The Buḥturids of the Garb.

Mediaeval Lords of Beirut and of Southern Lebanon

Author(s): Kamal S. Salibi
Source: Arabica, T. 8, Fasc. 1 (Jan., 1961), pp. 74-97
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4054971
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 THE BUHTURIDS OF THE GARB.
MEDIAEVALLORDS OF BEIRUT AND OF
SOUTHERNLEBANON*
BY

KAMAL S. SALIBI

L EBANON1 owes much to its Druze feudal dynasties. The Druze

house of Ma'n unified the country under its leadership in the
late sixteenth century; and, during the two centuries that followed,
Druze political acumen steered Mount Lebanon through the
labyrinth of Ottoman domestic and foreign politics and maintained
the quasi-autonomy on which its later development was based.
Throughout this period the Druze feudal system was the unwritten
constitution of Mount Lebanon, and political divisions among the
Lebanese were determined by the rivalry between leading Druze
families. The Maronitefeudality, which appearedafter the Ottoman
conquest and replaced the older Maronite village and district
chieftainships, was an offshoot of Druze feudalism, organized in
its manner and remaining ancillary to it until the breakdown of
the Lebanese feudal regime towards the middle of the nineteenth
century.

$. The principal source for the history of the Buhturids of the (Oarb is
SALIH B. YAHYA, Thrikh Bayrit wa akhbar al-umartP al-Bukturiyyin min
bani al-Gharb (published by Louis CHEIKHO, Beirut, 1927; corrections to
the very poor edition were made by Jean SAUVAGET, ((Corrections au texte
imprimi de l'histoire de Beyrouth de Sdlih b. Yahyd#*, in BEO, VII-VIII,
1937-I938). $ilih b. Yahya, who wrote in the first half of the fifteenth
century, was one of the leading Buhturid emirs of his day. He wrote his
history depending on oral accounts and on a considerable number of family
documents, many of which he quotes verbatim. Information about the
Buhturids in the late fifteenth century is available in the history of IBN
SIBAT,of which I have used the American University of Beirut manuscript
(MS 956.9: I 13). IBN SIBAT (d. I520) was a clerk in the service of the
Buhturid emirs.
i. I shall use the term Lebanon to mean the area covered today by the
Lebanese Republic, and the term Mount Lebanon to mean the territory of
the Ottoman mutasarrillik of Mount Lebanon. By southern Lebanon (as
distinct from northern Lebanon) I shall mean that part of Mount Lebanon
which lies, roughly, south of the Beirut-Damascus highway.
 THE HOUSE OF BUHTUR

cAll

Nahid al-dawla Buhtur

garaf al-dawla cAll Za

Zayn al-din Salih 6a
The minor (cAramuin) branch Nagm
of the house of Buhtur _

Sacd al-din Hidr

Nasir al-din al-Husayn
Zayn al-din $lih

Sayf al-din Yahya S

Zayn al-din Slih III L1 Fahr al-din 'Utman

i. The author of TdrKh Bayriit .... See text, p. oo*.

76 K. S. SALIBI [3]

During the four centuries that preceded the Ottoman conquest

of Syria in 15I6, the Druzes had gradually developed into a coherent
political community with an established class of leaders, and their
organization so impressed the Ottomans that they allowed them
to maintain some measure of self-rule. In addition to being local
military-feudal chieftains, their leaders had won the recognition
of the Mamlilk government and had acted as their agents for
many years.
The Druze homeland of southern Lebanon is mountainous and
rugged, but its topography sets no obstacle to political unity. Its
natural districts, separated from each other by barriersless formi-
dable than those separating the districts of northern Lebanon 1,
are of comparatively easy access to one another. The tributaries
of Nahr al-Damiir, which meet almost at a common point 2, divide
the southern districts and group them in a rosette pattern; and
the topographical unity of the region is reinforced by 6abal al-
Baruik, which stretches wall-like along its eastern border and
provides it with excellent protection 3.
Like Cabal al-Lukam (the Amanus), cabal Bahra' (the Alouite
Mountain), Cabal 'Amil (south Lebanon), and the highlands of
Galilee and central Palestine, southern Lebanon served throughout
the Middle Ages as an Islamic march on the western border of
Syria4. Starting from the eighth century, Arab and Persian clans

i. The districts of northern Lebanon are separated by the deep gorges of

iivers and winter torrents that spring near the watershed and pour pre-
cipitously into the sea in roughly parallel courses. Communication between
the resultant mountainous strips of territory is, in most cases, virtually
impossible except by way of the coast. This geographic factor must have
contributed greatly to the political and ecclesiastical disunity among the
mediaeval Maronites. For the history of northern Lebanon in the Middle
Ages see K. S. SALIBI, "The Maronites of Lebanon under Frankish and
Mamliuk rule (IO99-I56)", in Arabica, IV (I957), Pp. 288-303.
2. Nahr al-Damfir is the name applied to the lower course of a juncture
of small rivers and winter streams pouring some I5 kilometers south of
Beirut. The approximate point of juncture is at Cisr al-Qadi: a point not
far from cAbayh, Dayr al-Qamar, and Btaddin, successively the feudal
capitals of Mount Lebanon.
3. See map.
4. Northern Lebanon was the only part of the border where no large-
scale military settlements were made, possibly due to the height of the
mountains there (the peaks range in height from 2098-3088 meters, as
compared with the 1950 meter peak of (Tabal al-Bariik) and the exceptional
ruggedness of the region. Northern Lebanon remained an almost exclusively
Christian refuge.
[4] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE GARB 77

(and much later Turkish and Kurdish clans) were settled in the
region to protect the coastal and mountain highways against
brigandage,to harass invaders, and to guard the adjacent harbours.
The rate of such settlement was increased considerably during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when more clans were brought
into southern Lebanon to thwart Frankish expansion and to act
as informers and vanguards for the counter-crusades1.
It must not be supposed that southern Lebanon before the
eighth century was an uninhabited region. The villages there, as in
northern Lebanon, retain Canaanite and Aramaic names which
point to an ancient origin2. Before the Arab conquest both regions
were probably inhabited by Christianpeasantry; and the military
colonist clans settled in southern Lebanon by the Islamic states
must have been a relatively thin Moslem upper stratum set over
the original peasant population, similar to the "Mardaite"colonies
established by the Byzantines in northern Lebanon 3. In time the
Moslem settlers brought the local peasantry under their control,
converted them to Islam, and organized them as a march warrior
community.
This new community which arose from the fusion of the original
Christian (and possibly heterodox Christian) peasantry and the
semi-nomadic military colonists was ideal ground for the spread
and growth of religious heresy. A composite population, differing
in religious background, living in mountainous seclusion, and
probably having many grounds for dissatisfaction with the central
government, the march warriors of southern Lebanon expressed
their separatism and political disaffections through religious
heterodoxy, like similar communities elsewhere4. Although no
i. See below.
2. Anis FRAYIIA, AsmCa' al-mudun wa-i-qura al-lubnaniyya wa-talsir
maacniha; dirasa lugawiyya (Beirut, I956), passim.
3. K. S. SALIBI, op. cit., p. 289.
4. In discussing a similar situation on the borderland between Byzantium
and Islam, Professor Paul WITTEK says: "Between the military borderlands
and the peaceful and industrious hinterland there exists the greatest cultural
contrast, and this contrast is further accentuated by racial differences. The
increase of the warlike elements, brought together from the most distant
parts of the world, gives rise on both sides of the frontier ... to a population
quite distinct from that of the hinterland. The continuous frontier fighting
created warrior clans, faithfully devoted to their chiefs and aspiring to the
greatest possible independence, fully conscious of their own importance in
their relations with the government. They tend to offer resistance to all
administrative interference, and especially detest taxation; on the contrary,
78 K. S. SALIBI [51

heresy was locally developed, heretical propagandists were warmly

received in the region, where they found conditions exceptionally
favourable for the dissemination of their doctrines ".
Druzism was merely the last form of Moslem dissent to invade
southern Lebanon and take root there. The Druze propagandists,
who preached the deification and messianization of the Fatimid
caliph al-Hakim (996-I02I A.D.), were persecuted during the elev-
enth century throughout Egypt and Syria; but they were well
received by the warrior-peasants of southern Lebanon. Their
missionary effort there resulted in the conversion of the dominant
part of the population to the Druze faith.
Druzism is an esoteric, exclusive, and non-proselyting cult, with
secret formulas for mutual recognition among its adherents. As
such, it was a factor of social and political cohesion among its
followers. The doctrine of the taqiyya, incorporated in the Druze
as well as in other extremist Si'ite cults, whereby an adherent may
deny his religion on oath in case of danger, enabled the Druzes
to serve and court the favours of the Sunni central government
without the embarrassment of having to admit their dissent 2.
Furthermore, the non-proselytism of the Druze cult, which contri-
buted to Druze solidarity and community pride, was elastic enough
in practice to admit desirable new elements. In Crusader and
Mamliik, and even in Ottoman times Druzism gradually admitted
into its presumably closed ranks the new families and clans which
settled in southern Lebanon and reached positions of leadership.

they claim from the government honours, pay and military aid. In religious
matters, too, a similar resistance is offered. The heresies, persecuted by the
state-church, find here a secure place of refuge, often an enthusiastic
reception." The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London, I938), PP. 17-I8.
i. Compare with the spread of the NusayrI and IsmAcill heresies in
Cabal Bahra', where a similar situation seems to have prevailed, and of the
Ismaclli heresy and of other extremist offshoots of Sicism in Cabal al-
D?inniyya (north Lebanon), the Biqac, and the southern regions of the
Anti-Lebanon. Similarly, the Monothelite monks of Mar Maruinestablished the
Maronite church in northern Lebanon, in a Christian march warrior commu-
nity. For the spread of Ismacllism geographically see Bernard LEWIS, "The
Ism2cilites and the Assassins" in K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin, (ed.),
A history of the Crusades (Philadelphia, 1955), PP. 99-I32.
2. The Druze Buhturid emir SALIH B. YAHYA, the author of Tarfkh
Bayriit ... (see fn. 7) never admits the Druzism of his family, and frequently
stresses their orthodox Islam. Another Buh.turid emir of the sixteenth
century built a mosque in Beirut which still bears his name (The Mosque
of Emir Mundir).
[6] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE GARB 79

On the other hand, the brotherhood of faith in Druzism did not

efface the distinction between the two elements that had gone to
form the Druze people. The ?ayh, muqaddam, and amir (emir)
ranks, descendedfrom the Moslemcolonist clans settled successively
in the region 1, remained a superiorclass. The rigid social rules that
forbade (and still forbid) their intermarriagewith Druze commoners
probably reflect the original race consciousnessof the alien military
elite superimposedover the native peasantry of southern Lebanon
by the Islamic states.

In ii1o Beirut fell to the Crusaders. The city garrison was

massacred, and the Franks hunted down the chieftains of the
Moslemclans already settled in the neighbouringhills. The Moslem
march defences in the region were weakened, and new military
settlements were in order. The Atabegs of Damascus took prompt
action and lured fresh settlers into the region, most important of
whom were a clan of the South Arab tribe of Tanih: the clan later
known as Banul Buhtur2
The Arab tribes that roamed Syria had always provided a source
for the recruitment of military colonists; and the Taniuh ranked
not least among them 3. It appears that soon after the fall of
Beirut to the Franks a Tanuihidchieftain, cAll b. al-Husayn, was
asked to settle with his men in the hills of the Oarb, to the south-
east of Beirut. This 'Ali's grandfather, Ibrahim b. Abi 'Abdallah,
had held command in al-Birah, a fortified town near the Byzantine-

i. The family traditions recorded in the early nineteenth century by

TANNUYS AL-SIDYAQ (Ajhbar al-acyan fi Gabal Lubnan, Beirut, I859), like
other traditional sources, indicate that all leading Druze feudal families
are descended from military settlers, mostly of the Crusader and post-
Crusader periods. Some families (like the Canbalat) entered Lebanon as
Sunni Moslems in Ottoman times.
2. SIDYAQ (op. cit., PP. 715-7I6) lists the chieftains who were massacred
mndhunted down by the Franks after the fall of Beirut. See also Haydar
AL-SIHABI,al-guray al-hisan ff tarih hawadit al-zaman (Cairo, 1900), PP. 317-
3I8. SIHABI and SIDYAQ, who wrote during the first half of the nineteenth
century, depended on earlier accounts, some of which seem to be lost, and
on oral traditions. They noted both the massacre of the original Moslem
settlements and the establishment of new ones by the Atabegs of Damascus.
I have made a special study of Sidyaq's account in my Maronite His-
torians of Mediceval Lebanon, (Beyrouth, I959), PP. I6I-233.
says that the clan previously settled in the
3. SIDYAQ (op. cit., p. ii8)
6arb, which he wrongly calls Banil Arslan, was also Tanuihid. It is this
same clan which was exterminated by the Franks (see previous note).
8o K. S. SALIBI [7]

Moslemfrontier 1, wherehis clan had probablyacquiredconsiderable

experience in border warfare.
It was 'All's son, Buhtur, who gave his name to the clan 2.
Towards the middle of Muharram542 h. (June II47) Mugir al-din
Abaq (II39-II54), the last BunridAtabeg of Damascus, recognized
Buhtur as Emir of the Oarb and issued for him a manOr (deed of
investiture) to the effect-the earliest known document relating
to the history of the Buhturids 3
This noble writ has been issued for the esteemed emir Ndhil al-dawla
Abui l-'AWir Buhtur b. cAli ... that he may abide with his old dues and
with the villages he already holds, such as have been attributed to the name
of his father and to his name. He may receive their royal revenues, which
he shall use for his own benefit and in order to strengthen himself for service.
He shall continue, as before, to hold command in the (;arb, in the mountain
of Beirut .... The duty of the village elders 4 and the peasants, may God
give them strength, shall be to attend to his orders and to obey him in
whatever he may demand of them with regard to the levy of royal dues,
and to assist him in whatever duties may be assigned to him by the State
.... r As for him, his duty shall be to defend them and to bring their
grievances to the attention of the governors.....

It is likely that Buhtur was one of the march commanders

summoned by Abaq in I148 to assist in warding off the Frankish
attack on Damascus 6, and that the Druze peasant-warriorsplaced
under his command by the man?f1rof II47 were among the "many
archers" who "arrived from the direction of the Biqa' and from
elsewhere" on the second day of the attack 7.
The Buhturids did not come alone to southern Lebanon. They
were accompanied by subsidiary clans like Banii 'Abd al-Malik:
at least so we are told 8. It is probable that were also other clans,
I. SALIHB. YAHYA,op. cit., pp. 46-47. IbrThim was an emir in al-Birah
in I027.
2. The clan was previously known as Banul Abi cAbdallah, and were later
known also as Banfi Amir al-Oarb, also with reference to Buhtur.
3. SALIHB. YAHYA,op. cit., pp. 45-46, as quoted verbatim. The following
translation mine.
4. Ru'asa', sing. ra'is: a village notable in charge of local administration
and police duties, same as the reis (L. regulus) under the Franks.
5. JO 4A U A
Jy
Z1 I v 1+ -.., l- ;F tbL
Aly

A history of the Crusades (Cambridge, 1951-54), II,

6. Steven RUNCIMAN,
P. 28I-282.
7. IBN AL-QALANISI, A Damascus chronicle of the Crusades (being H. A. R.
GIBB'S translation of Dayl t2rirhDima?q: London, I1932), P. 229.
8. According to a tradition recorded by SIDYAQ (Op. Cit., P. I6o). Note
that the pagination in Sidyaq is partly duplicated, probablydue to misprinting.
 0 RN:B0''
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L,j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

V4

B E I UR ~ ~ ~ I

AL-
aK//,----->(ttPeNAH

AL~~~~~~~~~
NAHR AL SUWAYJANI~~~~~~~cAN A
.iS 8AQ-RlHAN } ) N E|
ATH T
[8] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE OARB 8i

independent of the Buhturids, such as that Banii Macn who, it is

said, came to the hills of the Suif (north-east of Sidon) as early as
II20 at the request of Tugtigin of Damascus (II04-II28), with in-
structions to "conduct raids against the Franks who were on the
coast" 1. According to tradition, they became the allies of the
Buhturids, and the two clans fought the Franks together 2, With
the Macnids came minor clans, such as Banui Nakad3 and Band
Talhiiq '. It is also said that later on, in II73, Niir al-dimMahmiid
b. Zangi (II46-iI74) asked Banil SihTb to settle with their men in
Wadi al-Taym, in the southern Anti-Lebanon 5.
Even in the aarb the Buhturids and their subordinates were not
alone. Their chieftainship there was disputed by BaniuSa'dan, also
known as Banui Abi l-Cays: apparently a branch of the semi-
nomadic Banui al-Hamra (or al-Hummayra) of the Biq' 6. It is
not known whether BaniuAbi l-Cays were invited to settle in the
Oarb by the Buiridsor whether they chose to move there of their
own accord; but they shared the title of "emir" with the Buhturids
and held the town of 'Aramiin. The history of southern Lebanon
during the Crusaderand early Mamliukperiods tells of the rivalry
between the Buhturids and the Abill-6aysh in the (arb where the
former, the more powerful clan, were trying to establish an un-
disputed leadership. The Ma'nids of the Sflf remained in the
background.
It is not surprising that the Buhturids of the Oarb should have
dominated the internal scene in southern Lebanon under the Franks
and the Mamluiks.The Oarb,unlike the relatively remote and rugged
Sflf, was in the immediate neighbourhoodof Beirut and controlled
the southern approaches to the harbour as well as the road across
the hills to Damascus. As such, it was a district in which both
Moslems and Franks had a direct interest. The lords of Beirut and
Sidon were always willing to pay well for Buhturid good will, and
the Buhturids often found it necessary as well as profitable to come
to terms with them, although their raison d'ctre was to fight the
Franks and to block their advance in the region. At the same time,

i. Ibid., p. 247.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 145.
4. Ibid., p. I55.
5. Ibid., p. 44.
6. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
ARABICA VIII 6
82 K. S. SALIBI [9]

the Buhturids were anxious to show their masters in Damascus

that they were performingtheir duties with pious zeal, lest subsidy
and support be withdrawn and punishment follow. These manoeu-
vres were executed with masterly skill, but informers were never
lacking: the Abiu1-Cxay? were always there to report any intelligence
likely to compromisethe position of their rivals. After the expulsion
of the Franks from Syria, the Buhturids profited from the frequent
political splits within the Mamlik state and graduallygained control
of the whole of southern Lebanon. The harbour of Beirut, which
was entrusted to their care, was a source of considerable wealth;
and the Abi l-Cayg, at last reduced to subordination, entered their
service.
In II54 Nulral-din Mahmiudb. Zangi took Damascus from the
Biirids and unified Moslem Syria. The position of the counter-
crusaders was improved, and Zahr al-dawla Karama, the son of
Buhtur, who may have been toying with the idea of entering
the service of the Franks of Beirut 1, decided to commit himself
to the side of the new hero of Islam and hastened to Damascus to
offer his submission and services. In return, Nuiral-din recognized
him as emir of the aarb and granted him most of the villages of the
district in iqtd' (revenue fief) in addition to other villages elsewhere
in southern Lebanon, the Biqa', and Wadi al-Taym 2. Furthermore,
Karama was to receive provisions from Damascus for a retinue of
forty horsemen and "whatever he may be able to levy in case of
war" 3. Thus assured of the good will and support of Niir al-din,
he established himself in the fortress of Sarhammulr (modern
Sarahmill), south-east of Beirut, and began to harass the Franks
of the coast.
The Brisebarre,who held the seigneury of Beirut from the kings
of Jerusalem, did not welcome the presence of Karama in their
immediate neighbourhood. Raids and counter-raids between them
continued until iI66, when Gautier III of Brisebarre sold his
fief back to the crown4. The struggle between Karama and the
Franks of Beirut did not cease, however, until the death of the emir
I. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., p. 48: "Karama seems to have neglected the
Franks and he was attached to al-Malik al-cAdil." Italics mine.
2. He was recognized emir of the (;arb by a marsu4m(decree) dated II57
(ibid., pp. 48-49) and was granted his iqta' by a mansur dated i i6i (ibid., p. 49).
3. Ibid.
4. E. REY, Les seigneurs de Barut (Revue de l'Orient latin, IV, I896), p. 15.
Jean RICHARD, Le royaume de Jtrusalem (Paris, 1953), p. 8i.
[IO] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE GARB 83

sometime before II70 1. Soon after his death the Franks lured his
three elder sons to the city, where they were murdered.The fortress
of Sarhammulrwas then attacked and destroyed. For the moment,
it seemed as if the history of the house of Buhtur had come to an
end 2.
Only the youngest of Karama's sons, Gamdl al-din Haggi,
survived the plight. He was a child of seven at the time, and his
mother escaped with him from Sarhammiirwhen the fortress was
stormed. The young emir grew up in Tirdala (also in the (Oarb)
and received a small iqtac from Nuir al-din, probably in compen-
sation 3. Ha"I's uncle, Saraf al-dawla cAll, was another survivor.
He established himself in cAramiun4 and sired the minor branch
of the house.
On August 6, ii87 Saladin (II74-II93) reconquered Beirut
from the Franks; and as the sultan approached the city young
IIa"i met him and bade him welcome at Halda 6. Saladin, pleased
by the gesture, summoned the young emir after he had taken the
city and said: "Behold! We have taken your revenge from the
Franks, so let your heart be at peace!" Ha"i was then confirmed
in the chieftainship of the Oarb and received the iqtad of seven
villages there which the sultan recognized as "his property and
inheritance from his father and grandfather"6.
Little is known about the subsequent career of Hagg1, and no

i. The date of Karama's death is not known: neither is the date of the
murder of his three sons and the destruction of Sarhammfir by the Franks
(see text). The latter event is said to have taken place towards the end of
the reign of Nuir al-din, but probably before II70. See SALIH B. YAHYA,
op. cit., pp. 50-52, and below, fn. 36.
2. Ibid., PP. 50-51. IBN HAJAR, al-durar al-kamina ft cayan al-mi'a at-
tamina (Hyderabad Deccan, I348-50 A.H.), p. 54. After the seigneury of
Beirut had been rejoined to the crown domain of Jerusalem it was assigned
as a fief for a time to the Byzantine prince Andronicus Comnenus. It was
possibly in the days of this Andronicus that the murder of the Buhturid
princes and the destruction of their fortress took place. See R. GROUSSET,
Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jirusalem (Paris, I934-36),
II, p. 85I.
3. $ALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., p. 52. The manRlr, granting the child HaI[a
the village of 6abca, is dated Ramadan 30, 565 h. (June I7, II70). The
likelihood is that the grant was subsequent to the murder of Haggi's brothers
and the destruction of Sarhammfir.
4. Ibid., p. 54.
5. Halda (Haldeh) is a village in the neighbourhood of Beirut, to the south.
6. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., PP. 5I-52. Saladin's manfilr was issued in
Beirut in (umada I, 583 h. (II87 A.D.).
84 K. S. SALIBI [II]

record of the date of his death is to be found 1. The Franks retook

Beirut in II97; and the reestablished fief was assigned to the house
of Ibelin, who exercised greater control over the hinterland than
the Brisebarre. Hagi seems to have suffered at their hands. On
at least one occasion he complained of their harsh treatment to
al-Mucazzamof Damascus 2, Later, on October 3, I242, Iaggi's
son and successor, Nagm al-din Muhammad and another son,
Saraf al-din cAllwere killed in Kisrawan3, probably in an encounter
with the Franks or with their native allies in the region 4.
It seems that during the 50 years that followed the death of
Saladin in II93 the Bubturids of the aarb were called upon to take
sides in the Ayyiibid dynastic quarrels5. On Saladin's death his
eldest son, al-Afdal, succeeded him as sultan of Damascus. Three
years later he was overthrown by his uncle al-cAdil, and indem-
nified with the fortress of Sarhad, south of Damascus. From Sarhad
al-Afdal wrote to Ha"i granting him the iqta' of "the whole
aarb" and urging the emir to procurefor him an oath of allegiance
from his relations, the other emirs of the aarb. The unfortunate
al-Afdal was obviously soliciting the assistance of the Buhturids
in a bid to regain his lost throne 6. Later Haggi's son, Nagm al-din
Muhammad, received a similar letter from al-alih Ayyulb of
Egypt (I240-I249). After commending the emir's obedience and

I. Haggi, however, was still alive in I222. In that year he received a

man?ir from al-Mu'azzam of Damascus (12I8-I227) recognizing the iqtCa
he had received from Saladin. See ibid., p. 53 (gives the sultan's name
mistakenly as al-cAzlz).
2. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., p. 53, quotes a letter from al-Mucazzam to
IjagI in which the sultan, apparently in answer to a complaint from Haggi,
assures him that the Franks of Beirut have been asked to maintain him and his
followers in their old positions and not to cause them any trouble. The emir,
it seems, was unwilling to compromise with the Franks because "they had
previously killed his brothers and destroyed their fort, so perhaps he bore
a grudge against them." Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 55.
4. See K. S. SALIBI, op. cit., Pp. 292-293.
5. The various branches of the Ayyuibid dynasty (Saladin's successors)
ruled in Egypt until I250, and in Syria until I260.
6. SALIH B. YAHYYA, op. cit., PP. 52-53. Jean SAUVAGET, ,,Corrections au texte
imprimd de l'histoire de Beyrouth de Salih b. Yahya", (VII-VIII, I937-38),
p. 69. Al-Afslal's letter, dated Rama4an 26, 593 h. (August I2, II97), is in
answer to a letter from Haggi to the sultan, the contents of which are not
known. Salih b. Yahyai was not conscious of the fact that in II97 al-Afdal
was no longer sultan of Damascus, and he merely considers the letter as a
document of investiture.
[I2] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE GARB 85

good services and promising to confirm his iqtd' and chieftainship

and to increase his stipend and that of his followers, the sultan
proceeds to say: "We are arriving in your country soon, by the
will of God, so let the emir and his followers be preparedto meet us,
that our bounty may show on them and that they may receive the
best of our honoursand attentions" 1. Since Nagm al-dinMuhammad
was killed in I242, the letter must have been written before that
date. It was only in I245 that al-Sa1ihAyyuabsucceeded in wresting
Damascus from his uncle, al-Salih Ismacil. Ayyiib, therefore, was
obviously trying to enlist the emirs of the (arb on his side in his
struggle for Damascus, hence his generouspromises. It is not known
whether the Buhturids responded to these appeals.

On Nagm al-din Muhammad'sdeath the chieftainship of the Garb

passed over to his two sons, (Tam5lal-din Haggi II (d. I298) and
Sa'd al-din Hidr (d. I3I4), who shared it with Zayn al-dmin Salih
(d. I296), a cousin of Haggi I. Those three emirs lived through
what was perhaps the most critical stage in the history of the
Buhturids.
During the second half of the thirteenth century the Islamic
world was in crisis. The Mamliuks,who had succeeded the Ayyulbids
as the masters of Egypt in I250, were striving to overthrow the
remnants of Ayyiubid power in Syria. Earlier in the century the
Franks had taken advantage of the Ayyiubiddynastic quarrels and
regained much of their lost dominion on the Syrian coast, and they
were certain to come to blows one day with the renascent Moslem
power in Egypt. In the Eastern lands of the Caliphate the Mongols
had established the Ilhanate of Persia. They had sacked Bagdad
in I258, and were threatening Syria. It was strongly suspected, and
with some reason, that the Mongols and the Franks were acting in
concert against the world of Islam; and Syria was the obvious
scene of the oncoming struggle.
In circumstances of such complexity the allegiance of the Buh-
turids of the Garb wavered. They could not stand uncommitted
and risk losing the good will of all sides. On the other hand, there
was greater risk in being committed exclusively to one side. The
obvious course was to have a foot in every camp and thus ingratiate
all the parties concerned. Therefore, while remaining on terms of
minimum friendship with the Franks of Beirut and Sidon, the
i. Ibid., pp. 54-55. The year in which the letter was sent is not mentioned.
86 K. S. SALIBI [I3]

Buhturid emirs reassuredthe Ayyiibids of their allegiance, invited

negotiation with the Mamliuks,and were willing in principle to
come to terms with the Mongols should that become necessary.
Indeed, documents have been preservedin quotation whichillustrate
the masterly duplicity of the Buhturids. These consist of mana?ir
(deeds of investiture) addressed to them by al-Nasir Yuisufof Da-
mascus (I250-I260), Mu'izz al-din Aybak (first Mamluk sultan
of Egypt, I250-I257), Hulagu (founder of the Ilhanate of Persia,
d. I265), and the Frankish lords of Sidon and Beirut'.
The Buhturid game did not go unnoticed. Al-Ndsir Yiisuf of
Damascus had his suspicions; and in I255 he sent a punitive
expedition against the garb which included regular troops from
Damascus as well as tribesmen from Ba'albak and the Biqa'.
After advancing well into the region, the expedition met with
heavy defeat at the hands of the Buhturids at the village of 'Aytat 2.
The suspicion and ill-will of the Ayyiibid sultan seems to have
convinced 6amal al-din Ha"i II that a conciliatory trip to Damas-
cus was in order. In I259 Hulagu led the first Mongol invasion of
Syria, and the moment was opportune for such a visit. Ha"i II
probably intended to win back the favours of al-Nasir Yuisuf by
lending him assistance in his hour of need; but by the time the
emir arrived in Damascus the city was already in the hands of
the Mongols. Therefore, IIa`1 II forthwith swore allegiance to
Ketbuga, the Mongol governor of Damascus, and procured from
him a deed of investiture 3. The news of the fall of Damascus to
the Mongols brought Hagi's cousin, Zayn al-din Slih, hurrying
over to the court of Ketbuga to demonstrate Buhturid submission
further 4.
The two emirs were still in Damascus when they heard that
Qutuz, the Mamliuksultan (I259-I260), was advancing from Egypt
to fight the Mongols. The news was truly alarming. With both
emirs in the Mongol camp, a Mamlilk victory would spell disaster

I. Ibid., pp. 55 sqq. gives the texts of these and several other documents,
with their dates.
2. SALIH B. YAHYA (op. cit., p. 64), writing about the event in the late
fifteenth century, explains that it probably took place because "the Da-
mascenes (Ayyiubids) believed that the emirs of the (;arb were on the side
of the Egyptians (Mamlfuks)". 'Aytat, in the 4arb, is very near the modern
summer resort of cAlay.
3. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
4. Ibid., p. 65.
[I4] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE GARB 87

to the house of Buhtur. But before long a wise decision was taken:
Hagi II and SMiih"held counsel together and agreed that [the
latter] would leave and join the Egyptian army while [the former]
would stay with the Mongolsin Damascus ... and the man on the
side of the victors would intercede for his comrade and for the
country. .. " 1

At the decisive battle of cAyn (4dlit, where the Mongols were

routed, $S1ih fought with the soldiers of Qutuz, and his brave
performance saved the fortunes of his house. "He shot a strong
bow; and the sultan's mamliiks admired his archery and began
offering him arrows from their own quivers. When, later on, he
appeared before the sultan, who had heard of his connexion with
the Mongols, the sultan's mamlulks testified to [the courage he
had shown], and he was forgiven" 2.
The Mamliukvictory at cAyn cxilflt decided the allegiance of the
Buhturids for nearly three centuries; but the Mamluikscontinued
to suspect this allegiance for many years. The Buhturid record of
duplicity was not easily forgotten, and the activities of the family
were closely watched during the remaining years of the thirteenth
century. Baybars (I260-I277), who succeeded Qutuz as sultan,
confirmed the chieftainship of the Buhturids in the aarb, renewed
their land grants, and enjoined them to assist the Mamlulktroops
fighting the Franks on the coast and to serve as informers3; but
the Franks of Beirut and Sidon remained their immediate neigh-
bours, and the Buhturids were probably unable to break off re-
lations with them completely. Petty dealings between the two
parties must have continued, at least in times of peace 4; and the
Abi l-Cayg emirs were prompt to fan the ever-present Mamluik
suspicions with reports, true or fictitious, of such dealings.

i. Ibid. Free translation mine.

2. Ibid. Free translation mine.
3. Ibid., pp. 67-69.
4. The Bu.hturids were certainly not above suspicion of dealing with the
Franks, although there is no indication that they did so under Baybars. In
1256, before cAyn Caluit, the lord of Sidon gave Haggi II a plot of farming
land in Damuir, to the south of Beirut, probably in repayment for services
rendered or in return for promises of future service (Ibid., pp. 57-58). In
1280, after the death of Baybars, Humfroy de Monfort, the lord of Beirut
(I264-1283), gave Salih a plot of land in al-cAmrfisiyya, near Swayfat, on
condition that the emir would "assist" him, that he would extradite anyone
escaping from Beirut to the (arb, and that he would keep the people of
his territory from causing damage in the territory of Beirut (ibid., p. 80).
88 K. S. SALIBI [I5]

A few years after 'Ayn cidliit, between I268 and 1270, one of the
Abi l-6ayg emirs forged a note addressed to the Count of Tripoli
in the names of the three Buhturid emirs, IHagi II, Hidr, and
$alih, and so arranged it that the answer of the Count of Tripoli
reached Baybars 1. The three emirs were promptly arrested and
put in prison, where they remained until released by Baraka Han,
the son and successor of Baybars, in I278. Their imprisonment
appears to have been a mere precaution, and it does not seem that
Baybars took the charges against them seriously. He neither
confiscated their property nor withdrew their iqta'; but, uncertain
of their loyalty, he was not willing to release them before making
himself master of the Syrian coast 2.
Having once succeeded in their intrigues against their rivals,
the Abuil-xayg emirs plotted the downfall of the Buhturids on at
least two other occasions. In I283 Taqi al-din Naga b. Abii l-6ayg
forged further letters in the names of HagI II, Hidr, and Salih,
addressed this time to the Franks of Sidon and Acre, and set out
to deliver those letters in person. The plot was discovered and the
three emirs, apparently, came to no harm 3. Later, in I288, they
were again accused of "having come into contact with the Franks"
when the soldiers of Qalawiun(I279-I290) appeared before Sidon;
but this time also they were acquitted, and the testimony brought
against them was pronounced a false accusation 4.
The reign of Qaldwvunbrought new difficulties to the house of
Buhtur: difficulties far more seriousthan the plots of the Abiul-6ays
emirs. The Mamliuks,freshly acquainted with the coastal borderland
of Lebanon, did not appreciate its special character; and it seems
that Qaldwiin decided to centralize the military administration
of the region and bring it to conformity with the military feudal
system as established elsewhere in Syria and Egypt. In southern
Lebanon the iq!d'had degenerated into quasi-hereditary holding,
and the chieftains who held iqtd' there had no fixed duties and were
not thoroughly dependable. Thereforein I288, some months before
his conquest of Tripoli, the sultan confiscated the property and

i. Ibid., pp. 69-72. This is the Buhturid version of the story, and no other
version is available. SALLIHB. YAHYA documents it, as usual, with selections
from family papers.
2. Ibid., p. 70.
3. Ibid., PP. 72-73.
4. Ibid., PP. 73-74. SALIH B. YAHYA quotes the document of acquita).
[i6] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE OARB 89

iqta' of the mountain chieftains, including those of the Buhturids,

and transformedthem into a reserve of land for the newly established
&alqa 1 of Tripoli after its conquest in I289 2.
The immediate successors of Qalawun reversed his policy in
southern Lebanon without altogether abandoningits basic premise:
the need for more centralization. Qalawiun'sexperiment must have
made it obvious that the experienced peasant guerillas of the
Lebanese borderlandwere invaluable for its defence, and that they
could only be effectively led by their own traditional chieftains.
As such, his successors realized that the permanent inclusion of
southern Lebanon in the Mamlilk system would be a mistake, and
that the needed measure of centralization could be brought about
more effectively by incorporating the local chieftains in the halqa
corps, thus recognizing their traditional chieftainship in the region
while keeping them under the central control.
By I29I al-Asraf Halil (I290-I293), the son and successor of
Qalawin, had conquered what was left of the Frankish realm in
Syria, including Beirut and Sidon. The danger of collaboration
between the chieftains of southern Lebanon and the Franks of the
coast was no more. The Buhturids, like other mountain chieftains,
were restored to their old positions in I292 and reinvested with their
old iqtda3. Halil was followed by his brother, al-Nasir Muhammad
(I293-I294, I298-I308, I309-I340), who reconfirmed the Buhturid
chieftainship in I2944. Despite appearances, however, a radical
change had taken place. The restored Buhturids were no longer
"Lebanese tribal chieftains" with "no fixed military duties except
the communication of intelligence regarding the activities of the
Crusaders".After I29I they were created "knights of the halqa or
emirs of specified grades, ordered to maintain mamliuk troops
correspondingto their rank, and made responsible for the watch

i. The gund al-halqa or a4ndd al-halqa were one of the three principal
corps of the Mamluk army. They were a corps of free non-mamluik cavalry,
composed of those knights who were in the sultan's service without being
his freedmen. See David AYALON, "Studies on the structure of the Mamluk
army" (BSOAS, 1953), P. 203. Also A. N. POLIAK, Feudalism in Egypt,
Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250-I900 (London, 1939), P. 2.
2. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., p. 77-78. IBN HAJAR, op. cit., II, PP. 55. A.
N. POLIAK, op. cit., PP. 26-27.
3. $ALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., p. 78.
4. Ibid., pp. 78-80. Al-Nasir Muhammad gave the Buliturids back what
his elder brother had not restored to them of their old iq!dc.
90 K. S. SALIBI [I7]

of roads and shores in specified regions" 1. The more influential

Buhturid ernirs received the humbler ones, including most of the
Abiu l-;ayg emirs, into their service as mamliuks2.
In I3I3 the Mamliiks tried again to reformnthe iqtd' system in
southern Lebanon as part of a general scheme for the reform of
feudal land tenure throughout the empire. Al-Nasir Muhammad
instituted a rawk (cadastre) for the redistribution of fiefs in Syria
(I3I3) and Egypt (I3I5) 3:
The sultans struggled to make the fief-holders more and more dependent
on the central government. At the beginning of the Mamliik epoch we still
find the influence of the Latin and Ayyfibid feudal systems, which made the
fief holders hereditary rulers of their respective regions. The means employed
by the sultans to put an end to it was the rawk, i.e. redistribution of lands
between the sultan and the feudatories .... A speedy cadastral survey
(ka?/ ae-bilad) was made; then the estates were divided into royal and
feudal; the feudal lands were redivided into the necessary number of fiefs
of variousgrades,and the fiefs of each gradewereredistributedby a drawing
of lots among the knights and emirs of that grade .... The feudatories
received now fiefs consisting of small portions dispersedin various places,
where the lords .. . were strangers 4.
The Syrian rawk of I3I3 affected the fortunes of the emirs of the
aarb, and the Buhturids immediately raised objections. Nasir al-din
al-Husayn (I269-I350), the son and successor of Sa'd al-din Hidr
and the leading Buhturid emir of his day, hurried to the court of
the viceroy of Damascus and pleaded that he and his kinsmen
had no use for the remote fiefs assigned to them by the rawk.
The Buhturids, he stressed, were "diligent in the service of our lord
the sultan", and the greater part of their iqtd' was legal private
property honoured by the ?arf (a 5. The cadastral survey had shown
beyond doubt that the Buhturids had saved much trouble and
expense to the state by calling on their own men in the (>arb to
assist them in guardingthe harbour of Beirut. "Shouldthis property
be included in the rawk", he concluded, "your slaves shall perish,
for it is their home and that of their men and clan, and they can
benefit of no other property" 6.

I. A. N. POLIAK, Op. cit., Pp. 26-27. See also SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit.,
PP. 42-43, 90-9I.
See Ibid., pp. 96-97.
2.
3. A. N. POLIAK, op. cit., p. 24. A previous rawk, the first in the series,
was held during the reign of Husam al-din Ldin in 1298.
4. Ibid., pp. 23-25.
5. A general term used in Arabic to include Islamic law.
6. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., Pp. 91-92.
[I8] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE GARB 9I

The Mamlilk authorities reconsidered the case of the Buhturid

iq.ta-, and the old fiefs of the family were restored. By so doing the
Mamlilks formalized the hereditary system of feudal land tenure
which had become traditional in southern Lebanon, and which was
maintained throughout Mamlilk and Ottoman times.

Nasir al-din al-Husayn, whose fluent pleading saved the Buhturid

iqtadin I3I3, was the first in a line of Lebanese emirs whose alert-
ness, capacity, and keen insight into the politics of their day won
for Mount Lebanon the special status it enjoyed under Mamluiks
and Ottomans. He was, besides, the first Lebanese emir to attract
the attention of the traditional Arabic biographers1.
Husayn was born on Muharram22, 668 h. (September 2I, I269).
His father, who lost interest in his chieftainship of the clan when
Qaldwiinconfiscated the Buhturid iqta' in i288, retired soon after,
leaving the complex problems of the family to his son. When al-
Agraf Halil restored the Buhturid iqtac in i292, IJusayn received
back his father's share and was created emir of three in the halqa
corps 2. A distant cousin, iams al-din Karama b. Buhtur 3, was
created emir of ten; and when this Karama died in I307, his iqtda
and rank went to Husayn. In I3I4, when the rawk in the Garb was
revoked, IHusaynwas created emir of twenty 4 without any increase
in his iqtdC.Accordingly, he became by far the most prominent
of the emirs of the Garb.
Husayn's rank in the halqa was a modest one, and the local
prestige he enjoyed was far above his official position. Like the later
emirs of Mount Lebanon, he loved pomp, and he built two sizeable
mansions: one on the sea front in Beirut and the other in the
mountain village of 'Abay. His court attracted minor poets who
sang his praises in verse of inferior quality. HJusaynhimself did not
lack literary taste and, apart from writing some verse, he was fond
of books and collected a small library.
In I305 Nasir al-din al-Husayn was invited to join the Mamlulk
punitive expedition against the Oird and Kisrawan. Earlier in the

I. IBN HAJAR (OP.cit., II, pp. 54-55) gives him a short biographical notice,
with some reference to the history of the family. For his full biography, on
which this account is based, see SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., pp. 87-I38 passim.
2. This is a very low grade of emir in the halqa. The highest was that
of emir of ioo, followed by that of emir of 40 (amlr tablahZina).
3. A grandson of Zayn al-din Salh (see genealogical table).
4. He actually commanded 22 knights.
92 K. S. SALIBI [19]

had rebelled against Mamliukrule 1. Husayn joined the expedition

along with other members of his family, and two of his cousins died
in the fighting 2, Once the rebels in the two districts were subdued,
the Mamluikssettled a Turkomanclan in the coastal hills of Kisrawan
to supervise the region and to cooperate with the Buhturids in
guarding the roads and harbours3.
The permanent duties of the Buhturids and the Turkomans of
Kisrawanwere fixed in I306. The formerwere to guard the harbour
of Beirut, to notify Damascus in case of naval raids from Cyprus
or elsewhere, and to assist the Mamliikarmy in repelling such raids.
Monthly relays of halqa troops from Ba'albak 4 worked in close
association with the Buhturids and kept them under supervision.
Beirut and Damascus were linked by pigeon relay and barfd (post
horse relay) for ordinary communication. In cases of danger alarms
were sent across the mountains to Damascus by night in a six-stage
fire relay; and a marine watch-tower (manzariyya) was set up in
Beirut to keep constant watch over the sea. All communication
with Damascus went through the mutawallf (district governor) of
Beirut, who was normally a Mamliuk5. The Turkomansof Kisrawan
were instructed to guard the pass of Nahr al-Kalb 6, and no one was
allowed pass there without a special permit from the Buhturid
emirs or the mutawalli of Beirut. They were also enjoined to guard
the coastal road and the minor harbours of the region 7.
Nasir al-din al-Husayn took his duties as an officer of the halqa
very seriously, as did his descendants and successors after him.
The Druze peasant warriorsthey commanded were among the best

I. See K. S. SALIBI, Op. cit., pp. 297-300. The Gird (east of the (O;arb)and
Kisrawan (north-east of Beirut) are two districts in Mount Lebanon.
2. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., pp. ioo-ioi. The two cousins were Muhammad
and Ahmad, sons of Haggi II. The death of those two emirs must have
enhanced Husayn's claim to the undisputed leadership of his clan.
3. In Ottoman times the Turkomans of Kisrawan came to be known as
Banui cAssaf. Sfilih b. Yahya referred to them occasionally as Awlad al-acmd
(sons of the blind man).
4. Bacalbak, under the Mamluks, was the principal town in the northern
march of the mamlaka (province) of Damascus. The wildyat (administrative
districts) of the northern Biqac, the southern Biqac, Beirut, and Sidon were
subordinate to it. See M. GAUDEFROY-DESMOMBYNES, La Syrie d I' Fpoqu
des Mamelouks d'aprns les auteurs arabes (Paris, I923), PP. 70-75.
5. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., PP. 40-43.
6. A river not far north of Beirut. The coastal road narrows down to a
mere pass at the mouth of that river because of the high cliffs.
7. $ALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., p. 42.
[20] THE BU HTURIDS OF THE GARB 93

year the Druzes, Nusayris, Rd/ida, and Maronitesof those districts

archersof their day, and they summoned them to the service of the
state on several occasions 1. During the lifetime of Husayn several
Cypriotand Genoesenaval raids on Beirut were effectively repulsed;
and in I343 the emir led Druze guerillas from the Gird to join an
expedition against al-Karak, in Transjordan, which was intended
to settle a succession problem between two sons of al-Nasir Muham-
mad2.
Nasir al-din al-Husayn retired from service in I348, at an ad-
vanced age, leaving his chieftainship and iqtdc to his son, Zayn
al-din dlihhII (d. I377) 3. The greater part of his career had fallen
during the long third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad: perhaps the
most peaceful and prosperous period in Mamlulkhistory. None of
the later Buhturid emirs enjoyed that advantage. The death of
al-Nasir Muhammad in I340 was followed by a series of thirteen
brief reigns when his sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons (all
of whom were young or otherwise incompetent) followed each
other to the throne in rapid succession. In the meantime, real
power fell to the leading Mamlulkemirs, and the period saw the
rising influence of the Circassian(or Burgs) Mamliuks.One of those,
the emir Barqulq(I382-I389, I390-I399), seized the throne in I382,
and his accession ushered in the second Mamlilk period (the Burg,
period) 4 in which the principle of hereditary succession to the
sultanate was almost entirely abandoned. Accession to the throne
came to be determined by strife between rival Mamlilk factions,
and the Mamlulkstate gradually broke down until it fell to the
Ottomans in I5I7. In general, the period was one of chronicpolitical
unrest, administrativeirregularityand corruption, and an economic
and fiscal breakdown ending in collapse. Under the circumstances
the Buhturids of the OWarb were forced again to resort to devious
means for the maintenance of their position in the face of suspicion
and intrigue, and to take sides in endless quarrels between rival
claimants to the throne of Cairo and rival governors in the Syrian
provinces.
I. SALIH B. YAHYA, mentions many such occasions often with details.
One such occasion was when the author himself joined a naval expedition
to Cyprus (see ibid., Pp. 22I sqq.).
2. Ibid., pp. 105 sqq.
3. Ibid., p. i66. For the biography of Salih II see ibid., pp. I66-175 passim.
4. For a survey of the Burgl period see Stanley LANE-POOLE, A history
of Egypt in the Middle Ages (London, I936), PP. 323-357.
94 K. S. SALIBI [2I]

It appears that Zayn al-din Slihh was the last Buhturid emir to
enjoy a recognized preeminence among his kinsmen. In I373,
four years before his death, he turned his iqtad over to two of his
sons, Sihab al-din Ahmad (I33I-138I) 1 and Sayf al-din Yahya
(d. I388) 2, who enjoyed some preeminence jointly. No distinct
leadershipcan be determined among the later emirs, although some
enjoyed more prestige than others. 'Izz al-din Sadaqa (d. I444), a
grandson of gihdb al-din Ahmad, did succeed in enjoying special
note, but it appears that he did so more by virtue of having been
appointed mutawalli of the Beirut wilaya 3 than through regional
chieftainship 4.
Despite this lack of outstanding leadership, however, the Buhtu-
rids, as a family, did maintain an ascendancy in the feudal structure
of southern Lebanon during the remaining years of the Mamlik
period: an ascendancy that was challenged by other rising families.
The Abi l-Cays, principal rivals of the Buhturids before I3I3,
lost much of their old positions after that year but continued to
intrigue against Husayn and his successors, although many of them
had entered the service of those emirs as halqa troops (gund)5.
Later on, apparently before the end of the fourteenth century,
the Buhturids attacked and destroyed the homes of the Abil
l-6ays, killed off all the members of the family and took over their
iqtd' 6. In the meantime other rivals were appearing.
A few years after the death of Nasir al-din al-Husayn the Turko-
mans of Kisrawanbegan to compete with the Buhturids for Mamllk
favours. In I36I one of the Turkoman emirs took over the iq(dC
of a Buhturid emir for a very short while. Later, in I366, the
Turkomans made the first major attempt to replace the Buhturids
in the control of the Oarb. In the previous year the Franks of
Cyprus had carried out a major naval raid on Alexandria. In res-
ponse, the ndaibof Damascus was sent to Beirut to arrange for a
number of ships to be built for a counter-raid on Cyprus, and to

I. SALIH B. YAHYYA, op. cit., Pp. I77-I78.

2. Ibid., p. I79-I84. Also IBN SIBAT, MS Tarih, PP. 3IO-312.
3. See above, fn. 76.
4. IBN SIBAT, op. cit., PP. 343-345; SALIH B. YAHYYA,op. cit., pp. I87, 226.
IBN SIBAT says that Sadaqa "had precedence over all the emirs ... and
governed [the region] from the frontier of Tripoli to the frontier of Safad,
both on the coast and in the mountains" (that being the wilaya of Beirut).
5. See above.
6. SALIH B. YAHYYA, op. cit., Pp. 99, I85, I89, I90, 200.
[22] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE GARB 95

reinforces the defence of Beirut. The Buhturids, apparently,showed

some slackness at the time in performing their duties and did not
impress the nd'ib of Damascus with their work. The Turkomans,
therefore, stepped in to offer their services. They offered to supply
a thousand troops for the projected counter-raid in return for the
iqta' of the Buhturid emirs. Deeds for that iqtd' were soon procured
from Egypt for the Turkomans; and Zayn al-din Salih II, then the
leading emir of the Oarb, had to send his son Yahya and another
kinsman to Cairo to solicit the annulment of those deeds 1.
The rivalry between the Buhturids and the Turkomans of Kis-
rawan became most embittered in I389-I390, at a time when two
serious seditions were shaking the Mamlilk state. In I389 Ilbuga
al-Nasirl, the nd'ib of Aleppo, and Timurbuga Mintas, the nd'ib of
Malatiya 2, rebelled against Barquq, defeated him in battle, and
restored al-MansurHa"! (a great-grandsonof al-Nasir Muhammad)
to the throne. Barqulq was imprisoned in al-Karak, whence he
escaped in I390 to lead a counter-rebellionand win back his throne.
In the meantime, Ilbuga and Timurbuga had quarrelled,and the
latter had defeated and imprisoned his former ally and become,
virtually, the sole ruler of the Mamliukempire.
During the first rebellion Ilbuga had won the Turkomans of
Kisrawanover to his side, while the Buhturids had remainedfaithful
to Barqiiq. After the downfall of Ilbuga the Turkomans continued
to support Timurbuga, even after the escape of Barquiqfrom al-
Karak. The Buhturids, on the other hand, rallied around Barqulq
and joined him in the siege of Timurbuga in Damascus, providing
him also with mangonel stones and carpentersfrom Beirut to help
with the siege works. The undecisive defeat of Barquiqin a prelimi-
nary encounter caused some panic among his auxiliary troops,
and the Buhturids, along with others, took to flight. When they
arrived back in Beirut, they were dealt a heavy defeat by the
Turkomans of Kisrawan and the other supporters of Timurbuga.
I. Ibid., p. i68. The Bu.hturid emirs, in Egypt, procured the help of the
kdtib al-sisr (secretary of state, who pleaded their case on the grounds that
it would not be seemly to take away from those emirs the fiefs with which
they had been endowed by the great sultans of old, even though they may
not be deemed personally worthy of such fiefs.
2. Malatiya was a province in the mamlaka of Aleppo, and the
northernmost province of the Mamluikempire. Although not an independent
mamlaka, its remoteness encouraged some of its governors to act indepen-
dently. (A mamlaka was a major administrative division of the Mamluk
empire).
96 K. S. SALIBI [23]

Ninety of their men were killed, and their homes and property
in Beirut were looted. Soon afterwards, on hearing the news of
Barqiiq's final victory and his triumphant return to Cairo, a
Buhturid delegation followed him there to reap the reward of their
services; and while they were away the Turkomans attacked and
looted the villages of the aarb and killed forty more of their men.
Barqiiq, later on, avenged the Buhturids by sending a special
punitive expedition against the Turkomans, but he was loth to
destroy them altogether, possibly for fear of leaving the Buhturids
too strong in the region 1.
The Banil al-Hamra, semi-bedouin fief-holders in the Biqa' 2
were another source of serious trouble to the emirs of the Garb
in the second Mamlilkperiod. It is said that members of that clan
were already settled in Ras Beirut towards the middle of the twelfth
century 3; and it is likely that the Abiul-6ayg were a branch of the
Hamra 4. Towards I366 Banuial-Hamra were already causing some
annoyance to Zayn al-din Salih II by the forcible seizure of some
properties which he had established as waql for a newly built
caravanserai on the Beirut-Damascus highway 6. During the early
years of the fifteenth century the Hamrd were already well estab-
lished in Beirut. They bought property at the eastern city wall
from the Buhturids, and they also established a madrasa6. Within a
few years they were in a position to challengeBuhturid leadershipin
the city; and in I425 Amir Ha", one of the Hami a chieftains, raided
the house of 'Izz al-din Sadaqa (then the mutawallzof Beirut), killed
a number of his men, and barely missed killing the emir himself 7.
Fortunately for the Buhturids Amir Hagg was himself slain soon
after by 'Ali b. al-Hanag, a rival chieftain in the Biqa' 8; and with
his death the Hamra ceased to be of any consequence in Beirut.
I. SALIHB. YAHYA,Op.Cit., PP. I95-I98. IBN SIBAT, OP.Cit.,PP. 3I6-3I8.
2. A. N. POLIAK,Op. Cit., PP. I2-I3.
3. TannuisAL-SIDYAK,Op. Cit., p. I55, mentions a quarrel between the
Talhuiq and the Hamra in Ras Beirut (the hilly region to the west of the
town) in II44. I have not been able to ascertain the facts.
4. See above, p. ooo.
S. SALIHB. YAH.YA, OP.Cit., PP. i68-i69.
6. SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., pp. iio-iii. The property they bought is on
the site of the modern Serail mosque, built on the ruins of the fourth century
church of the Saviour, which had been taken over by the Buhturids after
the Mamluk conquest of Beirut and turned into stables and troop quarters.
7. Ibid., p. 226. IBN SIBAT,op. Cit., pp. 343-344.
8. SALIH B. YAHYA, IcC. Cit. IBN SIBAT, op. cit., p. 344. Amir Hagg's
brother, Abu Bakr Ibn al-Hamra, had also been killed shortly before. See
[24] THE BUHTURIDS OF THE OARB 97

The Buhturids, as a family, maintained their position of leader-

ship in Beirut and the Oarb during the remainingyears of the Mam-
1lukperiod; and they continued to play an important role in the
affairs of the region during the first century of Ottoman rule,
when they allied themselves with the Ma'nids. It is not possible
here to trace the downfall and final extinction 1 of the Buhturids,
which belong to another chapter in the history of Lebanon-that
of the rise of the Ma'nids to power. But it is essential to note that
the Buhturids were the forerunnersof the Macnidsand that without
them the history of Lebanon under the Ottomans might well have
taken an entirely different direction.
During the four centuries that preceded the Ottoman conquest
of Syria the Buhturids succeeded in maintaining, in an important
region of southern Lebanon, a considerable measure of local rule
that made it essentially different from other regions in Syria.
By opposing Mamlilk attempts at centralization, they preserved
in southern Lebanon a hereditary feudal system that was to serve
later as the basis of Lebanese autonomy under the Ottomans.
ibid., and SALIH B. YAHYA, op. cit., p. 225. With the death of their leaders,
the Hamra seem to have dwindled rapidly into unimportance. It is worth
noting that their raid on Sadaqa's house in I425 was not their first attempt
on the life of the Buh.turid emir.
i. The Buhturids were massacred by their kinsmen, the cAlam al-din or
Ramtuini emirs, in I633; and with this massacre the Buliturid line became
extinct. See TannUs AL-SIDYAQ, op. cit., p. 247.

ARABICA VIII 7