1. Right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission; and
‣ This is similar to the writ of amparo
‣ The writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.
‣ Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy (particularly informational
privacy), on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty and security, on the other. (Gamboa vs Chan 2012)

‣ Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence,
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty, or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be granted
2. Such unlawful act or omission is by the following persons engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party
a. A public official or employee, or
b. A private individual or entity
‣ NOTE — In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as "a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely
of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the
existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege
of the writ may be extended. (Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College 2014)
‣ What is the Right to Informational Privacy?
‣ It is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. And such right depends on the existence of
“expectational privacy” a person has toward particular information. Before one can have expectational privacy, it must
be shown the the person intended such information to be private (Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College 2014)
‣ What is the meaning of "engaged" in the Gathering, Collecting or Storing of Data or Information?
‣ SEE — Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
‣ To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take
part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What
matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all,
is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
‣ To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small
group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process
decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view
of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the
users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
‣ To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided
under Section 1 of the Rule: Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
‣ The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in
gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her
family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
‣ For the Writ of Habeas Data to be available, is government involvement indispensable? (particularly must it relate
to enforced disappearances and extra-legal killings, similar to the Writ of Amparo)?
‣ NO. SEE — Virares vs St. Theresa’s College G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
‣ The writ of habeas data is NOT only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
‣ Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
‣ Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances, Section 2 of the Rules, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have
been made.

‣ Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” As
such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the
annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the
Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
‣ The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy,
more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control
of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
‣ When is the Writ of Habeas Data NOT available?
1. While the writ of habeas data is a remedy available for the protection of one’s right to privacy, the state interest in
dismantling private armed groups outweighed the alleged intrusion of a person’s private life (Gamboa vs Chan 2012)
2. Like the writ of amparo, the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect, under the context of the due process clause,
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the ground invoked in support of the petitions therefore are vague
or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right. (MERALCO vs Lim 2010)
‣ What reliefs does a Writ of Habeas Data provide to the aggrieved party?
‣ If the allegations the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the court may —
3. Grant access to the database or information
4. Enjoin the act complained of, or
5. In case the database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification. (Rodriguez vs Arroyo 2011)
‣ The remedies include updating, rectification, suppression, or destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or control of the respondents. It is not limited to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
(Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College 2014)
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
‣ What is the Writ of Kalikasan?
‣ It is a remedy against the enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws which deal with the
conservation, development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.
‣ What is the governing authority on the Writ of Kalikasan?
‣ Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Title 3: Special Civil Actions, Rule 7: Writ of Kalikasan (A.M. No. 09-6-8
SC)
‣ When is the Writ of Kalikasan available?
‣ REQUISITES — A petition for the Writ of Kalikasan may be availed of by any person —
1. Whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
2. Such act or omission is committed by a public official or employee, or private individual or entity
‣ NOTE — The environmental damages must be of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, healthy, or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces
‣ What reliefs does a Writ of Kalikasan provide to the aggrieved party?
‣ The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following —
1. Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
2. Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;

3. Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance
with the decision and orders of the court;
4. Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on
the execution of the final judgment; and
5. Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
RIGHTS AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Section 18.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military or civil service.
‣ RULE — NO INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE IN ANY FORM SHALL EXIST

‣ Involuntary servitude is every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to another no matter under what
form such servitude may be disguised. (Rubi v. Provincial Board 1919)
‣ It is the conduction where one is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for
another, whether he is paid or not. (State vs West)
‣ EXCEPT — It may exist in the following cases —
1. It may be imposed as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
2. In the interest of national defense all citizens may be compelled by law to render personal military or civil service.
(Art. 2, Sec. 4)
3. Posse comitatus — obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his
community. (US vs Pompeya 1915)
4. A “return to work order” (in relation to labor cases involving industries affected with public interest) is so imperative
is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude. (Kaisahan ng
Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills)
LIMITATIONS ON THE ENACTMENT OF PENAL LAWS
Section 18.
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) XXXXXX
Section 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
1. NO PERSON SHALL BE DETAINED SOLELY BY REASON OF HIS POLITICAL BELIEFS AND ASPIRATIONS.
‣ BERNAS — Thus, the state cannot hold political prisoners
2. EXCESSIVE FINES SHALL NOT BE IMPOSED

‣ BERNAS — A fine is excessive when under any circumstance it is disproportionate to the offense.
3. CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT CANNOT BE INFLICTED

‣ BERNAS — The old Constitution used the expression "cruel and unusual." The new Constitution drops the word
"unusual," in order to allow for development of penology, and uses instead "degrading and inhuman" in order to
emphasize that what is at stake is the dignity of the person.
‣ When is a penalty "cruel, degrading or inhuman?”
‣ It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community," (People v. Estoista 1953) or when they involve torture or lingering death. (People v. Puda 1984)
‣ The following may be used as guides for determining whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual” —
1. A punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
2. It must not be applied arbitrarily
3. It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society
4. It must not be excessive (it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment would)
(Furman v. Georgia 1972)
‣ NOTE — The 1987 Constitution has suspended the application of the death penalty. It may only be revived by law for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. In the meantime, any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. It was actually revived in 1993 by RA 7659 but later suspended again by RA 9346 in 2006.
‣ Isn’t the death penalty "cruel and unusual?”
‣ BERNAS — NO. The Constitution, by allowing the possibility of its restoration, implicitly admits that it need not
be cruel and inhuman. However, the circumstances under which a specific law may allow the death penalty
may make it cruel and unusual under such law.
‣ The death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. Punishment is so if it involves
torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life. (People v. Mercado 2000)
4. NO PERSON SHALL BE IMPRISONED FOR DEBT OR NON-PAYMENT OF A POLL TAX.

‣ Debt — means any liability to pay money growing out of a contract, express or implied.
‣ BERNAS — The cases touching on the subject reveal that the constitutional prohibition, stated in full, means this:
No person may be imprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in a civil proceeding, either as a substitute for
satisfaction of a debt or as a means of compelling satisfaction; but a person may be imprisoned as a penalty for a
crime arising from a contractual debt and imposed in a proper criminal proceeding.
‣ NOTE — BP 22 is constitutional as it penalizes not the non-payment of contractual obligation but the criminal act
of issuing a bouncing check.
‣ Poll tax — can be understood as the cedula tax or residence tax.
‣ BERNAS — The Constitution does not prohibit the cedula tax but it prohibits imprisonment for non-payment of the
cedula or residence tax. A poll tax may also be understood as a tax the payment of which is made a requirement
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. The imposition of a poll tax in this sense is prohibited by Article V, Section
1, which disallows "literacy, property, or other substantive requirementf for the exercise of suffrage.
5. NO EX POST FACTO LAW OR BILL OF ATTAINDER SHALL BE ENACTED.

‣ What is an ex-facto law?

‣ In general, an ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws which are prejudicial to the accused.
‣ Thus, there is a need to determine whether a particular law is penal or not. The ex post facto clause
prohibits only retrospective penal laws.
‣ A law is penal when it prescribes a criminal penalty imposable in a criminal trial. However, a law is also a
penal law if it prescribes a burden equivalent to a criminal penalty (e.g., disqualification from the practice
of a profession) even if such burden is imposed in an administrative proceeding. (Pascual v. Board of
Medical Examiners 1909) or forfeiture of property (Katigbak v. Solicitor General 1989)
‣ An ex post facto law is one which either —
a. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act
b. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed
c. Prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed
d. Alters the legal rules of evidence so as to make ti substantially easier to convict a defendant
e. Alters, in relation to the offense or its consequences, the situation of the person, to his disadvantage
f. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful
g. Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty
h. Gives a law retroactive application to the prejudice of the accused
‣ Such as — A law shortening the prescriptive period for a crime is ex post facto. (People v. Sandiganbayan
1992. An official interpretation of a penal law given by the Department of Justice which is subsequently
changed to the prejudice of one who had relied on the earlier interpretation. Co v. CA 1993)
‣ Can a rule on criminal procedure be an ex post facto law?
‣ YES. When it alters the legal rules of evidence or mode of trial unless the changes operate only in a limited
and unsubstantial manner to the disadvantage of the accused.
‣ What is a bill of attainder?

‣ It is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative act
for a judicial determination of guilt. (People vs Ferrer)
‣ ELEMENTS —
1. There must be a law
2. The law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily ascertainable members of a group
3. The penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial.
‣ Such as —
‣ Congress passes a law which authorizes the arrest and imprisonment of communists without trial.
‣ A law is passed requiring every lawyer who wishes to continue the practice of law to take the oath that he
or she has not committed an act of disloyalty to the Philippine government. This is a bill of attainder.
Depriving a person of the right to practice a profession is a penalty. And when this is imposed by the
legislature without trial there is a violation of the prohibition against bills of attainder. (Cummings v.
Missouri 1867)
‣ To be a bill of attainder, must the law specify by name the person being punished?
‣ NO. Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial are bills of attainder
prohibited by the Constitution. (United States v. Lovett 1946)

ARTICLE 4 — CITIZENSHIP
WHO ARE PHILIPPINE CITIZENS
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
IN GENERAL
‣ What is citizenship?
‣ Citizenship — is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession
within that particular political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications such as
minority. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community.
‣ What are the modes of acquiring citizenship?
1. By birth
a. Jus sanguinis — acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship;
b. Jus soli — acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth
2. By naturalization — the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native born citizen.
‣ NOTE — Philippine law follows the rule of jus sanguinis and provides for naturalization.
‣ Who are Filipino Citizens?
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
‣ How should the citizenship of a person be challenged?
‣ Only through a direct attack, through direct proceeding brought for such purpose. It cannot be collaterally attacked.
(Vilando vs HREP 2011)
‣ How does the principle of Res Judicata apply in citizenship cases?
‣ Generally, res judicata does NOT set in citizenship cases. (Valles vs Comelec 2000)
‣ EXCEPT — When the following are present —
1. Person’s citizenship is resolved by a court or an administrative body as a material issue in the controversy,
after a full-blown hearing
2. With the active participation of the Solicitor-General or his representative
3. Finding of citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court (Fortuno vs Comelec 2005)
WHO ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS? (EXPOUNDED)

1. THOSE WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF THE ADOPTION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
‣ This includes —
a. Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris
b. Those declared citizens by judicial declaration applying the jus soli principle (Tio Tiam vs Republic 1957)

c. Those naturalized under the law
d. Those citizens under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
2. THOSE WHOSE FATHERS OR MOTHERS ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES

‣ This is the jus sanguinis rule
‣ This is the same rule as that under the 1973 Constitution. This means that if a child is born under the 1973 or 1987
Constitution and either his father or mother is a Filipino citizen at the time the child is born, the child is a Filipino
citizen no matter where he may be born.
‣ NOTE — Even if the child is illegitimate and his mother is an alien, but if his father is Filipino, he will still be considered
as a Filipino provided that paternity is clear, because of jus sanguinis, which makes no distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate children. (Tecson v. Comelec 2004)
3. THOSE BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973, OF FILIPINO MOTHERS, WHO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE
AGE OF MAJORITY
‣ This provision took effect only with the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973. Hence, children
similarly situated but born prior to January 17, 1973 are governed by Section 1(4) of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution.
‣ Thus, if a child was born of a Filipina mother and an alien father BEFORE the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
(meaning during the 1935 Constitution), the the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions does NOT recognize such child as
Filipino unless upon reaching majority the child elects Philippine citizenship pursuant to the 1935 Constitution.
‣ BERNAS — this provision on election in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution are transitory provisions intended to take
care of those who under the 1935 Constitution could have elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching majority
but had not yet reached majority at the time of the effectivity of the 1973 or 1987 Constitution.
‣ Also, a child born under the 1973 or the 1987 Constitution of a Filipina mother and an alien father need NOT elect
Philippine citizenship.
‣ BUT — If the mother, however, had lost Philippine citizenship by the time of the birth of the child, the child has no
right of election and may acquire citizenship only by naturalization.
‣ When must the election be made?
‣ NACHURA — Within 3 years upon reaching the age of majority (Opinion, Secretary of Justice, s. 1948); except
when there is a justifiable reason for the delay.
‣ BERNAS — The election must be made within a reasonable period after reaching majority. However, may be
extended under certain circumstances as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino
citizen.
‣ How must the election be made?
‣ Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 625, enacted on June 7, 1941, says that the election must be expressed in a
statement sworn before any officer authorized to administer oaths and filed with the nearest civil registry and
accompanied by an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Constitution. However, participating in elections and
campaigning for candidates, and similar acts done prior to June 7, 1941, have been recognized as sufficient to
show one's preference for Philippine citizenship. (In re Florencio Mallare 1974)
‣ What the person who elects Philippine citizenship fails to immediately file the documents of election with the
nearest civil registry?
‣ They can still be considered Filipinos.
‣ SEE — Cabiling Ma v. Commissioner, G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010
‣ This case involved children who had grown to adult years and for some reason failed to register their election
but had all along acted as citizens. Among the things which the Court noted was that the 1973 Constitution
had already corrected the chauvinistic provision of the 1935 Constitution by making those born of a Filipina
mother a citizen without need for election.
4. THOSE WHO ARE NATURALIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

‣ Naturalization — is the legal act of adopting a foreigner and clothing him with the privileges of a natural-born citizen. A
person may be naturalized either by complying with both the substantive and procedural requirements of a general
naturalization law or he may be naturalized by a special act of the legislature.
‣ What kind of naturalization laws and procedures have been used in the Philippines?

a. General law of naturalization applied through a judicial process. (Revised Naturalization Law, C.A. 473, June
17,1939)
‣ NOTE — This is still in effect
b. Special naturalization law, i.e., an act of the legislature making a named individual a citizen of the Philippines
‣ Such as — a law was passed to naturalize former NBA player Andray Blatche so that he could play for the
National Basketball Team
c. Mass naturalization law
‣ Such as — The Philippine Bill of 1902 made Filipino citizens of "all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside in them who were Spanish subjects" on 11 April 1899 "and then resided in said islands
d. General law of naturalization applied through a combination of administrative process and presidential legislative
process
e. Administrative Naturalization Law, R.A. 9139, enacted in 2000
NATURAL-BORN PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
‣ Who are considered Natural-Born Filipino Citizens?
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
2. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority
‣ NOTE — A Filipino who is NOT a natural-born citizen is necessarily a naturalized citizen. There are only two kinds of
citizenship — natural born and naturalized. (Bengzon vs Cruz 2001)
‣ BERNAS — Jose was born a Chinese and married a natural born Filipina in 1932. Jose was eventually naturalized and
took his oath of allegiance in 1955. At that time Jose, Jr. was 9 years old. In 1987 Jose, Jr. was elected to the House of
Representatives.
‣ May the citizenship of Jose, Sr., already deceased, be attacked collaterally in this case?
‣ NO. An attack on one’s citizenship may be made only through a direct, not a collateral proceeding (Co v. HRET
1991)
‣ Did the minor Jose, Jr. become a Filipino citizen with his father?
‣ YES. Under the Naturalization Law.
‣ Did he have to elect Philippine citizenship when he came of age?
‣ NO. Because he already was one. It would be unnatural to expect him to. Election of Philippine citizenship
presupposes that you are not one. Moreover, jurisprudence recognizes both formal and informal election. (In re
Mallare 1974)
‣ Is he a natural born citizen?
‣ YES. He benefits from the curative nature of Sec. 2. He derives his status of being a natural born citizen not from
his father, who made election unnecessary for him, but from his mother who was a natural born Filipina. (Co v.
HRET 1991)
‣ Why is the classification of being a natural-born citizen important?
‣ It is a qualification which is often required for public office
‣ May the law treat natural-born citizens and naturalized citizens differently?

‣ NO. Except in the instances where the Constitution itself makes a distinction. Otherwise there would be a violation of
the equal protection clause. (Chen Teck Lao v. Republic 1974)
NATURALIZATION
GOVERNING LAWS ON NATURALIZATION

1. CA 473 — General law of naturalization applied through a judicial process. (Revised Naturalization Law, C.A. 473, June
17,1939)
2. RA 9139 — Administrative Naturalization Law, R.A. 9139, enacted in 2000
KINDS OF NATURALIZATION
1. Direct naturalization — when directly granted in favour of a certain individual or group of people
2. Derivative naturalization — when conferred upon the —
a. Wife of the naturalized husband
b. Minor children of naturalized parent
c. Alien woman upon marriage to a national
NATURALIZATION UNDER CA 473

‣ What are the substantive requirements for naturalization under CA 473?
‣ QUALIFICATIONS —
1. Not less than 21 years of age on the date of the hearing of the petition
2. Resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years
‣ BUT — This may be reduced to 5 years if he either—
a. Honorably held office in Government
b. Established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines
c. Married to a Filipino woman
d. Been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines (in a public or private school not established for the exclusive
instruction of persons of a particular nationality or race) or in any of the branches of education or industry
for a period of not less than two years
e. Born in the Philippines
3. Good moral character; believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; must have conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relations with the constituted government as well as the community in which he is living
4. Own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than P5,000.00, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation
5. Speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal Philippine languages
6. Enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public or private schools recognized by the Government
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, during the entire
period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization.
‣ DISQUALIFICATIONS — When the person is either —
1. Opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments
2. Defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominance of their ideas
3. Polygamists or believers in polygamy
4. Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude

5. Suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease
6. Who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens
or subjects thereof.
‣ What are the procedural requirements for naturalization under CA 473?
1. Filing of declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of the petition with the Office of the Solicitor General.
‣ BUT — The following are exempt from filing declaration of intention —
a. Born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public or private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality
b. Resided in the Philippines for 30 years or more before the filing of the petition, and enrolled his children in
elementary and high schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality
c. Widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines and
dies before he is actually naturalized.
2. Filing of the petition, accompanied by the affidavit of two credible persons, citizens of the Philippines, who personally
know the petitioner, as character witnesses
3. Publication of the petition —
‣ Under Sec. 9, Revised Naturalization Law, in order that there be a valid publication, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the petition and notice of hearing must be published; (b) the publication must be made once a week for
three consecutive weeks; and (c) the publication must be in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province where the applicant resides. In addition, copies of the petition and notice of hearing
must be posted in the office of the Clek of Court or in the building where the office is located (Republic v. Hamilton
Tan Keh 2004) The same notice must also indicate, among others, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner
proposes to introduce at the trial (Republic v. Michael Hong 2006)
‣ Publication is a jurisdictional requirement. Noncompliance is fatal for it impairs the very root or foundation of the
authority to decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his
counsel
‣ The failure to state all the required details in the notice of hearing, like the names of applicant’s witnesses,
constitutes a fatal defect. The publication of the affidavit of such witnesses did not cure the omission of their
names in the notice of hearing. It is a settled rule that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favour of the government and against the applicant (Ong Chua v. Republic 2000)
4. Actual residence in the Philippines during the entire proceedings
5. Hearing of the petition
6. Promulgation of the decision
7. Hearing after two years

‣ At this hearing, the applicant shall show that during the two-year probation period, applicant has —
a. Not left the Philippines
b. Dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession
c. Not been convicted of any offense or violation of rules
d. Not committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government- announced
policies.
8. Oath taking and issuance of the Certificate of Naturalisation
‣ NOTE — The applicant becomes a Filipino citizen only after taking the oath provided by law after satisfactorily
passing the period of probation.
‣ What are the effects of Naturalization under CA 473?
1. The applicant is deemed a Naturalized Filipino

2. It vests citizenship on wife if she herself may be lawfully naturalized
‣ Thus, the alien wife of the naturalized Filipino need not go through the formal process of naturalization in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship. All she has to do is to file before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a
petition for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). At the hearing on the petition, she does
not have to prove that she possesses all the qualifications for naturalization; she only has to show that she does
not labor under any of the disqualifications. Upon the grant of the petition for cancellation of the ACR, she may
then take the oath of the allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and thus, become a citizen of the
Philippines. (Moy Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration)
3. Minor children —
a. Born in the Philippines before the naturalization — considered citizens of the Philippines.
b. Born outside the Philippines —
i. Who was residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization — considered a Filipino citizen.
ii. Before parent’s naturalization — considered Filipino citizens only during minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines.
iii. After parent’s naturalization — considered a Filipino, provided that he registers as such before any Philippine
consulate within one year after attaining majority age, and takes his oath of allegiance.
‣ What are the grounds for de-naturalization under CA 473?
1. Naturalization certificate is obtained fraudulently or illegally
‣ A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by
misleading the court upon any material fact. Availment of a tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his
lack of good moral character. (Republic v. Li Yao)
2. If, within 5 years, he returns to his native country or to some foreign country and establishes residence there;
provided, that 1-year stay in native country, or 2-year stay in a foreign country shall be prima facie evidence of intent
to take up residence in the same.
3. Petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention.
4. Minor children failed to graduate through the fault of the parents either by neglecting to support them or by
transferring them to another school.
5. Allowed himself to be used as a dummy.
‣ NOTE — although the misconduct was committed after the two-year probationary period, conviction of perjury and
rape was held to be valid ground for denaturalization. (Republic vs Guy)
‣ What are the effects of de-naturalization under CA 473?
1. If the ground for denaturalization affects the intrinsic validity of the proceedings — the denaturalization shall divest
the wife and children of their derivative naturalization.
2. If the ground was personal to the denaturalized Filipino — his wife and children shall retain their Philippine
citizenship.
NATURALIZATION BY DIRECT LEGISLATIVE ACTION

‣ This is discretionary on Congress; usually conferred on an alien who has made outstanding contributions to the country.
ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION UNDER RA 9139

‣ Is RA 9139 (The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000) different from CA 473? What are the differences
‣ YES. CA 473 and RA 9139 are separate and distinct laws.
1. CA 473 — former covers aliens regardless of class
2. RA 9139 — covers native-born aliens who lived in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country
and all along thought that they were Filipinos, who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and
affinity to Filipino customs and traditions.
‣ The intention of the legislature in enacting RA 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical, and more encouraging. There is nothing in the law from which it can be inferred that CA473 is

intended to be annexed to or repealed by RA 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another
mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native-born aliens. The only implication is that a
native- born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.
‣ What are the substantive requirements for naturalization under RA 9139?
‣ QUALIFICATIONS — Applicant must —
1. Be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth
2. Not be less than 18 years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition
3. Be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the Constitutioin and must have conducted
himself/ herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines
in his relatioins with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living
4. Have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or private educational institution duly
recognized by the Department of Education, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and
prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrolment is not limited to any race or nationality, provided
that should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools
5. Have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for
his/her support and that of his/her family; provided that this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree
holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their
citizenship
6. Be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines
7. Have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs and traditions and
ideals of the Filipino people.
‣ DISQUALIFICATIONS — Same as those in CA 473
‣ What are the procedural requirements for naturalization under RA 9139?
1. Filing with the Special Committee on Naturalization of a petition (see Sec. 5, RA 9139, for contents of the petition)
2. Publication of pertinent portions of the petition once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, with copies thereof posted in any public or conspicuous area
3. Copies of the petition should also be furnished to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, the civil registrar of petitioner’s place of residence and the National Bureau of Investigation which shall
post copies of the petition in any public or conspicuous areas in their buildings offices and premises, and within 30
days submit to the Committee a report stating whether or not petitioner has any derogatory record on file or any such
relevant and material information which might be adverse to petitioner’s application for citizenship
4. The Committee shall, within 60 days from receipt of the report of the agencies, consider and review all information
received pertaining to the petition (if Committee receives any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall
allow the petitioner to answer, explain or refute the information)
5. Committee shall then approve or deny the petition.
6. Within 30 days from approval of the petition, applicant shall pay to the Committee a fee of P100,000, then take the
oath of allegiance and a certificate of naturalization shall issue.
7. Within 5 days after the applicant has taken his oath of allegiance, the Bureau of Immigration shall forward a copy of
the oath to the proper local civil registrar, and thereafter, cancel petitioner’s alien certificate of registration.
‣ What are the effects of Naturalization under RA 9135?
‣ The applicant is deemed a Naturalized Filipino
‣ After the approval of the petition for administrative naturalization and cancellation of the applicant’s alien certificate of
registration, applicant’s alien lawful wife and minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates
of registration with the Committee, subject to the payment of the required fees.
‣ BUT — If the applicant is a married woman, the approval of her petition for administrative naturalization shall not
benefit her alien husband, although her minor children may still avail of the right to seek the cancellation of their
alien certificate of registration.
‣ What are the grounds for cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization under RA 9139?

‣ The Special Committee on Naturalization may cancel certificates of naturalization issued in the following cases —
1. If the naturalized person or his duly authorized representative made any false statement or misrepresentation, or
committed any violation of law, rules and regulations in connection with the petition, or if he obtains Philippine
citizenship fraudulently or illegally
2. If, within five years, he shall establish permanent residence in a foreign country, provided that remaining for more
than one year in his country of origin or two years in any foreign country shall be prima facie evidence of intent to
permanently reside therein
3. If allowed himself or his wife or child with acquired citizenship to be used as a dummy
4. If he, his wife or child with acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to national security
LOSS AND RE-ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they
are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
LAW WHICH GOVERN LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

1. CA No. 63, as amended
2. RA 965 and 2639
3. RA 8171 and P.D. 725 on repatriation
4. RA 9225 — Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
LOSS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

‣ How is Philippine Citizenship lost?
1. By naturalization in a foreign country (Frivaldo vs COMELEC)
‣ BUT — this is modified by R.A. 9225, entitled An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Cititzenship Permanent (which took effect September 17, 2003), which declares the policy of the State that
all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act. Under RA 9225, Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republilc.
2. By express renunciation of citizenship
‣ Express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference or
implication. (Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Go Callano)
‣ SEE — Labo v. Comelec, 176 SCRA 1
‣ In this case, it was held that Labo lost Filipino citizenship because he expressly renounced allegiance to the
Philippines when he applied for Australian citizenship.
‣ SEE — Valles v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000.
‣ In this case, it was held that the fact that private respondent was born in Australia does not mean that she is
not a Filipino. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most she can also claim Australian citizenship,
resulting in her having dual citizenship. That she was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration do not constitute effective renunciation, and do not militate against her claim, of
Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, it must be express.
‣ SEE — Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364
‣ In this case, the obtention of a Portuguese passport and signing of commercial documents as a Portuguese
were construed as renunciation of Philippine citizenship.

3. Bv subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining
21 years of age
‣ NACHURA — However, a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic
of the Philippines is at war with any country. This may be considered as an application of the principle of indelible
allegiance.
4. By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country
‣ NACHURA — However, the rendering of service to, or acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall NOT divest a Filipino of his citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present —
a. The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country
b. The said foreign country maintains armed forces in Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines.
5. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalisation
6. By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war
‣ EXCEPT — When subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.
7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner, if by virtue of the laws in force of her husband’s country,
she acquires his nationality
REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

‣ How may lost Philippine citizenship be reacquired?
‣ Either by —
1. Naturalization — a former Filipino may be naturalized to re-acquire Philippine citizenship, provided that the
applicant possesses none of the disqualifications prescribed for naturalization.
2. Repatriation — This is the recovery of original citizenship.
3. By taking an oath of allegiance — This applies to former natural-born Philippine citizens who may have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their acquisition of the citizenship of a foreign country. (Under R.A. 9225)
4. By direct act of Congress
REPATRIATION
‣ What laws govern repatriation of Philippine citizenship?
‣ RA 8171 — governs the repatriation of Filipino women who may have lost Filipino citizenship by reason of marriage to
aliens, as well as the repatriation of former natural-born Filipino citizens who lost Filipino citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity
‣ P.D. 725 — allows repatriation of former natural-born Filipino citizens who lost Filipino citizenship. (But seems moot
due to RA 9225)
‣ Who may be repatriated under RA 8171?
‣ Either of the following —
1. Women who lost citizenship by marriage; or
2. Those who lost citizenship for political or economic reasons may be repatriated.
‣ DISQUALIFICATIONS (Under RA 8171) — Applicant must NOT be
1. Opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing organized government
2. Defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
predominance of his ideas
3. Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
4. Suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease.

‣ May a person, who lost his Philippine citizenship due to derivative naturalization during his minority when his
Father became a citizen of a foreign country, claim repatriation under RA 8171?
‣ NO. SEE — Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006
‣ The privilege of RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity and to their minor children. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine
citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA8171, his repatriatioin will also
benefit his minor children. Thus, to claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity to
undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for
repatriation or naturalization separately from the parents.
‣ How is repatriation accomplished under RA 8171?
‣ Repatriation is effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in
the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the
pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen. (Sec. 2, RA 8171)
‣ NOTE — the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is
a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. (Altarejos v. Comelec 2004)
‣ What are the effects of repatriation?
‣ The act of repatriation allows the person to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
‣ Thus, if what was lost was naturalized citizenship, that is what will be reacquired. If what was lost was natural born
citizenship, that will be reacquired. (Bengzon v. Cruz 2001)
‣ When does repatriation take effect?
‣ The grant of repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of the application for repatriation.The effective date is the
date of application for repatriation not the date when repatriation was approved. (Frivaldo vs Comelec)
RE-ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UNDER RA 9225

‣ What is the policy of the State with regard to Natural-Born Philippine citizens who become citizens of a foreign
country?
‣ It is the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of RA 9225. (Sec. 2, RA 9225)
‣ BERNAS — What R.A. 9225, the Dual Citizenship Law, has done is to liberalize the reacquisition and retention of
natural born Philippine citizenship. The law deals with two classes of persons: (1) Filipinos who lost their citizenship
prior to the enactment of RA 9225 and (2) Filipinos who become citizens of another country after the effectivity of R.A.
9225.
‣ How do Natural Born citizens who lose their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country reacquire Philippine citizenship?
‣ By taking an oath of allegiance as spelled out by Sec. 3, RA 9225
‣ NOTE — Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of RA 9225, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
‣ What is the effect of taking such oath of allegiance?
1. The former Natural Born citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship
2. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age, of those who reacquire
Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines (Derivative Citizenship)
3. Those who retain or reacquire Phiilippine citizenship under RA 9225 enjoys full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions —
a. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Sec. 1, Art. V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws

b. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath
c. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath
d. Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice;
e. The right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who: —
i. Are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens
ii. Are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which
they are naturalized citizens
DUAL ALLEGIANCE AND DUAL CITIZENSHIP
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
‣ Does the Constitution allow dual or multiple citizenship?
‣ BERNAS — YES. Because Philippine law has no control over citizenship laws of other countries, dual citizenship can
be unavoidable under the present Constitution.
‣ Instances of Dual Citizenship —
1. A child of a Filipina mother is a Filipino and might also have his alien father's citizenship
2. A Filipina married to an alien remains a Philippine citizen but might also acquire her alien husband's citizenship
3. A person with Filipino parents born in a country which observes the jus soli rule.
‣ Does not Section 5 in effect prohibit dual citizenship?
‣ NO. Dual citizenship and dual allegiance are different. The specific target of this new provision is not dual citizenship
but dual allegiance arising from e.g., mixed marriages or birth in foreign soil. This was seen as more insidious than
dual citizenship. To the extent, however, that dual citizenship also imports dual allegiance, then it must also be "dealt
with by law." In other words, the Constitution leaves the disposition of the problem of dual citizenship and dual
allegiance to ordinary legislation.
‣ Can dual citizens run for public office?
‣ YES. Provided they renounce their foreign citizenship
‣ SEE — Maquiling vs Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013
‣ Only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to
run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we
are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code.
‣ SEE — Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 as reiterated in Valles v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000.
‣ In this case, the Court clarified the “dual citizenship” disqualification in Sec. 40, Local Government Code, and
reconciled the same with Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution on “dual allegiance”. Recognizing situations in which a
Filipino citizen may, without performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that “dual citizenship” as a disqualification
must refer to citizens with “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under the
disqualification.
‣ Furthermore, for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing
of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate

of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as dual citizen. This
is so because in the certificate of candidacy one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance to the same. Such declaration
under oath operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship
‣ BUT — this doctrine in Valles and Mercado that the filing of a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign
citizenship does not apply to one who, after having reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, runs for
public office. To comply with the provisions of Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for public
office must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship. (Lopez vs Comelec
2008)

ARTICLE 5 — SUFFRAGE
THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
‣ What is “suffrage”?
‣ It is the right to vote in elections.
‣ What are the recognized theories on suffrage?
1. Natural right theory — Suffrage is a natural and inherent right of every citizen who is not disqualified by reason of his
own reprehensible conduct or unfitness.
2. Social expediency — Suffrage is a public office or function conferred upon the citizen for reasons of social
expediency; conferred upon those who are fit and capable of discharging it.
3. Tribal theory — It is a necessary attribute of membership in the State.
4. Feudal theory — It is an adjunct of a particular status, generally tenurial in character, i.e., a vested privilege usually
accompanying ownership of land.
5. Ethical theory — It is a necessary and essential means for the development of society.
‣ NOTE — In the Philippines, Suffrage is both a privilege and an obligation.
‣ What is “election”?
‣ It is the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period and to whom they entrust for
the time being the exercise of the powers of government
‣ Kinds of elections —
1. Regular — one provided by law for the election of officers either nationwide or in certain subdivisions thereof,
after the expiration of the full term of the former officers.
2. Special — one held to fill a vacancy in office before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was
elected.
‣ Is suffrage limited to elections?
‣ NO. Suffrage covers the following—
1. Referendum— It is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the
purpose
2. Recall — It is the termination of official relationship of a local elective official for loss of confidence prior to the
expiration of his term through the will of the electorate.
3. Initiative — It is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose. It is the “people-power” feature of the Constitution.
4. Plebiscite — It is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people. It is also the means by which the voters in affected areas consent or object to the change in the form of
local government.
5. Election — It is the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot.
Specifically, it may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of votes, the holding of the electoral
campaign; and the casting and counting of ballots and canvassing of returns.
‣ Who may exercise suffrage?
‣ It may be exercised by a person having the following requirements —
1. Filipino citizen

ATENEO LAW 4B 2017 109 OF 131 POLITICAL LAW
2. At least eighteen years of age
3. Has resided —
a. In the Philippines for at least one year; and
b. In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
3. Not otherwise disqualified by law
4. Compliance with procedural requirements (such as registration, etc.)
‣ What does “residence” mean?
‣ The term "residence" as used in the election law has two meanings.
1. In the requirement of “residence in the Philippines” — residence is synonymous with "domicile," which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur —
a. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality
b. An intention to remain there
c. An intention to abandon the old domicile.
‣ In other words, there must be an animus non revertendi and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must conform with his
purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary; the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must
be actual; and to the fact of residence there must be added the animus manendi. (Gallego v. Verra 1941)
2. In the requirement of “residence in the place where one is to vote” — residence can mean either domicile, as
described above, or temporary residence.
‣ BERNAS — Thus, one domiciled in a municipality in Camarines Sur but is assigned by his company to Quezon
City has a choice of either voting in Camarines Sur or in Quezon City if he has been "residing" in Quezon City
for at least six months.
‣ Who prescribes disqualifications?
‣ The Congress has been given the discretion to create disqualifications.
‣ BUT — It is prohibited from prescribing any literacy, property, or other substantive requirements.
‣ Under the Election Code, the following are disqualified to vote —
1. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer an imprisonment of not less than one year, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon
‣ BUT — any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote
upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.
2. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court of having violated his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
3. Insane or feeble-minded persons.
‣ BERNAS — It will be noted that the disqualifications found in the Election Code are "substantive," in that they touch
on the "quality" of the voter, as distinct from the procedural requirement of, e.g., registration. However, unlike literacy
or property qualifications, they are not "neutral" by themselves but have a direct bearing on the "moral" or "mental"
worth of the individual. It is submitted therefore that these disqualifications are compatible with the constitutional
prohibition. The substantive requirements prohibited by the Constitution are those which equivalently impose a
penalty for faultless disadvantage such as illiteracy or poverty.
‣ What does “procedural requirements” to exercise the right of suffrage mean?
‣ The right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among
others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition
to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996.'' The State, in the
exercise of its inherent police power, may enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end,
that even preelection activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner.
(Kahayan vs Comelec 2001)

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES ON CONGRESS REGARDING SUFFRAGE
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other
persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
‣ What are the Constitutional mandates for Congress in Sec. 2?
1. To provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, and for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.
2. To design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterate to vote without the assistance of other persons.
‣ What are the laws which provide for Absentee Voting?
1. For Filipinos abroad — RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) now allows citizens residing abroad to
vote even if they are recognized as immigrants by the country of their residence
‣ Under such law, all citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen
(18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for —
a. President
b. Vice-president
c. Senators
d. Party-list representatives
2. For members of the AFP, PNP, and other government officers and employees who may temporarily be
assigned in connection with the performance of election duties to places where they are not registered voters
— RA 7166 provides for absentee voting, for members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police and other government officers and employees who are duly registered voters and who, on election
day, may temporarily be assigned in connection with the performance of election duties to places where they are not
registered voters. They may vote for (1) President (2) Vice-president (3) Senators
‣ How do Filipino citizens residing abroad exercise their right of suffrage?
‣ Under RA 9189, they are required to file an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the COMELEC declaring that he/she
shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/
her registration under this Act.
‣ The affidavit is meant to be a statement the he or she never intended to abandon his or her domicile in the Philippines.
If no affidavit is filed, the person is deemed disqualified. But if after filing such affidavit the person does not reestablish
physical residence within three years, the person is likewise disqualified.
‣ Does the rule in RA 9189 dispense with the residence requirement?
‣ NO. The privilege under RA 9189 applies to those who have not lost their domicile in the Philippines that is why the
affidavit “to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years” is required as
a prerequisite to voter registration.
‣ Can Filipino immigrants abroad also vote?
‣ YES. Under RA 9189, an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country may
exercise the right to vote. Provided also that he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose
by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act.
‣ Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
‣ Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

‣ But isn’t it being an immigrant abroad mean that one has lost Philippine domicile?
‣ NO. Not necessarily. Loss of domicile is evidentiary matter. The presumption is that being an immigrant according to
the laws of another country may not necessarily mean loss of domicile. The required declaration of intent to return is
meant to be an assertion that one has not abandoned Philippine domicile. However, proof of loss of domicile may be
shown in a exclusion proceeding under the Election Law.
‣ Will those who have reacquired their citizenship through R.A. 9225 and have dual citizenship have to reacquire
Philippine domicile in order to vote?
‣ NO. They can vote even if they are non-residents.
‣ NOTE — “RA 9225 provides that those who retain or reacquire Phiilippine citizenship under RA 9225 enjoys full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions —
a. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Sec. 1, Art. V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws”
‣ SEE — Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162759, August 4,2006.
‣ Section 1 of Article 5 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the
other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying, that a
nonresident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the Section 1, be allowed to vote.There is no
provision in the dual citizenship law — R.A. 9225 — requiring “dual citizens” to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote.
‣ On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its
Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under RA. 9189. It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who,
save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
‣ BERNAS (Doesn’t seem to agree with this case ) — The Court seems to have recognized a novel way of amending
the Constitution, that is, by silence! Because the new citizens under R.A. 9225 are not specifically required to
establish residence in the Philippines, the conclusion is drawn that residence is not required. To bolster the
conclusion the Court assimilates the new citizens to absentee voters under R.A. 9189 who, incidentally, are
required to file an affidavit as indication that they had not abandoned their Philippine domicile.

ARTICLE 13 — SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
‣ BERNAS — The Bill of Rights focuses on civil and political rights, whereas Article 13 focuses on social and economic
rights. Moreover, the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are generally self-implementing, i.e., they can be appealed to even in
the absence of implementing legislation. On the other hand, the social and economic rights guaranteed in Article 13 as
also recognized in Article 2 generally require implementing legislation.
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
‣ What are the two principal activities which the State is commanded to attend to in order to achieve the goals of
social justice?
1. The creation of more economic opportunities and more wealth
2. Closer regulation of the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property in order to achieve a more equitable
distribution of wealth and political power.
‣ How important is the promotion of social justice?
‣ BERNAS — It is of the highest priority because the very survival of the Republic could depend on the attainment of
these goals. The most serious problems plaguing the nation can be traced to a long-standing history of injustice to the
underprivileged.
‣ NOTE — While the pursuit of social justice can have revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. While the
State is mandated to promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the field of housing, this cannot
be interpreted to mean that “squatting” has been legalized. The State’s solicitude for the destitute and the have-nots does
not mean it should tolerate usurpation of property, public or private. (Astudillo v. Board of Directors PHHC)
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Section 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and
other independent farmers' organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program,
and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial,
production, marketing, and other support services.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with
law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them
in the manner provided by law.
Section 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential
use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen
through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
Section 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to
promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used
as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
AGRARIAN REFORM IN GENERAL

‣ What is “Agrarian Reform”?
‣ It means redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to farmers and regular farmworkers who are
landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the
economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands, such
as production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of shares of stocks, which will allow
beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work. (Sec. 3[a], RA 6657)
‣ What must be the goals of agrarian reform?
1. Efficient production
2. A more equitable distribution of land which recognizes the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless
to own the land they till
3. A just share of other or seasonal farm workers in the fruits of the land
‣ What lands are covered under agrarian reform?

‣ Only agricultural lands.
‣ Agricultural Land — refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. (Sec. 3, RA 6657) "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are

arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. (Remman
Enterprises v. CA. 2006)
‣ What lands are exempt from land reform?
‣ Non-agricultural lands and lands previously converted to non- agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies.
‣ BUT — the inclusion of land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in the Agrarian Reform Law is
unconstitutional. (Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 1990)
‣ What kind of agricultural lands come under the scope of agrarian reform?
‣ BERNAS — All kinds of agricultural land. While P.D. 27, the agrarian reform law promulgated by President Marcos,
covered only rice and corn land. The 1987 Constitution commands that agrarian reform include "all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental or equity considerations." Obviously, therefore, the constitutional provision needs
implementing legislation. Lands not devoted to agriculture are not covered by CARL. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and
suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.”
‣ NOTE — The laws on agrarian reform simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to under what title the
land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the
landowner holds "naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of ownership. (Archbishop v. Secretary 2007)
‣ How is redistribution of land to be achieved?
‣ BERNAS — It is to be achieved either through voluntary sale or, where necessary, through expropriation and resale.
‣ Must the owner be given "just compensation?"
‣ YES. And the computation of what is just compensation must follow existing jurisprudence on the power of eminent
domain.
‣ BUT — for purposes of agrarian reform and in the spirit of social justice, while just compensation means that the
landowner has a right to receive as payment an amount equivalent to the value of the land, the farmer himself will pay
only what he can afford even if this is not equivalent to "just compensation." Hence, it will be necessary for the State
to subsidize the agrarian reform program in order that land owners can be properly compensated.
‣ Must compensation be in cash?
‣ NO. Art. 13, Sec. 8 of the Constitution says that compensation may be in the form of "financial instruments" which
government financing institutions and enterprises are bound to honor and accept at full value. Admittedly, the
compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already
remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we
know they are of the need for their forbearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in
the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the
Holy Grail. (Santos v. Land Bank 2000)
‣ Does the issuance of a certificate of land transfer to a land reform beneficiary prior to payment violate the
properly right of the original owner?
‣ NO. The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land
described therein. At most, the certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party
qualified to avail of the mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land. Neither is this recognition permanent
nor irrevocable. Failure on the part of the farmer to comply with his obligations can result in the forfeiture of his
certificate of land transfer. (Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella 1991)
‣ May the GSIS, a government owned corporation, be compelled to accept at face value Land Bank notes earlier
received in payment of expropriated land expropriated under land reform?
‣ YES. In land reform expropriation the owner seldom gets what he wants for his property. Requiring him to accept
Land Bank notes is another sacrifice. But, for the government to compel him further to discount those notes would be
unfair. (Maddumba v. GSIS 1991)
‣ Will agrarian reform have the effect of stripping some land holders of all land in order to make land available to
the landless?
‣ BERNAS — Obviously the object is not to make landowners of the landless by rendering others landless. Hence, the
State will set retention limits. Moreover, in setting such retention limits the State must protect "small landowners," that

is, ordinary people who may have inherited small pieces of land or who through sheer hard work and frugality have
managed to save enough to be able to purchase land for the security of their future.
‣ Does the reach of agrarian reform extend only to private agricultural land?
‣ BERNAS — NO. It also extends to "other natural resources," even including the use and enjoyment of "communal
marine and lishing resources" and "offshore fishing grounds.” (See Art. 13, Sec. 6 and 7)
THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW (RA 6657)

‣ What is the law which provides for agrarian reform?
‣ RA 6657 — Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL)
‣ Is the CARL an exercise of police power or the power of eminent domain?
‣ BOTH. To the extent that the law prescribes retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power. But
where it becomes necessary to deprive owners of their land in excess of the maximum allowed there is compensable
taking and therefore the exercise of eminent domain. (Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform 1989)
‣ The exercise of eminent domain requires that the taking is for public use. Is this satisfied by CARL?
‣ YES. The constitution itself by ordaining land reform settles the question of public use. (Association of Small
Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 1989)
‣ But should not the State first distribute public agricultural lands before touching private lands?
‣ The discretion is given by the Constitution to Congress to decide how to start. This is a question of wisdom in which
courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of Congress. (Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform 1989)
‣ What kinds of land are covered under the CARL?
‣ The following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program —
1. All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking
into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits
of the public domain
2. All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph
3. All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture
4. All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon. (Sec. 4, RA 6657)
‣ What are the retention limits under the CARL?
‣ No person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil
fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
‣ BUT — in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.
‣ Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications —
1. That he is at least fifteen (15) years of age;
2. That he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm
‣ Who has the choice of the area to be retained?
‣ The Landowner. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the
landowner (Sec. 6, RA 6657)
‣ BUT — in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to
choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder
and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act.n case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another
agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise

this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
(Sec. 6, RA 6657)
‣ The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves
to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A
retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus
sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which
would be a pointless process. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does not exceed
the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained must prevail. (Danan, et al. v.
CA 2005)
‣ What is the procedure for expropriation under the CARL?
1. After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land
to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of
the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other
pertinent provisions hereof.
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner,
his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
3. If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall pay the landowner the
purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.
4. In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above
period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is
submitted for decision.
5. Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR
shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
6. Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
‣ NOTE — The CARL conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by
the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either. (Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 1989)
‣ How is just compensation determined under the CARL?
‣ In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered.
‣ NOTE — The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government
to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
‣ SEE — the CARL for more details on just compensation
‣ Is not the manner of fixing the compensation unconstitutional because it is left to administrative authorities?
‣ NO. The determination by administrative authorities may always be reviewed by the courts. (Association of Small
Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 1989)
‣ Is not the mode of compensation unconstitutional because it compels the owner to accept compensation in less
than money?
‣ NO. The weight of authority in existing traditional jurisprudence is that compensation must be in money. However, we
do not deal here with traditional expropriation but with a revolutionary kind of expropriation in which it is

understandable for government not to immediately have the money needed for compensation. Hence, some other
device was found necessary. (Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 1989)
‣ In what sense is expropriation under Article 13 revolutionary?
‣ It is revolutionary in that it affects all private agricultural lands wherever found and of whatever kind as long as they are
in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit
not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all
levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the
whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify
with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. (Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform 1989)
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and
basic services to under-privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote
adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the
rights of small property owners.
Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law
and in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the
communities where they are to be relocated.
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING (SEC. 9)

‣ What is the import of the use of the word "reform?
‣ BERNAS — The word carries the meaning that what is sought is not just proper urban land use or zoning but also the
righting of inequitable land distribution. It thus includes the authorization to use expropriation for redistribution of
urban land.
‣ What law provides for Urband Land Reform and Housing?
‣ RA 7279 — Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA)
‣ Under the UDHA, how should lands for socialized housing be acquired?
‣ Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order —
1. Government lands
2. Alienable lands of the public domain
3. Unregistered, abandoned or idle lands
4. Lands within the declare Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, Slum Improvement
and Resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired
5. BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired
6. Privately-owned lands
‣ The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions —
1. It shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted
2. Parcels owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
‣ Small property owners are —
1. Owners of residential lands with an area not more than 300 square meters in urbanized cities and not more than
800 square meters in other urban areas; and
2. They do not own residential property other than the same.

‣ NOTE — Urban land reform has become a paramount task of Government in view of the acute shortage of decent
housing in urban areas, particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, local government units are not given an unbridled
authority when exercising this power in pursuit of solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be
followed, i.e., Sec. 1 and Sec. 9, Art. Ill of the Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code imposes certain restrictions on
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. R.A. 7279 provides the order in which lands may be acquired for
socialized housing, and very explicit in Secs. 9 and 10 thereof is the fact that privately owned lands rank last in the
order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. (Filstream International, Inc. vs CA)
RESETTLEMENT OF URBAN OR RURAL DWELLERS (SEC. 10)

‣ Does Sec. 10 mean that eviction of illegal occupants of land can only be done through court orders?
‣ NO. What the provision requires is that eviction be done "in accordance with law," that is, with due process. But due
process is not necessarily judicial process; it can also be administrative process. In every case, however, eviction
must be "in a just and humane manner."
‣ What does eviction and demolition "in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner" mean?
‣ It does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement
area designated or earmarked by the government. Rather, it means that the person to be evicted be accorded due
process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property
involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the
occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and there be no loss of lives, physical
injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties. (People v. Judge Leachon 1998)
‣ What is the law which governs eviction and demolition?
‣ Also RA 7279 — Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA), particularly Sec. 28.
‣ What are the rules on eviction and demolitions?
‣ Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the
following situations —
1. When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds
2. When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented
3. When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
‣ In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be
mandatory —
1. Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition
2. Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of the families to be
resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be relocated Presence of local government
officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;
3. Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition
4. Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good
weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise
5. No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete materials
6. Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement
and observe proper disturbance control procedures
7. Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition
pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the
local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government
agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said
order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period, financial
assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be
extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.

HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the under-privileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
WOMEN
Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS
Section 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest
and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
Section 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of
adequate consultation mechanisms.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17.
(1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and
disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise
its present functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human
rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10)Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11)Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
Section 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of
the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.
ARTICLE 2— DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR)

‣ Is the CHR a constitutional commission?
‣ NO. It is a creation of the Constitution although it is NOT on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions in
Article 9. Moreover, its full operationalization will require congressional action.
‣ The Commission on Human Rights does not enjoy fiscal autonomy. It does not belong to the species of constitutional
commissions under Art. IX of the Constitution (Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. CHR 2004)
‣ What is the composition of the CHR?
‣ It is composed of a total of 5 members. Chairman and 4 Members
‣ What are the qualifications of the chairman and the members of the CHR?
1. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines
2. Majority of must be members of the Bar.
‣ NOTE — The term of office and other qualifications/disabilities of the Members of the CHR shall be provided by law.
‣ How are the members of the CHR appointed?
‣ NACHURA — The power to appoint the Chairman and members of the Commission is vested in the President of the
Philippines, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Investigative powers — Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights
2. Rule-making powers and Contempt powers — Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court
3. Provide legal measures, remedies and aid — Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of
all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection
4. Visitorial powers — Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities
5. Others —
a. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human
rights
b. Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families

c. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights
d. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority
e. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions
f. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law
g. Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law
‣ Does the CHR have adjudicatory/quasi-judicial powers?
‣ NO. the Commission on Human Rights has NO jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over certain specific types of
cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. However, the CHR may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official; the function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. Having merely the power to investigate, the Commission
cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits. (Carino v. Commission on Human Rights 1991)
‣ BERNAS — In essence the Commission's power is only investigative. It has no prosecutorial power. For prosecution,
it must rely on the executive department.
‣ Can the CHR issue writs of injunction or temporary restraining orders?
‣ NO. The Commission on Human Rights, not being a court of justice, cannot issue writs of injunction or a restraining
order against supposed violators of human rights. (EPZA v. Commission on Human Rights) The CHR has no
jurisdiction to issue the “order to desist” inasmuch as such order is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from
an adjudicatory power it does not possess. (Simon v. Commission on Human Rights)
‣ Is the focus of the investigatory power on any specific group of persons?
‣ BERNAS — NO. The focus is on violations of human rights no matter by whom committed. However, the Commission,
in being authorized to adopt its "operational guidelines," is in fact authorized to fix priorities according to what is most
needed at the moment.
‣ What kind of "measures" can it take for the protection of human rights?
‣ BERNAS — Anything it can legally do short of passing judgment on legality or ordering the release of detainees. 

ARTICLE 14 — EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
ARTICLE 14 — EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS,

CULTURE AND SPORTS

Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism
and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
EDUCATION
Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
Section 2. The State shall:

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of
the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting
the natural rights of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which
shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self- learning, independent, and out-of-
school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other
skills.
Section 3.
(1) All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part of the curricula.
(2) They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the
role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
(3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children
or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved
by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the
Government.
Section 4.
(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall
exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely
by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational
institutions.
The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than
one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established for
foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary
residents.
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate

existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. Proprietary educational
institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the
limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly,
and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
Section 5.
(1) the State shall take into account regional and sectoral needs and conditions and shall encourage local planning in the
development of educational policies and programs.
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements.
(4) The State shall enhance the right of teachers to professional advancement. Non-teaching academic and non-
academic personnel shall enjoy the protection of the State.
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
ARTICLE 6 — THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 28. XXXXX
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
EDUCATION IN GENERAL
‣ What are the three principal characteristics of the educational system which the State must promote and
protect?
‣ The State must promote and protect —
1. Quality education, that is, education that is of high academic standards
2. Affordable education, that is, education that is financially within the reach not just of the wealthy
3. Education that is relevant to the needs of people and society.
‣ Is it the duty of private schools to subsidize the education of students?
‣ BERNAS — NO. The duty of which the Constitution speaks is a state duty, not the duty of private schools. Private
schools must maintain high academic standards and relevant educational policy but are also entitled to
commensurate compensation for the service they render. Private schools generally can give students only the kind of
service which is commensurate to what they pay for.
‣ What are the Constitutional norms in what schools must teach?
1. All educational institutions must —
a. Include the study of the Constitution as part of the curricula
b. Inculcate patriotism and nationalism
c. Foster love of humanity
d. Respect for human rights
e. Appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country
f. Teach the rights and duties of citizenship
g. Strengthen ethical and spiritual values
h. Develop moral character and personal discipline
i. Encourage critical and creative thinking
j. Broaden scientific and technological knowledge

k. Promote vocational efficiency
2. Optional religious instruction — At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be
allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by
instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong
‣ BUT — This should be without additional cost to the Government.
STATE REGULATION OF SCHOOLS; STATE OBLIGATIONS IN EDUCATION

‣ RULE — The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational
system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
‣ The requirement that a school must first obtain government authorization before operating is based on the State
policy that educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and, therefore, shall at least satisfy
minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities and administrative and
management viability. (Philippine Merchant Marine School v. Court of Appeals)
‣ Specifically, the State is required to —
1. Protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make
such education accessible to all.
2. Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of
the people and society
3. Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the
natural rights of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age
4. Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which
shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged
5. Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self- learning, independent, and out-of-
school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs
6. Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other
skills.
7. Take into account regional and sectoral needs and conditions and shall encourage local planning in the development
of educational policies and programs.
8. Enhance the right of teachers to professional advancement. Non-teaching academic and non-academic personnel
shall enjoy the protection of the State.
PHILIPPINE OWNERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOLS

‣ What aspects of education are Filipinized?
‣ Art. 14, Sec. 4(2) is the Filipinization provision of the article on Education. It Filipinizes —
1. Ownership — Educational institutions must be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
‣ EXCEPT — Those established by religious groups and mission boards
‣ NOTE — The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational
institutions.
2. Control and administration — The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens
of the Philippines.
3. Student population — No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens
shall comprise more than 1/3 of the enrollment in any school.
‣ What is the rule on schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents?
‣ They are exempt from the rule on Filipinization of ownership, control and administration, and student population.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the same rule applies to other temporary residents.

INCOME TAX EXEMPTION OF SCHOOLS
‣ Why are the tax privileges granted to educational institutions?
1. Exemption from real property taxes (Art. 6, Sec. 28[3]) — All lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
2. Exemption from income taxes (Art. 14, Sec. 4[3]) — All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
3. Exemption from donor’s and estate tax (Art. 14, Sec. 4[4]) — all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions
used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
‣ RATIONALE — These tax exemptions are meant to help enable private schools to offer quality and affordable
education.
‣ What must an institution prove with substantial evidence to be granted tax exemptions?
1. That it must be an educational institution
2. That it falls under the classification of a non-stock, non-profit corporation
3. The income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes
‣ What does the term "educational institution" mean?
‣ It refers to schools and "non-formal education is understood to be school-based and 'private auspices such as
foundations and civic-spirited organizations' are ruled out. It is settled that the term 'educational institution,' when
used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to a “school, seminary, college or educational establishment.” Thus, the
YMCA is not an educational institution. (Commission of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals 1998)
‣ Part of the school building is used as residence of the President and his family and another part is rented out to a
commercial establishment. Do these uses of the building come under the phrase "used exclusively for . . .
educational purposes" ?
‣ The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution. "Exclusive
use," however, includes "incidental use" reasonably related to the accomplishment of the purpose mentioned. The
President's residence qualifies under such "incidental use" but not that portion used for commercial purposes. (Abra
Valley college, Inc. v. Aquino 1988)
HIGHEST BUDGETARY PRIORITY OF EDUCATION

‣ The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
‣ BUT — This provision has been construed to be merely directory; it does not follow that the hands of Congress be so
hamstrung as to deprive it of the power to respond to the imperatives of national interest and the attainment of other
state policies and objectives. (Guingona v. Carague)
RIGHT OF STUDENTS TO EDUCATION

‣ RULE — Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements.
‣ Does the requirement of passing a medical admission test (and other admission tests) before one may be
admitted to a medical school violate the provision which makes education accessible to all?
‣ NO. Section 1 of Article 14 must be read in conjunction with Section 5 which makes admission subject to "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission requirements." Besides, the challenged limitation on the right to enter a
medical school is an exercise of police power for the protection of the health of the public through regulation of the
medical profession. (Tablarin v. Gutierrez 1987)
‣ NOTE — While students has the right to education, this is limited by the school’s right to academic freedom which
includes the power to decide who and what to teach.
SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

‣ What is the relationship of the school and its students?

‣ SEE — Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523
‣ The relation between student and school is contractual, the contract is for the duration of the course until
graduation, subject to the right of the school to dismiss students for academic or disciplinary reason.
‣ The “termination of contract” theory in Alcuaz can no longer be used as a valid ground to deny readmission or re-
enrolment to students who had led or participated in student mass actions against the school. The students do not
shed their constitutionally- protected rights of free expression at the school gates.
‣ Accordingly, the only valid grounds to deny readmission of students are —
1. Academic deficiency
2. Breach of the school’s reasonable rules of conduct.

‣ What are the minimum standards of due process that schools must observe in disciplining their students?
1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case. (Guzman v. National University 1986)
‣ NOTE — Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be
summary; and cross- examination is not an essential part thereof. (Guzman v. National University 1986)
‣ May schools take disciplinary action for acts committed outside the campus?
‣ Generally NO. However, it may in the following cases —
1. In respect to violations of school policies in connection with school sponsored activities
2. Where the misconduct affects the student's status or the good name or reputation of the school. (Angeles v. Judge
Sison 1982)
‣ RATIONALE —The school is charged with the development of moral character and in this must receive the aid of
government. (Angeles v. Judge Sison 1982)
‣ How does due process for students affect the academic freedom of schools?
‣ While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education and to due process, the schools are
also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this
freedom is not jeopardized. (Licup vs USC 1989)
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
‣ RULE — ACADEMIC FREEDOM SHALL BE ENJOYED IN ALL INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
‣ Do all schools enjoy academic freedom?
‣ NO. Only those educational institutions of higher learning. (Collegiate level)
‣ NACHURA — Colleges, publicly- or privately-owned, if they offer collegiate courses, enjoy academic freedom.
‣ What is academic freedom?
‣ BERNAS citing the 1940 Statement of Principles of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) —
Academic freedom means that —
1. The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate
performance of his other academic duties
2. The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to
introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject
3. The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an officer in an educational
institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but
his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer,
he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence, he

should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of
others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.
‣ SEE — Garcia v. Faculty Admissions Committee, 68 SCRA 277 (November 28,1975) —
‣ It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedoms' of a university
to determine for itself on academic grounds —
1. Who may teach
2. What may be taught
3. How it shall be taught
4. Who may be admitted to study
‣ NOTE — Included in these is the right to discipline (Miriam College Foundation v. Court of Appeals 2000)
‣ NACHURA —
1. Academic freedom from the standpoint of the educational institution — The freedom of the university to
determine “who may teach; what may be taught, how it shall be taught; and who may be admitted to study
2. Academic freedom from the standpoint of the members of the academe — The freedom of the teacher or
research worker in higher institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to
express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without interference from
political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is employed,
unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profession to be completely incompetent or
contrary to professional ethics
‣ Do students have academic freedom?
‣ BERNAS — YES. But in a different aspect. As to the academic freedom of students, who admittedly are primarily on
the learning end of education, academic freedom has been seen in jurisprudence mainly as the right to enjoy in school
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
‣ How does the academic freedom of schools affect the right to education of students?
‣ The right to education is also limited by the right of schools to dismiss, after due process, for disciplinary reasons.
(Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals 1986)
‣ May an institution of higher learning be compelled to accept a person demanding admission into its degree
program?
‣ NO. Section 5 (2) guarantees the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning. This freedom includes the right
of the school to determine the qualifications of the applicants who may be admitted. Similarly, a school may refuse
admission to a student for academic reasons. (Tangonon v. Pano 1985)
‣ Is academic freedom absolute?
‣ NACHURA — NO. It is subject to the the dominant police power of the State and the social interests of the
community.
‣ NOTE — It is also limited by the right of the students to education and due process.
JURISPRUDENCE ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM

‣ Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, the university has the
right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction conferred. This right of the university does not terminate upon the
“graduation” of the student, because it is precisely the “graduation” of such student which is in question. Wide, indeed,
is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom
“is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion”. (U.P. Board of Regents v. William 1999)
‣ Academic freedom grants the University the exclusive discretion to determine to whom among its graduates it shall
confer academic recognition, based on its established standards. And the courts may not interfere with such exercise
of discretion unless there is a clear showing that the University has arbitrarily and capriciously exercised its judgment.
Unlike the UP Board of Regents that has the competence and expertise in granting honors to graduating students of
the University, courts do not have the competence to constitute themselves as an Honor's Committee and substitute
their judgment for that of the University officials. (Morales v. Board of Regents 2004)

‣ It is within the sound discretion of the university to determine whether a student may be conferred graduation honors,
considering that the student had incurred a failing grade in an earlier course she took in school. (USC vs CA)
‣ Resolution No. 105 of the Professional Regulation Commission prohibiting examinees for the accountancy licensure
examinations from attending “any review class, briefing, conference or the like” or to “receive any hand-out, review
material or any tip” from any school, etc., was held to have violated the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their
enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming full-fledged public accountants. (Lupangco vs CA)
‣ While DECS regulations prescribe a maximum of three years probation period for teachers, the termination of the
three-year period does not result in the automatic permanent status for the teacher. It must be conditioned on a
showing that the teacher’s services during the probationary period was satisfactory in accordance with the employer's
standards. The prerogative of the school to provide standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these
standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give
educational institutions the right to choose who should teach. (Cagayan Capitol College v. NLRC)
‣ The Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil Service rules on AWOL, stressing that
when the UP opted to retain private petitioner and even promoted him despite his absence, the University was
exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in light of provisions
of the Civil Service Law, the respondent Commission had no authority to dictate to UP or any institution of higher
learning the outright dismissal of its personnel. (University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres v. CSC 2001)
LANGUAGE
Section 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched on
the basis of existing Philippine and other languages.
Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and
sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational
system.
Section 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until
otherwise provided by law, English.
The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction
therein.
Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis.
Section 8. This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be translated into major regional
languages, Arabic, and Spanish.
Section 9. The Congress shall establish a national language commission composed of representatives of various regions
and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development, propagation, and
preservation of Filipino and other languages.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Section 10. Science and technology are essential for national development and progress. The State shall give priority to
research and development, invention, innovation, and their utilization; and to science and technology education, training,
and services. It shall support indigenous, appropriate, and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, and their
application to the country's productive systems and national life.

Section 11. The Congress may provide for incentives, including tax deductions, to encourage private participation in
programs of basic and applied scientific research. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other forms of incentives shall be
provided to deserving science students, researchers, scientists, inventors, technologists, and specially gifted citizens.
Section 12. The State shall regulate the transfer and promote the adaptation of technology from all sources for the
national benefit. It shall encourage the widest participation of private groups, local governments, and community-based
organizations in the generation and utilization of science and technology.
Section 13. The State shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists, and other gifted
citizens to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for such period as may be
provided by law.
ARTS AND CULTURE
Section 14. The State shall foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based
on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression.
Section 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the
nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.
Section 16. All the country's artistic and historic wealth constitutes the cultural treasure of the nation and shall be under
the protection of the State which may regulate its disposition.
Section 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and
policies.
Section 18.
(1) The State shall ensure equal access to cultural opportunities through the educational system, public or private cultural
entities, scholarships, grants and other incentives, and community cultural centers, and other public venues.
(2) The State shall encourage and support researches and studies on the arts and culture.
SPORTS
Section 19.
(1) The State shall promote physical education and encourage sports programs, league competitions, and amateur
sports, including training for international competitions, to foster self-discipline, teamwork, and excellence for the
development of a healthy and alert citizenry.
(2) All educational institutions shall undertake regular sports activities throughout the country in cooperation with athletic
clubs and other sectors.

ARTICLE 15 — THE FAMILY
ARTICLE 15 — THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of
social security.

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.


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CONSTITUTIONAL

ARTICLE 5 — SUFFRAGE 109

ARTICLE 13 — SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113

ARTICLE 15 — THE FAMILY 131

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

ARTICLE 3 — BILL OF RIGHTS

BILL OF RIGHTS IN GENERAL

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS

‣ What rights are protected by the Bill of Rights?

THREE INHERENT POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

2. Power of eminent domain

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

‣ Who wields and exercises these power?

‣ What are the common characteristics of these three inherent powers?

2. Necessary and indispensable; State cannot be effective without them.

3. Methods by which State interferes with private property.

4. Exercised primarily by the Legislature.

‣ What are some distinctions between these three inherent powers?

‣ It is essentially government regulation of private activities for the public good.

‣ Examples of the valid exercise of Police Power —

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

ARTICLE 2 — DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

‣ “Life and liberty” Includes the following rights —

e. Freedom of expression and speech

‣ Protected property includes —

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‣ Such as a perfected mining claim, or a perfected homestead, or a final judgment

d. Right to exercise a Profession

‣ A certificate of public convenience granted to public utilities confers no property right

HIERARCHY OF PROTECTED RIGHTS

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‣ Aspects of Due Process —

1. Procedural Due Process — a guarantee of procedural fairness, depending on the forum.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

ASPECTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

a. Laws and other government issuances must be published

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‣ It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects —

c. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard

3. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING CRIMINAL CASES

4. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN GENERAL

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‣ SEE — Webb vs People, 276 SCRA 243

‣ SEE — Lai vs People, G.R. No. 175999, July 1, 2015

5. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS

a. He is NOT a flight risk; and

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6. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

7. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

8. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them

9. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN BANK CLOSURE PROCEEDINGS

‣ SEE — Rural Bank of Buhi vs Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 288

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10. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS

‣ SEE — NAPOCOR vs. Dela Cruz, 514 SCRA 56

11. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS WITH REGARD TO EX PARTE PROVISIONAL ORDERS

‣ SEE — Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA, 195 SCRA 112

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

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