PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)Rivera vs.

CSC, Land Bank of the

Philippines (January 4, 1995)
Facts:
Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged
with dishonesty, receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in
the course of official duties, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft
Laws, and pursuit of private business vocation or profession without permission
required by CSC. Rivera allegedly told Perez that he would facilitate the
processing, approval and release of his loan if he would be given
10% commission. Rivera was further charged having served and acted, without
prior authority required by CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao and
consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. LBP held Rivers
guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service
in accepting employment from a client of the bank. The penalty of forced
resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed
on Rivera.

Issue:
Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital
penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions

Ruling:
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved
Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in
resolving Rivera’s appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a
fundamental aspect of due process. CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the case is
remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation of CSC
Commissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose
ruling is thus appealed.
Building Care Corp vs. Myrna Macaraeg
GR. 198357
December 10, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners are in the business of providing security services to their clients.
They hired respondent as a security guard beginning August 25, 1996, assigning
her at Genato Building in Caloocan City. However, on March 9, 2008,
respondent was relieved of her post. She was re-assigned to Bayview Park Hotel
from March 9-13, 2008, but after said period, she was allegedly no longer given
any assignment. Thus, on September 9, 2008, respondent filed a complaint
against petitioners for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, non-payment
of separation pay and refund of cash bond. Respondent claimed that petitioners
failed to give her an assignment for more than nine months, amounting to
constructive dismissal. On the other hand, petitioners alleged in their position
paper that respondent was relieved from her post as requested by the client
because of her habitual tardiness, persistent borrowing of money from
employees and tenants of the client, and sleeping on the job. Respondent then
filed an administrative complaint for illegal dismissal with the PNP-Security
Agencies and Guard Supervision Division on June 18, 2008, but she did not
attend the conference hearings for said case. Petitioners brought to the
conference hearings a new assignment order detailing respondent at the Ateneo
de Manila University but, due to her absence, petitioners failed to personally
serve respondent said assignment order. LA dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Respondent filed a notice of appeal but it was dismissed for having been filed
out of time. CA however reversed the NLRC decision and declared respondent
to have been illegally dismissed.

Issue: Did CA err in reversing the NLRC decision?

Held: Yes. While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is
well-settled that these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended
to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The right
to appeal is not a natural right or part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to
the loss of the right to appeal."18
Clearly, allowing an appeal, even if belatedly filed, should never be taken
lightly. The judgment attains finality by the lapse of the period for taking an
appeal without such appeal or motion for reconsideration being filed.21 When
the Labor Arbiter's Decision became final, petitioners attained a vested right to
said judgment. They had the right to fully rely on the immutability of said
Decision. The Court will not override the finality and immutability of a
judgment based only on the negligence of a party’s counsel in timely taking all
the proper recourses from the judgment. To justify an override, the counsel’s
negligence must not only be gross but must also be shown to have deprived the
party the right to due process.

SINGSON VS. NLRC

FACTS:

Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In 1991, a
Japanese national alleged that Singson extorted money from her ($200.00) by
accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the issue, she needs to
pay said amount to him. Singson was later investigated and the investigating
committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment.
Singson then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor
Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PAL’s side
insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled to the 2nd Division thereof. The
2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay,
Rogelio Rayala, and former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino – same arbiter which
decided Singson’s case. The commissioners deliberated on the case and
thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino. Singson moved for reconsideration.
This time, only Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala deliberated on the motion.
The motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due process. The
SC held that Singson was denied due process when Aquino participated, as
presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL’s
appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter.

Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each
Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the
Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and
employers sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees
equal representation and impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are
entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the
start of the process of review.

Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the

arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself
from any participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution was not
cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of Singson was denied by
two commissioners and without the participation of Aquino. The right of
petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his
appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of
three commissioners. The denial of Singson’s right to an impartial review of his
appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

Gozun v. Liangco

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136

August 30, 2000

(Aspect of the Proceedings)

Point of the Case:

Judges are expressly prohibited from engaging in the private practice of the law
or from giving professional advice to clients. The respondent judge argues that
the "resolution" he issued was a mere expression of his legal opinion and not a
judgment or order "which adjudicates and settles rights and obligations of the
parties". The function of the court is limited to adjudication of actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable.
Unlike lawyers, judges cannot render legal advice.

Facts of the Case:

Complainant Hermogenes Gozun was in open and adverse possession of subject

land for a period of more than thirty years. His family's house was erected on
the land. The Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.
On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued
Resolution No. 26-98 stating that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga
considers the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government
of San Luis, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and family were
"squatting" and declared that the lot as the new site for the Rural Health
Center. On May 24, 1996, Romulo Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the
Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for
declaratory relief. On the same day, respondent judge issued a resolution,
reasoning that the municipality of San Luis may enact resolutions and
ordinances, through the Sangguniang Bayan, to regulate the use of property
within its jurisdiction; that Resolution 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and
public policy; that the municipal mayor, through an executive order, may order
the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to
enforce or implement the resolution; and lastly, that squatting in government
property is considered a "nuisance per so". The respondent judge ruled.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge exercised impartiality

Ruling:

In this case, respondent judge not only acted without jurisdiction, but in so
acting ignored blatantly the basic rules of fair play. Complainant was not
notified of nor made party to the petition. This chance was not given to
complainant Gozun, and consequently, because of an arbitrary act of
respondent judge, complainant's house was demolished and he and his family
were rendered homeless. Respondent judge argues that the "resolution" he
issued was a mere expression of his legal opinion and not a judgment or order
"which adjudicates and settles rights and obligations of the parties."
Respondent's argument betrays either gross ignorance of or contempt for the
law, neither of which is acceptable, for it is given that a member of the bench
must keep himself constantly abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments,
bearing in mind that this learning process never ceases even as it is so
indispensable in the correct dispensation of justice. The resolution, suffice it to
say, is legally flawed, bore all earmarks and characteristics of an order or
judgment disposing of the case. Sans reception of evidence, respondent judge
made conclusions of fact, labeling complainant as a "squatter", stating that his
house was a nuisance per se. Without citing any law or jurisprudence,
respondent judge gave the municipality a "go signal" to demolish complainant's
house even using force. The rule of impartiality is applied more strictly to
municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges. This is because they are
"judicial front liners" who have direct contact with the litigating parties. the
Court ordered the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits,
if any, and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

Namil v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 150540

October 28, 2003

(Aspects of the Proceedings - Due Process: Administrative, Quasi-Judicial,

Arbitration)

Point of the Case:

While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a broad power to enforce all
election laws, the same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. In
this case, the petitioners had been proclaimed as the winning candidates and
had assumed their office. Since then, they had been exercising their rights and
performing their duties as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang,
Sultan Kudarat. Their proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of
regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the
same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of
law. Due process in the proceedings before the public respondent exercising its
quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus,
although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or
suspend the proclamation of any candidate, we also ruled in Fariñas vs.
Commission on Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs.
Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without
notice and hearing.

Facts of the Case:

On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan

Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for their Sangguniang
Bayan. The following day, herein private respondents were proclaimed winners
as well. Private respondents claimed that they should be recognized as the
winners, and not the petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter, the
Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked the Law Department, the
Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit
their reports on the matter. All of them found the second proclamation valid.
Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the immediate installation
of the private respondents as the newly elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have
assumed office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void
because they were not accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a
violation of the due process principle.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or the
effects thereof without notice and hearing.

Ruling:

No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a

proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and
hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of
regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the
same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of
law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires
due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning candidate
cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Fariñas vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs. COMELEC
and Gallardo vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without
notice and hearing.

People v. Cabiles

G.R. 125005

October 3, 2000

(Aspects of the Proceedings - due process in general)

Point of the Case:

The automatic review with appellants raising the following alleged errors of the
trial court:

*The Honorable Judge Joven Costales committed a grave abuse of discretion in

having participated actively in the prosecution of the case and as a result, he
rendered a biased judgment convicting both the accused of the crimes charged,
that such actuations of the honorable judge constitute a reversible error.

*By reason of bias, the honorable judge failed, as he did fail, to appreciate the
facts or circumstances of great weight and value (which if considered might
alter the outcome of the case) has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
same.
*The judge made official declaration in open court which made counsel believe
to be an order of the court, thus relying upon such declaration, counsel was
therefore of the honest evaluation that the defense of the accused had been
fully established so that he no longer proceeded to present additional
exculpatory evidence.

*The lower court failed to consider the numerous inconsistent and

contradicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

*THe judge declared that the testimony of Arman Pamarang's testimony is

categorical, spontaneous, and straightforward, which declaration only shows
bias in his decision.

*The Lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving weight to
the testimonies of the two accused which were corroborated by disinterested,
unbiased and credible witnesses.

Facts of the Case:

Two persons went to the house of Moises Pamarang, Sr. Arman Pamarang, son
of the victim, saw the duo. Thinking that the two were interested in buying
something from their store, Arman went to their house and stood behind the
two, whom he recognized as appellants Emerito delos Reyes and Marcelo
Cabiles. The victim's wife, Estelita Pamarang, went to their front door, which
served as the door of their store. She recognized appellants delos Reyes and
Cabiles standing outside, with her son Arman behind them. Upon seeing
Estelita, Cabiles muttered that he had something to tell her husband. Estelita
replied that her husband was asleep and asked them to return the next day.
However, the victim arrived and asked the appellants what they wanted.
Suddenly, Cabiles pulled out a handgun and shot the victim in the mouth. The
victim fell and delos Reyes shot the victim in the stomach. Cabiles fired another
shot and the two left. When the police arrived, Moises, Jr. informed them that
he knew the person who killed his father. Cabiles was pointed out as the killer
by Moises, Jr. However, Estelita failed to identify Cabiles as one of the shooters.
Moises, Jr. and Arman likewise failed to identify Cabiles. Cabiles ad delos Reyes
were brought to the police station for re-investigation. However, for the second
time, Estelita identified Cabiles as one of the killers. She also identified delos
Reyes as one of the gunmen. The appellants were placed in detention and
underwent paraffin test. Both yielded negative results. Complaints were filed in
the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta for Murder against Emerito delos Reyes
and Marcelo Cabiles; for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition against
both.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

*The appellants complained that the trial judge actively participated in the
prosecution of the case and thus rendered a biased judgment. Scrutiny of the
detailed questions asked by the trial judge, however, fails to disclose bias on the
part of the trial judge which would prejudice appellants. The questions were
clarificatory. It is a judge's prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out
the truth.

*The appellants also contend that because of the eagerness of the judge to
convict them, he overlooked certain facts, which if considered would affect the
result of the case. They also assail the failure of witness Estelita Pamarang to
identify Cabiles during the initial confrontation at the police station, just couple
hours after the fatal shooting. Equally stressed is the failure of Estelita, Arman,
and Moises, Jr. to identify delos Reyes as the other gunman during their
confrontation in the presence of police investigators. However, Estelita
explained that her failure to initially identify Cabiles as one of the men who
shot her husband was due to the change of the appellant's hairdo.THe trial
court found the explanation credible and convincing.

*Eyewitness identification constitute vital evidence and in most cases, decisive

of the success and failure of the prosecution. Yet, eyewitness identification is
not always reliable or accurate, given the possibility of misidentification. In
evaluating out-of-court identification, the adoption of the totality of
circumstances test when the following factors are considered: a) witness
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; b) witness' degree of
attention at the time; c) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; d) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness of the
identification; e) the length of time between the crime and the identification; f)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Against this test, it is found
that Estelita Pamarang's identification of the appellants is of doubtful value.
The trial court had rushed the conviction of and the imposition of severe
penalties on the appellants. It should have scrutinized minutely the evidence
for and against them. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Cabiles and delos
Reyes are acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the charges against
them beyond reasonable doubt.
Soriano v. Angeles

G.R. No. 109920

August 31, 2000

(Aspects of the Proceedings)

Point of the Case:

If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an

appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General, though the offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. (criminal procedure)

A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is

void, does not exist in legal contemplation, and thus, cannot be the source of an
acquittal. (judgment: due process, double jeopardy)

Divergence of opinion between the trial judge and a party's counsel as to the
admissibility of evidence is not proof of bias or partiality; extensive cross-
examination by the defense of the prosecution winess amounts to waiver of the
defense's right to object to the failure of the prosecution to make an offer of
evidence. The fact that a judge believed the evidence of the defense more than
that of the prosecution does not indicate that she was biased. (evidence: offer of
evidence)

Facts of the Case:

The prosecutions evidence was as follows: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and
his uncle, Pedro Garcia, were members of the Caloocan police. Shortly after
midnight on November 7, 1991, they barged into the barangay hall of Barangay
56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking for petitioner Ceferino A. Soriano, the
barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner fist blows on the face four
times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand.
Although there were four barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del
Rosario, Ramiro Samson, and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could
not come to the aid of petitioner because they were held at bay by Pedro
Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting
outside the hall. Petitioner was treated for his injuries in the hospital. Private
respondent denied petitioners allegations. He testified that he went to the
barangay hall in the evening of November 6, 1991 because his younger brother
had been reportedly arrested and beaten up by petitioner.When private
respondent insisted on going inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him
and then pushed him on the chest. Private respondent also pushed petitioner.
All the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist.
Private respondents uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home. In
acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it
incredible that petitioner did not resist or even say anything when private
respondent allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods
who were near him came to his aid. She thought that if petitioner had indeed
been attacked, he would have suffered more serious injuries than a contusion
on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower
lip. Respondent judge also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of
petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the ground that their
testimonies had not been formally offered in evidence as required by Rule 132,
34 to 35 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Petitioner alleges that the decision is
void because it was not rendered by an impartial tribunal.
Issue:

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed outright because it was filed
without the intervention of the OSG as counsel for the prosecution.

Ruling:

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to
the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainants role
is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed
by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only
the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal.
The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However,
the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the
civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so
doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. The
petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.