Class-based masculinities: The interdependence of gender, class, and interpersonal power

Gender & Society; Thousand Oaks; Oct 1996; Pyke, Karen D;

Volume: 10
Issue: 5
Start Page: 527
ISSN: 08912432
Full Text:
Copyright Sage Publications, Inc. Oct
1996
[Headnote]
This article presents a theoretical framework that views interpersonal power as interdependent with broader structures of gender and class
inequalities. In contrast to oversimplified, gender-neutral or gender-static approaches, this approach illuminates the ways that structures of
inequality are expressed in ideological hegemonies, which enhance, legitimate, and mystify the interpersonal power of privileged men
relative to lower-status men and women in general. The discussion centers on how the relational construction of ascendant and subordinated
masculinities provide men with different modes of interpersonal power that, when exercised, (re)construct and reaffirm interclass male
dominance. Examples of how the construction of femininity can undermine women's interpersonal power and implications for other forms
of masculinities and femininities are discussed. Examples are drawn from an analysis of conjugal power in the accounts of remarried
individuals ' first and second marriages to illustrate the main points of this perspective.
Conventional theoretical perspectives on power have ignored the structural reciprocity between interpersonal power and gender and class
inequalities. Such perspectives, such as exchange theory, view microlevel power practices as simply derivative of macrostructural
inequalities and overlook how power in day-to-day interactions shapes broader structures of inequality. My purpose in this article is to
outline a theoretical approach that views interpersonal powering processes as reflecting and (re)constituting broader relations of class and
gender and to provide some illustrative examples of how this occurs.
This discussion focuses specifically on how the ascendant masculinity of higher-class men and the subordinated masculinity associated with
lower-class men are constructed in relation to one another in a class-based gender system. Classbased masculinities provide men with
different mechanisms of interpersonal power that, when practiced, (re)constitute and validate dominant and subordinated masculinities.
Because this perspective evolved from an analysis of power in the accounts of remarried individuals' first and second marriages, I use the
case of conjugal power to illustrate its main points.
In elaborating this approach, I draw on three currents of social thought. First, I incorporate the critical view that pervasive cultural
ideologies that obscure and justify oppressive practices serve as a conduit between macrostructural inequalities and microlevel power
relations (Bourdieu 1977; Chafetz 1990; Connell 1987;
Foucault 1980; Henley 1977; Lipman-Blumen 1984; Lukes 1974). Second, I take an interactionist approach that views gender as a dynamic
and emergent property of situated interaction and in need of ongoing accomplishment, rather than as something that is settled, static, and
causally prior to interactive practices (Coltrane 1989; West and Fenstermaker 1993; West and Zimmerman 1987). Last, gender is
conceptualized as splintered into multiple forms of masculinities and femininities, rather than as simple one-dimensional categories
(Connell 1987,1991,1993,1995; Donaldson 1993; Frankenberg 1993; Messerschmidt 1993; Messner 1989, 1992). I begin with a discussion
of how the relationship between power and ideology as conceptualized here differs from conventional approaches to conjugal power. Then I
present the theoretical linkages between class, gender, and power.
CULTURE-MEDIATED POWER
Conventional resource theory has dominated the conjugal power literature, emphasizing a material basis for power. It "justifies" power
dynamics as resulting from the amount of relative resources each partner brings to the relationship (see Blood and Wolfe 1960; Centers,
Raven, and Rodrigues 1971; McDonald 1980). More recent attempts to expand the theoretical thinking of marital power continue to
emphasize men's and women's disparate economic resources as the most important factor in power differentials (Blumberg and Coleman
1989). Some researchers have amended resource theory to include cultural ideology, conceptualized as normative attitudes about
appropriate power relations (Burr 1973; McDonald 1980; Rodman 1967,1972). Cultural ideology is an exogenous variable in this literature,
affecting power but not affected by it (for an exception, see Chafetz, 1990). In contrast, critical theorists, who focus on a broader set of
power relations, conceptualize macrostructures of power as affecting cultural ideology, which then acts back to extend and legitimate
existing power relations (Bourdieu 1977; Connell 1987; Foucault 1980; Henley 1977; Lipman-Blumen 1984; Lukes 1974). The main
mechanisms that link macrostructural relations of power and micropractices are cultural ideologies woven into the fabric of "commonsense"
knowledge. Thus, it is necessary to examine dominant cultural ideologies to understand interpersonal power dynamics.
Foucault (1980) argues that structures of domination produce particular discourses of truth and knowledge that are disadvantageous to the
less powerful, thereby (re)producing power relations. These discourses camouflage domination by generalizing the interests of the powerful.
As Lukes ( 1974, 23) stated, "Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to
have-that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires."
Komter (1989, 191) used Gramsci's (1971) notion of "ideological hegemony" to capture these invisible power dynamics in marriage.
Ideological hegemony refers to the process of attaining consensus between dominant and subordinate groups, such as men and women,
respectively. An ideology is hegemonic when three characteristics are present. First, those social arrangements that are in the best interests
of the dominant group are presented and perceived as being in everyone's best interests. Hence, subordinates frequently and nonconsciously
accept dominant group interests as their own. Second, the ideology becomes part of everyday thought and is taken for granted as the way
things are and should be. Third, by ignoring the very real contradictions in the interests of the dominant and subordinate groups, a
hegemonic ideology creates social cohesion and cooperation where otherwise there would be conflict. Thus, these pervasive ideologies
obscure the true nature of interpersonal power dynamics. Because men compose an elite group relative to women, we would expect to find
that certain dominant ideologies promote and obscure their marital power.
Although these commonsense ideologies are often nonconscious, they become apparent in the ways that spouses explain unequal marital
arrangements as natural, rational, and the only way things can be (Komter 1989). An additional method of identifying such ideologies is to
look for places where they have ceased to function and repressed conflict has emerged. Divorce is such a place. It creates a break with the
day-to-day reality of married life, forcing a greater awareness, particularly among women, of how ideologies that operated in their previous
marriage undermined their true interests. By tapping the raised consciousness of the divorced, we can get a better understanding of these
hidden powering processes.
Two kinds of hegemonic ideologies that favor men's interests over women's emerged in my interviews with divorced white women and
men. The first is the ubiquitous belief in an "essential" gender order. Notions of masculinity and femininity-and men's greater resources,
status, and power relative to women-are seen as natural and inevitable. The omnirelevance of this belief in an "essential" gender order
makes this a kind of master ideology, out of which subsidiary ideologies are spun that further obscure gender inequality.
The second ideology, identified in the interviews with middle- and higher-class respondents, is an example of such a subsidiary ideology. It
rationalizes the primacy of the successful male career in marriage as economically efficient and in the best interests of all family members.
This class-specific ideology adds an additional layer of legitimations to practices that emphasize gender differences in ways that obscure the
gendered nature of inequality. Ideologies such as this one are particularly important in an era of widespread challenge to specific
assumptions of natural gender differences that promote inequality. By obscuring gender inequality in ideologies that appear gender neutral,
logical, and practical, the embeddedness of masculine privilege in institutional life becomes less vulnerable.
These two ideologies will be discussed in greater detail later. First, I use the master ideology concerning an "essential" gender order to
outline a theoretical approach that views interpersonal power as mutually constitutive with gender and class inequalities. Second, I examine
the hegemony of the male career and illustrate how marital powering processes vary across social class in ways that reflect and (re)construct
larger structures of inequality. I set the conceptual stage with a discussion of how gender and social class are interconnected and indicate the
ramifications of this linkage for interpersonal power between men and women across class.
GENDER, CLASS, AND INTERPERSONAL POWER
Feminist interactionists and ethnomethodologists conceptualize gender as an emergent property of situated interaction rather than a role or
attribute (Coltrane 1989; Kessler and McKenna 1978; West and Fenstermaker 1993; West and Zimmerman 1987). Deeply held and
typically nonconscious beliefs about men's and women's essential natures shape how gender is accomplished in everyday interactions.
Because those beliefs are molded by existing macrostructural power relations, the culturally appropriate ways of producing gender favor
men's interests over those of women. In this manner, gendered power relations are reproduced.
One of the ways that gender is enacted is in face-to-face power dynamics. For example, in Garfinkel's (1967) study of Agnes, a preoperative
male-to-female transsexual, Agnes learned that in producing herself as female she should not push her opinion or insist on having her way.
Such knowledge came in the form of "lectures" from her boyfriend when she strayed outside of acceptable behavior for her gender and in
his angry criticism of a friend's female date who assumed a peer-like relationship with men and asserted her desires and opinions. In another
example, analyses of men's and women's conversations find that men control topics and interrupt more than women, thereby enacting their
"essential" natures as men and women (Fishman 1978; West and Fenstermaker 1993). Male dominance and female submission also are
constructed as natural in body language, such as with men's spatial expansion and women's accommodating shrinkage and with men's
greater use of power gestures (Henley 1977). Thus, the production of gender often constrains women's exercise of power while motivating
that of men, making those power relations inherently assymetrical. In this manner, power dynamics often are obscured and legitimated as
"essential" and "natural."
Although females are "culturally prepared for powerlessness" (Lips 1994, 90), notions of gender do not always restrict the exercise of
women's power in relations with men. For example, the enactment of essential masculinity requires husbands to retreat from exerting
control and authority-along with responsibility-in certain arenas that are viewed as women's natural domain and typically undervalued, as
with the care and nurturance of children (Coltrane 1989). In fact, it appears that women can exercise greater power without sanction when it
is on the behalf of others, such as children, than when it is to serve their own apparent purposes, as in their job (Finch and Groves 1983).
Thus, rather than viewing interpersonal power as a deliberate goal in and of itself, toward which men and women are equally motivated,
researchers must consider how power practices are a by-product of the manufacturing of gender differences. We can do so by looking for
circumstances in which women behave in ways that bolster men's power, at the expense of their own, as a means of celebrating essential
differences and asserting their identity as women. I illustrate this point later with case studies of conjugal power.
Yet the effects of gender on interpersonal power relations are not one dimensional. Hierarchies of social class, race, and sexuality provide
additional layers of complication. They form the structural and cultural contexts in which gender is enacted in everyday life, thereby
fragmenting gender into multiple masculinities and femininities. For example, white heterosexual middle- and upper-class men who occupy
order-giving positions in the institutions they control-particularly economic, political, and military institutions-produce a hegemonic
masculinity that is glorified throughout the culture (Connell 1987, 1995; Donaldson 1993; Messner 1989,1992). On the other hand, the
masculinities produced predominantly by working-class men, men of color, and homosexual men either outside of these institutions or in
subservient positions within them are subordinated and denigrated (see Connell 1987, 1991; Donaldson 1987; Majors and Billson 1992;
Messerschmidt 1993). Dominant and subordinated masculinities are configurations of social practices (Connell 1995, 72) produced not only
in relation to femininities but also in relation to one another (Connell 1987; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Messner 1994; Messerschmidt 1993;
Messner 1989, 1992). Thus, gendered power relations and inequalities of class, race, and sexual orientation are interdependent and
(re)produced simultaneously.
Take the case of class-based masculinities, the focus of the present discussion. The hypermasculinity found in certain lower-status male
locales, such as on shop floors, in pool halls, motorcycle clubs, and urban gangs, can be understood as both a response to ascendant
masculinity and its unintentional booster. With their masculine identity and self-esteem undermined by their subordinate order-taking
position in relation to higher-status males (which potentially delegates them to the role of "wimps"), men on the shop floor reconstruct their
position as embodying true masculinity (Collinson 1992; Donaldson 1987). They use the physical endurance and tolerance of discomfort
required of their manual labor as signifying true masculinity, an alternative to the hegemonic form associated with managers. They rely on
this "compensatory" masculinity to symbolically turn the tables against managers, whom they ridicule as conforming "yes-men" and
"wimps" engaged in effeminate paper-pushing kinds of labor (Collinson 1992). To further compensate for their subordination, some lower-
status men also engage in pervasive talk of their sexual prowess and a ritualistic put-down of women, who are viewed as passive and
dependent (Collinson 1992; Connell 1991; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Messner 1994; Willis 1977). Middle- and upper-class men, on the other
hand, who display the more civilized demeanor of polite gentility, express disdain for the ostentatious displays of exaggerated masculinity
and misogyny among lower-class male subcultures (Farr 1988; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Messner 1994). In so doing, privileged men reaffirm
their superiority over lower-class men and disguise themselves as exemplars of egalitarianism in their interpersonal relations with women.
This serves to cover up the gendered power advantages of higher-class men that are built into the institutions they control and camouflaged
by an aura of merit and righteousness that accompanies their privileged position (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Messner 1994; Messner 1993).
Thus, there is a division of labor in the production of gender, as with goods and services. Lower-status men do the physically taxing and
often life-threatening production of hypermasculinity from which higher-status men benefit in two different ways. First, they benefit from
the masculine strength displayed by working-class athletes, manual workers, soldiers, and violent criminals that contributes to the mystique
of men's superior prowess. For example, the higher-class male who cheers male athletes, sports teams, and military victories enjoys the
vicarious thrill of physical conquest while simultaneously celebrating "essential" masculine strength, endurance, aggression, and
domination; he reaffirms symbolically (and nonconsciously) his superiority over women. This lends understanding to the strong opposition
mounted against women's participation in sports and the military, for it would undermine the ritual glorification of gender differences and
male superiority (Lorber 1993). Second, higher-class men call on hypermasculine practices, especially violence and misogyny, as an
example of the untamed masculine brutality that they, supposedly, do not share. Thus, they use it to reemphasize their superiority over
lower-class men.
The literature on masculinities focuses on the construction of hegemonic and subordinated masculinities directly among men, particularly in
the hierarchy of work organizations. However, masculinities also are constructed more indirectly, as in relations with women. Indeed, the
way that men oppose one another affects the way that they oppose women (Risseeuw 1991). And the methods men use to oppose women
both reflect and (re)construct particular forms of masculinities. I have presented a conceptual framework of gender, class, and interpersonal
power as systemically intertwined, and I have suggested that this system of inequality interweaves hierarchies of race and sexuality as well.
Applying this framework to the case of marital power, we expect to find that the power of higher-class husbands receives more legitimation
and is better obscured than that of lower-class husbands. In addition, marital power mechanisms are expected to vary by social class in such
ways that they reflect and (re)constitute dominant and subordinated masculinities. I have suggested that one such mechanism for obscuring
the marital power of higher-status men is the hegemony of the male career, which I describe next because it is central to the illustrative case
that follows.
THE HEGEMONY OF THE MALE CAREER
The supremacy of the male career is most apparent in the marital arrangements of the middle to upper classes (Hochschild with Machung
1989; Hood 1983; Kanter 1977; Papanek 1973). Husbands are relatively freed from day-to-day family obligations so they can meet the
demands of their all-important career. Wives and hired females serve as the unpaid and underpaid handmaidens to husbands and their
careers. Even if the wife has a career of her own, additional household labor may be purchased to supplement hers but rarely replaces it
entirely, especially if there are children in the home.
The ideological supremacy of the male career is piled on top of other, more deeply seated patriarchal ideologies concerning the essential
nature of gender differences. It provides a rationale for husbands' entitlements that obscures the underlying gendered power structure. The
logic is this: Because husbands are the main providers in their families, they ought to have certain privileges and rights that enable them to
perform their duties (Hochschild 1975). Such entitlements are ostensibly not due to their maleness but to their provider role. This ideology
justifies husbands' privileges and rights and wives' concomitant obligations as structurally necessary and only incidentally gendered. It
permits the reasoning that if the wife were performing this role she, too, would be entitled to the same privileges. But because providing is
an important way that men accomplish their gender within families, such as the doing of housework is for women (Berk 1985), it does not
have the same meaning and accompanying entitlements when performed by women, even when they contribute substantially to the family
income (Bielby and Bielby 1992; Pyke 1994; Pyke and Coltrane 1996).
A closer examination of this ideology reveals how it undermines wives' longterm economic interests. Husbands' overall higher earnings
serve as the rationale for assigning precedence to their jobs in marriage. Indeed, human capital theorists such as Gary Becker (1981) argue
that such marital arrangements are based on maximizing family resources and efficiency. This view assumes that family life is organized
around family interests rather than the interests of more powerful members. However, this assumption ignores the costs that many wives
pay for limiting their own job involvement in support of their husbands', particularly on the loss of a spouse to divorce or death, which
befalls most married women prior to the age at which they can draw pensions and Social Security benefits (Ahlburg and DeVita 1992;
Sweet and Bumpass 1987). So it may be in the best interests of married women to focus on their own job development and economic
independence, because the majority of them will be supporting themselves when their marriages end. This capacity to impose a definition of
reality that masks the real interests of their wives is indicative of the power of higher-status men, who benefit most from this ideology. The
hegemony of the male career does not extend male power uniformly across all marriages. Working-class husbands, who do not have male
"careers" but "jobs" and whose lower income and greater dependency on wives' earnings undermine their ability to fulfill the male provider
role, would not be expected to derive much benefit from this ideology. Instead, the nature of their jobs is more likely to erode rather than
enhance their sense of success and self-esteem (Pyke 1994). This limits the strategies at their disposal to produce masculinity and exercise
conjugal power while exacerbating their need to do so. Although the empirical research has been contradictory, little evidence suggests that
working-class marriages are significantly less male dominated than those in the middle class (Komarovsky 1967; Rubin 1976). Thus, lower-
status husbands must rely on other powering processes. I pursue this point later.
To conclude, there are three implications of the conceptual framework presented here. First, higher-status husbands' conjugal power is
expected to be more legitimated and obscured than that of lower-status men. Second, marital power is expected to vary by social class in
such ways that it reflects and (re)constructs dominant and subordinated masculinities. Finally, the relational enactment of femininity and
masculinity leads to the expectation that some wives will encourage their husbands' marital power at the expense of their own.
METHODS
To illustrate this perspective, I present examples from interview data concerning the first and second marriages of 70 divorced and
remarried individuals. The interview sample was drawn from among 215 white participants in a larger survey study examining changes in
gender strategies across marriage, divorce, and remarriage. Most of the survey participants were randomly drawn from public marriage
records dated between 1980 and 1990 in Orange County, California, and located through telephone listings (7 of the 70 interviewed were
gathered from the Orange County Annual Survey).
The interview subsample was stratified by gender and social class, with half of the 34 men and half of the 36 women in lower- to working-
class remarriages and the other half in middle- to upper-class remarriages. Husband's occupation was used to determine social class.
Middle- to upper-level supervisory and professional occupations were classified as middle class; unskilled, semiskilled, and low-level
supervisory occupations were classified as working class. Both the first and second marriages of respondents endured for a minimum of one
year. For other purposes of the study, participation was limited to white individuals under 43 years of age (for more details about sample
selection and rationale, see Pyke 1994; Pyke and Coltrane 1996).
The interviews, which were tape-recorded and transcribed, occurred between March 1990 and March 1991 and lasted between one and one
and a half hours. They elicited detailed descriptions of marital interactions in both the respondents' first and second marriages so as to
permit an analysis of hidden power processes. Respondents were asked about marital dynamics concerning housework, child care, leisure,
and employment. They were asked how they and their spouse felt about their own and one another's employment. They also were asked if
they ever wanted changes in the areas of housework, child care, and leisure and whether they pushed for change, how, and with what
results.
I employed a constant comparative method of the interview data (Glaser and Straus 1967) that entailed sorting the interviews into
increasingly refined categories of similarities and differences. The identification of certain cultural ideologies that sanction and obscure
men's conjugal power emerged from this analysis and was not initially sought. Upon identifying the ideological supremacy of the male
career as a salient characteristic of many marriages, I noted when husbands' careers and jobs were associated with particular marital
privileges and rights and when they were not. I then compared these two groups of husbands to explore the specific ways this ideology
empowers husbands and to uncover other powering mechanisms employed by husbands who did not have successful careers. The women's
interviews provided more explicit accounts of the institutional privilege associated with the male career, typically because their divorce
raised their consciousness of how the prevalent practices and beliefs in their first marriage undermined their own economic interests. Men,
who were much looser in applying egalitarian labels to their marriages, were less aware of how their marital arrangements disadvantaged
their wives. This was not surprising because, as Rich writes (1976, 49), "the powerful . . . has no apparent need for such insights." Indeed,
"any system of domination can be seen most clearly from the subject positions of those oppressed by it" (Frankenberg 1993, 5). Because
these insights were strongest concerning respondents' previous marriages, my description focuses on first marriages unless otherwise stated.
Because the data are retrospective and cross the great divide of divorce, there is good reason to suspect that the respondents described their
earlier marriage with greater negativity. However, the interview elicited rich descriptions of a wide range of practices respondents routinely
engaged in during their earlier marriage. Thus, the data do not focus on respondents' opinions about their ex-spouses as much as on the
actual arrangements of their first marriages. Furthermore, that some divorced wives came to see their earlier marital arrangements as
detrimental to their own interests should not be discounted as potentially more biased than accounts provided by married respondents who
are unaware of power disadvantages in their marital arrangements. In fact, women's awareness upon divorce of the ways their marriages
undermined their interests is not surprising. Sociologists have well documented how common marital practices limit women's economic
well-being upon divorce (e.g., Arendell 1986; Weitzman 1985).
Among the 69 first marriages described by the 70 respondents (2 respondents, who had divorced and remarried, described the same
marriage), 38 were working class and 31 were middle to upper class. Research on class differences in marital power has traditionally been
framed in terms of which marriage is more male dominated, middle, or working class (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Centers et al. 1971;
Komarovsky 1967). This assessment is based on a comparison of the same few measures of overt power, usually decision-making
outcomes, in each type of marriage. It is assumed that power only will be exercised in the manner under investigation, making direct
comparison of such outcomes across class meaningful. I emphasize instead the different ways that husbands are empowered in marriages
across class and broaden the scope of analysis to include those power dynamics that are ideologically endorsed and obscured.
In the sections that follow, I present examples of male dominance in higher-class and lower-class marriages to illustrate how interpersonal
power is linked in this conceptual framework to class and gender inequalities. Although these examples represent patterns observed in the
data, they should be regarded as illustrations of the framework rather than empirical "proof." I begin with a discussion of how the primacy
of the male career obscures higher-class men's leisure, whereas some lower-class husbands defiantly pursue unsanctioned leisure activities
in a manner that reflects and (re)constructs their subordinated masculinity.
MEN'S JOBS AND CONJUGAL PRIVILEGES
Leisure and Autonomy
An important indicator of marital power is the ease with which husbands can free themselves from the boundaries of family life to pursue
other interests. Roughly half of the 69 husbands in first marriages did not spend an inordinate amount of time away from their families
beyond what was required of their work day. Among those who did, however, some interesting class differences emerge. The ideological
supremacy of the male career provided a means by which higherclass husbands could absent themselves in the evenings and on weekends.
These absences often were due to legitimate business trips, though not always as necessary as portrayed to their wives and sometimes
lengthened for the pursuit of leisure. Some higher-class husbands used work as a smokescreen for leisure time with friends or extramarital
affairs. For example, one husband, the owner of a textile firm and father of two, extended his foreign business trips to add some pleasure,
which included sexual affairs.
In fact, middle-class wives were more often shocked than were working-class wives to learn of their husbands' sexual affairs, which had
been easily obscured by the broad cloak of the male career. When her first husband, a salesperson who spent a few nights a month out of
town, confessed that he had been with 10 different women, one respondent said, " `When? When?' I couldn't believe that he even had the
time to do that.... It was a real shock." Another respondent recalled how she "would go out of [her] way to make sure that [her husband] was
ready to go" when he had his weekend business trips. She did so for years before she learned they weren't business trips at all and that he
had been having an affair with one woman in particular for the previous two years. "And you'd think that if I was bright enough or
something I would've noticed it."
For lower-class men there is less blurring of the line between work and leisure, often delineated by the punch of a time card. Men's time
with male friends, often drinking or "tinkering" with cars (sometimes resold for a profit), was viewed by their wives as self-centered leisure
(see also Halle 1984, 58). In reality, however, many higher-class husbands also were drinking with other men, but it was associated with
"working" and "getting ahead." These varying meanings shaped wives' resentment and acceptance. Working-class wives viewed husbands
who spent a lot of time with their male friends as "lazy," "not ambitious," "self-centered," "carefree," "immature," and "irresponsible." But
higher-class men who spent a lot of time away from home pursuing leisure that was at least nominally associated with work were more
often viewed as "ambitious" and doing so out of necessity, even if their wives wished they could cut back on their hours.
When working-class men, such as self-employed contractors, had jobs that could have provided a smokescreen for leisure, they relied on
them as a cover less often. Instead they tended to be more blatant in their pursuit of leisure away from their families. They also were more
careless in hiding their extramarital affairs and, consequently, were more likely to get caught. For example, with his wife in the hospital
after having given birth, one husband, a truck driver, brought another woman home without concealing her from his wife's visiting brother,
who later reported the infidelity to his sister.
Half of all working-class men (20 of 38) did not engage in rebellious behavior or stray outside of the boundaries of "good husbands." Those
who did typically moved in a social milieu of like men, often coworkers, who encouraged such behavior (see Connell 1991; Halle, 1984;
LeMasters 1975; Rubin 1976; Willis 1977). For example, Nick, who had several jobs in construction and other trades as well as periods of
unemployment in his first marriage, drank heavily, often with coworkers. He said, "The people I worked with, that's just what you did,
especially on the weekends, on Friday nights, you'd get hammered."
This interplay between social milieu and the construction of a defiant masculinity is evident in Ted and Debbie's 9-year-long marriage. At
the age of 15, Debbie married Ted, a self-employed plumber 9 years her senior. She finished high school and, later, stayed home and raised
their son. Ted was often away from home drinking with male friends and "running around" with women. Although he sometimes used work
as an excuse, he wasn't covering it up very well. For example, as Debbie explained, he would say, " `I'm going out to buy a pack of
cigarettes' and wouldn't come back until the next day."
Debbie regards Ted's affairs as having been "quick thrills." She said, "He wasn't emotionally involved. It was more part of the recreation of
being drunk, being high, being part of that group of people." She referred to that group as "low lifes," who are people that have no
responsibility, they don't care.... It just seemed that they didn't care about the families they had at home, the bills that were due, and the rest
of us.... We were the ones who held down the fort.... They had no boundaries.... It's just a totally different way of living and thinking....
They live in a different reality.
Lower-class husbands who ostentatiously pursued drugs, alcohol, and sexual carousing are constructing a compensatory form of
masculinity. Such behavior was worn like a badge of masculinity in the work and social environments they inhabited. By drinking with
other working-class men at the bar and openly engaging in extramarital relationships, they appear to be defying existing power structures,
displaying their independence from the control of their wives and "the establishment" (i.e., higher-status men). This exaggerated
masculinity compensates for their subordinated status in the hierarchy of their everyday work worlds. It gave them a sense of autonomy and
self-gratification, entitlements that higher-status men acquire more easily and with greater impunity, thereby creating the illusion of
ascendant masculinity. Although this behavior is characteristic of some and not all working-class men, it reinforces a stereotype of
subordinated heterosexual masculinity that higher-class men call on as evidence of their own civility and gender equity, thereby further
obscuring their power and privilege and reaffirming their ascendant masculinity.
In sum, lower-class men do not enjoy the same ideological legitimations for personal autonomy and leisure in their marriages that higher-
class men acquire as part of their career package. Instead, some working-class husbands engage in defiant behavior and construct a
compensatory masculinity (see Collinson 1992; Connell 1991, 1995; Willis 1977). In the next section, I describe this overt form of power in
more detail. Overt Domination of Wives
Because working-class men's jobs do not provide a shortcut to marital power, they must either concede power to wives or maintain
dominance by some other means. They were, overall, both more egalitarian (especially in sharing housework and child care) and more
explicitly domineering in their marriages than were higher-class husbands. Domineering lower-class husbands draw more directly and
overtly on personal masculine privilege as their essential right as a means of bolstering their conjugal power (see Collinson 1992; Rubin
1976). The following case provides an example of such overt power and illustrates its link to the denigrated status of working-class men.
Nick, age 38, remarried his first wife, Nina, following 4 years of divorce and a tumultuous 10-year marriage that was marked by his
drinking, violence, and chronic depression. In his first marriage, his dissatisfaction with several jobs, mostly in construction, led to his
current position as a splicer for a utility company. Nick's description of his transition to a splicer reflects the centrality of his work in
affecting his low self-esteem:
It was a nice stable job but . . . it didn't matter how hard you worked. It wasn't my kind of job because I've always prided myself on working
hard, making a good reputation.... [Do you think that affected your marriage at all?] Oh yeah, definitely, because my pride had been shot.
That's what I prided myself on was my work. And after that it didn't mean anything. You got a paycheck whether you worked hard or not. I
was working next to people that asked me to slow down. They had a lot of time with the company and I was making them look bad. That
really tore me up. Nick's self-esteem as a man also plummeted when Nina returned to work. He recalled, "That probably hit me really
hard.... I wanted to be the provider. When she went to work, it took that away, it took away my status as the man of the house, I thought."
Nick's heavy drinking in his first marriage often was accompanied by violent attacks on his wife and their house, usually prompted by
violations of the traditional and submissive role Nick wanted Nina to fulfill. "Small things would trigger it," Nick explained, such as his
wife's "lousy" housekeeping. "Plus I was a real jealous person, and whenever [her] old flames would appear I just couldn't handle that, even
though I'm sure she was pretty dedicated." Nick's violent rage also was triggered when Nina challenged his domination. He said,
When she put up the arguments is when I got nasty. And I'd see that, too, I'd say, "Look, don't try to get the last word in, if you just let me
say what I need to say and let it go, then nothing's gonna happen."
Nick's low self-esteem, alcoholism, and violence eventually gave way to chronic depression and thoughts of suicide that landed him in the
hospital. "All I was trying to do was provide for the family and be with the kids, but I was sinking the whole way.... Even though I was
trying harder, I was still getting violent, and things were getting worse and worse," he explained.
Nick was not exceptional in his abuse. Among the 36 women interviewed, 52 percent married the first time to lower-class men said their
first husbands had hit them, compared to 20 percent of those married to higher-class men. The greater incidence of wife abuse (based
mostly on self-reports) committed by lower-status, underemployed, and unemployed husbands who cannot fulfill the provider role has been
documented elsewhere (Dibble and Straus 1980; Gelles and Cornell 1985; Levinger 1966; O'Brien 1971; Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz
1980). Other research links economic disadvantage with the husband's increased hostility toward his wife (Conger, Ge, and Lorenz 1994;
Liker and Elder 1983).
Working-class husbands' subordinated class status in relation to other men-and women-in the labor force seems to exacerbate their need to
use their marriage as a place where they can be superior (Ferraro 1988; O'Brien 1971; Pyke 1994; Rubin 1976). With their power base on
shakier ground, they are more likely to resort to explicit and relentless tactics, such as violence, as well as criticism and constant
surveillance of their wives.
Some lower-class husbands, particularly those who were violent and adulterous, greatly feared their wives' infidelity. They expressed this
fear in baseless accusations, demands for their wives' constant attention, restrictions on their wives' movement and employment, or spying
(see also Ferraro 1988). Seemingly irrational, this fear appears to be a reflection of their sense that they offered too little compared to other
men to hold onto their wives. These feelings of powerlessness led some to use terrorizing tactics to bolster their control over their wives;
however, it had devastating consequences on the marriage, typically pushing wives to leave. These dynamics were evident in Ted and
Debbie's marriage.
Ted, who blatantly engaged in extramarital affairs, nonetheless exercised tight control over Debbie. Despite the lack of evidence to ground
his suspicions, he feared that Debbie would "run around" with men while he was at work. So he immobilized her car by removing the
distributor cap. "He'd isolate me," she said. "He was truly afraid of me leaving more than anything." Ted also spied on Debbie when she was
away from the house. Forbidden to work for pay, she was able to take an evening cake-decorating course. "I'd go to classes and come out to
the car . . . and I'd see him, he'd be watching me. It was real weird. It was sick." Ted's need for domination led to verbal and physical abuse.
"Every time I'd get a little high-handed, find a little strength, or find somebody to back me, he'd beat me for it. I was scared to death."
At first glance, the brutality of Ted's and Nick's power strategies would make it easy to conclude that they possessed greater marital power
than is typical among higher-class husbands. However, this implies that hidden power is less effective than easily observed acts of coercive
power. Indeed, the invisibility of hidden power, the unchallenged legitimacy of domination and unfair privileges, makes it so powerful.
Furthermore, explicitly patriarchal power comes with tremendous costs for the men who exercise it-such as wives' resentment, loveless
marriages, and unwanted divorce-probably prompting some working-class husbands to seek alternatives to male dominance as a basis of
their self-esteem. Such was the case with Nick, who in his remarriage to Nina has refrained from any violent attacks, assumes more of the
housework rather than complaining about Nina's performance, and compensates for his feelings of failure as a worker by deriving a sense of
self-worth from parenting. Yet some tension remains. He still refuses to converse with Nina about her job as a registered nurse and admits
to ongoing difficulties. "I still can loose it.... I still work on it day to day."
Husbands' Entitlement to Housework
The hidden power of higher-class men and the explicit power of lower-class husbands are also evident by the mechanisms that excuse them,
to varying degrees, from performing domestic work. Male careers provide a rationale for higher-class husbands' freedom from family
work, whereas working-class men are more likely to rely on blatant and increasingly contested patriarchal ideologies for similar
entitlements. In both higher- and lower-class marriages, husbands' absences precluded their doing household chores. However, because the
absences of higherclass men were more likely due, ostensibly at least, to evening or out-of-town business obligations or night classes, wives
viewed this division as fair. In addition, any work higher-class husbands brought home from their jobs also excused them from family tasks.
For example, a female accounting manager remarried to a systems analyst said, "I do 75 percent of the housework because he also works at
home.... He's always on the computer so I don't know if it's work or play."
Higher-class husbands also derived from their careers greater entitlement to a stay-at-home wife. They were more likely than working-class
husbands to veto, discourage, or limit their wives' labor force participation, especially in first marriages (Pyke 1994). For example, Jane was
married the first time to a prominent attorney who earned $300,000 annually. His position entitled him to limit her teaching to part-time.
She said,
But he made sure that we both knew that his job came first and if I was working too many hours, he made it clear that I should cut back on
my hours.... He had a very prominent job, a lot of public recognition that came with his job.... So I supported him in that and I was sort of
content to be in his shadow.... His career came before my career and was much more important to me at the time.
Another attorney, who was childless prior to remarriage, gave a description of the kind of wife he sought after his divorce that emphasized
her supporting role to his career. He said, "I made good money as a lawyer, so my wife didn't need to work to support the household. I
needed someone to take care of my children and my house when I am not there."
This need for a wife to serve as a maid and nanny propelled many higher-status men to look in the same places for a wife as they do for paid
domestic help: among the lower class. An interclass mate selection occurred in remarriage between men employed in high-status
occupations and women who were unhappy with dead-end, low-skilled jobs and who had worked out of necessity in their first marriages.
Among 102 women whom I surveyed whose first and second marriages were identified as being either working or middle to upper class, 25
percent moved from a working-class first husband to a middle-class second husband (70 percent remarried husbands of the same social
class as their first husbands, and 5 percent moved from middle to working class). Similarly, Gerson (1985, 1993) found that men are more
likely to seek domestically oriented partners as their breadwinning ability increases, and women are more likely to veer toward domesticity
when faced with blocked job opportunities and married to men who earn enough to be the sole provider.
Even though both higher- and lower-class husbands tended to avoid household labor, they enjoyed varying levels of legitimacy for doing
so. Higher-class husbands were more likely to be excused by the priorities granted to their career and provider role (see also Gerson 1993;
Hochschild with Machung 1989), which also served as the places they most prominently produced ascendant masculinity. Lower-class
husbands, on the other hand, whose jobs and lower-earnings provided them with little justification for not sharing chores-especially when
wives worked for pay also-more directly relied on rigid gender divisions of labor in the home as a means of producing masculinity (see
Game and Pringle 1983). However, explicit traditional ideologies about the proper roles of husbands and wives were likely to be challenged
and resented by wives. Hence, they were a less reliable basis of men's freedom from housework than was the ideology of the husband's
career. This again suggests that the power of lower-class husbands that rests on notions of masculine privilege is likely to be undermined,
especially in long-term, stable marriages.
What about the minority of husbands actively embracing egalitarian divisions of labor? Higher-class husbands more often were constrained
by their job demands from doing so, even when they professed a sense of obligation or desire. In contrast, there is a greater structural
incentive for working-class families to adopt egalitarian practices. Lower-class husbands often cared for children while wives worked a
different shift from their own. And, for some, such as Nick in his remarriage, greater involvement with children and family life provided a
sense of self-worth and meaning that compensated for the degradation endured on the job (Connell 1991; Gerson 1993; Pyke 1994). These
men do not appear to put stock in ascendant or exaggerated masculinities and instead produce an egalitarian masculinity involving
expressiveness and high levels of family involvement (referred to as the "New Man": Messner 1993).
The pressures exerted by the structural conditions of working-class life may lead some men to juggle a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde existence in
which they produce hypermasculinity in male cliques and on the job and an egalitarian masculinity in their family relations. For example,
working-class men might use talk of masculine superiority, privilege, and authority as a means of producing hypermasculinity while
nonetheless sharing power and family work with their wives on a day-to-day basis. That is, when the situational context changes, the form
of masculinity produced, even within categories of social class, can change as well. Furthermore, the consistent construction and
maintenance of hypermasculinity across all arenas of social life, including family relations, are so costly as to become less desirable and
untenable to individual men. In fact, as they approach midlife, working-class men tend to drop out of the male cliques in which
hypermasculinity is collectively produced (Rubin 1976).
Egalitarian masculinity may not be appreciated by some wives who view it as a threat to their feminine identity. In the next section, I
discuss some surprising insights about how the supremacy of the male career leads some middle-class wives to negatively evaluate
egalitarian husbands out of preference for male dominance.
Middle-Class Men and Egalitarian Masculinity
Ideological hegemonies present elite interests as everyone's interests. Thus, they lead subordinates, as well as elites, to sanction those who
fail to reproduce the dominant group's power advantage. For example, higher-class egalitarian men who violate notions of ascendant
masculinity often attract hostility, even from wives who would appear to derive benefits from their husbands' defection but are convinced
otherwise. This was evident in a few middle-class first and second marriages in which husbands were unable to live up to the ethic of
masculine ambition and high earnings to which their wives felt entitled. It was not that these husbands were poor providers or husbands; on
the contrary, they tended to be very family-involved men with moderate earnings. However, their wives, who expected I think from [ex-
wife's] perspective, and my current wife is still kind of the same way, it's almost like . . . they both felt that when you get married it's . . .
you hit a button and all of a sudden your husband is out there making $75,000 a year. And they [wives] work as a lark.
His second wife pressures him to leave advertising, where his earnings have suffered, and go into commercial real estate like one of her
relatives who earns $100,000 a year. Their individual highest annual earnings during their marriage are equal at $40,000. Her resentment,
which he gingerly tiptoes around, is a dominant theme in their marriage. He described her as "contentious" and a "battle ax," adding,
I know the reason why she's crabby. Alot of it is because I'm not making much money now.... I don't know why or what I'm supposed to do
about it, but income and career has been a bone of contention in both of my marriages. Although her husband performs 60 percent of their
weekly total household labor hours, her resentment for his failure to live up to the middle-class standard of success overshadows any
gratitude she might have for his greater household work. The previous two examples illustrate how some women's acceptance of the
dominant ideology about what it means to be a man reflects and contributes to the hegemony of the male career. These examples suggest
that when middle-class men are not very successful in their careers, power can shift to a resentful wife. Because methods of accomplishing
femininity often rest on women's subordination to men, some women may resent their power. They may use it, as exemplified here, to steer
men toward the production of masculinity in ways that emphasize male power and female subordination. These examples underscore the
ways cultural notions of what constitute a "real" man and a "real" woman elicit women's participation in the project of male dominance and
female subordination.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In contrast to oversimplified, gender-neutral or gender-static approaches, the theoretical framework presented here integrates interpersonal
power with broader structures of class and gender inequality. I used empirical examples of conjugal power to illustrate how interpersonal
powering processes and gender and class relations can be considered components of an interacting system. Specifically, structures of
inequality are expressed in ideological hegemonies, which construct gender in ways that reemphasize and normalize the domination of men
over women and that of privileged men over lower-class men. Furthermore, the relational constructions of ascendant and subordinated
masculinities have different implications for interpersonal power dynamics.
For example, the different conjugal power processes available across social class further feed into the cultural legitimations of higher-class
men's superior position. In the absence of legitimated hierarchical advantages, lower-class husbands are more likely to produce
hypermasculinity by relying on blatant, brutal, and relentless power strategies in their marriages, including spousal abuse. In so doing, they
compensate for their demeaned status, pump up their sense of self-worth and control, and simulate the uncontested privileges of higher-class
men. The production of an exaggerated masculinity in some working-class subcultures also serves the interests of higher-class men by
deflecting attention from their covert mechanisms of power and enabling them to appear egalitarian by contrast.
The coercive power strategies of lower-class men appear unmatched in degree. This is misleading, however. It is precisely their demeaned
status and weak power base that have propelled many working-class men to rely on extreme methods of control as a kind of last resort in
asserting power and producing masculinity. Thus, those who study power relations must be careful not to equate brutality of power with
quantity of power and examine the ways that power inequalities may be obscured in other seemingly egalitarian relationships by hegemonic
cultural ideologies. In addition, brutal styles of masculinity, such as displayed in the workplace or tavern, should not be assumed to be
automatically linked to brutal power strategies in marriage. Some men may balance more egalitarian practices in their personal life with
more public displays of hypermasculinity and claims to male dominance. Similarly, higher-class men who are mild mannered and civil in
the workplace may nonetheless exercise brutal forms of power in their family life. The omnirelevance of gender to social life and the ways
it is taken for granted as essential and inevitable makes it an especially effective ideology in normalizing and mystifying gendered power
relations. In doing gender, men and women engage in practices that promote male dominance and female subordination in most social
contexts. Specifically, I have shown how some women pursue marital arrangements that contribute to male dominance as a method of
accomplishing their gender; that is, they do so to affirm their "essential nature" (West and Fenstermaker 1993). It is not necessarily that they
consciously desire male dominance, but the methods they employ in "doing gender" produce conditions that foster such power differentials.
It is thus important that researchers studying interpersonal power consider how it is a symbolic artifact of the routine production of gender
as well as the structural conditions of men's and women's lives.
Although I have used the case of marital power and the hegemony of the male career, other hegemonic ideologies similarly affect power
dynamics in marriage as well as other social relationships and reinforce "essential" gender differences. For example, a white heterosexual
masculine ethic pervades capitalist, managerial ideologies that stress rationality, success orientation, impersonality, emotional flatness, and
a disregard for family concerns. Because these traits are associated with "essential" masculinity and are antithetical to notions of "essential"
femininity, this ethic would appear to exclude women from management positions and undermine the power of those who have successfully
acceded to such ranks while (re)constructing "essential" femininity and ascendant masculinity. Similarly, the masculine ethic of
management associated with higher-class men embodies traits that reflect and perpetuate the negative evaluation of lower-class men, men of
color, young men, and homosexual men. This, in turn, reinforces the construction of compensatory masculinities, such as the "cool pose"
associated with African American men (Majors and Billson 1992) and the hypermasculinity described here among lower-class white men
and also common among male youths (Messerschmidt 1993). Thus, ideological hegemonies have a different impact on men and women
across race, sexuality, age, and social class in ways that reflect and (re)construct relational conceptions of masculinities and femininities
with different implications for interpersonal power. The ensuing practices of interpersonal power, in turn, reinforce structures of inequality
and their ideological legitimations.
Femininity is also cross-cut into diverse forms by the structural and cultural conditions of race, social class, sexuality, and age. For the sake
of clarity, however, I have centered this discussion almost exclusively on white, heterosexual, classbased masculinities. The construction of
femininities can perhaps best be understood in relation to men. As Connell observed (1987, 186-87), all forms of femininity are constructed
in the context of the overall subordination of women to men. The interplay of diverse femininities does not reemphasize a hierarchy among
women as much as intermale hierarchies of dominance as well as gender hierarchies.
The degree to which women are accommodating to men provides a useful basis for conceptualizing femininities. "Emphasized femininity"
(Connell 1987, 187) is produced among women who view their role as naturally subservient to men. Noncompliant femininity, on the other
hand, emphasizes women's independence and desired equality with men. It is displayed by the woman who can do it all: maintain a good
job, a clean house, well-behaved children, and a loving marriage. Noncompliant femininity obscures women's subordination to men by
associating their paid labor with equality and downplays how their employment benefits elite males who purchase women's discounted
labor.
How the construction of femininities reflects and (re)constructs (or resists) the gender order and intermale hierarchies needs to be further
explored. An examination of hidden power dynamics might reveal that the key difference in the ways these two forms of femininities are
played out has less to do with quantity of male dominance than with quality. For example, women who display greater egalitarianism in
some arenas of their marriage or job may feel pressed to accomplish their gender with greater submission in other arenas (see Hochschild
with Machung 1989; Pyke 1994). On the other hand, women who emphasize their femininity may be able to wield considerable Dower
from behind a smokescreen of female subservience. By examining the underlying cultural ideologies at play and the actual practices, we can
learn how the construction of these and other forms of femininity shapes interpersonal power, plays into the construction of masculinities,
and obscures while (re)producing inequality.
To conclude, microlevel power practices are part of a system that affirms and (re)constitutes broader relations of inequality. Linked by the
distorting lens of ideological hegemonies, larger structures of inequality are easily reflected and (re)produced in day-to-day power practices.
Although I have focused on the ways that social hierarchies are maintained and reproduced, it should not be assumed that they are
impervious to challenge. Social change, such as the increased demand in the United States for women's paid labor while the demand for
men's has declined, and personal life-altering events, such as rape or divorce, have the potential for making explicit the inequality promoted
by certain pervasive beliefs. Although increased consciousness of the ideological underpinnings of social hierarchies does not magically
cause those hierarchies to disappear, it provides an interesting point of investigation as to how new legitimizing ideologies arise in the wake
of challenges to previous hegemonic beliefs and how microlevel power processes and macrostructural inequality are altered or reproduced
under such conditions.
[Footnote]
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper was awarded the 1995 Jessie Bernard Paper Award for Outstanding Contribution to Feminist Scholarship by
the National Council on Family Relations. Grants from the National Science Foundation (#SES90-01015), Sigma Xi (the Scientific
Research Society), and the National Institute on Aging (#ST32A00037)funded this research. I am especially grateful to Francesca Cancian
for her encouragement and many helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Cathleen Armstead, Frank Bagrash, Janet Saltzman
Chafetz Paula England, and Michael Messner for their suggestions.

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[Author note]
KAREN D. PYKE
University of California, Irvine

[Author note]
Karen D. Pyke is Lecturer and Faculty Undergraduate Advisor in the Sociology Department at University of California, Irvine. A recent
NIA postdoctoral fellow, her research has focused on gender, class, aging, and power in families. She is currently launching a new research
project that examines the production of gender, cultural conflicts, and intergenerational powerdynamics among young adult children of
Korean and Vietnamese immigrants.