1. NAGA CENTRUM, INC. v. ORZALES G.R. No.

203576 |

14 September 2016

Easements

DOCTRINE: The owner of a landlocked property has a right to demand a right-of-way through neighboring estates
provided that it is least prejudicial to the servient estate and shortest to the highway
FACTS:
• Sps. Orzales owns a house and lot situated in Valentin Street, Sabang Naga City. Their property was surrounded by
different property owners and eventually lost passageway to public highway. To access the public road, they can only
pass through Rizal Street, which is in Naga Centrum’s property, on a limited time from 9:00am to 2:00pm daily. Burdened
by it, Sps. Orzales demands for a right-of-way from Naga Centrum but the later declined. Naga Centum intentionally
blocked the passageway and landlocked Sps. Orzales’ .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sps. Orzales has the right to demand right-of-way
HELD: Yes, to be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met: (1) The estate is
surrounded by other immovable and is without adequate outlet to public highway (2) Payment of proper indemnity (3)
Isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts (4) Right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate • All the four requisites were present in this case which justifies Sps. Orzales demand for right of way.
Also with the interest of justice as enshrined under Art. 19 and 26 of the Civil Code, Naga Centrum should have exercised
its right with justice and respect to its neighbors
2. GR No. 202176, August 1, 2016
Metrobank (Petitioner) v Chuy Lu Tan et al. (Respondents)
Third Division
Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Respondents Chuy Lu Tan and Romeo Tanco obtained five loans from herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company.
These loans are evidenced by five Promissory Notes executed by Chuy and Tanco on various dates. As security for the said
loans, Chuy executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land in Quezon City. Subsequently, Chuy and Tanco failed
to settle their loans despite Metrobank's repeated demands for payment. Metrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
and the property was sold to it (Metrobank) as the highest bidder. After application of the bid price to the respondents'
outstanding obligation and the payment of the costs of foreclosure, interests and other expenses, there remained a deficiency.
As such, Metrobank demanded from respondents the payment of the said deficiency. For respondents’ failure to pay,
Metrobank filed a suit for collection of a sum of money with the RTC of Makati. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and
ordered respondents to pay the deficiency balance. On appeal however, the C reversed the ruling of the RTC ruled that to
allow Metrobank to recover the amount it seeks from respondents would be iniquitous, as it is allegedly consisted almost
entirely of interest and penalties, which is iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant, unconscionable and would amount to
unjust enrichment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the right to claim from respondents the remainder of their obligation after deducting the amount
obtained from the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

RULING:
Yes. Settled is the rule that a creditor is not precluded from recovering any unpaid balance on the principal obligation if the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the property subject of the real estate mortgage results in a deficiency.

In Spouses Rabat v. Philippine National Bank, this Court held:

 x x x it is settled that if the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to cover the debt in an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage,
the mortgagee is entitled to claim the deficiency from the debtor. For when the legislature intends to deny the right of a
creditor to sue for any deficiency resulting from foreclosure of security given to guarantee an obligation it expressly provides
as in the case of pledges [Civil Code, Art. 2115] and in chattel mortgages of a thing sold on installment basis [Civil Code,
Art. 1484(3)]. Act No. 3135, which governs the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, while silent as to the mortgagee's right
to recover, does not, on the other hand, p:ohibit recovery of deficiency. Accordingly, it has been held that a deficiency claim
arising from the extrajudicial foreclosure is allowed.

Indeed, the fact that the mortgaged property was sold at an amount less than its actual market value should not militate against
the right to such recovery. This Court has likewise ruled that in deference to the rule that a mortgage is simply a security and
cannot be considered payment of an outstanding obligation, the creditor is not barred from recovering the deficiency even if
it bought the mortgaged property at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at a lower price than its market value notwithstanding
the fact that said value is more than or equal to the total amount of the debtor's obligation.

2. Metropolitan Bank & Trust co. v. Chuy Lu Tan

G.R. No. 202176, August 1, 2016, Peralta, J. | kam

TOPIC: Nominal, temperate, liquidated, and exemplary damages

SUMMARY: Debtors Chuy and Tanco and sureties Sy and Tan (4 Respondents) defaulted on their obligation to Metrobank. Metrobank
extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgaged property but still demanded payment from respondents with regard to the deficiency
amounting to 1.6 million pesos. RTC ordered respondents to pay the deficiency amount to Metrobank but CA reversed the RTC ruling,
siding with respondents in their contention that allowing Metrobank to recover the amount that it seeks, despite selling the mortgaged
property at an amount lower than its market value, would amount to unjust enrichment.
SC ruled that a creditor is not precluded from recovering any unpaid balance on the principal obligation if the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of the property subject of the real estate mortgage results in a deficiency. However, SC did not fully agree with Metrobank’s
contention that the penalty charge on the deficiency claim should be the same as what is indicated in the promissory notes. The surcharge
or penalty stipulated in a loan agreement in case of default partakes of the nature of liquidated damages under Article 2226 of the Civil
Code, and is separate and distinct from interest payment. SC reversed the CA decision and affirmed the RTC decision with some
modifications, reducing the penalty charge on the deficiency claim from 18% to 12% and awarding attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of
the deficiency claim (as opposed to the demand of Metrobank - 10% of the full amount of obligation).

DOCTRINES:
 The surcharge or penalty stipulated in a loan agreement in case of default partakes of the nature of liquidated damages under
Article 2226 of the Civil Code, and is separate and distinct from interest payment.
 Under Article 2227 of the Civil Code, liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably
reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
 The attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal clause. It has
been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant.
(Barons Marketing Corporation v. CA)

FACTS: Petition for review on Certiorari to reverse CA decision

Petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
Respondents Chuy Lu Tan, Mr. Romeo Tanco, Dr. Sy Se Hiong, and Tan Chu Hsiu Yen
 Chuy Lu Tan (Chuy) & Romeo Tanco (Tanco) obtained 5 loans from Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank) amounting
to a total of 19.9 million pesos.
 Securities for the loan:
1. Real Estate Mortgage executed by Chuy over a parcel of land in QC
2. Continuing Surety Agreement, wherein Sy Se Hiong (Sy) and Tan Chu Hsiu Yen (Tan) bound themselves to be solidarily liable
with Chuy & Tanco for the principal amount of P 19,900,000 plus interests & other costs.

Default:
 Chuy & Tanco failed to settle loans despite repeated demands from Metrobank.
 In a final demand letter dated Oct. 27, 1999, it was stated that as of Oct. 15, 1999, their obligations, comprising the principal
amount loaned, together with interest and penalties, amounted to P 24,353,062.03.
 Dec. 14, 1999 – Metrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and Metrobank was the highest bidder, property sold for P
24,572,268.00.

Deficiency:
 Metrobank claimed that after application of the bid price to the respondents’ outstanding obligation and the payment of costs of
foreclosure, accrued interest, penalty charges, attorney’s fees and other related expenses, there remained a deficiency of P
1,641,815.00 as of January 15, 2000.
  Metrobank demanded payment of deficiency and filed a suit for collection of sum of money with RTC Makati when respondents
did not pay.

RTC Makati
 Chuy was declared in default for failure to attend pretrial and to file her pretrial brief so Metrobank was allowed to present
evidence ex parte against Chuy.
 Respondents were ordered by RTC to pay Metrobank the deficiency with 16% interest until paid.

Court of Appeals
 Metrobank appealed because RTC did not apply the interest rates and penalty charges stipulated in the promissory notes and no
award of attorney’s fees were given to Metrobank in RTC.
 Respondents except Chuy appealed the decision because they claimed that the value of the property foreclosed was already more
than enough to pay the debt in full.
 CA ruled in favor of respondents, holding that to allow Metrobank to recover the amount it seeks from respondents would be
iniquitous, unconscionable, and would amount to unjust enrichment. Metrobank’s MR denied.

ISSUE (HELD): WON CA erred in reversing and setting aside RTC’s decision? (YES)

RATIO DECIDENDI: SC ruled for the petitioner. (Nasa dulo / baba pa yung RATIO related to temperate damages.)

Creditor’s right to recover unpaid balance in case of deficiency

 Settled is the rule that a creditor is not precluded from recovering any unpaid balance on the principal obligation if the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the property subject of the real estate mortgage results in a deficiency.
 Indeed, the fact that the mortgaged property was sold at an amount less than its actual market value should not militate against
the right to such recovery.
 This Court has likewise ruled that in deference to the rule that a mortgage is simply a security and cannot be considered payment
of an outstanding obligation, the creditor is not barred from recovering the deficiency even if it bought the mortgaged property at
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at a lower price than its market value notwithstanding the fact that said value is more than or
equal to the total amount of the debtor’s obligation. (Not expressly stated in the facts of the case pero bought at a lower price than
market value yung foreclosed property.)
 Settled is the rule that a mortgage is simply a security and not a satisfaction of indebtedness.
Amount sought to be recovered
 Respondents never disputed the amount and computation of the deficiency sought to be recovered by petitioner.
 What respondents are insisting is that petitioner is barred from recovering any deficiency because the bid price is
considerably inadequate as compared to the alleged actual value of the foreclosed property.
 However, as discussed above, the settled rule is that when there is right to redeem, the inadequacy of the price becomes immaterial
since the judgment debtor may reacquire the property or sell his right to redeem.
 The SC does not agree with respondents’ implication that the bid price should approximate the value of the mortgage property.
Act No. 3135 (rules on extrajudicial foreclosure) does not have any requirement with regard to the mortgaged properties’
appraisal value (no minimum amount guideline).

Tempering respondents’ liability on the ground of equity

 Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the Court may not temper respondents' liability to the petitioner on the ground of equity.
 The Court is barred by its own often repeated admonition that equity, which has been aptly described as “justice outside legality”,
is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. For all its conceded merit, equity
is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement.

Unjust enrichment
 The CA simply says that to allow petitioner to recover the amount it seeks, which is allegedly over and above the actual value of
the property it bought at public auction, would amount to unjust enrichment.
 However, the Court does not see any unjust enrichment resulting from upholding the right of the petitioner to collect any
deficiency from respondents.
 Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good governance. As discussed above, there is a
strong legal basis for petitioner’s claim against respondents for the balance of their loan obligation.

Rates to be imposed (RELATED TO TOPIC)

 The Court does not totally agree with petitioner's contention that the rate of penalty charges which should be imposed on the
deficiency claim, as well as the recoverable attorney's fees, should be that embodied in the contract entered into by the parties.
Promissory Notes indicate 16% interest, and the SC held that such rate is fair.

 Penalty charge - SC has held that the surcharge or penalty stipulated in a loan agreement in case of default partakes of the
nature of liquidated damages under Article 2226 of the Civil Code, and is separate and distinct from interest payment.
 Also referred to as a penalty clause, it is expressly recognized by law. It is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on
the part of an obligor in case of breach of an obligation.
o Nonetheless, under Article 2227 of the Civil Code, liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
 In the instant case, the Court finds the 18% penalty charge imposed by petitioner on the deficiency claim, computed from the
time of default, as excessive and, accordingly, reduces it to 12% considering that petitioner was already able to recover a large
portion of respondents' principal obligation. (Note: Iba yung penalty charge sa Promissory Notes sa penalty charge sa deficiency
claim. Yung sa deficiency claim nireduce ng SC.)

 Attorney’s fees - The attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly
called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is
strictly binding upon defendant. (Barons Marketing Corporation v. CA) However, the courts still have the power to reduce the same
if the said fees are unreasonable.
- Promissory notes indicate attorney’s fees at 10% of the total amount due. Since Metrobank has already recovered principal
amount of loan and a sizeable portion of the interest and penalty charges during the foreclosure sale, SC reduced the
attorney’s fees to 10% of the deficiency claim only (not total amount).
 Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, total monetary awards shall earn 6% interest per annum (p.a.) from the finality of this
Decision until full satisfaction thereof.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition PARTLY GRANTED. CA decision REVERSED, RTC decision AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
1. The sum of P 1,641,815.00 due to Metrobank shall earn 16% interest p.a. and penalty charge at 12% p.a.
2. Attorney’s fees in the amount of P 164,181.50 which is 10% of the deficiency claim.
3. Total monetary awards will earn 6% interest p.a. from finality of this decision until full satisfaction.

3. Republic of the Philippines Vs. Lorena Omapas Sali

G.R. No. 206023. April 3, 2017

Facts

Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC.
Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and Almarina A. Albay who was born on April 24, 1968 in Baybay,
Leyte.
Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte, thru
inadvertence and mistake, erroneously entered in the records the following: Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as
“DOROTHY” instead of “LORENA” and Secondly, the date of birth of the petitioner as “June 24, 1968” instead of “April 24,
1968.”
The petitioner alleged that she has been using the name “Lorena A. Omapas” and her date of birth as “April 24, 1968” for as
long as she could remember and is known to the community in general as such.
To sustain petitioner’s claim that the entries in her Certificate of Live Birth pertaining to her first name and date of birth
should be corrected so that it will now read as “LORENA A. OMAPAS” and “April 24, 1968”.
RTC granted the Petition. However, appealed the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction on the part of RTC because the title of
the petition and the order setting the petition for hearing did not contain Sali’s aliases.
The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication that Sali is known by a name other than
“Lorena,” hence, it would be absurd to compel her to indicate any other alias that she does not have; (2) Sali not only
complied with the mandatory requirements for an appropriate adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules but also
gave the Republic an opportunity to timely contest the purported defective petition; and (3) the change in the first name of
Sali will certainly avoid further confusion as to her identity and there is no showing that it was sought for a fraudulent
purpose or that it would prejudice public interest.

Issue

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition

Ruling

No, In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali’s first name, was not within the RTC’s primary
jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been administrative, e., filing of the petition with the local
civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the petition to
correct Sali’s first name.

4. Maria Concepcion Singson v. Benjamin Singson

G.R. No. 210766
January 8, 2018

FACTS: This is a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
alleged that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably
extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually,” and a compulsive gambler;
that respondent was immature, and was unable to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also irresponsible, an
easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any
help, support, or assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she
was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.

Respondent countered that petitioner failed to demonstrate gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. He averred
that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support or assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family
home where petitioner and their children are living was in fact his own capital property; that his shortcomings as mentioned
by petitioner do not pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders that would satisfy the standards
required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing more than a complaint of a woman
with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that contrary to petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing
fellow, he has a college degree in business administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was money problem, and
not his alleged personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him and petitioner.

The RTC declared the marriage null and void while the CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is null and void due to psychological incapacity? NO

RULING: Petition denied; CA decision affirmed

RATIO: 'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to
no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in
Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate
the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.
In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations because she failed to establish that such incapacity was
grave and serious, and that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.

We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was
grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family
from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with
petitioner-appellee and their children."

It is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will." "[I]t is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness."

Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1,

5.

2016
FACTS:

Petitioner – Raquel Kho ;

Respondent – Veronica Borata

Sometime in the afternoon of May 1972, petitioner’s parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon,
then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare
whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and
respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the
public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;

Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony.

Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license
and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement
of a marriage license;

Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer’s office
was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the
purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before
dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby
rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential
requisite and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such
marriage license;

Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and
respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of
action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner’s allegation that their marriage was
celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and
respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license
which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING

ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT’S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE

RULING: The marriage is void for not having a valid marriage license.

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but
not those under Article

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the
Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar “has no
record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and
Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972.”21 Thus, on
the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent
has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid
as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge
that burden.

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be
said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which
would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that
the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed
without the corresponding marriage license is null and void

It can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33
As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without
a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72
to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions

6. Vitangcol v People G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016

By SeciaMarch 29, 2017No comments

Doctrine:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they
proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the
nullity of the first marriage.

Facts:
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice). Born into their union were three (3) children. After some time,
Alice eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as
evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for
bigamy against Norberto.

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence a Certification from the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his
favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage
license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution
of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.

Issue: Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to
petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from
the bigamy charge.

Ruling: No. Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is
true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere
certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his
alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision from any
trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Ratio:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina
when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

7. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) andLOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents
April 20, 1998
FACTS:
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance and action for partition of four
(4) parcels of land. He was claiming that he was the son of the deceasedInocentes Trinidad. Patricio Trinidad,
the father of the deceased, owned four (4) parcels of land,which he left to his three children namely, Inocentes,
Lourdes, and Felix. The refusal of the defendants, Lourdes and Felix, to the demand of Arturo to the partition
of the land into three (3)equal parts caused Arturo to file a case which was decided in his favour.The Appellate
court did not decide in favor of Arturo and reversed the ruling of the lower court onthe ground that he was not
able to present sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to present a marriage contract would mean that there was no marriage that
transpired.
RULING:
While it is true that a marriage contract is the primary evidence of a marriage, the failure topresent it does not
prove that no marriage took place because there are other evidences thatcould have the same bearing as a
marriage contract. He failed to present the marriage contractdue to the destruction of such records. His act of
presenting witnesses who were present duringthe nuptial of his parents, his baptismal certificate and the
affirmation of the cohabitation of hisparents is enough evidence to prove the marriage of his parents.
 8. Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. CA (Presumption of Marriage)

Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration

Facts: Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed
Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and
the deceased.

Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly supported by an
Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased
Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.

Pedro sought to intervene during the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of the
deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the marriage between
Appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the
original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa
presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. Several irregularities on the reconstructed
Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by
the solemnizing officer; (2) a mere “thumbmark” was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on said reconstructed marriage
contract on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead of his customary signature as affixed in their Sworn Affidavit; (3)
inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage Contract mentioned in the affidavit executed
by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony admitted by the appellant; and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported
marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the legally
adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent.
The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.

Issues: 1. WON the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed valid

Held: Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.

Ratio: Pilapil’s claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was misplaced. An affidavit executed by the
appellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they lived together as husband and wife for at least five years exempted them from the marriage
license requirement (Article 76 of the Civil Code).

Also misplaced was Pilapil’s argument that the marriage was void because of the absence of a marriage contract and the absence of
entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar and in the National Census and Statistics Office. A marriage contract
is the best evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, “the contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other
than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly,
the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.” In the instant case, appellant provided
competent evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony was solemnized between her and the late Dr. Jacob. Such evidence was
supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and the solemnizing officer Msgr. Yllana through their sworn testimonies both in
open court and in writing, and through the photographs taken during the ceremony.

The absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census
and Statistics Office (NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of the solemnizing officer, not the petitioner, to send
a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in order to be duly recorded.

In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and appellant Tomasa lived
together as husband and wife was not disputed in this case, but was in fact even accepted, it would follow that the presumption of
marriage was not likewise rebutted.

9. MARRIAGES DISSOLVED BY FOREIGN JUDGMENT

REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 199515
June 25, 2018
Third Division
Leonen J.

Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001. They lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama Prefecture,
Japan and did not have any children. Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was
granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese Consulate in
the Philippines and had it authenticated. She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan,
where she was informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to the Philippines to report
the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce. She tried to have the Divorce
Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there was no court order
recognizing it. She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry.

The RTC rendered a Decision, finding that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was
able to prove Tanaka's national law.

Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or
written, by both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance
Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan" is sufficient to prove that she and
her husband have divorced by agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that a divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the
Family Code. Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse," OSG posits that
only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between
petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to his national law.

2.Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties was valid

SC:

1. YES.

Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that
it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular
agent or any officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country.

The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao
of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between petitioner and respondent.

The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes effective by
notification." Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between
petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to respondent's national law.
2. YES.

Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse," the Office of the Solicitor
General posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.

The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would
be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from something that a foreign law may allow.
Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.

The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards any agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It presumes that
the Filipino spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of the marital bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce
proceedings are protracted litigations fraught with bitterness and drama. Some marriages can end amicably, without the parties
harboring any ill will against each other. The parties could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if the national law of the
foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity between the former spouses, a friendly
atmosphere for the children and extended families, and less financial burden for the family.

It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more progressive than current enactments. Our laws should never be
intended to put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should
not tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may
not, only contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation encourages unequal partnerships and perpetuates abuse m intimate
relationships.

To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws, petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's
newfound companionship with another cannot be just. Justice is better served if she is not discriminated against in her own
country.86 As much as petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her
commitment within the institution of marriage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court June 2, 2011 Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in SP. Proc. No.
10-0032 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code and the Certificate of Acceptance
of the Report of Divorce dated December 16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to remarry.

10. Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera

TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child
who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in
January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while
still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer
husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is
the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration
and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

11. Republic v. Manalo (Case Digest)

Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan
and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the
entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname,
Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign
spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to Justice
Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd
situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to
the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only
that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether
it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted
that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation
since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be
bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that the
limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the
equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce
proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the
divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or
constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still
be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to
the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

12.Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the
wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
13. DOREEN GRACE MEDINA vs. MICHIYUKI KOIKE
G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 733

FACTS: Doreen and Koike, a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City.

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Koike jointly filed for divorce in Japan, which was gra
nted.

Subsequently, Doreen filed before the RTC a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.

The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse must be proven.

ISSUES
 1) Whether a divorce decree jointly filed and obtained by the Filipino and Japanese
can be recognized by RTC under paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

2) Whether our courts can take judicial notice of a foreign judgment of divorce.

3) Whether the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the divorce decree is a ques
tion of fact.

RULINGS

1) YES, paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippin

e courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely beca
use the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.

2) NO, our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment. This me
ans that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our r
ules on evidence.

Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who ob
tained the divorce must be proven.

3) YES, considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Koike,
as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factu
al that calls for a re-
evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal
is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review.

The question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice
warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further proceedings.

It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration
of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A d
eviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for
after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the cou
rts.

14. WASSMER VS. VELEZ 12 SCRA 648

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on September 4, 1954. On
the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes
it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.

Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.

Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this
appeal.
 Issue:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding and go through all the
necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.

When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary damages may not be awarded when it
is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
15. C. Agreements prior to Marriage
2. Breach of promise to marry

APOLONIO TANJANCO V. CA and ARACELI SANTOS

18 SCRA 994 – December 17, 1996

FACTS:
About December 1997, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age. That Apolonio expressed his undying love affection to Araceli
also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings, in consideration of Apolonio promise of marriage Araceli consented and
acceded to Apolonio’s pleas for carnal knowledge. Until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of
marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child. Araceli
informed Aplolonio and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage but instead of honoring his promises and
righting his wrong, Apolonio stopped and refrained from seeing Araceli since about July 1959 has not visited her and to all intents
and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

ISSUE:
WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21.

HELD:
No. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, Araceli, a
woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Apolonio, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Hence, the courts conclude that no case is made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no other cause of action being alleged, no
error was committed by the CFI in dismissing the complaint. The decision of CA is reversed and that of CFI is affirmed.

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

16. De Jesus vs Syquia

TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866

FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s
brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent
family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had
an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a
letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was
out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s”
sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital
in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived
together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was
married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the
ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her
pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should
be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to
connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be
indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and
the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status”.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for
supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof
upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally,
SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the
amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify
the order as to the amount of pension.

17. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

Posted on October 20, 2010 at 12:36 PM
219 scra 115
Article 21 of the Civil Code

This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty
lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other
hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student,
before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition
that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the
Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s
attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the
petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After
trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.

HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which defines quasi-delicts thus:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry
in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy.

18.Constantino vs Mendez
Constantino vs. Mendez
209 SCRA 18

FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan
Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was
working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual
contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate
child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her
son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the
crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual
intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage
was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

19. JO-ANN DIAZ - SALGADO vs. LUIS G. ANSON
G.R. No. 204494. July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 541

FACTS: Luis alleged that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina, with whom he
was married in a civil ceremony in 1966. During the marital union, they acquired severa
l real properties, which Luis claimed pertained to the conjugal partnership.

Without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three (3) separate Unilateral Deeds
of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-
Ann, Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship. Jo-
Ann secured new certificates of title over the said property while the properties subject o
f the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina.

Claiming that he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties, and of
his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina, Luis filed a complaint to annul the
deeds of sale.

On the other hand, Jo-

Ann contends that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis,
only knowing theirs to be a common-
law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agr
eement by virtue of which Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him.

Jo-
Ann disputed the validity of Luis and Severina’s marriage on the ground of lack of marri
age license. The marriage contract presented to court contained an equivocal declaration that
no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage.
 The RTC nonetheless ruled that the marriage is valid. It noted that the marriage contr
act, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is
conclusive to the fact of marriage.

The CA sustained the RTC ruling because Jo-

Ann did not present any evidence to controvert the evidence presented by law.

ISSUES

1) Whether the presumption of regularity attached to public document stand in the pres
ence of prima facie evidence of the non-existence of the marriage license.

2) Whether the partition agreement is valid.

RULINGS

1) NO, the presumption of regularity does not hold water vis-à-

vis a prima facie (marriage license), which on its face has established that no marriage
license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requ
ires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract
, or the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no suc
h marriage license was issued to the parties.

Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage itself
, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character and no
proof to the contrary was presented, there is no plausible conclusion other than that the
marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and
is thus, void ab ignitio.

2) YES, the provision on co-

ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-
owned by Luis and Severina.

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each oth
er at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the
very beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code in rel
ation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing th
eir properly relations.

Article 147 of the Family Code “applies to union of parties who are legally capacitat
ed and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonethel
ess void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license. Under this property regime
, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of
the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s e
ffort consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.

It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that “partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it
may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value.

As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise t
hat “partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by Judicial proceedings x x
x,” The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence,
even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the e
xecution of the Partition Agreement.
20. Raquel Kho v. Republic of the PH
GR 187462

June 1, 2016

Facts:

Petitioner’s parents summoned a clerk to arrange necessary papers on one afternoon of May 31, 1972 for
the intended marriage of parties herein on the midnight as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage
ceremony. They were only able to fulfill such ceremony at 3AM of June 1, 1972 for reason that there was a public
dance held in town plaza that was adjacent to the church and such dance only finished at 2AM. Due to the
shortness of period, said clerk was not able to secure them a marriage license. RTC declared their marriage null
and void. CA reversed it stating that the marriage was valid and subsisting.

Issue: W/N CA erred to give due credence to petitioner’s evidence which established the
absence or lack of marriage license when the marriage was solemnized.

Held:

Marriage is void. Art 58 and Art 80 (3) of the Civil Code explicitly provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first issued by the LCR (Art. 58). Marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void (Art. 80 (3)). Court favors petitioner.

21. AM NO. 02-11-10-SC ON THE RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT OF
VOID MARRIAGES DOES NOT APPLY IN A CASE INVOLVING RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE Republic
of the Philippines vs. Florie Grace Cote G.R. No. 212860; March 14, 2018 Reyes, Jr. J. FACTS: Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals which held that the RTC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
petition of the respondent is covered by AM No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages on the ground that Respondent’s husband, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) was already an American Citizen
when he obtained the divorce decree. Rhomel and respondent Florie Grace Cote (Florie) were married, at that time,
they were both Filipinos. Few years after, Rhomel, who is already naturalized citizen of another country, filed a Petition
for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage was irretrievably
broken. The petition was granted. Seven years later, the RTC, upon petition for recognition of foreign judgment
granting the divorce, declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry after its declaration of absolute nullity attained
finality. Republic filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the RTC believing that the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC applied Section 20 of said Rule and denied the appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for Certiorari with the
CA claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion which was then denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner posits that A.M. No. 02-11-10- SC does not cover cases involving recognition of foreign divorce because the
wording of Section 1 thereof clearly states that it shall only apply to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of AM No. 02-11-10-SC apply in a case involving recognition of a foreign decree of divorce?
RULING: No, AM No. 02-11-10-SC provisions do not apply. The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. A decree of absolute
divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers
void and voidable marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code of the Philippines. Void and
voidable marriages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never existed.
Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising after the marriage.
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Thus, since
Florie followed the procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, an appeal from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

22. FAILINGS AS HUSBAND AND FATHER ARE NOT TANTAMOUNT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY Yolanda E. Garlet
vs. Vencidor T. Garlet G.R. No. 193544; August 2, 2017 Leonardo-De Castro, J. FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which assails the Decision of the CA which reversed and set aside
the Decision of the RTC. Petitioner Yolanda Garlet and respondent Vencidor Garlet were married with two children.
During their marriage, petitioner worked in Japan to support their family. Petitioner then acquired parcels of land, a
mini-grocery store, and a jeepney. Petitioner alleged that she was the only one working for their family as respondent
turned into a selfish, irresponsible, philandering and abusive husband. Petitioner alleged that respondent never
bothered to look for a stable job and maintained his vices of gambling, drinking, and womanizing. Petitioner and
respondent were fighting constantly. Petitioner and respondent tried to settle their marital issues before the barangay.
There, respondent admitted taking petitioner's money and jewelry because he had no means to support the family.
Realizing that there was no more love and respect between them and that respondent was just using her, petitioner
finally separated from respondent. A clinical psychologist concluded that respondent was suffering from narcissistic
type of personality disorder. Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of respondent’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations to petitioner and their
children. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and gave weight to the clinical psychologist’s conclusion. The CA reversed
the RTC judgment and reasoned that the evidence adduced by petitioner was not enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

ISSUE: Were failings as husband and father tantamount to psychological incapacity to declare the marriage null and
void?
RULING: No. Failings as husband and father are not tantamount to psychological incapacity to declare the marriage null
and void. While the Court does not hold respondent totally without blame or free of shortcomings, his failings as
husband and father are not tantamount to psychological incapacity which renders their marriage void from the very
beginning. Worthy of reiterating herein is the declaration of the Court in Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviado that: “These
acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished
from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders — existing at the time of the marriage — clearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.” The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. Hence, failings as
husband and father are not tantamount to psychological incapacity to declare the marriage null and void.

23. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

v. DANILO A. PANGASINAN, Respondent
GR. No. 214077, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

Danilo and Josephine first met at the Philippine Plaza Hotel in Manila where they were both working sometime in 1981. Following
a three-month courtship, Josephine became pregnant. To erase any notion of impropriety, the couple immediately contracted
marriage, first civilly on December 29, 1981, followed by a church wedding on January 23, 1982. 4 The couple begot three children—
Juan Carlo, Julia Erika, and Josua.

At the outset, life for Danny and Josephine generally ran harmoniously, although marred from time to time by arguments about
money matters. They did not have any major problems, and even became partners in Danilo's business pursuits. 5 Signs of marital
kinks appeared when Danilo's business began to slow down. This caused the couple to fight incessantly, since Danilo began to have
difficulty supporting Josephine and their children at the same level to which they were accustomed. 6 Allegations of infidelity on the
part of Danilo compounded things.nrobleslaw

Sometime in September 2007, Josephine underwent hysterectomy. Four days after bringing her home from the hospital, Danilo
flew to Tacloban for a business trip, which Josephine already knew of even prior to her operation. As it turned out, Josephine did not
want him to leave. Danilo came home to find an irate Josephine seething at him. Josephine's sudden demand to see his bank
passbook so enraged Danilo that he tossed the passbook in front of her. Josephine, in turn, became incensed and started to curse
and berate him. Out of anger and exasperation, Danilo grabbed and smashed two glass cups beside him, while Josephine continued
on with her tirade against him. Josephine left the conjugal home the next day, never to resume cohabitation with Danilo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Josephine's psychological incapacity is a medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable and existing
at the inception of their marriage.

HELD:

It is true that in petitions for nullification of marriages, it is not necessary that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. However, the totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity. In addition to the foregoing, the psychological illness and its
root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage.c
 In this case, there is no such reliable and independent evidence establishing Josephine's psychological condition and its
associations in her early life. Aside from what Danilo relayed to Dr. Dayan, no other evidence supports his claim and Dr. Dayan's
finding that the root cause of Josephine's personality disorder antedated the marriage since Emelie and Jay's testimonies covered
circumstances that transpired after the marriage.

24. Republic vs. Romero, February 24, 2016

e Number: G.R. No. 209180 and G.R. No. 209253 Date: February 24, 2016

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As

amended by Executive Order 227)

FACTS: Reghis Romero II and Olivia Lagman Romero were married on May 11, 1972 and were blessed with two (2) children. The couple first
met in Baguio City in 1971, where Reghis’ closeness to Olivia’s family led them to become sweethearts. However, as Reghis was still a student,
determined to finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of his siblings and parents, he tried to break-up with Olivia. Olivia, however,
refused to end their relationship. With circumstances leading Olivia’s parents to believe that they had eloped, planned for Reghis and Olivia to
get married. Reghis initially objected to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared. However, Olivia’s parents assured
him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they are financially able. As Olivia’s parents had treated him with
nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed. However, the couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and
jealous fits. They became more estranged when Reghis secured a job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career and
focused on supporting his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little time with his family, causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to
be a real husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways.

On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing his psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations. He testified that he married Olivia not out of love but out of the desire to please the latter’s parents and he was not
prepared to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time, as his mind was geared towards finishing his studies and finding
employment to support his parents and siblings.

Reghis also presented Dr. Basilio, a clinical psychologist, who submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report and testified that Reghis suffered
from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD). According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for
whatever endeavour he choses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as those pertaining to his roles as
father and husband. Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis’ OCPD was the root of the couple’s disagreements and that the same is incurable,
explaining too that Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest from his mind at the time and, as such, felt cheated into marriage.

Both the RTC and the CA declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE : Can Reghis and Olivia’s marriage be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity?

RULING: NO, the marriage cannot be declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
25. Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA

266 SCRA 324

FACTS:

Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Gina’s
expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth
night. From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was
no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches
and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.

ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity ?

HELD: If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides
that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction
therefor is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This
is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope
of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

26.

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AUTHOR: Reyes, Brixton

G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
TOPIC: Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
PONENTE: J. Velasco
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under Art.
41 of the Family Code.

 Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already established by law. There is no need to file such
petition under said provisions before the court.
FACTS:
1. Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of the Philippine Constabulary and assigned
in Araya, Pampanga. They were married on January 7, 1968.

2. On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in order to serve his duties. He was never seen
or heard from again and has never made contact with any of his or Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner constantly sought updates from
the Philippine Constabulary regarding the whereabouts of her husband to no avail.

3. After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D. 1638 from the Philippine Veteran’s Affair Office
(PVAO) of the AFP. One of its requirements is a judicial declaration of presumptive death.

4. RTC: Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under Art. 41 of the Family Code.

5. CA: Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41only allows such declaration in cases of remarriage which Petitioner did not seek.
ISSUE(S): Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.
 HELD: No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a viable suit.

RATIO:
 Article 41 of the FC involves that presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage.

 The RTC erred in considering said petition because it was not filed for the purpose of remarriage under the FC but Art. 390 and 391
of the Civil Code.

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpo se of
opening his succession till after an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

 Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a person
presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. The
presumption in the said articles is already established by law. In short, the petition is not authorized by law.

 It is unnecessary for Petitioner to file for judicial declaration of presumptive death to claim death benefits from the PVAO or the AFP.
What is only required is evidence of the claimant that the concerned soldier had been missing for a number of years and or under
the circumstance prescribed under Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

27. Republic v Javier, GR 210518, April 18, 2018

Case Number: GR 210518 Date: April 18, 2018

Recit Ready Synopsis

This is a case about declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Martin Javier filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage against respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier citing that both are
psychologically incapacitated, diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, and cannot comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The Court disagrees with the CA's findings that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated since she didn’t appear personally
before Dr. Adamos, Psychological Impression Report on Michelle was based on the statements of Martin and Jose Vicente (common
friend), and there were no other independent evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged
psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the marriage was declared null and void ab initio on the basis of Martin’s psychological incapacity.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)

In this case, the marriage of Martin and Michelle was declared null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity. Martin was
diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with tendencies toward sadism. The respondent was able to provide evidence that his
disorder was rooted in the traumatic experiences he experienced during his childhood, having grown up around a violent father who was
abusive of his mother. This adversely affected him in such a manner that he formed unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage,
and proposed unconventional sexual practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals, Martin would not only quarrel with
Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her.

FACTS

● February 8, 2002 – Martin and Michelle were married

● November 20, 2008 - Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
● Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
He thus prayed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, and for the joint custody of their minor child, Amanda M. Javier.
● In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his own behalf,8 and presented the psychological findings of
Dr. Elias D. Adamos
● The psychological report of Michelle Javier and Martin Javier showed that both of them suffer from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder.
● Their disorder was considered grave and incurable, and rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
● Dr. Adamos further testified before the RTC to provide his expert opinion, and stated that with respect to the Psychological
Impression Report on Michelle, the informants were Martin and the respondents' common friend, Jose Vicente Luis Serra (Jose
Vicente)
● Dr. Adamos was unable to evaluate Michelle because she did not respond to Dr. Adamos' earlier request to come in for
psychological evaluation.
● RTC: Denied the petition. Martin's testimony is found by the Court to be not supportive of such psychological finding. Thus, as to
Michelle's alleged psychological incapacity, the Court finds Martin's testimony to be self-serving and Dr. Adamos' findings to be
without sufficient basis.
● CA: There was sufficient evidence to support Martin's claim that he is psychologically incapacitated. The CA also negated the
RTC's ruling by referring to Martin's own testimony, in which he narrated his tendency to impose his own unrealistic standards on
Michelle. In its challenged decision, the CA likewise ruled that Michelle's diagnosis was adequately supported by the narrations of
Martin and Jose Vicente.
● Republic argues that Martin's testimony is self-serving and there were no other witnesses that were presented in court, who
could have testified on Michelle's behavior.

ISSUE

Whether or not nullity of marriage should be granted to Javier on the basis of psychological incapacity pursuant to article 36 of the Family
Code

RULING

The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The totality of evidence supports the finding that Martin is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

The Court disagrees with the CA's findings that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. They cannot absolutely rely on the
Psychological Impression Report on Michelle. There were no other independent evidence establishing the root cause or juridical
antecedence of Michelle's alleged psychological incapacity. While the Supreme Court cannot discount their first-hand observations, it is
highly unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood history. The records do not
show that Michelle and Jose Vicente were childhood friends, while Martin, on the other hand, was introduced to Michelle during their
adulthood. Either Martin or Jose Vicente, as third persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have known about her childhood, how
she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her family.45 Without a credible source of her supposed childhood trauma, Dr. Adamos
was not equipped with enough information from which he may reasonably conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and
persistent disorder that is grave and incurable.

However, that Martin was also subjected to several psychological tests and Dr. Adamos diagnosed him with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Additionally, the diagnosis was based on Dr. Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who underwent more than 10 counselling
sessions with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to 2009. In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose self-existence," which
proceeded from his "ideas of preference towards ideal love and ideal marriage. Dr. Adamos also found that Martin lacked empathy,
leading him to disregard and ignore the feelings of Michelle.

As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with tendencies toward sadism. Dr. Adamos concluded from the
tests administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic experiences he experienced during his childhood, having
grown up around a violent father who was abusive of his mother. This adversely affected Martin in such a manner that he formed
unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual practices. When Michelle would disagree
with his ideals, Martin would not only quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her. Other manifestations include excessive
love for himself, self-entitlement, immaturity, and self-centeredness.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

● The Court's explanation in Rumbaua v. Rumbaua judiciously discussed the dangers of relying on the narrations of a petitioner-
spouse to the psychologist, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent
and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.

To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

● The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability, which
the Court discussed in Santos v. CA, et al.

28. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. BRIX FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368
July 17, 2006

FACTS : Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the marriage and even
during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short
period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida
even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when
Armida started doubting Brix’ fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from
women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and
jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid
and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brix’s “leaving-the-house” attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity,
the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family.
ISSUE : Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio on the ground of
respondent’s psychological incapacity.

RULING : NO. The respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with
his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but
a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential marital obligations. A “difficulty”, if not
outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their duties as married persons. It is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

29. BREAKDOWN OF MARITAL RELATION IS NOT NECESSARILY ATTRIBUTABLE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz vs. Nilo Santos Cruz
G.R. No. 201988; October 11, 2017 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: This Petition for Review on Certiorari challenges the Decision and Resolution CA that affirmed the Decision of
the RTC which refused to declare the marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner Marivi
Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi) married respondent Nilo Santos Cruz (Nilo) a few months after they met so that she could join the
latter in Hong Kong where he was then working. Marivi narrated that during their marriage, Nilo would rarely spend
time with her and would devote his time acting like a bachelor – partying with friends and meeting other women. Nilo
was also unable to sexually perform adequately. Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the marriage
because his job required him to come home late and he had had extramarital affairs. At the same time, Nilo insisted
that Marivi also contributed to the collapse of their union because she was always jealous, conceited, and had a “prima
donna attitude.” Marivi filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. She
averred that it had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate personality disorder related to
masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex," while she herself was found to be suffering from a
"personality disorder of the mixed type, histrionic, narcissistic with immaturity. The RTC denied the Petition. From the
RTC's verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA found that the psychiatrists failed to paint a clear picture of the
supposed gravity or seriousness of Nilo's psychological incapacity and ruled that it was the couple's irreconcilable
differences that marred their marriage.
ISSUE: Does breakdown of marital relation necessarily amount to psychological incapacity? RULING: No, breakdown
of marital relation does not necessarily amount to psychological incapacity. In Marcos v. Marcos, the actual medical
examination of the one claimed to have psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is the
totality of evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological incapacity. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all
the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings." In the case of Nilo, what brought about the
breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily attributable to his so-called "psychological disorder" but
can be imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings. With regard to his failure to sexually
perform "adequately," the same appeared to be a case of "selective impotency," as he was turned off by Marivi's
disclosure of their bed secrets to her family. Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the family
was caused by his "inadequate personality disorder" or "unresolved oedipal complex." Nilo explained that he has a
taxing and demanding job, and that unfortunately, with his working hours eating up his home life. It is significant to
note that Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo's penchant for womanizing as a manifestation of his psychological
incapacity. Thus, the Court believes that the protagonists in this case are in reality simply unwilling to work out a
solution for each other's personality differences and have thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or
disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.
30. REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS SHALL EXERCISE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN ALL ACTIONS INVOLVING THE
CONTRACT OF MARRIAGE AND MARITAL RELATIONS
Jerrysus l. Tilar vs. Elizabeth A. Tilar and the Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 214529; July 12, 2017 Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is direct recourse from the Decision and Order both issued by the RTC dismissing the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and denying reconsideration thereof,
respectively. Petitioner Jerrysus Tilar married respondent Elizabeth Tilar in a Catholic Church with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot
as the solemnizing officer. Their union produced one son and their marriage went well in the first few months.
However, respondent later became an extremely jealous, frequent gambler, violent and extravagant type of person.
This resulted to their quarrels and petitioner being threatened and physically harmed. The spouses eventually
separated, and respondent is now living with another man. Petitioner consulted a clinical psychologist and respondent
was said to be suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well as histrionic personality disorder" which made
her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Petitioner filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and reasoned that marriages solemnized by the Church are governed by its Canon Law and not by
the civil law observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argued that courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the provision of the Family Code,
and that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving contracts of marriage.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage solemnized and celebrated by the Church pursuant to
the provision of the Family Code?
RULING:
Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage solemnized and celebrated by the Church pursuant to
the provision of the Family Code. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and
legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant petition
only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and
the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably,
the proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the
State as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation
of the church and state finds no application in this case. As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot
just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds
may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of BP Blg. 129
provides that: “RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: In all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations.” Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the RTC falls
within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
31. Bakunawa v Bakunawa, G.R. No. 217993, August 9, 2017

Case Number: Date:

Recit Ready Synopsis

Manuel and Nora got married in 1975. After a few years, their relationship turned sour, and Manuel filed a petitionfor declaration
of nullity of marriage with RTC on the ground that they are both psychologically incapacitated. RTC granted the petition, but CA
reversed the decision. SC affirmed the decision of the CA. Marriage is VALID

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

It’s more on irreconcilable differences not psychological incapacity.

FACTS

· Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines.

· Nora got pregnant and they got married in 1975.

· Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived with Manuel's parents

· Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father in the family's construction business where
he was assigned to provincial projects and came home only during weekends.

· Whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments, he chose to spend his limited time with friends and
girlfriends instead of his family.

· Nora resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel’s behavior.

· Manuel depended on his father and Nora for their family’s needs.

· In 1976, they started to live separately from Manuel’s parents. Manuel noticed Nora's passiveness and laziness which led
to verbal quarrels and physical violence.

· In 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child.

· In 1979, Manuel had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He eventually left Nora and their children in 1980 to
cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves separated.

· In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. After Manuel spent a few nights with
them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third child

· In 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC of Quezon City, on the ground that he and
Nora are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

o Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, who testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder,
characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed
Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitudes and passive
resistance in her relationship with Manuel. Her findings were based on her interview with Manuel and the
parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora did not participate in the psychological assessment.

o Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-law wife and has a son with her, whereas,
Nora lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City.

· RTC granted the petition. CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

 ISSUE

WON the evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological
evaluation report, sufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.

In other words: WON FC 36 can be used as a ground for declaring a marriage void

RULING

· No. The Court held that the CA correctly ruled that there is an insufficiency in the evidence presented. Dr.
Villegas’ conclusion is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child who could not
be considered as a reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to
Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

· The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on Manuel despite having had
the opportunity to do so.

32. Valdes vs RTC

Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for
a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage
is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the
custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family.
 33. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , vs. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR.

G.R. No. 199194 February 10, 2016

DOCTRINE:

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present
spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

Republic vs Jose Sarenogon

Case Digest GR 199194 Feb 10, 2016

Facts:

Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie. He testified
that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to
contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned home after his contract expired, then inquired from
Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts. They also did not know where she was. Because
of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so
he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Jose’s testimony was
corroborated by his older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt. These two witnesses testified that Jose and
Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for
separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s location. The
RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that
his wife was indeed already dead.

Issue : W/N the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied with (CIVIL LAW)

Held:

No. To comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to satisfy required “well-founded belief” standard.

Sarenogon’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required
degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had
inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government
agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging
search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places,
provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons
he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.

34. CLAIMS BASED ON BARE ASSERTIONS UNCORROBORATED BY ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE FALLS SHORT OF THE
DILIGENCE REQUIRED TO ENGENDER A WELL- FOUNDED BELIEF THAT THE ABSENTEE SPOUSE IS DEAD

Republic of the Philippines vs. Ludyson Catubag

G.R. No. 210580; April 18, 2018 Reyes, Jr. J.

FACTS: Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court the Resolution of the Court of Appeals and likewise challenging the Decision of the RTC declaring
Ludyson C. Catubag's (private respondent) spouse, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag (Shanaviv), as
presumptively dead. In July 2006, Private respondent Ludyson Catubag, while working abroad, was informed
by his relatives that his wife Shanaviv Alvarez Catubag left their house and never returned. He returned and
looked for his wife. He inquired from his close friends and relatives; went to Bicol, where her wife was born and
raised; and sought the help of radio networks in the Philippines. Moreover, private respondent searched
various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol, to no avail. In 2002, after almost seven (7)
years of waiting, private respondent filed a petition to declare his wife presumptively dead. RTC granted the
petition. The petitioner opposed and contended that private respondent failed to establish a "well- founded
belief" that his missing wife was already dead.

ISSUE: Did the private respondent establish a well-founded belief that his missing wife is dead based on bare
assertions uncorroborated by any kind of evidence?

RULING: No. The private respondent did not establish a well-founded belief that his missing wife is dead based
on bare assertions uncorroborated by any kind of evidence

Although there is no exact definition of the term “well-founded belief,” it was held in the case of Republic vs.
Orcelino-Villanueva that such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Such
diligence entails an active effort on the part of the present spouse to locate the missing one. The mere
absence of a spouse, devoid of any attempt by the present spouse to locate the former, will not suffice.

In this case, the private respondent’s efforts fall short of the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for
the following reasons: First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife's whereabouts
from both friends and relatives. Further, he claims to have carried out such inquiries in the place where they
lived and, in the place, where his wife was born and raised. However, private respondent failed to present
any of these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these "inquiries." Second, private respondent did not
seek the help of other concerned government agencies, namely, the local police authorities and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the present
spouse cannot be said to have actively and diligently searched for the absentee spouse. Finally, aside from
the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private respondent bases his "well-founded belief" on bare
assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife.

Again, the present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the
diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.

35.
Republic vs Tampus GR 214243
FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days thereafter, or on
December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no
children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14,
2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after
the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.

ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead

RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under
Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that
the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that
the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent
and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere
absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to
communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives,
and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him.
Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were
assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest
efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required
to create a "well-founded belief of his death.

36. MAYOR AMADO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE, GR Nos. 212656-57, 2016-11-23

Facts:
two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
Petitioner, in his official capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, was indicted for two (2) counts of
the abovementioned criminal offense.
Arsenio Flores, a retired government employee who testified that being one of the wedding sponsors of Alex
Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal, he attended and witnessed the actual ceremony of their wedding which was
solemnized by Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, and not petitioner, at the Municipal Registrar's Office
where it was held; that with the knowledge that said Municipal Registrar was not authorized to solemnize marriage,
he did not sign as a witness their marriage certificate, and thereafter searched for documents, including pictures
and invitation cards, in order to establish such illegal acts; that based on the documents he gathered, it was made
to appear that petitioner was the one who solemnized said marriages because of his signature appearing on the
corresponding marriage certificates; and that he could not explain why the subject marriage certificate was already
signed by petitioner when in fact he was not around during the ceremony, and was immediately given to them on
the same day.[4] His testimony was corroborated by Honorato M. Tolentino, the brother-in-law of Alex Pascual,
who testified that he rendered his services for free as a photographer during said wedding, and witnessed the
actual ceremony, with the observation that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. who solemnized the same.[5]
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public documents.
Ruling:
In the instant case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC, which
provides:ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:x x x
x4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; x x x
It bears emphasis that what is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public faith and
the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it.[18] Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: (1) the
offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that
he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done.[19]
Specifically, paragraph 4 of the said Article requires that: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; and (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[20]
In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken
advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is
considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which
he falsifies.[21]
In the case at bench, and as correctly found by the SB, it is undisputed that petitioner was a public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, duly authorized by law to solemnize marriages, at the time such
alleged criminal offense was committed. Likewise, in issuing marriage certificates, being a public document issued
by the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, petitioner had the legal duty to prepare said document, and not only to
attest to the truth of what he had given account of but more importantly, to warrant the truth of the facts narrated
by him thereon.[22] Undoubtedly, these factual circumstances were clearly established since petitioner himself
admits the same. Accordingly; we are now left with one final matter to determine, i.e. whether or not the facts
narrated by petitioner on the subject marriage certificates were absolutely false. If answered in the affirmative, then
petitioner is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public documents. Otherwise, he shall be
exonerated.
I... n ruling that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the subject marriages, the SB relied heavily on the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, particularly on the common fact that they all witnessed an
alleged ceremony conducted on said dates wherein Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, was the one
who acted as the solemnizing officer, and not petitioner. It further considered the photos and photocopies of the
invitations presented and offered as additional proofs to establish the aforesaid incidents which show spouses
Pascual and spouses Asuncion standing in front of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. Moreover, the testimony of Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., being a rebuttal evidence to the claims of Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion that it was
petitioner who solemnized their respective marriages, was vastly recognized as acceptable and damaging to
petitioner's defense since the principle of res inter alios acta (the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or mission of another) does not apply in this case.
we rule to reverse the SB's ruling of conviction against petitioner.
First,... none of the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by the prosecution was able to dispute the
presumption of regularity of an official function and authenticity and due execution of the public instruments issued
by petitioner as the Municipal Mayor, which may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.
As can be gleaned from the narration of facts provided by the trial court, there is no showing that an actual
appearance by the concerned parties (spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion) before petitioner as their
solemnizing officer did not occur or happen.
L... ooking into the evidence presented, the only patent conclusion that can be derived from the prosecution's
evidence, as admitted by the witnesses for the defense, is that both couples appeared before. Thelmo O. Corpuz,
Sr., for the sole purpose of recetvmg marriage counseling and/or marriage rehearsals, nothing more.
Second,... the SB expressed that the testimonies of the defense's witnesses appear biased considering that they
"owe their current employment with the accused as these narrations rang no truth and sounded to have been well-
coached;"
Unfortunately, we find this declaration quite odd considering that there was no iota of evidence to show that both
Alex Y. Pascual and. Manny M. Asuncion owe debts of gratitude to petitioner.

37. Gandionco vs Penaranda Case Digest

Gandionco vs. Peñaranda

G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987

Facts: Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against
petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed
a complaint for concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for the application for the provisional
remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendente lite.

Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case
for concubinage.

Issue: Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case of concubinage.

Ruling: Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with
a criminal action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense.

Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the
discretion of the judge.
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38. Partosa-Jo vs CA
Partosa-Jo vs CA
GR 82606, December 18, 1992
FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have
cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation
of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite
disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated
the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed
for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil
Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated
permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD:

SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the case
filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming
their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of
the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the determination
of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have been illegally registered
in the name of the persons.

39.De Ocampo vs Florenciano

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with
plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining
illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture
where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other
than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In
June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his
intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family
Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery
other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is
prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of
the adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should
be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the
law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the
second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

40. Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil 168 (October 18, 1957)

Plaintiff – Appellant: William H. Brown

Defendant – Appellee: Juanita Yambao
Ponente: Justice JBL Reyes
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

FACTS OF THE CASE:

William H. Brown filed a petition for legal separation from his wife, Juanita Yambao, before the Court of First Instance of Manila on the ground of
adultery.

According to Brown, while he was interned by the Japanese invaders from 1942 to 1945 at the University of Santo Tomas internment camp, his
wife engaged in adulterous relations with a certain Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl. Brown said that he learned of his wife’s misconduct
only in 1945 upon his release from internment and that they have lived separately thereafter.

Brown is now praying for the confirmation of their liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; and that the defendant
be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff and for other remedy as might be just and equitable.

Now, because Juanita Yambao failed to file her answer to the petition in due time, the trial court declared her in default and ordered the City Fiscal
to represent the state and investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the New Civil Code, if collusion exists between the parties.
During the cross-examination of the plaintiff by Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose, it was found out that after the liberation, Brown had lived
martially with another woman and had begotten children by her. Because of this fact, the trial court denied the petition for legal separation on the
ground that, while his wife’s adultery was established, Brown had incurred a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under
Article 100 of the new Civil Code, and that there had been consent and connivance in addition to Brown’s action for filing a petition for legal
separation prescribing.

Brown is now appealing the decision of the lower court before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be granted?
DECISION:
. No. Decision appealed from affirmed.

ISSUE #2: In the case at bar, the SC said that the petition for legal separation should not be granted it being evident that Brown is also guilty of
co-habiting with a woman other than his wife. This misconduct bars him from claiming legal separation in accordance with the express provision of
Article 100 of the new Civil Code.

Another reason why the petition for legal separation cannot be granted is that the action for legal separation in the case at bar has already
prescribed, since Brown did not institute the proceeding until 10years after he learned of his wife’s adultery in 1945 (he filed it on 1955) and Article
102 of the new Civil Code states that “an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within 1year from and after the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within 5years from and after the date when such cause occurred”

41. Bugayong vs Ginez

Bugayong vs. Ginez
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956

FACTS:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while
on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before
he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in
Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she
had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.

Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s sister-in-law) and some from anonymous
writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted
that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in
October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendant’s
godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as
husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the
information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the
acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the
action.

HELD:

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of
marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in
the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

42. MATUBIS V PRAXEDES

109 Phil 620

Facts:

In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married. In 1948, they entered into a contract wherein they agreed
that they shall live separately and that they should not prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or
suit arising from their separation. In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion, who later gave birth to their child. In
April 1956, Socorro filed a complaint for legal Separation on the ground of abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo. The
lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription and condonation/consent.

Issue:

1.) Did the action prescribe?

2.) Did Socorro consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband?

Held:

1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after
the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause
occurred (now 5 years under Art. 57, FC). The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the
very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted
the complaint only on April 24, 1956.

2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Condonation
and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent
here are not only implied but expressed. The law specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned
and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
 43. DELA VINA V. VILLAREAL
41 Phil 13

De la Vina v. Villareal

July 31, 1920, Johnson, J.

Facts:

Geopano, wife, filed a complaint of divorce (Sept. 17, 1917) in RTC Iloilo against her husband de la Vina on the ground of concubinage
(which was allegedly occurring since 1913). When she learned of the illicit relationship, she was ejected from the conjugal home.
She prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony pendente. After filing the complaint, she presented
a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property. Mars Veloso 1C,
2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 34 Respondent Judge Villareal granted the motion. Husband filed present case of petition
for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in
issuing preliminary injunction.

Issue/ Held/Ratio:

(1) WON a married woman may ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of a
subsisting marriage.

Yes. The general rule of law that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband is not an absolute rule. The husband unlawfully
ejected the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another woman. Continued cohabitation would give the
impression of the wife’s condonation. A wife may acquire a separate residence where the husband has given cause for divorce.

(2) WON in an action for divorce, where conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary injunction may be issued to restrain a spouse
from alienating/encumbering conjugal property during the pendency of the action.

Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is granted power to alienate and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of the
wife. This only holds true as long as a harmonious relationship exists. When such relation ceases, the husband’s powers of
administration should be curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests of the wife.

44. Reyes v Ines-Luciano

88 Scra 803

Facts: Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the JDRC of Quezon City a complaint against her husband, Manuel J.C.
Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill the plaintiff. The plaintiff
asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, the petitioner herein,
opposed the application for support pendent elite for the ground that his wife had committed adultery with
her physician.

Issue:

1. WON the alleged adultery of his wife disqualifies her from alimony pendente lite.

2. WON in determining the amount of support pendent lite, it is enough that the court ascertain the kind
and amount of evidence even by afiidavits only or other documentary evidence.

Held:

1. It is true that the adultery of the wife is defense in an action for support. However, the alleged adultery
of his wife must be established by competent evidence. The mere allegation that wife has committed
adultery will not bar her from the right to receive support pendente lite. In the instant case, at the hearing
of the application for support pendente lite before the JDRC, petitioner did not present any evidence to
prove the allegation that his wife had committed adultery with any person.

2. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into
the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which
it may deem sufficient to enable to it justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the
merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass
upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough that the facts be satisfied by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. The private respondent has submitted documents showing
that the corporations controlled by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of
the Ministry of Public Highways. Considering the high cost of living due inflation and the financial ability
of the petitioner as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4, 000.00 a month
granted by the respondent Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not excessive.

45. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married
civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife
continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during
their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or
about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the
defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However,
before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a
vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period
provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will
it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired
by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a
proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

46.