Sharing Maritime Security Perspectives

in the South China Sea:

An Australian Perspective

Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer,

Presentation to Session 2, Workshop on
Maritime Security in the South China Sea and
Indian Ocean Region: Exploring Convergent Views
co-sponsored by
National Maritime Foundation and Embassy of Japan
Jacaranda Hall, India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, India
January 30, 2020
 Six Talking Points
1. Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper
2. U.S.-Australia Alliance
3. Trilateral Security Dialogue
4. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
5. Strategic Partnerships
6. South China Sea Code of Conduct
 1. Australia’s
2016 Defence White Paper (DWP)
• Indo-Pacific region is a framework for defence planners, the maritime
arc across the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Western Pacific
• Strategic trends – greatest geopolitical realignment since 1945
• Major power rivalries – coercion, grey zone tactics
• Norms and international law are being undermined
• U.S.-China relations are the defining factor for peace and security in
the Indo-Pacific region
• Sea Control
• $50bn Future Submarines, $35bn Future Frigates
 Current Strategic Appreciation
Defence Minister Linda Reynolds*
• DWP 2016 underestimated speed at which the strategic outlook
has changed in the Indo-Pacific
• What was thought likely in 2030 has already happened
• China – new ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, stealth drones,
autonomous vehicles, cyber and space; rail guns to be mounted on war
ships
• Military modernization challenges Australia’s capability lead
• Concern U.S.-China competition may shift to adversarial relations
• Reassessment of strategic assumptions that underpinned DWP
2016 is underway
*Address to Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference, Sydney, October 8, 2019
 2. U.S.-Australia Alliance
29th AUSMIN August 2019
• Networked structure of alliances and partnerships to maintain a ‘free
and open’ Indo-Pacific
• Japan, India, South Korea, ASEAN members,
• Infrastructure investment and defence cooperation
• Strong support for ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN-led regional
architecture, underlining the value of the East Asia Summit as the
region’s premier Leaders-led forum for addressing political and
security challenges.
• Maritime security and oceans governance, cyber security, counter-
terrorism and transnational crime
 3. Trilateral Security Dialogue August 2019
• Cooperation on capacity building for maritime security and safety
• Broad convergence with ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
• Support for ASEAN centrality and unity, and the East Asia Summit as
the region’s premier Leaders-led forum
• Maritime and security cooperation to promote regional resilience,
quality infrastructure, finance, and financial institutions
• South China Sea – advanced weapons, coercive unilateral actions.
Arbitral Tribunal Award binding on all parties, COC should not
prejudice interests of third parties
 4. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
• Quad 2.0 security dialogue revived (2017)
• India, Japan, United States and Australia
• Biennial meetings, no binding joint statement
• A work in progress
• Inclusion of non-security issues
• private sector development, good governance
• Support for ASEAN centrality and IORA and Pacific Islands
Forum
• Free and Open Indo-Pacific, rules-based order
 5. Australia’s Strategic Partnerships
• Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2015)
• Malaysia Strategic Partnership (2015)
• Five Power Defence Arrangements or FPDA
• Philippines Comprehensive Partnership (2015)
• Annual joint defence consultations, navy to navy strategy talks (2017)
• Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2018)
• Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation (2017)
• Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action
• 5 pillars – includes maritime cooperation, contribution to Indo-Pacific stability
 Australia’s Strategic Partnerships
• Vietnam Strategic Partnership (2018)
• Annual meeting of PMs and Defence ministers
• Defence, intelligence and security cooperation
• Maritime and aviation security/Maritime policy making
• France Enhanced Strategic Partnership (2017)
• Strategic Partnership (2012)
• Logistics agreement
• Germany Intent on Strategic Partnership (2012)
• United Kingdom Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty (2013)
• Hunter-class frigates
• China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2014)
 6. South China Sea Code of Conduct
• Focus on military-to-military cooperation in draft COC text
• Section 2c. Basic undertakings iii. Self-restraint / Promotion of
trust and confidence
• China made the most detailed proposals on mil-to-mil
cooperation
• Vietnam’s Option was to replace China’s (and other) Options
with a long list of proposals setting out the normative and
legal basis for military-to-military cooperation and a highly
specific list of seven “no nots”
 China’s Proposals for Military-to-Military
Cooperation in the Draft COC
• Option 2: [CH = China]
• 2. Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional
disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek
ways, in a spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and
confidence between and among them, including but not limited to:
[CH]
a. Undertaking that military activities in the region shall be conducive
to enhancing mutual trust among the countries concerned and to
maintaining peace and stability of the region; [CH]
 China’s Proposals for Military-to-Military
Cooperation in the Draft COC
• Option 2: [CH] continued
• b. Enhancing exchanges and cooperation among the defence
and military forces, promoting maritime cooperation,
dialogue and exchanges at all levels, setting up and
improving platforms for regular communication and
dialogue, and carrying out activities such as mutual port calls
of military vessels and joint patrol on a regular basis; [CH]
 China’s Proposals for Military-to-Military
Cooperation in the Draft COC
• c. Undertaking joint military exercises among China and
ASEAN Members States on a regular basis; [CH]

• d. The Parties shall establish a notification mechanism on

military activities, and to notify each other of major
military activities if deemed necessary. The Parties shall
not hold joint military exercises with countries from
outside the region, unless the parties concerned are
notified beforehand and express no objection; [CH]
 Other Options
for Notification of Military Exercises
• 2c. Basic undertakings iii. Self-restraint/Promotion of trust and
confidence
• Option 1 [ID = Indonesia]
• 5(c) notifying on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any
impending joint/combined military exercise
• Alternate (for entire Point 2c) [VN = Vietnam]
• 1(q) Notify other Contracting States of any impending joint/combined
military exercise/drill to be taken place within the South China Sea.
Such notifications shall be made 60 days before the commencement
of such military exercise/drill.
 China’s Proposals for Military-to-Military
Cooperation in the Draft COC
• e. Military vessels and military aircraft enjoy sovereign
immunity and are therefore immune from the
jurisdiction of any State other than their flag state.
Military vessels and military aircraft are entitled to
self-defence under international law, but should have
due regard for the other side’s military vessels and
military aircraft while exercising the right of self-
defence; [CH]
 Proposals for the Management of Incidents
in the Draft COC
• 2 v. Management of incidents
• On the management of incidents/collisions at sea, the
Parties agree to comply with the 1972 COLREG and the 1974
SOLAS [SG]; [SG’s comment: These instruments, cited in the
previous section, also cover the management of incidents.]
• 2. Encourage the application of international standards for
the safety of navigation at sea such as International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPC Code), Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES), etc., in accordance with the
specific scope of each document [TH];
• SG- Singapore, TH = Thailand
 Proposals for the Management of Incidents
in the Draft COC
• 3. In order to improve operational safety of naval ships
and naval aircrafts in air and at sea, and ensure mutual
trust among all Parties, Parties agree to use the safety
and communication procedures for the safety of all
Parties’ naval ships and naval aircrafts, as set out in the
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) CUES when
they encounter each other in the South China Sea; [CA,
CH, SG]
• CA = Cambodia, CH -= China, SG = Singapore
 Proposals for the Management of Incidents
in the Draft COC
• 4. The Parties agree to carry out joint exercises for the
implementation of CUES; [CH]

• 5. The Parties are encouraged to develop bilateral and

multilateral codes for maritime and air encounters of
military ships and aircraft, consistent with the
purposes and principles of the COC; [CH]
 Proposals for the Management of Incidents
in the Draft COC
8. In managing and resolving incidents, the concerned
Parties abide by the following rules and procedures:
[ID]
• c. The chiefs of naval operation or naval
attaches/military attaches of the parties involved shall
discuss the incident immediately after it occurs; [ID]
• ID = Indonesia
 Proposals for the Management of Incidents
in the Draft COC
• 9. Establish in a gradual manner bilateral and multilateral
military hotlines among the defence authorities at all levels;
[CH]
• 10. Establish hotline platforms among maritime law
enforcement agencies in a step-by-step manner; [CH]
• 11. Launch “the Hotline Platform on Search and Rescue
Among China and ASEAN Member states” at an early date.
Explore the possibilities to establish hotline platforms in
other fields where there is a practical need. [CH]
 Vietnam’s Proposal to Replace
All Other Options – 7 Do Nots
• Alternate (for entire point 2c on Basic Undertakings) [VN]
• 2. The Contracting States shall not:
• a. Resort to threat or use of force, coercive actions or any
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment against persons from other Contracting States
while conducting law enforcement activities;
• b. Conduct construction of any artificial island in the South
China Sea;
 Vietnam’s Proposal to Replace
All Other Options – 7 Do Nots
• c. Initiate, participating in, or allow the use of its territories for any
policy or activity that would complicate or escalate disputes and
affect peace and stability;
• d. Militarize occupied features in the South China Sea;
• e. Blockade vessels carrying provisions or personnel for rotation;
• f. Declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China
Sea;
• g. Conduct simulated attacks that aim guns, missile launches, inter
alia, at targets of other countries.
 Conclusion
• Australia and its Regional Partners
• Training, exercises, capability, maritime domain awareness
• Increased Australian Military Presence in Indo-Pacific
Region
• Build Collaborative Regional Architecture
• ASEAN-centric, East Asia Summit, ADMM Plus
• Trilateral, Quad
 Conclusion

• Build Australia’s Defence Capability

defence industry cooperation with the U.S.
Maintain capability edge
• Engage with China
• Our interests are not always aligned
• China engages in counter-productive behaviour
 Final Takeaway
• 2c iv Prevention of incidents
• Confidence Building Measures
• 2. Consistent with their obligations under this Code and
international instruments, the Parties shall adopt, at the
appropriate levels of government, processes, guidelines and
notification protocols to operationalise the Parties’
obligation to exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea,
and mechanisms at the appropriate levels to ensure their
implementation. [PH = Philippines]
 Final Takeaway
• Assist ASEAN members in drafting processes, guidelines and
protocols as Appendices to final South China Sea Code of
Conduct
• Military-to-military cooperation – exercises, hot lines etc.
• Cooperation between maritime law enforcement agencies
• Prevention of incidents at sea
• Management of incidents at sea
• Resolving incidents at sea
• Accession to COC by Third Parties who have direct interests in
the security of the South China Sea
Sharing Maritime Security Perspectives
in the South China Sea:
An Australian Perspective
Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer,
Presentation Session 2 to Workshop on
Maritime Security in the South China Sea and
Indian Ocean Region: Exploring Convergent Views
co-sponsored by
National Maritime Foundation and Embassy of Japan
Jacaranda Hall, India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, India
January 30, 2020