MODULE 3: THE LAWYER and the CLIENT revealed during legal consultations.
revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to
Consolidated Case Digest
Burbe V. Magulta
FACTS; A complaint for the disbarment, suspension or any other disciplinary action against
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is Filed by Dominador P. Burbe alleging that Atty. Magulta agreed to
legally represent him in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach
of contract; "That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Magulta prepared for me the demand
letter for which services I have accordingly paid; however, I failed to secure a settlement of the
dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently
drafted, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of P25,000.00; "That having the need to
legally recover from the parties to be sued I, deposited the amount to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,
upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;"That a week later, I was informed
by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that I should
receive notice of its progress; "That in the months that followed I had grown impatient on the
case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; I had grown impatient on the case,
considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk
of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of my case,
and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my
behalf, "That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta with his excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and that
he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his
own purpose; Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed
between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. As the
25,000 was not for the filing fee but it was the acceptance fee. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
ISSUE; Whether there was attorney-client relationship established
RULING; Yes, A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought. If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is
established. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's
fees.8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent,
and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to
the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and
had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest.
Atty is suspended for 1 year.
Hadjula V. Madianda
FACTS; A complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against
respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda alleging that she and respondent used to be friends as
they both worked at the BFP whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the
Chief Nurse. That in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. In the course of
their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets
and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only
to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer
friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case
only after she had already heard her secrets. In her answer, respondent denied giving legal
advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed
confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge
in the BFP.
ISSUE; Whether there is attorney-client privilege that was established
RULING; Yes, As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also
then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the
then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed
by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the
lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for having filed fifteen days late a motion for
handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal
professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no
contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship.
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the
confidence of a client. The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client
from possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer. She is
reprimanded with a stern warning.
Ledesma V. Climaco
Duty to serve as counsel de officio
FACTS; What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying
a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio for two
defendants. One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment
as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full
time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay
this case.
ISSUE; Whether the judge erred in denying his motion to withdraw as counsel de officio
RULING; No, What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of
his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. hose enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid
any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required
to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should
not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted
to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar.
People v. Sta. Teresa
G.R. No. 130663, March 20, 2001
FACTS: RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his 12-year old
daughter and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death.
Appellant with the assistance of his counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty." But after
the prosecution presented its witnesses Dr. De Guzman, medico-legal officer, and the rape
victim -- appellant withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and changed it to a plea of "guilty." After such
manifestation, the prosecution decided to dispense with the presentation of other testimonial
evidence and formally offered their exhibits to the trial court. When asked for comment by the
trial court, appellant's counsel de oficio responded, "considering that the accused openly admits
his guilt, I am not anymore in a position to oppose the said formal offer of exhibits."
ISSUE: Whether the defense counsel's conduct falls short of the commitment and zeal required
of him as appellant's attorney.
RULING: Yes, the defense counsel's conduct falls short of the commitment and zeal required
of him as appellant's attorney. Barely 9 days after appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged, his counsel de oficio made a manifestation in open court that his client is changing his
plea to that of "guilty." Considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the
penalty, we find Atty. Adriano's performance as counsel de oficio utterly wanting. As a lawyer
sworn to uphold justice and the law, he had the bounden duty to exert utmost efforts to defend
his client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he appears to be. This duty becomes
more compelling if his client is accused of a grave crime and is in danger of forfeiting his life if
he is convicted.
MAIN POINT: The defense counsel is duty bound to defend his client, protect his rights and
fulfill the stringent standard set by the Constitution and the Rules of Court on due process. For
the rank failure of both the trial court and the defense counsel to observe appellant's right to
due process, this Court cannot affirm his conviction. A remand to the trial court is thus in order.
People vs. Ingco
42 SCRA 170 (1971)
FACTS: Respondent Barrios, a member of the Philippine Bar, who was appointed counsel de
oficio for the accused in this case, Ingco, sentenced to death on for the crime of rape with
homicide, was required in a resolution of this Court to show cause within ten days why
Page 1 of 13
the extension of time for submitting the brief for appellant Ingco. The explanation came in a
manifestation that it was therein stated that respondent "was then busy with the preparation of
the brief of one Benjamin Apelo pending in the Court of Appeals; that while he had made studies
in preparation for the brief in this case, during such period he had to appear before courts in
Manila, Quezon City, Pasay City, Bulacan and Pampanga; and that likewise he did file motions
for extension in the aforesaid case of Benjamin Apelo with the CA, which motions were duly
granted. He would impress on this Court then that he was misled into assuming that he had
also likewise taken the necessary steps to file a motion for extension of time for the submission
of his brief in this case by the receipt of the resolution from the Court of Appeals granting him
such extension.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent be dealt with disciplinary action
RULING: Yes, it is a lame excuse that respondent did offer. By his own confession, he was
woefully negligent. Considering that the accused is fighting for his life, the least that could be
expected of a counsel de officio is awareness of the period within which he was required to file
appellant's brief. The mere fact that according to him his practice was extensive, requiring his
appearance in courts in Manila and environs as well as the provinces of Bulacan and
Pampanga, should not have lessened that degree of care necessary for the fulfillment of his
responsibility. What is worse is that by sheer inattention, he would confuse the proceedings in
a matter pending before the Court of Appeals with this present case. Such grave neglect of duty
is deserving of severe condemnation.
MAIN POINT: It is clearly unworthy of membership in the Bar which requires dedication and
zeal in the defense of his client's rights, a duty even more exacting when one is counsel de
officio. On such an occasion, the honor and respect to which the legal profession is entitled
demand the strictest accountability of one called upon to defend an impoverished litigant. He
who falls in his obligation then has manifested a diminished capacity to be enrolled in its ranks.
Angalan vs. Delante,
578 SCRA 113 (2009)
FACTS: The complainants alleged that they were illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took
advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would
help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent
took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name.
Complainants and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to complainants,
they engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property from the
Spouses Eustaquio. In violation of the trust and confidence they reposed in him, respondent
transferred the title over the property to his name. According to respondent, complainants did
not engage his services. His client from New York was the one who bought the property from
the Spouses Eustaquio.
The Court was not impressed. Angalan and complainants went to respondent’s office not to
seek advice about borrowing money but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering
their property. First, after Angalan and complainants went to respondent’s office, respondent
filed a complaint with the CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the property to
Angalan and complainants. Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, “by reason of
unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter
have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel.” Third,
respondent issued a receipt to complainants stating that he “RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO
CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to the recovery
of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal).” Fourth, in
respondent’s letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay,
Samal, Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of complainants.
ISSUE: Whether respondent disbarment was proper
RULING: Yes, Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his
client’s financial plight to acquire the latter’s properties for his own benefit is destructive of the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for
violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of
the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves
the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
MAIN POINT: The Court disbarred the respondent Atty. Delante for violating Canons 16 and 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that lawyers shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in them and that that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of
their clients that may come into their possession.
Quilban vs. Robinol

FACTS: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative complaint before
this Court requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75000 and
praying that the court exercise its power to discipline over members of the bar unworthy to
practice law.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by complainants to appeal their
case to the CA after they had lost in the lower court. The agreement as to the attorneys’
fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the decision of the lower Courts
decision, they will give him a portion of the property subject matter of the litigation. There was
confusion as to payment and they want the lawyers to be disciplined for the said actions
of the lawyers engaged in their complaint. It is equally true that the Court cannot pass
judgment on complainants pleas that the amount deposited by respondent be returned to
them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action that he does not have the
slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession for himself but he is holding it
until the fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because of the
complainants refusal to pay him.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Robinol is unworthy to practice law.
RULING:Yes. Atty. Robinol has, in fact been guilty of ethical infractions and grave
misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of his profession. After
the CA had rendered a decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter’s
funds, suddenly he had change of mind and decided to convert a portion of the land equivalent
to that of each plaintiffs to P50000 which he alleges to be the monetary value of that
area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money not
only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because under the
circumstances it was highly unjust for him to do so. His clients were mere squatters who could
barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas per family
with which after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them. The
principle of quantum merit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon
for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his
services, as much as he has earned. In this case however, there was an express
contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumps it on quantum
merit therefore is inapplicable.
Cantiller vs. Potenciano
180 SCRA 246 (1989)
Facts: A notice to vacate was issued against Cantiller. Cantiller then asked the Atty. Potenciano
to handle their case. The complainant was made to sign by respondent what she described as
a “[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed petition for annulment of
judgment”.Cantiller paid Potenciano as demanded by the latter which was allegedly needed to
be paid to another judge who will issue the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not
succeed in locating the judge.
Complainant paid Potenciano allegedly as purchase price of the apartment and to cover the
expenses of the suit. Cantiller found out that the amounts were not necessary to be
paid.Contrary to Potenciano’s promise that he would secure a restraining order, he withdrew
his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as
replacement. Hence, the order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed.
Issue: W/N Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of Cantiller.
Ruling: Yes. Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach
in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business
proposition since it is a matter of public interest. Suspended indefinitely and ordered to return
the money.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF
ATTY LEON G. MAQUERA
Facts:Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was indebted to Edward Benavente
who obtained judgment in a civil case. Castro’s property was sold at public auction to satisfy
the obligation, but Castro retained the right to redemption over said property. In consideration
for Maquera’s legal fees, Castro and Atty Maquera entered into an oral agreement that he
would assign his right of redemption to Maquera. Maquera purchased the property from
Benavente for $525.00 then sold it for$320,000.The District Court of Guam informed the SC of
the 2-year suspension of Atty. Maquera from the practice of law in Guam. The IBP sent
Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline but the notice was returned unserved because Maquera’s current address
was unknown. The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to practice law in the Philippines in
1958 and in Guam in 1974.He was suspended in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired
his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence
obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case. Based on the Decision of
the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera
liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera]committed a breach of
ethics in the Philippines. However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for
his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977,
Issue: W/N member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of
law in a foreign jurisdiction may likewise be disbarred or suspended in this country for the same
infraction?
Ruling: Yes. As Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf, the SC
required him to show cause why he should not be suspended or disbarred for said acts. In the
meantime, Atty. Maquera was SUSPENDED for 1 YEAR or until he shall have paid his
membership dues, whichever comes late. The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer
for acts an omission committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Sec 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court: “[…]The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar
by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such
action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of
the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension.” Also, he violated Article 1492 in relation to 1491 of the civil code
which prohibits a lawyer from acquiring by assignment the client’s property which is the subject
of litigation. It extends to legal redemption. Most particularly, Canon 17 which states that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and be mindful of the trust and confidence In him;
and rule 1.01, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Tanhueco v. De Dumo
Facts: Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano de Dumo for his
refusal to remit her money collected from debtors and refusal to return documents entrusted
to him as a counsel in certain collection cases. Tanhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of
what he may be able to collect from debtors but De Dumo responded that in their agreement
he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect as contingent fee. De Dumo also admitted he
did not turn over the P12,000.00 he collected and applying it instead as part of his attorney’s
fee.
Issue: W/N De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive.
Ruling: Yes. De Dumo’a contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50% is more than half of
the total amount due from Tanhueco’s debtors. His action is believed to be fraudulent because
he took advantage of his client who is an old and sickly woman. Canon 20 of the CPR states
that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Attorney’s fee which is found out to
be unconscionable or unreasonable is subject to court’s modification. A lawyer as an officer of
the court has the duty to assist in the impartial administration of justice between parties, and
hence, the fees should be subject to Judicial control. Thus, De Dumo is suspended from the
practice of law for six months and the attorney’s fee is reduced to 15% of the total amount
collected by him. He is also ordered to return the P10,200.00 net amount of the P12,000.00 he
collected and entitled of 15% attorney’s fee in case he made any other collection from
Tanhueco’s debtors.
10-Cruz
Mattus v Villaseca
A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013
Main Point: A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the
latter’s interest with utmost diligence.
Facts: Respondent was counsel for the complainants in a case for estafa with falsification of
public document. He was often absent during court hearings but still collected appearance fees,
frequently asked for postponements, failed to ask for NBI examination of questioned
documents, failed to file a demurrer to evidence in spite of having been granted time to file the
same, failed to present evidence for the defense, failed to notify his clients of the dates of
presentation of the evidence for the defense and promulgation of judgment, and indicated the
wrong case number in the notice of appeal, resulting in their conviction.
Issue: Whether respondent counsel was grossly negligent in handling the criminal case as to
violate his duty of fidelity to his client’s cause
Page 2 of 13
Ruling: Court held that respondent’s failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes
inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients’ cause.
Furthermore, respondent’s failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence
for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court;
it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and
livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut the
presented prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete
discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client’s cause.
His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society
indicate a high degree of irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the legal profession.
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for 5 years.
11-Cruz
Lopez v Aquino
G.R. No. L-28078, April 29, 1971
Main Point: The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging
of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. Petitioner’s counsel was ordered
to pay treble costs for the frivolous appeal.
Facts: The CFI rendered judgment approving the money claim of a respondent against the
petitioner estate by ordering the then special administratrix "to pay from the available funds of
the estate to respondent. This was later affirmed by CA (with modification to interest imposed
– from simple to compound). The estate's counsel of record in the appellate court allegedly did
not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment but the estate's attorneys in
the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court were verbally informed by respondent's
counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court. Pursuant to this, petitioner
filed "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment,"
stating that the former administratrix had long resigned and that the CA had granted "new or
further relief" in favor of respondent (interest modification). This was denied by the CA. No
further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five months later, after respondent
had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment, as affirmed in his favor
by the appellate court, it filed the present petition for certiorari - alleging and praying that the
appellate court's decision be declared null and void for having been rendered and entered in
excess of or without jurisdiction or that the SC send for the records from the appellate court "for
purposes of review and thereafter render its own decision reversing the judgment of the CA"
notwithstanding its long having become final and executory.
Issue: Whether the appeal was frivolous
Ruling: Yes. The court found no merit in the petition and reminded petitioner’s counsel to be
more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 3 of the Rules of Court which provided that “the
signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay” and expressly admonishes that “for a willful violation of this rule,
an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.”
12-Cruz
Gillego v Diaz
G.R. No. L-27428, May 29, 1971
Main Point: Where an appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation
unnecessarily, counsel responsible therefor was adjudged to pay treble costs and the decision
noted in his personal records with the Supreme Court.
Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for ejectment and illegal detainer of a certain residential
property against petitioner before the MTC. After numerous postponements attributed by
respondents to the efforts of respondent judge to effect an amicable settlement of the case
(petitioner's wife being the sister of respondent Diaz) and to postponements secured by the
parties, judgment of ejectment was rendered. Respondents filed a motion for execution of
judgment since it was already final and executory. But petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari with injunction, praying for a declaration of nullity of the judgment of ejectment on the
sole ground that "the said decision of the respondent Municipal Judge is null and void ab initio
for the reason that the same was rendered by him after he has lost jurisdiction over the case
due to the lapse of one year from the date of filing of the complaint. This was dismissed on the
ground that the court did not lose jurisdiction over the case just for the reason that the decision
was rendered more than one year after the filing of the complaint. Hence, this direct appeal on
a question of law from the order of the CFI dismissing appellant's petition for certiorari seeking
to restrain the execution of a judgment of ejectment rendered by the MTC, on the ground of the
latter court's alleged loss of jurisdiction over the ejectment case after the lapse of one year from
the filing of the complaint.
Issue: Whether the appeal was frivolous.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner, in his brief on appeal, would belatedly assail the municipal court's
ejectment judgment against him on the alleged ground that the said suit should have been
considered as one between members of the same family under Article 222 of the Civil Code
(since he is a brother-in-law of respondent Diaz) and it had not been shown that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made but failed, as enjoined by said codal provision.
Assuming arguendo the applicability of the cited article, it is much too late now for petitioner to
raise this question for the first time here on appeal. Not having raised it in the ejectment suit,
which has long become final and executory he is barred now by laches and waiver from invoking
the cited provision. Not having raised it either in his petition for certiorari below, where the sole
issue raised by him was the alleged nullity of the municipal court's ejectment judgment "for loss
of jurisdiction over the case due to the lapse of one year from the date of filing of the complaint,"
he is doubly barred from raising it for the first time in this appeal, under the well-settled principle
that issues of fact or of law not properly brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal and will not be considered by the reviewing court.
13. SABURNIDO v. MADRONO
FACTS:Spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido filed an administrative complaint for disb
arment against Atty. Florante Madro Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing
them by filing numerous complaints againstthem, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.
The cases filed were:
Adm. Case No. 900755, for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano Sabur
nido. 2.Adm. Case No. 900758, for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Sabur
nido and two others.
Crim. Case No. 9367, for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal
Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.
Adm. Case No. 9533, filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the Omnib
us Election Code.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano Saburnido
had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending. Complainants
allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since they had earlier filed
administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary. Complainants
assert that due to the complaints filed against them, they suffered much moral, mental, physical,
and financial damage. They claim that their children had to stop going to school since the family
funds were used up in attending to their cases. Respondent contends that the grounds
mentioned in the administrative cases in which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did
not constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he could not be disbarred therefor. Complainants
reiterate their charge that the cases against them were meant only to harass them.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent and his
counsel failed to appear and present evidence in the hearing of the case set for January 26,
2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have waived his right to present
evidence in his behalf during said hearing. Neither did respondent submit his memorandum as
directed by the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether the lawyer’s act of filing multiple complaints against the gross misconduct
RULING: Yes. Clearly, respondent’s act of filing multiple complaints against herein
complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces
vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental in respondent’s dismissal from the judiciary. We see in
respondent’s tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of
one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
The IBP concluded that complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed
committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative
sanction.The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
14. CASTANEDA vs AGO
FACTS: Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover
certain machineries. Judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson. Ago appealed, and on June
30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment . Ago moved for a
stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots
located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961.
Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied. Sheriff sold the house and lots to
Castaneda and Henson,Ago failed to redeem. Sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued
writ of possession to the properties
Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was
his personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could not legally be
reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda
the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the
matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued
Ago filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession
where SC dismissed. Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition;
Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition.Agos filed another petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy
RULINGS
No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff’s
sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin
suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer
of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his
client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate.
15. WARRINER v.DUBLIN
FACTS: Sps Warriner engaged the services of Atty. Dublin to file a civil case against EB
Vilarosa & PartnerCo. Wherein he failed to submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
leading to the dismissal of the complaint. An administrative sit was instituted. After obtaining a
30 day extension to file a comment, Atty. Dublin did not file any response for a period of 2tears.
He continued ignoring the directives of the court despite several show cause orders. Only when
the court ordered his arrest and detention until compliance with the resolution did he file a
comment to the petition.
Atty. Dublin defense was that he lost his records of the case above mentioned and he could not
get a copy from the RTC. He also argues that he accepted the case free of charge and because
of Mr. Warriner’s criticism of the Philippine Judicial System. He also mentioned that the veracity
of Mr. Warriner’s claims are suspicious and fabricated. That to withdraw from the case would
only expose other lawyer’s to the perpetuation of Warriner’s fraudulent schemes. More so, his
belated answer is a result of his duty to protect the legal profession in accordance with his oath.
The IBP Board of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants.
Respondent also his propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus it recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year. Respondent moved for
reconsideration insisting that the IBP’s Resolution is not supported by facts. He maintained that
his actuations did not amount to a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that
the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, although belated, exculpated him from
any liability.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of mishandling case
RULING: Yes. Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records
show that the 10-day period given to respondent to submit his formal offer of documentary
evidence pursuant to the RTC Order dated November 11, 1997 lapsed without any compliance
from the respondent. Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 which provide:
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Page 3 of 13
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the
prejudice of herein complainants. Culled from the pleadings respondent submitted before this
Court and the IBP, respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of
exhibits because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same
would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If respondent truly believes that the
exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to
withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such
as "[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is
handling"20 or "[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules."21 Respondent adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden
as a fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City. Unfortunately, respondent
anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph C.
Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-time gardener. Complainants refuted this allegation
by claiming that Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that more than
eight years have passed since the estimate was secured. Complainants also pointed out that
since the filing of this case, respondent has thrice relocated his office but this does not mean
that his practice has ceased to exi
16 Tejano v Baterina
AC N0 8235
Facts: Joselito F. Tejano had filed an affidavit-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada for acting in conspiracy
with Atty Benjamin F. Baterina (Tejano’s prior counsel) for taking possession of Tejano’s
property. The said property was a strip of land in the northern portion of lot 5663 in Vigan City.
Initially the whole lot was owned by the Tejano family until the Province of Ilocos Sur had built
an access road lacking the proper expropriation proceedings which was the subject of Civil
Case No. 4046-V. Four judges had heard this case in the RTC prior to Judge Arquelada.
However before Judge Arquelada had presided over this case in 2001, he was one of the trial
prosecutors to represent the Province of Ilocos Sur in Civil Case No. 4046-V.
In the affidavit-complaint filed by Tejano he had stated that Judge Arquelada for taking illegal
possession of the subject property while collecting rent from squatters who had set up business
in the aforementioned lot. The evidence presented to support Tejano’s claim was the Transfer
Certificate naming Judge Arquelada’s daughter, Karen Laderas and receipts of rents paid to
Aida Calbuso and the brother of Judge Arquelada. As for the complaint against Atty Baterina,
Tejano had miserably failed to advance his cause in (1) failure to object waiver of right to present
evidence due to his mother’s illness; (2) failed to file a motion for reconsideration; (3) declared
in open court that he will present any witness without consulting his clients; and (4) failure to
comply with trial court’s order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.
Atty Baterina had defended that during the time of the filed complaint, he had just recuperated
from a kidney transplant and begged the Court’s indulegence. He expressly stated, “ his failure
to comply was not at all intended to show disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal”.
Atty Baterina had assailed the allegation of the conduct of bad faith and negligence for he was
suspended from the practice of law after the initial presentation of Tejano’s case.
Issue: W/N Atty Baterina should be disbarred for his alleged conduct which contradicts the
necessary need to serve a client with competence and diligence.
Ruling: No, Atty Baterina was not disbarred but rather suspended from the practice of law for
five years for gross negligence. The court had mentioned that Atty Baterina had violated
CANON 18, Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04 for not obeying the trial courts orders for his client but
even disregarding the court’s orders in his own disciplinary proceedings. Atty Baterina had
neglected to perform the duties bound on him which disregard the necessary conduct of
safeguarding his client’s welfare. A lawyer who is in a suspended state from the practice of law
owes to his client to “not to sit idly and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty”.
The client should never be in the position of being left in the dark but should be adequately and
fully informed about development of his case.
17 Llunar v Ricafort
AC No 6484
Facts:In this case, the complainant Adelita B. Llunar had filed a complaint against Atty. Romulo
Ricafort on the grounds of gross and inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct. The
complainant was an attorney-in- fact of Severina Bafiex and employed the respondent to file a
case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes for recovery of land allegedly own to
the Banes family however was fraudulently registered in the name of Ricardo which was then
passed to Ard.
The property under the possession of Ard, was under mortgaged with the Rural Bank of
Malilipot, Albary subject to foreclosure proceedings while Atty Ricafort was hired. Llunar had
given Atty Ricafort P70,000 for partial payment of the redemption price on the property; P19,000
to recover the filing fees; and P6,500 as attorney’s fees (total amount of P95,000). Three years
passed and Llunar had found out that the case was not filed to the RTC and in return demanded
the amount of P95,000. Atty Ricafort refused to reimburse the amount for the reason that
anunulment of the title against Ard Cervantes has already been filed by Atty Edgar Abitria
instead. Atty Ricafort was only willing to reimburse P45,000 for the P50,000 was used to pay
Atty Abitria in an acceptance fee for taking over the case.
The IBP with the Investigating Commissioners had found the respondent liable for his conduct.
The IBP had figured out that Atty Ricafort did not inform his client that he was already under
indefinite suspension from the practice of law whereby Commissioner Villanueva had
recommended that such suspension should be indefinite. Also, the IBP had ordered the full
reimbursement of P95,000 to Atty Ricafort. Atty Ricafort had filed a motion for reconsideration
stating that Llunar was fully aware of referring the case to Atty Abitria.
Issue: W/N the complaint against Atty Ricafor on the grounds of gross and inexcusable
negligence and serious misconduct has standing.
Ruling: Yes, the complaint against Atty Ricafor has standing which resulted to Atty Ricafor to
be disbarred from the practice of law, to be removed from the Roll of Attorneys and to return
the total amount of P95,000 to Llunar. Atty Ricafor was noted by the court, to have several
infractions which made him a contender for grave misconduct. The first infraction was Atty
Ricafort’s failure to exert the due diligence in handling the case such as the three year delay
period of the case which is in violation of Rule 18.03. The second infraction was the failure of
Atty Ricafort to return within demand the amount of P95,000 who had refuse to pay upon the
false reassurance that the action on her case is taken care of which is violative of CANON 16.
The third infraction was the dishonesty displayed by Atty Ricafort towards his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law which is contrary of CANON 15 for he had the complete
absence of candor within his conduct. The last infraction was the unauthorize practice of law
within his indefinite suspension period which aggrevates Atty Ricafort’s wrong doings and
makes him appear as a frequent violator of professional ethics.
18 Legarda v CA
Facts: The petitioner Victoria Legarda was a defendant in a complaint for specific damages that
had been filed by the private respondent New Cathay House, Inc in the RTC. The complaint
was done initially to compel Legarda to sign a lease to turn her house into an operating
restaurant. The lower court had issued a TRO which refrain Legarda and her agents from
stopping the renovation of the property. Legarda’s counsel Antonio Coronel had filed for
extension of 10 days to file an answer to the complaint. Legarda had failed to file her answer
and was declared by default to uphold the actions of the complaint. Legarda was then ordered
by the lower court to sign the lease contract and to pay for the following: exemplary damages
of P100,000; actual and compensatory damages of P278,764; and attorney’s fees of P10,000.
Legarda later on being represented by an attorney-in-fact named Ligaya C. Gomez filed a
petition for annulment of judgement on the basis that the decision was brought through fraud
and that there was no account of her pleadings or evidences submitted. The claim of fraud
brought from Legarda was on the reason that Robert Cabrera that represent New Cathay House
had made her believe in false pretenses that he had agreed with the conditions of the lease and
in return they would drop the complaint against Legarda to where there is no need of answer to
be filed to the complaint. The CA had found the defense of Legarda to not hold water, Legarda’s
counsel along with the terms agreed with Cabrera should have filed the motion for dismissal or
withdrawal of the complaint. Therefore, the absence of the Legarda’s counsel to file the proper
motion of withdrawal or dismissal had shown that Legarda’s counsel had committed simple and
pure negligence.
The decision of the CA had become final with the demand made by New Cathay House Inc. to
vacate the property within three days by which Atty Coronel did not inform Legarda. The person
who had informed Legarda to vacate was the secretary of Atty Coronel. Legarda not having any
other option had to vacate the property.
Issue: W/N Atty Coronel should be held administratively liable for the injustice to Legarda.
Ruling: Yes, Atty Coronel should be held administratively liable for the unjust actions done to
Legarda. Atty Coronel’s failure to show to reply to the complaint against himself places him in
default of waiving his right to be heard on the matter and distinguishes him as guilty. Atty
Coronel was held in violation of CANON 18 and Rule 18.03 through neglecting to file the answer
of Legarda to the complaint of New Cathay House Inc., Atty Coronel’s actions had deprived
Legarda’s rights over her house and lot which signifies the failure of exercising due diligence in
protecting and attending the interest of his client. A lawyer in regards to a lawyer-client
relationship should exert all efforts for the client’s cause until its final conclusion and failure upon
this would make such lawyer unworthy of the trust impose upon him. The result of gross
negligence on the part of Atty Coronel had stemmed from depriving the petitioner of her property
rights.
GENON- CASE NO. 19
Endaya vs. Oca, 410 SCRA 244,
FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty. Wifredo Oca for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and what complainant termed as “professional delinquency or
infidelity. The complainant and his spouse were charged with unlawful detainer and filed their
answer which was prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. Thereafter, complainant sought
the services of the PAO in Batangas City and respondent Oca was assigned to handle the case
for the complainant and his wife. 1. Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and
position pape in MCTC, nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer
principally on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. 2. On appeal by
the opposing party, once again, respondent failed the complainant and his wife as respondent
did not file the memorandum for his clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case
as submitted for decision which reversed the ruling of MCTC against the spouses Endaya.
Respondent denies the allegation stressing that he was not the original counsel of complainant
and his spouse. He further avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the
continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking
leave of court to file an amended answer because he was made to believe by the complainant
that the answer was prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon discovering that the answer was in fact
the work of a lawyer, forthwith he asked the court to relieve him as complainant’s counsel, but
he was denied. He adds that he agreed to file the position paper for the complainant upon the
latter’s undertaking to provide him with the documents which support the position that plaintiffs
are not the owners of the property in dispute. As complainant had reneged on his promise, he
claims that he deemed it more prudent not to file any position paper as it would be a repetition
of the answer. He offers the same reason for not filing the memorandum on appeal with the
RTC.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Oca should be suspended.
RULING: Yes. When respondent was directed to file affidavits and position paper by the MCTC,
and appeal memorandum by the RTC, he had no choice but to comply. However, respondent
did not disregard of the court orders. This constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by
Rule 18.03 of the CPR which mandates that “(A) lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Respondent’s failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC did not actually
prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. However,
the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03. The court cannot sustain respondent’s excuse in
not filing the affidavits and position paper with the MCTC and the appeal memorandum with the
RTC. He claims that he did not file the required pleadings because complainant failed to furnish
him with evidence that would substantiate complainant’s allegations in the answer. He argues
that absent the supporting documents, the pleadings he could have filed would just be a
repetition of the answer. While respondent could have thought this affidavit to be without
probative value, he should have left it to the sound judgment of the court to determine whether
the affidavit supports the assertion of his clients. That could have happened had he filed the
required position paper and annexed the affidavit thereto. Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months from notice, with the warning that a
similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
GENON- CASE NO. 20
Carandang vs. Obmina, 586 SCRA 82
FACTS: This is a complaint filed by the petitioner Carlito P. Carandang against Atty. Gilbert S.
Obmina. Atty. Obmina was counsel for Carandang in civil entitled “Sps. Emilia A. Carandang
and Carlito Carandang vs. Ernesto Alzona.” Petitioner Carandang brought suit for Atty.
Obmina’s failure to inform him of the adverse decision in the civil case after 6 months and for
failure to appeal the decision. “Ang aking anak na si Rosemarie ay nagpunta sa BIÑAN, sa RTC
ay binati at tinatanong kung saan kayo nakatira at ang sagot [ng] aking anak, bakit? At ang
sagot naman [ng] taga RTC, HINDI MO BA ALAM NA ANG INYONG KASO AY TAPOS NA.
Nang marinig yon ay umuwi na siya at sinabi agad sa akin. Tapos na daw yung kaso [ng] ating
bahay at ako ay pumunta sa opisina . ATTY. OBMINA at aking tinanong “BAKIT DI MO SINABI
SA AKIN NA TAPOS NA ANG KASO?” At ang sagot niya sa akin “AY WALA KANG IBABAYAD
SA ABOGADO DAHIL WALA KANG PERA PANG-APILA” dahil sa sagot sa akin ay para akong
nawalan [ng] pag-asa sa kaso.” Manifestation filed by a certain Atty. Ma. Carmencita C.
Obmina-Muaña. Allegedly, she is the daughter of respondent Atty. Obmina. She further alleged
that her father is already a permanent resident of the USA since March 2001 and had already
retired from the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Obmina should be suspended.
RULING: Although complainant is partly to blame for his loss for failure to maintain contact with
Atty. Obmina and to inform himself of the progress of his case, it the duty of Atty. Obmina to
notify his client as to what happened to his case pursuant to Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04.
The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the
Page 4 of 13
lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important developments affecting the client’s
case. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the
client’s interests. That as a result of the respondent’s failure to notify the complainant, the latter
lost the case leading to his eviction. Atty. Obmina admitted that he was counsel for Carandang
but blamed Carandang for the adverse decision because Carandang did not tell him that there
was a Compromise Agreement executed prior to Atty. Obmina’s filing of the. Atty. Obmina’s
futile efforts of shifting the blame on Carandang only serve to emphasize his failure to notify
Carandang that the trial court already promulgated a decision that was adverse to Carandang’s
interests (he executed compromise agreement prior). Atty. Obmina cannot overlook the fact
that Carandang learned about the promulgation of the decision not through Atty. Obmina
himself, but through a chance visit to the trial court. Instead of letting Carandang know of the
adverse decision himself, Atty. Obmina should have immediately contacted Carandang,
explained the decision to him, and advised them on further steps that could be taken. It is
obvious that Carandang lost his right to file an appeal because of Atty. Obmina’s inaction.
Notwithstanding Atty. Obmina’s subsequent withdrawal as Carandang’s lawyer, Atty. Obmina
was still counsel of record at the time the trial court promulgated the decision. The Court
SUSPENDS Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for one year, and WARNS him that
a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
GENON- CASE NO. 21
Agot vs. Rivera, 732 SCRA 12
FACTS: Complainant Chamelyn A. Agot filed a case against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera
(respondent), charging him of violating the CPR and the lawyer’s oath for misrepresentation,
deceit, and failure to account for and return her money despite several demands. Complainant
alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best friend’s wedding in USA. To facilitate
the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services of respondent
who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, they entered into a Contract of Legal
Services whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant
visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding and paid respondent the amount of
P350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the
issuance of the US visa. The parties likewise stipulated that should complainant’s visa
application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or
for records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is
obligated to return the said downpayment. However, respondent failed to perform his
undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview
in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded,
complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful
conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the
services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainant’s downpayment of
P350,000.00.
Respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his obligation under the Contract was due to
the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for
the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount given by the complainant. Respondent
elaborated that he had a business relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the
issuance of US visas to his friends and family, including himself. He happened to disclose this
to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the complainant, whose previous
US visa application had been denied, resulting in the execution of the Contract. Respondent
claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but,
nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant. To buttress
his claims, respondent attached pictures supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda as
well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly coming from the latter.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Rivera should be suspended.
RULING: Yes. Respondent failed to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to
facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant
violation under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client,
he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.[16] Therefore,
a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as in this case. Atty. Pineda is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the
finality of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant
Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within
ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive
will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
WACK-WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB V. CA

FACTS: These petitions were filed by the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc., to review
the decisions of the Court of Appeals in two cases involving the same corporation.
First, Petronilo Arcangel, a former employee of the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc.,
filed a money claim for overtime services rendered to said employer, for unenjoyed vacation
leave, moral damages and attorney's fees. The employer having filed its answer to the
complaint. Neither the defendant (employer) nor its counsel, Balcoff, Poblador and Angel Cruz
appeared notwithstanding the fact that they were duly notified of the hearing since March 22,
1955; hence, the plaintiff was allowed to continue presenting his evidence without the presence
of defendant and judgment was in favour of the plaintiff employee.
The law firm of Juan Chuidian, on behalf of the defendant, filed a petition to set aside the
judgment on the ground of misunderstanding, mistake and excusable neglect, which petition
was denied by the lower court in its order of May
Second, Antonino Bernardo, former official of appellant, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a claim against the Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. for overtime pay, unenjoyed
vacation and sick leaves from 1946 to 1951 and attorney's fees. As the employer denied the
claim.
At the hearing of May 6, 1955, neither the defendant nor its counsel, Balcoff, Poblador and
Angel Cruz, appeared notwithstanding the fact that they were duly notified of the hearing since
March 22, 1955; hence, the plaintiff was allowed to continue presenting his evidence without
the presence of defendant.
On May 14, 1955, the law firm of Juan T. Chuidian, on behalf of the defendant employer, filed
a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding, mistake and excusable
neglect, which petition was denied by the lower court in its order of May 31.
The petition was later supplemented by another similarly praying for the setting aside of the
decision rendered therein, on the ground of accident or excusable negligence.
ISSUE: Whether the Trial court abused its discretion in denying its petition for relief from the
order authorizing the reception of plaintiff's evidence in the absence of the defendant and the
judgment rendered in the case, is premised on the ground (1) that counsel's tardiness or delay
as well as his unpreparedness to go to trial are accidental or may be considered as excusable
negligence, and (2) that the trial court should have allowed the motion for postponement.
RULING: The responsibility for representing defendant at the trial on May 12, 1955 was
therefore still his. On the other hand if it is true, as alleged by appellant, that the services of
Attorney Juan Chuidian had been engaged sometime prior to May 11, 1955 then it was the
latter's duty to file his appearance opportunely and prepare for the trial on May 12, 1955. It is to
be presumed that in accepting the case Attorney Chuidian knew that the trial was to be held on
that date; and he certainly was not justified in accepting the case unless he was prepared to go
to trial as scheduled. He had no right to take for granted the liberality of the court or generosity
of the plaintiff by appearing, through an assistant of his, after the case had been actually called
on the calendar and while the evidence of the plaintiff was already being received, and then
only to ask (verbally) for another postponement.
All motions for postponement should be presented at such time as is practicable to prevent the
adverse party from incurring unnecessary expenses by coming to trial, otherwise postponement
shall be denied. And a party moving for the postponement should be in court on the day for trial
if the motion was not acted upon favorably before that day. He has no right to rely either on the
liberality of the court, or on the generosity of the adverse party
Defendant-appellant had manifested its desire to replace its former counsel Messrs. Paredes,
Balcoff and Poblador with the law office of Atty. Juan Chuidian. If this were so, it was the
bounden duty of both law firms to have made the necessary arrangement for the protection of
the interest of their client. Their failure to do so cannot certainly be considered excusable neglect
to the extent of making the action of the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals in denying
relief based thereon, an abuse of discretion constituting reversible error.
BLANZA V. ARCANGEL
FACTS: Atty. Agustin Arcangel, volunteered to help Olegaria Blanza and Maria Passion,
complainants, in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their
husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent
documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed
that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and refused to
surrender the papers when asked by the complainants six years later.
ISSUE: WON the respondent be reprimanded for professional non-feasance
RULING: No. The Court found the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of
disciplinary action against respondent. But the Court cannot but counsel against his actuations
as a member of the Bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than
merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of the law, he is
necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must,
perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional
services.
It was unnecessary to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension
claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith terminated their
professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. And although we voted
that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the
high standards of his chosen profession require of him
ABAY V. MONTESINO
FACTS: Eduardo T. Abay charges Atty. Raul T. Montesino with gross negligence, gross
incompetence and evident bad faith, in violation of his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
Negros Institute of Technology (NIT), of which the complainant is a stockholder, hired
respondent as counsel in an action for "Cancellation of Title of Ownership, Recovery of
Ownership and Possession and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" against the estate of
Vicente T. Galo. Complainant attributes the failure of respondent to submit the brief to the
latter’s gross negligence and evident bad faith. Respondent allegedly abandoned the appeal
without the knowledge and consent of the NIT. Worse, he supposedly never told the Institute
that its appeal had already been dismissed. Respondent denied and felt that to pursue the
appeal would be "dilatory, expensive, frivolous and taxing [to] the precious time of the [CA]."
Thus, he deemed it wise to advise the stockholders of the NIT to abandon the appeal and
instead "file appropriate Complain.
Complainant thus prayed that respondent be duly sanctioned with disbarment
ISSUE: WON the failure of respondent to file the appellant’s brief was a clear violation of his
professional duty to his client.
RULING: The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with
competence and diligence. 21 Rules 18.03 and 18.04 specifically provide:
"Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
"Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information."
The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he had a
cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former of the latter’s
because made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if respondent was
"honestly and sincerely" protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had no right to
waive the appeal without the latter’s knowledge and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable
or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance and
allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.
Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of negligence and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six months.
ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI
FACTS: There were two petitions for review on certiorari which were consolidated per
Resolution. The National Housing Authority filed expropriation proceedings against the
Zuzuarreguis, for parcels of land belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal. The
Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor.
Resolution was issued, where Zuzuarreguis would be paid in NHA Bonds, subject to the
availability of funds; and that the yield on the bonds to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis shall be
based on the Central Bank rate at the time of payment.
a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and
Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds
paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or
criminal action and informing the latter that their services as counsels in the expropriation
proceedings filed by the NHA was being formally terminated.
Apparently unsatisfied with the explanation of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, the Zuzuarreguis filed
a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages
Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 152072.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter-agreement executed by the zuzuarreguis, and attys. Roxas
and pastor, fixing the exact amount that must go to the former, should stand as law between
the parties.
RULIING: It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They
are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz:
Page 5 of 13
13. Contingent Fees. – A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness.
and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,46 viz
CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to
which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the
just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or
an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no
full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the
44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is,
therefore, in order.
They were not short-changed for their efforts for they would still be earning or actually earned
attorney’s fees. The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys. Roxas and
Pastor to the Zuzuarreguis
Lagua VS CA
Facts: Melchor Lagua, the accused petitioner is guilty of homicide, he received an Order from
the CA requiring to file his Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof.He filed a Motion
for Extention twice, which the CA granted with a warning that no further extension shall be
allowed.Despite the two extensions, petitioner Lagua still failed to file his appellant’s brief. His
counsel, Atty. Salvador Quimpo, manifested to the Court that he had already withdrawn as
defense counsel, and so he filed a Motion for Reconsideration requesting more time to secure
the services of another counsel. But, Solicitor General manifest that accused-appellant’s
abandonment of his appeal rendered the judgment of conviction final and executory, moved for
his immediate arrest and confinement at the New Bilibid Prison. Petitioner request for
reconsideration and CA granted it to him.
With petitioner’s new counsel, Atty. Emerson Barrientos, he again failed to seasonably file his
brief, for the second time, declared his appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissed. Roused
from inaction, he filed another Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief.
The CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the Appellant’s Brief to be
expunged.
Issue: WON the Appellate court erred in dismissing the case.
Ruling: No.The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even
mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once
retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the
prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by
counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or
omission of the client himself.
It is the client’s duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of
the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of
his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough.
As clients, petitioners should have maintained contact with their counsel from time to time, and
informed themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that standard of care
"which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his business."
Thus, with the ordinary remedy of appeal lost through the petitioner’s own fault, SC affirms that
no reversible error was committed in the dismissal of the petition by the appellate court.
Millare VS Montero
FACTS: Millare, obtained a favorable judgment which ordered Co to vacate the premises. Co,
through Atty. Montero, filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the
execution of the judgment.
ISSUE: WON respondent shall be held guilty of malpractice
RULING: Yes. Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required
to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice, but it is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the
filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of
frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same
judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Thus, Respondent is suspended for one
year.
In re: Atty De Vera
Facts:Atty. Leonard De Vera gave a contemptuous statements quoted hereunder:
“Atty. De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed
vagueness”
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II
"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong.
Sovereignty must prevail."rtua1aw library
Atty. De Vera is directed to explain why he should not be in contemp, in which he argued that
he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he
said that a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional "would trigger
mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II." While he
admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having made the
same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.
Issue: WoN Atty. De Vera should be in contempt for uttering some allegedly contemptuous
statements in relation to the case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law
Ruling: Yes, he is guilty of indirect contemp of court. Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules
of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that
is directed against the dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration
of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Respondent cannot justify
his contemptuous statements — asking the Court to dispel rumors that it would declare the
Plunder Law unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as such was basically
wrong and would not be accepted by the people — as utterances protected by his right to
freedom of speech.
Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such
right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court’s integrity and authority, and
interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as
the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. Thus, making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise
of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the
courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence
therein.
Nestle Phil, Inc. Vs Sanchez
GR. No. 75209
Facts: The Union of Filipro Emplyoees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism
and Nationlisim-Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July
8 1987 outside Padre Faura gate of the SC building. Since june 17, 1981.
On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the
opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other
individuals to appear before the court on July 14 and then and there to show cause why they
should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose Espinas, counsel of the union of Filipro
employees, was further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt
with.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leader’s concemed, apologized
to the Court with an assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s
leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK,
an unregistered loosed alliance of about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by
either the UFE or KILU.
Issue: WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas be administratively
dealt with.
Ruling: Yes, Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts
as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice. it is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court;
and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies."
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by
the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or
interference." The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and
the citizenry at large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence
the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty.
Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the
pickets the untenability of their acts and posture.
29. Lantoria vs. Bunyi
Facts: Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said
farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos.
81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. These cases were
assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of
which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the
municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). The defendants in the mentioned civil cases
were, in due course, declared in default.
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present
administrative case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on three (3) letters dated 04
March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974 for acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge
and bribery .
The letters contain statements addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and
Orders, which said judge told Atty. Bunyi to prepare and he is going to sign them. Complainant
contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because the (respondent) was the one
who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by
respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.
Respondent contended that such letter was from the under-standing between the Judge and
the complainant who, from his several letters, had demonstrated so much interest to eject at
once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to manage and such preparation of said
decision never came from him and such was not lutong macao as Judge Galicia asked for help
in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants
lost their standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers
and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof .
Issue: Whether or not respondent must be suspended from practice of law for influencing a
judge in relation to the three civil cases
Ruling: Yes. We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by
way of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge
Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and
which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the
Page 6 of 13
trial court judge’s consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of
respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were
enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the
personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of
motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the
judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device
or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting
independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy
and respect due the judge’s station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official
relations between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer’s attempt to influence the court is
rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the
court where he had pending civil case
30. Mercado Vs Security Bank
Facts: Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R. Mercado, petitioners, filed with this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (a) Decision 2 dated May 27,
2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71570 dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment; and (b) its
Resolution3 dated October 23, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.
On January 12, 2004, the court denied the petition because of petitioners’ failure to show that
a reversible error had been committed by the Appellate Court. 4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the Court of Appeals, in dismissing
their petition for annulment of judgment, merely relied on technical rules of procedure, thereby
sacrificing the greater interest of justice and equity; and that their former counsel’s gross
negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud, a ground for annulling the trial court’s judgment.
On March 24, 2004, we issued a Resolution granting petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and
reinstating their petition. We likewise required Security Bank Corporation, respondent, to
comment on the petition.
In its comment, respondent averred that the issues raised in the present petition are mere
rehash of the issues petitioners raised before the Appellate Court. As to the alleged negligence
of their counsel, respondent pointed out that the same cannot be considered an extrinsic fraud
since through the same counsel, they actively pursued and recovered moral damages and
attorney’s fees. Furthermore, assuming that petitioners’ counsel refused to file a motion for
reconsideration with the trial court, still, they had the option to terminate his services and hire
another; and that they should not have waited for four (4) years before filing the petition for
annulment of judgment.
On June 7, 2004, we issued a Resolution denying the petition on the ground that petitioners
indeed failed to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Appellate Court.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but we dismissed the same in our Resolution
dated September 15, 2004.
A contempt proceedings against petitioner Jose Teofilo T. Mercado arising from his letter dated
October 18, 2004, insinuating that: (1) the ponente succumbed to the "tremendous pressure"
of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2) the Security Bank Corporation,
respondent, financed the ponente’s travel to the United States; and (3) the ponente gave
respondent a "go signal" to sell his property.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Villanueva violated Canon 15 of the CPR.
Ruling: Yes, Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a
lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body." Further, Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer must impress upon his client compliance with
the laws and the principles of fairness." Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In informing
Mercado that he was "a very very good, close and long time friend" of the ponente, Atty.
Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of his case.
However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercado’s expectation crumbled. This
prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente.
We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer
who guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure and employ
any means to win the case at all costs. But when the case is lost, he will blame the courts,
placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this case, Atty. Villanueva’s
statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court, together
with Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or influenced.

31. Nakpil vs Valdez
FACTS: Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a summer
residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase
the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for
the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained
two (2) loans from a bank which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then
issued in respondent’s name.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose
Nakpil died. Respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent
excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate and transferred his title to the
Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and
the complainant.
RULING: YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.
[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to
each other. Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate
and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a
conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two
claimants who are creditors of the estate.
[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could
be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondent’s law firm was to contest the
claims of these two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm.
Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The
test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not
certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings
to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to
his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.
32. Hilado vs David
FACTS: Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim
Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty.
Ohnick. Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad . Four months later,
Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out
that Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case
and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter. Atty. Francisco opposed the
motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material information was relayed
to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her
case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared
by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an
associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to
Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a
legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty.
Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty.
Agrava said that it was merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential
information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was
already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty.
Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
RULING: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty.
Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s
consent. As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established. Section 19 € of Rule 127
imposes upon an attorney the duty “to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client.” Communications between attorney and client are,
in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the
dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant’s cause. We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be
allowed.
33. Dee vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by
the latter’s cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of
petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las
Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Private respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar’s
Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of
the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president
told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would
be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private respondent’s return to Manila, he
conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In
August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning
the debt and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the
casino never bothered him.
Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private respondent sent several demand
letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioner,
however, ignored said letters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an attorney-client relationship between parties.
HELD:
YES. Court affirmed the decision of the defendant Court of Appeals. Costs against the
petitioner.
[T]here is no question that professional services were actually rendered by private respondent
to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee,
with Caesar’s Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further
freed from the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia.
For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable
compensation and this right cannot be concluded by petitioner’s pretension that at the time
private respondent rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the
Philippine consultant of Caesar’s Palace.
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services
rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in
good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his
just fees.
34.LIM
Perez vs De La Torre
Conflict of Interest
Facts: Complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct
or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests. Perez alleged that he
is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in December 2001,
several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego
Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the
municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made
representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial
confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the
murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against
them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the
mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at
the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial
confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and
robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial
confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be
utilized as a state-witness. Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in
executing his extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and
only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the
accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.
Page 7 of 13
Issue: Whether there was a conflict of interest
Ruling: Yes. Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two
parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and
without any proof that he secured the written consent of both parties after explaining to them
the existing conflict of interest, respondent should be sanctioned.
To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to
accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their
extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after
apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were
under no compulsion to give their confession. The excuse proferred by the respondent does
not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
35.LIM
Samson vs Era
Conflict of Interest
Facts: Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent
Atty. Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the
interest of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his
interest. Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding
scam perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business
(ICS Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison. The other
officers were Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and
Jhun Sison. Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the
criminal prosecution of Sison and her group.
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility
of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that
undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and
that they could settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover
to them of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange
for their desistance. They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and
in turn they received a deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation. When Samson and his co-
complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of Deeds and the Assessor’s Office
of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could not liquidate the property because
it was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation but was already under the name
of Bank Wise Inc.
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group.
This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however,
that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding
scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated.
Issue: Whether there is a conflict of interest
Ruling: Yes. In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by accepting
the responsibility of representing Sison in the cases similar to those in which he had
undertaken to represent Samson and his group, notwithstanding that Sison was the very
same person whom Samson and his group had accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He
had drafted the demand letters and the complaint-affidavit that became the bases for the filing
of the estafa charges against Sison and the others in the RTC in Quezon City. In his report
and recommendation dated October 1, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and for
failing to champion his clients’ cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. The SC
sustained the decision. 2 years suspension
36.LIM
Hornilla vs Salunat
Conflict of Interest
Facts: Benedicto Hornilla is a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA). Along with several other complainants, Hornilla filed intra-corporate cases before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against PPSTA board members for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of real property. Atty. Ernesto Salunat on the other hand is
a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, and a retained legal counsel of PPSTA. As retained
counsel, he represented PPSTA in the cases against them by Hornilla and other members.
Hornilla alleged that Atty. Salunat is laboring under conflict of interests for engaging with
PPSTA, where his fees are derived from the corporate funds that its members, including
himself, contributed on.Atty. Salunat refused to withdraw his representation despite being told
by PPSTA members about the conflict of interest. For his part, he contends that his
representation was in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates, being the retained legal counsel of
PPSTA, and not under his personal capacity.
Issue: Whether Atty. Salunat is indeed representing conflicting interests for representing
members of the same corporation in a derivative suit
Ruling: Yes. The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Since this is
still his first offense, Atty. Salunat is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in his
professional practice, and is further warned that a repetition of such act will be dealt with
severely.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled "Philippine Public
School Teacher’s Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public
School Teacher’s Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of
Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner,
was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent
Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when
he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case
No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By filing
the said pleading, he necessarily entered his appearance therein. Again, this constituted conflict
of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the
individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the
corporation.Atty. Salunat is found guilty of representing conflicting interests. Engaging as
counsel for a corporation and representing part of its members in a derivative suit would
normally give rise to a conflict of interests.
37. Musa
Conflict of Interest
Gonzales vs. Cabucana, Jr., 479 SCRA 320, A.C. No. 6836 January 23, 2006
Main point: The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action; The
representation of opposing clients, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interest or, at the
very least, invites suspicion of double dealing which the Court cannot allow.
Facts: A complaint was filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino
Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.
On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City where she was represented by the
law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty.
Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner; a decision
was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of
P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as attorney's fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to
fully implement the writ of execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted
Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff with this Court; in September 2003, Sheriff
Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her
to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint before this Court; Gonzales
thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral
defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation; notwithstanding the pendency of the Civil
Case where respondent's law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent
represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses; thus
respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since respondent's acceptance of the
cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and
respondent's law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rules 10.01,[1] 13.01,[2] 15.02,[3] 15.03,[4] 21.01[5] and
21.02.[6].
In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in Civil
Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and represented
Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the
cases filed against them but claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the spouses
pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance
in good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave them defenseless. When the
Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by
Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even with them
for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case. At first, respondent declined
to serve as counsel of the spouses as he too did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking
official, but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for money
or malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the spouses free of any
charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted against respondent which shows that
respondent is now the subject of a 'demolition job. The civil case filed by Gonzales where
respondent's brother served as counsel is different and distinct from the criminal cases filed by
complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal ethics.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Cabucana violated the CPR 15.03 for representing conflicting
interest.
Ruling: YES. The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the
civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases
filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The
representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of
interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of that duty.
For violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and taking into
consideration the fact that he represented the Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his
firm and not respondent personally, which handled the civil case of Gonzales as mitigating
circumstances, the Court imposed the penalty of fine of P2,000.00 with stern warning.
38. Musa
Conflict of Interest
Solatan vs. Inocentes, 466 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 6504 August 9, 2005
Main point: The present case focuses on a critical aspect of the lawyer-client relationship¾the
duty of loyalty. The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally characterized as "undivided."
This means that lawyers must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference
or impairment from any conflicting interest.
Facts: Attys. Inocentes and Camano were both engaged in the practice of law under the firm
name of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office. Atty. Inocentes held office in his home
located at No. 19 Marunong St., Central District, Quezon City, while Atty. Camano was stationed
at an "extension office" of the firm located in 3rd/F, 956 Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist., Quezon
City.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Andres and Ludivina
Genito (spouses Genito), owners of an apartment complex (the Genito Apartments) when the
Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). The law office represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and
the Sandiganbayan, and subsequently, with authority from the PCGG in ejectment cases
against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments including George Solatan whose
apartment was occupied by his sister.
Complainant seek advice from Atty. Inocentes. Atty. Inocentes referred complainant and his
mother to his associate, Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of the ejectment cases against
tenants of the Genito apartments. After the exchange, complainant went to Atty. Camano at the
satellite office of Atty. Inocentes’s firm. Different versions of subsequent events were presented.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Camano guilty for a) Receiving money (₱5,000
then ₱1,000) from the adverse party purportedly for attorney’s fees and for reimbursement of
sheriff’s expenses. Such act of accepting funds from the adverse party in the process of
implementing a writ, borders on technical extortion particularly in light of the factual
circumstances as discussed; and b) he gave unsolicited advice to the adverse party in
suggesting the filing of an Affidavit of Ownership over the levied properties, a suggestion
evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client, supposedly, the Genitos.
Page 8 of 13
Issue:
1. Whether or not Atty. Camano violated Rule 15.03.
2. Whether Atty. Inocentes should also be held liable.
Ruling:
1. YES. The IBP held that Atty. Camano’s act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a
culpable act because the advice conflicted with the interest of his clients, the spouses Genito.
The rule on conflicting interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, deals with conflicts in the interests of an attorney’s actual clients among
themselves, of existing and prospective clients, and of the attorney and his clients. It states that
a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. An attorney giving advice to a party with an interest conflicting
with that of his client resulting in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. The
penalty of six (6) months suspension is therefore recommended to be imposed on Respondent
Camano.
2. YES. We now hold further that partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities
are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and
goings of the cases handled by the persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority
and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge. Nonetheless, the liability of the
supervising lawyer in this regard is by no means equivalent to that of the recalcitrant lawyer.
The actual degree of control and supervision exercised by said supervising lawyer varies, inter
alia, according to office practice, or the length of experience and competence of the lawyer
supervised. Such factors can be taken into account in ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly,
a lawyer charged with the supervision of a fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes should
bear greater responsibility for the culpable acts of the underling than one satisfied enough with
the work and professional ethic of the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to his/her own
devises. Atty. Camano. Atty. Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED to monitor more closely the
activities of his associates to make sure that the same are in consonance with the Code of
Professional Responsibility with WARNING.
39. Musa
Conflict of Interest
Daging vs. Davis, A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014
Main point: The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule
applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.
Facts: Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She
leased it from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac).
Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis & Sabling Law Office signed
by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling) and eventually
resulted in the signing by the complainant.
Complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease.
Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music
bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the
operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as business
partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later renamed
Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis & Sabling
Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and in force.
However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case.
In his Comment, respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business partner
of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole proprietress of the
establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who initiated the proposal and
was in fact the one who was able to convince complainant to accept the law office as her
retainer. Respondent maintained that he never obtained any knowledge or information
regarding the business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling. Respondent
admitted though having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied that he took
advantage of the Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and Sabling Law Office.
The Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation finding respondent
guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information obtained from his client to the
disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of another person. He recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Issue: Whether the respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes. In Hilado v. David,15 reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.,16 this Court
held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the
services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took advantage
of any information acquired by his law finn in the course of its professional dealings with the
complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that
complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the
complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot represent
any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting interests and
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised
both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer. He was
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning.
40. Quiambao v. Bamba
FACTS: Felicitas Quiambao was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation
Bureau, Inc (AIB). She procured the legal services of Atty. Nestor Bamba for the corporate
affairs of AIB. Atty. Bamba was also the official legal counsel of an ejectment case filed by
Quiambao against spouses Santiago and Florito Torroba. When Quiambao resigned from AIB,
Atty. Bamba, without withdrawing as counsel from the ejectment case, represented AIB in a
complaint case for replevin and damages against her. Quiambao filed charges against Atty.
Bamba for representing conflicting interests and violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For his part, Atty. Bamba denies that he was a personal lawyer of Quiambao,
and he believes that it is part of his duty to pursue cases in behalf of employees at the time
Quiambao was working in AIB. Even then, Atty. Bamba contends that the ejectment case and
replevin case are completely unrelated.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Yes, Atty. Bamba is representing conflict in interests. Despite Atty. Bamba’s
contention that his legal services extend to AIB’s employees, this should not cover the personal
cases filed by its officers. Even though the replevin and ejectment case are unrelated,
representing opposing clients therein gives rise to suspicions of double-dealing, and would thus
result to a conflict of interest. Furthermore, Atty. Bamba failed to show that he disclosed or
procured the approval of Quiambao before pursuing the replevin case against her. Atty. Bamba
was found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from
practicing for one year.
MAIN POINT: It must be noted that the proscription against representation of conflicting
interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general
matter however slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the
lawyer’s private activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity. In
the process of determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is
probability, not certainty, of conflict.
41. Alisbo v. Jalandoon
FACTS: On March 16 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as his counsel
to commence an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased spouses Catalina
Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had been adjudicated to him under the judgment dated April
29 1961 by the CFI of Negros Occidental in Civil Case 4963, because Alisbo failed to file a
motion for execution of a judgment in his favor within the reglementary five-year period. On April
18 1970, Atty. Jalandoon prepared a complaint for revival of the judgment in CC 4963 but filed
it only on September 12 1970, five months later (Civil Case 9559). The complaint was signed
by respondent alone. However, he withdrew it and filed a second complaint with Ramon Alisbo
as the lone plaintiff, praying for the same relief. On December 8 1971, an amended complaint
was filed by Ramon Alisbo, assisted by his judicial guardian, Norberto Alisbo, and joined with
eight others. The amended complaint was signed by Atty. Bernardo Pablo alone as counsel of
the plaintiffs. On August 21 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a Motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the action for revival of judgment in Civil Case had already prescribed. On
October 3 1973, the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became final on May 30 1961 and, although
a complaint for revival of said judgment was filed by Ramon Alisbo on September 12 1970,
before the ten-year prescriptive period expired, that complaint was null and void for Ramon
Alisbo was insane, hence, incompetent and without legal capacity to sue when he instituted the
action. The subsequent filing of an Amended Complaint on December 8 1972, after the statutory
limitation period had expired, was too late to save the plaintiffs right of action. Thereafter,
nothing more was done by any of the parties in the case. On January 2 1974, the complainants
charged respondent Atty. Jalandoon with having deliberately caused the dismissal of Civil Case
9559 and with having concealed from them the material fact that he had been the former legal
counsel of Carlito Sales, their adversary in the probate proceedings. The respondent denied
the allegations against him. When Ramon Alisbo engaged the services of Atty. Jalandoon to
enforce the decision in Civil Case 4963, that decision was already nine years old, hence, it could
no longer be executed by mere motion. Complainants had only about a year left within which to
enforce the judgment by an independent action. Ramon Alisbo was already insane or
incompetent when he hired Atty. Jalandoon to file Civil Case 9559 for him. Atty. Jalandoon
concealed from Alisbo the fact that he had been the former counsel of Carlito Sales in the
probate proceedings where Alisbo and Sales had litigated over their shares of the inheritance.
According to him, it was only on October 6 1972, when Civil Case 9559 was called for pre-trial,
that he discovered his previous professional relationship with Sales. At that time, the ten-year
prescriptive period for revival of the judgment in favor of Alisbo had already expired. He there
upon asked Alisbo's permission to allow him to withdraw from the case. He also informed the
court about his untenable position and requested that he be allowed to retire therefrom. His
request was granted.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Jalandoon be held responsible for the dismissal of the case and had
betrayed his client’s trust.
RULING: Yes. Attorney Jalandoon betrayed his client Ramon Alisbo. There is a hint of duplicity
and lack of candor in his dealings with his client, which call for the exercise of this Court's
disciplinary power. After filing the complaint, Atty. Jalandoon sat on the case. While he allegedly
found out about Ramon Alisbos’ insanity on July 17 1971, only, he amended the complaint to
implead Alisbos’ legal guardian as plaintiff on December 8 1971 only, almost five months later.
By that time, the prescriptive period had run out. In view of his former association with the
Sales’, Atty. Jalandoon, as a dutiful lawyer, should have declined the employment proffered by
Alisbo on the ground of conflict of interest. Had he done that soon enough, the Alisbos’ would
have had enough time to engage the services of another lawyer and they would not have lost
their case through prescription of the action. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all concerned, given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that, in which it is also his duty to another client, to oppose.
The Court suspended him for a period of two years from the finality of this decision.
Atty. Jalandoon's pretense that he did not know before the pre-trial that the Sales defendants
had been his clients in the past, is unbelievable because: (1) Before he filed the complaint for
revival of judgment, he had had several interviews with Ramon Alisbo and Norberto Alisbo
regarding Civil Case No. 4963; and (2) He must have done some research on the court records
of Civil Case No. 4963, so he could not have overlooked his own participation in that case as
counsel for Carlito Sales, et al..
42. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio
FACTS: Plaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that their father engaged the services
of respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry (in which Lydio and
his brother Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty. Baguio used and submitted
evidence of: 1.) A special power of attorney executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh
Falame, appointing him as his attorney-in-fact; and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed
before the respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the
case.
Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in the said case,
Lydio still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and counsel of his
businesses until his death in 1996. However, in October of 2000, Atty. Baguio, in representation
of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, filed a complaint against the plaintiffs involving the
same property that was the subject matter in the first case. Said complaint sought the
declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, TCT issued as
a consequence of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage. Plaintiffs in turn,
filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging that by acting as counsel for the
spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they were impleaded a defendants, respondent
violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. They contend that the spouses Falame’s
interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Baguio violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Page 9 of 13
RULING: Yes. Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides: “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” A
lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. The test is whether, on behalf
of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to contest that which his duty another client requires him to
oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. The rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence
has been bestowed or will be used.
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client’s confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. The protection
given to a client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as
defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and
respondent was established despite the fact that it is immaterial whether such employment was
paid, promised or charged for. As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated
the stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case
involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued
the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with
complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondent’s rights as
co-owner. The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio’s death or
through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason
for respondent to advocate a position opposed of Lydio. And while plaintiffs have never been
respondent’s clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydio’s ownership of it which
respondent maintained in the first civil case.
43 REYES
Rule 15.03 – Conflict of Interest
Aniñon vs. Sabitsana, Jr.
FACTS: Josefina Aniñon previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana,
Jr. in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned
by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja. However, Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated
her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the
Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido. Josefina accused Atty.
Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.
Josefina filed a disbarment case against Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. for (1) violating the lawyer’s duty
to preserve confidential information received from his client; and (2) violating the prohibition on
representing conflicting interests. Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised Josefina in the
preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any
confidential information and asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by
one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint, who lost a court case
against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for such reason. The IBP found
Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing conflicting interests and recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
RULING: YES. A lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract which he prepared and
thereby take up inconsistent positions. Atty. Sabitsana had a duty to decline his current
employment as counsel of Zenaida in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting
interests. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over
the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s favor. Atty. Sabitsana met with
Zenaida to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At
that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida’s interest clashed with the
complainant’s interests. Despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients,
Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida. Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of
the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he
filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the
complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of
the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.
Moreover, Atty. Sabitsana’s right to due process was not violated. Although the specific charge
in the disbarment complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not
for representation of conflicting interests, the complaint itself contained allegations of acts
sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. In the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession.
CONCLUSION: Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of
law.
44 REYES
Rule 15.03 – Conflict of Interest
Orola vs. Ramos
(Long but relevant facts ☺)
FACTS: Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn and Marjorie (complainants) are the children
of Trinidad (deceased) and Emilio Orola. Meanwhile, Karen (complainant) is the daughter of
Maricar and Antonio Orola (deceased). Emilio and Antonio were brothers. In the settlement of
Trinidad’s estate pending before the RTC of Roxas, the parties were represented:
Atty. Villa (for Josephine, Myrna, Manuel as heirs of Trinidad)
Atty. Azarraga (for Mary Angelyn, Marjorie, Karen and other heirs of Antonio) with Atty. Ramos
(respondent) as collaborating counsel
Atty. Brotarlo (for Emilio, the administrator)
The Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator
and sought the appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel, which the RTC granted. However, Atty.
Ramos filed an entry of appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and
moved for the reconsideration of such. Because of this, the complainants filed a disbarment
case against Atty. Ramos for violating Rule 15.03 of the CPR as he undertook to represent
conflicting interests in the subject case. They further claim that although his withdrawal was
consented by Maricar (surviving spouse of Antonio), the same was only obtained after he had
already entered his appearance for Emilio.
On the other hand, Atty. Ramos contended that he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of
Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio; that the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of
Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented
by Atty. Azarraga; that only accommodated Maricar’s request to temporarily appear on her
behalf as their counsel of record could not attend some of the hearings; and that his appearance
thereat was free of charge. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent
Emilio in the same case. Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject
case was more of a mediator, rather than a litigator.
The IBP found Atty. Ramos guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen
as the records of the cases how that he never acted as counsel for the other complainants. The
Investigating Commissioner observed that while his withdrawal of appearance was with the
express conformity of Maricar, he nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was
already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ramos is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code.
RULING: YES. Records reveal that Atty. Ramos was the collaborating counsel not only for
Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in the subject case. In the course
thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as
administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when Atty. Ramos
proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in
the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio – particularly,
Karen – in violation of the above-stated rule.
His justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him
for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests provides an absolute prohibition
from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer
cannot change his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case.
CONCLUSION: Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
45 REYES
Rule 15.03 – Conflict of Interest
Mabini Colleges vs. Pajarillo
FACTS: Mabini Colleges (complainant) had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two
opposing factions: (1) Adeva group; and (2) Lukban group. They appointed Atty. Pajarillo
(respondent) as its corporate secretary with a total monthly compensation and honorarium of
P6,000.00. The Adeva group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution authorizing the
Executive Vice President and Treasurer (Andrade) and Vice President for Administration and
Finance (Cacawa) to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP) in favor of Mabini
Colleges. However, the Lukban group sent a letter to RBP opposing the loan application
because the Adeva group appointed Guerra and Echano, who were allegedly not registered as
stockholders, as members of the Board of Trustees. It also alleged that Mabini Colleges was
having financial difficulties. Meanwhile, Atty. Pajarillo sent a letter to RBP to assure their
financial capacity to pay the loan.
RBP granted the loan which was secured by a real estate mortgage over the properties of
Mabini Colleges. Later on, SEC issued an order which nullified the appointment of Guerra and
Echano by the Adeva group as members of the Board of Trustees. Mabini Colleges then sent
a letter to RBP to inform them of such order. The RBP sent a letter back to Mabini Colleges
informing them that they have referred the order to their legal counsel. However, Mabini
Colleges alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that Atty.
Pajarillo was also the legal counsel of RBP.
Later on, the amount of the loan was increased. RBP moved to foreclose the real estate
mortgage. Mabini Colleges filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage. In this, Atty. Pajarillo
entered his appearance as counsel for RBP. Subsequently, Mabini Colleges filed a disbarment
case against Atty. Pajarillo for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to
exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty. Atty. Pajarillo contended that:
He is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest which applies only to the legal counsel
of Mabini Colleges. He argued that he merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant
and did not serve as its legal counsel; and
There was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage because all the documents and information related to the loan transaction between
RBP and the complainant were public records.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Pajarillo is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his
appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by Mabini Colleges
against RBP.
RULING: YES. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. This rule applies regardless of the degree of adverse interests.
In the case at bar, Atty. Pajarillo was compensated by Mabini Colleges for his retained legal
services. This was supported by the evidence cash vouchers. Clearly, Mabini Colleges was
Atty. Pajarillo’s former client. He acted for the Mabini College’s interest on the loan transaction
with RBP when he sent a letter to RBP to assure them of the financial capacity of the Mabini
Colleges to pay the loan. But he appeared as counsel for RBP in the annulment of mortgage
case filed by Mabini Colleges, his former client, against RBP, his present client. He clearly acted
against the interest of the Mabini Collegesa as his former client.
CONCLUSION: Atty. Jose Pajarillo is held guilty of violating Rule 15.03 and shall be suspended
from the practice of law for one year.
CASE NO. 46 - SABTALUH
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. The
Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A
public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance
and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA
Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, conveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio
Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them
by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former SOLGEN
Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Page 10 of 13
Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to
Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza.
ISSUE Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza.
RULING: No. The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as
SOLGEN and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there
is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning
of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond
doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar
is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by
respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear
in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with
the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention
on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration.
CASE NO. 47 – SABTALUH
GENATO VS SILAPAN
FACTS: Complainan William Ong Genato filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty.
Essex L. Silapan, complainant alleged that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a
small office space in complainant's building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant
acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainant's retained lawyer,
who accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainant's
cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship between complainant and respondent. The
conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. However, the
document of sale of the car was issued in complainant's name and financed through City Trust
Company. Subsequently respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing
firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondent's postdated
check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondent's account therein was already
closed. Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. On his
response respondent, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer: That
complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and
sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has many cases
pending in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violates canon 17.
RULING: Yes. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on
him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications
made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation
to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their
relationship.3 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death
of the client. It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and
properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made
in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. 5 If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in
this case, the complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case,
the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer
professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may
commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense. Be that as it may,
respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleadings
fails to satisfy us.
The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the
foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the
foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent's
professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must
conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is
beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree
of good faith and fairness. Six months suspension.
CASE NO. 48 – SABTALUH
REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Petitioners are partners of the ACCRA Law Firm. One of their clients (allegedly
Eduardo Cojuangco) engaged them to organize corporations and serve as nominees of the
client. The PCGG filed a case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth against Cojuangco. The PCGG
allege that the numerous corporations (including the ones organized by the petitioners for their
unnamed client) were organized to serve as conduit for ill-gotten wealth of Cojuangco and
President Marcos. The PCGG impleaded the petitioners as defendants in the case against
Cojuangco. They will only be dropped as defendants if they (1) disclose the identity of their
clients; (2) submit documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (3) submit the
deeds of assignments that petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their respective
shareholdings. The petitioners refused to give in to the conditions invoking attorney-client
privilege.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the Attorney-client privilege.
RULING: Yes. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in
mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States
is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this
client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established. First, the court has a
right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the
privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process
considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
"A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." He cannot be obliged to grope
in the dark against unknown forces. Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity
for which he sought the lawyer's advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass
v. Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim
to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter
to civil litigation. 3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client
unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is
privileged.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the
very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorney-
client relationship). The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought was duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The
key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners'
ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto. (a) the disclosure of the identity of its
clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering
their respective shareholdings. From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding
the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In
turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned
deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the afore stated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients
would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. Furthermore, under the
third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link
for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of
Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a .
. . crime." An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the
services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for
the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have
previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly
does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The
second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought
advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to
evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against
him. These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or
used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a
case against the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to
build up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the
professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason
for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same
policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
Salinas- 49. People v. Sandiganbayan
Privileged Communication: Confidences and Secrets
Facts: Paredes, was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same
province and is at present a Congressman. Atty. Sansaet is a practicing attorney who served
as counsel for Paredes in several instances. In 1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over a
piece of land and it was granted to him. But later, the Director of Lands found out that Paredes
obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. A civil case was
filed and Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes. A criminal case for perjury was subsequently
filed against Paredes and Sansaet also served as counsel. Later, Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer,
initiated perjury and graft charges against Paredes and Sansaet, claiming that they acted in
conspiracy, by not filing an arraignment in the criminal case. To evade responsibility for his own
participation, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes, and to
discharge himself as a government witness. The Sandiganbayan claimed that there was an
attorney-client privilege and resolved to deny the discharge.
Issues: Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Sanset is barred by the attorney-client privilege
Ruling: No. Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already
committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications. However, the communication between an attorney and client having to do with
the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the
cloak of privilege ordinarily existing in reference to communications between an attorney and a
client. The falsification not having been committed yet, these communications are outside the
pale of the attorney client privilege.
Moreover, Sansaet himself was a conspirator in the commission of the falsification. For the
communication to be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.
The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
Salinas- 50. People v. Castillo
Privileged Communication: Confidences and Secrets
Facts: RP filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against several persons, one of which is Gregorio Castillo. The latter
was accused of having acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent of the Marcoses, et al. in
establishing Hotel Properties, Inc., in order to acquire beneficial interest and control, and
conceal ownership, of Silahis International Hotel. Castillo later died, therefore, a motion to
dismiss was subsequently filed on the ground that the action did not survive the death of
petitioner. Sandiganbayan denied the motion, stating that the case is not only one for recovery
of money, debt or interest thereon, but one for recovery of real and personal property and that
the cause of action being inclusive of claim for damages for tortuous misconduct. In another
motion to dismiss, petitioner contended that the complaint filed against Castillo is violative of
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege (since Castillo is attorney-in-fact). But Sandiganbayan
ruled that Castillo is sued as principal defendant for being in conspiracy with other defendants
in the commission of the acts complained of. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the suit is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege
Ruling: Yes. The Court adopted its own ruling in the Regala case, viz: “an argument is advanced
that the invocation by petitioner of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this state of
Page 11 of 13
the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify and
examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objection.
But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged
ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not
willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right
against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege
of attorney-client confidentiality.”
Salinas- 51. Dalisay v. Mauricio
Privileged Communication: Confidences and Secrets
Facts: On October 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondent‘s services as
counsel in a Civil Case pending before the MTC. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and
attorney‘s fees from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result,
she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and
documents, but respondent refused. On January 2004, IBP- Commission on Bar Discipline,
found that ―for the amount paid by the complainant, no action had been taken nor any
pleadings prepared by the respondent. IBP recommended that respondent be required to
refund the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. On February 2004,
the IBP Board of Governors approved IBP-CBD’s recommendation. On April 2005, SC rendered
the assailed Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of the SC Decision, respondent went to the
MTC to verify the status of the Civil Case. There, he learned of the trial court‘s Decision holding
that ―the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant ―are not official records of the
Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. The respondent thereafter filed falsification cases
against petitioner and an MR stating arguing that he did not render his services because the
petitioner offered falsified documents as evidence in the civil case.
Issue: WON the inaction of Atty. Mauricio is justified by saying that he did not render his services
because the petitioner offered falsified documents as evidence in the civil case.
Ruling: No. Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in
the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law. Instead of inaction, he should have
confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant
refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no
truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the
documentary evidence in Civil Case. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged
falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a
result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in in Civil Case. As a matter of
fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainant’s title only after the “news of
his suspension spread in the legal community.”
Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by
vindictiveness.
52. SALVADOR
Privileged Communication: Confidences and Secrets
Lee vs. Simando, A.C. No. 9537, June 10, 2013
Facts: This is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Dr. Teresita Lee against respondent Atty.
Amador L. Simando before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline.
Dr. Lee lend money to Mejorado (another client of Atty. Simando) but the latter was not able to
pay the amount due therefore Dr. Lee asked Atty Simando to demand for payment but still no
payment was made. Dr. Lee then terminated her contract with Atty. Simando and file a case
against him due to the unpaid loan. Atty. Simando in his defense claimed that complainant is a
money-lender exacting high interest rates from borrowers. He narrated several instances and
civil cases where complainant was engaged in money-lending where he divulged that even after
defendants had already paid their loan, complainant still persists in collecting from them. He
further claimed that there is no conflicting interest as there was no case between Mejorado and
Dr. Lee that he is handling for both of them. Dr. Lee answered that Atty. Simando is guilty of
violating the lawyer-client confidentiality rule.
Issue: Whether Atty. Simando violated the right of privileged communication to his former client.
Ruling: YES, since he divulged informations which he acquired in confidence during the
existence of their lawyer-client relationship. The termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client’s confidence once reposed cannot
be divested by the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer should
not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously
affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous relation.
53. SALVADOR
Duty to hold client’s moneys and properties in trust; Art 1491, Civil Code
Zalamea vs. De Guzman, A.C. No 7387, November 3, 2016
Facts: This is a Petition for Disbarment which petitioners Manuel Enrique L. Zalamea and
Manuel Jose L. Zalamea filed against their lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo P. De Guzman, Jr., for
acquiring their property by virtue of their lawyer-client relationship, in violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Angel the wife of Atty. De Guzman in order to help Manuel on the reacquisition of the Speaker
Perez property and paid for P2M under a condition that the property would later be transfered
in the name of a new corporation they had agreed to form (EMZALDEK Venture Corp) which
includes the Zalamea brothers, De Guzman Spouses and Manuel. However, since Manuel
Enrique still could not produce sufficient funds and EMZEE continued to incur losses. All in all,
Angel paid P13,082,500.00. Then, the relationship between the Zalamea brothers and the
Spouses De Guzman turned sour. The Spouses De Guzman wanted reimbursement of the
amounts which they had advanced for the corporation, while the Zalamea brothers claimed sole
ownership over the Speaker Perez property. Hence, the brothers filed a disbarment case
against De Guzman for allegedly buying a client’s property which was subject of litigation.
Issue: Whether Atty. De Guzman violated the prohibition in Art 1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling: NO. The prohibition which the Zalameas invoke does not apply where the property
purchased was not involved in litigation. De Guzman clearly never acquired any of his client’s
properties or interests involved in litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession.
Clearly, the relationship between the Spouses De Guzman and the Zalamea brothers is actually
one of business partners rather than that of a lawyer and client. Atty. De Guzman’s acquisition
of the Speaker Perez property was a valid consequence of a business deal, not by reason of a
lawyer-client relationship, for which he could not be penalized by the Court. De Guzman and
his wife are very well allowed by law to enter into such a transaction and their conduct in this
regard was not borne out to have been attended by any undue influence, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
Under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited to acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another, their client’s
property and rights in litigation. The purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property or interest in
litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. The persons mentioned
in Article 1491 are prohibited from purchasing said property because of an existing trust
relationship. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in
litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the
client.
54. SALVADOR
Duty to hold client’s moneys and properties in trust; CPR Rule 16.01
Berbano vs. Barcelona, 410 SCRA 258 (2003)
Facts: This is a Petition for Disbarment of Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross
Misconduct Unbecoming a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment.
Mr. Daen was detained and needed assistance of a lawyer for his relase from incarceration.
Atty. Barcelona told us that if you could produce the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
Pesos he will cause the release of Mr. Daen from prison the following day. Atty. Barcelona
informed them that he could not secure the release of Mr. Daen because the check had not
been encashed, Mr. Gil Daen, a nephew of Porfirio Daen, gave him FIFTEEN THOUSAND
(P15,000.00) Pesos in cash. In addition also gave him an additional P1,000.00 for his gasoline
expenses. Since Mr. Daen was not released they searched for Atty. Barcelona but cannot be
found they filed this petition.
Issue: Whether Atty. Barcelona violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR.
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that he deserves to be disbarred from the practice of law.
Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper
connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly
be given to such connections. In this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that he
could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court Justice.
Not only that, respondent even had the audacity to tell complainant that the Justices of the
Supreme Court do no accept checks. Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal
processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client
under the pretext of having connections with a Member of this Court.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Case 55 – Tan
Canon 16.01: Duty to hold client’s money and property in trust
Licuanan vs. Melo
Facts: Atty. Manuel Melo was the counsel of Leonila Licuanan in an ejectment suit against Aida
Pineda. Pineda alleges that she has been paying her lease religiously for 1 year to Licuanan’s
lawyer. This is also the basis for the suit against her landlord when the latter filed the ejectment
suit. The truth is that Atty. Melo was actually receiving the payments for over 1 year and his
reason for withholding this information was due to him wanting to surprise his client of his
success in collecting the rent due. Licuanan only discovered of this fact when she acquired a
new lawyer and 1 year from actual receipt of payment of Atty. Melo.
Issue: Whether Atty. Melo was in violation of Canon 16.01?
Ruling: Yes. He was disbarred. Respondent’s failure to account and remit the money he
received on behalf of his client for over a year is glaringly a breach of the lawyer’s oath to which
he swore observance. The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a
one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his client, the
complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the same despite
inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath to which he swore observance,
and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Case 56 – Tan
Canon 16.02: To keep client’s fund separate
Hernandez vs. Go
Facts: The husband of Nazaria Hernandez abandoned her and their son. Thereafter, her
husband’s numerous creditors demanded payment of his loans. Fearing that her properties
would be foreclosed, she acquired the services of Atty. Jose Go. Go instilled in complainant a
feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give
him her land titles at Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her creditors.
He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable
consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the
proceeds pay her creditors.
Hernandez later discovered that he only sold some the properties and paid the
creditors with his own money. Hernandez filed a complaint but Go filed a motion to dismiss. He
argues there were indeed sales, these were in good faith, and he bought some of the properties
also in good faith. He even argues that maliciousness was not absent because he invited her
to sleep in his home with his family and that she was always around to the point that his children
called him “lola”. The IBP recommended suspension of 6 months
Issue: Whether the respondent attorney violated the canon?
Ruling: Yes. He was disbarred. Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the penalty
recommended by the IBP too light. His acts of acquiring for himself complainant’s lots entrusted
to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden
act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name
and honor of the legal profession. He violated the Court’s mandate that lawyers must at all times
conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
Case 57 – Tan
Canon 16.03: Delivery of funds, lawyer’s lien
Busiños vs. Ricafort
Facts: Lourdes Busiños, representing her co-heirs, executed a special power of attorney,
appointing Atty. Francisco Ricafort as attorney-in-fact to demand, collect and receive for any
and all rentals that may be deposited in court by the defendant in the civil case due and owing
to her or co-heirs. The rental of 30,000 was received by Atty. Ricafort. Instead of depositing the
money, respondent converted the money to his own personal use. Also, 2,000 was demanded
from complainant supposedly for a bond in a Civil Case, when no such bond was required. On
despite several demands, he failed to return the same to complainant. Petitioner filed a criminal
case for estafa and an administrative case for disbarment against him.
Page 12 of 13
On the hearing of the estafa, respondent paid complainant inside then courtroom. This
prompted the petitioner not to anymore pursue the estafa case against respondent. However,
she did not withdraw the instant complaint.
Issue: Whether the return of the money relieves him of the liability?
Ruling: No. He is disbarred. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration
of justice—a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. He violated
Canons 1, 16.01, 16.02, and 16.03, which is aggravated by violation of Canon 11 for failing to
observe multiple demands from the court to answer to the accusations against him.
58 TORIBIO
QUILBAN vs. ROBINOL
CPR Rule 16.03: Delivery of funds, lawyer’s lien
Administrative Case 2144, April 10, 1989
FACTS: Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to
Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a
training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters,
Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the Idea of donating or selling the land cheap
to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and
choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the
squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with
Bernabe Martin as President, who was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf
for the sale of the land to them. But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin
went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the
exclusion of the other Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was ultimately sold to
Rivera at P 15 per square meter or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The prevailing price
of the land in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It was evident that Father
Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. On
the same date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name
alone.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch IV,
Quezon City, entitled "Celedonio Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al.,
Defendants." with the principal prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of
conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter of the corresponding
amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, however,
dismissed the case.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their
counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees
on 8 October 1975. Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land,
subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was
initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979.
No payment was conveyed to Rivera but was withheld by Atty Robinol no disclosure to the
client that the case was already dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the counsel violates Canon 16 of the CPR?
RULING: YES. CPR 16.03 states that A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. Therefore, in the case at bar, the interest of the clients for
the property to be delivered to them must have been delivered to them. Likewise,
disbursements must be necessary and lawful for the charges to the client to prosper.
Atty Robinol is found guilty and is DISBARRED.
59 TORIBIO
RAYOS vs. HERNANDEZ
CPR Rule 16.03: Delivery of funds, lawyer’s lien
GR No 169079, August 28, 2007
FACTS: The case at bar is a Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 March 2007 filed by
respondent Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez, seeking a modification of the Decision dated 12
February 2007.The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:
1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath and of serious
professional misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely;
• Respondent acted in good faith. He was not able to meet financial obligations due
to his financial difficulties
• Ordered to repay client P41, 280
• Warning
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be meted with disciplinary sanction for violation of
professional ethics by misappropriation of client’s money?

2. Respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five RULING: YES. The Court believed that respondent’s failure to cause the transfer of title was
percent (35%) of the total amount awarded1 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM- due to his own financial difficulties. It can be inferred from respondent’s letter that he used
951; and complainant’s money to alleviate if not solve his financial woes. What compounded his unethical
conduct was his drawing of a personal check without sufficient funds in his bank account.

3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One

Hundred Nine Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (₱290,109.21),2 which he A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his
retained in excess of what we herein declared as fair and reasonable attorney’s possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. The lawyer’s failure to return the
fees, plus legal interest from date of finality of this judgment until full payment money of his client upon demand give rise to presumption that he has misappropriated the
thereof. money. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation
of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
Respondent begs the compassionate understanding and magnanimity of the Honorable Court
for some leniency regarding his unintentional transgression and prays that the penalty of
The relationship of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate,
suspension of six months imposed upon him be reduced to a fine, invoking his almost 15
exacting and confidential character. The profession demands an attorney an absolute
years of patient, devoted, complete and successful professional services rendered to
abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the
petitioner; for the bad faith of the latter in dismissing him as counsel without justifiable cause;
interest of his client.
and his good faith in retaining the money "contingently" with the view of winning petitioner’s
cause.

The Respondent of the case pleaded that the retention of the money was made in good faith
in the intent that it serves as the contingent fee for his services to the client. Atty Quiocho is found guilty and is SUSPENDED FOR 1 YEAR and asked to pay FINE.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the counsel violates Canon 16 of the CPR?

RULING: NO. Contrary to Canon 16.03, there was no intent not to deliver and such is
pertinent element for violation and misconduct. There was no action or manifestation that
suggests the lawyer intend to keep the amount and in fact responded urgently with the matter
to clarify and subsequently perform his obligation to deliver.

Atty Robinol is found not guilty and is asked to pay FINE.

60 TORIBIO
BARNACHEA vs. QUIOCHO
CPR Rule 16.04: No borrowing, lending
Administrative Case 5925, March 11, 2003

FACTS: Respondent had not been in private practice for quite some time. However in 2001, he
decided to revive his legal practice. Complainant engaged the services of respondent to cause
the transfer under her name the title over a property previously owned by her sister.

Complainant issued two checks (P41, 280) in favor of respondent for the expenses for said
transfer and in payment for respondent’s legal services. However, after two months, the
respondent failed to secure title over the property in favor of complainant. The latter demanded
that her money and documents be returned. Respondent failed to comply with the demand.
Respondent sent a letter to complainant stating that he will return the complainant’s money. A
postdated check was given to the complainant. Respondent told complainant that he needed
more time to fund the check. However, respondent failed to fund the check.

Defense of the respondent:

• The checks were to cover actual and incidental expenses
• He acted in good faith. Failure to transfer was due to infliction with diabetes and
consequent loss of sight of his right eye.
• He offered to complainant services which a non-lawyer familiar with the procedure
and the related offices can perform and provide to the complainant with respect to
the transfer of the title of the property in her name (Note that respondent was also
a license real estate and insurance broker)
• Original copy of the transfer of certificate title was destroyed in a fire in Quezon City
Hall. Complainant’s copy still needs to be reconstituted before it can be transferred.

IBP Findings:
Page 13 of 13