G.R. No. 8095. November 5, 1914, and March 31, not control his action in any manner.
anner. It operates and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue
1915
F C. FISHER, plaintiff,
vs.
YANGCO STEAMSHIP COMPANY, J. S. STANLEY, as
Acting Collector of Customs of the Philippine
Islands, IGNACIO VILLAMOR, as Attorney General
of the Philippine Islands, and W. H. BISHOP, as
prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila,
respondents.
Facts:
FC Fisher is a stockholder in the Yangco Steamship
Company.
The company adopted a resolution which
expressly declaring and providing that the classes
of merchandise to be carried by the company in its
business as a common carrier do not include
explosives.
JS Stanley, demanded from the company the
acceptance and carriage of such explosives.
Thereafter, Stanley refused and suspended the
issuance of the necessary clearance documents of
the vessels of the company.
Issue:
Whether the refusal to accept for carriage of
explosives is valid
Ruling: No.
While the statute provides a person liberty in
engaging and managing his business, this does not
preclude the state from exercising control on its
conduct of its business by imposing just and
reasonable regulations thereon.
The self-imposed limitations by the carrier upon
his business, do not involve unreasonable or
unnecessary discrimination that the statute would
only in cases involving such unreasonable or
unnecessary preferences or discriminations.
Common carriers exercise a sort of public office,
and have duties to perform in which the public is
interested. Their business is, therefore, affected
with a public interest, and is subject of public
regulation.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND
TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND
REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 115381
December 23, 1994
Facts:
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center filed a petition
for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and
validity orders of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
The offending provisions contained, have resulted
in the introduction into our highways and
thoroughfares thousands of old and smoke-
belching buses, many of which are right-hand
driven, and have exposed our consumers to the
burden of spiraling costs of public transportation
without hearing and due process.
Issue:
Whether or not LTFRB can give provincial bus
operators the authority to set fare range over and
above authorized existing fare
Ruling:
No. The authority given by the LTFRB to the
provincial bus operators to set a fare range over
and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal
delegation of legislative authority.
The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators
to change and increase their fares at will would
result not only to a chaotic situation but to an
anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the
riding public at the mercy of transport operators
who may increase fares every hour, every day,
every month or every year, whenever it pleases
them or whenever they deem it “necessary” to do
so.
SPOUSES DANTE CRUZ and LEONORA CRUZ,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SUN HOLIDAYS, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 186312 June 29, 2010
Facts:
Spouses Cruz, stayed at Coco Beach Island Resort
by a tour package contract which includes
transportation to and from the resort and the
point of departure in Batangas.
On the last day, after they sailed, as they went
farther, the wind got stronger which caused the
boat to tilt from side to side and later on
overturned the boat.
Spouses Dante Cruz and Leonora Cruz, thereafter,
filed a complaint against Sun Holidays, Inc. The
petitioners demanded indemnification from
respondent for the death of their son. They
claimed that the respondent, as a common carrier,
was guilty of negligence in allowing M/B Coco
Beach III to sail notwithstanding storm warning
bulletins issued by PAGASA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Resort’s ferry services is
merely ancillary to its business thus it is not liable
to any damages
Ruling:
No. Its ferry services are so intertwined with its
main business as to be properly considered
ancillary thereto. And the tour packages it offers,
which include the ferry services, may be availed of
by anyone who can afford to pay the same. These
services are thus available to the public.
Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. When a passenger
dies or is injured in the discharge of a contract of
carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is
at fault or negligent.
G.R. No. L-9605 September 30, 1957
GAUDIOSO EREZO, ET AL., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUEDO JEPTE, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Defendant-appellant is the registered
owner of a six by six truck bearing. On August, 9,
1949, while the same was being driven by Rodolfo
Espino y Garcia, it collided with a taxicab. As the
truck went off the street, it hit Ernesto Erezo and
another, and the former suffered injuries.
The driver was prosecuted for homicide through
reckless negligence. The defendant does not deny
at the time of the fatal accident the cargo truck
driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia was registered
in his name. He, however, claims that the vehicle
belonged to the Port Brokerage, of which he was
the broker at the time of the accident. He
explained, that the trucks of the corporation were
registered in his name as a convenient
arrangement so as to enable the corporation to
pay the registration fee with his backpay as a pre-
war government employee.
Issue: Whether or not Jepte should be held liable?
Held: Yes. The registered owner, the defendant-
appellant herein, is primarily responsible for the
damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-
appellee, but he (defendant-appellant) has a right
to be indemnified by the real or actual owner.
The Revised Motor Vehicle Law provides that no
vehicle may be used or operated upon any public
highway unless the same is properly registered.
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens,
caused by the vehicles on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner.
[G.R. No. 143360. September 5, 2002]
EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA ENANO, MYRNA
TAMAYO and FELIX OLEDAN, respondents.
Facts: A Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor
rammed into the house store of Myrna. A portion
of the house was destroyed which caused death
and injury.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation
Office, it was known that the registered owner of
the tractor was Equitable Leasing
Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim.
The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already
been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no
longer in possession and control thereof at the
time of the incident.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was liable for
damages based on quasi delict for the negligent
acts.
Held:
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries
complained of, because it was the registered
owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.
The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless
of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered
owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public
and third persons are concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of
the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for
the deaths and the injuries arising from the
negligence of the driver.
G.R. No. 98275 November 13, 1992
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANGELES CITY, BRANCH LVI, CARLOS
OCAMPO, INOCENCIO TURLA, SPOUSES MOISES
AGAPITO and SOCORRO M. AGAPITO and NICOLAS
CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 6, 1983, an accident occurred involving
petitioner's Isuzu ten-wheeler truck then driven by
an employee of Lino Castro. After due trial,
Rogelio Villar y Amare, the driver of the Isuzu
truck, was at fault when the mishap occurred in as
much as he was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence.
Moreover, the trial court applied Article 2194 of
the new Civil Code on solidary accountability of
join tortfeasors insofar as the liability of the driver,
herein petitioner and Rock Component Philippines
was concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can be held responsible to the
victim albeit the truck was leased to Rock
Component Philippines when the incident
occurred
HELD:
Yes. As held in the Perez and Erezo cases the
Supreme Court held that the registered owner of a
certificate of public convenience is liable to the
public for the injuries or damages suffered by
passengers or third persons caused by the
operation of said vehicle, even though the same
had been transferred to a third person.
The principle upon which this doctrine is based is
that in dealing with vehicles registered under the
Public Service Law, the public has the right to
assume or presumed that the registered owner is
the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult
with the public to enforce the actions that they
may have for injuries caused to them by the
vehicles being negligently operated if the public
should be required to prove who actual the owner
is.
G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989
GILBERTO M. DUAVIT, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Acting through the
Third Division, as Public Respondent, and
ANTONIO SARMIENTO, SR. & VIRGILIO CATUAR
respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio
Catuar were aboard a jeep driven by Ruperto
Catuar. While approaching Roosevelt Avenue,
another jeep driven by defendant Oscar Sabiniano
hit and bumped Catuar’s jeep on the portion near
the left rear wheel.
The plaintiffs have filed this case both against
Oscar Sabiniano as driver, and against Gualberto
Duavit as owner of the jeep. Defendant Gualberto
Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other
jeep, denied that the other defendant was his
employee. Duavit claimed that he has not been an
employer of defendant Oscar Sabiniano at any
time up to the present.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle
which figured in an accident can be held liable?
HELD:
No, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle
cannot be held liable for an accident involving the
said vehicle if the same was driven without his
consent or knowledge and by a person not
employed by him. Under the facts established, the
defendant cannot be held liable for anything.
At the time of the accident, James McGurk was
driving the truck, and he was not an employee of
the defendant, nor did he have anything to do
with the latter's business; neither the defendant
nor Father Ayson, who was in charge of her
business, consented to have any of her trucks
driven on the day of the accident.
G.R. No. 125817 January 16, 2002
ABELARDO LIM and ESMADITO GUNNABAN,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DONATO
H. GONZALES, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Donato Gonzales
purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from
Gomercino Vallarta. While private respondent
Gonzales continued offering the jeepney for public
transport services, he did not have the registration
of the vehicle transferred in his name. Thus,
Vallarta remained on record as its registered
owner and operator. Years later, the jeepney
collided with a ten-wheeler-truck owned by
petitioner Abelardo Lim and driven by his co-
petitioner Esmadito Gunnaban.
The parties did not reach an agreement. Hence,
the filing of the complaint for damages by private
respondent against petitioners. Lim asserted that
as the jeepney was registered in Vallarta’s name,
it was Vallarta and not private respondent who
was the real party in interest.
ISSUE: Does private respondent have the
right to proceed against petitioners for the
damage caused on his passenger jeepney?
RULING: Yes, private respondent has the
right to proceed against petitioners for the
damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well
as on his business.
The kabit system is an arrangement
whereby a person who has been granted a
certificate of public convenience allows other
persons who own motor vehicles to operate them
under his license, sometimes for a fee or
percentage of the earnings.
In the present case it is at once apparent that the
evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit
system does not exist. It is evident that private
respondent has the right to proceed against
petitioners for the damage caused on his
passenger jeepney as well as on his business. Any
effort then to frustrate his claim of damages by
the ingenuity with which petitioners framed the
issue should be discouraged, if not repelled.
G.R. No. L-64693 April 27, 1984
LITA ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. SECOND CIVIL CASES
DIVISION, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
NICASIO M. OCAMPO and FRANCISCA P. GARCIA
FACTS: The spouses private respondents
Nicasio and Francisca Garcia, purchased five (5)
cars to be used as taxicabs. Since they had no
franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted
with petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc. for the use of
the latter's certificate of public convenience.
About a year later, one of said taxicabs had an
accident. A civil case for damages was instituted
by the heir of the victim against Lita Enterprises,
Inc., as registered owner of the taxicab. Petitioner
Lita Enterprises, Inc. was adjudged liable for
damages.
Thereafter, respondent Nicasio Ocampo decided
to register his taxicabs in his name, but was
efused. Hence, he and his wife filed a complaint
against Lita Enterprises, Inc. The trial court ruled in
favor of respondent spouses. Petitioner now
wants respondents to pay whatever amount the
former has paid to the heir of the victim as a result
of the accident.
ISSUE: Can petitioner recover from
private respondent under the “kabit system”
arrangement?
RULING: No. Unquestionably, the parties
herein operated under an arrangement,
commonly known as the "kabit system", whereby
a person who has been granted a certificate of
convenience allows another person who owns
motors vehicles to operate under such franchise
for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a
special privilege conferred by the government.
Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof
cannot be countenanced. The "kabit system" has
been Identified as one of the root causes of the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the
government transportation offices.
Upon this premise, it was flagrant error on the
part of both the trial and appellate courts to have
accorded the parties relief from their
predicament. Article 1412 of the Civil Code denies
them such aid.
G.R. No. L-65510 March 9, 1987
TEJA MARKETING AND/OR ANGEL JAUCIAN,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT *
AND PEDRO N. NALE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Facts: Pedro Nale bought a motorcycle for his
transportation business. A chattel mortgage was
constituted on the motorcycle in favor of Teja
Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian. The registration
papers were not given to Nale.
Defendant had no franchise of his own and he
attached the unit to Teja. The agreement also of
the parties here was for the plaintiff to undertake
the yearly registration of the motorcycle with the
Land Transportation Commission. The plaintiff,
however failed to register the motorcycle on that
year on the ground that the defendant failed to
comply with some requirements.
Issue: Who is the rightful owner of the vehicle?
Ruling: Nale is the owner of the vehicle.
As the purchase of the motorcycle for operation
as a trimobile under the franchise of the private
respondent Jaucian, pursuant to what is
commonly known as the "kabit system", without
the prior approval of the Board of Transportation
was an illegal transaction involving the fictitious
registration of the motor vehicle in the name of
the private respondent so that he may traffic with
the privileges of his franchise, or certificate of
public convenience, to operate a tricycle service,
the parties being in pari delicto, neither of them
may bring an action against the other to enforce
their illegal contract provided in Art. 1412 (a), Civil
Code.
SALUDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 95536 March 23, 1992
REGALADO, J.
Facts:
Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of Chicago,
made the necessary preparations and
arrangements for the shipment of the remains of
Crispina Saludo, mother of the petitioners.
Pomierski brought the remains to Continental
Mortuary Air Services (CMAS) which made the
necessary arrangements such as flights. CMAS
booked the shipment with PAL thru Air Care
International. PAL Airway Bill Ordinary was issued
wherein the requested routing was from Chicago
to San Francisco on board Trans World Airline
(TWA) and from San Francisco to Manila on board
PAL.
Salvacion went to the TWA to inquire but she was
told they did not know anything about it. It was
found out that the remains were on a plane to
Mexico City, that there were two bodies at the
terminal, and somehow they were switched.
Petitioners filed a complaint against TWA and PAL
for the misshipment and delay of the cargo
containing the remains of her late mother.
Issue: Whether or not the delay in the delivery of
the remains of petitioners’ mother was due to the
fault of thet airline companies
Ruling:
No. The delay in the delivery of the casketed
remains was not due to the fault of the
respondent airline companies.
The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier's liability
for delay is that in the absence of a special
contract, a carrier is not an insurer against delay in
transportation of goods. When a common carrier
undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a
contract that they shall be delivered at destination
within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any
agreement as to the time of delivery. But where a
carrier has made an express contract to transport
and deliver property within a specified time, it is
bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any
delay, no matter from what cause it may have
arisen.
MAERSK LINE vs. CA
G.R. No. 94761, May 17, 1993
FACTS: Petitioner Maersk Line is doing business in
the Philippines, while private respondent Efren
Castillo is the proprietor of Ethegal Laboratories, a
firm engaged in the manufacture of
pharmaceutical products.
Castillo ordered from Eli Lilly, Inc. of Puerto Rico
gelatin capsules. Shipper Eli Lilly,Inc. advised
Castillo through a Memorandum of Shipment that
the products were already shipped and specified
the date of arrival to be April 3, 1977.
However, said cargoes of capsules were mis-
shipped and the goods finally arriving after two (2)
months from the date specified. Consignee
Castillo refused to take delivery of the goods on
account of its failure to arrive on time, and filed an
action for rescission of contract.
ISSUE: Whether Castillo is entitled to damages
resulting from delay in the delivery of the
shipment?
RULING:
Yes. While there was no special contract entered
into by the parties indicating the date of arrival,
petitioner nevertheless, was very well aware of
the specific date when the goods expected to
arrives as indicated in the bill lading. There was
delay in the delivery of the goods, spanning a
period of 2 months and 7 days falls way beyond
the realm of reasonableness. Petitioner never
even bothered to explain the cause for delay of
more than 2 months in the delivery of the goods.
Therefore, Markers Line is liable for breach of
contract carriage amounting to bad faith.
G.R. No. 95529. August 22, 1991.
MAGELLAN MANUFACTURING MARKETING
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
v.
COURT OF APPEALS, ORIENT OVERSEAS
CONTAINER LINES and F.E. ZUELLIG, INC.
respondents.
Facts:
Magellan Manufacturers Marketing Corp.
(MMMC) entered into a contract with Choju Co to
export anahaw fans. MMMC contracted F.E.
Zuellig, a shipping agent, to ship the anahaw fans
through Orient Overseas Container Lines, Inc.,
(OOCL) specifying that he needed an on-board bill
of lading and that transshipment is not allowed
under the letter of credit.
MMMC paid freight charges to F.E. Zuellig
presented to Allied Bank. However, MMMC was
informed that payment was refused by the buyer
allegedly because there was no on-board bill of
lading, and there was transshipment of goods. As
a result, MMMC requested F.E. Zuellig and OOCL
to ship the anahaw fans back to Manila, for which,
the carriers demanded MMMC for payment.
MMMC abandoned the whole cargo and asked the
carriers for damages.
Issues:
Whether MMMC should be held liable for freight
charges and demurrage incurred when it exercised
its option of abandonment.
Ruling:
No. It will be remembered that in overland
transportation, an unreasonable delay in the
delivery of transported goods is sufficient ground
for the abandonment of goods. By analogy, this
can also apply to maritime transportation.
Further, with much more reason can petitioner in
the instant case properly abandon the goods, not
only because of the unreasonable delay in its
delivery but because of the option granted to and
exercised by it as a means of settling its liability for
the cost and expenses of reshipment. And, said
choice having been duly communicated, the same
is binding upon the parties on legal and equitable
considerations of estoppel.
G.R. No. 118126. March 4, 1996
TRANSASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. RENATO T.
ARROYO, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo, bought a
ticket from petitioner TRANSASIA SHIPPING LINES,
INC. Plaintiff boarded the M/V Asia Thailand
vessel. At that instance, plaintiff noticed that
some repair works were being undertaken on the
engine of the vessel. After an hour of slow voyage,
the vessel stopped near Kawit. After half an hour
of stillness, some passengers demanded that they
should be allowed to return to Cebu City. The
captain acceded to their request.
On account of this failure of TransAsia to transport
Arroyo to the place of destination, he filed a
complaint for damages against defendant.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Arroyo be compensated?
Held:
Yes, where the common carrier fails to observe
extraordinary diligence resulting in delay or
interruption of the voyage, it shall be liable for any
pecuniary loss or loss of profits which the
passengers may suffer by reason thereof. For the
private respondent, such would be the loss of
income if unable to report to his office on the day
he was supposed to arrive were it not for the
delay.
G.R. No. 143133 June 5, 2002
BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING
N.V. and JARDINE DAVIES TRANSPORT SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC.,
respondents.
Facts: CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board 242
coils of various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for
transportation consigned to the Philippine Steel
Trading Corporation. M/V Anangel Sky arrived
however, Four (4) coils were found to be in bad
order finding. The consignee Philippine Steel
Trading Corporation declared the same as total
loss.
Despite receipt of a formal demand, defendants-
appellees refused to submit to the consignee's
claim. Consequently, plaintiff-appellant paid the
consignee. Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant
instituted this complaint for recovery of the
amount paid by them, to the consignee as insured.
Impugning the propriety of the suit against them,
defendants-appellees imputed that the damage
and/or loss was due to pre-shipment damage, to
the inherent nature, vice or defect of the goods,
or to perils, danger and accidents of the sea, or to
insufficiency of packing thereof, or to the act or
omission of the shipper of the goods or their
representatives. In addition thereto, defendants-
appellees argued that their liability, if there be
any, should not exceed the limitations of liability
provided for in the bill of lading and other
pertinent laws. Finally, defendants-appellees
averred that, in any event, they exercised due
diligence and foresight required by law to prevent
any damage/loss to said shipment."
13. DEFENSES OF COMMON CARRIERS
Digested by: Gretchen B. Canedo
[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000]
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
D E C I S I ON
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga
was given by the conductor an "extension seat”.
As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga
gave way to the outgoing passenger. An Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a
third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the
owner of the Isuzu truck.
ISSUE:
Is Calalas exempt from liability?
HELD:
No. The court found it hard to give serious thought
to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our
seas should not be compensated merely because
those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is
also true of petitioners contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito.
13. DEFENSES OF COMMON CARRIERS
13.2 G.R. No. L-10605 June 30, 1958
PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L.
FACTS: Severina Garces and her one-year old son,
Precillano Necesito, boarded passenger bus of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. After passing
Pangasinan the front wheels swerved to the right;
the driver lost control, fell on its right side into a
creek where water was breast deep. The mother
and son was both injured.
Two actions for damages was filed against the
carrier. The latter pleaded that the accident was
due to "engine or mechanical trouble"
independent or beyond the control of the
defendants or of the driver Bandonell.
ISSUE: Was the common carrier exempt from
liability due to the manufacturing defect of the
steering knuckle?
RULING: No. In the case now before us, the
record is to the effect that the only test applied to
the steering knuckle in question was a purely
visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any
cracks developed. It nowhere appears that either
the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested
the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its
strength was up to standard, or that it had no
hidden flaws would impair that strength.

Fortuitous Events
13.3
G.R. No. L-19495 February 2, 1924
HONORIO LASAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Respondent Frank Smith, Jr. was
engaged in the business of carrying passengers for
hire. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile
was operated by a licensed driver, but after having
reached the town of San Juan, the driver allowed
his assistant, Remigio Bueno, to drive the car.
Bueno held no driver's license. After the crossing
of the Abra River, defects developed, the
automobile was overturned and the petitioners
pinned down under it. The petitioners filed a
complaint against respondent for damages.
Respondent now contends that the accident was
due to a fortuitous event.
ISSUE: Whether the accident was due to
a fortuitous event.
RULING: No, Caso fortuito or fortuitous
event is an event that takes place by accident and
could not have been foreseen. Examples of this
are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robbers.
The essential element of a caso fortuito is that the
extraordinary circumstance is independent of the
will of the obligor, or of his employees. In this
case, the said essential element is lacking. It is not
suggested that the accident in question was due
to an act of God or to adverse road conditions
which could not have been foreseen. As far as the
records shows, the accident was caused either by
defects in the automobile or else through the
negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.
13.4 ASIA LIGHTERAGE AND SHIPPING, INC. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE
AND ASSURANCE, INC.
G.R. No. 147246. August 19, 2003 PUNO, J
Facts: A cargo was shipped and was transferred to
the custody of the Asia Lighterage and Shipping,
Inc. However, the cargo did not reach its
destination. It was found out that the transport
was suspended due to a warning of an incoming
typhoon.
The barge developed a list because of a hole it
sustained after hitting an unseen protuberance
underneath the water. The hole was patched with
only clay and cement. To avoid the sinking of the
barge, a portion of the goods was transferred to
three other barges. The next day, the towing bits
of the barge broke. It sank completely, resulting in
the total loss of the remaining cargo.
Thereafter, as subrogee, it sought recovery of said
amount from the petitioner, but to no avail.
Petitioner claims that this was caused by a
typhoon, hence, it should not be held liable for the
loss of the cargo.
Issue: Whether petitioner can invoke the
occurrence of the typhoon as force majeure?
Ruling: No. The evidence show that, even before
the towing bits of the barge broke, it had already
previously sustained damage when it hit a sunken
object while docked at the Engineering Island. It
even suffered a hole. Clearly, this could not be
solely attributed to the typhoon.
The officers/employees themselves of petitioner
admitted that when the towing bits of the vessel
broke it was no longer affected by the typhoon.
The typhoon then is not the proximate cause of
the loss of the cargo; a human factor, i.e.,
negligence had intervened.
FORTUITOUS EVENT
Philippine American General Insurance vs. PKS
Shipping Company
G.R. No. 149038. April 9, 2003
FACTS:
Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC)
contracted the services of respondent PKS
Shipping for the shipment of bags of cement.
While Limar I was being towed by respondent’s
tugboat, the barge sank a couple of miles off the
coast bringing down with it the entire cargo of
bags of cement. Philamgen made payment to
DUMC upon filing a formal claim; it then sought
reimbursement from PKS Shipping of the sum paid
to DUMC but the shipping company refused to
pay. This prompted Philamgen to file suit against
PKS Shipping with the Makati RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether PKS Shipping has observed the proper
diligence required of it?
RULING:
Yes. Article 1733 of the Civil Code requires
common carriers to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods they
carry. In case of loss, destruction or deterioration
of goods, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and the
burden of proving otherwise rests on them.
The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of
extraordinary resulting in the entry of water into
the barge’s hatches. The official Certificate of
Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine
Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line
Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of
Limar I and should strengthen the factual findings
of the appellate court.
G.R. No. 6092. March 8, 1912.
TAN CHIONG SIAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
INCHAUSTI & Co., Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
Tan Chiong Sian, delivered to Inchausti & Co, 205
cases of general. These merchandise was to be
delivered in Samar.
The said merchandise was put on board the
steamer Sorsogon. Upon its arrival at the said
port, it should have been transshipped to Samar
through “Lorcha Pilar.” But since Lorcha Pilar was
not yet at the port in Gubat when the steamer
arrived, the goods were unloaded and stored at
the defendant’s warehouse.
After several days, Lorcha Pilar arrived. However,
before such vessel could leave, strong winds
began to blow heavily, and the Lorcha Pilar was
dragged and driven, by the force of the storm, to
the shore despite the means employed by the
crew to avoid the accident. The craft was
completely wrecked and destroyed, including the
205 cases of merchandise.
Issue:
Whether the defendant is liable for the loss?
Ruling: No. Inchausti & Co. is not liable for the loss
of the goods since it was due to a fortuitous event
and there was no negligence or lack of care or
diligence on the part of the respondent and its
agents.
Here, the plaintiff himself admitted that a heavy
storm occurred, therefore, the defendant is
exempt from the obligation imposed by the law to
prove the occurrence of the said storm in the port
of Gubat, and, therefore, if the said goods were
lost or damaged and could not be delivered in
Catarman, it was due to a fortuitous event and a
superior, irresistible natural force, or force
majeure, which completely disabled the Lorcha
intended for their transportation to the said port
of the Island of Samar.
13.7 Participation of the Carrier: Fire
G.R. No. 146018. June 25, 2003
EDGAR COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES, INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
respondent.
Digested by: Kathleen Kaye M. Laurente
Facts:
Nestor Angelia delivered to the Edgar Cokaliong
ShippingLines, Inc., cargo, to be transported.
When the vessel left port, fire ensued in the
engine room, and, despite earnest efforts of the
officers and crew of the vessel, the fire engulfed
and destroyed the entire vessel resulting in the
loss of the vessel and the cargoes therein.
Issue:
(1) Is petitioner liable for the loss of the goods?
Held:
1. Yes. The law provides that a
common carrier is presumed to have been
negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised
extraordinary vigilance over the goods it
transported. Ensuring the seaworthiness of the
vessel is the first step in exercising the required
vigilance. Petitioner did not present sufficient
evidence showing what measures or acts it had
undertaken to ensure the seaworthiness of the
vessel. It failed to show when the last inspection
and care of the auxiliary engine fuel oil service
tank was made, what the normal practice was for
its maintenance, or some other evidence to
establish that it had exercised extraordinary
diligence. It merely stated that constant inspection
and care were not possible, and that the last time
the vessel was dry-docked was in November 1990.
Necessarily, in accordance with Article 1735 of the
Civil Code, we hold petitioner responsible for the
loss of the goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. 58
and 59.
G.R. No. L-6155 April 30, 1954
JOSE SON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CEBU AUTOBUS COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Facts: A truck of the Cebu Autobus Company left
for Cebu. It left Maya on its return trip, without
having been inspected or examined by the
mechanic. During the trip, the truck fell into a
canal and pinned plaintiff down, causing him to
lose consciousness for some time.
Furthermore, two of plaintiff’s hogs fell into a
canal and died during the accident. Hence,
plaintiff instituted a suit for damages due to the
injuries he suffered and for the hogs which were
killed.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the CFI in
favor of Jose Son was proper
Held: Yes, in our opinion, the trial court was
correct. Its express finding as to the cause of the
accident in effect blames the defendant for it and
logically rejects the defendant's theory that the
cause emanated from an unforeseen or inevitable
event. In essence, the trial court held that the
drag-link spring of the truck in question was
defective.
The conclusion of the trial court with respect to
the amount of damages sustained by and award in
favor of the plaintiff, is being factual, conclusive.
With Regards to the Issue of Damages due to
Death of the Hogs
After trial the court rendered a decision,
sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of P2,000 as moral damages, and the sum
of P286.80 as plaintiff's actual expenses, together
with his loss and unrealized profit in connection
with the seven hogs loaded by the plaintiff in
defendant's truck. From this decision the
defendant has appealed.
MECHANICAL DEFECTS
Digested by: Gretchen Canedo
G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987
VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON,
respondents.
FACTS:
An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art.
2176 of the Civil Code) was filed by private
respondent against petitioner. The action arose
from a vehicular accident that occurred, when
Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the
store-residence of the private respondent, causing
damages thereto.
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner
alleged that his driver Martin Belmonte operated
said cargo truck in a very diligent and careful
manner; that the steering wheel refused to
respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-
out tire and despite application of his brakes, the
said cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff
(private respondent) and that the said accident
was an act of God for which he cannot be held
liable."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of fault or
negligence
HELD:
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he
applied the brakes but the latter did not work due
to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the
petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes
can not be consideration as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and
the accident preventable.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any
evidence to overcome the disputable presumption
of negligence on his part in the selection and
supervision of his driver.
MECHANICAL DEFECTS
13.10
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth
Division) and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the sale of
soft drinks and other goods to the students of
Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public. On
August 12, 1989, some parents of the students
complained that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks
contained fiber-like matter and other foreign
substances. She discovered the presence of some
fiber-like substances in the contents of some
unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the
contents of an unopened Sprite bottle. The
samples sent to the lab informed her that the
drinks were adulterated. Her sales of soft drinks
plummeted from 10 cases sold per day to 2-3
cases sold per day, and not long after that, she
had to close shop. She became jobless and
destitute. She demanded from the petitioner the
payment of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages by
the proprietess against the soft drinks
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach
of implied warranty against hidden defects, which
must be filed within six months from the delivery
of the thing sold, or one for quasi-delict, which can
be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146
of the Civil Code.
RULING: The action in based on quasi-delict,
therefore, it prescribes in four years. The
allegations in the complaint makes a reference to
the reckless and negligent manufacture of
“adulterated food items intended to be sold for
public consumption.” The vendee’s remedies are
not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of
the Civil Code. The vendor could be liable for
quasi-delict under Article 2176, and an action
based thereon may be brought by the vendee.
The existence of a contract between the parties
does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages therefore. Liability for quasi-delict may
still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations.
Other invalid defenses
13.11
G.R. No. L-16629 January 31, 1962
SOUTHERN LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and CITY OF ILOILO, respondents.
FACTS: The City of Iloilo requisitioned for
rice from the National Rice and Corn Corporation
(NARIC) in Manila. NARIC, pursuant to the order,
shipped sacks of rice on board the SS "General
Wright" belonging to the Southern Lines, Inc.
When the City of Iloilo received the shipment, the
bill of lading indicated that there was a shortage
of 41 sacks of rice with a net weight of 13,319
kilos.

Thereafter, the City of Iloilo filed a complaint in

against NARIC and the Southern Lines, Inc. for the
recovery of the amount of the value of the
shortage of the shipment of rice.

After trial, the lower court absolved NARIC from

the complaint, but sentenced the Southern Lines,
Inc. to pay the said amount. Petitioner claims
exemption from liability by contending that the
shortage in the shipment of rice was due to such
factors as the shrinkage, leakage or spillage of the
rice on account of the bad condition of the sacks
at the time it received the same and the
negligence of the agents of respondent City of
Iloilo in receiving the shipment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the herein

petitioner is liable for the loss or shortage of the
rice shipped.

RULING: Yes, petitioner is liable for the loss

or shortage of the rice shipped. It is a well-settled
rule that if the fact of improper packing is known
to the carrier or his servants, or apparent upon
ordinary observation, but it accepts the goods
notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved
of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom.

Furthermore, petitioner itself frankly admitted

that the strings that tied the bags of rice were
broken; some bags were with holes and plenty of
rice were spilled inside the hull of the boat, and
that the personnel of the boat collected no less
than 26 sacks of rice which they had distributed
among themselves." This finding shows that the
shortage resulted from the negligence of
petitioner.