NEYPES VS. CA (GR NO.

141524)
(FRESH PERIOD RULE)

FACTS:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et.al, filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,
Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa,
Salvador and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various
motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the
respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the
motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N.
Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows:

(1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against
the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them
was improper;
(2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there
were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and
(3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was
also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss
on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration.
On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
 On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February
12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final
order appealable under the Rules.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by
the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000 prompting the petitioners to file before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45 of the Rues of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the instant petition was filed out of time or has been
prescribe.
Whether or not July 1, 2018 is to be construed as the last and final order under Section 3, Rule 41
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

RULING:

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to
appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998),
petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration.
According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled
that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had
only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of
15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the
July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be
availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the
lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the
order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well
within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.